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ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ

PLATONIS EUTHYPHRO

WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

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τί ποτ' ἐκτίν ἐκεῖν ὑπὸ πάγκαλον ἔργον, δ'o
οἱ θεοὶ ἀπερράζονται ἡμῖν ὑπηρέταις
χρώμενοι'.

Plato: Euthyphro 13E.

θεοὶ ράρ ἐκμεν συνεργοὶ. θεοὶ γεώργιον, θεοὶ
οἰκοδομή ἐστε.

Paul: 1 Cor. 3. 9.
PREFACE.

The present edition of the Euthyphro is intended to be uniform with my editions of the Apology and the Crito. I have tried to shew in the Introduction that a thorough examination of the Euthyphro forms an excellent training for the study of Plato's more profound and complex dialogues: and with this end in view, I have spared no effort to make my exposition of Plato's style and doctrine as complete as possible.

The text is based on Schanz's collation of B and T, the few cases where I have departed from these manuscripts being noted in the commentary. In writing the notes, I have derived considerable help from the annotated editions of Fritzsche and Wohlrab, but above all from that of Schanz, whose work in this department proves him as great in exegesis as he is patient and trustworthy in collating manuscripts. For the Introduction, Fritzsche's Prolegomena and Bonitz's Platonische Studien have been of the greatest service. I hope however to have contributed a good deal that is new
in the interpretation both of the text and subject matter of the dialogue.

I am indebted to my friends Mr Neil of Pembroke, Mr Platt of Trinity, and Mr Headlam of Trinity Hall, for kindly reading through the sheets and contributing many valuable suggestions.

Emmanuel College,
Cambridge,
January 21, 1890.
INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. On the leading motive of the Euthyphro.

In the well-known passage of the Phaedrus, where Plato weighs the rival claims of spoken and written discourse, it is said that the philosopher will write books for amusement (παιδιάς χάριν), as well as to provide a treasury of memories and suggestions for himself when he shall have reached "oblivion's old age," and for all who follow the same trail. Generally however, even a single dialogue of Plato shews a great complexity of motive. Playful personalities, veiled eulogies on his master Socrates, logical inquiries, ethical and metaphysical doctrine, are fused into one whole by his unsurpassed dramatic skill. Regarding as he did written discourse as the image of words spoken (τὸν τοῦ εἴδοτος λόγον λέγεις ζωντα καὶ ἐμψυχον, οὕτω γεγραμμένος εἰδώλων ἂν τι λέγοιτο δικαίως²), Plato endeavoured to communicate to the image something of the variety and vivacity of actual conversation: δεῖν πάντα λόγον ὡσπέρ ζῶν τον συνεστάναι σομα τι ἔχοντα αὐτὸν αὐτῷ, ὡστε μήτε ἀκέφαλον εἶναι μήτε

¹ 276 D.  ² Phaedr. 276 A.


INTRODUCTION.

The dialogue called 'Euthyphro' was intended less for amusement, than as a finger-post to point the way παντὶ τῷ ταύτω ἵνα μετιόντι. Though by no means deficient in character-drawing and general dramatic vivacity, it is in this respect inferior to dialogues like the Phaedrus or Euthydemus. The accessories of scene and setting are very simple: as in the Crito, only two actors appear upon the stage. But the very simplicity of its structure renders the work all the more suitable as an introduction to the more serious study of Plato. For while the artistic unity and brilliant colouring of the most finished dialogues frequently make it difficult to discover the germ of positive teaching which lies latent in them, in the Euthyphro, on the other hand, it is comparatively easy to see what Plato meant to say: in spite of more than one false start, and much wandering through devious byways, we come at last within clear view of the summit, though it still remains unscaled. The lesson learned in unravelling the Euthyphro may be afterwards made use of to disentangle the more complex dialogues. And besides this training in method, the careful student of the Euthyphro will be introduced to many logical problems that continually reappear in the more elaborate dialogues of Plato: while even more clearly than in any other of the Socratic dialogues, he will see the doctrine of λόγου transforming itself into the theory of Ideas. If we add to this, that the diction of the Euthyphro possesses all the marks of Plato's style in dialogue,

1 Phaedr. 264 c.
except that it is simpler, we shall admit that a thorough examination of the dialogue will form a fitting preparation for a more comprehensive study of Plato's style and doctrine.

It will facilitate the proper apprehension of the meaning of the Euthyphro to describe as clearly as possible the progress of the dialogue.

Socrates, going to the King's Porch in connection with the indictment preferred against him by Meletus, is met by Euthyphro. In reply to Euthyphro's wondering question as to why he had so far left his usual haunts, Socrates rapidly describes the accusation and alludes to his accuser in no flattering terms. His resentment is shared by Euthyphro, who sees in the prosecution something of the same spirit of secularism that leads the Athenian assembly to deride his own deliverances on things divine. 'Just so', says Socrates: 'you they deride, but me they prosecute: I suppose because I teach my wisdom, whereas you keep yours to yourself'. Euthyphro hopes that all will end well with Socrates' trial as he thinks it will with his own (Chapters I—III).

It is now the turn of Socrates to ask and of Euthyphro to answer. In reply to Socrates' questions, Euthyphro says that he is about to prosecute his own father for manslaughter. Socrates is horrified, or

1 I am glad to see that Dr Franz Lauczizsky (in the Zeitschrift für österreichische Gymnasien Vol. XL 3. p. 274) also regards the Euthyphro as 'eine fruchtbare und lohnende Schullektüre', chiefly on account of the clear and emphatic way in which the Socratic doctrine of concepts is presented and illustrated. Wohlrab's Euthyphro for schools has now reached a third edition (1887).
pretends to be: and his horror is not lessened when Euthyphro narrates the circumstances on which the charge rests. A day-labourer, in a paroxysm of drunken rage, had killed a slave belonging to Euthyphro's father. He was put in chains and thrown into a pit, till directions as to his treatment should come from Athens. In the meantime he died. Euthyphro is so confident in the correctness of his views of holiness and unholiness that heedless of the remonstrances of his family he resolves to prosecute his father (Chapter IV). As one who is himself accused of impiety, Socrates professes himself eager to be taught by Euthyphro the true nature of holiness and its opposite, so as either to prove to Meletus that he is not guilty of impiety, or to induce him to attack Euthyphro the teacher first (Chapter V).

What, asks Socrates, is holiness and unholiness? Euthyphro answers (1): Holiness is to do what I am doing now: unholiness is not so to do. See how Zeus treated his guilty father Cronus! But Socrates expresses his disbelief in such legends as dishonourable to the gods, hinting that perhaps that is why he is put upon his trial (Chapter VI).

Postponing the inquiry into the truth of such tales, Socrates directs his attack upon the definition given by Euthyphro and has no difficulty in shewing that it errs by putting one special instance in place of the general quality. Perceiving the mistake, Euthyphro offers an amended definition (2): what is dear to the gods is holy, what is not dear, unholy (Chapter VII).

In assailing this definition, Socrates points out that there are gods and gods: and as in the allusion
to Zeus and Cronus it has already been admitted that they have differences, different gods will differ from each other just on those points on which men differ among themselves, viz. on such questions as what is honourable and what is just: and since they will love what they think honourable, it follows that they will love different things, so that one and the same thing will be both holy and unholy (Chapter VIII). For example, the conduct of Euthyphro in prosecuting his father may commend itself to one god, and not to another: in which case it will be unholy no less than holy. To Euthyphro's objection that all the gods will agree in thinking that the doer of unrighteous manslaughter should be punished, Socrates replies that the point at issue in such a case, with gods as well as with men, will be 'Is the manslaughter righteous or not?' So that they will still differ none the less (Chapter IX). How can Euthyphro shew that all the gods hold the manslaughter committed by his father to be unrighteous? Euthyphro pretends that he could give the proof if time allowed: the judges shall have it, if they will but hear him (Chapter X). After Euthyphro has thus for the first time shirked the issue, he is allowed by Socrates to restate his second definition in the corrected form which the inquiry has shewn to be necessary. "Holiness", he now says, "is (3) what all the gods love, unholiness what all the gods hate". With this ends Chapter XI.

The third definition is refuted in the course of the two following chapters. Socrates proves that it is only an accident of piety to be beloved of the gods: whereas a definition should state, not the accident, but the essence of a notion. A brief interlude follows,
in which Euthyphro complains of the unsettling character of Socrates’ dialectic.

Presently, with a view to attaining a more satisfactory definition, Socrates himself puts forward a suggestion: Is all that is right holy, or is all that is holy right, but only part of that which is right holy? Euthyphro is unable to catch the meaning of the question, until by an exercise in the conversion of propositions it is made clear to him (Chapters XII—XIII).

The question still remains what part of that which is right is to be identified with holiness? Euthyphro’s solution is (4): “Piety and Holiness are that part of rectitude which is concerned with the care of the gods” (Chapter XIV).

In criticising this definition, the first object of Socrates is to determine what meaning is to be assigned to the word ‘care’. That it is not the care which results in benefit to the gods, making them better, he agrees: it is rather such care as is shewn by slaves to their masters—ὑπηρετικὴ τῆς θεραπεία (Chapter XIII). But even now the definition is not clear. Servants, working under their masters, produce some definite result: what result does the pious man produce, working under the gods? What do the gods produce, when they make use of us as their servants? To this question Euthyphro returns only the vague reply “many beautiful things”, thus for the second time shirking the issue: when further pressed, he evades the point and declares (5) that “if one knows how to say and do what is acceptable to the gods in prayer and sacrifice, that is holiness, and such a course of conduct is the salvation both of private
homes and public communities: whereas the opposite of what is acceptable to the gods is impious, and overthrows and ruins everything” (Chapter XVI).

Socrates first points out that Euthyphro has evaded the issue: afterwards, taking his definition as equivalent to the notion that “holiness is the knowledge of how to sacrifice and how to pray”, he interprets this as “the knowledge of how to ask from the gods and give to the gods aright” (Chapter XVII). In other words, Holiness is the art of merchandise exercised between gods and men. What benefit, then, do the gods derive from the gifts we give them? In Euthyphro’s opinion, none: our gifts to the gods are acceptable to them, nothing more. And Euthyphro admits that if acceptable, they must be dear, thus reverting to the second definition, which has already been refuted (Chapter XVIII).

In the two remaining chapters, Socrates twits Euthyphro with even greater unsteadiness in argument than himself, and parts from him with an expression of deep regret that one so wise should be so niggardly of his wisdom.

From this analysis of the dialogue, it is clear that the Euthyphro falls into three parts, the two first of which are followed by a kind of transitional episode, and the last by a sort of valediction.

The structure of the dialogue is therefore as follows:

I. Introduction, with transitional chapter: I—V.

II. Suggestions coming from Euthyphro, followed by an interlude on the bewildering nature of the Socratic method: VI—middle of XIII.
III. A suggestion by Socrates, and its dialectical development, with two concluding chapters: XIII—XX.

Without going so far as to assert that there can be no positive teaching in the second division of the dialogue, we can hardly be wrong in looking for the most valuable result in the last section, seeing that it is introduced by Socrates. In the Theaetetus (184 b foll.), one of the most important doctrines of the whole dialogue, the power of the soul to cognize things by herself, independently of the senses, is introduced by Socrates and not by Theaetetus. Nevertheless, on a first inspection of this part of the dialogue, it may seem that there is no definite result attained even here: and, as we shall see later, Schleiermacher, in company with other critics, has taken this view. But on a closer examination, we shall find at least one question of the first importance to which Euthyphro returns no precise answer, and if we can find in our dialogue some unrefuted hints of the true answer, we shall be justified in regarding these as the key to the conception of piety contained in the Euthyphro. The principle of interpretation, that whatever remains unrefuted in a Platonic dialogue contains the key to its positive teaching, a principle consistently applied by Bonitz in his Platonische Studien, would seem to have the countenance of Plato himself in the Gorgias where he sums up the teaching of the dialogue in these words (527 b): ὅπερ ἐξετε ἀποδεῖξαι ὃς δὲὶ ἄλλων τινά βίον ζῆν ἢ τοῦτον οὐσίαν καὶ ἐκείσε φαίνεται συμφέρων, ἀλλ' ἐν τοσούτος λόγοις τῶν ἄλλων ἑλεγχο-μένων μόνος οὕτως ἴσως ἧρεμεῖ ὁ λόγος, ὡς εὐλαβητέοις ἔστι τὸ ἀδικεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, καὶ παντὸς μᾶλλον

The key to the Euthyphro, as to Plato's dialogues generally, is to be found by studying the unrefuted statements.
INTRODUCTION.

Applying this canon to the Euthyphro, we have first to note what questions are left partly or entirely unanswered in our dialogue. There is only one, but that of first-rate importance, the question in 13 E: εἰπὲ δὴ πρὸς Διώς, τί ποτὲ ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνο τὸ πάγκαλον ἐργον, ὅ ὦ θεοὶ ἀπεργάζονται ἡμῖν ὑπηρέταις χρώμενοι; The question is presently repeated in 14 A: τὶ δὲ δὴ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν ὅ ὦ θεοὶ ἀπεργάζονται; τὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον ἐστὶ τῆς ἐργασίας; Once more Euthyphro evades the point: and, as if to make it clear beyond dispute that in the answer to this question lies the true conception of Holiness, Socrates in 14 B—C reproaches Euthyphro in these words: ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ πρόθυμος με εἰ διδάξαι· δῆλος εἰ· καὶ γὰρ νῦν ἐπειδὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἡ σοθα, ἀπετράπου· ὅ εἰ ἀπεκρίνω, ἴκανῶς ἂν ἠδὴ παρὰ σοῦ τῆν ὁσιότητα ἔμεμαθήκη. It may be added that as early as 1820 Socher (über Platons Schriften p. 62) saw that in this unanswered question lies the key to our dialogue: among more recent writers, Bonitz\(^1\), Lechthaler\(^2\), Fritzsche\(^3\), and with some modifications, Wohlrab\(^4\), hold the same view.

It is much more difficult to discover how Plato would himself have answered the question here ad-

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1 Platonische Studien\(^3\) pp. 227—242.
2 Die ὁσιότης (Frömmigkeit) bei Platon mit Rücksicht auf Schaarschmidt’s Athetese des Dialogs Euthyphron (pp. 46—47). Meran 1879.
3 Prolegomena ad Euthyphronem p. 147.
dressed to Euthyphro. If we confine ourselves in the first instance to indications contained in the Euthyphro, we shall attain only to the conception of piety as a mode of working under the gods which is productive of some altogether beautiful result (πάγκαλον ἔργον 13 ε). In the same view Socrates in 14 ε remarks that we have no good thing, which does not come from the gods (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐστὶν ἁγαθόν, ὅ τι ἀν μὴ ἐκεῖνοι δῶσιν). Viewing these passages in connection with Socrates’ emphatic rejection of legends imputing wicked conduct to the gods (6 Α foll.), we may take it as established that whatever the joint ἔργον of gods and men may be, it will be something altogether good. Farther than this, there seems to be no hint in the Euthyphro of the true answer to Socrates’ question. Wohlrab¹ can hardly be right in supposing that 14 β contains the secret: for, although Socrates does not refute the statement that holiness ‘conserves private houses and public communities’, yet he does refute the notion (upon which this remark of Euthyphro’s depends) that piety is the knowledge of how to sacrifice and how to pray.

The most that can be elicited from the Euthyphro in the way of positive teaching as to piety is that piety consists in working under God for the production of some good result not specified. I say ‘under God’, because there seems to be an underlying note of monotheism in Socrates’ refusal to allow that gods can quarrel among themselves. Throughout the argument in 7 Α—8 Α, Socrates is most careful to shew that the hypothesis of differences in opinion between gods and gods, on which he refutes the definition of Euthyphro,

¹ I.c. p. 9 (edition of 1886).
is Euthyphro's own hypothesis: he is refuting Euthyphro upon his own ground.

It was no small achievement to have brought the investigation even so far as to have asked the one vital question: ἔστι δὲ τοῖς εὐπορησάι βουλομένοις προὔργουν τὸ διαπορήσαι καλῶς, as Aristotle says¹. But unless we regard every dialogue of Plato as in itself a whole, to be studied quite apart from the others, it becomes our duty to inquire whether Plato has furnished any answer to the problem in any other dialogues. The conception of man as the ὁργανον of the gods is far from rare in Plato²: but it is less easy to discover what precise result the gods and pious men produce in common. Bonitz has correctly solved the question as follows. Reminding us that Plato in all his dialogues invariably ascribes perfect goodness to God³, and comparing passages of such a tenor with the slight indications of the nature of the ἐργον given in the Euthyphro itself, he infers that the true Platonic definition of Piety, as sketched in the Euthyphro, and filled in elsewhere, is "perfect morality, only in such a form, that man is conscious of being thereby the auxiliary organ of the divine working". In other words, Piety is conceived of as a virtue that transcends and at the same time includes all the other leading virtues. It is the knowledge of the good or God translated into the field of action: and is not to be separated from the ethical end, as expressed in ὀμοίωσις ἥθει κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν (Theaetetus i76 B), ἐπεσθαί ἥθει and the like.

¹ Met. b. i 995a 27.
² See note on i3 d.
³ Rep. ii 379 b. Timaeus 29 e et al.
This conception of piety suggests two reflections.

In the first place it is equivalent to an assertion of the unity of the virtues. Piety includes all other virtues because it is the knowledge of the good: just as in the Laches, courage, being the knowledge of good and evil, is represented as identical with the whole of virtue¹. And besides many particular hints throughout the Euthyphro of the unity of virtue in knowledge, it is implied in the dramatic setting of the dialogue that, being knowledge, piety may be taught by Euthyphro to Socrates.

In the second place, the notion of man’s working in common with God has its root in the truly Greek idea that God and man are of one family. As is pointed out in the notes, this idea runs throughout a considerable part of the argument of our dialogue. In arguing that if gods differ among themselves, they will differ exactly on those points which arouse dissension among men (7 D), and again, when Socrates clears up Euthyphro’s confusion about the precise point on which the gods join issue in discussing a case of manslaughter, the latent major premise might be expressed in the words which Lucian² puts into the mouth of Heraclitus³: τί δαί οἱ ἀνθρωποί; θεοὶ θυητοῖ. τί δαὶ οἱ θεοὶ; ἀνθρωποί ἀθάνατοι. Only in respect of immortality and superior power are the gods different from mankind: they will work together as members of one household, whether we regard them as standing to one another in the relation of master

¹ Laches 199 E: cf. Charmides 174 D, Alcibiades II 146 E foll.
² Vitarum Auctio § 14.
INTRODUCTION.

and slave\(^1\), or children of a common stock, as Hesiod\(^2\) does or Pindar\(^3\), when he sings \(\varepsilon\nu\ \alpha\nu\nu\rho\omicron\omicron\nu, \varepsilon\nu\ \theta\varepsilon\omicron\nu\ \gamma\epsilon\omicron\omicron\omicron\cdot \ \varepsilon\kappa\ \mu\nu\alpha\nu \delta\varepsilon \ \pi\nu\nu\omicron\omicron\nu\ \mu\alpha\tau\rho\omicron\delta\ \alpha\mu\phi\omicron\omicron\tau\omicron\rho\omicron\omicron\iota.\)

\§ 2. The definitions of Piety contained in the Euthyphro.

Besides the leading conception of holiness as a co-working with God, it is worth while to direct some attention to the minor definitions. For the interlocutors in Plato are for the most part types both of his contemporaries and of men in general: what they say is intended to represent a certain attitude of mind.

The first definition advanced by Euthyphro need not in itself detain us, since it is in reality no definition, any more than Theaetetus’ account of knowledge as mathematics, shoemaking etc. (Theaet. i46 c—d), or the other abortive attempts at defining which meet us in the Hippias Major, Laches and elsewhere\(^4\). But it is important from the manner in which Euthyphro supports his view. He appeals to Zeus, who himself put his own father in chains for wrongfully devouring his offspring: and in this appeal he finds a sanction for his own conduct. Now it would seem that these and similar legends were in Plato’s time

\(^1\) Euthyphro i3 d.

\(^2\) Works and Days i08. Compare also Frag. i87 (ed. Göttling): \(\xi\nu\nu\alpha\nu \gamma\alpha\rho \tau\omicron\nu\tau\omicron\ \delta\alpha\imath\tau\omicron\nu\varepsilon\sigma\alpha\nu, \xi\nu\nu\alpha\nu \delta\varepsilon \ \theta\omicron\nu\kappa\omicron\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\nu\tau\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\iota\ \theta\omicron\alpha\omicron\iota\omicron \ \kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\theta\nu\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\iota\ \tau\omicron\ \alpha\nu\nu\rho\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\iota.\) Aeschylus too in Sept. 238 makes the chorus address the gods as fellow-citizens.

\(^3\) Nem. vi i.

\(^4\) See note on Ch. vi ad init.
and earlier cited to give countenance to deeds which the morality of the day condemned. This might be done either sophistically, as by the Unjust Cause in the Clouds (904 foll.), or conscientiously and with religious faith, as when the Eumenides¹ defend themselves for leaving Agamemnon's doom unheeded by reminding Orestes that Zeus put his own aged father in chains. As for Euthyphro, there is nothing insincere or sophistical about his manner of using the legend. To him all these legends are true; he is in fact the quintessence of consistent orthodoxy. He differs from the Athenians on the one hand by not only believing the national theology but letting it influence his life and conduct: on the other hand, Socrates and he are still further apart, inasmuch as Socrates goes so far as to disbelieve the theology of his country. And here one of the subsidiary motives of our dialogue is seen to be at work—the apologetic motive, as we may call it. Socrates had been accused of heterodoxy—that is, of treason, according to the ancient view—and of corrupting the youth. In particular he was blamed for setting sons against their fathers. Plato replies by giving us a picture of active and consistent orthodoxy in the person of Euthyphro. It is as if he had said: "After all, you Athenians are not consistent: the creed which you theoretically believe you do not carry out in practice. If you would see what your creed leads to, look at Euthyphro: in living out his religion, which is yours, he becomes unfilial in his own person, to the extent of prosecuting his own father for manslaughter: it is your own religion that is the traitor, for its consistent

¹ Eum. 640—641.
believers are worse than useless to the state (3 c—d). The fact is, you do not really believe your national creed, otherwise you would approve of Euthyphro: why then do you prosecute Socrates for seeking to replace your indifference by some new faith?" It was of course no new thing to protest against a theology which ascribed to the gods deeds of which men might be ashamed. Since Xenophanes wrote his well-known censure on Homer and Hesiod (πάντα θεοὶς ἀνέθηκαν Ὁμηρός θ’ Ἡσίοδος τε ὁσσα ταρ’ ἀνθρώπωσιν ὀνείδεα καὶ ψόγος ἐστίν, κλέπτειν μοιχεύειν τε καὶ ἀλλήλους ἀπατεύειν1), it had been a commonplace with Pindar, Aeschylus, and other writers of a lofty moral tone2, to urge that goodness must needs be one of the divine attributes, but in the character of Euthyphro Plato goes even further, and makes it clear that an active faith in the old theology was incompatible with what the ordinary public opinion of Athens pronounced to be right conduct: Athens had in fact outgrown her faith. And as Plato like his master hated nothing more than idle acquiescence in an inert λόγος, he desired to make the Athenians feel that the old religion was virtually dead, so as to pave the way for a higher creed.

Euthyphro’s second definition may best be considered along with the third, which is but an amended form of the same underlying conception. The view that Holiness is what is dear to the gods, would have been accepted by most of the Greeks. ‘Beloved of the gods’ was an epithet of the truly pious and virtuous man. Δίκαιος ἄνήρ, asks Socrates in the Philebus

2 See Nägelsbach’s Nachhomerische Theologie p. 45 ff.
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(39 E) καὶ εὐσεβῆς καὶ ἀγαθὸς πάντως ἄρ' οὖ θεοφιλής ἔστι; and in the first Alcibiades (134 D) we read δικαίως μὲν γὰρ πράπτοντες καὶ σωφρόνος σὺ τε καὶ ἡ πόλις θεοφιλῶς πράξετε. It was probably the popular conception of piety. In his preliminary criticism of the definition, Socrates is really arguing against polytheism. On the assumption of a plurality of gods, it is useless to say that what is dear to the gods is holy, since one god will love what another hates: but if the divine nature is one, then it will be constant in its likes and dislikes, and, so far, the definition may still hold good. Here therefore we have a distinct allusion to the underlying monotheism of the Socratic creed: but the doctrine is not explicitly stated and hardly goes beyond the common usage of τὸ θεῖον, τὸ δαιμόνιον and the like, so often used in referring to the divine power as shewing itself in the government of the world.

After conceding the difficulty as to a plurality of gods, Socrates attacks the definition in earnest, and proves it inadequate even on a monotheistic creed, inasmuch as it puts a πάθος in place of the οὐσία. This is probably the earliest place in Greek literature where the distinction of πάθος and οὐσία is clearly recognised (11 A). Nor is this the only contribution to logic in our dialogue. The exercise in the conversion of propositions shewing that although all ἀιδώς is at the same time δέος, yet the converse is not true (12 A ff.), doubtless had some value in an age when logic was still young. Moreover, the manner in which the notion of δικαιον is subdivided into ὀσιον and another unknown quantity, with a view to reaching a definition (12 A), is suggestive of the διάφρασις.
which is so constantly employed in Plato's later dialogues: while in the form of definition required by Socrates in 12 δ ἐν δ ἅ ἣμᾶς, ὡς ἐοικεν, ἐξευρέψ τὸ ποιον μέρος δὲν εἰθ τοῦ δίκαιου τὸ ὅσιον, we have a clear recognition of the principle of defining per genus et differentiam. We may therefore infer that one of the subsidiary purposes of our dialogue is to be a lesson in logic.

It has already been shewn that in the development of Socrates' suggestion about the relation between δίκαιον and ὅσιον lies the most valuable part of the positive teaching of the Euthyphro. We may therefore pass on to Euthyphro's fifth effort: Holiness is the knowledge of how to sacrifice and how to pray. In effect, as Socrates proves, there is nothing but the second definition elaborated in detail: it is therefore instructive to observe how Euthyphro, dizzy from the effect of Socrates' logic, takes refuge in crooning over to himself the sacerdotal view of religion with which his profession had made him familiar. As a professional μάντις Euthyphro cannot shake himself clear of the mantic stand-point. His theology is correctly described as a sort of ἐμπορική: it conceives of gods and men as bound by a compact to give and take reciprocally¹. There is no hint of the importance of true devotion in the soul of the worshipper, such as Socrates always inculcated. δῶρα θεοὺς πείθει, δῶρον αἰδοίους βασιλῆς² was the corner-stone of Euthyphro's creed. And it is just this view of religion which marks him out as essentially the representative

of active Greek orthodoxy: there could be no greater mistake than to take Euthyphro as a type of the disbelieving Athenians of his day. That sacrifice was a gift, almost a bribe to the gods (originally the gods' food\(^1\)), was so thoroughly recognised in the Greek religion as to have passed into a proverb\(^2\). The sentiment was only a natural outcome of the view that gods and men are one in kind—an idea which we have already seen to be a distinctive feature of the Hellenic faith.

**Summary.** The results of the preceding investigation may be thus summed up. The main purpose of the Euthyphro is to lead the way to a higher conception of piety than was possible under the most orthodox belief in the old Greek religion. As secondary motives, there is first and foremost a desire to defend Socrates by shewing that orthodoxy if active and not quiescent was more dangerous to the family and the state than the heterodoxy of Socrates: there are also indications of a wish to improve the occasion by imparting some lessons in logic. The rejected definitions are valuable as shewing different points of view characteristic of the Greek religion, above all, the belief in a common origin and common interests for gods and men.

\[\text{§ 3. On Euthyphro.}\]

Nothing is known for certain about Euthyphro as a historical person except what we learn from Plato. The statements of later authors rest entirely upon his authority.

\(^1\) Article Sacrifice in Encycl. Brit.

\(^2\) Eur. Med. 964 πειθεῖν δῶρα καὶ θεοῦς λόγος.
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It is argued, indeed, by Bergk (De Reliquiis Comœdiae Atticae Antiquae p. 357 foll.) that Eupolis' comedy called Προσπάλτιοι was directed against Euthyphro, who was a native of the deme of Prospalta, in the tribe of Acamantis. We know from Suidas (s.v. δραχαρνεῖο) that the Prospaltians were derided for their extreme litigiousness: and Euthyphro, who accused his own father, might well be taken as a type of his demesmen. The fact that Eupolis' drama was written long before 399, the assumed date of Euthyphro's accusation, need not prove a difficulty, for "satis superque notum est, quam parum Plato curam temporum rationis habuerit: ut nihil distet, quominus illam litigationem aliquanto ante accidisse statuamus". Some degree of probability is lent to the theory of Bergk by the line

τί κατακροᾶσθέ μου τὰ μονοσοδονήματα;

which seems to allude to some such tricks of language as are attributed to Euthyphro in Plato's Cratylus: but at most the theory is only a brilliant conjecture, and we are bound to confine ourselves to the Platonic picture of Euthyphro.

Except in the dialogue called after him, Euthyphro appears only in the Cratylus. The description of him there accords generally with what we gather from our dialogue: he is a μάντις not to say a μανικός ἀνήρ. There his frenzy takes the form of etymologizing, and Socrates humorously makes him responsible for his own philological vagaries. καὶ αἰτιῶμαι γε, ὃ Ἐρμόγενες (says Socrates), μάλιστα αὕτην (sc. τὴν

1 See Fritzsché's Prolegomena p. 153 foll.
2 Bergk l.c. p. 358.
3 Kock Frag. 245.
σοφίαν) ἀπὸ Εὐθύφρονος τοῦ Προσπαλτίου προσπεπτω-
κέναι μου· ἔωθεν γὰρ πολλὰ αὐτῷ συνῆ καὶ παρεῖχον τὰ
ὀστα. κινδυνεύει σοὶ ἐνθουσιῶν οὐ μόνον τὰ ὀστὰ μου
ἐμπλήσαι τῆς δαιμονίας σοφίας ἄλλα καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς
ἐπειλήφθαι (396 δ)\(^1\). In the present dialogue there
are perhaps one or two examples of Euthyphro’s
philological skill\(^2\): but it is chiefly as a μάντις that he
is represented. Euthyphro is the incarnation of Plato’s
view of Athenian orthodoxy carried consistently into
practice. Implicitly believing in the creed of Athens
as a rule of conduct, he accepts all the obnoxious
stories about the gods and despises the Athenians for
not shewing their faith in their works: a superior
person in his own estimation, he is at once fanatical
and complacent, even jaunty in his bearing, as one
who has solved the problem of the Universe. When
he is confronted with the necessity of defending his
position, he submits with the amiable condescending
smile of a man who is impervious to reason, because
he claims to stand on the higher platform of inspiration
and faith: and when he is refuted, instead of distrusting
himself, he takes refuge in the old position from
which he has long ago been dislodged. He combines
the worst features of a sciolist and a prig. But for his
own sincere faith in himself, he might be regarded as
a type of the μάντις ἀλαζῶν\(^3\). Doubtless the picture is

\(^1\) Cf. ibid. 399 Λ τῷ τοῦ Εὐθύφρονος ἑπινοίᾳ, 407 Δ ὁφὸν ἑστὶ
οἰς Εὐθύφρονος ἑπιποῖ, 409 δ ἦ τοῦ Ἐὐθύφρονος μοῶσα (Fritzsche
Proleg. p. 154). The expression ὁ ἀμφί Εὐθύφρονα in 399 ε does
not of course imply that Euthyphro had a following of Neo-
grammarians.

\(^2\) See notes on 2 Β and 3 Β, lines 11 and 18.

\(^3\) See Aristotle’s account of ἀλαζονεία in Eth. Nic. IV 13,
p. 1127\(^a\) 13 ff., esp. 1127\(^b\) 19—20 οἱ δὲ κέρδοις (sc. χάρων ἀλαζον-
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overdrawn, but not without reason: for Plato's object was to contrast the logical outcome of the Athenian creed with that of his master's, in order to shew that the Athenians no longer believed the national religion, and were ripe for something higher.


Since the time of Ast (1816), doubts have frequently been expressed as to the authenticity of the Euthyphro, and not a few critics have categorically denied it. But the overwhelming balance of opinion is in favour of regarding the dialogue as a genuine work of Plato.

The arguments advanced by the party of attack are of very different weight.

Starting with the notion that every genuine dialogue contains some positive teaching either worked out or at least suggested, Ast rejected the Euthyphro on the ground that the essence of piety is not thoroughly investigated "oder auf Platonische Weise auch nur angedeutet". Schleiermacher had already refused to allow the presence of any dogmatic teaching in the Euthyphro, while still retaining it among the works of Plato. Four years later it was pointed out by Socher that the required hint of positive doctrine

\[\text{Arguments against the genuineness of the dialogue.}
\]

1) That it is devoid of positive doctrine:

\[\text{ἐνόμενοι τὰ τοιαῦτα προσποιοῦνται} \] ὅν καὶ ἀπόλαυσις ἐστὶ τῶν πελας καὶ ἀ διαλαθεῖν ἐστι μὴ δύτα, ὁλοῦ μάντεων σοφῶν ἰατρῶν. Numenius actually refers to Euthyphro as ἄνδρα ἀλαξόνα καὶ κοάλεμον (apud Eusebium Praep. Evangelica XIII. 5).

1 See above p. xix.
2 Platon's Leben und Schriften p. 470.
3 Ueber Platon's Schriften p. 62.
was to be found in the question addressed to Euthyphro in 13 E. After him, Susemihl (1855), Munk (1857), and later, Bonitz and Lechthaler, have all recognized that the Euthyphro is far from being devoid of positive teaching.

The views of these scholars have been subjected to a spirited criticism by Josef Wagner, in a Brünn Program of 1882—3 pp. 6—17, but he has not succeeded in weakening the position of Bonitz, if only we are willing to admit that Plato’s meaning is not always discoverable without some effort on the part of the reader. In view of our previous discussion on the leading motive of the Euthyphro, without raising the question whether Plato could have written a purely peirastic dialogue, we may take it as certain that the arguments against the present dialogue which are drawn from its alleged absence of dogmatic teaching miss their mark. It cannot indeed be maintained that the Euthyphro by itself contains a clear and definite solution of the problem proposed: but this is in full harmony with Plato’s representation of the Socratic method. Socrates does not take pains to enlighten those with whom he converses unless their humiliation is sincere: and it is manifest from the whole tone and bearing of Euthyphro that even while professing his inability to follow Socrates he still believes himself to be in the right.

1 Die ὀντότητα bei Platon: Meran 1879. On the other hand, Schaarschmidt (Die Sammlung der Platonischen Schriften p. 390 ff.) declares himself upon the side of Ast.

2 In the Zeitschrift für öst. Gymn. Vol. xl 3. p. 275 Dr Lauczizsky also expresses his surprise that Wagner should still cling to his belief in the spuriousness of the dialogue.

3 See note on 11 E.

4 In 11 B.
A further argument has been found by Schaarschmidt\(^1\) in the apparently untrue representation of Socrates given in the Euthyphro. To leave Euthyphro in a course of wicked conduct, and pass on to discussions on ὀσιον and ἀνόσιον which have only a remote bearing on the situation, is inconsistent (thinks Schaarschmidt) with Socrates’ well-known practice of assisting his friends to improve their conduct by theoretical discussions. To this it seems a sufficient answer to point out that we are dealing here with Plato’s Socrates, and not Xenophon’s: nor are the discussions on ὀσιον at all irrelevant, but thoroughly in harmony even with Xenophon’s representation of the Socratic method as an attempt to establish a λόγος for the regulation of conduct.

More serious would seem to be the arguments drawn from the alleged formal and structural defects of the dialogue. Wagner\(^2\) descants upon the ‘poverty manifest in the external scenery and characterisation of the actors’: the whole dialogue is carried on between two actors and we hear nothing of auditors, in spite of the busy quarter where the scene is laid: Socrates is not true to life and Euthyphro’s portrait is absurdly overdrawn! The climax is reached when in criticising the words of Socrates in 3D (ἐγὼ δὲ φοβοῦμαι μὴ ὑπὸ φιλανθρωπίας δοκῶ αὐτοῖς ὅτι περ ἔχω ἐκκεχυμένως παντὶ ἀνδρὶ λέγειν, οὗ μόνον ἄνευ μισθοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ προστιθεῖσ ἀν ἥδεως, εἰ τίς μον ἔθελοι ἄκούειν), Wagner remarks “Auf welcher Seite die Ungeschicklichkeit liegt, brauchen wir nicht weiter zu erörtern, fragen nur, woher Sokrates dazu das Geld hätte hernehmen sollen,

\(^{1}\) Die Sammlung der Platonischen Schriften p. 393.
da er in der Apologie nur über eine Mine verfügt?"
We may allow that the dialogue is inferior in dramatic
power to the best of Plato’s works without denying it
to Plato: and as for Euthyphro’s portrait, if it is
meant to represent the logical outcome of an active
faith in the old mythology, it is doubtless intentionally
overdrawn.

A great deal has been made of the supposed
allusion to the theory of Ideas in 5 C—D and 6 D—E.
It is chiefly on this ground that Ueberweg\(^1\) rejects the
dialogue, and Schaarschmidt\(^2\) has used the same
argument with great emphasis. The words (in 5 D)
\(\varepsilon\chi\omicron\upsilon\omicron\upsilon\ \mu\lambda\alpha\nu\ \tau\iota\nu\alpha\\ \iota\delta\epsilon\alpha\nu\ \kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\ \tau\iota\nu\ \alpha\nu\omega\sigma\iota\omicron\omicron\tau\eta\tau\alpha\) (sic), ap-
plied to \(\alpha\nu\omicron\sigma\omicron\omicron\nu\), have incurred the especial censure of
Schaarschmidt and Wagner\(^3\). And it must be allowed
that an Idea of pure and absolute negation is a singular
doctrine to meet with in Plato. But, beyond all doubt,
the correct reading in this particular passage is the
\(\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\ \tau\iota\nu\ \delta\sigma\iota\omicron\omicron\tau\eta\tau\alpha\) of the Bodleian manuscript\(^4\): and,
on the general question, Bonitz\(^5\) seems to me to have
conclusively shewn that there is no knowledge whatever
of the ideal theory implied in either of the places cited.
The \(\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\alpha\) are not hypostasized, since in \(\tau\omicron\ \delta\sigma\iota\omicron\nu\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\), \(\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\) belongs to \(\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\) and not to \(\tau\omicron\ \delta\sigma\iota\omicron\nu\), while
the expression \(\varepsilon\chi\omicron\upsilon\omicron\upsilon\ \mu\lambda\alpha\nu\ \tau\iota\nu\alpha\\ \iota\delta\epsilon\alpha\nu\) is parallel to the
words in the \(\text{Men}o\) (72 C) \(\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\ \delta\eta\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \pi\epsilon\rho\iota\ \tau\iota\nu\ \alpha\rho\epsilon\tau\omicron\nu\cdot
\kappa\alpha\nu\ \epsilon\iota\ \pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\iota\ \kappa\αi\ \pi\alpha\nu\tau\omicron\deltaa\tau\alpha\iota\epsilon\iota\nu\), \(\epsilon\iota\ \gamma\epsilon\ \tau\iota\ \epsilon\iota\delta\omicron\alpha\ \tau\alpha\upsilon\omicron\nu\]
\(\alpha\omicron\pi\alpha\sigma\alpha\iota\ \varepsilon\chi\omicron\omicron\nu\iota\cdot\), \(\delta\iota\ \delta\ \epsilon\iota\iota\nu\ \alpha\rho\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota\). Similar passages,
in which the expressions which were afterwards used
in connection with the theory of ideas occur in speak-

1 Untersuchungen p. 251.
2 I.c. p. 394.
3 I.c. p. 22.
4 See note in loc.
5 Plat. Stud.\(^3\) p. 240 ff.
ing of the Socratic λόγου, are far from rare in the Socratic dialogues: it will suffice to refer to the first Alcibiades 129 B and 130 D (δ ἀρτί οὐτω πως ἔρρήθη, ὅτι πρῶτον σκεπτέων εἶναι τοῦ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πρῶτον) and to the Hippias Major 289 D εἰ δὲ σε ἡρώμην, φήσει, εἷς ἀρχής, τί ἐστιν καλὸν τε καὶ αἰσχρόν, εἴ μοι ἄπερ νῦν ἀπεκρίνω ἄρα, σὺ δὴ ὅρθως ἀπεκέκρισο. ἔτι δὲ καὶ δοκεῖ σοι αὐτῷ τοῦ καλοῦ, ὃ καὶ τὰλλα πάντα κοσμεῖται καὶ καλὰ φαίνεται, ἐπειδὰν προσγένηται ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος, τοῦτ' εἶναι παρθένος ἢ ἵππος ἢ λύρα; In neither of these two dialogues is the Ideal theory presupposed: but as it was chiefly out of the Socratic λόγου that Plato’s theory of Ideas was evolved, it is only natural that the phraseology of the later theory should sometimes be used in connection with the earlier: and the much discussed passage in the Euthyphro is extremely valuable as a link in the chain of development, since besides the words ἓδα and εἶδος applied to the Socratic λόγος we find the concept regarded as a παράδειγμα, exactly like the Idea in Platonic teaching generally.

It is further pointed out¹ that an imitator of Plato (5) That the dialogue is might well have composed the dialogue as a sermon on the text in the Republic (Π 378 B) οὐδὲ λεκτέον a patch-work from other dialogues. νέω ἄκοιντι, ὡς ἄδικῶν τὰ ἐσχάτα οὐδὲν ἂν θαυμαστοῦν ποιοί, οὐδ' ἄν ἄδικοντα πατέρα κολάξων παντὶ τρόπω, ἄλλα δρώη ἂν ὅπερ θεῶν οἱ πρῶτοι τε καὶ μέγιστοι. Plato then proceeds, in language closely parallel to that of the Euthyphro², to enter a protest against the stories of wars between gods, whether sung of in poetry, or depicted on canvas, and concludes

¹ Ast, p. 472.
² Compare Euthyphr. 6 b with Rep. Π 378 c.
with an eloquent assertion of the supreme goodness of God. Schaarschmidt¹ conjectures that the author of the Euthyphro had also in view the passage in the Laws (ix 865 c), where Plato would inflict only a moderate penalty in cases of manslaughter resembling that committed by Euthyphro’s father. Numerous parallels with the Meno and the Theaetetus are also quoted: in particular, the comparison of unstable ideas with figures by Daedalus (11 c—E and 15 B) is supposed to be borrowed from the Meno (97 D—E), or elaborated out of the expression in the Theaetetus (203 B) καὶ οὖτως ἡμῖν ὃ καλὸς λόγος ἀποδεδρακὼς οἰκήσεται. Socrates’ demand that Euthyphro should give in his answer not a plurality of things holy but the one form of holiness reminds us of similar passages in the Meno (71 E ff. 74 A) and Theaetetus (146 A ff.). And among other reminiscences of the dialogues noted by Schaarschmidt is the echo of the Phaedrus (229 c) in Socrates’ question (6 B) ἀλλὰ μοι εἶπὲ πρὸς φίλου, σὺ ως ἀληθῶς ἤγει ταῦτα οὖτως γεγονέναι;

Striking as these parallels are, and especially that from the Republic, they are by no means enough to justify us in denying the Euthyphro to Plato. Were the ideas in question more fully and elaborately worked out in our dialogue than elsewhere, and with greater dramatic power, the same critics would be ready to doubt whether those other dialogues were genuine. If the dialogue could be shewn to be spurious on other grounds, such evidence as this would be valuable as shewing from what quarries the imitator had hewed his stone: but, as it is, the same ideas continually reappear in the admittedly

¹ l.c. p. 395.
genuine works of Plato, and if we are prepared to allow that the Euthyphro is a comparatively early dialogue, it may well be that ideas and images employed in this early work were afterwards expanded and developed by Plato in his more mature productions.

