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**DOCUMENTARY TESTIMONY OF GEN. IZYADOR MODELSKI,  
FORMER MILITARY ATTACHÉ OF THE POLISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

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**HEARINGS**  
BEFORE THE  
**COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES**  
**HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**  
EIGHTY-FIRST CONGRESS  
FIRST SESSION

MARCH 31 AND APRIL 1, 1949

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NOTE.—Testimony taken in executive session and made public by full Committee on Un-American Activities for release on April 24, 1949.

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DOCUMENTARY TESTIMONY OF GEN. IZYADOR MODELSKI,  
FORMER MILITARY ATTACHÉ OF THE POLISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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THURSDAY, MARCH 31, 1949

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE OF UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,  
*Washington, D. C.*

EXECUTIVE SESSION

A subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities met pursuant to call at 10 a.m. in room 226, Old House Office Building, Hon. John S. Wood, (chairman), presiding.

Committee members present: Hon. John S. Wood, chairman.

Staff members present: Louis J. Russell, senior investigator; William A. Wheeler, investigator.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. Chairman, the witness this morning is General Izyador Rudolf Modelski. General Modelski made available to the committee a number of original documents in the Polish language which he kept in his possession after he left his position as military and air attaché at the Polish Embassy, Washington, D. C. Photostatic copies of the documents were made and the documents were later translated from Polish into English by official Government translators. General Modelski's appearance here is in conjunction with the documents he made available to the committee.

Mr. WOOD. Will you stand and be sworn, please. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

General MODELSKI. I do.

Mr. RUSSELL. Will you please state your full name for the record?

General MODELSKI. Izyador Rudolf Modelski.

Mr. RUSSELL. Where were you born?

General MODELSKI. I was born in Lwow, Poland, now under Russia.

Mr. RUSSELL. What is your present address?

General MODELSKI. Chevy Chase, Md.

Mr. RUSSELL. Were you at one time associated with the Polish Embassy?

General MODELSKI. I came here as a military and air attaché. I was attached to the Polish Embassy here in Washington, D. C.

Mr. RUSSELL. When did you arrive in the United States?

General MODELSKI. I came here the 29th of May, 1946.

Mr. RUSSELL. You were sent here by the Polish Government?

General MODELSKI. Yes; I was sent by the Polish Government.

Mr. RUSSELL. Are you presently attached to the Polish Embassy?

General MODELSKI. No; I denounced it. I sent a letter to Dr. Josef Winiewicz, Polish Ambassador. I informed him that I will not return to Poland as long as they are under a Communist regime.

Mr. RUSSELL. Before you came to the United States, what position did you hold?

General MODELSKI. I was Under Secretary of War during the last war in France and was in Great Britain with General Sikorski and Mikolajczyk.

Mr. RUSSELL. Had you ever held any other position in the Polish Government?

General MODELSKI. Yes; I was sent to Poland in July 1945 after our defeat and I was sent afterward, in October, as head of a military mission to London to get Polish military views abroad.

Mr. RUSSELL. Were you attached to the Polish Government at the time of the partition of Poland—when Poland was partitioned between Russia and Germany?

General MODELSKI. In exile. Under Secretary of War.

Mr. RUSSELL. Do you recall the circumstances under which you became affiliated with the present Polish Government?

General MODELSKI. Yes; I was shocked after Yalta and Teheran, when it was decided that three powers would secure Poland's independence and democratic way of life. Although I was shocked, I decided to return to Poland to help build a democratic government and help Mr. Mikolajczyk to do this job under those conditions under which Poland must live. Then, when I came to Poland, I saw that it was difficult to find any Poles. Many army officers I saw wore Polish uniforms, but they were Russians. They could speak Polish but they were really Russians. I have discussed this many times with Mikolajczyk. I understood very well that the Polish situation was very grave and that Russia desired only to rule the Polish people and that she was using criminal means to have them suppressed. I discussed this many times with Mikolajczyk, as I told you before.

Mr. WHEELER. Before you left Poland for the United States, were you given any instructions as to the type of information the Polish Government desired concerning the United States?

General MODELSKI. I had spoken with many Communist officials and especially with Marshal Zymierski. They reviewed the situation in this way: Great Britain is going down. We must do all we can to see that Great Britain is eliminated from the world. Then we will stand face to face with the United States. Perhaps there is a possibility that the United States will agree upon the division of the world in two spheres. Afterward we will do all we can to make political changes in the United States. Russia and Poland will separate the United States from all other people and we will stand against the United States alone. Our victory is then sure.

Mr. WHEELER. And the Polish Government is in support of Russia?

General MODELSKI. Exactly. They told me, especially General Zymierski, "You are a prominent general. Your name is known to the people in the United States. You have many friends; you are a friend of Paderewski. You are a friend of other great politicians in Poland. You are going to meet friends. You will have many op-



portunities to see Americans of Polish descent." They told me what Col. Gustaw Alef-Bolkowiak had repeatedly stated—"that the position of the so-called 'new liberal movement' in the United States is very great and on firm ground. Your job is especially to work among Americans of Polish descent." I had spoken about that with my friends in Poland and especially with Mikolajczyk. He told me, "I understand, and I know that you will be there only as a human curtain to cover the activity of Col. Gustaw Alef-Bolkowiak. I am afraid," he told me, "that you will not be in a position to prevent his doing spy work, because he will be your boss, although for outside appearances, you will be chief."