This leads us to say a word as to the date of the Euthyphro. Of external evidence there is none: we have only the style and treatment to guide us. From the tables given by Constantin Ritter in his Untersuchungen über Plato (pp. 56—59), it is seen to belong to the earlier dialogues, if any faith is to be placed in statistics of the use of particles and the like: and the absence of any allusion to the theory of ideas, together with the somewhat overdrawn picture of Athenian orthodoxy in the person of Euthyphro, lead one to place it among Plato's early works. It is of course impossible fully to discuss this point without at the same time discussing the chronological sequence of Plato's dialogues generally: at present it will suffice to say that I believe it (in common with all Plato's dialogues) to have been written after the death of Socrates, and to be considerably later than the Crito. It probably belongs to about the same period as the Laches and the Charmides, but I think it precedes both of these dialogues by a short interval.

1 No argument can of course be based on the connection between the Introduction of the Euthyphro and the end of the Theaetetus: this is only one of Plato's many dramatic fictions.

2 See above p. xxvii.

3 Siebeck (Zur Chronologie der platonischen Dialoge p. 128)
It has however been argued from the manner in which piety is here treated that the dialogue is later than the Laches and Protagoras, possibly even than the Meno and Gorgias. Socrates’ own definition of εὐσέβεια, as given in the Memorabilia (IV 6. 4), identifies it with ‘knowledge of what is lawful in respect of the gods’: δικαιοσύνη being the ‘knowledge of what is lawful in respect of men’. In other words εὐσέβεια and δικαιοσύνη are put on the same platform by Socrates, each being regarded as a distinct and special virtue. Now in the Protagoras, Meno, and Gorgias, ὀσιώτης is in the same way held to be one of the virtues, parallel with δικαιοσύνη: whereas in the Euthyphro (12 a), δικαιοσύνη is set above ὀσιώτης, the general notion δίκαιον being subdivided into σωτίον and some other section not specified. And as in the later dialogues of Plato ὀσιώτης is not mentioned as a substantive virtue at all, it is supposed by Fritzsché that Plato in the Euthyphro is passing from the Socratic conception of piety (as contained in the Protagoras, Meno and Gorgias) to a fourfold classification of the virtues, in which ὀσιώτης as a special virtue shall be excluded. But the difference in the treatment of piety is susceptible of another explanation. The word seems to me right in assigning the Laches and Euthyphro to the same period: but whether he is right in holding that the first four books of the Republic preceded these dialogues, ἄλλως ἄν εἴη σκέψεως.

1 Fritzsché Prolegomena ad Euthyphronem p. 157.
2 Prot. 329 C et al. Meno 78 D. Gorg. 507 B.
3 Such as the Republic (IV 428 A τέταρτα διὰ τοῦ γκόνακεν) and Laws xii 963 C. The four are σοφία, ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη and δικαιοσύνη.
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δίκαιον had two well-marked senses throughout Greek literature: the first wider, equivalent to our 'right', as when Theognis said ἐν δὲ δίκαιοσύνη συναίσθημαν πᾶσ' ἄρετή 'νιν and in this sense τὸ ὅσιον might at all times be regarded as a subdivision of δίκαιον. Plato is not in the Euthyphro propounding a table of the virtues: he is therefore justified in using δίκαιον in its non-technical sense. And the apparent divergence between the Protagoras for example and the Republic in the doctrine of piety has been explained by Bonitz in a way which fits in with the teaching of the Euthyphro as already expounded. "Where Plato", says Bonitz, "is demonstrably following the ordinary views (e.g. in the Protagoras), he enumerates Piety among the different expressions of man's moral nature, viz. the individual virtues: on the other hand, he makes no mention of it where he himself marshals the idea of virtue in its different expressions according to his own conviction (e.g. in the Republic), and thus he shews that to him Piety is not a single virtue, to be coordinated with Temperance or Justice. On the contrary, the entire essence of moral conduct is characterized by Plato on the one hand as the knowledge of the good determining of necessity the will, and on the other hand as a process of assimilation to the divine essence and an attaching of oneself thereto combined with service". For it is exactly this view of piety which is at all events suggested in the Euthyphro, and which marks it as belonging to the earlier

1 Bergk's Theognis (Poetæ Lyrici Graeci) line 147.
3 Plat. Studien p. 234.
dialogues like the Charmides and Laches, in which the individual virtues, such as temperance and courage, are each of them finally resolved into the knowledge of the Good.
ΕΥΘΥΡΟ ΠΑΡΟ
ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ.

Ἡ περὶ ὅσιον [πειρατικός.]

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ
ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ.

St. I.

2 I. Τί νεώτερον, ὁ Σώκρατες, γέγονεν, ὅτι σὺ τὰς ἐν Αρκείῳ καταληπτῶν διατριβὰς Σocrates informs Euthyphro of his impending trial;
eνθάδε νῦν διατριβεῖς περὶ τὴν τοῦ βα-
σιλέως στοὰν; οὐ γὰρ ποι καὶ σοὶ γε δίκη τις οὕσα
τυγχάνει πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα ὡσπερ ἐμοί.

ΣΩ. Οὔτωι δὴ Ἀθηναίοι γε, ὁ Εὐθύφρον, δίκην
αὐτὴν καλοῦσιν, ἄλλα γραφῆν.

Β ΕΘ. Τί φῆς; γραφῆν σὲ τις, ὡς ἔοικε, γέγραπ-
tαι' οὐ γὰρ ἐκεῖνο γε καταγγώσωμαι, ὡς σὺ ἔτερον.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΕΘ. 'Αλλὰ σὲ ἄλλος;

ΣΩ. Πάνυ γε.

ΕΘ. Τὸς οὕτος;

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' αὐτὸς πάνυ τι γιγνώσκω, ὁ Εὐθύφρον,
tὸν ἄνδρα: νέος γὰρ τὸς μοι φαίνεται καὶ ἀγνός; ὁ

ονομάζουσι μέντοι αὐτὸν, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, Μέλητον. ἔστι
δὲ τῶν δήμων Πιτθεύς, εὖ τίνα νῦ ἔχεις Πιτθέα Μέλητον, ὅποιον τετανότριχα καὶ οὐ πάνω εὐγένειον, ἐπίγρυπτον δὲ.

20 ἙΘ. Οὐκ ἔννοῳ, ὁ Σώκρατες· ἄλλα δὴ τίνα γραφήν σε γέγραπται;

ΣΩ. Ἡντινα; οὐκ ἄγεννη, ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ· τὸ γάρ νέον ὄντα τοσοῦτον πράγμα ἐγνωκέναι οὐ φαύλον ἐστίν· εἰκονις γάρ, ὡς φησίν, οἴδε, τίνα τρόπον οἱ 25 νέοι διαφθείρονται καὶ τίνες οἱ διαφθείροντες αὐτοὺς. καὶ κινδυνεύει σοφός τις εἶναι· καὶ τὴν ἐμὴν ἀμαθίαν κατιδών ὡς διαφθείροντος τοὺς ἡλικιώτας αὐτοὺς, ἔρχεται κατηγορήσων μοῦ ὡς πρὸς μητέρα πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, καὶ φαίνεται μοι τῶν πολιτικῶν μόνος ἀρχεσθαι ὁρθῶς· ὁρθῶς γάρ ἐστὶ τῶν νέων πρῶτον ὑπιμληθήματι, ὅπως ἐσονται ὁ τι ἀριστοί, ὡσπερ γεωργόν ἀγαθὸν τῶν νέων φυτῶν εἰκὸς πρῶτον ἐπιμεληθήματι, μετὰ δὲ τούτῳ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων· καὶ δὴ καὶ Μέλητος ὕσως πρῶτον μὲν ἴημα ἐκκαθαίρει 30 τοὺς τῶν νέων τὰς βλάστας διαφθείροντας, ὡς φησίν· ἔπειτα μετὰ τούτῳ δήλου ὅτι τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἐπιμεληθεῖς πλείστων καὶ μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν αὐτίς τῇ πόλει γενήσεται, ὡς γε τὸ εἰκὸς ξυμβῆναι ἐκ τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς ἀρξαμένῳ.

Π. ἙΘ. Βουλομένην ἄν, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἄλλῃ

in which Eu-thyphro sees but a symptom of the contempt in which seers are held.

35 τοὺς τῶν νέων τὰς βλάστας διαφθείροντας, ὡς φησίν· ἔπειτα μετὰ τούτῳ δήλου ὅτι τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἐπιμεληθεῖς πλείστων καὶ μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν αὐτίς τῇ πόλει γενήσεται, ὡς γε τὸ εἰκὸς ξυμβῆναι ἐκ τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς ἀρξαμένῳ.

ΣΩ. Ἄτοπα, ὁ θαυμάσιε, ὡς οὔτω γὰρ ἀκοῦσαι. ἐφεσι γάρ με ποιήτην εἶναι θεῶν, καὶ ὡς καίνους
ποιοῦντα θεοῦς, τοὺς ἰ ἅρχαῖους. οὐ νομίζοντα, ἓγράψατο τούτων αὐτῶν ἑνεκα, ὡς φησιν.

ΕΤΘ. Μανθάνω, ὡς Σώκρατες· ὅτι δὴ σὺ τὸ δαιμόνιον φῆς σαυτῷ ἐκάστοτε γίγνεσθαι. ὡς οὖν καυνοτομοῦντός σου περὶ τὰ θεία γεγραπταί ταύτην τὴν γραφήν, καὶ ὡς διαβαλῶν δὴ ἔρχεται εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, εἴδως ὅτι εὐδιάβολα τὰ τοιαύτα πρὸς 15 C τοὺς πολλούς. καὶ ἐμοῦ γὰρ τοι, ὅταν τι λέγω ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ περὶ τῶν θείων, προλέγων αὐτοῖς τὰ μέλλοντα, καταγελάσιων ὡς μαυρομένου. καῖτοι οὔδὲν ὦ τι οὐκ ἀληθῶς ἐὑρήκα ὡν προεῖπον, ἀλλ' ὂμως φθονοῦσιν ἡμῖν πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις. ἀλλ' οὔδέν 20 αὐτῶν χρὴ φροντίζειν, ἀλλ' ὀμόσε ἕναι.

ΙΙΙ. ΣΩ. Ὁ φίλε Εὐθύφρον, ἀλλά τὸ μὲν καταγελασθήναι ἵσως οὐδέν πρᾶγμα. Αὐθηναῖος γὰρ τοι, ὡς ἔμοι δοκεῖ, οὐ σφόδρα μέλει, ἀν τινα δεινὸν οἴωνται εἶναι, μὴ μέντοι διδασκαλικὸν τῆς αὐτοῦ σοφίας· ὅν δὲ ἂν καὶ ἄλλοις οἴωνται D ποιεῖν τοιούτους, θυμοῦνται, εἰτ' οὖν φθόνῳ, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, εἰτε δε' ἄλλο τι.

ΕΤΘ. Τούτον οὖν πέρι ὅπως ποτὲ πρὸς ἐμὲ ἔχουσιν, οὐ πάνυ ἐπιθυμῶ πειραθῆναι. ΣΩ. Ἡσυχαὶ γὰρ σὺ μὲν δοκεῖς σπάνιον σεαυτὸν παρέχειν καὶ διδάσκειν οὐκ ἐθέλειν τὴν σεαυτοῦ σοφίαν· ἐγὼ δὲ φοβοῦμαι μὴ ὑπὸ φιλανθρωπίας δοκῶ αὐτοῖς ὦ τι περ ἔχω ἵκκεκχυμένως παντὶ ἀνδρὶ λέγειν, οὐ μόνον ἀνευ μισθοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ προστιθείς 15 ἀν ἢδεως, εἰ τὸς μου ἐθέλοι ἄκοινειν. εἰ μὲν οὖν, ὦ νῦν δὴ ἐλεγον, μέλλοιεν μοι καταγελᾶν, ὡσπερ σὺ Εφῆς σαυτοῦ, οὔδέν ἂν εἰη ἄηδες παίζοντας καὶ
γελώντας ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ διαγγέλειν, εἴ δὲ σπου-
20 δάσονται, τούτ’ ὕδη ὅπῃ ἀποβήσεται ἄδηλον πλὴν
ὑμῖν τοῖς μάντεσιν.

ΕΤΘ. 'Ἀλλ' ὅσως οὐδὲν ἔσται, ὁ Σώκρατες,
πράγμα, ἀλλὰ σὺ τε κατὰ νοῦν ἀγωνιεῖ τὴν δίκην,
οίμαι δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ τὴν ἐμὴν.

IV. ΣΩ. Ἔστιν δὲ δὴ σοί, ὁ Εὐθύφρον, τίς ἡ
δίκη; φεύγεις αὐτὴν ἡ διώκεις;

ΕΤΘ. Διώκω.

ΣΩ. Τίνα;

5 ΕΤΘ. | Ὅν διώκων αὖ δοκῶ μαίνεσθαι.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; πετόμενον των διώκεις;

ΕΤΘ. Πολλοῦ γε δεῖ πέτεσθαι, ὅσ γε τυγχάνει
ἀν εὖ μάλα πρεσβύτης.

ΣΩ. Τίς οὗτος;

ΕΤΘ. Ὅ ἐμὸς πατήρ.

ΣΩ. Ὅ σὸς, ὁ βέλτιστε;

ΕΤΘ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἐστιν δὲ τί τό ἐγκλημα καὶ τίνος ἡ δίκη;

ΕΤΘ. Φόνον, ὁ Σώκρατες.

15 ΣΩ. Ἡράκλεις· ἦ που, ὁ Εὐθύφρον, ἀγνοεῖται
ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ὅπῃ ποτὲ [ὁρθῶς] ἤχεις.† ὁ γὰρ
οἴμαι γε τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος ὁρθῶς αὐτὸ πράξαι, ἀλλὰ
πόρρω που ὕδη σοφίας ἑλαύνοντος.

ΕΤΘ. Πόρρω μεντοι νη Δία, ὁ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἐστιν δὲ δὴ τῶν οἰκείων τις ὁ τεθνεώς ὑπὸ
tου σου πατρός; ἦ δῆλα δῆ; οὐ γὰρ ἄν που ὑπέρ γε
ἀλλοτρίον ἐπεξήγεισθα φόνου αὐτῷ.

ΕΤΘ. Γελοίον, ὁ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οἶει τι διαφέ-
20 ρεων, εἴτε ἀλλότριος εἴτε οἰκεῖος ὁ τεθνεὼς, ἀλλ' οὐ

† MSS. ὅπῃ ποτὲ ὁρθῶς ἤχει.
τοῦτο μόνον δεῖν φυλάττειν, εἴτε ἐν δίκῃ ἔκτεινεν ὁ 25
κτείνας εἴτε μή, καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐν δίκῃ, εἶν, εἰ δὲ
μὴ, ἐπεξείναι, εάντερ ὁ κτείνας συνεστίος σοι καὶ
ὁμοτράπεζος ἂν. ὦσον γὰρ τὸ μίασμα γίγνεται, ἐὰν
ξυνῆς τῷ τοιούτῳ ξυνειδῶς καὶ μὴ ἁφοσίοις σεαυτόν
tε καὶ ἐκείνων τῇ δίκῃ ἐπεξείν. ἔτει ὁ γε ἀποθανὼν 30
πελάτης τοῖς ἤδον ἔμος, καὶ ὡς ἐγερωργοῦμεν ἐν τῇ
Νάξῳ, ἐθήτειν ἐκεῖ παρ᾿ ἡμῖν. παροινήσας οὐν
καὶ ὀργισθείς τῶν οἰκετῶν τίνι τῶν ἡμετέρων ἀπο-
σφάττει αὐτόν· ὁ οὖν πατήρ συνδήσας τοὺς πόδας
καὶ τὰς χείρας αὐτοῦ, καταβαλὼν εἰς τάφρον τινά, 35
πέμπει δεύρο ἀνδρα πενσόμενον τοῦ ἔξηγητον ὁ τι
χρείη ποιεῖν. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ τοῦ δεδεμένου
ὀλυγώρει τε καὶ ἡμέλει ὡς ἀνδροφόνοι καὶ οὐδέν ὅν
πράγμα, εἰ καὶ ἀποθάνοι· ὅπερ οὖν καὶ ἔπαθεν.
ὑπὸ γὰρ λιμοῦ καὶ ρίγους καὶ τῶν ἀσμάτων ἀπο-
θνήσκει, πρὶν τὸν ἀγγελον παρὰ τοῦ ἔξηγητοῦ
ἀφικέσθαι. ταύτα δὴ οὖν καὶ ἀγανακτεῖ ὁ τε πατήρ
καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οἰκεῖοι, ὅτι ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀνδροφόνου τῷ
πατρὶ φόνου ἐπεξέρχομαι, οὐτέ ἀποκτείνων, ὡς
φασίν ἐκεῖνοι, οὐτ’ εἰ ὁ τι μάλιστα ἀπέκτεινεν, 45
ἀνδροφόνου γε ὅντος τοῦ ἀποθανόντος, οὐ δεῖν φρον-
tίζειν ὑπὲρ τοῦ τοιούτου· ἀνόσιον γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ὑδὲν
πατρὶ φόνου ἐπεξείναι· κακῶς εὐδότες, ὃ Σῶκρατες,
tὸ θεῖον ὡς ἔχει τοῦ ὅσιον τε πέρι καὶ τοῦ ἀνοσίου.

ΣΩ. Σὺ δὲ δὴ πρὸς Διὸς, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, οὐτωσι 50
ἀκριβῶς οἴει ἐπίστασθαι περὶ τῶν θείων, ὅπῃ έχει,
kαὶ τῶν ὅσιων τε καὶ ἀνοσίων, ὡστε τούτων οὐτὼ
πραχθέντων, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, οὐ φοβεῖ δικαζόμενος
τῷ πατρί, ὅπως μὴ αὕ σὺ ἀνόσιον πρᾶγμα τυγχάνης
πράττων;
ΕΤΘ. Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν μου ὄφελος εἰη, ὁ Σώκρατες, οὐδὲ τῷ ἂν διαφέροι | Εὐθύφρων τῶν πολλῶν 5 ἀνθρώπων, εἰ μὴ τά τοιαῦτα πάντα ἀκριβῶς εἰδείην.

V. ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν μοι, ὁ θαυμάσιε Εὐθύφρον, κράτιστον ἐστὶ μαθητῇ σὺ γενέσθαι καὶ πρὸ τῆς γραφῆς τῆς πρὸς Μέλητον αὕτα ταύτα προκαλεῖσθαι αὐτὸν λέγοντα, ὦτι ἐγώγε καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν χρόνῳ τὰ θεῖα περὶ πολλοῦ ἐποιούμην εἰδέναι, καὶ νῦν ἐπειδὴ με ἐκεῖνος αὐτοσχεδιάζοντά φησι καὶ κανονομοῦντα περὶ τῶν θείων ἐξαμαρτάνειν, μαθητής δὴ γέγονα σὺς—καὶ εἰ μὲν, ὁ Μέλητε, φαίνῃ ἂν, Εὐθύφρονα B 5 ὁμολογεῖς σοφῶν εἶναι τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ ὅρθως νομίζειν καὶ ἐμὲ ἡγοῦ καὶ μὴ δικάζων· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἐκεῖνῳ τῷ διδασκάλῳ λάχε δίκην πρότερον ἦ ἐμοὶ, ὥς τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους διαφθείροντι, ἐμὲ τε καὶ τὸν αὐτοῦ πατέρα, ἐμὲ μὲν διδάσκοντο, ἐκεῖνον δὲ νοθετοῦντι 10 τε καὶ κολάζοντι—καὶ ἂν μὴ μοι πείθηται μηδὲ ἀφίη τῆς δίκης ἦ ἄντ' ἐμοῦ γράφηται σέ, αὕτα ταύτα λέγειν ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ ἢ προϋκαλούμην αὐτὸν.

ΕΤΘ. Ναι μὰ Δία, ὁ Σώκρατες, εἰ ἄρα με ἐπιχειρήσεις γράφεσθαι, εὔροιμ' ἂν, ὡς οἶμαι, ὅτι C 15 σαθρός ἐστιν, καὶ πολὺ ἂν ἢμῖν πρότερον περὶ ἐκεῖνου λόγος ἐγένετο ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ ἢ περὶ ἐμοῦ.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἔγω τοι, ὁ φίλε ἐταῖρε, ταύτα γιγνώ- 20 σκών μαθητής ἐπιθυμῶ γενέσθαι σός, εἰδὼς ὅτι καὶ ἄλλοι ποῦ τις καὶ ὁ Μέλητος οὕτος σὲ μὲν οὐδὲ δοκεῖ ὅραν, ἐμὲ δὲ οὕτως ὄξεως καὶ ῥαδίως κατεῖδεν, ὡστε ἄσεβειας ἐγράψατο. νῦν οὖν πρὸς Δίως λέγε μοι, ὁ νῦν δὴ σαφῶς εἰδέναι δισχυρίζουσιν ποιῶν τι τὸ εὐ-
σεβές φής εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἁσέβες καὶ περὶ φόνου καὶ
D περὶ τῶν ἄλλων; ἦν οὖν ταύτων ἦστιν ἐν πάσῃ πράξει 30
τὸ ὁσιον αὐτὸ αὐτῷ, καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον αὖ τὸν μὲν
ὁσιὸν παντὸς ἐναντίον, αὐτὸ δὲ αὐτῷ ὀμοιὸν καὶ ἔχου
μίαν τινὰ ἱδέαν κατὰ τὴν ὁσιότητα πᾶν, ὃ τὶ περὶ ἄν
μέλλῃ ἀνόσιον εἶναι;

ΕΤΘ. Πάντως δῆπον, ὁ Σῶκρατας.

VI. ΣΩ. Λέγε δὴ, τί φής εἶναι τὸ ὁσιον καὶ τὸ
ἀνόσιον;

ΕΤΘ. Λέγω τούνυν, ὅτι τὸ μὲν
ὁσιὸν ἦστιν ὁπερ ἐγὼ νῦν ποιῶ, τὸ
ἀδικοῦντι ὃ περὶ φόνους ἡ περὶ
ἰερῶν κλοπάς ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιού-
tων ἔξαμαρτάνοντι ἐπεξεῖναι, εἰν τε πατήρ
ἂν τυγχάνῃ εάν τε μήτηρ εάν τε ἄλλος ὁστι-
Ε σοῦν, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐπεξεῖναι ἀνόσιον ἐτεί, ὁ
Σῶκρατας, θέασαι, ὃς μέγα σοι ἐρῶ τεκμήριον τοῦ ἱ
νόμου ὅτι οὖτωσ ἔχει, ὃ καὶ ἄλλος ἦδη εἶπον, ὅτι
ταύτα ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴη οὖτω γνυμόμενα, μὴ ἐπιτρεπθῇ
τῷ ἁσεβοῦντι μηδὲ ἂν ὁστισοῦν τυγχάνῃ ὃν· αὐτοὶ
γὰρ οἱ ἀνθρώποι τυγχάνουσι νομίζοντες τὸν Δία τῶν
θεῶν ἀριστον καὶ δικαίοτατον, καὶ τούτων ὁμολογοῦσι 15
6 τὸν αὐτόν | πατέρα δῆσαι, ὅτι τοὺς νεῖς κατέπινεν
οὐκ ἐν δίκη, κἀκεῖνον γε αὖ τὸν αὐτὸν πατέρα
ἐκτεμεῖν δι' ἐτερα τοιαῦτα· ἐμοὶ δὲ χαλεπαίνουσιν,
ὅτι τῷ πατρὶ ὑπεξέρχομαι ἀδικοῦντι, καὶ οὖν
αὐτοὶ αὐτοὶς τὰ ἐναντῖα λέγουσι περὶ τε τῶν θεῶν
20 καὶ περὶ ἔμοι.

ΣΩ. Ἄρα γε, ὁ Ἐυθύφρον, τούτ' ἦστιν, οὐνεκα
tὴν γραφὴν φεύγω, ὅτι τα τοιαῦτα ἐπειδάν τις περὶ
tῶν θεῶν λέγη, δυσχερῶς πως ἀποδέχομαι; διὸ δὴ,
25 ὡς ἔοικεν, φήσει τίς με ἐξαμαρτάνειν· νῦν οὖν εἰ καὶ σοὶ ταῦτα ἴσώδοκεῖ τῷ εὖ εἰδότι περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, ἀνάγκη δὴ, ὡς ἔοικεν, καὶ ἡμῖν ἴσωνχορεῖν. τί γὰρ σκιά τι, καὶ φήσομεν, οὐ γε αὐτοὶ ὁμολογοῦμεν περὶ αὐτῶν μηδὲν εἰδέναι· ἀλλὰ μοι εἴπε πρὸς φίλου, σὺ ὡς ἂν ἴσωδος ἴσων ταῦτα οὕτως γεγονέναι·

ΕΤΘ. Καὶ ἔτι γε τοὺτων θαυμασιώτερα, ὁ Σώκρατες, ὃ οἱ πολλοὶ οὐκ ἴσασιν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ πόλεμον ἄρα ἴσων τῷ ἔντι ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ ἔχθρας γε δεινᾶς καὶ 35 μάχας καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλά, οία λέγεται τε ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἰγαθῶν γραφέων τὰ τε Χ ἄλλα ἵσων καταπεποίκιλταί, καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῖς μεγάλοις Παναθηναίοις οἱ πέπλοι μεστὸς τῶν τοιούτων ποικιλμάτων ἀναγενεῖται εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν; ταῦτα 40 ἰσωδῇ φῶμεν εἶναι, ὁ Ἐυθύφρων;

ΕΤΘ. Μὴ μοῦνον γε, ὁ Σώκρατες· ἄλλα ὅπερ ἀρτι εἴπον, καὶ ἄλλα σοι ἐγὼ πολλά, ἐάντερ βούλη, περὶ τῶν θεών διηγήσομαι, ὃ σὺ ἄκοινον εὖ οἴδ᾽ ὅτι ἐκπλαγήσει.

VII. ΣΩ. Οὔκ ἄν θαυμάξοιμι. ἄλλα ταῦτα μέν μοι εἰσαύθεις ἐπὶ σχολῆς διηγήσεις· νυνὶ δὲ, ὅπερ ἀρτι σε ἢρόμην, πειρῶν σαφέστερον εἴπειν. οὐ γὰρ με, ὃ ἐταῖρε, τὸ πρῶτον ἰκανῶς ἐδίδαξας ἐρωτήσαντα τὸ ὀσιοῦ, ὃ τί ποτὲ εἶπ, ἄλλα μοι εἴπες, ὅτι τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὀσιοῦ οὖν, ὃ σὺ νῦν ποιεῖς, φόνου ἐπεξιὼν τῷ πατρί.

ΕΤΘ. Καὶ ἰσωδῇ γε ἔλεγον, ὁ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἰσως. ἄλλα γάρ, ὁ Ἐυθύφρων, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ φῆς εἶναι ὀσία.
ΕΤΘ. Καὶ γὰρ ἐστὶν ὀσία.
ΣΩ. Μέμνησαι οὖν, ὅτι οὐ τοῦτο σοι διεκελευόμην, ἐν τῷ δῶρο με διδάξαι τῶν πολλῶν ὀσίων, ἀλλὰ ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ τὸ εἴδος, ὃ πάντα τὰ ὀσία ὀσία ἐστὶν; 15 ἐφῄσθα γὰρ ποιν μὴ ἴδεα τὰ τε ἀνόσια ἀνόσια εἶναι καὶ τὰ ὀσία ὀσία. ὃ οὐ μνημονεύεις;
ΕΤΘ. Ἑγώνε. 
ΣΩ. Ταύτην τοῖνυν με αὐτὴν δίδαξον τὴν ἴδεαν, τίς ποτὲ ἐστὶν, ἵνα εἰς ἐκείνην ἀποβλέπων καὶ χρώ-μενος αὐτῆς παραδείγματι, ὃ μὲν ἂν τοιοῦτον ἤ, ὃν ἂν ἤ σὺ ἢ ἄλλος τις πράττῃ, φῶ ὀσίον εἶναι, ὃ δ' ἂν μὴ τοιοῦτον, μὴ φῶ.
ΕΤΘ. 'Αλλ' εἰ οὖτω βούλει, ὃ Σώκρατες, καὶ οὖτω σοι φράσῳ.
ΣΩ. 'Αλλὰ μὴν βούλομαι γε.
ΕΤΘ. Ἑστὶ τοῖνυν τὸ μὲν τοῖς θεοῖς προσφιλές ὀσιον, τὸ δὲ μὴ προσφιλές ἀνόσιον.
ΣΩ. | Παγκάλως, ὃ Εὐθύφρον, καὶ ὃς ἐγὼ ἐξή-τουν ἀποκρίνασθαι σε, οὖτω νῦν ἀπεκρίνω. εἰ μέντοι 30 ἀληθῶς, τοῦτο οὖτω οἴδα, ἀλλὰ σὺ δῆλον ὅτι ἐπεκδι-δάξεις ὡς ἐστὶν ἀληθὴ δ λέγεις.
ΕΤΘ. Πάννυ μὲν οὖν.
VIII. ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, ἐπισκεψόμεθα τι λέγο-μεν. τὸ μὲν θεοφιλές τε καὶ ὁ θεοφιλής ἀνθρωπος ὀσιος, τὸ δὲ θεομισες καὶ ὁ θεομισης ἀνόσιος· οὐ ταύτων δ' ἐστὶν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐναντιώτατον, τὸ ὀσιον τῷ ἀνοσίῳ· οὐχ οὖτος <εἰρηται>;
ΕΤΘ. Οὔτω μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐν γε φαίνεται εἰρήσθαι.
V ΕΤΘ. Δοκῶ, ὃ Σώκρατες [εἰρηται γάρ].
10 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι στασιάζουσιν οἱ θεοὶ, ὡς Εὐθύφρον, καὶ διαφέρονται ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἐχθρα ἐστίν ἐν αὐτοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ τούτο ἐϊρηται;
ΕΤΘ. Ἐϊρηται γὰρ.
ΣΩ. Ἐχθραν δὲ καὶ ὀργάς, ὡς ἄριστε, ἡ περὶ τίνων διαφορὰ ποιεῖ; ὥδε δὲ σκοπῶμεν. ἂρ ἂν εἰ διαφεροîtreba ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ περὶ ἄριστον, ὅποτερα πλεῖον, ἡ περὶ τούτων διαφορὰ ἐχθροὺς ἂν ἡμᾶς ποιοῖ καὶ ὀργίζεσθαι ἀλλήλοις, ἡ ἐπὶ λογισμοῖς ἐλθόντες περὶ τῆς τοιούτων ταχύ ἂν ἀπαλλαγεῖμεν;
ΕΤΘ. Πάντα γε.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μείζονος καὶ ἐλάττωνος εἰ διαφεροîtreba, ἐπὶ τὸ μετρεῖν ἐλθόντες ταχὺ παυσαίμεθ' ἂν τῆς διαφορᾶς;
ΕΤΘ. Ἐστι ταύτα.
ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐπὶ γε τὸ ἱστάναι ἐλθόντες, ὡς ἐγώμαι, περὶ τοῦ βαρυτέρου τε καὶ κοιφοτέρου διακρίθειμεν ἂν;
ΕΤΘ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖν;
ΣΩ. Περὶ τίνων δὲ δὴ διενεχθέντες καὶ ἐπὶ τίνα κρίσιν οὐ δυνάμενοι ἀφικέσθαι ἐχθροῖ γε ἂν ἀλλήλοις
30 εἰμεν καὶ ὀργιζοîtreba; ὥσος οὐ πρόχειρον σοῖ ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἐμὸν λέγοντος σκόπει, εἰ τάδ' ἐστὶ τὸ τε δίκαιον D καὶ τὸ ἀδίκον καὶ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν· ἄρα οὔ ταύτα ἐστιν, περὶ οὖ διενεχθέντες καὶ οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐπὶ ίκανὴν κρίσιν αὐτῶν ἐλθεῖν ἐχθροῖ
35 ἀλλήλους γιγνόμεθα, ὅταν γιγνώμεθα, καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ σὺ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι πάντες;
ΕΤΘ. Ἀλλ' ἐστιν αὕτη ἡ διαφορά, ὡς Σωκράτες, καὶ περὶ τούτων.
ΣΩ. Τί δὲ; οἱ θεοὶ, ὡς Εὐθύφρον, οὐκ εἴπερ τι
40 διαφέρονται, διὰ ταύτα διαφέροντι' ἂν;
IX 8 B  ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ.  II

ΕΤΘ.  Πολλή ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ.  Καὶ τῶν θεῶν ἄρα, ὡς γενναὶ Ἐυθύφρον, ἄλλοι ἄλλα δίκαια ἡγούνται κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακᾶ: οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποὺ ἔστασιάζον ἄλληλοις, εἰ μὴ περὶ τούτων 45 διεφέροντο· ἢ γὰρ;

ΕΤΘ. Ὅρθῶς λέγεις.

ΣΩ.  Οὐκοῦν ἀπερ καλὰ ἡγούνται ἕκαστοι καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ δίκαια, ταῦτα καὶ φιλοῦσιν, τὰ δὲ ἐναντία τούτων μισοῦσιν;

ΕΤΘ.  Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ.  Ταῦτὰ δὲ γε, ὡς σὺ φῆς, οἵ μὲν δίκαια ἡγούνται, οἱ δὲ ἁδικὰ· περὶ ὧν καὶ ἁμφισβητοῦντες 50 στασιάζοντες | τε καὶ πολεμοῦντων ἄλληλοις· ἢρ ὦν ὦντος;

ΕΤΘ.  Ὡντόντω.

ΣΩ.  Ταῦτ' ἄρα, ὡς ἐοικεν, μισεῖται ύπὸ τῶν θεῶν καὶ φιλεῖται, καὶ θεομισῆ τε καὶ θεοφιλῆ ταῦτ' ἂν εἰη.

ΕΤΘ. ὙΕοικεν.

ΣΩ.  Καὶ ὅσια ἄρα καὶ ἀνόσια τὰ αὐτὰ ἂν εἴη, ὡς Ἐυθύφρον, τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ.

ΕΤΘ.  Κινδυνεύει.

ΙΧ.  ΣΩ.  Οὐκ ἄρα ὁ ἡράμην ἀπεκρίνω, ὡς θαυμάςιε. οὐ γὰρ τούτῳ γε ἡρώτων, ὁ τυγχάνει ταῦτῶν ὁν ὅσιόν τε καὶ ἀνόσιον, ὁ δὲ ἄν θεοφιλὲς ἢ, καὶ θεομισῆς 60 ἐστὶν, ὡς ἐοικεν. ἢστε, ὡς Ἐυθύφρον, ὁ σὺ νῦν ποιεῖς τῶν πατέρα κολάζων, οὐδεὶς θαυμαστὸν, εἰ τοῦτο δρῶν τῷ μὲν Δίῳ προσφιλὲς ποιεῖς, τῷ δὲ Κρόνῳ καὶ τῷ Οὐρανῷ ἔχθρόν, καὶ τῷ

A. EU.
μὲν Ἡφαῖστῳ φίλον, τῇ δὲ "Ἡρα ἔχθρον· καὶ εἰ τις ἀλλος τῶν θεῶν ἔτερος ἔτέρῳ διαφέρεται περὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἑκεῖνοις κατὰ ταῦτα.

ΕΤΘ. Ἀλλ᾿ οὖν, ὥς Σωκράτες, περὶ γε τούτου τῶν θεῶν οὐδένα ἔτερον ἔτέρῳ διαφέρεσθαι, ὡς οἱ δὲ δίκην διδόναι ἑκεῖνον, ὅς ἂν ἄδικως τινὰ ἀπο-

κτεῖνη.

ΣΩ. Τῇ δὲ; ἀνθρώπων, ὥς Ἐὐθύφρου, ἡδη τινὸς ἣκουσας ἀμφισβητοῦντος, ὡς τὸν ἄδικως ἀποκτεῖναντα ἢ ἄλλο ἄδικως ποιοῦντα ὅτιον οὐ δεὶ δίκην διδόναι;

20 ΕΤΘ. Οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν παύονται ταῦτα ἀμφισβητοῦντες καὶ ἄλλῳ καὶ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις. ἄδικοντες γὰρ πάμπολλα πάντα ποιοῦσι καὶ λέγουσι φεύγοντες τὴν δίκην.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ ὁμολογοῦσιν, ὥς Ἐὐθύφρον, ἄδικεῖν, καὶ ὁμολογοῦντες ὁμοιοὶ οὐ δεῖν φασὶ σφᾶς διδόναι δίκην;

ΕΤΘ. Οὐδαμῶς τούτο γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἂρα πάν γε ποιοῦσι καὶ λέγουσιν. τούτο γὰρ οὖν οἴμαι οὐ τολμῶσι λέγειν οὐδὲ ἀμφισβητεῖν, οὐχι, εἰπερ ἄδικοσι γε, δοτεον δίκην· ἀλλ᾿ οἴμαι διο ὁ φασιν ἄδικεῖν. ἢ γὰρ;

ΕΤΘ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἂρα ἑκεῖνο γε ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ὡς οὐ τὸν ἄδικοντα δεὶ διδόναι δίκην· ἀλλ᾿ ἑκεῖνο ισως ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, τὸ τίς ἐστιν ὁ ἄδικων καὶ τί δρῶν καὶ πότε.

ΕΤΘ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν αὐτά γε ταῦτα καὶ οἱ θεοὶ πεπόνθασι, εἰπερ στασιάζουσι περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ
ἐάκικων, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος, καὶ οἱ μὲν φασίν ἄλλα ἄλλους 40 ἄδικεῖν, οἱ δὲ οὐ φασίν; ἐπεὶ ἐκείνῳ γε δήποτοι, ὦ θαυμάσιε, οὐδεὶς οὔτε θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων τολμᾶ ἐλέγειν, ὡς οὐ τῷ γε ἀδικοῦντι δοτέον δίκην.

ΕΤΘ. Ναι, τούτο μὲν ἀληθὲς λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ κεφάλαιον.

ΣΩ. 'Αλλ' ἔκαστὸν γε οἶμαι, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, τῶν πραχθέντων ἀμφισβητοῦσιν οἱ ἀμφισβητοῦτες, καὶ ἀνθρωποὶ καὶ θεοὶ, εἴπερ ἀμφισβητοῦσιν θεοὶ πράξεως τινος πέρι διαφερόμενοι οἱ μὲν δικαίως φασίν αὐτὴν πεπράχθαι, οἱ δὲ ἀδίκως· ἀρ' οὐχ οὔτω;

ΕΤΘ. Πάνυ γε.

9 Χ. ΣΩ. 'Ἰθι νυν, ὦ φίλε Εὐθύφρον, δίδαξον | καὶ ἐμὲ, ἵνα σοφώτερος γένωμαι, τί σοι τεκμήριον ἐστιν, ὡς πάντες θεοὶ ἡγούνται ἐκεῖνον ἀδίκως τεθναναί, ὃς ἀν θητεύων ἀνδροφόνος γενόμενος, ξυνδεθεῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου τοῦ ἀποθανόντος, φθάσῃ τελευτήσασι διὰ τὰ δεσμά, πρὶν τὸν ξυνδήσαντα παρὰ τῶν ἔξηγητῶν περὶ αὐτοῦ πυθέσθαι, τὶ χρή ποιεῖν, καὶ ύπὲρ τοῦ τοιούτου δὴ ὀρθὸς ἐχει ἐπεξείναι καὶ ἐπισκηπτεῖσθαι φόνου τὸν νῦν τῷ πατρί· ἢθι, περὶ τούτων πειρῶ τί ἦν, μου σαφές ἐνδείξασθαι, ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον πάντες θεοὶ ἡγοῦνται ὀρθῶς ἐχειν ταύτην τὴν πρᾶξιν· κἂν μοι ἰκανῶς ἐνδείξῃ, ἐγκωμιάζων σε ἐπὶ σοφία οὐδέποτε παύσομαι.

ΕΤΘ. 'Αλλ' ἢσως οὖν ὅλιγον ἔργον ἐστίν, ὦ 15 Σώκρατες· ἐπεὶ πάνυ γε σαφῶς ἥχουμι ἀν ἐπιδείξαι σοι.

ΣΩ. Μανθάνω· ὅτι σοι δοκῶ τῶν δικαστῶν δυσμαθέστερος εἶναι· ἐπεὶ ἐκεῖνοι γε ἐνδείξει δῆλον
20 ότι, ώς ἀδικά τέ ἐστιν καὶ οἱ θεοὶ ἀπαντες τὰ τοιαῦτα μισοῦσιν.

ΕΤΘ. Πάννυ γε σαφῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐἀνπερ ἀκούσωι γέ μου λέγοντος.

XI. ΣΩ. 'Αλλ' ἀκούσονταί, ἐἀνπερ εὐ δοκήσῃ λέγειν. τόδε δὲ σου ἐνενόησα ἀμα λέγοντος, καὶ πρὸς ἔμαυτόν σκοπῶ· εἰ οἱ θεοὶ ἀπαντες τὸν τοιοῦτον θάνατον ἡγοῦνται ἄδικον εἰναι, τί μᾶλλον ἐγὼ μεμάθηκα παρ' Ἐυθύφρονος, τί ποτ' ἐστὶν τὸ ὀσίον τε καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον; θεομισές μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἰ ἂν· [ἄλλα γὰρ οὐ τοῦτῳ ἐφάνη ἄρτι 10 ὀφθαλμένα τὸ ὀσίον καὶ μή· τὸ γὰρ θεομισῆς οὐ καὶ θεοφιλῆς ἐφάνη·] ὡστε τοῦτον ἀφίημι σε, ὦ Ἐυθύφρων· εἰ· Βοῦλει, πάντες αὐτὸ ἡγεῖσθων θεοὶ ἄδικον ὑπὸ πάντες μισοῦντων. ἀλλ' ἀρα τοῦτο νῦν ἐπανορθώμεθα ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, όσι γὰρ ἐν πάντες οἱ θεοὶ 15 μισῶσιν, ἀνόσιον ἐστιν, ὦ δ' ἄν φιλῶσιν, ὀσιον· ὦ δ' ἄν οἱ μὲν φιλῶσιν, οἱ δὲ μισῶσιν, οὐδέτερα ἡ ἄμφοτερα; ἀρ' οὔτω βοῦλει ἡμῖν ὀρίσθαι νῦν περὶ τοῦ ὀσίου καὶ τοῦ ἀνόσιου;

ΕΤΘ. Τὶ γὰρ κωλὺς, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Οὐδέν ἐμέ γε, ὦ Ἐυθύφρων, ἀλλὰ σὺ δὴ τὸ σῶν σκόπει, εἰ τοῦτο ὑποθέμενος οὔτω ράστα με διδάξεις ὦ ὑπέσχου.

ΕΤΘ. 'Αλλ' ἐγνωγε φαίνην ἄν τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ὀσίον, ὦ ἄν πάντες οἱ θεοὶ φιλῶσιν, καὶ τὸ 25 ἐναντίον, ὦ ἄν πάντες θεοὶ μισῶσιν, ἀνόσιον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπισκοπῶμεν αὕτω τοῦτο, ὦ Ἐυθύ-φρων, εἰ καλῶς λέγεται, ἡ ἔωμεν καὶ οὔτως ἡμῶν τε
αὐτῶν ἀποδεχόμεθα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἐὰν μόνον φη τίς τι ἔχειν οὕτω, ἔγνωροῦντες ἔχειν; ἦ σκέπτεον 
tί λέγει ὁ λέγων;

ΕΤΘ. Σκέπτεον· οὔμαι μέντοι ἐγώγε τοῦτο νυνὶ καλὸς λέγεσθαι.

XII. ΣΩ. Τάχ’, ὦγαθέ, βελτιών εἰσόμεθα. ἐν-

ιο νῦνον γὰρ ἵ ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν, ὅτι 

ὁσιόν ἐστιν, φιλεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν, ἦ ὅτι φιλεῖται, ὁσιόν ἐστιν;

ΕΤΘ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ὁ τι λέγεις, ὁ Σῶκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ πειράζομαι σαφέστερον φράσαι.

λέγομεν τι φερόμενον καὶ φέρον, καὶ ἀγόμενον καὶ ἄγον, καὶ ὄρωμεν καὶ ὄρων· καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαύτα μανθάνεις ὅτι ἐτερα ἄλληλων ἐστὶ καὶ ἦ ἐτερα;

ΕΤΘ. Ἐγώγε μοι δοκῶ μανθάνειν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοὖν καὶ φιλοῦμενον τί ἐστιν, καὶ τοῦτο ἐτερον τὸ φιλοῦν;

ΕΤΘ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

Β ΣΩ. Λέγε δὴ μοι, πότερον τὸ φερόμενον, διότι 

φέρεται, φερόμενον ἐστιν, ἦ δι' ἄλλο τι;

ΕΤΘ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τὸ ἀγόμενον δὴ, διότι ἄγεται, καὶ τὸ 

ὄρωμενον, διότι ὄραται;

ΕΤΘ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἀρα διότι ὄρωμενόν γέ ἐστιν, διὰ ἵ ἐτερον ἄρα 

tοῦτο ὄραται, ἀλλὰ τούναντίον διότι ὄραται, διὰ 
tοῦτο ὄρωμενον· οὐδὲ διότι ἄγόμενόν ἐστιν, διὰ τοῦτο ἄγεται, ἀλλὰ διότι ἄγεται, διὰ τοῦτο ἄγόμενον· οὐδὲ 

diότι φερόμενον, φέρεται, ἀλλὰ διότι φέρεται, φερό-

μενον. ἀρα κατάδηλον, ὁ Εὐθύφρον, ὁ βουλόμαι 25 

C λέγειν; βουλόμαι δὲ τόδε, ὅτι, εἰ τι γίγνεται ἦ 

tι
πάσχει, οὖχ ὅτι γιγνόμενον ἐστὶ, γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ὅτι
gιγνεται, γιγνόμενον ἐστιν· οὐδ' ὅτι πάσχον ἐστὶ,
pάσχει, ἀλλ' ὅτι πάσχει, πάσχον ἐστιν· ἦ οὖ
30 ἔγχωρεῖς οὕτως;
ΕΤΘ. Ἔγωγέ.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ φιλούμενον ἢ γιγνόμενον τι
ἐστιν ἢ πάσχον τι ὑπὸ του;
ΕΤΘ. Πάνυ γε.
35 ΣΩ. Καὶ τούτῳ ἄρα οὕτως ἔχει, ώσπερ τὰ
πρότερα· οὔχ ὅτι φιλούμενον ἐστιν, φιλεῖται ὑπὸ ὅν
φιλεῖται, ἀλλ' ὅτι φιλεῖται, φιλούμενον;
ΕΤΘ. Ἀνάγκη.
ΣΩ. Τί δὴ οὖν λέγομεν περὶ τοῦ ὁσίου, ὥς Εὐθύ-
40 φρον; ἀλλο τι φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν πάντων, ὥς ὁ σὸς
λόγος;
ΕΤΘ. Ναὶ.
ΣΩ. Ἀρα διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι ὁσίον ἐστιν, ἢ δ' ἄλλο τι;
ΕΤΘ. Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο.
45 ΣΩ. Διότι ἄρα ὁσίον ἐστιν, φιλεῖται, ἀλλ' οὔχ
ὅτι φιλεῖται, διὰ τοῦτο ὁσίον ἐστιν;
ΕΤΘ. Ἐοικέν.
ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ διότι γε φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν,
φιλούμενον ἐστὶ καὶ θεοφιλές <τὸ θεοφιλές>.
50 ΕΤΘ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;
ΣΩ. Οὔκ ἄρα τὸ θεοφιλές ὁσίον ἐστιν, ὥς Εὐθύ-
φρον, οὐδὲ τὸ ὁσίον θεοφιλές, ὥς σὺ λέγεις, ἀλλ' ἐτερον
tοῦτο τοῦτο.
ΕΤΘ. Πῶς δὴ, ὥ Σῶκρατες;
ΣΩ. Ὁτι ὁμολογοῦμεν τὸ μὲν ὁσίον διὰ τοῦτο
φιλεῖσθαι, ὅτι ὁσίον ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ διότι φιλεῖται,
ὡσιον εἶναι η γὰρ;
ΕΤΘ. Ναί.

XIII. ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ γε θεοφιλές ὤτι φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν, αὐτῷ τούτῳ τῷ φιλεῖσθαι θεοφιλὲς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ οὕχ ὤτι θεοφιλὲς, διὰ τούτο φιλεῖσθαι.

ΕΤΘ. Ἀλήθη λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ εἶ γε ταύτων ἡν, ὃ φίλε Εὐθύφρον, τὸ θεοφιλὲς καὶ τὸ ὁσιον, εἰ μὲν διὰ τὸ ὁσιον εἶναι ἐφιλεῖτο τὸ ὁσιον, καὶ διὰ τὸ θεοφιλὲς εἶναι ἐφιλεῖτο ἀν τὸ θεοφιλὲς, εἰ δὲ διὰ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ θεῶν τὸ θεοφιλὲς θεοφιλὲς ἡν, καὶ τὸ ὁσιον ἀν διὰ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι ὁσιον ἡν· νῦν δὲ ὅρας ὦτι ἐναυτῶς ἔχετον, ὡς παντάπασιν έτέρῳ ὅτι ἀλλήλων, τὸ μὲν γάρ, ὦτι φιλεῖται, ἐστὶν οἶον φιλεῖσθαι· τὸ δὲ ὦτι ἐστὶν οἶον φιλεῖσθαι, διὰ τούτῳ φιλεῖται. καὶ κινδυνεύεις, ὃς Εὐθύφρον, ἔρωτόμενος τὸ ὁσιον, ὁ τί 15 ποτ’ ἐστιν, τήν μὲν οὐσίαν μοι αὐτοῦ οὐ βούλεσθαι δηλώσαι, πάθος δὲ τι περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν, ὁ τι πέ- B πονθε τούτῳ τὸ ὁσιον, φιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ πάντων θεῶν’ ὁ τι δὲ ὄν, οὕτω εἶπες. εἰ οὕν σοι φίλον, μή με ἀπο- κρύψῃ, ἀλλὰ πάλιν εἰπὲ εὖ ἄρχῃς, τί ποτε ὅτι τὸ 20 ὁσιον εἰπὲ φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν εἰπὲ ὅτι ἴδῃ πάσχει· οὐ γάρ περὶ τούτου διοισόμεθα· ἀλλ’ εἰπὲ προθύμως, τί ἐστιν τό τε ὁσιον καὶ τὸ ἄνοσιον;

ΕΤΘ. Ἀλλ’, ὃς Σῶκρατες, οὐκ ἔχω ἐγγυών ὧπως σοι εἶπω ὅ νοῦ. περιέρχεται γὰρ πως ἡμῖν ἀεὶ ὁ ἀν 25 προθώμεθα, καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλει μένειν ὧπον ἀν ἱδρυσώ- μεθα αὐτῷ.

ΣΩ. Τοῦ ἰμετέρου προγόνου, ὃς Εὐθύφρον, έοικεν C εἶναι Δαιδάλου τὰ ὑπὸ σοῦ λεγόμενα. καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ ἐγὼ ἠλεγον καὶ ἐτιθέμην, ἵσως ἂν με ἐπέσκωπτες, 30
ός ἄρα καὶ ἐμοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐκεῖνον ἐνυγγένειαν τὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔργα ἀποδιδράσκει καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλει μένειν ὁποὺ ἂν τις αὐτὰ θῆ· νῦν δὲ σαὶ γὰρ αἱ ὑποθέσεις εἰσὶν· ἄλλου δὴ τίνος δεῖ σκῶμματος. οὐ γὰρ 35 ἐθέλουσι σοι μένειν, ὡς καὶ αὐτῷ σοι δοκεῖ.

ΕΤΘ. Ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκεῖ σχεδὸν τι τοῦ αὐτοῦ σκώμματος, ὡ Σόκρατες, δεῖσθαι τὰ λεγόμενα· τὸ γὰρ περιέναι τούτως τοῦτο καὶ μὴ μένειν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ οὖκ ἐγὼ εἰμὶ ὁ ἑντιθεῖς, ἀλλὰ σὺ μοι δοκεῖς, ὁ

40 Δαίδαλος· ἐπεὶ ἐμοῦ γε ἕνεκα ἐμενεν ἂν ταῦτα δ οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Κινδυνεύω ἄρα, ὡ ἑταῖρε, ἐκεῖνον τοῦ ἄνδρὸς δεινότερος γεγονέναι τὴν τέχνην τοσοῦτο, ὅσῳ ὁ μὲν τὰ αὐτῶν μόνα ἐποίει ὁ μένοντα, ἐγὼ δὲ πρὸς τοῦς 45 ἐμαυτοῦ, ὡς ἐοίκε, καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια. καὶ δὴ τοῦτο μοι τῆς τέχνης ἐστὶ κομψότατον, ὅτι ἀκων εἰμὶ σοφός. ἐβουλόμην γὰρ ἂν μοι τοὺς λόγους μένειν καὶ ἀκινήτως ἰδρύσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τῇ Δαίδαλου ἐ σοφίᾳ τὰ Ταυτάλου χρήματα γενέσθαι. καὶ τούτων 50 μὲν ἄδην· ἐπειδὴ δὲ μοι δοκεῖς σὺ τρυφᾶν, αὐτὸς σοι ξυμπροβουρμήσομαι [δείξαι] ὁποῖος ἂν με διδάξῃς περὶ τοῦ ὅσιον καὶ μὴ προαπόκαμῃς. ίδὲ γὰρ εἰ ὁμὰ ἀναγκαῖον σοι δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι πᾶν τὸ ὅσιον.

ΕΤΘ. Ἐμοίγε.

55 ΣΩ. Ἀρφ ὁμοί καὶ πᾶν τὸ δίκαιον ὅσιον, ἢ τὸ μὲν ὅσιον πᾶν δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ | δίκαιον οὖ πᾶν ὅσιον, ἀλλά 12 τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ ὅσιον, τὸ δὲ τι καὶ ἄλλο; ΕΤΘ. Οὐχ ἐπομαι, ὡ Σόκρατες, τοῖς λεγομένοισι. ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴ νεώτερος γε μοι εἰ ὁμὴ ἐλάττουν ἢ

60 ὅσῳ σοφότερος· ἀλλ', ὁ λέγω, τρυφᾶς ὑπὸ πλούτου τῆς σοφίας. ἀλλ', ὡ μακάριε, ξύνηετε σαυτῶν· καὶ
γὰρ οὖν ἐκέμπων κατανοήσαι ὁ λέγω. λέγω γὰρ δὴ τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ ὁ ποιητής ἐποίησεν ὁ ποιήσας
Ζήνα δὲ τὸν θ' ἐρξαντα, καὶ ὦς τάδε πάντ᾽ ἐφύτευσεν,
Β Οὐκ ἐθέλεις εἰπεῖν· ἰνα γὰρ δέος, ἐνθα καὶ 
αἰδώς. ἐγὼ οὖν τούτῳ διάφέρομαι τῷ ποιήτῃ. εἰπὼ σοι ὅπι,
ΕΤΘ. Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. Οὐ δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι, ἰνα δέος, ἐνθα καὶ 
αἰδώς· πολλοὶ γὰρ μοι δοκοῦσι καὶ νόσουν καὶ 
πενίας καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα δεδιότες δεδείναι 70 
μὲν, αἰδείσθαι δὲ μηδὲν ταύτα ἀ δεδίασιν. οὐ καὶ 
σοὶ δοκεῖ;
ΕΤΘ. Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἰνα γε αἰδώς, ἐνθα καὶ δέος εἶναι· ἐπεὶ 
ἐστιν ὅστις αἰδούμενος τι πράγμα καὶ αἰσχυνόμενος 75 
Οὑ πεφόβηται τε καὶ δέδοικεν ἅμα δόξαν πονηρίας;
ΕΤΘ. Δέδοικε μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρ' ὀρθῶς ἔχει λέγειν· ἰνα γὰρ δέος, 
ἐνθα καὶ αἰδώς· ἀλλ' ἰνα μὲν αἰδώς, ἐνθα καὶ δέος, οὐ 
μέντοι ἰνα γε δέος, πανταχοῦ αἰδώς. ἐπὶ πλέον γὰρ 80 
οἶμαι δέος αἰδοῦς· μόριον γὰρ αἰδώς δέος, ὠστε 
ἄριθμοῦ περιττόν, ὡστε οὐ ὕπαπτε ἄριθμός, ἐνθα καὶ 
περιττόν, ἰνα δὲ περιττόν, ἐνθα καὶ ἄριθμός. ἐπεὶ 
γὰρ ποὺ νῦν γε;
ΕΤΘ. Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. Τὸ τοιοῦτον τοῖνυν καὶ ἐκεῖ λέγων ἡρώτων, 
ἅρα ἰνα δίκαιον, ἐνθα καὶ ὅσιον, ἢ ἰνα μὲν ὅσιον, ἐνθα 
καὶ δίκαιον, ἰνα δὲ δίκαιον, οὐ πανταχοῦ ὅσιον· μόριον 
γὰρ τοῦ δίκαιου τὸ ὅσιον. οὕτω φῶμεν ἢ ἄλλως σοι 
δοκεῖ;
ΕΤΘ. Οὐκ, ἀλλ' οὔτω. φαίνει γάρ μοι όρθως λέγειν.

ΧΙ. ΣΩ. ὁφα δὲ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο. εἰ γάρ μέρος τὸ ὁσιόν τοῦ δικαίου, δεῖ δὴ ἢμᾶς, ὃς ἔοικεν, ἐξευρέω τὸ ποιον μέρος ἂν εἰη τοῦ δικαίου τὸ ὁσιόν. εἰ μὲν οὖν σὺ με ἡρώτας τι τῶν νῦν δὴ, οἴον ποιον μέρος ἐστὶν ἀριθμοῦ τὸ ἀρτιον καὶ τίς ὁν τυχάναι οὔτος ὁ ἀριθμὸς, εἴπων ἂν ὅτι ὅσ ἂν μὴ σκαληνὸς ἢ ἀλλ' ἰσοσκελής ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι;

ΕΤΘ. Ἐρωτάγε.

10 ΣΩ. Πειρῶ δὴ καὶ σὺ ἐμὲ οὔτω διδάξαι, τὸ Εποιον μέρος τοῦ δικαίου ὁσιόν ἐστιν, ὡς καὶ Μελῆτῳ λέγωμεν μηκέθ' ἢμᾶς ἀδικεῖν μηδὲ ἀσεβείας γράφεσθαι, ὡς ἰκανός ἢδη παρὰ σοῦ μεμαθηκότας τὰ τε εὔσεβῆ καὶ ὁσια καὶ τὰ μὴ.

ΕΤΘ. Τούτο τοίνυν ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὁ Σώκρατες, τὸ μέρος τοῦ δικαίου εἶναι εὔσεβές τε καὶ ὁσιον, τὸ περὶ τὴν τῶν θεῶν θεραπεῖαν τὸ δὲ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸ λοιπὸν εἶναι τοῦ δικαίου μέρος.

ΧΥ. ΣΩ. Καὶ καλῶς γέ μοι, ὁ Ἑυθύφρον, φαίνει λέγειν' ἀλλὰ σμικρῶν | τινος ἐτὶ ἐνδεής εἰμι. τὴν γάρ θεραπεῖαν οὕτω ἔνυνημι ἢντινα ὁνομάζεις. οὐ γάρ που λέγεις γε, οἰαίπερ καὶ αἱ περὶ τὰ ἀλλα θεραπεῖαι εἰσιν, τοιαύτην καὶ περὶ θεοὺς. λέγομεν γάρ ποὺ—οἶνον φαμέν, ὕππους οὐ πᾶς ἐπίσταται θεραπεύειν, ἀλλ' ὁ ἰππικὸς' ἢ γάρ;

ΕΤΘ. Πάνυ γε.

10 ΣΩ. Ἡ γάρ ποὺ ἰππικῆ ὕππων θεραπεία.
ΕΤΘ. Ναί.
ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ γε κύνας πᾶς ἐπίσταται θεραπεύειν, ἀλλ’ ὁ κυνηγητικός.
ΕΤΘ. Οὕτως.
ΣΩ. Ἡ γὰρ ποι κυνηγητική κυνών θεραπεία. 15
ΕΤΘ. Ναί.
ΣΩ. Ἡ δὲ βοηλατικὴ βοῶν.
ΕΤΘ. Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. Ἡ δὲ δὴ ὀσιότης τε καὶ εὐσέβεια θεῶν, ὁ Ἐυθύφρον; οὗτοι λέγεις;
ΕΤΘ. Ἡ Ἐγώγε.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν θεραπεία γε πάσα ταῦτὸν διαπράττεται; οἶνον τοιόνδε ἐπ’ ἀγαθῷ τινὶ ἔστι καὶ ὕφελία τοῦ θεραπευομένου, ὡσπερ ὁρᾶς δὴ ὅτι οἱ ὑποὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἱππικῆς θεραπευόμενοι ὕφελουνται καὶ βελτίους 25 γίνονται· ἢ οὐ δοκοῦσί σοι;
ΕΤΘ. Ἡ Ἐμοιγε.
ΣΩ. Καὶ οἱ κύνες γε ποι ὑπὸ τῆς κυνηγητικῆς καὶ οἱ βόες ὑπὸ τῆς βοηλατικῆς, καὶ ἄλλα πάντα C ὀσιάτως· ἢ ἐπὶ βλάβη οἶει τοῦ θεραπευομένου τὴν 30 θεραπείαν εἶναι;
ΕΤΘ. Μὰ Δ’ οὐκ ἔγωγε.
ΣΩ. Ἀλλ’ ἐπ’ ὕφελία;
ΕΤΘ. Πῶς δ’ οὔ;
ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν καὶ ἡ ὀσιότης θεραπεία οὕσα θεῶν 35 ὕφελία τε ἐστὶ θεῶν καὶ βελτίους τοὺς θεοὺς ποιεῖ; καὶ σὺ τοῦτο ξυγχωρήσας ἂν, ὡς ἐπειδὰν τι ὄσιον ποιήστω, βελτίω τινὰ τῶν θεῶν ἀπεργάζει;
ΕΤΘ. Μὰ Δ’ οὐκ ἔγωγε.
ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγώ, ὁ Ἐυθύφρον, οἷμαι σε τοῦτο 40 λέγειν· πολλοῦ καὶ δέω· ἀλλὰ τούτου δὴ ἔνεκα καὶ
ἀνηρόμην, τίνα ποτὲ λέγοις τὴν θεραπείαν τῶν θεῶν, ὃ
οὐχ ὤγομενός σε τοιαύτην λέγειν.

ΕΤΘ. Καὶ ὁρθῶς γε, ὁ Σώκρατες. οὐ γὰρ
45 τοιαύτην λέγω.

ΣΩ. Εἰπών· ἀλλὰ τις δὴ θεῶν θεραπεία εἳ ἂν ἡ
ὀσιότης;

ΕΤΘ. Ἡπερ, ὁ Σώκρατες, οἱ δούλοι τοὺς δεσ-
pότας θεραπεύονσιν.

ΣΩ. Μανθάνω· ὑπηρετικὴ τις ἂν, ὡς ἐοικείν, εἳ
θεοῖς.

ΕΤΘ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἐχοις ἄν οὐν εἰπείν, ἡ ἱατρὸς
ὑπηρετικὴ εἰς τίνος ἔργου ἀπεργασίαν
tυγχάνει οὔσα ὑπηρετική; οὐκ εἰς ὑγείας
5 οἴει:

ΕΤΘ. Ἡγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ; ἡ ναυπηγοῖς ὑπηρετικὴ Ε
eἰς τίνος ἔργου ἀπεργασίαν ὑπηρετικὴ
εἶστιν;

ΕΤΘ. Δῆλον ὁτι, ὁ Σώκρατες, εἰς πλοίου.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἡ οἰκοδόμοις γέ ποιν εἰς οἰκίας;

ΕΤΘ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Εἰπὲ δὴ, ὁ ἁριστεῖ ἡ δὲ θεοῖς ὑπηρετικὴ εἰς
tίνος ἔργου ἀπεργασίαν ὑπηρετικὴ ἂν εἳ; δῆλον γὰρ
ὅτι σὺ οἰσθα, ἐπειδῆπερ τά γε θεία κάλλιστά γε φῆς
15 εἰδέναι ἀνθρώπων.

ΕΤΘ. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε λέγω, ὁ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Εἰπὲ δὴ πρὸς Διόσ, τί ποτ' ἐστιν ἐκεῖνο τὸ
πάγκαλον ἔργου, ὃ οἱ θεοὶ ἀπεργάζονται ἡμῖν ὑπηρε-
tαις χρόμενοι;

ΕΤΘ. Πολλὰ καὶ καλά, ὁ Σώκρατες.
ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ὅι στρατηγοὶ, ὥ φίλε, ἀλλ’ ὁμοὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ῥαδίως ἂν εἴποις, ὅτι νίκην ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ ἀπεργάζονται· ἢ οὐ;
ΕΘ. Πῶς δ’ οὐ;
ΣΩ. Πολλὰ δὲ γ’ οἴμαι καὶ καλὰ καὶ οἱ 25 γεωργοὶ· ἀλλ’ ὁμοὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ἔστιν τῆς ἀπεργασίας ἢ ἐκ τῆς γῆς τροφῆ.
ΕΘ. Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δή τῶν πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν ἃ οἱ θεοὶ ἀπεργάζονται; τί τὸ κεφάλαιον ἔστι τῆς ἐργασίας;
ΕΘ. Καὶ ὅλιγον σοι πρῶτον εἴποιν, ὦ Ἐυθύφρων, ὡς Σώ-Βραχυτέρων, ὅτι πλείονος ἔργου ἔστιν ἀκριβῶς πάντα ταῦτα ὡς ἔχει μαθεῖν· τόδε μέντοι σοι ἀπλῶς λέγω, ὅτι ἐὰν μὲν κεχαρισμένα τις ἐπίστηται τοῖς θεοῖς λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν εὐχόμενός τε καὶ θύων, ταῦτ’ ἔστι τὰ ὀσια, καὶ σοφεὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τούς τε ἰδίους οἶκους καὶ τὰ κοινὰ τῶν πόλεων τὰ δ’ ἐναντία τῶν κεχαρισμένων ἁσεβῆ, ἃ δή καὶ ἀνατρέπει ἀπαντα καὶ ἀπόλλυσιν.

ΣΩ. Ἡ πολύ μοι διὰ βραχυτέρων, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, εἰ ἐβούλουν, εἴπεις ἄν τὸ κεφάλαιον ἃν ἥρωτών. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ πρόθυμός με εἰ διδάξαι, δῆλος εἰ. καὶ γὰρ νῦν ἐπειδὴ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ ἥσθα, ἀπετράπου· ὦ εἰ 5 ἀπεκρίνω, ἱκανῶς ἂν ἢδη παρὰ σοῦ τὴν ὁσίότητα ἐμεμαθήκην. νῦν δὲ ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸν ἐρώτα τῷ ἐρωμένῳ ἀκολουθεῖν, ὅτι ἂν ἐκεῖνος ὑπάγῃ· τί δὴ αὐτό λέγεις τὸ ὅσιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὁσίότητα; οὐχὶ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ τοῦ θύειν τε καὶ εὐχεσθαι;
ΕΘ. Ἔγωγε.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ θύειν δωρεῖσθαι ἐστὶ τοῖς θεοῖς, τὸ δὲ εὔχεσθαι αἰτεῖν τοὺς θεούς;
ΕΤΘ. Καὶ μάλα, ὡ Σώκρατες.

15 ΣΩ. Ἐπιστήμη ἁρὰ αἰτήσεως καὶ δόσεως θεοῖς ὁσιότης ἃν εἴη ἐκ τούτων τοῦ λόγου.
ΕΤΘ. Πάντως καλῶς, ὡ Σώκρατες, ξυνήκας ὁ εἶπον.

ΣΩ. Ἐπιθυμητὴς γάρ εἴμι, ὡ φίλε, τῆς σῆς σοφίας καὶ προσέχω τὸν νοῦν αὐτῆς, ὥστε οὐ χαραι ἐπειταί ὃ τι ἃν εἴπης. ἀλλὰ μοι λέξον, τὸς αὐτῆς ἡ ὕπηρεσία ἐστὶ τοῖς θεοῖς; αἰτεῖν τε φῆς αὐτοὺς καὶ διδόναι ἑκείνως;
ΕΤΘ. Ἐγώγε. ΧVIII. ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν οὐ τὸ ὀρθῶς αἰτεῖν ἃν εἴη, ὃν δεόμεθα παρ' ἑκείνων, ταῦτα ἀυτοὺς αἰτεῖν;
ΕΤΘ. Ἀλλὰ τί;

5 ΣΩ. Καὶ αὖ τὸ διδόναι ὀρθῶς, ὃν ἑκείνοι τυγχάνουσιν δεόμεθα παρ' ἡμῶν, ταῦτα ἑκείνους αὐ ἀντιδωρείσθαι; οὐ γάρ ποὺ τεχνικὸν γ' ἃν εἴη δωροφορεῖν διδόντα τῷ ταῦτα ὃν οὐδὲν δεῖται.
ΕΤΘ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὡ Σώκρατες.

10 ΣΩ. Ἐμπορική ἀρὰ τις ἃν εἴη, ὡ Εὐθύφρον, τέχνη ἡ ὁσιότης θεοῖς καὶ ἀνθρώποις παρ' ἄλληλων.
ΕΤΘ. Ἐμπορική, εἰ οὖτως ἢδιόν σοι ὀνομάζειν.
ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὖδὲν ἢδιον ἐμοιγε, εἰ μὴ τυγχάνει ἀληθῆς ὃν. φράζου δὲ μοι, τὸς ἡ ὀφελία τοῖς θεοῖς τυγχάνει οὖσα ἀπὸ τῶν δώρων ὃν παρ' ἡμῶν λαμβάνουσιν; ἄ μὲν γὰρ διδόσασιν, παντὶ δὴλον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν ὃ τι | ἃν μὴ ἑκείνοι δώσιν· ὃ δὲ παρ' ἡμῶν λαμβάνουσιν, τὶ ὀφελοῦνται; ἡ τοσοῦτον
αὐτῶν πλεονεκτοῦμεν κατὰ τὴν ἐμπορίαν, ὡστε πάντα τάγαθα παρ’ αὐτῶν λαμβάνομεν, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ 20 παρ’ ἡμῶν οὐδέν;

ΕΤΘ. Ἅλλα οἴει, ὦ Σώκρατε, τοὺς θεοὺς ὦφελεῖσθαί ἀπὸ τούτων ἄ παρ’ ἡμῶν λαμβάνουσιν;

ΣΩ. Ἅλλα τί δὴποτ’ ἂν εἴη ταύτα, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, τὰ παρ’ ἡμῶν δῶρα τοῖς θεοῖς;

ΕΤΘ. Τί δ’ οἴει ἄλλο ἢ τιμῆ τε καὶ γέρα καὶ ὁπερ ἐγώ ἀρτι ἔλεγον, χάρις;

Β ΣΩ. Κεχαρισμένου ἄρα ἐστίν, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, τὸ ὅσιον, ἄλλοι οὐχὶ ὦφέλιμον οὔδέ φίλον τοῖς θεοῖς;

ΕΤΘ. Οἶμαι ἐγώγε πάντων γε μάλιστα φίλον.

ΣΩ. Τούτῳ ἀρ’ ἐστίν αὐ, ὡς ἐοίκε, τὸ ὅσιον, τὸ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον.

ΕΤΘ. Μάλιστα γε.

ΧΙΧ. ΣΩ. Θαυμάσει οὐν ταύτα λέγων, εὰν σοὶ οἱ λόγοι φαίνονται μή μένοντες ἄλλα βαδίζοντες, καὶ ἐμὲ αἰτιάσει τὸν Δαίδαλον βαδίζοντας αὐτοὺς ποιεῖν, αὐτὸς ὁν πολὺ γε τεχνικότερος τοῦ Δαίδαλου καὶ κύκλῳ περιόντας 5 ποιῶν; ἢ οὐκ ἀισθάνει ὅτι ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν περιελθὼν C πάλιν εἰς ταύτον ἴκει; μέμνησαι γὰρ ποὺ ὅτι ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν τὸ τε ὅσιον καὶ τὸ θεοφίλες ὑδα ταύτον ἡμῖν ἑφάνῃ, ἄλλ’ ἔτερα ἄλληλων. ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι;

ΕΤΘ. Ἐγώγε.

ΣΩ. Νῦν οὖν οὐκ ἐννοεῖς, ὅτι τὸ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον φῆς ὅσιον εἶναι; τούτῳ δ’ ἄλλο τι ὁ θεοφιλῆς γίγνεται; ἢ οὔ;

ΕΤΘ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἢ ἀρτι οὐ καλῶς ωμολογοῦμεν, ἢ εἰ 15 τότε καλῶς, νῦν οὐκ ὀρθῶς τιθέμεθα.
ΕΤΘ. Ἐσκεν.

XX. ΣΩ. Ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἄρα ἦμων πάλιν σκέπτεον, τί ἐστι τὸ ὀσιον· ὡς ἐγὼ, πρὶν ἂν μάθω, ἐκὼν εἶναι οὐκ ἀποδεικνύσα. ἀλλὰ μὴ δι' ἀτιμάσης, ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ προσέχων τὸν νόον ὁ τι μάλιστα νῦν εἰπὲ τὴν ἀλήθειαν. οἶσθα γὰρ, ἐπερ τις ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων, καὶ οὐκ ἀφετέος εἰ, ὥσπερ ο Πρωτεύς, πρὶν ἂν εἴπης. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ᾧδησθα σαφῶς τὸ τε ὀσιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον, οὐκ ἐστων ὅπως ἂν ποτε ἐπεχειρήσας ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπης θητὸς ἄνδρα πρεσβύτην πατέρα διωκάθειν φόνου, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἂν ἔδεισας παρακινδυνεύειν, μὴ οὐκ ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ ποιήσοις, καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἡσυχίνθης. νῦν δὲ εὖ οἴδα ὅτι σαφῶς οἴει εἰδέναι τὸ τε ὀσιον καὶ μὴ· εἰπὲ οὖν, ὁ βέλτιστε Εὐθύφρον, ἐ καὶ μὴ ἀποκρύψῃ ὁ τι αὐτὸ ἡγεῖ.

ΕΤΘ. Εἰσαὺθις τοῖνυν, ὁ Σωκρατής· νῦν γὰρ σπεύδω ποι, καὶ μοι ὁρα ἀπιέναι.

ΣΩ. Οὶ ὁποὶς, ὃ ἔταιρε· ἀπ' ἐκπίθοις με καταβαλων μεγάλης ἀπέρχει, ἦν εἴχον, ὡς παρὰ σοῦ μαθὼν τὰ τε ὀσία καὶ μὴ καὶ τῆς πρὸς Μελητον γραφῆς ἀπαλλάξομαι, ἐνδειξάμενοι ἐκεῖνο ὅτι σοφὸς ἦδη παρ' Εὐθύφρονος | τὰ θεία γέγονα καὶ ὅτι οὐκέτι ὑπ' ἀγνοιας αὐτοσχεδιάζω οὐδὲ καινοτομῶ περὶ αὐτὰ, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν ἄλλον βίον ὅτι ἀμεινον βιωσοίμην.
NOTES.

Εὐθύφρων ἡ περὶ ὅσιον, πειραστικὸς. So the title appears in the Bodleian MS, except that πειραστικὸς seems to have been added by a later hand. Plato probably called the dialogue simply Εὐθύφρων, in accordance with his frequent habit of naming his dialogues after an interlocutor: e.g. Crito, Theaetetus, Protagoras, Phaedrus. The words ἡ περὶ ὅσιον were added by the critic Thrasylius, who flourished about the Christian Era. Thrasylus classified the Platonic dialogues into dialogues of search (ἐρημικός) and of exposition (ὑφηγητικός): he subdivided the former into γνωμαστικός (including μαεντικός and πειραστικός) and ἀγωνιστικός (including ἐνδεικτικός and ἀναπραστικός), while the latter or expository class fell into θεωρητικός (either φυσικός or λογικός) and πρακτικός (ἡδικός or πολιτικός). See Grote’s Plato Vol. 1 p. 161. The other examples of peirastic or ‘testing’ dialogues were the Charmides, Io, and Meno: with the last of these the Euthyphro has much in common: see Introduction p. xxx.

The scene of the dialogue is in or near the porch of the King Archon. For dramatic purposes, Plato seems to represent the conversation as taking place soon after the interview with Theaetetus in the dialogue of that name: see Theaet. 210 D: νῦν μὲν ὁ παντητεύον μοι εἰς τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως στοάν ἐπὶ τὴν Μελητοῦ γραφὴν, ἢν μὲ γέγραπται. On Euthyphro as a man see Introd. p. xxii.
CHAPTER I.

Socrates, happening to fall in with Euthyphro, relates to him the circumstances of his prosecution by Meletus.

2 A 1. τι νεώτερον. Socrates had never figured in a law-court till now, either as prosecutor or as defendant: see Apol. 17 D νῦν ἐγὼ πρῶτον ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβέβηκα, ἐτή γεγονὼς ἐβδομήκοντα. The neuter comparative of νέος (less frequently καυνός) is preferred to the positive, to express an objectionable novelty: Prot. 310 B μη τι νεώτερον ἀγγέλλεις; Hence νεώτερόν τι, νεώτερίζειν, and νεώτερισμός are used of revolutionary movements. ὅτι is the conjunction quod Eng. that: here however it retains more than it usually does of its original pronominal use as acc. n. of ὅστις. See the editor’s Apol. App. II p. 123. Cron invariably writes ὅτι for both rel. (not ὅ τι) and conjunction.

2. τὰς ἐν Δυκείῶ—διατριβᾶς. The Lyceum was one of the three famous gymnasia outside the walls of Athens: the others were the Ἀκαδημεία (6 stades from the Dipylon or north-west gate: Cic. de Fin. v 1. 1) and the Κυνόσαργες (a little way N. E. from the Lyceum, on the road to Alōpeke). It was situated (see Milchhöfer in Baumeister’s Denkmäler i p. 182) on the right bank of the Ilisus, near Diochares’ gate, east of the city. Connected with the gymnasia, which is said by Theopompus to have been founded by Pisistratus, was a shrine of Ἀπόλλων Δύκειος of very early date (Plut. Theseus 27. 9). In later times it was famous as the seat of Aristotle and the Peripatetic school. Socrates was generally to be found in places of common resort, like gymnasia and the market place: it is to the Lyceum that he betakes himself after Agathon’s banquet (Symp. 223 D): and the Lyceum is also the scene of the dialogues Lysis and Euthydemos. διατριβεῖν and διατριβᾶς (originally simply of spending the time) suggest philosophical conversation, as the most rational way of occupying one’s leisure: e.g. in Apol. 29 C ἐφ’ ὅτε μηκέτι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ζητήσει διατριβεῖν μηδὲ φιλοσοφεῖν: ibid. 37 C τὰς ἐμᾶς διατριβὰς καὶ τῶν λόγους. So σχολή has already in Greek come to be used for a disputation and even for a ‘philosophical school’.

3. τὴν τοῦ βασιλεῶς στοάν. The porch of the King Archon (στοὰ βασιλείως Ar. Eccles. 685) was the first porch in the ἀγορά on your right as you approached the market place from the Ceramicus.
Paus. I 3. 1 πρώτη δὲ ἐστὶν ἐν δεξιᾷ καλουμένη στοὰ βασίλειος (sc. as you leave the Ceramicus). It was the duty of the King Archon to maintain many of the religious duties that had originally belonged to the Athenian King (compare the function of the Rex Sacrorum in the early Roman Republic): among other religious offices, he had charge of the mysteries, the Αὐναία and the torch-race: and in accordance with the usual principle of Athenian law, he had the presidency (ἡγεμονία δικαστηρίου) of the Heliotic Court when charges connected with his sphere of duties, impiety, for example, were being heard (Gilbert Handbuch der Gr. Staatsalterthümer I p. 241).

4. καὶ σοι γε. γε does not go with καὶ in the idiomatic sense of καὶ—γε = 'yes, and', but with οὐ γὰρ: cf. infra 2 Β οὐ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος γε: 4 Β οὐ γὰρ ἀν που γε: 8 Α οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο γε. Schanz remarks that Plato nearly always uses γε with οὐ γὰρ.

δίκη. δίκη is the general term for a case heard before an Athenian law-court. There were two sorts of δίκαιοι viz. the δίκη ὴδα (ἀγών ὴδος) or δίκη proper, and the δίκη δημοσία (ἀγών δημοσίους) or γραφή. The first was a civil suit: the latter either a criminal or a public process, in which the state (as represented by any Athenian citizen in the full exercise of his rights) was prosecutor. An accusation of φόνος was a γραφή: but Euthyphro here uses the more general term, in order not to prejudge the nature of the case in which Socrates might be concerned. In Socrates' careful distinction between γραφή and δίκη in his reply Schanz sees a delicate sarcasm on Euthyphro's vaunted accuracy in the use of names: see Crat. 396 D.

5. οὐσπερ ἐμοί. The ἄρχων βασιλεὺς as public guardian of religion presided in trials for φόνος: for it was a religious duty to wipe off the stain of bloodguiltiness: see 4 C ἱερὸν γὰρ τὸ μίασμα γίγνεται, ἐὰν ἐννυχτη τῷ τοιούτῳ ἐννυχτήσας καὶ μὴ ἀφοσίοις σεαυτὸν τε καὶ ἐκεῖνον τῇ δίκῃ ἐπεξεύρη.

6. οὕτω δὴ—γε. 'No, Euthyphro, the Athenians do not' etc. γε, following the emphatic Ἀθηναῖοι, should be taken with οὕτω δὴ. So in Crat. 438 D οὕτω δὴ δίκαιον γε, οὐ Σώκρατες.

ὁ Εὐθύφρον. B for the most part and T everywhere read ὁ Εὐθύφρον throughout the dialogue. Fritzsche compares similar

1 The Bodleian ms of Plato is denoted by B: T stands for the ms in the library of St Mark's at Venice. These two are the best representatives of the two families of Platonic mss.
mistakes in the Laurentian ms of Sophocles e.g. Ajax 903 ὁ ταλαίφρων: O. T. 1299 ὁ τλῆμων.

2 B 8. ὁς ἐδεικε seems to shew that no interrogation is intended: I have therefore removed the mark of interrogation placed by most of the editors after γέγραπται. σὲ is clearly emphatic (as in line 11): for which reason I print γράφην ἐὰν τις, not γραφὴν ἐὰν τις. Euthyphro, knowing Socrates’ invariable ἀπραγμοσυνι, at once leaps to the conclusion that he is the accused, and not the accuser.

γέγραπται. γράφεσθαι = to cause to be written down: γράφειν = to write, as in Theaetetus 142 D ἐγραφάμην τὸτ’ εὐθὺς—ὑπομνήματα, ὦστερον δὲ—ἐγραφὸν. Hence γράφεσθαι = ‘to indict’: the name of the accused party being written down by the ἀρχων or his clerk: whereas γράφειν = ‘to propose a motion’ i.e. to write it out oneself. Notice the two accusatives γραφὴν γράφεσθαι σὲ: the first is the accusative of the internal, the second of the external object: Thompson Greek Syntax p. 66. γέγραπται alone would have sufficed for the sense: but a certain rhetorical effect of surprise and indignation is attained by repeating Socrates’ γραφὴν, at the same time that the antithesis with δίκην is thereby emphasized.

9. καταγνώσομαι. καταγινώσκειν is to see a weak point in one: Apol. 25 A πολλὴν γέ μου κατέγνωκας δυστυχίαν: Phaed. 116 c οὐ καταγινώσκεις γε σοῦ διπέρ τῶν ἄλλων καταγινώσκω. οὐ γάρ ποι is found in one inferior ms, whence Stephanus read οὐ γάρ σοῦ; but the omission of the genitive is accounted for by the presence of σοῦ in the next clause ὡς σοῦ ἔτερον. Compare Thuc. vi 34. 8: ἔτερχοταί γὰρ ἡμῖν ὡς οὐκ ἁμηνομένοις, δικαίως κατεγνώκτες ὅτι αὐτός οὐ μετὰ Ἀκαδαιμονίων ἐφεδρομεν. T here has ὡς σοῦ γε ἔτερον.

11. ἀλλά σὲ ἄλλος. ‘Interrogatio supravacanea est valde mirantis’, says Wohlrab. ἄλλος is used after ἔτερον for the sake of variety. So in Aristotle Ethic. Nic. ix 4. 1166b 7 ἐτέρων μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἄλλα δὲ βούλονται. Here perhaps the jingle is intended to suggest Euthyphro’s peculiar tricks of language: see Crat. 396 D and Introd. p. xxiii.

14. οὐδ’ αὐτὸς πάνυ τι γιγνώσκω = “ne ipse quidem satis novi”. On οὐ πάνυ see Kiddell’s Digest of Platonic Idioms § 139. It means ‘not quite’ i.e. generally ‘not exactly’, though sometimes ‘not at all’ by the usual Greek μεῖος or ἐμφασις. It is however held by some scholars that οὐ πάνυ occasionally = πάνυ οὐ even without assuming meiosis: see Classical Review for 1887 p.
71. The addition of the adverbial τι makes the expression vaguer and less emphatic. So Phaed. 57 Α οὐ δεις πάντα τί ἐπιχωριάζει τά νῦν Ἀθήνας: Rep. iv 419 Α ἔαν τίς σε φῆ μη πάντα τί εὐθαμονοις ποιεῖν τούτους τοὺς ἄνδρας.

16. Μελητών. Apol. 23 ε ἐκ τούτων καὶ Μελητών μοι ἐπέθετο καὶ "Ἀνυτος καὶ Λύκων. Meletus was the protagonist in the prosecution of Socrates: his σωφρόνοι were Anytus and Lyco. Hence when it is desired to allude to the prosecution briefly, Meletus alone is mentioned: so in Apol. 19 B foll. and Theaet. 210 D τὴν Μελητών γραφῆν, ἣν μὲ γέγραπται. On Meletus generally see the editor’s Introduction to the Apology p. xxvi. Notice the indifference which Socrates contrives to express by means of νέος τις and ὃς ἐγὼ μαί.