Mr. WHEELER. In other words, your deputy, Colonel Alef, was head of espionage in the United States?

General MODELSKI. Yes.

Mr. WHEELER. Although you were his superior?

General MODELSKI. I was his superior only to speak with other people of diplomatic circles, but I was ordered to collaborate with him. I spoke about that to Mikolajczyk and he told me, "You will go there as a human curtain; nobody will suspect that you are doing anything under-handed." At first I did not want to go, and he afterward told me, "You are an experienced man. I don't know if you will succeed, and perhaps you will not lose face."

Mr. WHEELER. When you left Poland, did you receive written instructions to set up espionage units in the United States?

General MODELSKI. Yes.

Mr. RUSSELL. Before you left Poland, was there any discussion as to what contact you might have with the Communist Party in the United States?

General MODELSKI. No. They only told me that I had such a great political position. They ordered me to approach Americans of Polish descent to obtain information.

Mr. RUSSELL. Did they discuss any Americans whom they felt might be sympathetic to communism?

General MODELSKI. No. They told me, "You are a prominent man. You are doing a great job for Poland. You must go among the American Poles." And it was as Mikolajczyk told me—that he was convinced I would never get any instructions for espionage. But in March of 1946, as I was leaving for London, very late one night, someone knocked at my door, and I saw an officer in a Polish uniform who handed me an envelope which was addressed to me. I was very eager to look at it, and I opened it and saw that it contained instructions to set up a spy ring in the United States. It had exact instructions as to which way I was to do it.

Mr. WHEELER. At this point, General Modelski, I have three documents which I received from you on February 13, 1949, photostatic copies of the originals you now have in your possession. I would like for you to look at these documents and identify them. The first document is dated March 14, 1946, is written in Polish, and bears the signature of Michal Zymierski, Marshal of Poland.

Mr. RUSSELL. General, would you say that these instructions were written in the Polish language, but with Russian phrases?

General MODELSKI. Yes.

Mr. RUSSELL. Reference is made to page 2 of the translation of this document, wherein General Modelski is advised to take advantage of:

- a. Polish American Labor Council, whose president, Leon Krzycki, is a member of the Socialist Party.
- b. Polonia Society, affiliated with the International Workers Order, president, Boleslaw Gebert.
- c. "Kosciuszko League," with headquarters in Detroit, Michigan.
- d. American Slav Congress.

General Modelski, did you ever contact any of the forementioned individuals or organizations?

General MODELSKI. No.

Mr. RUSSELL. In view of the fact that you were advised to contact the organizations and individuals, do you believe that they are sympathetic and cooperative toward the present Communist-dominated Polish Government?

General MODELSKI. Yes.

Mr. RUSSELL. Do you know Leon Krzycki?

General MODELSKI. No; but he was at one time president of the American Slav Congress, and may still be.

Mr. RUSSELL. Are you acquainted with Boleslaw Gebert?

General MODELSKI. Yes. He was formerly in the United States, but is now a great, high-ranking officer in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Poland. When he was decorated here in Washington, he was told publicly, "You are our great support. You gave us information of great importance."

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. Chairman, the committee has additional information on Leon Krzycki and Boleslaw Gebert and the organizations mentioned, but we would like to exclude our information from this report and include it in a hearing at a future date if it is satisfactory with the chairman.

Mr. Wood. It is so ordered.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this document be introduced as Exhibit I.

Mr. Wood. So ordered.

#### EXHIBIT I<sup>1</sup>

POLISH ARMY  
(blurred) Command  
Staff (blurred) Division II  
No. 0334  
14 March 1946

SECRET  
Copy No. 1.

#### INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE MILITARY ATTACHÉ AT THE EMBASSY OF THE POLISH REPUBLIC [R. P.]

#### IN WASHINGTON

1. To corroborate and observe the activity of Polish organizations in the United States. Through our "residents" to observe particularly Polish reactionary organizations, to determine their connection with similar circles in London, to corroborate their trails leading to Poland, such as ways of shuffling agents and saboteurs.

2. With the aid of people devoted to the democratic idea, to maintain contact with Polish democratic organizations, to support their struggle against reaction, aiming at creating a democratic bloc of all Poles. Information and propaganda

<sup>1</sup> See appendix, pp. 53 and 54, for photostat of original document. Leon, Polish spelling for Leo.

activity should unmask the policy of the emigrant clique, in whose hands the [American] Poles are objects of a political game against the Government of National Unity. A significant time for winning the [American] Poles to our side is the commemoration of Tadeusz Kosciuszko. This year observes the 200th anniversary of the birth of the Polish and American hero.