17. τῶν δῆμων Πιθεύς. The deme Πιθός was in the tribe Cecropis. τῶν δῆμων is a partitive genitive; for Πιθεύς = ἐκ Πιθόου. The old reading was τῶν δήμων (acc. of reference): Cobet Novae Lectiones p. 671 rightly remarks “corrige τῶν δήμων”, and so B and T. See Holden on PlutarchThemist. 1 § 1 πατρὸς γὰρ ἤν Νεοκλέους—Φρεαρρίου τῶν δήμων. Schanz remarks that this gen. is not found on Inscriptions, and that in manuscripts it generally precedes the name of the deme.

νῷ ἔχειν = meminisse: εὖ νῷ ἔχειν = in animo habere i.q. to intend. Contrast Apol. 20 B τίνα αὐτόν εὖ νῷ ἔχεις ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν; with Rep. vi 490 Λ ἥγειτο δ’ αὐτῷ, εἰ νῷ ἔχεις, πρῶτον μὲν ἀλήθεια κτλ. There is here inferior ΜS authority for εὖ νῷ.

18. οἷον τετανύτριχα by the usual attraction for τοιοῦτον οἷος ἐστι τετανύτριξ. Cf. Soph. 237 ζ χαλεπὸν ἦρον καὶ σχεδὸν εἰπεῖν οἷῳ γε ἐμοὶ παντάπασιν ἀποροῦν = τοιοῦτω οἷος γε ἐγὼ εἰμί. Kühner’s Griechische Grammatik II p. 916. τετανύτριξ implies long rigid hair (curls). Astrologers used to maintain that a man born under the sign Virgo would be τετανύότριξ χαροπόδα λευκόχρως ἀπαίς αἰδήμων (Sext. Emp. adv. Math. v 95). For long hair as affected by anyone who δοκεῖ εἶναι τι see Aristoph. Nub. 545 κάγῳ μὲν τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ ὃν ποιητής οὐ κομ. In Rep. iv 425 B Plato cites short hair (κουραλ) as a mark of the well-conducted youth. Just so the Ephors annually commanded the Spartans κείρεσθαι τὸν μύστακα καὶ πελεσθαι τοῖς νόμοις (Plut. Cleom. 9, on the authority of Aristotle), although it was only the moustache that the Spartans fell foul of: long hair in general was considered Dorian and aristocratic. οὐ πάνυ εὐγενεῖον alludes to Meletus’ youth: so infra
in 2 C he is the tell-tale little boy complaining to his mother. It is clear also from Apol. 25 D and 26 E that Meletus was young. ἐπίγρυπος (ἐπίσιμος = 'somewhat hook-nosed': the word occurs again Phaedr. 253 D in a description of the noble steed, just as the horses in the Panathenaic frieze are ἐπίγρυποι. In Rep. v 474 D βασιλικός is said to be a polite euphemism for γρυπός, like ἐπίχαρις for σιμὸς. Here the δὲ seems to imply that Meletus made up for deficiency in beard by amplitude of nose. On the whole, Meletus gives us the impression of a Roman-nosed and angular young man: Socrates was flat-nosed and rotund.

20. οὐκ ἐννοῶ: ἐννοῶ = νοῦ ἐχω 'I remember': Polit. 296 λ οὐκ ἐννοῶ νῦν γ' οὔτως. ἀλλὰ δὴ marks the return after the digression. The particle is also idiomatically used = 'at enim' to introduce the objection of an adversary: see Stallbaum on Rep. II 365 D.

22. Ἑντινα; A previous speaker's question is invariably repeated by the indirect interrogative. Schanz (following one inferior ms) emends Laches 195 λ where a question is repeated with πρὸς τί; to πρὸς ὁ τί;

ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ: without ὁς, as in Crito 50 β ἢ δοκεῖ σοι οὖν τε and Phaed. 108 ν ὁ βίος μοι δοκεῖ ὁ ἐμὸς. In such cases inferior mss frequently insert ὁς.

23. οὐ φαιλον 'no slight thing': φαιλον is a more general term than ἀγεννής, which denotes lack of courage (γεννάδας. Supra ἔγνωκέναι (novisse) is 'to know': as γνωστεῖν (noscere) 'to perceive' or 'learn'.

24. τίνα τρόπον οἱ νέοι διαφθείρονται. For the terms of the indictment of Socrates see Apol. 24 β Σωκράτη φησίν (sc. ὁ Μέλητος) ἀδικείν τοὺς τε νέους διαφθείροντα καὶ θεοὺς οὖς ἡ πόλις νομίζει οὐ νομίζοντα ἐτέρα δὲ δαιμόνια καίνα.

26. κινδυνεύει σοφός τις εἶναι: κινδυνεύει = δοκεῖ as often in Plato: the word must originally have been used only where the predicate involved something evil = κινδυνὸς ἔστι with inf. as in Lysias κατὰ Ἀγοράτου § 27 σοὶ δὲ—κινδυνοῦ ἡ βασανισθήναι. σοφός ('clever') is sarcastic, as often e.g. in Crito 51 α ὡς μετα τί σοφός; The word (like φρονείστης) was almost a nickname of Socrates (see Apol. 18 β): here it suggests the sophists, as in Meno 75 c τῶν σοφῶν—καὶ ἔρωτικῶν καὶ ἀγωνιστικῶν. Meletus is ὁ κατὰ νέους σοφός: see infra on line 32.

καὶ τὴν ἐμὴν ἀμαθίαν—διαφθειροντος. ἀμαθίας is regularly
used as the opposite of ὁσφός. Notice the implication that vice is due to ignorance (ἀμαθία). This doctrine is frequently regarded as peculiar to Socrates: but it is embedded in the Greek language. Take for example the words ἀμαθὴς ἀπαλέωντος ἀγνώμων. Primarily these words denoted a want of intellectual cultivation: but in practice they are often used of deficient moral culture: ἀμαθὴς (see Verrall on Medea 224) = 'boorish' 'unfeeling': ἀπαλέωντος is 'rude' and ἀγνώμων 'unkind'. An untutored intellect (from the Greek point of view) implies moral delinquency: since in the flourishing period of Greek life intellect and will are not discriminated. The same point of view comes out in Plato's theory of education (Rep. vi—viii): true education awakens ἐπιστήμη, and does not implant ὀρθὴ δόξα: and ἐπιστήμη means the regeneration (περιαγωγή) of the entire man, moral as well as intellectual. As to the syntax, note ἐμὴν (≡ ἐμοῦ) with διαφθείροντος.

28. ὡς πρὸς μητέρα πρὸς τὴν πόλιν. Had Plato chosen to make the simile an identification, he would have omitted the second πρὸς as Cobet requires. See on Crito 46 c: "If it is wished to bring the objects compared into the closest possible union, ὡςπερ (ὡς, καθάπερ) with the preposition is placed first, and the preposition itself written only once: Rep. viii 545 E ὡς πρὸς παῖδας ἡμᾶς παιζούσας καὶ ἐρεσχηλουσάς". Where ὡςπερ with the preposition precedes, Cobet (Variae Lectiones p. 165 foll.) would in every case delete the second preposition: but he defies the MSS. Otherwise both prepositions are inserted: and in case the object compared comes first neither preposition may be omitted e.g. πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ὡς πρὸς μητέρα. Schanz emends two curious cases in which the first preposition is omitted with preceding ὡςπερ, viz. Phaed. 67 D ἐκλυμένην ὡςπερ δεσμῶν (leg. ἐκ δεσμῶν with T) and Tim. 79 A ἰεῖν ὡςπερ αὐλῶνος (leg. διὰ αὐλῶνος) διὰ τοῦ σώματος. Archer-Hind retains ὡςπερ αὐλῶνος. The motherhood of the state is the leading motive of the Crito (see the editor's introduction to that dialogue): Socrates spurned the temptation to break her laws as parricide. On this view rested during the most flourishing period the entire fabric of Greek civic life. It is worthy of remark that the Cretans called their country μητρᾶς (Rep. ix 575 d).

29. τῶν πολιτικῶν is neuter, and goes with ἀρχεσθαι.

30. ὀρθῶς γάρ ἔστι. ἔστι of course is not equivalent to ἔχει, 2 D for ὀρθῶς (which would in English be printed with marks of quotation) = τὸ ὀρθῶς ἀρχεσθαι. Schanz compares (inter alia) Symp.
NOTES ON

183 δ καλῶς μὲν πραττόμενον καλῶν, αἰσχρῶς δὲ αἰσχρῶν. αἰσχρῶς μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ πονηρῷ τε καὶ πονηρῶς χαρίζεσθαι, καλῶς δὲ χρηστῶ τε καὶ χρηστῶς.

31. ἐπιμεληθήναι: true to his name Μέλητος: so infra 3 A ἐπιμεληθείσες. Cf. Apol. 25 C (where see note), Μέλητε—ἀμέλειαν—μεμέληκεν and 26 B Μέλητω τοῦτων οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν πῶ-ποτε ἐμέλησεν. In Aristoph. Ran. 990—991 there is perhaps a similar pun on Meletus’ name, κεχρύτες μαμάκανθοι, μελητίδαι (v.l. μελητίδαι) καθήντο: cf. ibid. 1302. For similar plays upon words in Plato and the principle which they involve see on Crito 46 C and especially 47 B (τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπαίτοντι). It should be remarked that ἐπιμελεῖσθαι was almost a technical term of the Socratic ethics (Crito 51 A): Socrates himself habitually professed ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἀρετῆς.

32. γεωργὸν ἀγαθὸν. Herewith begins the agricultural metaphor, continued in ἐκκαθαίρει and in τὰς βλάστας: compare Rep. IX 589 B τοῦ πολυκεφάλου θρέμματος ἐπιμελησταὶ ὅσπερ γεωργός, τὰ μὲν ἡμέρα τρέφον καὶ τιθασεύον, τὰ δὲ ἀγρίαι ἀποκολύουν φύεσθαι. The γεωργός is the σοφὸς κατὰ φυτά (Theat. 167 B): so Meletus poses as ὁ κατὰ νέους σοφός. As to the subject matter, note in the first place the implication that the politician should make the citizens morally better: in the best period of Greece politics had an ethical purpose, see Aristotle Eth. Nic. 110. 1099b 30 ff. αὐτῇ δὲ (sc. ἡ πολιτικὴ) πλείστην ἐπιμελείαν ποιεῖται τοῦ ποιοῦ τινας καὶ ἀγαθοὺς τοὺς πολίτας ποιήσαι καὶ πρακτικοὺς τῶν καλῶν. In fact ethics and politics were not separated in Plato’s time, since τὸ νόμομον = τὸ δίκαιον—the law of the state is the law of morality for the man. (Introduction to Crito, p. xiii.) Only from this point of view can we see the true unity of the Republic, which, though it is called πολιτεία, is almost as much ethical as political. It was only when man was forcibly torn from the state by the loss of civic freedom that Aristotle wrote an ethical treatise as distinct from politics. In the second place, observe the paramount importance here assigned to the care of the young: sound education seemed to Plato the only possible salvation for a state: εὖ τραφέντων καὶ τρεφομένων τῶν νέων πάντα ἡμῖν καὶ ὀρθῶν πλεῖ (Legg. vii 813 D).

33. καὶ δή καὶ introduces the application as in Crito 47 C οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ λλα—οὖτως—καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαλων κτλ. ἵσως infra = ‘doubtless’ (sarcastic).

34. ἡμᾶς ἐκκαθαίρει. Socrates as a noxious weed, or per-
haps as some pestilent monster preying on the young plants: cf. Arist. Hist. An. IX 625b 33 τὰ δὲ γυμνὰ θηρία ἐν τοῖς σμήνεσι καὶ λυμαίνομενα τὰ κηρία αἱ μὲν χρησταὶ μείλωται ἐκ καθαλροῦσιν. Hirschig's ἐκκαθαρεῖ is unnecessary, and in fact less forcible and accurate.

35. τοὺς τῶν νέων τὰς βλάστας διαφθείροντας. There is much irony in this clause, expressed by placing it after the verb ἐκκαθαρεῖ, and adding the words ὡς φησιν. Friztsche well compares Apol. 34 A: εὐρήσετε—πάντας ἐμοὶ βοηθεῖν ἐτοίμους τῷ διαφθείροντί, τῷ κακά ἐργαζομένῳ τοὺς οἰκείους αὐτῶν, ὡς φασί Μέλητος καὶ Ἀνυτος. For the general idea Schanz compares Legg. VI 765 ἐ παντὸς γὰρ ὑπὸ φυτοῦ ἡ πρώτη βλάστη καλῶς ὀρμηθείσα πρὸς ἀρετῇ τῆς αὐτοῦ φύσεως κυριωτάτη τέλος ἐπιθείναι τὸ πρόσφορον and ibid. VII 813 D quoted above on 2 D. The words τῶν νέων are bracketed by Schanz, following Gomperz, chiefly on the ground that τὰς βλάστας = τοὺς νέους (with the additional agricultural idea) can alone form a correct antithesis to τῶν πρεσβυτέρων: but I think the words are right, for it is quite in Plato's style in passing from the simile to the application to choose words applicable to both (τὰς βλάστας to agriculture, and τῶν νέων to the young: cf. note on Crito 47 b): moreover τὰς βλάστας τῶν νέων is more than τοὺς νέους or τὰς βλάστας alone since it means the development or 'sprouting' of the young. The idea contained in the four words is afterwards expanded in the Phaedrus: where philosophic "Έρως is viewed as that which fosters the sprouting of the wings of the soul (τὴν βλάστην τοῦ πτεροῦ): Phaedr. 246 c foll. For a similar juxtaposition of the comparison and the thing compared, see Alc. 1 134 D—Ε εἰς τὸ θείον καὶ λαμπρὸν ὄραμας,—εἰς τὸ ἄθεον καὶ σκοτεινὸν βλέποντες. [Liebhold in the Wochenschrift für Klassische Philologie 1888 no. 40 p. 1226 also retains τῶν νέων, regarding it as an echo of the words τῶν νέους in the indictment: but he can hardly be right in changing τὰς βλάστας to τοὺς βελτιστοὺς.]

36. ἔπειτα μετὰ τούτο. Not exactly a case of the σχῆμα ἐκ παραλλήλου. ἔπειτα corresponds to πρῶτον μὲν (ἔπειτα and ἑίτα are more common than ἔπειτα δὲ and ἑίτα δέ) as 'in the second place' to 'in the first place': while μετὰ τοῦτο = μετὰ τὸ ἡμᾶς ἐκκαθαίρειν. Compare Aristoph. Ran. 1026 ἑίτα διδάξας Πέρσας μετὰ τοῦτ' ἐπιθυμεῖν ἐξεδιδάξα κτλ.

39. ἄρξαμένῳ sc. Μελητῷ: τῷ ἄρξαμένῳ would make the statement general.
CHAPTER II.

The Introduction is here continued. Euthyphro is indignant that Socrates should be accused of heterodoxy and insult cast upon the profession of the μάντις to which both belonged.

2. ὀρρωδῶ is a very strong word, suggesting the physical results of excessive fear.

ἀτεχνῶς γάρ μου δοκεῖ. ἀτεχνῶς = 'literally', 'absolutely' is used to intensify a statement, especially a simile or (as here) a proverb: it is opposed to σχεδόν τι, ἐμπραχυ (with relatives only) or ὡς ἐπος εἰπεῖν, which modifies a universal affirmative or negative. Distinguish ἀτέχνως = 'inartistically': the English word 'simply' has both senses. Cf. Apol. 17 d and note.

3. ἀφ' Ἐστίας ἀρχεσθαι. All offerings began and ended with a libation to Hestia. In the economy of Greece, both political and religious, Hestia was the central divinity; she is the heart of the House and of the State. As a Goddess, she does not appear till Hesiod and the Homeric hymns, where she figures as the first-born daughter of Cronus and Rhea (Hes. Theog. 454): she is simply the personification of the Hearth. Every πόλις, being regarded as a family in accordance with the usual Greek view, had a κοινὴ ἐστία, on which holy fire was always kept burning: it was situated in the πρωτανεῖν (Pind. Nem. xi 1 παί 'Ρέας, ἃ τε πρωτανεῖα λέογκας Ἐστία), which for that reason was the central point without which no πόλις could exist. Therefore the proverb ἀφ' Ἐστίας ἀρχεσθαι means to begin with the central or κόριον or fundamental point: Ar. Vesp. 845—846 ἢνα ἀφ' Ἐστίας ἀρχόμενος ἐπιτρίψω τινά. Euthyphro implies that Socrates is the corner-stone of Athens. Plato claims exactly the same honour for his master: as the ἵναι ἐστία of Athens he too should be supported in the Prytaneum (Apol. Ch. xxvi): cf. Gorg. 521 D ὅμως μετ' ὀλίγων Ἀθηναίων ἢνα μὴ εἰπὼ μόνος ἐπιχειρεῖν τῇ ὑψ ἀληθῶς πολιτικὴ τέχνη καὶ πρᾶπτειν τὰ πολιτικὰ μόνος τῶν νῦν. But Euthyphro resents the accusation of Socrates because he feels himself attacked through him: Socrates is to him a μάντις, and μαντικὴ he regards as the safety of the State. See Introd. p. xxi.

4. κακουργεῖν τὴν πόλιν. κακουργεῖν is opposed to πλεῖστων καὶ μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν αἰτίος—γενήσεται. Notice the implication that
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evil treatment makes a man worse: κακουργεῖν = κακὸν πείραμα. (Rep. I 335 B foll.): this is an essentially Greek view, well illustrated by the transition of meaning in πονηρός and μορχηρός from ‘bad’ to ‘depraved’: see the editor’s note on Crito 47 E where allusion is made to Simonides Frag. 5. 10—13, ἀνδρα δ’ οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐκ κακὸν ἐμμεναί, ὅν ἀμάχανος συμφόρα καθέλη. The converse view, that prosperity means goodness, is implied in the usual equivocation on εὖ πράττειν = to ‘do well’ and ‘fare well’: see Aristotle Eth. Nic. I 1098b 20. The principle on which this view rests is found in Hom. Od. XVIII 136—137 τοῖος γὰρ νόσος ἐστὶν ἐπικεχοτῶν ἀνθρώ-πων οἶνον ἐπ’ ἡμαρ ἁγγίζει πατήρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε.

5. καὶ μοι λέγε. καὶ before Imperatives = ‘pray’: Apol. 24 εὶ καὶ μοι δεῦρο εἰπέ = agedium die mihi.

τί καὶ ποιούντα σέ. καὶ suggests that Socrates cannot possibly have done anything to corrupt the youth. See on τί γὰρ καὶ φήσομεν in 6 B.

7. ἀτοπα, ὡς οὖτω γ’ ἀκούσαι. The charge is ἀτοπον, because 3 B gods should make men, not men gods. γε is placed after the emphatic οὖτω, and belongs strictly speaking to ὡς. So Lysis 216 Α εἰ γε, ἔφη ὁ Μενέξενος, ὡς γε οὖτωσὶ ἀκούσαι. οὖτω is idiomatically used for ‘at first sight’, ‘on the first hearing’, and the like. So Crat. 397 Α εἰ ἄρα ἡμῖν ἐπιμαρτυρήσει αὐτὰ τά ὄνοματα μὴ πάνυ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου οὖτως ἔκαστα κείσθαι. For ὡς with inf. in this sense (as in ὡς ἔσος εἰπεῖν) see Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, p. 207.

8. ποιητὴν εἶναι θεῶν. It is worth while to notice the gradual development of the metaphor from the mint. καινός rather than νέος is used of new coinage; cf. Ar. Ran. 720 ἐστε τάρχαιον νόμισμα καὶ τὸ καινὸν χρυσὸν. Presently in ἄρχαιος οὐ νομίζοντα the metaphor comes into sight: for νομίζεων and its derivatives mean not only to ‘believe in’ or ‘worship’, but also ‘to use as current coin’. See Ar. Nub. 247—249 (a passage precisely similar to this) ποῖον θεὸν οἷος ὁμοί σὺ; πρῶτον γὰρ θεὸν ἡμῖν νόμισμα οὐκ ἔστι. τῷ γὰρ διώνυ; ἡ σιδαρέωσιν, ὥσπερ ἐν Βυζάντιῳ; In the reply of Euthyphro the metaphor is explicit: ὡς οὖν καινοτομοῦντός σου περὶ τὰ θεία κτλ.

10. τούτων αὐτῶν ἐνεκα, ὡς φησίν. The precision of τούτων αὐτῶν ἐνεκα (summing up ὡς καινὸς—νομίζοντα) followed emphatically by ὡς φησί (echoing the φῆσθι with which the sentence begins) insinuates that Meletus was not actuated solely by a zeal for the
national faith. In the indictment against Socrates (for which see above on 2 c) it is clear that the religious accusation was introduced only to give a foothold to the graver charge of corrupting the youth: i.e. the religious charge was ancillary to the social and political. At the same time it should be remembered that owing to the constitution of the ancient state heterodoxy was equivalent to treason. In Apol. 23 E—24 A a personal motive for the prosecution is assigned: Μέλητος μοι ἐπέθετο καὶ Ἀνυτος καὶ Λύκων, Μέλητος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀχθόμενος, Ἀνυτος δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, Λύκων δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ῥητόρων.

11. μανθάνω· ὅτι δὴ σὺ τὸ δαιμόνιον—γέγνεσθαι. It is barely possible that μανθάνω is intended to suggest μάντις: Euthyphro (as appears in Cratylus 396 D) was addicted to the etymological pun. δὴ ὅτι is ‘because forsooth’, cf. 9 Β μανθάνω· ὅτι (‘because’) σου δοκῶ κτλ. Socrates regarded his δαιμόνιον as a species of μαντική—a divine sign (σημεῖον) or voice (φωνή), vouchsafed to him as a proof of the divine care: see the editor’s Apology pp. xxvii and 88. He certainly did not look upon it as a new divinity: but it is clear from Apol. 31 D (θείων τι καὶ δαιμόνιον—ὁ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικωμῳδοῦ ὅν Μέλητος ἐγράψατο) that it was so misrepresented by Meletus, willfully, if we may trust the sarcasm of ὅτι δὴ and infra ὡς σῴν καϊνοτομοῦντος. σαυτῇ is written in preference to σοί, because—σοι αὐτῇ i.e. ‘to you alone’: αὐτός often=solus. Socrates held that he was almost if not quite the sole possessor of a ‘divine voice’ (Rep. VI 496 C ἦ γάρ ποιε τινι ἄλλῳ ἦ μηδενὶ τῶν ἐμπροσθεν γέγονε).

12. ἐκάστοτε is ‘on each occasion’: the voice did not speak always, but only as occasion arose—forbidding, not encouraging: Cic. Div. I § 122 divinum quiddam—cui semper paruerit, nunquam impellenti, saepe (not semper) revocanti. Notice that γέγνεσθαι is “the technical expression for the appearance of Socrates’ δαιμόνιον” (Schanz): see on Crito 46 B.

13. καϊνοτομοῦντος. New coinage is apt to be inferior to old (Ar. Ran. 717 ff.) and καϊνοτομεῖν in Plato (who employs the word only as a metaphor) always denotes a change for the worse, like κυνεῖν of revolutionary change.

14. ὡς διαβαλῶν δὴ: δὴ is ‘therefore’. διαβάλλειν was a regular term in Athenian law for the opposite of a fair and honourable accusation (κατηγορεῖν): cf. Thuc. III 42 εὖ μὲν εἶπεῖν οὐκ ἂν ἥγειται περὶ τοῦ μὴ καλοῦ δύνασθαι, εὖ δὲ διαβαλῶν ἐκπλήξαι ἂν κτλ.
15. εἰδώς ὅτι εὐδίαβολα—πολλοῦς: since the πολλοὶ, for whom Plato had no great respect (οἱ γε πολλοὶ, ὡς ἤπος εἰπεῖν, οὕτειν αἰσθάνονται Prot. 317 Λ), judge by the canons of ὀρθὴ δόξα and not ἐπιστήμη, in which they do not partake. Witness (among the ancients) Anaxagoras, Socrates and Aristotle: each of whom was condemned for impiety.

16. καὶ ἐμοῦ γὰρ τοι: καὶ (also) goes with ἐμοῦ: τοι is 'let me tell you'. Observe how Euthyphro recognises in Socrates a kindred spirit: "we are both μάντει (see infra ἡμῖν πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις)—they laugh at, you they accuse—in both cases envy is their motive". The Athenians were right in laughing at Euthyphro, but Socrates was a far more serious antagonist—more serious indeed than he himself knew. His teaching contained the germs of ethical and political doctrine destined to contribute to the downfall of Greek civic life, while it at the same time paved the way for something higher. See Apol. p. xxviii.

18. καταγελώσων ὡς μανομένου. As if the μάντει were μανικὸς: for the word μανομένου naturally suggests μάντις: see Phaedr. 244 C: τῶν παλαιῶν οἱ τὰ ὀνόματα τιθέμενοι οὐκ αἰσχρῶν ἤγουτοι οὐδὲ ὑπείρους μανίαν. οὐ γὰρ ὅτι καλλίστη τέχνη, ἤ τὸ μέλλον κρίνεται, αὐτὸ τὸ οὔτο τοῦνόμα ἐμπλέκοντες μανικὴν ἐκάλεσαν.—οἱ δὲ νῦν ἀπεροκάλως τὸ ταῦ ἐπεμβάλλοντες μαντικὴν ἐκάλεσαν.

In the same passage Plato recognises four varieties of serviceable madness whereof two are μαντικὴ ἐνθεος and μαντικὴ ἡ τῶν ἐμφρόνων (working through signs and omens). Euthyphro's variety was ἡ τῶν ἐμφρόνων.

καὶτοι = 'quandam' 'and yet' followed by ἀλλ' ὅμως as in Phaed. 68 E (quoted by Schanz) καὶτοι φαμέν γε ἀδύνατον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅμως κτλ.

20. τοῖς τοιούτοις, i.e. τοῖς μάντεσι. The words at the same time express the grounds of the envy.

ἀλλ'—ἐίναι. Notice the threefold occurrence of ἀλλὰ in three lines: in the first and last case it forms the natural adverstive to the negatives: in the second it has the effect of a spirited exhortation.

21. ὁμόσε ἐίναι. A Homeric phrase (Π. ΧΙΙII 337 ὁμόσ' ἡλθε μάχη) meaning 'to come to close quarters', 'grapple with'. ὁμός in Homer=ὁ αὐτός: so that ὁμόσε = ἐς ταὐτόν, shewing the same suffix as in ἐκείσε, ἄλλοσε, ποτέρωσε, ἐτέρωσε etc., a suffix confined for the most part to pronominal stems, except in the Homeric κυκ
NOTES ON II 3 C

λόσε (II. IV 212) and υψόσε (II. X 461). Kühner’s Griechische Grammatik I p. 731, Anm. 5. Plato employs the phrase as a metaphor not unfrequently, e.g. Euthyd. 294 D ὁμος ἤτην τοῖς ἔρωτήμασιν, cf. Phaedo 95 B Ὄμηρυκως (‘as Homer’s heroes do’) ἐγγὺς ἱόντες.

CHAPTER III.

In this chapter Socrates is careful to point out the difference between himself and Euthyphro. Euthyphro the Athenians laugh at: Socrates they prosecute, because the latter proselytises, while the former is content with merely displaying his cleverness.

1. ὃ φιλε Εὐθύφρον, ἀλλά. More emphasis is thrown on ἀλλά by placing the vocative first. Schanz compares the position of the vocative before an imperative followed by δὲ e.g. Phileb. 48 D ὡ II ρωτάρχε, πειρῶ δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τριχὰ τέμνειν.

tὸ μὲν καταγελασθῆναι. The antithetical clause is to be understood as ‘but to be accused is’. In 3 D—E infra the antithesis is fully expressed: εἰ μὲν οὖν, δὲ νῦν δὴ ἐλεγον, μέλλοιεν μου καταγελάν κτλ., εἰ δὲ σπονδάσονται κτλ. For μὲν with no corresponding δὲ clause cf. Apol. 21 D ἔλογιζόμην ὅτι τούτου μὲν τοῦ ἄνθρωπον ἐγώ σοφότερος εἰμὶ: ibid. 17 B and note.

When the ignorant laugh at the wise, the wise may retaliate with laughter less ridiculous than theirs, says Plato (Rep. VII 517 B): for the ignorant come short in matters of far graver moment than the philosopher (Theaet. 175 C foll.).

2. οὔδεν πράγμα is idiomatic for ‘nothing’, ‘a matter of no importance’: so in 3 E (οὔδεν ἔσται πράγμα ‘will come to nothing’), and not rarely in Plato.

4. δεινόν: ‘clever’ with the secondary notion of an ‘uncanny, unsettling tendency’.

5. μὴ μέντοι διδασκαλικὸν τῆς αὐτοῦ σοφίας. See infra on 3 D ἐγὼ δὲ φοβοῦμαι μὴ κτλ.

3 D 7. τοιοῦτος sc. σοφὸς τῆς αὐτοῦ σοφίαν. τοιοῦτος is frequently used to avoid the repetition of an adjective: see on Apol. 26 A τῶν τοιοῦτων καὶ ἀκοουσίων. So ἑτέρος τοιοῦτος often = ‘just such another’ Euthyd. 298 D—E, Gorg. 493 B.

θυμοῦνται sc. τοῦτῳ.
εἰτ’ οὖν φθόνῳ—εἰτε δ’ ἄλλο τι. οὖν has the effect of
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'perhaps': cf. Soph. O. T. 1049 εἰτ' οὖν ἐπ' ἄγριων εἰτε κανθάμεν. Akin is the use of οὖν after relatives as in ὀποσοσσόν, οὖδ' ὀπωστιόν.

No doubt some Athenians may have been envious of the proselytising δεινός: but others were indignant on political grounds (δεινόν τι), because such teaching seemed to weaken the authority of law, by promoting inquiry into its basis. See the speech of Cleon in Thuc. III 37. 4 οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν τε νόμων σοφῶτεροι βούλονται φαίνεσθαι—καλ' ἐκ τοῦ τοιοῦτον τὰ πολλὰ σφάλλουσι τὰς πόλεις. Socrates himself did not call in question the authority of the laws; for he defined τὸ δίκαιον as τὸ νόμιμον (see Introduction to Crito p. xiii): but some of his associates, as for example Alcibiades, were ready to submit the laws and constitution of their country to the test of reason. See Apol. Ch. xxi.

9. τοῦτον οὖν πέρι. τοῦτον ἢ τὸ διδασκαλικὸν τῆς σοφίας εἶναι. Euthyphro is not the man to cast his pearls before swine. Note the emphatic ἐμέ.

10. οὐ πάνυ = 'not exactly': see on 2 B above.

11. σπάνιον σεαυτὸν παρέχειν: 'shew yourself rarely' not 'make yourself scarce'. For this use of σπάνιον cf. Legg. VIII 841 Α σπανιόν γὰρ αὐτὸ τοιοῦτῳ δι’ αἰσχύνην χρώμενοι κτλ.

13. ύπὸ φιλανθρωπίας: whereas the attitude of Euthyphro is that of μισανθρωπος.

14. ἐκκεχυμένως παντὶ ἀνδρὶ λέγειν. Apol. 33 Α ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος (different from διδασκαλικός supra) μὲν οὐδενὸς πόσον ἐγενόμην: εἰ δὲ τίς μου λέγοντος καὶ τὰ ἐ μαυτοῦ πράττουτοι ἐπίθυμεν ἀκούειν, εἰτε νεώτερος εἰτε πρεσβύτερος, οὐδὲν πώποτε ἐπιθυμεῖα, οὐδὲ χρήματα μὲν λαμβάνων διαλέγομαι, μὴ λαμβάνων δὲ οὖ, άλλ’ ὑμοῖος καὶ πλούσιος καὶ πένητι παρέχω ἐμαυτὸν ἐρωτῶν κτλ. Socrates believed himself commissioned by God to preach to all who would listen. Apol. Chapters vi and xvii.

15. οὐ μόνον ἅνευ μισθοῦ: for Aristophanes misrepresents Socrates in Nub. 98 σοτηλ διδάσκουσιν, ἀργυρίου ἡν τὶς διδῷ κτλ. προστιθεῖς (sc. μισθήν) is not here used absolutely, as Wohlrab and Schanz suppose. Josef Wagner (Die Athetese des Dialogs Euthyphron, Brünn 1882—3, p. 26) shews but little sense of humour when in arguing against the authenticity of the dialogue he asks, apropos of this passage—"where could Socrates have got the money to pay his audience, when in the Apology he can command only a single mina?"
16. εἰ τίς μου ἔθελεν ἀκούειν. So B: T has ἔθελεν. Either is right: but the reading of B gives the natural protasis to the apodosis in προστιθει cl ἑν ἡδέως (i.q. προστιθειν ἑν ἡδέως—the participle being preferred in order to form a balance with οὐ μόνον ἑνεὶ μισθοῦ).

17. νῦν δὴ ἀρτίως is written by Schanz and Cobet νῦνδὴ: see on Apol. 37 c. The reference is to c above τὸ μὲν καταγελῶσθηναι ἑος οὐδὲν πράγμα. Note that if Plato had omitted νῦν δὴ he would probably have written λέγω: cf. Apol. 21 οὐκ ἔχει λέγω (alluding to 20 ε).}

3 E 18. οὐδὲν ἄν εἰη ἄδης. ἄδης is used as in Apol. 41 B ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἐκεῖνα—οὐκ ἃν ἄδης εἰη.

19. εἰ δὲ σπουδάσονται. So T, rightly: B has σπουδάζοντας, by an obvious assimilation to παίζοντας καὶ γελῶντας. Note the contrast between the optative εἰ μέλλοντεν and the future indicative εἰ δὲ σπουδάσονται: the latter alternative is regarded as the more likely. εἰ with the future is common in threats and grave forebodings. For the middle form σπουδάσονται see Rutherford’s New Phrynichus p. 138: “All verbs expressing the exercise of the senses or denoting any functional state or process have the inflexions of the middle voice either throughout or in the future tense”. σπουδάζω does not exactly fall under this rule, but it is a word in which the physical concomitants of enthusiasm (haste and the like) were “primarily uppermost” (ibid. p. 409).

20. τοῦτο ἰδη. Note the emphatic position of τοῦτο. This use of ἰδη ) (οὐπω or οὐκέτι as the case may be is elaborately illustrated by Cope on Arist. Rhet. A 1 1354b 7 (p. 13 of Cope’s edition): it is like dēnum, or iam in Lucretius. The rule may be stated thus. In two or more cases where a certain predicate applies to all or any of the others after the first, ἰδη may be used in applying the predicate: οὐπω is then rightly used in negativing the predicate in the first case: similarly, οὐκέτι is used in stating that a predicate which has been applied to one or more previous cases does not apply to one or more that follow.

οπη ἀποβήσεται. Naber would read ὁποι, thus changing the meaning, which is ‘how it will turn out’, not ‘in what it will end’. Schanz compares Apol. 19 Α τοῦτο μὲν ἵνω οπη τῷ θεῷ φίλου and Lysis 206 Α δεδω τὸ μέλλων οπη ἀποβήσεται.

ἀδηλὸν πλὴν ὑμῖν τοῖς μάντεσιν. So in Apol. 42 A ἀδηλὸν παντὶ πλὴν ι τῷ θεῷ. In the emphatic ὑμῖν Socrates refuses to recognize
Euthyphro as a brother μάτης: contrast Euthyphro's remark in 3 c: ἄνα, τις τοις τοιούτοις. Spoken by Socrates, the words πλὴν ὑμῶν κτλ. might have been sincere: in Plato's mouth they would probably have been ironical. Plato had no high idea of μαντική: see Politicus 209 c where priests and soothsayers are placed on the same platform with slaves, artisans and merchants. 'Divination is the gift of God to human folly' says Plato in Timaeus 71 e: where see Archer-Hind's note.

22. οὐδὲν ἔσται πράγμα: see on οὐδὲν πράγμα in c above.

23. σὺ τε—οἶμαι δέ. δέ (especially if followed by καὶ) is not rarely used after τε, both in Plato and in other authors: e.g. Rep. III 394 c ἔν τε τῇ τῶν ἐπῶν ποιήσει, πολλαχοῦ δὲ καὶ ἄλλοθι: see Madvig's Greek Syntax p. 172 Rem. 5.

κατὰ νοῦν = 'ex animi sententia': as in Soph. 217 D εἶ τίς σοι κατὰ νοῦν.

24. οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ τὴν ἐμὴν. The idiom οἶμαι δὲ καὶ is frequent in Plato, followed either by the accusative (with infinitive) or by the nominative, since οἶμαι is often merely parenthetical: Schanz quotes (inter alia) Lach. 180 οἶμαι δὲ καὶ Λάκτητα τόνδε and Crat. 402 B οἶμαι δὲ καὶ Ἡσιόδος. ἐμὲ is here preferred to the more regular ἔγὼ to prevent the doubt as to whether ἔγὼ is the subject to οἶμαι or to the infinitive (understood): the other possible construction (the omission of ἐμὲ) is not chosen because an antithesis is wanted to σοῦ. Similarly in Soph. 234 E οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ τῶν ἐτι πόρρωθεν ἀφεσμοκτόνω εἶναι: and so regularly in Plato when οἶμαι δὲ καὶ is followed by the 1st pers. pron. with the infinitive, not οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἔγω. There is only one previous allusion to Euthyphro's δίκη: viz. in 2A οῦ γὰρ ποὺ καὶ οἱ γῆ δίκη τῆς οὖσα τυγχάνει—ὡσπέρ ἐμοὶ.

CHAPTER IV.

In chapters IV and V we are gradually introduced to the subject of the dialogue—what is piety?

Chapter IV explains the suit instituted by Euthyphro—an accusation of manslaughter against his father. Euthyphro allows that to bring such an accusation implies a knowledge of τὰ θεῖα and of τὰ ὁσιά τε καὶ ἀνύσια.

1. ἐστίν δὲ δὴ σοι κτλ. The effect of the order is to throw
emphasize on ἡ δίκη. So infra in 4 Α ἐστιν δὲ τὶ τὸ ἐγκλημα κτλ. ‘But your lawsuit, Euthyphro, what is it?’ so is probably emphatic: for which reason I have accented it.

2. φεύγεις αὐτὴν ἡ διώκεις; αὐτὴν is in both cases the internal accusative: see Thompson’s Greek Syntax p. 66. φεύγειν ‘to be a defendant’ is used as the passive of διώκειν ‘to prosecute’. So πάσχω ἐκπίπτω ἀποθνήσκω πρόσκειμαι μανθάνω etc. are used as passives of ποιῶ ἐκβάλλω ἀποκτείνω προστέθεικα διδάσκω etc.

4. τίνα; masculine (as Euthyphro’s answer shews), and the external accusative: so we find τιππειν τίνα πληγάς and the like: Thompson Gk. Syntax p. 66.

5. αὐ δοκῶ μαίνεσθαι. αὐ refers to 3 C καταγελῶσιν ὡς μανωμένου. Phocion thought he was wrong when Athens applauded him: Euthyphro thinks himself right when Athens thinks him mad. αὐ goes with μαίνεσθαι. Graser changes ὤν to ἡν, not seeing that τίνα is masculine.

6. πετόμενον τίνα διώκεις; =‘are you on a wild goose chase?’ Socrates playfully understands διώκεις in its literal sense. The proverb τὰ πετόμενα διώκεις might well be applied to a madman (αὐ δοκῶ μαίνεσθαι); it is found also in Arist. Met. Ι 1009b 37—39. πῶς οὐκ ἄξων ἀνυμῆσαι τοὺς φιλοσοφεῖν ἐγχειροῦται; τὸ γὰρ τὰ πετόμενα διώκεις τὸ γητεῖν ἂν εἰς τὴν ἀλῆθειαν. In Aesch. Ag. 394 διώκει παῖς ποταμὸν ὅρμων and probably in Gorg. 471 C ἡ ἔφι διώκοντα ἐμπεσεῖν καὶ ἀποθανεῖν there is an allusion to the same proverb: cf. Euthyd. 291 Β ὥσπερ τὰ παιδία τὰ τοὺς κορύδους διώκοντα: Ar. Αν. 169 ἀνθρωπος βρῶσις ἀστάθμητος, πετόμενος and Theocritus vi 17 καὶ φεύγει φιλέοντα καὶ αὐ φιλέοντα διώκει.

7. δεῖ is personal as in Apol. 30 D πολλοῦ δεῖ—ἀπολογείσθαι.

8. εῦ μᾶλα πρεσβύτης. To the same effect Tyrtaeus Frag. 10. 19 τοὺς δὲ παλαιστέρους, ὡν οὐκετί γονυντ’ ἐλαφρά κτλ. εῦ μᾶλα, originally an epic phrase (Hom. Od. xxii 190 εῦ μάλ’ ἀποστρέφαντε κτλ.), is frequent in Athenian conversational style. μᾶλα qualifies εῦ, not vice versa. μάλ’ εῦ is rarer, e.g. Theaet. 156 Α μάλ’ εῦ ἄμουσιν.


13. ἔστιν δὲ τὶ—δίκη; the order as in 3 E above. ἐγκλημα is τὸ ἐγκεκλημένον, the charge as distinct from the trial: Schanz quotes Isocr. περὶ τοῦ Ἐνγους § 2, τὰς μὲν γὰρ δίκας ὑπὲρ τῶν ἱδίων ἐγκλημάτων λαγχάνουσι. The object of a δίκη is placed in the
genitive, which is here originally adjectival: ‘trials of manslaughter’ (φόνον) = ‘manslaughter trials’.

15. Ἡράκλεις. A strong expression of wonder, much stronger than merely to repeat the word φόνον; (cf. supra ὁ σῶς, ὃ βελτιστεῖ). The expression is common in Attic conversation, with or without ὁ, e.g. Symp. 213 B ὁ Ἡράκλεις, τουτέ τι ἦν: cf. Ar. Av. 277 ὅνα ἦς Ἡράκλεις: Lys. 208 ὥ Ἡράκλεις, ἦν ὁ ἐγώ, μῶν μή τι ἧδικκας τὸν πατέρα ἥ τὴν μητέρα; Originally no doubt the appeal was to Heracles as ἀλεξικακος or σωτῆρ: so Ἀπολλον is used in exclamations Ἀπολλον ἀποτρόπαιε.

ἡ ποἱ—ὅπη ποτῇ [ὀρθῶς] ἔχεις. The difficulties of this passage are very great. There is no variant in the mss.

Madvig (Adversaria Critica I 366) and Schanz assume a lacuna in the first clause, in order to provide a subject to ἔχει: for the subject cannot be vaguely ‘things in general’, nor can ὁρθῶς ἔχει be the same as τὸ ὁρθὸν ἔχει. To insert εὐσεβεῖν (as Madvig suggests) would be prematurely to anticipate the mention of the subject treated in the dialogue, viz. εὐσεβεῖν or ὁσίτης, which (after the manner of Plato, who wished to preserve the semblance of a conversation: see on Crito 47 A) is reserved for a later stage (4 E). At the same time, if ἔχει is retained, it seems certain from ὁρθῶς αὐτὸ πράξαι that an infinitive is the subject to ἔχει: and the only relevant subject is ‘to prosecute one’s father for manslaughter’. Either therefore τὸ ἐγκαλεῖν (sc. πατρὶ φόνον) must be supplied from ἐγκλημα above, or we must assume the loss of some phrase to the same effect, probably τὸ ἐπεξείναι πατρὶ φόνον in view of the frequent recurrence of these words throughout the chapter (οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποιεῖ—ἐπεξεῖνισθα φόνου αὐτῷ, and again ἐπεξείναι in B: in D τῷ πατρὶ φόνον ἐπεξέρχομαι: and especially ἀνύσιον γὰρ εἶναι τὸ νῖν πατρὶ φόνον ἐπεξείναι in E). Now it will be admitted that while on the one hand it is harsh to supply τὸ ἐγκαλεῖν πατρὶ φόνον from ἐγκλημα, the insertion on the other hand of the phrase τὸ ἐπεξείναι πατρὶ φόνον, whether after ἔχει or πολλῶν—and the latter position would be preferable—makes the sentence at once too cumbersome and too precise.

But even if we allow that ἔχει has some such subject, expressed or understood, a further difficulty presents itself in the precise meaning of the words ὁρθῶς αὐτὸ πράξαι. The clause introduced by οὐ γὰρ must either give the reason or the proof of the ignorance of the many. Obviously, no proof is here given, and if a reason is to
be assigned, we should expect, instead of ὄρθως αὐτὸ πράξαι something like ὄρθως αὐτὸ ἐγνωκέναι. I formerly thought of ὄρθως αὐτὸ τάξαι in the sense of ‘to rank it rightly’, ‘rate it rightly’ (cf. Euthyd. 279 C τὸν δὲ σοφίαν ποὺ χορὸν τάξωμεν); but I now think the error lies in ὅτη ποτὲ ὄρθως ἔχει.

First, as to ὄρθως. ὄρθως can hardly be right on any view, for even if we retain ἔχει, the only relevant meaning is ‘the many do not know the truth about τὸ ἐπεξείναι πατρὶ φόνου, for they cannot ὄρθως αὐτὸ πράξαι’, not ‘the many do not know how such a prosecution is to be justified’: the following οὐ γάρ clause can in no way be viewed as a reason for the statement in the preceding clause, if ὄρθως is retained there. I therefore agree with Madvig in supposing that the word has been wrongly inserted from ὄρθως in ὄρθως αὐτὸ πράξαι.

Second, as to ἔχει. Even with the omission of ὄρθως, it is by no means easy to supply the correct subject to ἔχει. If ἔχεις is read, we obtain (I think) a satisfactory meaning and escape all possible risk of obscurity. ‘Good Heavens!’ cries Socrates, ‘surely the many are ignorant of your condition: for it is not every one who could do rightly what you do, but only one far advanced in wisdom’. The force of αὐτὸ in αὐτὸ πράξαι is ‘the thing in question’ viz. τὸ ἐγκαλεῖν: and as regards the sentiment, we have already had several indications of the indifference or contempt with which the people regarded Euthyphro, e.g. 3 C ὅταν τι λέγω ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ περὶ τῶν θεῶν, προλέγων αὐτοῖς τὰ μέλλουτα, καταγελώσιν ὡς μαίνομένοι, 3 D—E and 4 A. In accordance with his usual theory, Socrates ascribes the injustice of the Athenians in their treatment of Euthyphro to ignorance.

17. ἐπιτυχόντος is followed by εἶναι in T. Schanz remarks that where the verb substantive appears in only one of the two leading mss (B and T), we are justified in assuming interpolation. The aorist (not the present) participle of ἐπιτυχάνω (προστυχάνω, τυχάνω) is regularly used as ‘der erste beste’ = εἰς τῶν πολλῶν.

αὐτὸ πράξαι: αὐτὸ is τοῦθ’ ὁ σῶ πράττεις i.e. ἐπεξείναι πατρὶ φόνου.

4 B 18. πόρρω—σοφίας ἐλαύνοντος. So in Crat. 410 E πόρρω ἡ ζη, οἴμαι, φαίνομαι σοφίας ἐλαύνειν. The metaphor is doubtless from the race-course.

20. ἐστιν δὲ δὴ τῶν οἰκείων. For the order see on 3 E above. In early times it was only the relations of a murdered man who
were permitted to exercise the right of blood-revenge: and when the State undertook the punishment of manslaughter, the right to act as prosecutor was confined to certain relatives of the victim, or (if he were a μέτοικος or δοῦλος) to his προστάτης or δεσπότης. See Gilbert's Handbuch der Griechischen Staatsalterthümer i p. 365.

Two passages appear to contradict this principle of Attic law—viz. Demosthenes (?) in Neeraam § 9 and the present passage. But in the Demosthenic speech there is nothing to shew that the woman killed was not the prosecutor's slave. Various theories have been suggested to account for Euthyphro's position. Stallbaum conjectures that in the eye of the law Euthyphro may have been his master. In Lipsius' edition of Meier and Schömann's Der Attische Process p. 199 note 10 it is argued that the whole reasoning in the Euthyphro is intended to conform to moral law but not necessarily to the Athenian. I think the correct solution is to be found in Euthyphro's fanaticism: he was just the man to lodge a charge which the law would not receive, by way of protest. We have seen similar protests in our own days: and it should be remembered that Plato nowhere says that the archon received the charge. [So also Liebhold (in Wochenschrift für Klassische Philologie 1888 No. 40. p. 1227) says everything points to Euthyphro's bringing the charge even “ohne das formelle Recht dazu auf seiner Seite zu haben”.

ό τεθνεώς. The present θνησκόω is hardly used in the best Attic prose: ἀποθνησκόω takes its place. On the other hand τέθνηκα, not ἄποτέθνηκα, is used. See Rutherford's Babrius p. 36. For ἀποθνήσκω as passive to ἀποκτενῶ see above on 3 e, line 2.

21. ἢ δῆλα δῆ; so Schanz, rightly understanding the words as a question. ἢ; = Latin An? introduces a second question intended to anticipate Euthyphro's answer to the first: see on Apol. 26 β ἢ δῆλον δῆ δτι κτλ.; Wohlrab (adopting Schanz's earlier reading) prints a colon after δῆ.

οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποὺ ὑπὲρ γε ἄλλοτρίου κτλ. So T and Schanz: in B γε follows ποὺ. ἄλλοτρίος: alienus:: οἰκεῖος: proprius. Socrates implies that Euthyphro's conduct was not permissible on legal as well as on moral grounds; see on ἐστὶν δὲ δῆ τῶν οἰκεῖων in line 20 above.

23. γελοιον is different from καταγέλαστον as γελάν from καταγελάν: see on Crito 53 A and cf. Symp. 189 B φοβοῦμαι—οὕτι μή γελοίαι εἰπώ—ἀλλὰ μὴ καταγέλαστα. The omission of the copula is commonest in Plato with ἔστιν: εἴ and ἐσμέν are sometimes omitted: ἦν rarely: εἶναι very often: parts of the conjunctive and optative are very seldom left out. See Schanz Novae Commentationes Platonicae 31—35 and Cope on Aristotle’s Rhetoric Vol. 2, p. 328.

25. ἔκτεινεν ὁ κτεῖνας. A frequent idiom in Plato: cf. Apol. 20 οὗ ταυτί μοι δοκεῖ δίκαια λέγειν ὁ λέγων. Notice that κτείνω is rare in Attic prose: it is found chiefly in the older writers, or with an archaic and solemn effect, as here. ἀποκτείνω is generally used instead.

26. εἰ μὲν ἐν δίκη. ἐν δίκη is an idiomatic adverbial phrase=ἐνδίκως. The cases of justifiable homicide are enumerated in Gilbert’s Handbuch der Gr. Staatsalterthümer 1 p. 363. They were these: unintentional slaughter of an opponent in the games or of a comrade in war; the killing of an adulterer discovered with one’s wife, mother, sister, daughter or legal concubine; and manslaughter in self-defence. Meier and Schömann Der Attische Process II p. 377 add cases of tyrannicide, and where one killed a man who had plotted to overthrow the democracy with or without success, or who had occupied a leading position under oligarchical or tyrannical government.

27. ἐπεξείναι—ὅμορπαξεος ἦ. This is the only point in which Euthyphro’s view transcends the standpoint of ordinary Athenian morality. He sees that family ties have nothing to do with the question of right and wrong: and so far Plato agreed with him. But his motive in prosecuting his father is mostly (though not entirely, see on 5 ἀ) self-regarding, viz. a desire to escape the μίασμα coming from daily life with one whom he knew to be guilty: whereas Plato, who regards punishment mainly in its corrective aspect, suggests that one should prosecute one’s friends rather for their own sake, to set them free from the greatest of all diseases, sin. See Gorg. 48ο οὐκ πρῶτον διὰ καθηγορον καὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ χρώμενον τῇ ῥήτορικῇ ὀπως ἄν καταδήλων τῶν ἄδικημάτων γιγνομένων ἀπαλλάττωντα τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ, ἅδικια. ἕναν περ is not=‘although’, a meaning which it never bears, but ‘that is to say, if’. Euthyphro implies that one is not bound to prosecute unless the guilty man lives under one’s own roof: only then is one exposed to μίασμα. It is in harmony with
his self-regarding morality to reason in this way. Schanz needlessly (I think) changes the text to εάνπερ χω = ‘although indeed’.

28. ὦσον—μιᾶσμα γίγνεται: i.e. whether the person killed is 4C ἀλλότριος or οἰκεῖος. For the communication of the taint of guilt Stallbaum compares Hor. Carm. iii 2. 26 foll. ‘Vetabo, qui Cereris sacrum Volgarit arcanae, sub idem Sit trabibus fragilernve mecum Solvat phaselon. Saepe Diespiter Neglectus incesto addidit integrum’; and Schanz Antiphon Tetr. i i. io ἀδύμφορον θ’ ὑμῶν ἐστιν τόνδε μιαρόν καὶ ἀνάγινον δυντα εἰς τὰ τεμένη τῶν θεῶν εἰσίντα μιᾶνεν τὴν ἀγνειαν αὐτῶν, ἐπὶ τε τὰς αὐτὰς τραπέζας δύντα συγκαταπίπταναι τοὺς ἀναιτίους. So in Soph. Oed. Tyr. 241—2 ὢθεῖν δ’ ὁ ἀκρόπαντα, ὡς μιᾶςματος τοῦδ’ ἡμῖν δυτος. Plato himself, speaking of the slayer in much the same vein as Euthyphro here, ordains (Legg. ix 868 ε) κατελθὼν δὲ ὅ τι τοιοῦτον δρᾶσας τοὺς αὐτοῦ παισὶν ἱερῶν μὴ κοινωνεῖτο μηδὲ ὦμοτράπεζος γιγνέσθω ποτέ.

29. τῷ τοιούτῳ goes with ξυνήγει rather than with ξυνειδόσ.

アルバム. The first clear hint is here given of the subject of the dialogue viz. τὸ δειον καὶ τὸ ἀνόσσον.

30. ἐπεί ὑ γε ἀποθανών. ἐπεί is virtually = ‘although’, ‘and yet’: see on Apol. i 9 ε where is quoted Prot. 335 C ἐγώ δὲ τὰ μακρὰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατος, ἐπεί ἐβουλόμην ἄν οἶδο τ’ εἶναι. Here too its force is obscured by an ellipse: “(But neither was the victim quite ἀλλότριος) for the murdered man was a day-labourer of my own”. A πελάτης was a freeman, who hired himself out as a day-labourer (θής cf. 15 Λ): Timaeus explains the word as ὁ ἀντὶ τροφῶν ὑπηρετῶν καὶ προσπελάζων. The word was used in Graeco-Roman times to translate the Roman cliens: but there is no reason for supposing that the employer was in any way the legal representative of the πελάτης.

31. ἐγενργοῦμεν. Euthyphro’s father was perhaps a κληρούχος in Naxos. If so, as the Athenians had to give up their κληρούχαι after the battle of Aegospotami in 404, at least 5 years must be supposed to elapse between the death of the πελάτης and Euthyphro’s indictment of his father. There was probably no νόμος τῆς προθεσμίας relating to cases of φόνος (see Meier and Schömann Der Attische Process ii pp. 838—840): but was Euthyphro’s conscience sleeping all this time? Or did he and his father occupy separate houses? Most probably Plato does not mean the dates to be pressed too closely. It is however possible that Euthyphro and his father
were farming in Naxos even after 404, not as κληροῦχοι, but in some other capacity.

32. παροινήσας οὖν. οὖν continues the story as in ὁ ὁ τον πατὴρ below. παροινεῖν means to forget oneself in one's cups. With the order in τῶν οἰκετῶν τινι τῶν ἡμετέρων Schanz compares Apol. 33 διὰ τῶν οἰκελών τινάς τῶν ἐκείνων. ἀποσφάττει presently is a strong word and denotes a brutal murder.

34. συνδήσας—καταβαλὼν. For the collocation of participles cf. 9 Α δοὺς ἂν θητεύων ἀνδροφόνος γενόμενος, ἐυνεθεῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου—φθάσῃ τελευτήσας:

36. ἐξηγητός. The ἐξηγηταὶ formed a College of three members, according to Suidas (cf. also 9 Α), apparently under one head, here called ἐξηγητής (κατ’ ἐξοχήν): besides other religious duties, they were especially concerned with purification from blood-guiltiness (οἷς μέλει καθαίρειν τοὺς ἁγεῖ τινι ἐναχθέντας Suidas l.c.). Schöll in Hermes vi 36 foll. makes it probable that the members of the board were partly chosen by Apollo as πάτροις ἐξηγητής: apparently the Athenians selected 9 out of whom 3 were chosen by the Delphic representative of Apollo, one from each triad.

ὅ τι χρέι ποιεῖν. So apparently B, followed by Schanz: Wohl- rab (with T) reads χρῆ. The-latter is probably due to an assimilation in tense to the historical present πέμπει: after which the optative in a subordinate clause is quite regular: cf. Gorg. 512 Α λογίζεται οὖν ὅτι οὐκ—τούτῳ δὲ βιωτεόν ἐστί καὶ τούτον ὄνησειν (so mss: Schanz ὄνησει), where ὄνησειν = ὄνησα of direct speech.

38. ὄλγωρεῖ τε καὶ ἡμέλει. ἀμελεῖν is stronger than ὄλγωρεῖν (ὀλίγη, ὀρα).

οὐδὲν οὖν πράγμα. See for οὐδὲν πράγμα above on 3 c. For the collocation of genitive and accusative absolute Schanz compares Rep. x 604 Β ὥς οὕτε δῆλον ὄντως τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ τῶν τοιούτων, οὕτε εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν οὐδὲν προβαίνων τῷ χαλεπῶς φέροντι, οὕτε τι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἄξιον ὅν μεγάλης σπουδῆς. I think ei καὶ ἀποθάνοι is simply 'though he should die' and not si vel perirel, as Wohlrab and Schanz take the phrase.

39. ὅπερ οὖν καὶ ἐπαθεῖν: much as in Euthyd. 283 Α ὅπερ οὖν καὶ συνεβῆ ἡμῖν.

40. τῶν δεσμῶν ἀποθύσκει: δεσμά = chains; δεσμοὶ = cases of imprisonment (δεσμός i.q. τὸ δεθέοι). See Apology 32 c and Rutherford's New Phrynnichus p. 353: 'The masculine and neuter inflexions are not interchangeable, and though δεσμός is occasionally
used for δεσμά, no Attic writer ever employed δεσμά for δεσμον'.
Contrast infra 9 ἀ τελευτήσας διὰ τὰ δεσμά with Rep. 11 378 D Ἰρας
de δεσμοῦς ύπὸ τοῖς κτλ. On the form ἀποθνήσκω (not ἀπόθνησκω)
see Meisterhans Grammatik der Attischen Inschriften 2 p. 50.

42. ταύτα δή οὖν καί. καί goes with the pronoun as in the
familiar δ καί. ταύτα is strictly speaking the internal accusative
after ἀγανακτεῖ: its use here is akin to the use of ταύτα δή, ταύτ'
ἀρα = διὰ ταύτα κτλ., for which see on Apol. 23 B.

43. ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀνδροφόνου: τῶν is justified not so much because
the person has been already mentioned, as because it adds to the
force of the indignation: 'in defence of that manslayer' (slowly and
with emphasis).

44. ὡς φασίν ἔκεινοι. They doubtless maintained that death
was due to natural causes.

45. εἰ δὲ τῷ μάλιστά ἀπέκτεινεν: 'were it never so true that he
had killed him': cf. 9 c εἰ δὲ τι μάλιστά (si vel maxime) με
Εὐθύφρων διδάξειν—τὶ μᾶλλον ἐγὼ μεμάθηκα κτλ. In historians
and orators εἰ τὰ μάλιστα is sometimes used in the same sense:
Demosthenes περὶ τοῦ στεφάνου § 95 συκοφαντιάς οὐσας ἐπιδείξω μὴ
μῶνον τῷ ψευδείς εἶναι—ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ, εἰ τὰ μάλιστα ἦσαν
ἀληθεῖς κτλ.

46. ἀνδροφόνου γε ὄντος. The γε shews that this clause is
equivalent to a clause expressing condition.

οὐ δεῖν. The negative is repeated, partly because ὦτ' εἰ δὲ τῷ
μάλιστα is somewhat remote, but still more for emphasis. I think
οὐ δεῖν is the infinitive: the indirect is justified by the preceding
ὡς φασίν ἔκεινοι, exactly as in Herodotus 1 65 ὡς δ' αὐτοὶ Δακε-
δαιμόνιοι λέγουσι, Δυκοῦργοι—ἐκ Κρήτης ἄγα γέσθαι ταύτα, where
see Stein, who shews that this anacolouthentic idiom is common in
Herodotus, and found also in Aesch. Pers. 188 τοῦτω στάσιν τιν' ὡς
ἐγὼ ἑδόκουν ὁρᾶν, τεῦχειν ἐπ' ἀλλήλαισι. See also Sophocles
Trach. 1240 ἀνήρ δ' ὡς ἐοικεν οὖ νέμειν ἐμοί φθινοντι μοῦραν,
with Blaydes' note. In Plato the idiom is comparatively rare: e.g.
Phileb. 20 D τόδε γε μήν, ὡς οἴμαι, περὶ αὐτοῦ ἀναγκαίητατον εἶναι
λέγειν: Soph. 263 D and Euthyd. 280 D δεῖν (so BT: Schanz δεῖ,
rightly I think, because the ὡς clause follows) ἀρα, ὡς ἐοικεν.
Crat. 399 D ὥσπερ τούνων μοι δοκεῖ τούτοις ἔξης εἶναι τι χρῆμα is not
a case in point, for ὥσπερ qualifies the whole expression: still less is
Crat. 384 C ὥσπερ ὑποπτεύω αὐτὸν σκόπτειν. The idiom has a
colloquial effect.
Stephanus read δείν, not δείν. The syntax would then resemble ὡς ἀνδροφόνον καὶ οὐδὲν ὅν πράγμα in line 38. δείν is retained by Schanz and explained as a participle: δείν : δένω :: πλείν : πλέον. The existence of such a participle is attested by some ancient grammarians, and by Hesychius (δείν· χρῆ, ἀναγκαῖον, πρέπον, ἢ προσήκον); and Hertlein (Neue Jahrbücher für Phil. und Paedagogik 1867, p. 474) finds another example of it in Plato's Charmides 164 ε ὡς τοὺτον μὲν οὐκ ὁρθὸν ὑντος τοῦ προσρήματος—οὐδὲ δείν τοῦτο παρακελεύσθαι ἄλληλοι, while other alleged examples of its occurrence have been found in Xen. Hell. vii 4. 39 κατηγόροσ καὶ οὐ ὁ λεύκον ἀποθανεῖν, Lysias xiv § 7 ἀστρατείας μὲν γὰρ δικαίως ἀν αὐτῶν ἀλώναι—δείλιας δὲ τι δείν αὐτῶν (so Stephanus: mss δεῖ ἐκαστον) μετὰ τῶν ὀπλιτῶν κυνόμευεν ἵππευεν εἰλετο, and Ar. Frag. 220 (ed. Kock) εἰς τάς τρυπήρεις δείν (mss δεῖ μ') ἀναλοῦν ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τείχη κτλ. The whole subject is discussed at length in Jahrb. für Philol. for 1872, p. 741 by Usener, who derives δείν from δείω (participle of δείω, an assumed bye-form of δείω), like πλείν for πλεῖον and οἶμαι for οἴομαι: also in σμικρῷ, ὀλγῷ, ἐνὸς δείν and the like, he takes δείν as a participle, and ingeniously multiplies examples by emending in Thuc. vi 12 ἐνθάδ' εἶναι to ἐνθα δείν. But none of the examples hitherto cited seem to be enough to establish the use in Attic Greek: I therefore agree with Kock (l. c.) in looking on the usage as Byzantine.

4 E 47. ἀνόσιον γὰρ εἶναι κτλ. The second hint of the subject of the dialogue, here in its negative aspect: the first or positive indication comes in C εἶναι—μὴ ἀφοσιός (i. q. δοσὶν ποιήσ ἀπὸ τούτων). Presently the subject is hinted at in both aspects: τὸ θεῖον ὡς ἔχει τοῦ ὀσίου τε περὶ καὶ τοῦ ἀνόσιου: but it is not till 5 D that the subject is first explicitly announced: λέγε δὴ, τὶ φῆς εἶναι τὸ ὀσίου καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον; Schanz regards the words ἀνόσιον γὰρ—ἐπεξειώναι as a marginal note: but without them the subject would not be introduced so gradually as is Plato's wont.

49. τοῦ ὀσίου τε περὶ καὶ τοῦ ἀνοσίου. περὶ when it goes with two substantives is regularly placed between them. Only περὶ and ἐνεκα among Greek prepositions are permitted to follow their case in Attic prose. Schanz says of τὸ θεῖον ὡς ἔχει 'verba interpolata esse videntur': in his annotated edition he conjectures that they represent a marginal gloss τὸ ὀσίον ὡς ἔχει, θείον and ὀσίον being frequently confounded. I think the words are genuine, (1) because οἰεὶ ἐπιστασθαί περὶ τῶν θείων follows immediately,
(2) because what Euthyphro means is that ἄνόσιον γὰρ εἶναι—ἐπεξείναι is not a belief entertained by the gods (whence the emphatic place of τὸ θεῖον), but mere ἀνθρώπων φλυαρία καὶ ούδενός ἄξια (Gorg. 492 c). τὸ θεῖον ὡς ἔχει simply means ‘the position of the gods’, and is parallel to τῶν θείων ὑπη ἔχει in Socrates’ reply.

50. Ὡς Ἐυθύφρων—ἀκριβῶς ολεὶ ἐπιστασθαί. Here and in ἀκριβῶς εἰςεῖν of line 58 there is perhaps an allusion to the etymological meaning of ἐυθύφρων ‘right minded’.

53. Ὡς σὺ λέγεις. The insertion of σὺ shews that Socrates accepts Euthyphro’s narrative only provisionally.

54. ὅπως μὴ αὖ σὺ. ὅπως μὴ after verbs of fearing makes the object of apprehension appear more vividly as something to be shunned. For parallel cases see Goodwin M. T. p. 82. ad=vicissim: lest you, who censure others for not knowing τὸ ὅσιον, be yourself guilty of τὸ ἄνόσιον. Presently πράγμα is meant to recall τοῦτων οὕτω πραξάντων: and τυγχάνεις πράττων virtually = be really doing: see Verrall on Medea 608. Plato himself would not have considered Euthyphro’s father as deserving of prosecution for murder: see Legg. IX 865 C ἔαν μὲν δούλον κτείνῃ νομίζων τὸν ἑαυτὸν διειργάσαθι, τὸν τὸν τελευτήσαντος δεσπότην ἄβλαβῇ παρε-χεῖτο καὶ ἀξίημον, ἢ δίκην εἰς τὴν ἄξιαν τοῦ τελευτήσαντος ὑπεχέτω διπλήν.


57. οὐδέ τω ἂν διαφέροι Ἐυθύφρων. τῳ is of course dative of amount of difference. διαφέρειν is ‘to excel’ rather than ‘to differ’: Crito 49 ἐλάθομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς παλὸν ὁδὲν διαφέροντες. The effect of διαφέροι Ἐυθύφρων=διαφέρομεν ἐγὼ is to make Euthyphro’s conceit more conspicuous, by putting the praise as it were into the mouth of a second party. Wohlrab compares Soph. Ajax 98 where Ajax says ῥοτ’ ὄσιν αἰνηθ’ ὀδὴν ἀτιμᾶσαν’ ἑτοί. Cf. Iliad 1 240 ἄτιμον θάλας ποθὴ ζύεται νίκας ‘Αχαιῶν: Plautus Rudens 1245 ‘minime istuc faciet noster Daemones’ (the Daemones I know). Much the same effect is produced by the pompous use of the article in Theaet. 166 ἂ γέλωτα δὴ τὸν ἐμὲ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀπέδειξεν.

τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων: contemptuously: nearly = ‘the rout of 5 A
human beings': I am more than a mere ἄιθρωπος, I am a θεῖος ἀνήρ.

58. εἶ μη...εἰδεῖν. For the change from the third to the first person, cf. (with Schanz) Phaed. 91 C συμκρόν φροντίσαντες Σωκράτους, τῆς δὲ ἄληθείας πολὺ μᾶλλον, εὰν μὲν τι ὑμῶν δοκῶ ἄληθες λέγειν. The idiom is regular in Greek: see Jebb on Ajax 864. The second hand in T reads εἰδεῖν.

CHAPTER V

forms a transition to the subject of the dialogue. See Introduction, p. viii. Socrates proposes to become Euthyphro's pupil, so as to learn the nature of piety and impiety, and shift the accusation from Socrates the pupil to Euthyphro the teacher.

1. ὁ θαυμάσιος Εὐθύφρον: 'admirable Euthyphro' (sarcastically). See on Crito 44 B ὁ δαμώνει Σωκράτης. To be called θαυμάσιος is a left-handed compliment: for θαυμάζειν means 'to be surprised at' as well as 'to esteem', like the old English 'admire'. This form of address is common in Plato: e.g. 8 A, 8 D, Symp. 222 E, Crat. 439 C.

3. πρὸ τῆς γραφῆς: Before either the ἀνάκρισις or trial proper began, either party could challenge the other (προκαλείσθαι, πρόκλησις) in the presence of witnesses to take some particular step. In case the challenge was declined, evidence was given at the trial (ἐν τῷ δ.καστηρίῳ: see infra on B) that such a challenge had been given and refused, with a view to prejudice the refuser's case. See for example the form of μαρτυρία in Demosthenes κατὰ Στέφανον Λ § 8 Στέφανος — 'Εὐδίας—Σκύθης—μαρτυροῦσι παρεῖναι πρὸς τῷ διαίτητι Τιαία Ἀχαρνές, ὅτε προνικαλεῖτο Φορμίων Ἀπολλόδωρον—ἀνολγεῖν τὰς διαθήκας τὰς Πασίωνος κτλ. In the present case the effect of Meletus' refusal to accept the challenge of Socrates would be to make it appear that Meletus' motive was not public spirit, but private animosity: cf. Apol. 23 E Μελητός μοι ἐπέθετο—ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν ἄχθόμενος. See Meier und Schömann Att. Process 11 pp. 872 ff.

4. λέγοντα after μοι as in Crito 51 D ὡς ἔν μη ἄρεσκομεν ήμεῖς, ἐξεῖναι λαβόντα τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀπέναι. In both cases the accusative is due to the preceding infinitive.

ὁτι ἔγγυς...σός. Note the curious mixture of the direct and
indirect speech. From ἐγωγε down to εἰδέναι, or rather strictly speaking down to καλ νῦν, we have Socrates' ipsissima verba, addressed (in the hypothetical case) to Meletus: after καλ νῦν we should expect ἐπειδὴ με σὺ (i.e. Μέλητος)—φήσι—Εὐθύφρονος (in place of σῶς): instead of this, Socrates wishing to address Euthyphro directly says μαθητὴς δὴ γέγονα σῶς: so that to prevent ambiguity ἐκεῖνος—φησὶ must take the place of σὺ—φῆς just before.

7. αὐτοσχεδίαζοντα φησὶ καλ καινοτομοῦντα. For αὐτοσχεδίαζειν (to improvise, speak, think, act on one's own initiative and hence hastily and unadvisedly) see on Apol. 2ο c (ίνα μὴ ἡμεῖς περὶ σοῦ αὐτοσχεδίαζωμεν). The phrase is pathetically repeated in the end of the dialogue (16 Α) when Euthyphro has proved a broken reed. For καινοτομοῦντα see on 3 β: there we find καινοτομοῦντις σοῦ περὶ τὰ θεῖα, because the metaphor is more prominent (‘a coiner of novelties in regard to divine matters’): here καινοτομοῦντα περὶ τῶν θείων (‘coining novelties about’ etc.). Cobet in Mnemosyne iii (N. S.), p. 281 would bracket καλ καινοτομοῦντα, holding the words to be an interpolation from 16 Α. He further adds: “Graecum est καινοτομεῖν, ut σπουδάζειν, περὶ τί non περὶ τινος ut καινοτομῶ περὶ αὐτά et pag. 3 β ὥς ὅσον καινοτομοῦντος σοῦ περὶ τὰ θεῖα”. But αὐτοσχεδίαζειν περὶ σοῦ in the Apology is enough to defend the construction, and the occurrence of καινοτομῶ περὶ αὐτά in 16 Α is really an argument for the genuineness of the words here, since 16 Α is intended as a reminiscence of this passage. The indictment against Socrates is given in the note on 2 c.

8. μαθητής δὴ γέγονα σῶς. δὴ adds a touch of sarcasm (‘why of course’). The peculiar cadence is intended to throw ludicrous emphasis on σῶς, as in Horace’s ‘ridiculus mus’ and Martial’s ‘Unus de cunctis animalibus hircus habet cor’ (xi 84. 17). Notice the implication that to learn τὰ εὐσεβή is to be εὐσεβῆς.

9. καλ...φαίην ἄν. Herewith Socrates as is his wont breaks 5 β into direct speech. καλ of course goes with φαίην ἄν.

εἰ μὲν...τὰ τοιαύτα. Meletus would not be likely to: see on 3 c ὅταν τι λέγω ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ περὶ τῶν θείων καταγελῶσιν ὥς μανικομένου. The position of Εὐθύφρονος after the pause is meant to suggest ironically that Euthyphro was an authority on the question.

10. καλ ὡρθᾶς νομίζειν...δικάζου. The first καλ goes with the third in the sense of ‘both—and’: ἡγοῦ being parallel to μὴ δικάζου. The second καλ is ‘also’, i.e. ‘as well as Euthyphro’ and
goes with ἐμέ. Schanz and Wohlrab omit the second καὶ with B: but as it is found in T and as a correction in B, and would more naturally fall out than be inserted, I think it right. The old punctuation was τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ὀρθῶς νομίζειν, καὶ ἐμέ: Schanz set this right. If any change were necessary, I should prefer to read ὀρθῶς νομίζειν καὶ ἐμὲ ἡγοῦ καὶ μὴ δικάζου, assuming that καὶ before ἐμὲ was wrongly placed before ὀρθῶς in B: b then inserted it before ἐμὲ without striking it out before ὀρθῶς.

ὀρθῶς νομίζειν: 'to be orthodox'. νομίζειν is especially used of belief in the gods: see on 3 b above.

II. ἐκεῖνῳ τῷ διδασκάλῳ. τῷ διδασκάλῳ is meant to explain ἐκεῖνῳ: a pause should be made in reading after ἐκεῖνῳ. This I think more likely than to take ἐκεῖνῳ as = ἱλί = 'that famous'.

12. λάχε δίκην πρότερον ἦ ἐμὸι. λαγχάνεων δίκην τινι is to bring an accusation against one. The original meaning was 'to obtain (by lot) one's rights': hence to obtain leave to discuss one's rights. The reason why λαγχάνεων (to get by lot) was chosen in preference to λαμβάνειν in this phrase seems to have been that in cases of simultaneous charges the order of precedence was determined by lot. Meier und Schömann 379-794.

ὡς τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους διαφθείροντι. It might fairly be argued that it is worse to corrupt the young than to corrupt the old, and that so far Socrates was worse than Euthyphro: but Socrates means that to prosecute Euthyphro would be to get at the foins et origo mali, the corrupter of the corrupters. Euthyphro as Socrates' teacher would be just as responsible for Socrates' ill-doing as Socrates was for that of Alcibiades: and it was largely owing to Alcibiades' misconduct that Socrates was accused: see Apol. § 33 and notes. Note the double meaning in διαφθείροντι: taken with ἐμὲ μὲν, it = κακὸν ποιεῖν, with ἐκεῖνον, κακῶς ποιεῖν (or worse); and κακῶς ποιεῖν in Greek is κακὸν ποιεῖν. Cf. Rep. 1 335 b foll. and note on κακοφρωγεῖν τὴν πόλιν in 3 a above.

14. διδάσκοντι — νουθετοῦντι — κολάζοντι. The accusative (found in B and T) is impossible. It is no doubt due to assimilation, as Schanz remarks, νουθετεῖν and κολάζειν are combined as in Gorg. 479 a ὥστε μήτε νουθετεῖσθαι μὴτε κολάζεσθαι. Euthyphro might have replied that he prosecuted his father for his father's own sake: punishment being a corrective agency, as is implied in 4 c ἐὰν—μὴ ἀφοσίοις σεαυτῶν τε καὶ ἐκεῖνου τῇ δίκῃ ἐπεξεῖσθαι, where see note.
15. καὶ ἀν μὴ μοι πείθηται—γράφηται σε. Herewith Socrates turns to Euthyphro again. The clause ἣ ἀντ’ ἐμοὶ γράφηται σε is still under the influence of the negative of μηδὲ. γράφεσθαι (cause to be written down sc. in the archon’s book) is ‘to indict’: see above on 2 B. Notice the emphasis on σε (not σε).

16. λέγειν ἐν τῷ δικαστήριῳ: see on A above (πρὸ τῆς γραφῆς). The statement had to be supported by witnesses (μαρτυρεῖν τὴν πρόκλησιν). Meier und Schömann Π 872 note 293.

18. εἰ ὥρα μέ. The emphasis is on εἰ: whence μέ (the reading of B) not ἐμέ (T). Translate ‘if’ he tried etc.’. Euthyphro implies that the supposition is unlikely: presently, in ἐγένετο ἀν, it is assumed to be impossible. Euthyphro’s animation and self-confidence increase as he hears himself talk.

19. ὀπη σαθρός ἐστιν. σαθρός (lit. ‘furnished with holes’ hence ‘unsound’) is frequently used as a metaphor in Plato and in Greek generally. It is no doubt a derivative from σήθω (σαῳ) ‘I sift’ like σαπρός from σήπω. Conformably to this derivation it is combined with τετρημένος in Gorg. 493 ε (ἀγγεία τετρημένα καὶ σαθρά) shortly after the allusion to the sieve of the Danaids in Β.

20. καὶ πολὺ ἀν—η ἐπὶ ἐμοῦ. The second apodosis is framed as if the verb of the conditional clause had been in the past indicative. The effect is to throw the growing self-confidence of Euthyphro into stronger relief: if he had tried (but he dared not), I should have turned the tables on him. Schanz quotes from Xenophon an example of the converse change (from past Ind. to Optative): Cyneg. 12. 22 εἰ οὖν εἰδεῖν τοῦτο, ὦτι θεάται αὐτοῦς, ἕντο ἀν ἐπὶ τοὺς πόνους καί τὰς παιδεύσεις, αἰς ἀλίσκεται μόλις καὶ κατεργάζοντο ἀν αὐτὴν.

23. καὶ ἐγὼ τοι. καὶ goes with ἐγώ, not with τοι. Socrates pretends to share Euthyphro’s confidence.


26. ὥραν—κατείδειν. Schanz draws attention to the pun on Meletus’ name: here is a Μέλητος ἀμελής! After ὥρας T has ἀτεχνῶς, which, if right, can only intensify ὥρας, as if ‘literally with so keen an eye’. But ᾧρας in connection with sight is no longer sufficiently metaphorical to be coupled with ἀτεχνῶς. κατείδειν is ‘caught sight of’ ‘descried’: blind to Euthyphro, Meletus could see
only Socrates. It is implied that personal animosity inspired the prosecution: see note on 3 B line 8 ad fin.

28. νῦν δη. See on 3 D. The reference is to 4 E—5 A.

ποιόν τι—ἀλλων; The subject of the dialogue is rather δοσιν τε καὶ ἀνόσιον than εὐσεβὲς τε καὶ ἀσεβὲς: it is presently stated more precisely in 5 D. εὐσεβὲς and ἀσεβὲς are used here on account of the preceding ἀσεβελας: so infra in 12 E. Of the two words δοσιν and εὐσεβὲς, δοσιν is the wider, εὐσεβὲς denoting more especially the fulfilment of religious obligations: but throughout the dialogue εὐσεβεῖν and ἀσεβεῖν are used as the verbs corresponding to δοσιν and ἀνόσιον. On the difference between ποιός τις and ποιός Cobet remarks: "differunt enim certo usu ποιός et ποιός τις, ut ποιός cum irissione dicatur—ποιός μάγειρος—ποιός τις ubi serio quaeritur de alicuius personae aut rei ingenio, indole, natura aut genere" (Nov. Lect. p. 276).

5 D 30. ἡ οὖ ταυτόν ἐστιν—ἀνόσιον εἶναι. See for ταυτόν note on 10 E below. Here and in 6 D—E Plato uses language which he afterwards used in connection with the theory of Ideas: but in neither passage is it necessary to suppose that the Ideas are already part of the Platonic doctrine. See Introd. p. xxviii.

What Plato means is this: δοσιν is always and everywhere the same, possessed of some one form (ἰδέα) or character: similarly with ἀνόσιον: and these two, δοσιν and ἀνόσιον, are always and everywhere the opposites of one another. So far there is nothing that goes beyond the Socratic doctrine of λόγοι.


32. παντὸς ἐναντίον. So the mss. Schanz reads πᾶν τούναντιον: but πᾶν τούναντιον in Plato is generally used adverbially. The μὲν is concessive; the unholy, while (though) it is the opposite of all the holy (τοῦ δοσιν παντὸς is virtually = τοῦ ἐν πάσῃ πράξει δοσιν), nevertheless resembles it in this point, viz. that it is like itself, etc. The resemblance of the unholy to the holy in this one point is presently brought out still more clearly by the words κατὰ τὴν ὀσιότητα, i.e. like holiness, as holiness is like itself. κατὰ in this sense is common in Plato, e.g. Apol. 17 B ὁμολογοῖν ἂν οὖ κατὰ τούτους εἶναι ὑπόωρ. Missing the precise force of the μὲν and δὲ clause, the editors (Schanz, Fritzsch and Wohlbrab) read ἀνοσιότητα with
T for the ὄσιότητα of B, taking κατὰ τὴν ἀνοσιότητα as = 'in virtue of its impiety'. So also Bonitz Platonische Studien p. 241. Prof. Josef Wagner (Zur Athetese des Dialogs Euthyphron, p. 22) derives an argument against the genuineness of the dialogue from the mistaken reading κατὰ τὴν ἀνοσιότητα. An additional argument for the reading κατὰ τὴν ὀσιότητα is contained in the words of δ δ — ἐφησάνα γὰρ ποὺ μὴ ἱδέα τὰ τε ἀνόσια ἀνόσια ἐλναι καὶ τὰ ὀσία ὀσία: that ὀσία are ὀσία μὴ ἱδέα has not been stated precisely if κατὰ τὴν ἀνοσιότητα is read here. Finally, the Scholiast read κατὰ τὴν ὀσιότητα, and explained it as I have done: his note is κατὰ τὴν ὀσιότητα: ἀντὶ τοῦ ὡμολογεῖν τὴν ὀσιότητι. See also on μᾶν τινὰ ἱδεψαι and on the whole passage, Introduction, p. xxviii.

34. μέλλη: on this idiomatic use of μέλλω see Madvig, Gk. Syntax, p. 94, Rem. 1.

CHAPTER VI.

The subject of the dialogue is now propounded: what is τὸ ὅσιον and τὸ ἀνόσιον? Euthyphro's first answer puts a special case in place of a general definition: τὸ ὅσιον is to act as I act now, τὸ ἀνόσιον is not so to act: witness the treatment of Cronus by Zeus. Before pointing out to Euthyphro his mistake, Socrates professes his disbelief in such legends about the gods, and suggests that this is perhaps why he is put upon his trial.

The habit of putting the particular for the general (πολλὰ ποιεῖν ἐκ τοῦ ἐνὸς Meno 77 A) in a definition is frequently illustrated in the Socratic dialogues. A good example is Theaet. 146 c—d. What is ἐπιστήμη? asks Socrates. Theaetetus replies: mathematics, shoemaking, etc.—these, all and each, are ἐπιστήμη. Other examples are Xen. Mem. iv 2. 13 foll.: ibid. 31 ff.: Hipp. Major 287 ε ff.: Lach. 190 ε ff.: Meno 71 ε ff. See Grote's Plato Vol. i p. 317 ff. The mistake consists in a simple conversion of the universal affirmative: to do this is pious (thinks Euthyphro), therefore all piety is to do this.

4. τῷ ἀδικοῦντι — ἐξαμαρτάνοντι. The second participle (which is to be taken with all the three alternatives) is logically subordinate to the first. The construction of ἀδικῶ with a participle is common enough: and there is no reason for rejecting ἀδικοῦντι as Schanz suggests, or reading καὶ ἤ for ἤ after ἀδικοῦντι with Fischer. Euthyphro states his principle thus: ὅσιον is to prosecute ὃ ἀδικῶν

A. EU.
(which contains the notion of law-breaking, as well as of injustice: see on Crito p. xiii), whether his sin (ἐξαμαρτάνοντι) is in connection with manslaughter or sacrilege etc. ἐξαμαρτάνοντι is necessary, because manslaughter was not always ἀδικὸν or illegal: see on 4 B, line 26 above. ἱερσοῦλα on the other hand was always punished with death: see Isocrates κατὰ Δοξίτου § 6. ῥι ἄλλο goes closely with περὶ ἱερῶν κλοπᾶς and περὶ is to be taken with ῥι as well as with κλοπᾶς.

5 E 10. τοῦ νόμον ὅτι οὕτως ἔξει. So the mss. Schanz reads νομίμου for νόμον after Baumann: Hirschig reads ὅσιον. The idiom is like οἶδα σε τίς εἶ: and ὁ νόμος οὕτως ἔξει is just as good Greek as τὸ νόμμων οὕτως ἔξει. Probably Plato uses the noun νόμος rather than the adjective νομίμων (conformably with ὅσιον above) because it is more personal and direct. νόμος is written rather than ὅσιον for two reasons. In the first place, Plato wishes to indicate that νόμος and nothing else determines Euthyphro’s view of τὸ ὅσιον: in the second place ὅσιον would be inapt here, because the example quoted is an act of Zeus, who could hardly (I think) have been called ὅσιος by Euthyphro without presumption: for which reason he is presently called not ὅσιος, but τῶν θεῶν ἀριστος καὶ δικαιότατος. νόμος is here simply the law of Athens. Euthyphro’s position is: the conduct of Zeus is sanctioned by Athenian law, Zeus is worshipped by the State, and I am simply following out his example.

11. ὅτι ταύτα—γιγνόμενα. Schanz brackets this clause. I believe the words are genuine: they explain ὅ καὶ ἄλλως ἡδη εἶπον. Euthyphro is a little indignant that his conduct should be called in question: he has already told others that this affair will be managed rightly (ὁρθῶς i.e. δικαίως or legally) in his way (οὕτω i.e. by prosecuting his father). ὁρθῶς goes with γιγνόμενα, and οὕτω, logically considered, is equivalent to a participial clause ‘if done thus’.

12. μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν explains οὕτως ἔξει above.

13. αὐτοὶ γὰρ οἴ ἄνθρωποι: γὰρ like enim is often introductory: here it explains τεκμηρίων. See on Apol. 20 E Χαιρεφώτα γὰρ ἔστε ποιοῦν. The force of αὐτοὶ is ‘of themselves’, ulterior, though laymen )μάντεις: cf. infra 6 B τί γὰρ καὶ φήσωμεν, οἷς ᾧ αὐτοὶ ὁμολογοῦμεν περὶ αὐτῶν μηδὲν εἶδεν: As Euthyphro’s argument is: the Athenian law approves my conduct, we might expect Ἀθηναῖοι for ἄνθρωποι: but here again Euthyphro’s point of view comes out: he is no cosmopolitan: for him the Athenians are οἴ ἄνθρωποι and Athens the world.
14. τυγχάνουσι νομίζοντες i.e. do really think, by the usual Attic litotes: see on 4 e line 54 above.

16. νείς κατέπινεν οὐκ ἐν δίκη. For the form νείς see on 6 a Crito 45 c. The forms of the second declension are preferred in the singular: in the dual and plural νη νείς etc. are preferred. Schanz everywhere prints this word without the i: and so it generally appears in Inscriptions of Plato’s time: see Meisterhans Grammatik der Attischen Inschriften 2 p. 113. Notice καταπίνω used in connection with solids; the effect is to make Cronus’s seat disgusting as well as unjust. For κατέπινεν a late hand in T reads κατέπινεν. The imperfect denotes as usual the repeated act. Hesiod is the literary source of this article in the Greek creed: Theog. 459 καὶ τοὺς μὲν κατέπινε Κρόνος μέγας κτλ. For ἐν δίκη see above on 4 b line 26.


20. τὰ ἐναντία—περὶ ἐμοῦ. ἐναντία λέγουσι without the article would mean to ‘state contradictory views both about the gods and about me’; since ἐναντία λέγεω is idiomatic for ‘to contradict’: the meaning here is contradict themselves by giving one view about the gods and another about me. Note the implication that the rule of conduct for gods and men is the same—a distinctive feature in the Greek creed, where God is man in magno, and man God in parvo. As the champion of Greek orthodoxy Euthyphro thinks it actually impious that there should be one rule for Zeus and another for him. See Introd. p. xvi, and ibid. p. xviii for the apologetic motive which appears in this part of the dialogue. Socrates was accused of setting sons against their fathers: Plato shews that the orthodox creed, believed and acted on, errs in this way more than he.

22. ἄρα γε: “assensum poscit” says Stallbaum, wrongly. The particle ἄρα merely marks the interrogation: see on Crito 44 e. Socrates plays his usual rôle of the ignorant man seeking for information.

24. δυσχερὸς πῶς ἀποδέχομαι. πῶς is nescio quomodo, as
Fritzsché remarks. In Rep. II 377 d ff. Plato rejects all these crude stories as false and pernicious. God is altogether good and never lies: ibid. 379 b and 380 d. In particular he emphatically rejects the stories about the unnatural conduct of Cronus and Zeus: ibid. 377 e ὁρθῶς ἔχει τά γε τοιαύτα μέμφεσθαι—πρῶτον μὲν τὸ μέγιστον καὶ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων ψευδοὺ—ὅσι Οὐρανός τε εἰργάσατο ἀφησι ἐρεῖται αὐτὸν Ἑσίοδος, ὃ τε αὐ Γρῶνος ὦς ἐτιμωρήσατο αὐτὸν. τά δὲ δὴ τοῦ Κρόνου ἔργα καὶ πάθη ὑπὸ τοῦ νέας, οὖδ᾽ ἂν εἰ ἦν ἀληθῆ, ὑμνοὶ δεῖν ῥαδίως ὑπὸ λέγεσθαι πρὸς ἄφρονας τε καὶ νέους κτλ. In the doctrine that God is good, latent in this passage, Bonitz finds the key to the positive teaching of the Euthyphro—the answer to the question left unsolved in 14 A: see Introduction, p. xiv.

διῶ δῆ. So Schanz with T: B has δι᾽ ἀ. The antecedent is the entire clause τὰ τοιαύτα—ἀποδέχομαι. Special stress is to be laid on φήσει: it is implied (as above in 3 b) that the accusation of impiety is a mere blind. There is no need for Madvig’s conjecture ἑιδοὶ δῆ.

26. τῷ εὐ εἰδότι. There is irony in the participial clause: cf. note on 3 a above.

6 B 27. ἡμῖν: not for ἐμοί, but equivalent to ‘us laymen’)(μάντεις. So presently ὁ γε αὐτῷ ὁμολογοῦμεν περὶ αὐτῶν μηδὲν εἰδέναι. The sense is much the same in 12 e: πειρῶ καὶ σοῦ ἐμὲ ὠτον διδάξαι—ῖνα καὶ Μελήτῳ λέγωμεν μηκέτερ ἡμᾶς ἀδικεῖν μηδὲν ἀσέβεια γράφεσθαι, ὥσι κανῶς ἂν παρὰ σοῦ μεμαθηκότας τὰ τε εἰσεβῇ καὶ ὁσία καὶ τὰ μὴ.

τῇ γὰρ καὶ φήσομεν. Cf. 3 a τὶ καὶ ποιοῦντα. ‘‘Qui tī χρῆ λέγειν interroget, is quid dici, non an alicquid dici debeat quærēt; sed qui τὶ χρῆ καὶ λέγειν, is non solum quid, sed etiam an alicquid dicendum sit dubitatum’’ Hermann, quoted by Fritzsché.

28. αὐτοὶ—μηδὲν εἰδέναι. αὐτοὶ of course goes with εἰδέναι: see on αὐτοὶ γὰρ οἱ ἀνθρωποὶ in 5 e above. A negative infinitive dependent on verbs sentiendi et declarandi in Greek generally takes οὐ: μὴ is sometimes used by Plato, with the effect of intensifying the negation, just as τὸ μηδὲν is stronger than οὐδὲν: cp. infra 12 b πολλοὶ γὰρ μου δοκοῦν—δεδεῖνα μὲν, αἰδεῖον δὲ μηδὲν ταῦτα ἃ δεδίασιν. Schanz quotes another example with ὁμολογεῖν: Phaed. 94 c οὐκοῖν αὐτὸ ὁμολογήσαμεν—μὴποτ' ἂν αὐτὴν—ἐναντία ἀδειν οἷς ἐπιτείνουσι κτλ.

29. ἀλλὰ μοι ἐπὶ—γεγονότα. The situation here reminds one of the words of Phaedrus (Phaedr. 229 c) ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πρὸς Δίον, ὁ Σώκρατες, σοὶ τοῦτο τὸ μυθολόγημα πείθει ἄληθες εἶναι; Ueberweg
(Untersuchungen über die Echtheit etc. p. 251) needlessly sees in this correspondence an indication that the Euthyphro is spurious. Zeus as the god of friends had a temple in Megalopolis, seen by Pausanias and described in Book VIII 31. 4. Socrates, as might be expected from the high value he set on friendship, frequently invokes this god: see Ast’s Lexicon Platonicum s.v. φίλος.

ός ἀληθῶς: see on Crito 46 D. οὕς ἀληθῶς, τῷ δυτὶ and τῷ ἀληθείᾳ are used by Plato chiefly in his earlier dialogues: in his later works he prefers ἀληθῶς, δυτικῶς and ἀληθείᾳ: Schanz in Hermes (1886) XXI 3. pp. 439—459.

32. οἱ πολλοὶ. λοιποὶ is a variant in T for πολλοὶ: but the ignorant multitude are here contrasted with the eἰς τεχνικὸς ἀνήρ or μάντες, who is familiar with articles of faith not generally known.

33. καὶ πόλεμον ἄρα. So B: the editors read ἄρα for ἄρα. καὶ is ‘also’ and ἄρα asks the question. Hitherto only two examples of Euthyphro’s orthodoxy have been given: Socrates now proceeds to ask whether he believes the other stories of poets and painters about war between the gods etc. Compare Rep. II 378 C ff.

τῷ δυτὶ. See on οὕς ἀληθῶς in line 29 above.

34. καὶ ἔχθρας γε. So B: T omits γε, perhaps taking καὶ before πόλεμον as ‘both’, in which case it could not be followed by καὶ—γέ.

36. τὰ τε ἄλλα ἰερά. ἄλλα means ‘besides’: for ἰερά is 6 C ‘temples’.

37. καταπεποκιλταί: sc. τοιαῦτα (acc.): for καταποκιλλεῖν like verbs of clothing takes two accusatives. We are not to understand οἷα or οἶας, as Schanz says: the Greek rule is rel. + conj. + anaphoric (demonstrative) pronoun, not rel. + conj. + rel. See on Apol. 40 Α. The relative clause is now changed into a main sentence.

καὶ δὴ καὶ: introduces a climax as in Apol. 26 D, καὶ δὴ καὶ οἱ νέοι ταῦτα παρ’ ἐμοῦ μανδάνουσιν κτλ.

τοῖς μεγάλοις Παναθηναῖοις. There were two Panathenaic festivals, one annual and less gorgeous (τὰ Παναθηναῖα τὰ κατ’ ἐναντῖν, or simply τὰ Παναθηναῖα in Inscriptions, also called by writers Παναθηναῖα τὰ μικρὰ or μικρὰ Παναθηναῖα), the other held once every four years, in the 3rd year of every Olympiad (Παναθηναῖα τὰ μεγάλα in Inscriptions, called also by writers τὰ Παναθηναῖα τὰ μεγάλα or τὰ μεγάλα Παναθηναία). At the latter, if not also in the former (the evidence is contradictory), a robe,
woven by Athenian maidens and depicting the triumph of Athene and the Olympians over the giants, together with other celestial fights, was carried in procession to the Acropolis and presented to the statue of the goddess in the Erechtheum. Plato alludes to the same ceremonial in Rep. II 378 c πολλοί δεις γίγαντομαχίας τε μυθολογητέον αὐτοῖς καὶ ποικίλτεόν κτλ. The subject is represented on the Parthenon frieze: see Baumeister's Denkmäler des Klassischen Alterthums II p. 1185. From the beginning of the 4th century B.C., if not earlier, the robe was stretched like a sail upon the rigging of a ship, which ran on rollers in the procession. Preller's Griechische Mythologie 4 I p. 243.

39. ἀνάγεται: ἄνα because of the rising ground of the Acropolis, not because the robe was an offering (ἀνάθημα). It is not unlikely that ἄνα- in ἀνάθημα and the like originally referred to the 'high places'. ἀγω is preferred to φέρω because of the accompanying procession.

41. μη μόνον γε. So B: T has μόνα. Strictly speaking, the sense is adjectival, but in Greek μόνον, πρῶτον etc. are occasionally used for the corresponding adjectives. Schanz quotes Meno 71 c ταυτα—ἀπαγγέλλωμεν; μη μόνον γε κτλ. Kühner Griechische Grammatik II p. 236 Anmerk. 3.

42. ἄρτι: in B above.

CHAPTER VII.

In this chapter Socrates recalls Euthyphro to the point; 'Your definition is no definition: give me the εἴδος ὃ πάντα τὰ ὅσια ὅσιά ἐστιν'. Euthyphro replies: τὸ τοῖς θεοῖς προσφιλές ὁσίον: τὸ τοῖς θεοῖς μη προσφιλές ἀνόσιον.

Socrates is sincerely anxious to convince Euthyphro of his impiety, but it was useless to try to do so directly: a preliminary training in logical method was necessary. See Lechthaler Die οὐσίατης bei Platov (Meran 1879) p. 21.

1. ἀλλὰ ταυτα—διηγήσει. Herewith Socrates dismisses the point. In Plato's expressed disbelief in these mythological tales we see the germ of his hostility to poetry, afterwards developed in the second, third, and tenth books of the Republic.

6 D 5. τὸ πρῶτερον viz. in 5 D.

9. καὶ ἁληθῆ γε ἑλεγον. The imperfect of verbs of saying is
sometimes used where we should expect the aorist: cf. ἔλεγον in 15 A. Goodwin (M. T. p. 8) notices this usage in Herodotus and Thucydides: but it is not less common in Plato, or indeed in Greek generally.

10. ἄλλα γάρ = 'but in point of fact': see note on Apol. 19 C.

12. καὶ γάρ ἐστιν ὀσιὰ. Schanz with T omits ὀσιὰ, reading ἐστι. It makes Euthyphro's answer more emphatic if ὀσιὰ is retained.

15. ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ τὸ εἴδος—μιᾷ ἰδέᾳ. εἴδος and ἰδέα are here practically synonymous: the only difference is that εἴδος views the thing in question more as to its content, ἰδέα more as to its form. Hence εἴδος is more naturally used as the object of διδάξαι than ἰδέα.

19. αὐτὴν διδαχὸν τὴν ἰδέαν. αὐτὴν (as its position shews) is 6 E 'by itself', unencumbered by the accidents of a special instance. So αὐτόι γάρ ἐσμεν = 'we are alone'.

20. ἀποβλέπων—παραδείγματι. These words are almost technical terms in Plato's theory of ideas, παράδειγμα in particular being common especially in the latest phase of that theory. Here there is no allusion to the theory as yet unborn: there is only a faithful description of Socrates' rule of conduct. Cf. infra 9 D line 21: also Crito 46 B and especially Phaedo 100 A ὑποθέμενος ἐκάστοτε λόγον (the λόγος sought after in the Euthyphro is τὸ ὀσιὸν) δὲ ἃν κρῖνω ἐρρωμενέστατον εἶναι, ἂ μὲν ἃν μοι δοκῇ τούτῳ συμφωνεῖν, τίθημι ὡς ἀληθῆ δυντα—ἀ δ' ἃν μή, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ. See Introduction p. xxviii.

24. καὶ ὦτῳ σοι φράσω. Euthyphro's readiness to suit his manner of answering to the wants of his audience is a point which he has in common with the sophists of Plato's dialogues. Cf. Gorgias in Gorg. 449 C: καὶ γὰρ αὖ καὶ τούτῳ ἐν ἐστὶν ἃν φημὶ, μηδένα ἃν ἐν βραχυτέροις ἐμοῦ ταύτα εἰπεῖν.

27. ἐστὶ τοῖνυν—ἀνόσιον. Euthyphro's second attempt at a definition is more successful. He avoids the former mistake of putting the particular for the general: but flaws hardly less serious remain. The worst (not pointed out till Ch. xii foll.) is still due to simple conversion of the universal affirmative: because all holiness is dear to the gods, it does not follow that all that is dear to the gods is holiness. Euthyphro in fact puts a πάθος of holiness in place of its ὀσιὰ. On this definition in general see Introd. p. xix.
Socrates proceeds to examine Euthyphro's definition. He first
endeavours to remove an ambiguity in the expression τοὺς θεοὺς: and
in so doing contrives to shew that Euthyphro's definition is un-
tenable from Euthyphro's own standpoint, while from a higher and
indeed essentially monotheistic conception of God it is less objec-
tionable, though still inadequate.

In this Chapter Socrates reminds Euthyphro that there are gods
and gods: what one god loves another may hate, in which case the
same thing will be both holy and unholy, which is impossible,
because holiness and unholliness are opposites. See Introduction
p. xix ff.

1. τὸ λέγομεν. λέγομεν is 'mean', as often: see on Apol. 21 B.

2. τὸ μὲν θεοφίλες τε—ἀνθρωπος. τε is displaced from its
natural position after τὸ, partly because of μὲν, and partly because
ὁσιος is thus more easily supplied. It is worth while noticing why
ἀνθρωπος is introduced. What Socrates desiderated was the οἶδος ὧ
πάντα τὰ ὅσια ὅσια ἐστίν: now ὅσια are of two sorts—men and
deeds: applied to men, ὅσιος has a subjective sense; applied to
deeds, an objective: the subdivision is therefore necessary to
illustrate πάντα τὰ ὅσια.

3. θεομοσίες is equivalent to μὴ προσφιλές θεοῖς. The neutral
condition of indifference is not admitted: if the gods are not with
us, they are against us. Just so ἀνεφελής is rather 'hurtful' than
'useless': and in like manner ἄβουλος, ἀκόπος, ἀμεμπτος, ἀφθονος and other words have a positive meaning in Greek. See Alcibiades II 138 D foll. and especially Protag. 331 A foll. οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν ὀσίότης οὗν δικαίων εἶναι πράγμα, οὐδὲ δικαιοσύνη οὗν ὄσιον, ἀλλ' οὗν μὴ ὄσιον: ἡ δὲ ὀσίότης οὗν μὴ δικαίων, ἀλλ' ἄδικον ἄρα, τὸ δὲ ἀνόσιον; Still more clear is Rep. IV 437 C τī δαί; τὸ ἄβουλειν καὶ μη ἑθελεῖν μηδ' ἐπιθυμεῖν οὐκ εἰς τὸ ἀπωθεῖν καὶ ἀπελαύνειν ἅπ' αὐτῆς (sc. τῆς ψυχῆς) καὶ εἰς ἀπαντα τάναντια ἐκεῖνοι θήσομεν; πῶς γὰρ οὗ; This style of reasoning is indeed disallowed by Diotima in Symp. 201 E—202 A: οὐκ εὐφημήσεις; ἐφη· ἦ οἰεί, ὃ τι ἂν μὴ καλὸν ἤ, ἀναγκαῖον αὐτὸ εἶναι αἰσχρόν; μάλιστα γε. ἦ καὶ <δ> ἂν μὴ σοφόν, ἀμαθές; ἦ ὦκ ἥσθησαι ὅτι ἔστι τι μεταξὺ σοφίας καὶ ἀμαθίας; but only with a view to make room for the Platonic doctrine of ὀρθὴ δόξα. It was very prevalent among the Greeks, and may perhaps be illustrated by the Solonian law requiring every one to take a definite side in political questions. There are fewer merely negative notions in Greek than in English: 'All men are not wise' meant to a Greek 'all men are fools'. The whole subject is discussed by Theodor Kock in Hermes XVIII p. 546 ff. (Ein Kapitel aus der formalen Logik, angewendet auf Aristoteles und Platon).

4. οὐ ταὐτὸν δ' ἐστὶν. This explanatory clause (introduced as usual by δὲ) is inserted to prepare for the reductio ad absurdum of 8 A καὶ ὁσίᾳ ἄρα καὶ ἀνόσια τὰ αὐτὰ ἂν εἶ, ὃ Εὐθύφρον, τοῦτω τῷ λόγῳ. "δὲ stands in the third place, to avoid the union of οὐ and δὲ". Schanz. For τὸ ἐναντιώτατον ("altogether its opposite") cf. Lysis 215 E τὸ γάρ ἐναντιώτατον τῷ ἐναντιώτατῳ εἶναι μάλιστα φιλόν. ἐναντιώτατον without the article would have a different meaning: the article implies that unholliness has but one opposite, holiness. For ταὐτὸν see note on 10 E.

6. οὐχ οὕτως <εἰρηται>; The reading is here very difficult. I adopt Hermann's emendation—a solution which had occurred to me independently. The MSS read: οὐχ οὕτως; οὕτω μὲν οὖν. καὶ εἶ γε φαίνεται εἰρήσθαι. δοκῶ, ὃ Σώκρατες, εἰρηται γάρ. Fritzschе and Wohlrab retain the MS reading, except that they reject εἰρηται γάρ after Σώκρατες, and insert it after οὕτω μὲν οὖν: Schanz now rejects εἰρηται γάρ in toto: formerly he bracketed the whole passage from καὶ εἶ γε down to the first εἰρηται γάρ. Ast, Heusde, Hoene-beek, Maresch and Badham have each of them different suggestions. Hermann's correction seems to me at once the easiest and the best in point of sense. After οὐχ οὕτωs we naturally expect εἰρηται, for the
statement has been made already in 5 D τὸ ἀνόσιον αὖ τοῦ μὲν ὅσον παντὸς ἡμαντίου, where παντὸς ἡμαντίου is practically equivalent to ἡμαντίωστον. I conjecture that the corruption arose thus. After δοκῶ, ὁ Σωκράτης, the words εἰρηταὶ γάρ were added on the margin by a copyist, perhaps with a reference to 5 D above, to indicate that the statement had been made already. Being afterwards introduced into the text, they were the occasion of the omission of εἰρηταὶ after οὖτος, the more readily, inasmuch as εἰρήσθαι, εἰρηταὶ, and presently εἰρηταὶ γάρ occur in the immediate vicinity.

8. καὶ εὖ γε φαίνεται εἰρήσθαι is added by Socrates because the assertion was previously made by Socrates, not by Euthyphro (5 D): Socrates wishes to have the sentiment approved by Euthyphro, in order that he may contribute to his own discomfiture.

7 B 9. δοκῶ, for which Schleiermacher suggested δοκεῖ, is not rarely used in the sense of δοκεῖ μοι, e.g. Rep. V 473 D οὐκ ἔστι κακῶν παῦλα—ταῖς πόλεσι, δοκῶ δ’ οὐδὲ τῷ ἀνδρωπίνῳ γένει. A distinct usage is δοκῶ for δοκεῖ μοι ‘it seems good to me’ e.g. Agam. 16 δέν & δ’ αἰείδειν ἢ μιμύρεσθαι δ. δοκῶ. See Mr Arthur Sidgwick in Classical Review (April, 1889) III 4, p. 148.

13. εἰρηταὶ γάρ: viz. in 6 A—C.

14. ἐχθραν δὲ καὶ ὀργάς: ὀργάς (irae) are the particular ebullitions of the permanent state ἐχθρα. The singular ἐχθραν is kept probably out of a desire to conform to ἐχθρα just before. For a similar reason ἐχθραν δὲ καὶ ὀργάς is placed first in the sentence.

15. ὡδε δὲ σκοπῶμεν. Once more the reasoning is from man to God: see above on 6 A line 20, and Introd. p. xvi.

16. περὶ ἀριθμοῦ. Three things are mentioned on which a dispute is capable of easy and sure settlement, viz. number, size, and weight. They all belong to the material universe, being things ὧν ἡν δυνάμεθα ἀριθμοῖ τῶν χεροῖν λαβέσθαι. Schanz aptly quotes Xen. Mem. I 1. 9 δαιμονάν δὲ (sc. ἐφη ὁ Σωκράτης) καὶ τῶν μακροεμένου ἢ τῶν ἀνδρωπίων ἑδόκων ὁ θεὸς μάθοιη διακρίνειν· οἷον κτλ., ἢ ἂ ἐξεστὶ ἀριθμησάντας ἢ μετρήσαντας ἢ στῆσαντας εἰδέναι, τόσο τὰ τοιαύτα παρὰ τῶν θεῶν πυθαμακομένου ἄδεμπστα ποιεῖσθαι ἡγεῖτο. See also Rep. X 602 D ἄρ’ οὖν ὡ τὸ μετέρειν καὶ ἀριθμεῖν καὶ ιστάναι βοηθεῖαι χαρίσταται πρὸς αὐτὰ ἐφάνησαν, ὡστε μὴ ἄρχειν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ φαινόμενον μείζον ἢ ἐλάττων ἢ πλέον ἢ βαρύτερον κτλ.; and Alcib. I 111 b foll. τι οὖν; δοκοῦσι σοι διαφέρεσθαι οἱ πολλοὶ ποιῶν ἐστὶ λίθος ἢ ξύλον; To find a μέτρον for immaterial
things like justice, piety, etc. was the whole work of Socrates, and absorbed a large share of Plato's philosophical activity.

ὄπότερα πλείον: at first sight we might expect ὀπότερος πλείον, but things are πλείον, hardly a number. The plural is used, because 'more' implies more than one.

17. ποιών. This older form of the optative of contracted verbs is so frequent in Plato as to be almost regular. In Aristophanes, the longer forms (-ολνος -ολῆς -ολή) are regularly used in the singular: see Rutherford's New Phrynichus p. 442 foll.

18. περὶ γὲ τὸν τοιοῦτων goes with ταχὺ ἀν ἀπαλλαγεῖμεν. The γὲ contains a sinister hint that after all some subjects would remain on which they would differ still, piety for example. What is here called λογισμός is called ἀριθμητική in Alc. 1 126 C διὰ τὴν οὖν τέχνην ὁμοοῦσιν αἱ πόλεις περὶ ἀριθμοῦς; διὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικήν.

21. μείξονος καὶ ἐλάπτονος forms one idea: hence there is but 7 C one article. So τοῦ βαρυτέρου τε καὶ κοινοτέρου below. The two opposites fall under one category—size in the first case, weight in the second. Aristotle was fond of saying τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης.

22. ἐπὶ τὸ μετρεῖν. So Schanz with T: B has μετριῶν. Formerly Schanz read μετρον. μετρεῖν is better, in view of καὶ ἐπὶ γε τὸ ἰστάναι which follows. Compare Alc. 1 126 C—ὅ διὰ τίνα δὲ τέχνην ἐκιστος αὐτός αὐτῷ ὁμοοεῖ περὶ σπιθαμῆς καὶ πῆχεως, ὁπότερα μείζον; οὐ διὰ τὴν μετρητικήν;

26. διακριθεῖμεν ἀν. T has διακριθείμεν ἀν: but the longer form seems not to be used by Plato in the plural: compare ἀπαλλαγεῖμεν in line 19 above. See Rutherford as cited on line 17 above. Schanz suspects that ταχῦ has fallen out before διακριθεῖμεν. Its occurrence before the verbs ἀπαλλαγεῖμεν and πανσαλμεθα in the two previous examples seems at first sight to confirm his suspicion: on the other hand, the threefold repetition of the adverb is somewhat offensive. Naber supplies ῥαδίως: but Plato may well have left out the adverb here: in the nature of things the operation of weighing could not have lasted long.

28. ἐπὶ τίνα κρίσιν i.q. ἐπὶ τίνος κρίσιν. So in Latin haec disputatio is used in the sense of huius rei disputatio. The meaning cannot be 'to what criterion', since the criterion is ex hypothesi unknown, never having been reached: the question moreover is not what test, but what thing. Schanz reads ἐπὶ τίνα κρίσιν: but if
τινα were the indefinite pronoun, it would naturally have followed, not preceded κρίσων. The indefinite τινα is too weak a word to bear the stress of the sentence-accent, which will infallibly fall on it, if it precedes κρίσων.

29. ἔχθροι γε. So B: T has ἔχθροι τε.
30. εἰμεν is easily restored from ἧμεν of B and εἰμεν of T (with η erased).

7 D 31. τὸ τε δίκαιον—κακὸν. The difficulty of finding a standard by which to determine what is just etc. was continually present to the mind of Plato: but he sometimes draws a clear distinction between the case of ἀγαθὸν and κακὸν on the one hand, and δίκαιον etc. on the other. Thus in Theaet. 172 Α it is said that the "incomplete Protagoreans" (perhaps to be identified with Socrates: see Dr Jackson in the Journal of Philology vol. XIII pp. 249—250) will probably allow that the doctrine πάντων μέτρων ἀνθρώπως holds good, not only of present sensations, but also of the notions καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ, δίκαια καὶ ἀδίκα, ὧσπερ καὶ μῆ, but not of συμφέροντα and the opposite, i.e. ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ (for Plato, like the Greeks generally, always equates ἀγαθὸν and συμφέρον, κακὸν and βλαβερὸν). Cf. Prot. 322 D—323 C. A close parallel to the present passage is Alcibiades I 112 Α ff., where Socrates says it is precisely περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων ἀνθρώπων καὶ πραγμάτων that the Athenians do differ: and just as here καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν is put on the same plane with δίκαιον and the others, so there Socrates proceeds to identify δίκαιον with συμφέρον through the middle terms καλὰ and ἀγαθὰ. Grote refers to Eur. Phoen. 499—502

ei πᾶσι ταῦταν καλὸν ἐφὺ σοφὸν θ’ ἁμα
οὐκ ἦν ἀν ἀμφιλεκτο ἀνθρώπως ἐρις.
νῦν δ’ οὐθ’ ὁμοιον οὐδὲν οὐτ’ ἦσσον βροτοῖς,
πλὴν ὄνυμασιν, τὸ δ’ ἐργον οὐκ ἔστιν τέδε.

Compare also Aristotle Eth. Nic. I 1. 1094b 14 ff. τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια—τοσαυτὴν ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ πλάνην ὥστε δοκεῖν νόμῳ μόνον εἶναι φύσει δὲ μῆ. τοιαύτην δὲ τινα πλάνην ἔχει καὶ τὰ γαθὰ διὰ τὸ πολλοῖς συμβαλλεῖν βλαβὰς ἀπ’ αὐτῶν: ἤδη γάρ τως ἀπόλλυτο διὰ πλοῦτον, ἐπεροὶ δὲ δι’ ἀνδρείαν. Notice by the way that the introduction of τὸ δίκαιον and similar ethical notions at this point prepares the way for the second division of the dialogue, in which τὸ δόσιον is viewed as a part of τὸ δίκαιον. As regards the Greek, it should be noted that the omission of the article before καλὸν and
the following adjectives is intended to reduce the notions to an ethical unity. Cf. Gorg. 459 D τὸ δικαῖον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τὸ ἀλοχρόν καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν.

34. αὐτῶν. Not ὅως see on καταπετοκιλται in 6 C above.

35. ἐταν γιγνώμεθα. This limitation (as Schanz remarks) is inserted because it is not every διαφορά which leads to ἔχθρα καὶ ὄργαν; a διαφορά about the weight of an object, for example, causes no ill-feeling, as we have been told. The editors compare Phaed. 68 D οὐκόν φόβῳ μείζων κακῶν ὑπομένουσιν αὐτῶν οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι τὸν θάνατον, ὅταν ὑπομένοις.

37. ἀλλ' ἐστιν αὐτη. αὐτη is in the predicate. Note the accent on ἐστιν; it is frequently accented at the beginning of a sentence.

39. οἱ θεοὶ κτλ. Observe how here again the reasoning is from men to gods: see on 6 A line 20 supra and Introd. p. xvi. The clause εἰπερ τι διαφέρονται indicates Socrates’ disbelief in the quarrels of gods. The caveat is more express in 7 E κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, ὡς σ' φῆς, 8 A ὡς ἐδοκεῖν, and 8 D ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος.

40. διὰ ταύτα. So B: T has δι' αὐτὰ ταύτα as in 8 D οὐκόν αὐτὰ γε ταύτα καὶ οἱ θεοὶ πεπόνθασιν, but here there seems no reason for so much emphasis.

43. ἀλλοι ἄλλα δίκαια. Schanz follows Hirschg in adding 7 E καὶ ἄδικα after δίκαια. He compares Alcib. 111 E where B has τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἄδικων while T omits καὶ ἄδικος: also Theaet. 172 B ἐν τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ ἄδικοις καὶ ὁσίοις καὶ ἀνοσίοις, where καὶ ἄδικοις (not in B'T) has inferior MS authority. Plato’s almost invariable rule in such enumerations is to use both the positive and negative notions in each case if he uses them in any: but here I think the omission of καὶ ἄδικα may be defended. If of two gods A thinks a just, and B thinks b just, it follows that A thinks b not-just, i.e. (according to the usual Greek view: see on θεομισεῖς in 7 A above) unjust. So that καὶ ἄδικα is unnecessary to the sense, and Socrates is justified in saying presently ταὐτὰ δὲ γε, ὡς σ' φῆς, οἱ μὲν δίκαια ἡγούνται, οἱ δὲ ἄδικα. καὶ ἀλοχρά and καὶ κακά have been added in the other two cases perhaps because they are further removed from ἀλλοι ἄλλα.

44. οὗ γὰρ ἂν τοῦ. Schanz remarks that this is one of the few cases where Plato uses this collocation without a following γε.

48. ἐκαστοι: plural, because we are considering the case not of god against god, but gods against gods (ἀλλοι ἄλλα in line 43 above): ἐστασιαζον above implies factions.
49. ταῦτα καὶ φιλοῦσιν. Observe how in the ancient view of life the emotions (here love) are made to depend on the intellect (καλὰ ἣγοδιεῖται): see on καὶ τῆν ἐμὴν ἀμαθίαν in 2 C.

57. ταῦτ' ἄρα. Here and in the next line ταῦτ' is easily restored from ταῦτ' or ταῦτ of the MSS.

61. καὶ ὁσία ὄμοιος—ἄν εἵ: which will contradict ἰ ἢ ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐναντιώτατον, τὸ ὅσιον τῷ ἀνοσίῳ. Protagoras however would have accepted the conclusion and said: A thing is pious for the gods who think it so, impious for those who think it impious. Notice the emphatic place of τοῦτῳ τῷ λόγῳ—on your theory, but on no other.

63. κινδυνεύει. Euthyphro’s assent becomes less hearty as he sees his approaching discomfiture. From πάνυ γε in 7 ε to κινδυνεύει his answers betray increasing caution. Cf. Prot. 360 c πάνυ γε—ὁμολόγει—οὐκέκτησα—ἐπένευσεν—ἐφή—πάνυ μόνις ἐνταῦθα ἐπένευσεν—αὐτός, ἐφη, πέρανου.

CHAPTER IX.

The ambiguity in Euthyphro’s definition being now clear, Socrates prepares the way for the amended form of the definition (viz. that piety is what all the gods love).

This he does in the present chapter by eliciting from Euthyphro the assertion that all the gods agree in desiring to punish wrongful manslaughter. ‘Exactly’, says Socrates ‘but will they agree what manslaughter is wrong, and what right?’

1. ὁ θαυμάστε. See on ὁ θαυμάστε Εὐθύφρον in 5 A.

2. δ τυγχανεῖ—ἀνόσιον. So BT. Schanz reads φ for δ and the change is approved by Apelt. In favour of Schanz’s text might perhaps be quoted 9 C ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὅτε τοῦτῳ ἐφάνη ἄρτι ὑρισμένα τὸ ὅσιον καὶ μή: only there τοῦτῳ depends on ὑρισμένα. I think the MS reading is right. The meaning is: what I asked was not a thing which, while one and the same (without undergoing any change), happens to be both holy and unholy: whereas what you gave in your answer was θεοφιλές = ὅσιον, which is at the same time θεομισές = ἀνόσιον. τυγχανεῖ ὅν go together and ὅσιον τε καὶ ἀνόσιον are the predicate. ταῦτὸν is pronounced with emphasis and a slight pause made after the word: otherwise ὅν would be taken with ταῦτὸν. A similar passage is Rep. IV 435 A ὅ γε ταῦτὸν ἄν τις.
προσείποι μειζόν τε καὶ ἔλαττον κτλ.; where Dobree would add ὅν after ἔλαττον. Here I do not think any change necessary: but it would be easy to insert ὅν after ἀνόσιον, and so relieve ταῦτα of its weight of meaning, at the same time giving a balance to the sentence which would compensate for the (only seeming I think) lack of euphony, and correspond closely to the twofold copula in θεοφιλεῖς ἢ, and θεοματές έστιν. In Rep. iv 425 C ἢ οὐκ ἄει τὸ ὄμοιον ὅν ὄμοιον παρακαλεὶ̂ some MSS omit ὅν.

5. ὡστε, ὦ Ἐὐθύφρον κτλ. applies the result arrived at to 8 B Euthyphro's special case. The shock of the insinuation is calculated to make him protest that all the gods approve his act and so lead up to the amended definition.

6. κολάζων is a more delicate word than τιμωρῶν: chastisement has the good of the chastised in view.

7. τῷ μὲν Δι. A touch of humour: Zeus had not been over-kind to his own father. See 6 A.

9. Ἡφαίστω. See Pausanias i 20. 2: λέγεται δὲ τάδε ὑπὸ Ἐλλήνων, ὡς Ὕστερον, ὦ δὲ οἱ μνησικακῶν πέμψατε δώρουν χρυσοῦν βρώνου ἄφανεῖς δεσμοὺς έχοντα· καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐπει τε ἐκαθέζετο δεδέσθαι κτλ. Dionysus finally made Hephaestus drunk and brought him back to Olympus to release his mother. The return to Olympus was frequently depicted on Greek vases: see Baumeister's Denkmäler i p. 643. Plato alludes to the incident again in Rep. ii 378 D Ὕπατ δὲ δεσμοὺς ὑπὸ νίεοις κτλ.

11. καὶ ἐκεῖνοι κατὰ ταῦτα i.e. τοῦτο δρῶν τῷ μὲν φίλον ποιεῖς τῷ δὲ ἔχθρον.

12. περί γε τούτοις: γε exactly as in perί γε τῶν τοιούτων 7 B.

13. διαφέρεσθαι ὡς οὐ. Verbs meaning 'to contradict' are regularly followed by a clause with ὡς (ὅτι) giving what is maintained, not what is contradicted: hence the οὐ. So presently ἁμφισβητοῦντος ὡς—οὐ δεὶ δίκην διδόναι: cf. 9 D and see on Apol. 31 B line 46.

14. δίκην διδόναι—ἄδικος. Notice the verbal play. He who does not render justice in deeds must render justice in punishment: the tale of justice must be made up. So 8 E τῷ γε ἄδικοιντι δοτέον δίκην. The form of expression implies the remedial view of punishment.

16. ἀνθρώπων. Once more Socrates solves the difficulty by reasoning from men to gods: see above on 6 A line 20.

18. ἄλλο ἄδικος ποιοῦντα is equivalent to ἄλλο ἄδικοιντα. As 8 C
an injury is supposed to be still in force till compensation is made, the present is used in spite of ἀποκτείναντα preceding: see on Crito 50 c.

20. οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν παύονται. μὲν οὖν is corrective (immo): see on Apol. 26 B. Cobet has pointed out that οὐ παύεται and οὐδὲν παύεται differ exactly as finem non facit and finem nullum facit (Nov. Lect. p. 500).

22. πάντα ποιοῦσι καὶ λέγουσι: a common phrase in Plato, occasionally with the singular πᾶν: e.g. Apol. 39 a πᾶν ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν. φεύγοντες is here conative like διδόναι = ‘offer’: Schanz compares Gorg. 479 B οἱ τὴν δίκην φεύγοντες.

24. ἡ καὶ ὁμολογοῦσιν. Euthyphro has made two assertions: (1) many say τὸν ἀδίκως ἀποκτείναντα ἡ ἀλλο ἀδίκως ποιοῦντα οὐ δεῖν δίκην διδόναι, (2) πάντα ποιοῦσι καὶ λέγουσι φεύγοντες τὴν δίκην. Socrates refutes (2) first, and the refutation of (1) follows from that of (2).

25. οὐ δεῖν φασὶ: οὐ φασὶ δεῖν would be more usual (as in εἶδε φανερῶς ἄδικεῖν presently), but less emphatic. Perhaps the unusual order is responsible for the corruption οὐδὲν (for οὐ δεῖν) in B.

27. οὐδαμῶς τοῦτο γε: has the idea of εὑρίσκειν! No! they stop short of that. To admit (ὁμολογεῖν) that one’s client has broken the law (ἀδικεῖν) would be tantamount to giving up the case: at the same time Socrates does not say that advocates do not sometimes defend clients whom they believe to be guilty.

33. οὐκ ἄρα ἐκείνῳ γε—ἄληθες λέγεις. These words are bracketed by Schanz (after Schenkl). They occur in the mss, except that ὡς—ἀμφισβητοῦσιν is omitted in B (obviously by mistake), and replaced by a later hand. They are necessary to the sense, for so far only the second of Euthyphro’s assertions has been expressly contradicted: it is equally necessary to reject the first expressly. In c above Euthyphro has said that men continually ἀμφισβητοῦσιν ὡς τὸν ἀδικοῦντα οὐ δεῖ δίκην διδόναι: Socrates now says no! οὐκ ἄρα ἀμφισβητοῦσιν ὡς οὐ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα δεῖ διδόναι δίκην. Plato is especially careful to make the refutation complete, and in terms likely to recall the statement of the doctrine refuted: cf. 8 a καὶ ὅσια—λόγῳ with 7 a οὐ ταῦτον δ’ έστιν—ἀνοσίᾳ.

35. τὸ τὸς ἐστίν κτλ. τὸ goes with the entire clause as in Aristotle’s well-known τὸ τί ὕπειν. Goodwin’s Greek Grammar p. 201, note 7.

38. οὐκοῦν αὐτά γε ταῦτα. Socrates now makes the applica-
tion to the case of gods: that of men was but an illustration. The
general reasoning reminds us of Pliny’s Panegyricus § 72 et sane
priorum principum exitus docuit ne a diis quidem amari nisi quos
homines amem.

40. *οἱ μὲν φασίν ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλους ἀδικεῖν* is a main sentence and
does not depend on *εἴπερ*. ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλους is my emendation for
ἀλλήλους. I believe that ἀλλήλους is corrupt. Fritzsche remarks
"Mira brevitas. Nam animo haec obversantur: ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὁ δὲ ὁ ἄλλους (ἀδικεῖν)"). But the Greek
will not bear this stress of meaning. The first thing to notice is
that ἀλλήλους if right must be the subject to ἀδικεῖν: the sense will
not allow the subject to be supplied from οἱ μὲν, and besides it is
irrelevant to name the object of the wrong-doing: the sole point is
that the wrong-doing should itself be named (ἀδικεῖν has no external
object wheréver it occurs, from τὸ δὲ; in a above to the end of the
chapter). This being so—is it possible to say in Greek: the one party
say that *one another* are doing wrong? It is just as impossible in
Greek as in English, unless this ‘one party’ means to accuse itself,
as Schanz’s translation of ἀλλήλους (die eenen die andern) makes it
do. In Isocrates Panegyr. 168 occur these words: ὥστε καὶ
μᾶλλον χαίρων εἰπτὸσ ἀλλῆλων κακοῖς ἢ τοὺσ ἀυτῶν ἱδίοις ἁγαθοῖς.
Cobet (Var. Lect. p. 519) substitutes ἄλλων for ἀλλήλων, wrongly
(as I think) in this passage, adding “communis librorum error et
frequens”. In Xen. Oecon. Ch. xx § 5 he replaces διαφέροντες
ἀλλήλων by διαφέροντες ἄλλων, this time rightly, although Holden
hesitates to accept the emendation. “Quam saepe ἄλλων et ἀλλή-
λων confundantur notum est omnibus” (Nov. Lect. p. 596). In
view of the last of these passages one might feel inclined to sub-
stitute ἄλλοι for ἀλλήλους here: I believe however that Plato
wrote ἄλλου ἄλλους. One set of gods say: A (another god) is wrong
in this, B wrong in that: but A and B deny that they are wrong.
The phrase is doubtless a reminiscence of 7 ε ἐκ ῥων θεῶν ἄρα—
ἄλλου ἄλλα ἀκαίρη ἡγοῦνται.

41. ὁ θαυμάσας: see on 5 A. Here the appellation is strictly
in point.

42. οὐδεῖς εὔτε θεῶν—δίκην. *γε* before ἀδικοῦντι makes the
words equivalent to ‘because he is a wrong doer’.

44. τοῦτο μὲν ἀληθῆς λέγεις almost = τοῦτο μὲν ἀληθεύεις. 8 E
Presently T has τὸ γε κεφάλαιον, which may be right. Schanz quotes
Phileb. 48 c ἔστι δὴ πονηρὰ μὲν τὸ τὸ κεφάλαιον. Euthyphro’s
A. EU.
guarded reply is not meant (I think) to indicate that there were some who openly professed the doctrine that ‘he shall take who has the power, and he shall keep who can’, though there were such men at Athens (see Callicles’s speech in the Gorgias 482c foll., and Rep. 1 338e foll.): it is merely a way of surrendering salva verecundia. Notice μὲν without a following δὲ: Euthyphro implies that Socrates is not always right in what he says. Cf. Apol. 21D τούτων μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐγώ σοφώτερος εἰμι.