3. To observe the activity of such Polish organizations as the P. C. K. and various Welfare Funds. To define their relationship to Poland and to emigrant circles. To what end and by what means funds are distributed.

4. To corroborate the intentions of the international organizations—UNRRA and YMCA—in relationship to Poland.

5. To corroborate the relationship of the United States and various political groups to Polish organizations, democratic and reactionary. The extent and manner of support given by them to Polish reactionary activities.

6. The connection of Polish reactionary organizations in the United States with the military clique of Anders, efficiency of, the information bureau of Matuszewski.

7. To define and observe the relationship of American financiers to [American] Poles and the Nation.

8. To arouse the public opinion of Americans and Poles against appeasement by American occupation authorities in Germany. A large percentage of the authorities are former German emigrants. Under their cover, the German press in the American Zone of Occupation is conducting a definite anti-Polish campaign.

9. Taking as a basis the Note of the Polish Government under date of 14 February 1946, to conduct a campaign against creation by American authorities of Polish guard companies or other Polish military units. It must be emphasized particularly that it is intolerable that anyone in these units should wear insignia and merit badge distinctions of the Polish Army.

10. To become assured of the ability to receive confidential political publications, especially those published by [American] Poles.

In order to obtain information relative to the above matters, to organize a suitable information network in concentrations of emigrants and in the seats of Polish organizations. In the first order of importance, it is necessary to take advantage of the following democratic organizations:

a. Polish American Labor Council, whose president, Leon KRZYCKI, is a member of the Socialist Party.

b. Polonia Society, affiliated with the International Workers Order, president, Boleslaw GEBERT.

c. "Kosciuszko League," with headquarters in Detroit, Michigan.

d. American Slav Congress.

The above-mentioned organizations do not exhaust the list of democratic organizations which conform loyally to the Government of National Unity. In order to become fully enlightened on the activities of emigrant-reactionary circles, it is necessary to have our own informers in organizations such as:

a. Polish National Association, which has contact with purged elements in Poland,

b. Polish Roman Catholic Union.

c. Other organizations which have the benefit of support from influential segments of the Polish colony in America.

In order to infiltrate influential American societies and to interest individual groups in the problem of Poland, it is necessary to take advantage of elements opposed to the President now holding office. To obtain extensive information, the Attaché organizes a net work of "residents," delegating to them the responsibility of choosing agents. The Military Attaché does not come in direct contact with the agents.

19,III,1946.

MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE,  
MICHAL ZYMERSKI, *Marshal of Poland.*

In 2 copies

Copy #1—addressee

#2—a/a

Drawn up 13, 46

K. S.

Mr. WHEELER. The second document that General Modelski turned over to the Committee is dated March 14, 1946. Would you explain this document to the Committee?

General MODELSKI. That is the document which concerned activities in the Western Hemisphere. From that you see the Military Attaché in Washington was intended to be a supervisor of activity in America, Mexico, Canada, and Brazil. The last phrase states exactly that I am obliged to collaborate with my deputy and he must be informed of my work here, and that, in my absence, he must do this work.

Mr. WHEELER. Whose signature appears on this document?

General MODELSKI. Michal Zymierski, Marshal of Poland.

Mr. WHEELER. General Modelski, did you ever visit Canada, Mexico, or Brazil and assist in setting up espionage units in those countries?

General MODELSKI. No; but Colonel Alef visited Mexico on three occasions and also visited Canada.

Mr. WHEELER. The espionage units in Mexico and Canada were controlled by Colonel Alef?

General MODELSKI. Yes.

Mr. WHEELER. How about the other countries in the Western Hemisphere?

General MODELSKI. He later told me that he had connections in South America.

Mr. WHEELER. Mr. Chairman, I request that this document be entered into the record as Exhibit 2.

Mr. WOOD. So ordered.

#### EXHIBIT 2<sup>\*</sup>

POLISH ARMY  
Chief Command  
General Staff Division II  
No. 0333  
14 March 1946

SECRET  
Copy No. 1

#### INSTRUCTIONS

#### ON THE SCOPE AND RANGE OF ACTIVITIES OF THE MILITARY ATTACHÉ ASSIGNED TO THE POLISH EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON

1. The Military Attaché assigned to the Polish Embassy in Washington is under the Ambassador of Poland in matters of representation and political appearances. The Military Attaché advises the Ambassador of Poland in military matters.

2. The Military Attaché directs the complex of activities connected with military representation in the United States. Through his first deputy, he makes preparations for establishing contact with Canada, Argentina, and Brazil—countries to which Military Attachés will be sent.

3. The Military Attaché facilitates direct communication between the offices of Attachés of the respective nations of North and South America with the homeland. On assignments via courier, he sees to it that no use is made of the resources of foreign diplomatic missions.

4. Through the first deputy, the Military Attaché does the following:

- supervises the work of the Military Attaché in Mexico;
- supplies that office with required materials from the homeland;
- collects and transmits the correspondence of that office.