46. ἀλλ’ ἐκαστὸν γε. So T: B has ἐκαστῶν by an accidental assimilation to τῶν πραξθέντων.

48. εἰπέρ ἀμφισβητοῦσιν θεοὶ: the usual caveat: see on 7D line 39 above.

πράξεως τινος πέρι. "Asyndeton explicativum" says Schanz. See on Apol. 22A ἡ μὴν ἐγὼ ἐπαθὼν τοῖς τοιούτοις οἱ μὲν μάλιστα εὐδοκίμουντες κτλ., and for περὶ postponed, ibid. on 19C and supra 4E. The emphatic place of πράξεως (‘it is about an action that they differ’) is meant to suggest the antithesis—‘not about the right of punishing a wrong action’.

CHAPTER X.

Socrates now asks Euthyphro what ground he has for holding that all the gods will think his father guilty of wrongful manslaughter, and approve the conduct of the son. Euthyphro shirks the question: he reserves his reasons for the judges.

9A 1. ἰδὶ νῦν: so Schanz now reads. The reading is easily elicited from ἰδὶ νῦν of B and ἰδὶ τοινῦν of T. νῦν when illative is enclitic. Other examples quoted by Schanz from Plato are Gorg. 451A: Alcib. 114D ἰδὶ νῦν: Politic. 294D φέρε νῦν.

2. σοφώτερος: σοφός (like φροντιστής) was almost a nickname of Socrates: see note on Apol. 18B and supra on 2C.

τεκμήριον. As Wohlrab remarks, we have here an indication of the inquiry raised in the next three chapters. Had Euthyphro been able to give a satisfactory τεκμήριον why all the gods approved his conduct, he would have been able to separate the οὐσία of ὁσιον from its πάθος (viz. τὸ θεοφιλές).

πάντες θεοὶ: without the article: contrast πάντες οἱ θεοὶ in 9E, where see note.

4. ἔθναναι as passive to the perf. of ἀποκτεῖνω: see on φεύγεις αὐτὴν ἰδίκεις in 3E above.
θητεύων ἀνδροφόνος γενόμενος. Compare the account in 4 c. θητεύων is logically subordinate to γενόμενος: ‘being guilty of manslaughter while a day labourer’.

6. φθάσῃ τελευτήσας: the words almost suggest that he died of set purpose (like a Chinaman) to spite Euthyphro’s father.

7. δεσμά: see on τῶν δεσμῶν ἀποθνήσκει in 4 D. The nom. (acc.) plur. δεσμά is said not to occur elsewhere in Plato.

ἐξηγητῶν: see on 4 c. Here the entire college is alluded to: in 4 c only ἐξηγητής, probably the president.

9. ὅρθως ἔχει. Hirschig reads ἔχειν: but the ὅς of ὃς πάντες θεοὶ ἡγοῦνται is still carried on. Notice the contempt expressed by τοῦ τουτοῦ δὴ just above.

10. οὗ recalls ὅν with which Socrates’ appeal began.

11. παντὸς μᾶλλον: ‘more than anything’ is constantly used 9 B by Plato in the sense of ‘assuredly’. See on Crito 49 B. The phrase is probably selected here because πάντες is to follow: ‘beyond all doubt all the gods etc.’.

15. ἄλλα ἵσος οὐκ ὅλγον κτλ. Euthyphro evades the difficulty after the usual fashion of self-confidence nonplussed. ‘I could an I would: but it’s no mere bagatelle, and it would take time’. So in 14 B when he retreats for the second time: καὶ ὅλγον σοι πρῶτερον εἶπον—ὁτι πλεῖον ἔργον ἐστίν ἀκριβῶς πάντα ταῦτα ὃς ἔχει μαθεῖν. Plato professes contempt for the man who has σχολή for ‘splitting differences between two degrees of the infinitely small, such as a tobacco pipe or the Roman Empire, a million or money or a fiddlestick’s end’, and none to probe a question to the bottom. See Theaet. 172 D foll. on the σχολή of the true φιλόσοφος.

16. ἐπεί: sc. were there time. Here ἐπεί is virtually equivalent to ‘although’: see on 4 C above.

ἐπιδείξαι: suggests a long, somewhat windy sermon, rather than a cogent proof (ἀποδείξαι). The word is regularly used of a sophistic display (ἐπιδείξεις). Prot. 347 B ἔστι μέντοι, ἔφη (sc. Ἰππίας), καὶ ἐμοὶ λόγοι περὶ αὐτοῦ εῦ ἔχων, ἃν ὑμῖν ἐπιδείξω, ἃν βούλησθε.

18. μαθάνω· ὅτι κτλ. See on 3 B. The sentence gives a sarcastic reason for Euthyphro’s οὐκ ὅλγον ἔργον. Socrates pretends to be ready to give Euthyphro as much time as the judges would allow him.

19. ἐνδείξει. Notice that it is Socrates who uses ἐνδείκνυμαι,
Euthyphro who says ἐπιδείκνυμι: see last note but one. ἀδικα presently is ‘illegal’ as well as ‘wrong’.

20. οἱ θεοὶ ἄπαντες: ‘the gods one and all’: the emphasis adds to the irony. On the article see πάντες οἱ θεοὶ in 9 E and note.

22. ἐάντερ ἀκούσοι γε: Euthyphro fears interruptions: indeed, like Phocion, he almost regarded them as a proof of his merit: see 3 C καὶ ἐμὸν γὰρ τοι, όταν τι λέγω ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ περὶ τῶν θείων,—καταγελώσων ὡς μαίνομένου.

CHAPTER XI.

In this chapter Euthyphro at last emends his definition thus: Holiness is what all the gods love, unholliness what all the gods hate.

9 C 1. ἐάντερ εὖ δοκῆς λέγειν. The Athenians liked above all things a clever orator: see Apol. 17 A μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν ἑθαύμασα τῶν πολλῶν ὥν ἐγείραντο, τοῦτο ἐν ὧ δὲ ἔλεγον ως χρὴ ύμᾶς εὐλαβεῖσθαι, μὴ υπ’ ἐμὸν ἐξαπατηθῆτε, ὡς δεινοῦ δυνὸς λέγειν.

2. ἐνενόησα. So B: T has ἔχομαι: “perhaps”, says Schanz “by interpolation, owing to the genitive”. The genitive is of course a gen. absolute.

3. καὶ πρῶς ἐμαυτὸν σκοπῶ. A familiar incident with Socrates: sometimes his earnest thought rooted him to the spot (Symp. 174 D), on one occasion, it is said, for twenty-four hours (Symp. 220 B). The syntax is as in Apol. 21 D πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν ἐλογιζόμην: the ego is as it were divided into two beings, one of whom talks to the other. So Plato used to say that thought was the soul talking to itself: Theaet. 189 E τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι ἃρ’ ὀπερ ἐγὼ καλεῖσ; τὲ καλῶν; λόγον δὲ αὐτή πρὸς αὐτὴν ᾳ ψυχὴ διεξέρχεται περὶ ὅν ἀν σκοπῇ: Soph. 263 Ε: cf. Phileb. 38 D. The same self-dissecting process underlies the meaning of the Latin words conscientia and conscientia (see Nettleship’s Passages for Translation into Latin Prose p. 14).

εἰ δ’ τι μάλιστα: see on 4 D above.

5. οἱ θεοὶ ἄπαντες: see on 9 B and 9 E.

6. τὶ μάλλον κτλ. Socrates proceeds to shew Euthyphro that τὸ θεομοσίας and τὸ θεοφιλές are only accidents of τὸ ἄνοσίων τε καὶ ὁμοιοῦ: we want their essence.

8. τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον viz. your father’s act of manslaughter.
9. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ τοῦτῳ — ἐφάνη. This passage is most difficult. There is no important variant in the mss.

We shall best understand the meaning by recapitulating the situation. Socrates says in effect: "Even supposing I allow that all the gods hate your father’s act, are we any nearer to the knowledge of τὸ ὁσιὸν τε καὶ ἀνόσιον? That his act will be θεομισείς I am willing to allow: but" (this is the implied antithesis to θεομισεῖς μέν) "is it necessarily ἀνόσιον? Is θεομισεῖς of the essence of ἀνόσιον, or is it not merely a πάθος thereof? This will best be settled, if we formally amend your definition to ‘what all the gods love is ὁσιὸν, and what they all hate ἀνόσιον’ and examine it in this amended form". That is to say, Socrates is about to point out a new and more serious error in Euthyphro’s definition, even when it is construed in its most favourable light: viz. that it puts the πάθος for the οὐσία. This chapter therefore is the transition to the following two chapters.

But what of the words ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ τοῦτῳ ἐφάνη ἄρτι ὑρισμένα τὸ ὁσιὸν καὶ μὴ τὸ γὰρ θεομισεῖς ὅν καὶ θεοφιλεῖς ἐφάνη? I believe them to have been interpolated by some scribe who failed to grasp the situation. For, on the supposition that they are genuine, τοῦτῳ must have for its antecedent either (a) θεομισεῖς or (b) τὸ ἔργον. If (a), then Plato is guilty of thoroughly confused thinking. The only argument on which ἀνόσιον has hitherto been denied to be identical with θεομισεῖς, is that all the gods do not hate the same thing, or, as the explanatory clause puts it presently, τὸ θεομισεῖς ὅν καὶ θεοφιλεῖς ἐφάνη. But this is just the argument which Socrates has declared that he is ready to give up: he will allow, for argument’s sake, that all the gods do hate the act of Euthyphro’s father. Moreover, it is intolerable to have three cases of the pronoun τοῦτῳ within four lines, whereof the first and third refer to the same thing, and the second to something quite different. In the third place, ὡστε before τοῦτου is hardly intelligible except on the supposition that ἀλλὰ γὰρ—ἐφάνη is either spurious or else a complete parenthesis. If therefore θεομισεῖς is the antecedent to τοῦτῳ, the entire clause must be rejected. If however the antecedent is (b) τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον, as Schanz believes, then another view is possible. The meaning will then be: suppose I allow that all the gods hate this one particular act of your father’s, yet does this bring us nearer to a general definition of piety and impiety? That is to say, Socrates feels that Euthyphro has not yet shaken himself clear of the
personal elements in the case: he is still anchored in the harbour of 'Piety is doing what I am doing now'. The reference in ἄρτι will in that case be to the refutation of Euthyphro's first attempt in 6 d. This is Schanz's view and seems at first sight to be supported by the emphasis on τοῦτο and τούτου in the words τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον, and ὥστε τοῦτον ἀφιημι σε: on the other hand, so far as I can see, there is on Schanz's view no antithesis latent or expressed to the μὲν after θεομοσές, and the position of the words in ὡς οἱ θεὸι ἄπαντες τὸν τοιοῦτον θάνατον ἥγονται ἄδικον εἶναι seems to shew that more emphasis was intended to fall on οἱ θεὸι ἄπαντες than on τὸν τοιοῦτον θάνατον: moreover, if the antithesis is between the particular and the universal, we should expect the statement of the universal presently in δ to be more emphatic e.g. πάνθ' ὅσ' ἂν πάντες οἱ θεὸι μισώσων, ἀνόσια ἔστι κτλ. Even on Schanz's explanation it is necessary to reject the words τὸ γὰρ θεομοσές ὃν καὶ θεοφίλες ἐφάνη (so Schanz, following Kleist), because they refer to the refutation of the second definition, whereas (on Schanz's view) the reference throughout is to the first. Schanz's explanation suits the passage taken by itself quite well: but it seems to me a flaw in Plato's art, if after the first definition has been quite refuted on the ground of putting the particular for the universal, and an error pointed out in the second definition, he should harp back again upon the first definition, without at the same time preparing the way (as I conceive him to have done) for discovering another grievous error in the second.

II. ὥστε τούτου ἀφιημι σε. τούτου sc. τοῦ ἔργου: viz. your father's act. ἀφιημι is a legal term for acquitting: Rep. v 451 b ἀφιέμεν σε ὃς περ φόνου.

9 D 12. ei βούλει. Asyndeton as in 8 E πράξεως των πέρι v. note in loc. Here T has καὶ ei.

ἡγεῖσθων: the mss have ἡγεῖσθωσαν, corrected by the second hand in B. "The Imperative suffix -ωσαν does not appear till 300 B.C. Till then we meet only with forms in -ων (-ντων -σθων). The proportion in the frequency of the two formations is:

Before 300 B.C. -ων : -ωσαν = 111 : 0
After 300 B.C. -ων : -ωσαν = 3 : 22".

13. ἀλλὰ ὅρα τούτῳ κτλ. Socrates suggests that the definition should be amended so as to identify holiness with what all the gods love. To some extent this is an approximation to Monotheism: for if πάντες οἱ θεοὶ always agree, then they are essentially one (τὸ θείον); although in the words ὅ ὅν οἱ μὲν φιλῶσιν, οἱ δὲ μισῶσιν κτλ., a diversity of view is still permitted to them. For ἐπανορθώμεθα followed by a clause giving what is asserted, not what is corrected, see on διαφέρεσθαι ως οὐ in 8 b above. ἐπανορθώμεθα (conj. delib.) is a probable restoration for ἐπανορθώμεθα of B and T: but ἐπανορθούμεθα is not necessarily wrong, since Greek sometimes uses the present where we should use the future, especially in questions e.g. Rep. Π 373 D ἦ πῶς λέγομεν; see also Kühner’s Gr. Gramm. Π p. 120 and compare note on ἀποδεχώμεθα infra in 9 E. Presently λόγῳ is simply ‘definition’.

15. ὅ δὲ ἃν—ἀμφότερα. This clause is really tantamount to a surrender of the definition, if ἀμφότερα is taken seriously: a thing cannot be both holy and unholy. But οὐδέτερα ἦ ἀμφότερα is only a way of saying that where the gods differ in their likes and dislikes, there is no question of holiness involved. For the expression cf. Rep. Π 365 E οἶς ἦ ἀμφότερα ἦ οὐδέτερα πειστέον. The plural is regular: in ἀμφότερα it is logically right, while in οὐδέτερα it is probably due to a desire for uniformity, made easier by the Greek tendency to use neuter plurals as a single notion (φανερὰ ἐστι etc.), as in the case of τὰ ἔτερα (θάτερα) Phaed. 68 c φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλότιμος, ἦτοι τὰ ἔτερα τοῦτων ἦ καὶ ἀμφότερα.

19. τὶ γὰρ κωλύει. Euthyphro talks with the airy tone of a man whose mind is already made up. The editors quote an exact parallel from Charm. 163 ἄ τὶ γὰρ κωλύει; ἐφὶ οὐδὲν ἐμὲ γε, ἦν δ’ ἐγὼ, ἀλλὰ ὃρα μὴ ἐκεῖνον κωλύει κτλ.

20. τὸ σὸν σκόπει ἐι: is exactly equivalent (as Schanz remarks) to σκόπει εἰ σὸ γε.

21. εἰ τούτῳ ὑποθέμενοι. See on 6 E, line 20 above. οὕτω sums up the participial clause τούτῳ ὑποθέμενοι. The usage is frequent in Plato e.g. Gorg. 457 c οὐ ῥαδίως δύνανται—μαθῶντες καὶ διδάσκαντες ἐαντοὺς οὕτω διαλύεσθαι τὰς συνουσίας: Prot. 310 D et al.

23. ἀλλὰ ἐγωνεὶ φανὴν. Euthyphro now states the amended 9 E definition viz.: “Holiness = what all the gods love: what all the gods hate = unholliness”.

24. πάντες οἱ θεοὶ. From 9 A to 9 E we find πάντες θεοὶ four times (A, B, D, E): πάντες οἱ θεοὶ twice (D, E), οἱ θεοὶ ἀπαντεῖς twice
(B, c). A study of these passages shews that πάντες θεοί and πάντες οἱ θεοί differ just as 'all gods', and 'all the gods': the latter is the more regular and formal expression, for which reason it is used in the suggested definition (b) and in the first part of Euthyphro's formal statement thereof. οἱ θεοί ἄπαντες is the most emphatic.

27. οὔτως—ἀποδεξώμεθα: so B. T has ἀποδεξώμεθα: see on ἐπανορθώμεθα in D above. Here the conj. is of course necessary on account of the preceding ἐπισκοπῶμεν. ἀποδεξώμεθα in this sense regularly takes a genitive: strictly speaking τοῦτο is carried on as the direct object, and the gen. depends on ἀπο-. οὔτως is 'simply' 'without more ado' as in ῥαδίως οὔτω Rep. π. 378 Α and Symp. 176 Ε οὔτω πίνοντας πρὸς Ἰδοὺν ὑμῖν.

28. ἐάν μόνον φη τίς τι ἔχειν οὔτω. What precisely is the meaning of τί and the reference in οὔτω? If the text is right, the situation is this. A man uses Euthyphro's definition as his λόγος, and asserts that a particular act (τί) squares with this definition (ἔχειν οὔτω) i.e. is θεοφιλές or θεομιστής (as Euthyphro asserted of his father's act): are we to accept this on his word, or inquire what sense there is in what he says? If the latter, we should still ask why this particular act is θεοφιλές (θεομιστής), and we should probably (as the next chapter shews) be told, because it is ὅσιον—so that we should be revolving in a circle. The result would be to shew us that we have not yet reached the οὐσία of ὅσιον (ἀνόσιον), but only a πάθος thereof. To omit τί would make the text easier, but I do not think this expedient necessary.

29. ἡ σκέπτεσθαι τί λέγει ὁ λέγων; The question with which Socrates began (οὐκὸν ἐπισκόπωμεν αὖ τοῦτο;) is renewed: the order is a b a. By this means we are led to expect an affirmative answer. Compare a more elaborate example in Crito 49 Α—β, where see note (line 14).

CHAPTER XII.

Here and in χΙΙ, Socrates tests the amended definition. In the present chapter, arguing from analogy, he shews that ὅσιον is not θεοφιλές, because while a φιλούμενου (whereof θεοφιλές is one special kind) is a φιλούμενον (θεοφιλές) ὅτι φιλεῖται, ὅσιον is not ὅσιον ὅτι φιλεῖται, rather ὅτι ὅσιον ἐστι φιλεῖται.

1. τάχα—εἰσόμεθα. Schanz reminds us that τάχα in prose
only means ‘soon’ when combined with a future tense. It is especially common with εἰσομαι.

3. φιλεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν = θεοφιλεῖς έστιν.

5. οὐκ οἶδ' ὃ τι λέγεις: the distinction between πάθος and οὕσα is not yet familiar to Euthyphro: compare infra in 12 A οὐχ ἐπομαί, ὃ Σωκρατε, τοῖς λεγομένοις.

7. λέγομεν τι φερόμενον καὶ φέρον κτλ. Socrates in the Platonic dialogues frequently argues in an ungrammatical way. Cf. Phaed. 103C τῇρμὸν τι καλεῖς καὶ ψυχρὸν; Μένο 75D τελευτήν καλεῖς τι; where Fritzsche reminds us that the Xenophonic Socrates shews the same tendency e.g. Mem. II 2.1 εἰπὲ μοι, ἔφη, ὃ παῖ, οὐσθά τινας ἀνθρώπους ἄχαριστους καλομένους; ibid. IV 2.22. The distinction between active and passive is also found in Gorg. 476B: compare also Theaet. 156A ff. It is worth while noticing that the examples chosen by Socrates (φερόμενον, ἀγόμενον, ὀρώμενον and their actives) are from the material world, in which the distinction of active and passive is less hard to grasp. The selection of φερόμενον as an example naturally suggests ἀγόμενον as another: they are often combined in the phrase φέρειν καὶ ἄγειν.

11. καὶ τοῦτον ἔτερον τὸ φιλοῦν is not essential to the argument, except in so far as it defines φιλομένον by contrast.

14. διότι φέρεται. The word διότι is preferred to the more usual ὅτι because it balances δι' ἀλλο τι better.

17. καὶ τὸ ἀγόμενον δή. δή is ‘then’ and καὶ ‘also’. The collocation is common in Plato. δή rarely follows καὶ directly as in Rep. VI 490C καὶ δὴ τὸν ἄλλον τῆς φιλοσφοφίας φύσεως χρόνον κτλ.

20. οὐκ ἄρα διότι κτλ. The illative ἄρα is justified because the results are being summed up. Notice the order of enumeration. It is exactly the reverse of that in which the illustrations were cited, and produces a chiastic effect. Formerly φερόμενον, ἀγόμενον, ὀρώμενον: now ὀρώμενον, ἀγόμενον, φερόμενον.

21. τοῦναντίον. Adverbial accusative in apposition to the sentence: see on τοῦναντίον τοῦτον πᾶν in Apol. 25B.

25. κατάδηλον is said of something which comes gradually into view. Cf. Polit. 291A δχλον—δς ἀρτι κατάδηλος νῦν ἡμῖν γέγονεν. κατά has the same force in καταφαίνομαι and καταφανῆς.

βούλομαι. ἐθέλω would be impossible here: βούλομαι is even frequently used by itself in the sense of ‘I mean’.

26. εἰ τι—πᾶσχει. The second τι is not the nom., but the ιο C acc.: thus the full expression would be η εἰ τι πᾶσχει τι. The words
are an attempt to express the grammatical notion of passive. Among passive verbs, some are γιγνόμενα (e.g. ὧρᾶσθαι), others πάσχοντα (as ᾧγεσθαι, φέρεσθαι): though in the last analysis they may all be viewed as πάσχοντα, and hence their name.

32. τὸ φιλούμενον is rather πάσχον than γιγνόμενον.

33. ἡ πάσχον τι ύπὸ τοῦ: the τι after γιγνόμενον is to be repeated with πάσχον.

35. καὶ τοῦτο ᾗρα. τοῦτο is τὸ φιλούμενον, and τὸ φιλούμενον is understood as the subject to ἐστὶν in the next line.

36. ύπὸ ᾗν φιλεῖται. Short for ύπὸ τοῦτων ᾗν: in such cases the preposition is idiomatically left out before the relative e.g. Rep. III 402 A ἐν ἄπασιν οἷς ἐστὶ. See Kühner’s Gr. Gramm. II p. 478. As regards the hiatus, Fritzsche on Meno 77 A quotes Cic. Orat. 44. 151, who remarks that Plato was not careful to avoid hiatus not only “in his sermonibus, qui διάλογοι dicuntur—sed in populari oratione, qua mos est Athenis laudari in contione eos, qui sint in proeliis interfecti” (alluding to the Menexenus).

40. ἄλλο τι. ἄλλο τι ἢ; = numquid aliud quam? = nonne? ἢ is often omitted. See on Apol. 24 C. B and T both have ἄλλα ὅτι.

45. ἐστὶν—φιλεῖται. The subject is still τὸ ὅσιον.

49. καὶ θεοφιλὲς <τὸ θεοφιλὲς>. With Bast, who is followed by Fritzsche and Schanz, I have added the words within brackets. If the mss are followed, the only possible subject to φιλούμενον (sc. ύπὸ θεῶν) ἐστὶ is τὸ ὅσιον. However, not only is the argument faulty on such a theory, but the words of Socrates in E, where he restates the admissions made, are conclusive in favour of regarding not ὅσιον, but τὸ θεοφιλὲς as subject to ἐστὶ. And as it is impossible to supply the words from the context, they must be inserted. Then in E, τὸ μὲν ὅσιον διὰ τοῦτο φιλεῖθαι, ὅτι ὅσιὼν ἐστὶν κτλ. corresponds to διὸτι ᾗρα ὅσιῶν ἐστὶν, φιλεῖται κτλ., and τὸ δὲ γε θεοφιλὲς ὅτι φιλεῖται ύπὸ θεῶν, αὐτῷ τοῦτῳ τῷ φιλεῖθαι θεοφιλὲς εἶναι corresponds to ἄλλα μὲν δὴ διὸτι γε φιλεῖται ύπὸ θεῶν, φιλούμενον ἐστὶ καὶ θεοφιλὲς <τὸ θεοφιλὲς>. Compare also II A καὶ διὰ τὸ θεοφιλὲς εἶναι ἐφίλειτό ἄν τὸ θεοφιλὲς, εἰ δὲ διὰ τὸ φιλεῖθαι ύπὸ θεῶν τὸ θεοφιλὲς θεοφιλὲς ἢν κτλ.

53. ἑτέρον τοῦτο τοῦτο. For the collocation Fritzsche compares Meno 87 D ἐμοῦγε δοκεῖ τοῦτο μετὰ τοῦτο σκεπτέον εἶναι.
CHAPTER XIII.

The mistake committed by Euthyphro is here presented as the substitution of a πάθος of τὸ ὅσιον for its οὐσία. After a complaint from Euthyphro on the bewildering nature of Socrates’ dialectic, Socrates remarks with a view to a new definition, that ‘all holiness is moral’; but ‘not all morality is holy’. Euthyphro is puzzled; and Socrates explains by means of an illustration the difference between these two propositions.

The first two sentences of this chapter belong more properly to Chapter xi. For the division of his dialogues into chapters Plato is not responsible; and Schanz discards the division entirely in his later editions.

6. ἀλλ’ εἶ γε ταύτων κτλ. The reasoning is somewhat difficult, though perfectly correct. It is desired to prove that ὅσιον and θεοφιλές are not convertible terms. If they were, then (a) supposing ὅσιον were loved because it is ὅσιον, θεοφιλές would be loved because it is θεοφιλές—but this is not so, since the truth is θεοφιλές is ὅσιον φιλεῖσθαι because it is loved (τὸ μὲν γάρ, ὅτι φιλεῖται, ἐστὶν ὅσιον φιλεῖσθαι): (b) supposing θεοφιλές were θεοφιλές because it is loved, ὅσιον would be ὅσιον because it is loved,—whereas the truth is, ὅσιον is loved because it is ὅσιον φιλεῖσθαι (τὸ δ’ ὅτι ἐστὶν ὅσιον φιλεῖσθαι, διὰ τοῦτο φιλεῖται). So that on neither supposition can θεοφιλές and ὅσιον be identified. It is noteworthy that the clauses εἶ μὲν ἐφιλεῖτο, and εἶ δὲ—θεοφιλές ἢν have the verb in the Imperfect Indicative, although the supposition is in both cases a true one: this is due, partly to the influence of εἶ γε ταύτων ἢν to which these two clauses are subordinate, but still more to the form of the anticipated conclusions καὶ ἐφιλεῖτο ἃν τὸ θεοφιλές and καὶ τὸ ὅσιον ἃν—ὅσιον ἢν.

Notice that Plato uses the forms ταύτων τοσούτων τοιούτων τηλεκουτοῦν in preference to ταύτο etc.: see on Crito 48 b and Apol. 24 c. The protases εἶ μὲν κτλ. and εἶ δὲ κτλ. are logically subordinate to εἶ γε ταύτων ἢν, of which they form two special cases: see on a parallel case Apol. 33 d.

II. νῦν δέ (but as it is = nunc) is regularly used in introducing the true state of the case after an untrue supposition with εἶ and a past tense of the Indicative: e.g. Prot. 335 c ἀλλὰ σὺ ἔχρην ἡμῖν συγχωρεῖν—νῦν δὲ ἐπειδή οὐκ ἐθέλεις κτλ.
12. ἐναντίως ἔχετον. ἐναντίως is the strongest possible word for opposition, whence παντάπασιν ἔτερω ὄντε ἄλληλων. Socrates somewhat overstates his case: the ἐναντιώτης expressed in the following sentence is more apparent than real—it is difference rather than opposition.

13. τὸ μὲν γὰρ—οίον φιλείσθαι. τὸ μὲν is τὸ θεοφιλές: τὸ δὲ is τὸ ὅσιον. οίον φιλείσθαι (i.e. τοιούτον οίον φιλείσθαι) is substituted here for θεοφιλές in order to make the antithesis between θεοφιλές and ὅσιον more striking by using the same predicate with ἔστιν in both clauses: at the same time, the use of οίον φιλείσθαι (sc. ύπὸ θεῶν) in the next line seems to indicate that θεοφιλές is not the οὐσία of ὅσιον, but only a πάθος thereof: it is only ‘such a thing as to be loved’—not ‘the god-loved’. The way is thus prepared for the following sentence.

16. τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν—πάθος τι. The distinction of οὐσία and πάθος is here for the first time clearly marked in Greek philosophy. The clause ὅ τι πέπονθε τοῦτο τὸ ὅσιον is epexegetical, being merely another way of expressing πάθος, which is comparatively new in this sense: had πάθος been the antecedent to the relative, ὅ and not ὅ τι, would probably have been written.

19. ὅ τι δὲ ὅν sc. φιλεῖται or πέπονθε τοῦτο τὸ πάθος. ὅν is meant to explain the novel use of οὐσία above.

21. εἶτε οὔτι θάσσει χ’ut illud, ita omnia accidentia (πάθη) in definiendo nullius momenti sunt”. Wohlrab.

24. ἀλλ’, ὥ Σώκρατες κτλ. The interlude is intended to mark a break in the course of the reasoning, and to prepare us for the fresh start, in which Socrates endeavours to rescue Euthyphro from the ἀπορία into which he is now plunged.

25. περιέρχεται—Ὑδρυσώμεθα αὐτῷ. For προθύμουσα B has προθυμώμεθα, perhaps by reason of ἀλλ’ εἴτε προθύμῳς above: see also on ξυμπροδομήσομαι in E below. The doctrine is personified, as often in Plato. It is so to speak an adherent of the Heraclitean πάντα ῥεῖ: see Theaet. 179 Ἐ ἄτεχνος γὰρ κατὰ τὰ συγγράμματα φέρονται (sc. οἱ Ἡρακλεῖτεοι), τὸ δ’ ἐπιμείναι ἐπὶ
λόγω—ἡττον αὐτοῖς ἐνι ἢ τὸ μηδὲν. Here περιέρχεται, as Fritzsche remarks, simply=ambulat, i.q. περιπατεῖ. See on ii C line 38, and 15 B ἐμὲ ἀλτίάσει βαδίζοντας αὐτοὺς (sc. τοὺς λόγους) ποιεῖν: cf. also Apol. 30 A ὀδδὲν γὰρ ἀλλο πράττων ἐγὼ περιέρχομαι ἢ πειθῶν κτλ.

28. τοῦ ἡμετέρου προγόνου. As the son of a sculptor, Socrates traced his descent to Daedalus, the eponymous hero of artists. So in Alc. I 121 A καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἡμετέρον, ὥ γενναίε Ἀλκιβιάδη, εἰς Δαίδαλον. Cf. also Symp. 186 E where Eryximachus the doctor speaks of δ ἡμετέρως πρόγονος Ἀσκληπιός. In Meno 97 D ff. Plato compares ἀληθεῖς δόξαι to the works of Daedalus, because just as the latter, ἐὰν μὲν μὴ δεδεμένα γ, ἀποδιδάσκει καὶ δραπατεύει, ἐὰν δὲ δεδεμένα, παραμένει, so true opinions δραπατεύουσιν ἐκ τῆς ἴσχυς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὥστε ὑπὸ πολλοῦ άξιαί εἰσιν, ἐως ἄν τις αὐτὰς δήσῃ άξιας λογισμῷ. The peculiarity of Daedalus’ statues was that they were supposed to move. Eur. Frag. 373 (ed. Dindorf) τὰ Δαίδαλεια πάντα κινεῖται δοκεὶ βλέπει τ᾽ ἀγάλμαθ᾽. ὡς ἀνήρ κεῖνος σοφός. The Scholiast explains the fable by saying that Daedalus was the first to separate the feet and legs of statues: and Overbeck Gesch. der Plastik I 36 (quoted by Schanz) accepts this explanation.

For the separation of Δαίδαλον from προγόνον Schanz compares Euthyd. 271 B καὶ τοῦ ἡμετέρου οὐ πολὺ τῷ τὴν ἥλικιαν διαφέρειν Κριτοβούλου.

29. τὰ υπό σοῦ λεγόμενα. Notice that Socrates shifts the ii C responsibility on to Euthyphro. Practically, Socrates calls Euthyphro a Daedalus: his ἔργα are the peripatetic definitions which he has advanced.

30. ἐπιθέμεν. τίθεμαι in Plato is more confident and dogmatic than τίθημι: see Dr Postgate in the Journal of Philology (1886), vol. xv pp. 111—119. I think there is here no allusion such as is implied in Fritzsche’s note “de statuis simul cogitat”. τίθέναι ἀγαλμα may be Greek, but τίθεσθαι ἀγαλμα is not.

31. ὡς ἀρα. ἀρα as usual expresses some surprise, genuine or affected: it is especially frequent in this sense “ubi aliquis non suis verbis loquitur” (Fritzsche on Meno 80 E). Cf. Apol. 34 C and note.

κατὰ τὴν ἐκείνου εὐγγένειαν. Professions were frequently hereditary among the Greeks.

τὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔργα=“dialectical works of art”. For ἐν cf. Rep. VI 487 C υπὸ πεπτέλας αὐ τάυτης τινὸς ἐτέρας, οὐκ ἐν
ψήφοις, ἀλλ' ἐν λόγοις: and for ἀποδιδράσκει Meno 97 D, quoted on τοῦ ἡμετέρου προγόνου in B above. ἔργα frequently means 'works of art' e.g. Meno 91 D Φειδίαν τε ὅς—καλὰ ἔργα εἰργάζετο. The entire imagery of this passage is only an elaboration of the metaphor in Theaet. 203 D καὶ οὕτως ἡμῖν ὁ καλὸς λόγος ἀποδιδρακὼς οἰκήσεται.

33. νῦν δὲ σαί γάρ κτλ. For νῦν δὲ see on 11 A above: and for γάρ after νῦν cf. on Apol. 38 B νῦν δὲ οὐ γάρ ἔστιν. It is usual to punctuate νῦν δὲ—σαί γάρ, and take νῦν δὲ with ἀλλ' ὅτι: but ὅτι ('therefore') is against that punctuation, and neither in νῦν δὲ—γάρ nor in ἀλλ' γάρ (= γ' ἀρα) do the Greeks appear to have been conscious of any ellipse. See on Apol. 19 C, and cf. infra 14 C.

ὑποθέσεις. The word is probably selected in preference to λόγοι because it denotes something of a more material nature and so suits τὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔργα better. Cf. Rep. vi 511 B τὰς ὑποθέσεις ποιούμενος οὐκ ἀρχάς, ἀλλὰ τῷ οἷτι ὑποθέσεις (i.e. we are to press both parts of the word—ὑπὸ and θέσεις), οἶον ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὀρμάς.

34. ἀλλ'—σκόποματος: i.e. as I am not responsible, you cannot say that μυ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔργα shew the traces of my ancestry. Euthyphro replies: a kindred jibe (σχεδὸν τι τοῦ αὐτοῦ) is still permissible, for τὰ λεγόμενα are made to move by σαί. σχεδὸν τι is very common in Plato's earlier dialogues, in which σχεδὸν is rarely found: on the other hand in the later writings (Sophistes, Politicus, Timaeus, Philebus, Critias, Laws), σχεδὸν has nearly everywhere replaced σχεδὸν τι: see Ritter's Untersuchungen über Plato p. 58. Note also the accent on σοί: because )( ἐμοὶ.

37. δεῖσθαι τὰ λεγόμενα. Contrast τὰ ὑπὸ σοῦ λεγόμενα in line 29 above. The omission here of ὑπὸ σοῦ is intended to make Socrates partly responsible for what has been said.

tὸ γάρ περιμέναι τούτωις κτλ. περιμέναι not περιέρχεσθαι, though περιέρχεται in 11 B above: see Cobet Variae Lectiones pp. 34, 307. Except in the case of ὑπέρχεσθαι in the derived sense of 'fawning on' (Crito 53 E), the parts of ἔρχομαι and its compounds other than the present Indicative are supplied from εἰμι (ὅα, ἴω, τοιμ, ίθι, ἵππα, ἴππω, fut. εἰμι). Notice the close parallel with 11 B: τὸ γάρ περιμέναι περιέρχεται γάρ: μη μένειν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ = οὐκ ἔθελει μένειν ὅπω τάν ἰδρυσώμεθα αὐτό. τούτωι is wrongly rejected by
Stallbaum: it goes with ἐντιθεῖς, by the usual Platonic hyperbaton, on which see Riddell’s Apology of Plato p. 236 ff., and Prof. Cook Wilson ‘On the Interpretation of Plato’s Timaeus’ p. 97 ff. Schanz remarks that its position is determined by the paronomasia with τοῦτο, and quotes the parallel in Phaedr. 239 Α τοσούτων κακῶν καὶ ἔτι πλειθὺν κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐραστὴν ἐρωμένω ἀνάγκη γυγυμένων τε καὶ φύσει ἐνόντων τῶν μὲν ἥδεσθαι, τὰ δὲ παρασκευάζειν. For the same reason I prefer (with Schanz) the τοῦτος of Β to αὐτοῖς in Τ.

39. σὺ μοι δοκεῖς, ὁ Δαίδαλος. With δοκεῖς understand ἐντιθέναι: ὁ Δαίδαλος is then in emphatic opposition to σὺ: cf. 15 Β ἐμὲ αἰτιάσει τὸν Δαίδαλον βαδίζοντας αὐτοῦς ποιεῖν. I think this better than to take ὁ Δαίδαλος as the predicate: the omission of εἶναι in such a case would be unusual. There is some derision expressed by placing ὁ Δαίδαλος at the end: see on 3 Α above.

40. ἐπεὶ ἔμοι γε ἐνεκα κτλ. Euthyphro clearly regards the ΙΙ Δ discussion as purely academic.

42. ἐκεῖνον τοῦ ἀνδρός: with a certain mock dignity: nearly = ‘the great departed’: cf. Rep. ΙΙ 368 Α ὃ παῖδες ἐκεῖνον τοῦ ἀνδρός. See on Apol. 33 Ε.

43. ὅσῳ ὁ μὲν κτλ. For ὅσῳ strict logic would require ὅτι, since there is no comparative in the relative clause. The idiom is an example of attraction of the relative akin in its nature to Attic attraction. Schanz quotes Xen. Cyr. VI 2. 19 δὲ τοσούτω Σύρων κακίων ἐγένετο, ὅσῳ Σύροι μὲν μάχη νικηθέντες ἐφυγον κτλ.

44. πρὸς τοῖς ἐκαυτοῦ. The Platonic Socrates is quite sincere in this: he did not pretend to have solved the universe—he only desired to discover some λόγος less unstable than the principles on which most men regulate their lives. Cf. Phaedo ΙΙΙ 4 ὑ ὅν ὤν ταῦτα δισχιρυσσαθαί ὀυτῶς ἔχειν, ὦ γε διελήλυθα, οὗ πρέπει νοῦν ἔχοντι ἀνδρί. ὅτι μέντοι ἢ ταῦτ’ ἐστὶν ἢ τοιαύτ’ ἄττα—τοῦτο καὶ πρέπειν μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ἄξιον κινδυνεύοι τοιοῦτον ὁμοίως ἐν τοῖς ἔχεων and Rep. VII 517 Β ὦ ὁμαρτηθῆτε τῆς γ’ ἐμῆς ἐλπίδος, ἐπειδή ταῦτ’ ἐπιθυμεῖς ἀκούειν’ θεὸς δέ ποιον οἶδεν, εἰ ἀλήθης οἴσα τυγχάνει.

45. καὶ δῆτα. This collocation is not very common in Plato: it occurs also in Protag. 310 Κ καὶ δῆτα μέλλων σοι φράζεων—ὑπὸ τινος ἀλλοῦ ἐπελαθόμην. Like καὶ δῆ καὶ (see on 2 Τ above) it directs especial attention to the following clause. τῆς τέχνης presently is a partitive genitive depending on τοῦτο.

46. ἀκών εἰμι σοφός. For σοφός as a nickname of Socrates see above on 2 Κ. Here the word has the idea of the English
'artist', just as σοφία, σοφίζομαι etc. are sometimes used in connection with poetry, sculpture and painting. The situation is like that in Theaet. 150 C ἀγονός εἶμι σοφίας, καὶ ὁπερ ἡδὴ πολλοὶ μοι ὑμεῖς ἄνωθεν, ὡς τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἐρωτῶ, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐδὲν ἀποκρίνομαι περὶ οὐδὲν διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν σοφῶν, ἀλλὰ ὑμεῖς ὑμεῖς οἰκεῖος κτλ.

48. ἄκινήτως. ἄκινήτως has inferior authority. Schanz quotes Thuc. viii 40. 2 ἡ στρατιὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων βεβαιῶς ἔδοξε μετὰ τείχους ἵδρυσθαι.

49. τὰ Ταντάλου χρήματα. Ταντάλου τάλαντα was a proverb. Schanz remarks that Plato cites, besides Tantalus, Darius Polycrates Cinyras and Midas as representatives of great wealth. There is intentional paronomasia in Δαιδάλου—Ταντάλου.

50. τρυφᾶν: said of one who is too high and mighty to condescend to details: so in 11 D above Euthyphro had said ἐπελ ἐμοῦ γε ἔνεκα ἐμενὲν ἀν ταῦτα οὕτως. The meaning is clearly fixed by 12 A infra: ἄλλ', δ λέγω, τρυφᾶσ ὑπὸ πλούτου τῆς σοφίας. Originally the word seems to have denoted the lethargy consequent on too much good living: see Alc. 114 A ἐπειδὴ δε τρυφᾶσ καὶ οὐκέτ', ἀν ἤδεως τοῦ αὐτοῦ γεύσασαι ὅγουν: Rep. 11 372 E; and Rep. iii 399 E λεληθαμέν γε διακαθαίροντες ἦν ἄρτι τρυφᾶν ἐφαμεν πόλιν.

ἀυτός σοι ἄνελπροδυνήσομαι δεἰξαι. So the mss read. I have followed Schanz in bracketing δεὶξαι. If δεἰξαι is retained, διδάξῃς must be changed into διδάξας with Bekker, Fritzche and Wohlrab: ὅπως ἂν κτλ. will then be a clause of manner, dependent on δεἰξαι. But on this view the sense is very cumbrous, viz. 'I will myself help you to shew how you might teach me etc.' The word δεἰξαι might well have been introduced by some scribe who was not familiar with the absolute use of ἄνελπροδυνήσομαι and the final use of ὅπως ἂν. The reference is directly to Socrates' invitation in 11 B ἄλλ' εἶπὲ προθυμῶσ. Of other alternatives δεῖγας is the most obvious, but this too necessitates διδάξας for διδάξῃς: Madvig's δῆσαι (Adv. Crit. 1 p. 367) can hardly be right, since Socrates has now expressly discarded the metaphor (καὶ τοῦτω μὲν ἄδην). As regards the sentiment, it is to be noted that Euthyphro is now reduced to ἀπορία: it remains for Socrates to point a way out. (Compare the conversation with Euthydemos in Xen. Mem. iv ch. 2.) Socrates accordingly now takes the initiative: we shall therefore be right in looking for the positive teaching of the Euthyphro mainly in the second half. But just as Euthyphro's
ἀποφιά is only half-confessed, so (in accordance with Socrates' usual procedure) the solution to the problem of the dialogue will be but a partial one. See Introd. p. xxvi.