5. All diplomatic missions delegated to North and South America will travel through Washington when reporting to their posts. The Attaché himself:

—will establish contact with the Military Attaché assigned to these missions; Through his deputy:

- he will give tactical instructions to the respective Attachés, based on experience gained in the preparatory work done in these countries prior to setting up the offices of the Attaches;
- he will decide on the method of supervising the work;
- he will decide on the method of correspondence.

<sup>\*</sup> See appendix, p. 55, for photostat of original document.

6. The Military Attaché in Washington will cooperate as closely as possible with the first deputy, so that the deputy can take his place in case of the Attaché's absence.

14 III 1946.

MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE,  
MICHAŁ ZYMIERSKI, *Marshal of*  
*Poland.*

Reproduced in 2 copies

Copy No. 1—addressee

Copy No. 2—file

Drawn up 13 III 1946

A. L.

Mr. WHEELER. The next document is dated March 22, 1946. It consists of seven pages in Polish, and pertains to instructions to General Modelski and bears the signature of Colonel Komar. Will you please look at this document, General Modelski, and tell us if it is a photostatic copy of the original which you turned over to the committee on February 13, 1949?

General MODELSKI. Yes. That is detailed instructions on what fields are to be covered, and which way the spy network must be set up. Colonel Komar is now a general.

Mr. WHEELER. When did you first meet General Komar?

General MODELSKI. In 1945. When I first met Komar, it seemed to me that there was something strange. Although he spoke to me very fluently in Polish I understood that he is not a Pole, but a colonel in the Russian Army. I was very interested.

Mr. WHEELER. When did you actually find out he was a colonel in the Russian Army?

General MODELSKI. He was chief political boss during the war in Spain. He was political boss over General Swierczewski.

Mr. WHEELER. This General Komar participated in the International Brigade in the Spanish War?

General MODELSKI. Yes; and he was a political boss, a political advisor. He was a political advisor and did a real job.

Mr. WHEELER. Is there anything further about Colonel Komar?

General MODELSKI. He was a political boss. Nobody knew him in Poland. That is not his real name, his name is Weinberg or a similar-sounding name. There is one phrase in this document that is a Russian translation:

Experience shows that some of our official representatives organized intelligence work without sufficient thought and did not give enough serious thought to the problem of recruiting, arranging meetings, etc.

Mr. WHEELER. Would you say that Komar, whom you have identified as an officer in the Russian Army, is directly responsible for setting up espionage networks? In other words, you feel he is head of the entire Polish espionage units throughout the United States?

General MODELSKI. Yes.

Mr. WHEELER. The point I want to make is that a citizen of Russia is in charge of espionage for the Polish Government?

General MODELSKI. Yes.

Mr. WHEELER. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this document be entered into the record as Exhibit 3.

Mr. WOOD. So ordered.



EXHIBIT 3<sup>3</sup>

POLISH ARMY  
 Chief Command  
 General Staff Division II  
 No. 0382  
 22 March 1946

TOP SECRET  
 Copy No. 1

## INSTRUCTIONS (DETAILED)

## FOR THE MILITARY ATTACHÉ AT THE POLISH EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON

These instructions (detailed), issued to the Military Attaché in the United States, contain directions for intelligence work and indicate the basic matters on which information should be given to Division II of the General Staff of the Polish Army. It also indicates some of the methods and procedures to be used in carrying on intelligence work. The methods and procedures for the activities of the Military Attaché will depend on conditions under which the work is done, on the internal situation of the country, and on the personal qualifications of the agent.

## INSIDE THE USA

*Armed Strength of the United States**A. Aviation*

1. Total number of aircraft formations and their distribution; combat and numerical strength of the units (manpower and equipment):

a. according to statute

b. actual status

2. Types of planes remaining in combat units and their characteristics—(a) in construction, (b) in combat. Number of planes in the first and second lines of defense.

3. Potentialities for development of aircraft units—(a) manpower, (b) production of aircraft equipment. Quantities and destination of exports of aircraft.

4. Distribution of base and alternate airfields, their technical equipment and characteristics.

5. The method of qualifying personnel and aviation schools, the curriculum and period of study.

6. Civilian aviation.

7. New types of planes.

8. New technical inventions in the aviation field, in detail, whether applicable in the air or on the ground; technical data; extent of the application of radar; radio direction from the ground of robot planes either singly or in squadrons.

9. Combat manuals and joint operation between aviation and other branches of service.

*B. Ground Troops*

1. *Infantry*.—Numerical strength, distribution, organization, combat manuals, firing power, training status, morale, combat status, officers' staff. The role and significance of the infantry in the total armed forces. Is there a trend to increase this role and the numerical strength of the infantry, or the opposite, or to maintain the status quo?

2. *Artillery and armored troops*.—Organization, distribution, training status, combat manuals, equipment (technical and combat data, characteristics, etc.). Extent of production and application of "V-1" and "V-2." The role and significance of the artillery and armored troops in the armed forces as a whole. Is there a tendency to give greater weight and significance to this branch as compared to others, to do the opposite, or to maintain the status quo?

3. *Engineer troops and signal corps*.—Organization, training status, technical equipment, characteristics of equipment. Is there a tendency to increase or decrease the role and numbers of these troops in the armed forces as a whole?

4. *Medical Service*.—Organization, new methods, etc.

*C. Navy*

1. General description of the naval fleet (surface and subsurface).

2. Tonnage of the fleet for the current year. Losses sustained during the war.

<sup>3</sup> See appendix, pp. 56-62, for photostat of original document.

3. Number of combat units according to categories—displacement, name, and class of ships.

4. Organization of naval units.

5. Principal naval bases and description.

6. Shipyards—technical equipment, number of docks, their capacity.

7. Plans for the construction of new naval units.

#### *D. Chemical Units*

1. Organization and distribution of chemical units.

2. Types of equipment used and concealed combat characteristics.

3. New inventions in chemical warfare, their characteristics and influence on war of the future.

#### *E. Training outside the military organization*

1. Military training in schools and other institutions. Curriculum, weight given to military training in the general curriculum of the school.

2. Youth organizations of military character; age and number of members.

#### *F. Territorial Army*

1. Methods of recruiting according to status, age, length of service.

2. Distribution and size of units.

3. Equipment and level of combat training.

#### *Organization and Administration*

1. Political organization (national authorities).

2. Chief legislative and executive body.

3. Election laws.

4. Divisions of administration.

5. Number of members in the House of Representatives and in the Senate.

6. Jurisdiction of the Secretary of State, the Supreme Court, and Congress.

7. Relation of various population groups to the national government.

8. Names of the most important officials in government service.

9. Political rights of the people.

#### *Domestic Situation*

1. Laws governing the life of citizens.

2. Reaction of people to legislation.

3. Sentiment and political views of various population groups.

4. Commerce, monetary system, speculation.

5. Market and commercial prices.

6. Strikes, demonstrations, accidents, and the reaction of the government.

7. Political parties, political contests, influence of political parties on the people.

#### *Economic condition*

1. Natural resources, stockpiles, annual extraction, location of natural resources.

2. Raw materials of military significance.

3. Development of various branches of industry and yearly production.

4. Agriculture, arable land, yield, total farm income, distribution of land.

5. Annual national budget and its subdivision.

#### *Industry*

1. Principal branches of industry, especially war industry, total production of various enterprises and branches of industry.

2. Location of industry, especially war industry.

3. Role of public and private capital in the various branches of industry.

4. Status of various firms and associations (trusts, cartels), their productive capacity, type of production, number of employed.

5. Role of foreign capital in industry—name of firm, size, branches of enterprise.

6. Construction of new industrial plants (especially war plants).

7. Technical innovations in industry.

8. Work of engineers, research institutions, and laboratories.

*Loans*

1. Announcements of national borrowing, purpose, terms, period, and amount.
2. Method of selling bonds to public.
3. Reaction of public to announcements of government borrowing.
4. Lotteries.

*Level of civilization, habits, and customs*

1. Average literacy. Educational system. Schools, size of attendance.
2. Publications. Political views in literature, music, and films.
3. Standard of living.
4. Social conventions in private life and public places.
5. Creeds, marriage contracts, divorces. Family life and the jurisdiction of courts over the family.

*Freedom of movement within the country*

1. Regulations and laws governing movements within the country (especially near the borders).
2. Documents needed for travel inside the country and for crossing the border.
3. Method of acquiring documents for travel (e. g., tickets) and their cost.
4. Supervision of railway authorities and of shipping organizations. Passenger routes on principal lines.
5. Baggage checking facilities, porters, restaurants, hotels. Customary procedures.
6. Customary procedure in use of mails, telegraph, telephone, etc.

*Conditions for residence of foreigners*

1. Total number of foreigners.
2. Sentiment and behavior of authorities in relation to foreigners, their political rights. Occupations engaged in most frequently by foreigners.
3. Relationship of authorities and public to particular nationalities.
4. Documents of personal nature and those authorizing residence. Method of obtaining them.
5. Possibilities of assuring living quarters and employment for foreigners.
6. Method of obtaining entrance and exit visas for foreigners.

*Opportunities for setting up enterprises, stores, workshops, etc.*

1. Opportunities and procedures for setting up the above-mentioned businesses for citizens and foreigners.

*Radio subscriptions*

1. Conditions for acquiring and using radio equipment.
2. Number of radio subscribers, methods and terms of registration, conditions for reception and broadcasting over one's own equipment.
3. Number of radio schools, duration of courses, vocations eligible for training. Entrance requirements for citizens and foreigners.

## FOREIGN POLICY

1. Trends in international politics and views of individual politicians.
2. International agreements (open and secret) of a political, military, and economic nature.
3. Public interest among specific groups in foreign policy.
4. Influence exerted by or on the foreign policy of other nations. (England, USSR, etc.)
5. Colonial policy.
6. Certification of representatives of foreign missions, press conferences.
7. Credits of economic or military significance extended to other nations—amount, duration, and terms of repayment.