53. δίκαιον εἶναι πάν τὸ ὀσίον. δίκαιον here has the meaning of 'moral', 'right': see Bonitz Platonische Studien pp. 230, 233 and the editor's note on Crito 45 c (ἐτὶ δὲ οὐδὲ δίκαιον). Whereas in this passage Plato regards ὀσίον as a part of δίκαιον, in the Protagoras, Meno and Gorgias he places ὀσίότης as a substantive virtue on the same platform with σοφία, σωφροσύνη, ἀνδρέα and δικαίοσύνη. For a discussion of the bearing of this on the date of the Euthyphro see Introduction pp. xxxii ff.

57. τὸ δὲ τι καλὸν ἀλλο. τι goes with τὸ δὲ: "the other, whatever it is, different". So in Rep. I 339 c οὐκουν ἐπιχειροῦντες νόμους τιθέναι τοὺς μὲν ὅρθως τιθέασιν, τοὺς δὲ τινάς οὐκ ὄρθως. Observe the latent logical process of διάλεξις: in order to hunt out what τὸ ὀσίον is, δίκαιον is subdivided into two ideas, one ὀσίον, and the other something unknown. The Sophists and Politicus shew this mode of logical analysis in its fullest development. See Introd. p. xx.

58. οὐχ ἔπομαι. Euthyphro has already shewn himself incapable of distinguishing between 'All A is B' and 'All B is A'. See on ch. vi ad init. Compare also 10 A οὐκ οἶδ' ὁ τι λέγεις, ὃ Σωκράτης.

59. καλ μήν—σοφότερος. Socrates plays on the literal meaning of ἔπομαι: young men should run fast: νέων δὲ πάντες οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ μεγάλοι πόνοι (Rep. vii 536 D). But though youth is the season to learn (τῷ γὰρ ὄντι ἡ νεότης εἰς πᾶν ἐπίδοσιν ἔχει Theaet. 146 B), yet youth is far from being σοφός (Rep. v 475 C): so that ὃς σοφότερος is very sarcastic. οὐκ ἐλάττων (for which Τ has ἐλάττου) is equivalent to τοσοῦτο, as Schanz remarks.

60. δ λέγω viz. in 11 E. λέγω rather than ἐλεγον (ἐπον) is generally used in referring to a previous passage of the same dialogue: see on ὅπερ λέγω in Apol. 21 A.

ὑπὸ πλοῦτου τῆς σοφίας. Socrates aspired to the belief that wisdom is the only true wealth: see the prayer to Pan in Phaedr. 279 C πλοῦσιον δὲ νομίζομι τὸν σοφόν. The same view afterwards became a commonplace among the Stoics.

61. ὃ μακάριε: see on ὃ δαιμονε Σώκρατες in Crito 44 B.

62. οὔδε χαλεπόν. οὐδὲ (for which Naber would read οὔδὲν) presents no difficulty: the idiom is exactly like the English 'for
neither is it difficult' etc. Schanz quotes Legg. 11 673 C ποιητέον· οὐδὲ γὰρ πάνυ χαλεπῶν ἐστὶν εἰπέων.

λέγω γάρ. An exercise follows in the conversion of propositions exactly as in Alcibi. 11 139 E. Here the example is not selected at random, though strictly speaking it is no more than an example: as Fritzschke remarks (p. 147 of his edition) "aptissime in quaestione de pietate instituta etiam de verecundia disputatur", for δέος and αἰδῶς are parts of ὀσιότης. The principle of selecting an example which shall itself involve a useful lesson is akin to this, and is recognised in modern works on Education e.g. Bain's Education as a Science p. 292. αἰδῶς as good shame is reverence, a proper sentiment to feel towards gods (Legg. xi 920 E θεοὺς προγνώνων αὐτῶν αἰδομένους), and something akin to ὀσιότης; it is used also like αἰσχίνεσθαι in connection with evil objects, as in the oracle quoted in Rep. viii 566 C οὐδ' αἰδεῖται κακὸς εἶναι. Both meanings are recognised in the sequel. Here the word is best translated by 'shame' throughout.

63. ὁ ποιητῆς—ποιήσας. According to the Scholiast, the verses are from the Cyprian poems, which dealt with the events prior to the Iliad, of unknown authorship but probably hailed from Cyprus, whence the name. Herodotus refuses to ascribe the poems to Homer—οὐκ Ὄμηρον τὰ Κύπρια ἔπεα ἐστὶ άλλ’ ἄλλου τινός, says he (11 117): and in Athenaeus xv 682 E (where several verses are quoted) Hagesias and Stasinus are mentioned as authors to whom the poems had been assigned. Perhaps Plato indicates his sense of the doubtful authorship in the words ὁ ποιητῆς, like Plutarch (περὶ ἀφρηγησίας ch. 11. 459 D): οὐ γάρ, ὡς ὁ ποιητῆς εἶπεν, ἦνα γάρ δέος ἐνθα καὶ αἰδῶς.

64. Ζήνα δὲ—αἰδῶς. These two lines involve considerable difficulties, both of language and of meaning.

The accepted reading is θ᾽ ἐρξαντα (so the second hand in B): but B has θερζαντα, and Τ στέρζαντα: while Stobaeus Florileg. 31. 18 reads ρέζαντα. If we suppose that ῥέζαντα or θ᾽ ἐρξαντα is right (ἐρξας was used for ἐρξας = δράσας, if we may believe the Scholiast on Ar. Ach. 329), two difficulties arise. First, ἐρξαντα is harsh if used intransitively and should in that case be ἐρξωντα (compare the word ἐρξῖς in Hdt. vi 98, as a translation of the Persian Darius), nor is it less harsh to supply τάδε πάντα as object, not to speak of the tautology involved in ἐρξαντα and ἐφύτευσεν: such tautology is however not uncommon in verses of an Orphic character. Second, do
τὸν θ’ ἐρξαντα καὶ ὅσ—ἐφότευσεν both refer to Zeus? At first sight this appears to contradict the well-known idiom by which an anaphoric pronoun replaces the relative after καὶ if a relative with the same antecedent precedes (see on Apol. 40 ἀ and supra 6 c): but on the other hand τὸν θ’ ἐρξαντα is not quite the same as ὅσ τ’ ἔρξε: and on the ground of meaning it seems obvious that both clauses are descriptive of Zeus. Perhaps ὅσ still retains something of its original anaphoric use.

Zeus is here conceived of as the creator, as so often in the Orphic hymns e.g. Hymn. xv 3—5 (ed. Abel) ὃ βασιλεὺ, διὰ σὴν κεφαλὴν ἐφάνη τάδε μεία, γαία θεά μὴ τρέων θ’ ὑπηχεῖς ὅχθαι καὶ πόντος καὶ πάνθ’ ὦ ὁρανὸν ἐντὸς ἑργεῖ. There is probably a veiled allusion to some such derivation of Ζήνα as is alluded to in Crat. 396 α—β οἱ μὲν γὰρ Ζήνα, οἱ δὲ Δία καλοῦσι. συντιθέμενα δ᾽ εἰς ἐν δῆλοι τὴν φύσιν τοῦ θεοῦ, ὁ δὴ προσηκεν φαμέν ὅνωματι ὦν τε εἶναι ἀπεργάζεσθαι (cf. τὸν θ’ ἐρξαντα). οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἡμῶν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν, ἄστιν ἀτίμον πᾶλαν τῶν ᾼδην ἢ οἱ ἀρχῶν τε καὶ βασιλεὺς τῶν πάντων. συμβαίνει οὖν ὅρθως ὁμομάζεσθαι οὕτως ο θεὸς εἶναι, δι’ δὲν ᾽Ζήναν ἐν τοῖς ᾽Ζωσιν ὑπάρχει: see also Stobaeus Eclog. Phys. 2. 24—26, 86 et al.: and cf. Aesch. Suppl. 584—585 φυσίζον γένος, τὸ δὴ Ζηνὸς ἐστιν ἄληθῶς. The feeling that the Highest should be unnamed meets us not rarely in Greek literature e.g. Eur. Troad. 885—6 ὅστις ποτ’ εἶ σὺ, δυστόπαστος εἰδέναι, Ζεὺς (where see Paley). So in Plato Crat. 400 ε and Phileb. 12 c: τὸ δ’ ἐμὸν δεὸς—ἀεὶ πρὸς τὰ τῶν θεῶν ὄνοματα οὐκ ἔστι κατ’ ἀνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ πέρα τοῦ μεγίστου φόβου. καὶ νῦν τὴν μὲν Ἀφροδίτην, ὅπη ἐκείνη φίλον, ταύτη προσαγορεύω. The last passage is thus appropriated by Origen adv. Cels. iv 80—81 (ed. Migne) ἄλλα καθαρὰν εὐσέβειαν εἰς τὸν δημιουργὸν ἀσκοῦντες οὐδὲ μέχρι ὄνοματος χραίνομεν τὰ θεῖα, ἀποδεχόμενοι τοῦ Πλάτωνος τὸν ἐν Φιλήβω λόγον—τὸ γὰρ ἐμὸν δεὸς κτλ. It is in the same spirit that Plato makes Socrates shrink from describing the Idea of Good otherwise than by a simile in Rep. vi 506 δ—ἐ ἄλλ’, ὡς μακάριοι, αὐτὸ μὲν τὶ ποτ’ ἔστι τάγαθων ἐάσωμεν τὸ νῦν εἶναι—ὁς δὲ ἐκγυνός τε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φαίνεται καὶ ὁμοιότατος ἐκείνω λέγειν ἑθέλω: with which compare the impressive words of the Timaeus (28 c) τὸν μὲν οὖν ποιήτην καὶ πατέρα τοῦ τοῦ παντὸς εὐρείν τε ἔργον καὶ εὐρόντα εἰς πάντας ἀδύνατον λέγειν.

Throughout this note I have assumed the correctness of θ’ ἐρξαντα, the reading of b; but I incline to think that θ’ ἐρξαντα is a
corruption of ὑπερφαντα—Zeus being conceived of as the sustainer and creator of all that is. The ὑπερφαντο πρότερον would then be like Homer’s well-known ὅμοι τράφεν ἥδε γένουτο e.g. in Od. IV 723, where see Ameis.

12 B 65. ἵνα γὰρ δέος, ἐνθα καὶ αἰδῶς. Fritzche points out that the same sentiment occurs in Epicharmus (Schol. on Soph. Ajax 1074) καὶ Ἐπίχαρμος ἐνθα δέος, ἐνταῦθα καὶ αἰδῶς. So also in Plut. Cleom. 9. 2 καλῶς ὃ εἰπὼν ἵνα γὰρ δέος, ἐνθα καὶ αἰδῶς, and περὶ ἀφργῆσιας Ch. 11. (quoted above on line 63). Plato’s point is that δέος (metis) is a wider term than αἰδῶς (pudor), which is only one kind of δέος.

68. οὐ δοκεί μοι ἐναι. ἐναι = ‘to be true’, and ἵνα δέος, ἐνθα καὶ αἰδῶς is virtually a quotation. So presently in ἀλλ’ ἵνα γε αἰδῶς, ἐνθα καὶ δέος εἴναι. This is much better, because more emphatic, than to regard εἴναι as merely the copula.

71. αἰδεῖσθαι δὲ μηδὲν. For μηδὲν, οὐδὲν would be more regular after δοκοῦσι: μηδὲν is however a more emphatic negative: see on 6 B above.

74. ἀλλ’ ἵνα γε αἰδῶς, ἐνθα καὶ δέος εἴναι. The Christian parallel (with a characteristic difference) is ‘Perfect love casteth out fear’. On εἴναι see last note but one.

75. αἰδοὺμενος—δέοικεν. Plato’s choice of words is very characteristic here. Wishing to prove that αἰδῶς implies δέος, he passes from the one notion to the other through a series of middle terms, of which the later in each case involves more notion of δέος than the earlier. Thus in αἰδῶς fear is less prominent than in αἰσχύνεσθαι, in αἰσχύνεσθαι than in φοβεῖσθαι: and φοβεῖσθαι (timere), in which the physical agitation due to present danger (ἡ παραντικα πτόνης, says Ammonius) is the leading idea, forms the natural transition to δεδείναι (metis, ὑπόνοια κακοῦ): see Prodicus’ perfectly just distinction between δέος and φόβος in Prot. 358D and for other examples of this quasi-sorites in Plato see on Crito 47 B τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπαλοντι. πεφόβηται as present of the state should be noticed.

12 C 77. δέοικε μὲν οὖν. μὲν οὖν is corrective, as usual: see on Apol. 26 B. Plato of course writes δέοικε rather than πεφόβηται or both because the point is to shew that αἰδῶς involves δέος, not φόβος.

79. οὖ μέντοι—γε: stronger than δὲ after μέν. γε is regularly separated from μέντοι by a word.

80. ἔπι πλέον: in logical terminology, δέος has more extension
and less intension than aiðws. Schanz puts the reasoning well thus: the higher idea (a) is the one which is poorer in essential marks, the lower is the one which is richer in these (a+x): consequently, the higher idea (a) is present where the lower (a+x) is, but not vice versa. For the phraseology cf. Euthyd. 290 B οὐδέμα—τῆς θηρευτικῆς αὐτῆς ἐπὶ πλέον ἐστὶν ἡ ὁσιν θηρεῦσαι κτλ. Notice the purely logical sense of μόριον and μέρος throughout this passage. It is important to bear this sense of μέρος in mind when Plato speaks of ‘parts’ of soul.

86. καὶ ἐκεῖ λέγων. ἐκεῖ refers to 11 E—12 A. τὸ τοιοῦτον of course depends on λέγων (meaning).

CHAPTER XIV.

Euthyphro now understands the logical difficulty just cleared up: and Socrates, with a view to reaching a definition of ὁσιων, asks ‘what sort of a part of δικαίωv it is’. The reply is—that part which is concerned with care for the gods.

3. τὸ ποιον μέρος. “Articulus ubi pronominibus interrogativis 12 D additur, semper refertur ad aliquid, quod praecessit”. Hermann, quoted by Fritzsche. In Ar. Ran. 1227—1229 there is a case of the violation of this rule: ὁ δαμὸν’ ἀνδρῶν, ἀποτρῆ τὴν λήκυθον, ἣν μὴ διακαλαγ σοῦ προλόγουν ἡμῶν; EUR. τὸ τί; ἕγὼ πρῶμαι τφδε; This particular passage is probably corrupt: but Hermann’s rule is by no means without exceptions e.g. Rep. v 469 B and x 595 A.

5. ἡρωτάς τι—ἐλπον ἄν. τι as internal accusative. With ἐρωτᾶv this acc. is for the most part confined to neuter pronouns: yet Crat. 407 C τὸν "Αρη ἡρωτά (ask about Ares). ἐλπον is probably preferred to the more regular ἔλεγον as more decisive and instantaneous. Schanz quotes Symp. 199 D ἀλλ’ ὄσπερ ἄν εἰ αὐτὸ τοῦτο πατέρα ἡρωτῶν,—ἐλπες ἄν κτλ. So also in Soph. Ant. 755 εἰ μὴ πατήρ ἡς θ’ ἐλπον ἄν σ’ οὐκ εὐ φρονεῖν.

6. οὗτος ὁ ἄριθμός i.e. ὁ ἄρητος.

7. σκαληνος—ίσοσκελής. Greek arithmetic was largely geometrical: see the well known passage in the Theaetetus 147 D—148 B. An even number is of course called isosceles as being divisible by 2. So the Scholiast explains the passage.

II. ὁσιόν ἐστιν. Hirschig would read (against the MSS) τὸ 12 E
NOTES ON XIV 12 E

οἰσιον, as in D above: but cf. infra in Euthyphro’s reply εἶναι εὐσεβέσ ὑπὲρ καὶ ὁσιον. It is indifferent whether ὁσιον or τὸ ὁσιον is written, since ὁσιον is to be no mere predicate of, but absolutely identical with, the part of δικαιον sought for.

13. μεμαθηκότας. It is implied as usual that to learn piety is to be pious.

15. τοῦτο τοῖνυν κτλ. This is the fourth definition given by Euthyphro. In harmony with the fact that it is led up to by Socrates, rather than by Euthyphro, we find it in other dialogues of Plato, e.g. Gorg. 507 A—Β καὶ μὴ περὶ μὲν ἀνθρώπους τὰ προσήκοντα πράττων δίκαι ἀν πράττοι, περὶ δὲ θεοῦ ὁσιο. τὸν δὲ τὰ δίκαια καὶ ὁσια πράττοντα ἀνάγκη δίκαιον καὶ ὁσιον εἶναι: ἐστι ταῦτα. Cf. Zeno in Diog. Laert. VII 119 εἶναι τε τὴν εὐσεβείαν ἐπιστήμην θεῶν θεραπελας: the same definition is also given by Sext. Emp. Adv. Math. IX 123. See also Introd. p. xiii.

CHAPTER XV.

This and the following chapters are concerned with the definition now reached. First, Socrates raises the question as to what θεραπελα means. In the present chapter he proves that it cannot be a care having for its object the benefit of the gods: and Euthyphro explains it as service like that of slaves to their masters.

1. καὶ καλὼς γε. There is no sarcasm here: for this definition (in Plato’s view) conceals at least if it does not reveal the truth: see 13 E.

13 A 2. σμικροῦ τινος ἐνδεής εἶμι. Schanz aptly quotes Prot. 329 B νῦν οὖν, ὡς Πρωταγόρα, σμικροῦ τινος ἐνδεής εἶμι πάντ’ ἔχειν, εἶ μοι ἄποκρίναι τόδε.

6. λέγομεν γὰρ ποι. Plato begins as if he would state the difference between θεραπελα of gods and that of other objects in general terms: instead of which he breaks off and takes special examples. οἷον is similarly used in οἷον τοιοῦτοι below (13 B).

7. ἐπιτείκης—ἐπιπείκως. The order is for emphasis. The analogies are quite in Socrates’ style: see Xen. Mem. I. 2. 37 where Critias says: ἀλλὰ τῶν τοι διὰ ἀπέξεσθαι δεήσει, ὡς Σῶκρατες, τῶν σκυτέων καὶ τῶν τεκτώνων καὶ τῶν χαλκέων κτλ. οὐκοίν, ἐφὲ ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ τῶν ἐπομένων τούτων, τοῦ τε δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ὀσίου καὶ τῶν ἀλλων τῶν τοιούτων;
13. κυνηγετικός = κυνών θεραπευτικός, for ἀγω often means to educate or train.

22. ταυτὸν διαπράττεται: for ταυτὸν see above on 10 B.


30. ὁσαυτῷς is now written by Schanz ὁς αὐτῶς, on the ground that Plato's ὁς δ' αὐτῶς shews that the two parts of the word were still felt to be distinct.

η ἐπὶ βλάβη κτλ. Is this the only alternative? Could they not remain in statu quo? See above on θεομασίς in 7 A.

37. ἐυγχωρίσαις. This older form of opt. Aor. is frequent in Plato.

38. βελτίω—ἀπεργάζει. Beltiw is primarily not of character, but of condition (prosperity and the like): but in the Greek view character is improved by improved circumstances: see above on 3 A kακουργεῖν τὴν πόλιν. The absurdity here consists in supposing that the gods are not already in the best condition possible.

43. οὖχ ήγούμενος explains τούτον δὴ ἑνεκα.

46. εἶεν was pronounced εἶεν, with intervocalic aspiration. The particle (which is perhaps connected with εἶα) serves to dismiss one point and introduce another. See on Crito 47 B.

Socrates now asks—what does this service seek to produce? Euthyphro is unable to reply, and the problem remains unsolved. Presently be declares (Def. 5) that holiness consists in saying and doing what is pleasing to the gods in prayer and sacrifice.

The key to the positive teaching of the Euthyphro lies in the unsolved question propounded in this chapter: see Introd. pp. xii ff.

1. η λατρεῖσ υπνεική sc. θεραπεία. The word θεραπεία is however not expressed, because its usual meaning is care which has for its aim the good of the object: and this meaning has just been excluded. The use of drugs and the like is meant.

13 E 6. η ναοπηγοῖς υπνεική: viz. the ὅργανα of their craft.

12. η δὲ θεῖος υπνεική κτλ. The possibility of piety being an ἐνέργεια without producing any ἔργον is not entertained.


17. ἐκεῖνο τὸ πάγκαλον ἔργον. Socrates asks the τί: Euthyphro in his reply gives the πολὺν. Compare Meno 86 D—E and Gorg. 448 E. In πάγκαλον Socrates gives a slight hint as to the nature of the reply which he desired: see Bonitz Platonische Studien p. 238 note 7. The answer to the question is thus supplied by Bonitz (p. 234) from hints in the Euthyphro and other dialogues: "Piety is nothing but perfect morality, only in such a form that man is conscious of being thus the organ by which God works his will": see Introd. p. xv.

18. ημίν υπνείταις: we are as it were the body of rowers, God the pilot: cf. Symp. 186 E η τε οὖν λατρικῇ—διὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦτον κυβερνᾶται κτλ. Heraclitus Frag. XIX (ed. Bywater) εἰν τὸ σοφοῖν, ἐπιστασθαι γνώμην η κυβερνᾶται πάντα διὰ πάντων. With the general sentiment compare Isocrates 5. 150 οἷμαι δὲ σ' οὐκ ἀγνοεῖν διὸ τόπον οἱ θεοὶ τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων διακοινοῦσιν. οὐ γὰρ αὐτὸ-χειρες οὔτε τῶν ἀγαθῶν οὔτε τῶν κακῶν γίγνονται τῶν συμβαίνοντων.
22. τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν. Schanz now inserts τῆς ἀπεργασίας 14 A before αὐτῶν: formerly he rejected τῆς ἀπεργασίας in the second passage below. The effect of αὐτῶν is to identify the generals with their profession: cf. τούτο μοι ἔδοξεν αὐτῶν ἀναισχυντότατον εἶναι (Apol. 17 B). Contrast αὐτῶν τῆς ἀπεργασίας below: where αὐτῶν of course depends on ἀπεργασίας in spite of the hyperbaton, and has for its antecedent, not πολλὰ καὶ καλά, but γεωργοί.

29. τί δὲ δὴ κτλ. The usual punctuation places the mark of interrogation after τί δὲ δὴ: but this seems to involve a confusion of thinking, unless τῆς ἐργασίας is regarded as merely epexegetical, which is very awkward. (Engelhardt’s note can hardly be right: “duo genitivi τῶν πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν et τῆς ἐργασίας eodem modo a κεφάλαιον pendent. Eadem grata (?) negligentia Wolfsius: multorum et pulchrorum, quae dii efficient, quaenam summa est effectiosis huius?”) Taking ἐργασίας with πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν, we get a wrong meaning. The meaning required is not ‘what is the κεφάλαιον of the ἐργασία of the πολλὰ καὶ καλά?’, but either, ‘what is the κεφάλαιον of the πολλὰ καὶ καλά?’ or ‘what is the κεφάλαιον of the ἐργασία?’ With the punctuation which I have adopted, the idiom is like Rep. ν 470 A τί δὲ γῆς τε μηνεσεως τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς καὶ οἰκίων ἐμπρήσεως; ποίον τί σοι δράσοσιν οἱ στρατιώται πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους; where see Stallbaum’s note.

30. τῆς ἐργασίας is said rather than ἀπεργασίας, on account of the preceding ἀπεργαζόνται: ἀπεργασία would moreover require an object, whereas ἐργασία is regularly used as equivalent to ‘business’ or ‘trade’: see also on ἐμπορίκη in 14 E. Similar cases where a preposition is dropped are Phaed. 104 D ἐπὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον δῆ, φαμέν, ἡ ἐναντία ἵδε ἐκεῖνη τῇ μορφῇ, ἡ ἀν τούτο ἀπεργάζεται, οὐδέποτε ἀν ἔθει—ἐγράφετο δὲ γε ἡ περιτίθ—Euthyd. 281 C οὐκ ἐλάττων πράττων ἐλάττω αὐτό ἀμαρτάνοι, ἐλάττω δὲ ἀμαρτάνων ἤττων αὐτὸς πράττοι (Schanz). So Eur. Bacchae 1065 κατηγεν, ἡγεν, ἡγεν ἐς μέλαν πέδον.

31. καλ ὀλίγον σοι πρότερον. The reference is to 9 B. After καλ ὀλίγον we should expect καλ νῦν ταύτα λέγω or the like: in place of which Euthyphro substitutes a sentence intended to contain his last deliverance on the subject of piety. ἀπλῶς presently is ‘simply’, ‘without qualification’.

34. ἐὰν μὲν—τὰ ὅσια. This is strictly speaking no entirely new 14 B
definition (though laid down by Euthyphro as such), but an amplification of the definition given in 12 E (δοσιν is τὸ περὶ τὴν τῶν θεῶν θεραπείαν): see also note on τὸς αὐτῆς ἡ ὑπηρεσία in 14 D. The special sense of θεραπεία is now said to be saying and doing what is acceptable to the gods in prayer and sacrifice, i.e. the formal aspect of religion is now insisted on, while at the same time, as Socrates proceeds to shew, there is a reminiscence of the definition already refuted viz. that Piety is τὸ θεοφάλες (6 E). Euthyphro (as a μάντις) takes the purely sacerdotal view of religion: cf. Cic. N. D. i 116 'sanctitas autem est scientia colendorum deorum'. The conception of εὐσέβεια as a proper recognition of ἡ περὶ θεοῦ τε καὶ ἄνθρωπος πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνία (Symp. 188 c)—originally a strictly legal, almost mercantile relation—is well brought out in Politic. 290 c: καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ τῶν ἑρέων αὐ γένος—παρὰ μὲν ἡμῶν δωρεᾶς θεοῖς διὰ θυσίων ἐπιστήμων ἐστὶ κατὰ νὸν ἐκεῖνος δωρεάσθαι, παρὰ δὲ ἐκεῖνων ἡμῖν εὐχαίς κτῆσιν ἀγαθῶν αἰτήσασθαι. See Introd. p. xxi. It should be noted that κεχαρισμένον is regularly used of what finds favour with the gods e.g. Arist. Pax 386 κεχαρισμένον χορήδιον: Hdt. i 87 εἰ τι οἱ κεχαρισμένον ἔξ αὐτῶν ἐδωρήθη: Xen. Hippiarch. i 1 θυσία χρὴ ἀιτεῖσθαι θεοὺς ταῦτα διδόναι, καὶ νοεῖν καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράσινον, ἀρ' ὕν θεοῖς μὲν κεχαρισμένωτα αὐτοῖς ἄρξειας ἀν κτλ.: Anacreon 2. 7 σὺ δ' ἐκμενής ἐλθ' ἡμῖν κεχαρισμένης δ' εὐχώλης ἐπακούειν.

36. καὶ σφέξει κτλ. Wohlrab formerly found in this sentence the most important positive result of the dialogue (see the Einleitung to his edition of 1880, pp. 8 ff.): this can hardly be correct however, for Socrates clearly implies in the immediate sequel (καὶ γὰρ νῦν ἐπειδὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἡ σθα, ἀπετάπαυ) that Euthyphro has shirked answering the vital question, viz. that in 13 E. See Introd. p. xiii. Observe that Euthyphro looks on religion as essential to the existence of a state: see on 5 E above.

CHAPTER XVII.

The statement of Euthyphro is now examined, with a view to elicit its meaning: and it is reduced to the form 'Piety is the ἐπιστήμη αἰτήσεως καὶ δόσεως θεοῖς'.

1. ἡ πολὺ μοι διὰ βραχυτέρων. Prepositions are frequently inserted between an adjective and the adverb going with it: e.g.
Euthyd. 305 C πάνω παρά πολλοῖς and Symp. 192 C οὕτως ἐπὶ μεγάλης σπουδῆς: see on Apol. 36 A.

3. ἤρωτων: the reference is doubtless to 14 A τι δὲ δῆ κτλ., but 14 C it should be noticed that Euthyphro’s answer is not so much a reply to that question as a fresh deliverance on the subject of piety.

ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ πρόθυμος: so in 12 A ἀλλ’, ὃ λέγω, τρυφᾶς ύπό πλούτου τῆς σοφίας.

4. δῆλος εἶ: a colloquial idiom, used in this paratactic way: Ar. Av. 1407 καταγελᾶς μου, δῆλος εἶ.

5. ἐπειδὴ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ ᾧσθαι: viz. in 13 E. For ἐπ’ αὐτῷ in this sense (‘at the point’) Schanz compares Phileb. 18 D ἦ μὴν ἐπ’ αὐτῷ γε ἦδη γεγονότες ἵππετε, ὡς φής, πάλαι.

ὁ εἶ ἀπεκρίνω. The precise force of ἀποκρίνεσθαι here is ‘state in your answer’: cf. the use of ἐρωτᾶν commented on above in 12 D.

6. ἰκανὸς: so B: T has ἵσως. We have here as clear a statement as is possible of the importance which Plato meant to attach to the question in 13 E. See Introd. p. xiii.

7. ἐμεμαθήκη: so the second hand in B: ἐμεμαθήκειν has inferior MS authority. Pluperfects in -εω are not found in the best Attic: see on Apol. 22 C (ἐνυήθη οὐδὲν ἐπισταμένως).

νῦν δὲ ἀνάγκη γὰρ: see on 11 C νῦν δὲ σαι γὰρ κτλ.

τὸν ἐρώτημα τῷ ἐρωμένῳ. So B: T has τὸν ἐρωτῶντα τῷ ἐρωμένῳ. Fritzschc and Wohlrab rightly retain the more difficult reading, which Schanz changes to τὸν ἐρωτῶντα τῷ ἐρωτωμένῳ. There is a similar confusion of ἐρώμενος and ἐρωτώμενος in the Erastae 132 D, and of ἐρωτῶσ and ἐρωτῶντος in Rep. IV 437 C. Socrates frequently uses the language of the tender passion in talking with a younger disputant: compare (with Wohlrab) 14 D infra ἐπιθυμητής γὰρ εἰμι, ὃ φιλε, τῆς σῆς σοφίας καὶ προσέχω τὸν νοῦν αὐτῇ: and see Alcibiades. 216 D.

8. ἀκολουθεῖν, ὡπὴ ἂν ἐκεῖνος ὑπάγῃ. So in Rep. III 394 D ὡπὴ ἂν ὁ λόγος ὡσπερ πνεῦμα φέρει, ταύτῃ ἵτεον. The preposition in ὑπάγω denotes the gradual leading on from step to step: a good instance is quoted by L. and S. from Arist. H. An. IX 8. 613 b 30 ἐὰν ὑπ’ ἀνθρώπου ὁφθῇ (sc. ἦ πέρδεξ)—ἀπὸ τῶν ψῶν ὑπάγει, πρὸ ποθῶν φαῖνομένη τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἔως ἂν ἀπαγάγῃ.

10. ἐπιστήμην τινὰ κτλ. Note that in this short form of Euthyphro’s definition there is nothing to represent the clause καὶ σφέτεν τὰ τοιαύτα κτλ. (14 B). A clause so unimportant cannot therefore be regarded as the corner-stone of the dialogue: see
Introd. p. xiv: and for the place of this definition in Greek religious thought ibid. p. xxii.


13. εὐχεσθαι αἰτεῖν. Fritzche quotes Legg. vii 801 λα εὐχαλ παρὰ θεῶν αἰτήσεις εἰς.


19. ἐπιθυμήσης has much the same sense as ἔρασθής, see on τὸν ἔρωντα τῷ ἐρωμένῳ in 14 C and cf. Legg. vi 643 Ε ἐπιθυμήσης τε καὶ ἔρασθήν τοῦ πολιτίν γενέσθαι τέλεον.

20. οὗ χαμαλ πεσεῖται. A proverbial expression ἐπὶ τῶν διακενῆς οὐδὲν λεγόντων, ἀλλ' ἐπιτυχανόντων, says the Scholiast. Fritzche well compares Ar. Vesp. 1012 τὰ μελλόντ' εὖ λέγεσθαι μη πέτα θαυμάζει εὐλαβεῖται, and Pindar's χαμαίπτετ' δ' ἀρ' ἐποικ ἀπέριψεν (Pyth. vi 37).

21. τὸς αὐτὴ ἡ ὑπηρεσία. The word ὑπηρεσία clearly shews that Socrates looks on the answer of Euthyphro in 14 B as no new definition, but an attempt to explain more precisely the meaning of ὑπηρετική θεραπεία in 13 D.

22. αὐτοὺς—ἐκείνους. Both pronouns refer to the gods: Fritzche compares Prot. 310 D ἀν αὐτῷ διδότας ἄργυρων καὶ πείθης ἐκείνων.

CHAPTER XVIII.

The present chapter reduces Euthyphro's theory to the statement already canvassed and rejected, viz. that ὅσιον is τὸ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον.

1. τὸ ὀρθῶς αἰτεῖν: as ὁ ἐπιστήμων τοῦ αἰτεῖν will: piety is herewith virtually declared to be a kind of ἐπιστήμη. With the introduction of ὀρθῶς here compare Alcib. I 128 B τι δέ, ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδη; ὁ ὀρθῶς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καλεῖς τι ὁποιοῦν πράγματος;

4. ἀλλὰ τι: i.e. why, what should it be? what else?' i.q. τι μήν; which Plato uses regularly in his later dialogues: see Ritter's Untersuchungen über Plato (1888) p. 57.
5. τυχάνουσιν δεόμενοι. There is the same ambiguity in I4 E δεόμενοι as in the English 'wanting'.

7. τεχνικόν γ' ἣν εἴη. Piety being ex hypothesi an ἐπιστήμη, the conduct of the pious man will be τεχνικόν. Stallbaum is hardly right: "Pietas 13 D vocata est ὑπηρετική θεοῦ (int. τέχνη)": see my note on the passage. Cobet would omit διδώντα, but δωροφορεῖν is used absolutely as if 'throw one's gifts away': cf. Phaedr. 266 C 01 ἄν δωροφορεῖν αὐτοῖς ὡς βασιλεύου εἶλεσιν—where the βασιλῆς are the Sophists.

10. ἐμπορική. Wohlrab aptly quotes Symp. 188 B καὶ θυσίαν πᾶσαι καὶ οὐς μαντικὴ ἐπιστατεῖ—ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ἡ περὶ θεοῦ τε καὶ ἀνθρώπου πρὸς ἄλλους κοινωνία. The way has already been prepared for this view of religion in the use of ἔργασια (which suggests 'trade', 'merchandise') in I4 A above. See also Introd. p. xxi.

12. έι οὖτως Ἰδιον. Euthyphro insinuates that Socrates is using an invidious word.

16. ἀ μὲν—δὴ λοι. ἀ here virtually = ἀττα the indirect interrogative: it is so used sometimes in dependent interrogative sentences. So ὅσος is used for ὅποιος, and οἷς for ὅποιος: see Gorg. 451 B, where Thompson quotes Soph. O. R. 1271 θὸν ω' οὐκ ὰφευτό μν οὐθ' οἱ ἐπασχεν οὐθ' ὁ πο' ἐδρα κακά. Kühner Ausf. Gramm. Π p. 742 takes a somewhat different view, regarding οἷς in such cases as equivalent to ὅς and denying that ὅς is ever used for ὅσις.

οὗδεν γάρ—δῶσιν. For Socrates' views on Providence see Mem. IV 3. 3 ff. εἰπέ μοι, ἐφη, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἦδη ποτὲ σοι ἐπῆλθεν ἐνυπαρθήματι, ὡς ἐπιμελώς οἱ θεοί, ὡν οἱ ἀνθρώποι δέονται, κατεσκενάσι; cf. Rep. Π 379 C οὐδ' ἄρα—ὁ θεός, ἐπειδὴ ἀγαθός, πάντων ἃν εἴη αἰτοις—ἀλλ' ὄλγοι μὲν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις αἰτοις, πολλῶν δὲ ἀναίτοις· πολύ γὰρ ἐλάττων τάγαθα τῶν κακῶν ἡμῖν: see Introd. p. xv. The Scholiast on this passage (as Cobet points out in Mnemosyne N. S. Π 88) was acquainted with St James's Epistle. His comment is συνώδον τῷ· πᾶσα δόσις ἀγαθὴ καὶ εἴη. The passage is in St James I 17: πᾶσα δόσις ἀγαθὴ καὶ πᾶν δώρημα τέλειον ἀνωθέν ἐστιν, καταβαίνον ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρός τῶν φῶτων.

24. ἀλλὰ τί—θεοὶς; i.e. if not, what can these gifts be etc.? ἀλλὰ has the same force as in ἀλλὰ τί in D above. τί shews that Socrates wishes a general description by way of answer: Euthyphro replies with an enumeration of details, much as in his first attempt at a definition (5 D above). For the syntax Engelhardt compares Phaed. 58 C τί ἢν τά λεχθέντα καὶ πραξθέντα;
27. ἀρτι ἔλεγον: viz. in 14 B. The words τιμή, γέρας, χάρις (and its derivatives χαριστήρια, χαριτήσια etc.) are of frequent occurrence in connection with Greek religion. χάρις prepares the way for κεχαρισμένον as gratiae might for gratum.

15 B

29. οὐχὶ ωφέλιμον οἶδὲ φιλον. τὸ ωφέλιμον is naturally also φιλον. The justification for adding τὸ φιλον is of course the desire to make Euthyphro confess that his present definition is identical with the earlier one in 6 E.

31. τοῦτο ἄρ' ἐστὶν αὖ. τοῦτο refers forward to τὸ τοῖς θεοῖς φιλον: αὖ back to 6 E.

CHAPTER XIX.

Socrates now retaliates on Euthyphro. "You who call me a Daedalus, yourself out-Daedalus Daedalus: for τὸ τοῖς θεοῖς φιλον is simply θεοφιλές".

1. ἔδω σοι. I have accented σοι, because it is emphatically opposed to καὶ ἐμὲ αἰτιάσει.

3. αἰτιάσει: as in ΙΙ C. τὸν Δαϊδάλου alludes in particular to ΙΙ C above, ἄλλα σῷ μοι δοκεῖσ, ὁ Δαϊδάλος: it is therefore virtually a quotation. The passage would be much less forcible if the words were expunged, as Schanz suggests. Liebhold's proposal, τρόπων Δαιδάλου, is ingenious, but quite unnecessary.

5. καὶ κύκλῳ περιόντας. So T: the second hand in B has περιόντα: B has περιόντα. καὶ is explanatory; there is no need to bracket the word, as Schanz suggests. For περιόντας Schanz reads περιόντας: but in ΙΙ C above περιέναι (with the mss). The forms περιόν etc. are found occasionally in the mss of Plato: but I cannot believe that Plato would have written both περιέναι and περιόντας within the compass of a single short dialogue. See on the subject of περιόν in Greek manuscripts Naber in Mnemosyne N. S. v 417. κύκλῳ is by no means otiose here: since περιέναι may mean simply 'to move about' (as above in ΙΙ C): Euthyphro is a greater artist than Daedalus, because he communicates to his λόγοι a special sort of motion viz. circular: Daedalus' statues merely walked about. With the whole passage cf. Euthyd. 291 C—D ὡσπερ εἰς λαβώρυνθον ἐμπεσόντες, οἴμενοι ἢ ἔτι τέλει εἶναι, περικάμψαντες πάλιν ὡσπερ ἐν ἀρχὴ τῆς ξητῆσεως ἀνεφάνημεν ὅντες καὶ τοῦ ἑσύν δεόμενοι, ὡσοπερ ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἔξητούμεν.
7. ἐν τῷ πρὸσθεν: the reading of T: B has ἐμπρὸσθεν. Schanz remarks that there is a tendency in Platonic mss to write ἐμπρὸσθεν for πρὸσθεν. The reference is to 10E ff.

8. ταῦτάν: see above on 10 E.

12. ἀλλὰ τί η: see on Apol. 24 C. If we regard the phrase as already a stereotyped particle of interrogation, the η οὖ; following will present no difficulty: but in any case η οὖ is otiose: and the fuller form ἀλλὰ τί η is rarely used without some hint of its origin = ecquid alium quam? Hermann reads οὐκ ἀλλὰ against the mss and places a colon after γλύνηται. On the whole I prefer Schanz’s view, with which Wohlrab agrees. ἀλλὰ τί η is taken by them as equivalent to German nicht wahr, used parenthetically in the sense of ‘I suppose’, without a distinctly interrogative sense. I know no other case of such a use. γλύνηται is ‘comes to be’ ‘is found to be’: cf. (with Schanz) Euthyd. 298 οὐκόιν πατήρ οὖν σὸς ἔστιν, ὠστε σὸς πατήρ γλύνηται ὁ κόνων καὶ σὺ κυναρίων ἀδελφός;

15. ἀρτί: viz. in 10E where the identity of ὀσιόν and θεοφιλές was finally disallowed. For τιθέμεθα see above on 11 C.

CHAPTER XX.

In this concluding chapter Socrates complains of Euthyphro’s willful reticence.

3. ἐκὼν εἶναι: is used by Plato only in negative sentences: see 15 D on Apol. 37 A.

4. προσέχων—νῦν. ὁ τι μάλιστα is to be taken with προσέχων, νῦν with εἶπε.


8. ἡδησθα: the only correct form in Plato: see on Apol. 22 C. Here B has ἡδεισθά, T εἰδησθά.

10. άνδρός θητός άνδρα πρεσβύτην. άνήρ is frequently added thus to words which denote one’s nationality, standing, condition and the like, as in άνήρ μάντις, άνήρ νομεύς (Sophocles), άνδρες δικασται etc.

I 5 E

13. σαφώς οὗτι εἴδεναι: so ἀκριβῶς οὗτι ἐπιστασθαί περὶ τῶν θειῶν ὑπ’ ἔχειν in 4 E. The emphasis is on οὗτι.

18. ἀπ’ ἐλπίδος—καταβαλὼν. Compare Phaedo 98 B ἀπὸ δὴ βαθμιασθῆς, οὗ ἐταίρε, ἐλπίδος ψυχόμην φερόμενον.

19. ἦν ἐχόν. The concluding sentence recalls 5 A—B. Thus in σοφὸς ἦν παρ’ Ἐυθύφρωνος τὰ θεῖα γένονα we have an echo of ἔγνω ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν χρόνῳ τὰ θεῖα περὶ πολλῶν ἐποιοῦμην εἴδεναι—καὶ εἰ μὲν, ὦ Μέλητε, φαίνην ἂν, Ἐυθύφρωνα ὁμολογεῖσι σοφόν εἶναι τὰ τοιαῦτα: and in οὐκέτι—ἀυτοσχεδιάζω οὐδὲ κανοτομῶ περὶ αὐτά there is a reminiscence of ἐπειδὴ μὲ ἐκείνοις ἀυτοσχεδιάζοντα φησι καὶ κανοτομοῦντα περὶ τῶν θειῶν.

20. τὰ τε ὅσια καὶ μῆ. It is unnecessary to read (with Liebhold Woch. für kl. Phil. 1888 no. 40 p. 1229) καὶ τὰ μῆ.
24. καὶ δὴ καὶ—βιωσόμην. For καὶ δὴ καὶ see above on 2 E. 16 A
For ὅτι ἄμεινον Schanz reads ἄμεινον against the mss, taking ὅτι (like ὡς παρὰ σοῦ above) with ἐλπίδος: I prefer the ms reading, as forming a more euphonious and impressive conclusion. In the concluding words of the Phaedo the traditional reading is to be preferred for a similar reason. Here ὅτι depends on ἐνδείξαμενος and is parallel to the other two ὅτι clauses: Socrates might hope to be acquitted by convincing Meletus of his resolution to reform. For the change of mood from Indicative to Optative we may compare (with Schanz) Thuc. 11 80 1 λέγοντες ὅτι—ῥαδίως ἄν—κρατήσουσι καὶ ὁ περίπλουσ οὐκέτι ἐσούτο Ἀθηναῖοι ὁμοίως περὶ Πελοπόννησον.
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