## FORMATION OF RESIDENCIES

In setting up the information network, it is important to see that the network is composed of separate residencies, not connected with one another, each with



its own informers. Particular care must be given to the selection of residents and to the creation of an organization that will be mobile, active, and have the opportunity of supplying the required information, in accordance with the assignment received.

The details of organizing information posts should be delegated to the residents. There should be a minimum number of residencies and the information network should not be extended at the expense of the number of informers. Over-extension of the information network may lead to the disclosure of its existence and to a reduction of its flexibility.

For intelligence work, one should engage people in high places with wide social connections, who can deliver intelligence material.

The selection of a resident should be preceded by a thorough and extensive investigation of his activities, social position, political convictions, as well as the positive and negative traits of his character.

Investigation of the individual may be carried out in the following manner:

(a) by personal observation in the course of contacts on official business and in casual social meetings;

(b) by becoming acquainted with the general opinion of him in his environment and with his political activities.

Residencies should be set up in accordance with the purpose and the assignment laid down beforehand.

One should not engage for intelligence work people whom one meets casually and does not investigate properly.

Haste in recruiting may lead to unfortunate results. It is necessary to remember that the success of intelligence work depends on the selection of staffs.

#### ORGANIZATION OF THE SYSTEM OF COMMUNICATION

1. Communications within the residencies are maintained only from the top downward. Each member of a residency knows only his immediate supervisor or the individual with whom he has contacts in his work (liaison man, boss of the secret local) depending on conditions.

Horizontal communications between various informers or members of residencies are forbidden. The resident directs the work of his post by:

- personal contact
- liaison men
- post office box

Selection of the method of maintaining contacts in each individual case will depend on the character of the agent and local conditions.

The resident must avoid frequent meetings with informers if there is no association in service or through personal friendship.

2. *Contacts of the Military Attaché with Residents.*—The Military Attaché directs the work of the residents by meeting them in person or by contacts through trusted persons. The other members of the residency should not know their "boss" (Attaché).

The Military Attaché should avoid frequent meetings with the residents in public places and on occasions which have nothing to do with the official appearances of the Military Attaché. Meetings in places at which the Military Attaché does not appear on official business should be delegated to trusted persons after working out the details of the meeting beforehand. Special care must be taken in the selection of the place for the meeting and in determining the password. The meeting should be adapted to local conditions. Rash meetings, not carefully worked out, must not be permitted.

#### COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE

The diplomatic passport and conditions surrounding the official presence of the Military Attaché facilitate in part the conduct of the intelligence work and create a certain "ceiling" for unofficial intelligence activity. However, it is necessary to remember that the Attaché will find himself under the constant and close observation of the counter-intelligence and of the reactionary circles of the Polish emigration (formerly, the agency of the London regime). Therefore, the Attaché should control his activity in accordance with intelligence instructions. Persons who are not associated with the intelligence work should have no knowledge of the work, either directly or indirectly.

Special care must be given in drawing people into the intelligence service. The final offer of a position should be made only after a thorough check on the

given individual and after a trial period during which he should be given isolated assignments which are not of an intelligence nature.

Experience shows that some of our official representatives organized intelligence work without sufficient thought and did not give enough serious thought to the problem of recruiting, arranging meetings, etc. They made disclosures of their activities to members of the diplomatic service who have no relationship to our work and the results of these activities became known to undesirable persons.

Such a worker is disgraced and should leave his diplomatic post. Therefore, the Attaché should take up his activities from the point of view of the counter-intelligence; with this as a point of departure, he should lay out his plan of action. He must constantly give instructions and supervise the activities of those whom he has entrusted with the execution of tactical assignments. Only a constant check on his own activities and on the activities of persons entrusted to him will enable the Military Attaché to conduct intelligence work well without compromising his position.

(Signature.)

Duplicated in 3 copies

Copy No. 1—addressee

Copy No. 2—Archives

Copy No. 3—file

22 III 1946

I. B. No. 52

**Mr. RUSSELL.** The next document which you turned over to the committee is dated June 27, 1946. This document is signed by W. Komar, Chief of the Second Division of the General Staff of the Polish Army. It pertains to General Bor Komorowski. On page 2 of this document is a statement as follows:

Attached to the present mail are two decorations, which please transmit to Major Klonowski. These are two crosses granted to two Mexican citizens—Citizen Sylvestre Ortiz and Citizen Nestor Sanchez Fernandes—for their work and service rendered in the Brigade dedicated to J. Dabrowski during the war in Spain. Major Klonowski must decorate both Mexicans on the occasion of the nearest national holiday.

**General MODELSKI.** Major Klonowski was military attaché in Mexico. Afterwards he was recalled on the demand of Colonel Alef.

**Mr. RUSSELL.** This document also refers to a list of American officers who were suggested as being proper recipients of Polish decorations. The suggestion was made to Colonel Alef by Citizen Kmiecik. Who is he?

**General MODELSKI.** That man, in my opinion, was living in Pittsburgh; that decoration was perhaps for over 20 officers. They were presented by Colonel Alef.

**Mr. RUSSELL.** Mr. Chairman, I ask that this document be introduced into the record as Exhibit 4.

**Mr. Wood.** So ordered.

Exhibit 4<sup>4</sup>

POLISH ARMY  
Chief Command  
General Staff Division II  
No. 035/II  
A—June 27, 1946

SECRET  
Copy No.—

MILITARY ATTACHÉ AT THE EMBASSY OF THE POLISH REPUBLIC IN WASHINGTON,  
MAJ. GEN. MODELSKI

1. The Matter of Bor Komorowski's Stay in the United States.

On the basis of the first concrete information concerning Bor's stay in the United States, the Minister of Foreign Affairs addressed to the Embassy of the United States a sharp protest against the conduct of those official persons in

<sup>4</sup> See appendix, pp. 63 and 64, for photostat of original document.

the United States who began, more and more clearly, to give to that stay an official character. Up to the present time, the government of the United States neither reacted to our note nor caused its officials to change their attitude towards Bor. Evidence that Bor is still treated as a "Chief Leader" and official representative of an unrecognized and unrepresented group of emigrants is, among other things, the fact that he was received by General Eisenhower, to say nothing about all his activities conducted with the support of the Polish National Alliance between May 3 and the present time.

From other information received, it is known to me that the military group of emigrants intends also to obtain opinion and recognition for its intentions in some countries of South America.

The general purpose of this action by Bor, it seems, is the desire to maintain intact military units outside of the sphere of influence and observation of the country—as well as to maintain a dynamic reactionary force.

This action did not meet, up to the present time, any serious difficulties. On the contrary, the statement of Senator Thomas, Chairman of the Senate Military Committee, shows that the question of the taking over by American Command of Polish units in Eastern Europe may become a fact. We must oppose this action with full energy. The following means are at the disposal of the General:

a. To request clarification and explanation from the War Department of the capacity in which the above-mentioned military officials accept Bor—that is, to request information as to what official conversations were conducted with Bor and the extent to which the War Department is engaged in the plan of Bor concerning the submission of the Polish Armed Forces to the American Command. Such a request is completely justified if one takes into consideration those Poles who are in the service in Polish units, a large percentage of whom are in the draft age.

b. To establish direct and indirect contacts with those members of the Congress and Senate who are opposed to the idea of taking the Polish units under the American Command, supporting and supplementing them in their actions in this subject matter.

c. In cooperation with the Press Attaché of the Embassy, to publish articles in the Polish-American press describing Bor in a true light on the basis of:

—Warsaw Rebellion,

—the activities of N. S. Z. in Poland, and the contacts of military commanders with them,

—accomplished breaking up of the unity of the Polish nation.

2. The next problem of basic importance is the matter of an American loan for our government.

Although this is not a matter in your immediate sphere, nevertheless, the weight of your authority as concerns rank, function, and dignity of office is of no lesser importance than the professional activities of specialists. Therefore, I would suggest that you add your reports to the reports of other persons who are working primarily in that field. Conversations on the subject of a loan were recently renewed. In order to have this loan financed and obtained on the best terms, it is necessary to prepare properly the American public opinion but above all, the circles interested in the loan—that is, military, industrial, and financial circles. In this sphere, I ask you to pay attention to the importance of personal activities in the circles concerned. In this action, it is necessary, using the cooperation of the Press Attaché, to use concrete material which is to be found at his disposal.

3. Among all problems belonging to the sphere of work of the Military Attaché in the United States, I request that you pay attention to the importance of the problems connected with American industry. The problems which are of basic importance for us are specified in the instructions.

4. Attached to the present mail are two decorations, which please transmit to Major Klonowski. These are two crosses granted to two Mexican citizens—Citizen Sylvestre Ortiz and Citizen Nestor Sanchez Fernandes—for their work and service rendered in the Brigade dedicated to J. Dabrowski during the war in Spain. Major Klonowski must decorate both Mexicans on the occasion of the nearest national holiday.

5. Concerning the list of American officers (sent by Colonel Alef) proposed by Citizen Knieciak for Polish decorations, I advise you that this list is taken under consideration for proper action.

6. An additional person to work in the office of the Attaché is already appointed and will be at your service within a short time. This is Major Klerys, who knows very well the English language and the United States.

7. Colonel Alef submitted a petition for sending to the Attaché a set of decorations and medals for propaganda purposes. Because up to the present time not all the decorations are available, I will wait until a complete set is available and will then send it.

CHIEF OF THE SECOND DIVISION OF THE  
GENERAL STAFF OF THE POLISH ARMY.  
(S) WACLKW,  
W. KOMAR, *Colonel*.

Typed in 3 copies

Copy No. 1—to the addressee

“ “ 2—a/arch.

“ “ 3—a/a (for files)

Sporz, K. E.

24.6.46 r.

Druk, B. I.

Nr. Dz. 26.

Mr. RUSSELL. The next document which you turned over to the committee is dated August 13, 1946, and is signed by W. Komar, colonel, and is marked “Secret.” This document pertains to the analysis of the problem of Polish immigration in the individual countries of Europe and outside of Europe, and requests that certain information be obtained regarding Polish immigration. The request designated as No. 8 in this document suggests the possibility of using the immigrants for political and intelligence purposes.

General MODELSKI. It is a correlation of instructions.

Mr. RUSSELL. Who was to obtain that kind of information? Were you instructed to?

General MODELSKI. Yes; that is the instruction for me to get information but I never did it. I didn’t do anything they asked me to, that is to spy, dealing with intelligence information among Americans of Polish descent.

Mr. RUSSELL. This would have been a full-time job for about 10 men?

General MODELSKI. Yes; they thought America was standing on the brink of depression; that it was going down; it was weak.

Mr. RUSSELL. Request No. 9, pertaining to outstanding personalities. Where would such a card file be maintained, in the Polish Embassy?

General MODELSKI. That is not Polish. That is for the purpose of spying and to get information for political action here. Main instructions.

Mr. RUSSELL. In other words, this document shows the extent to which the Polish Government would go to secure sympathizers for the present regime and recruit possible espionage agents.

I ask that this document be introduced into the record as Exhibit No. 5.

Mr. WOOD. So ordered.

#### EXHIBIT 5<sup>8</sup>

POLISH ARMY  
CHIEF COMMAND  
General Staff Division II  
No. 0219/II  
August 13, 1946.

SECRET  
Copy No. 1

MILITARY ATTACHÉ AT THE EMBASSY OF THE POLISH REPUBLIC IN WASHINGTON,  
MAJ. GEN. MODELSKI

For the purpose of analysis of the problem of Polish emigration in the individual countries of Europe and outside of Europe, we need to obtain the necessary material according to the following scheme:

1. Total number of emigrants, being sub-divided into:
  - a. emigration before 1939;

<sup>8</sup> See appendix, p. 65, for photostat of original document.

- b. emigration after 1939;
- c. influence of the new emigration on the old;
- d. number of Poles (Polish citizens);
  - number of Poles, citizens of a given country who feel that they belong to the Polish nation;
  - number of Poles assimilated.
- 2. Social standing:
  - a. country-side (farmers, farm hands);
  - b. industry;
  - c. commerce;
  - d. free professions;
  - earnings, standard of life, relationship between the social groups.
- 3. Relationship of the immigration with the government of a given country and local society, including the treatment of the immigration by the government and society.
- 4. Political organizations: Program, number of members, relations to other parties and to the Government of National Unity.
- 5. Organizations: Professional, social, cultural—their attitude to the Government of National Unity.
- 6. Distribution (where larger groups are to be found), local and general importance in a given country.
- 7. Survey of groups, organizations and individuals:
  - a. cooperating with the Government of National Unity;
  - b. sympathizers;
  - c. inimical.
- 8. The possibility of using the immigration (immigrants) for:
  - political purposes,
  - intelligence purposes.
- 9. Card file of the outstanding personalities.

CHIEF OF THE SECOND DIVISION OF THE  
GENERAL STAFF OF THE POLISH ARMY,  
W. KOMAR, *Colonel*.

Typed in 10 copies

Copy No. 1—daw.rozdz.

Copy No. 10—a/a (for files)

Sporz.K.E.10.8.46 r.

Druk.B.I.Nr.dz.21.

Mr. RUSSELL. The next document is marked "Top secret," addressed to General Modelski and is signed by Komar, dated August 22, 1946. The document refers to the awarding of a banner from the Polish armed forces to West Point. The purpose is establishment of personal contacts and closer connections between the Army and the Polish armed forces. Do you think that the awarding of this banner to West Point was for the purpose of establishing closer contacts between the United States Army and Polish armed forces?

General MODELSKI. No. General Swierczewski, who was former commander of the International Brigade, was to make the presentation of the banner. What they wanted was to get an official invited to West Point.

Mr. RUSSELL. In other words, you do not believe the Polish Government was sincere in awarding this banner to West Point?

General MODELSKI. No.

Mr. RUSSELL. Was this banner ever awarded?

General MODELSKI. No; I prevented it.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this document be introduced into the record as Exhibit 6.

Mr. WOOD. So ordered.



EXHIBIT 6<sup>6</sup>

Subject to return to the Code Division within 48 hours

TOP SECRET  
 Making of any copies forbidden  
 Copy No. —

Coded Message No. 400

from Warsaw sent August 22, 1946, received August 22, 1946. Taken by the Code Division August 22, 1946, 1500 hours (3 o'clock)

GEN. MODELSKI

We have advised Pashley that the Chief Command of the Polish Army wants to send one of the higher Generals in order to deliver a Kosciuszko banner from the Polish Armed Forces to West Point. The purpose is establishment of personal contacts and closer connections between the Army and the Polish Armed Forces.

Colonel Pashley makes contact with Washington in this matter. Will await answer.

If you can, send the answer through the proper channel. We are interested in having the General depart in the beginning of September.

KOMAR.

Nr. 4252

22.8.46r

Decoded August 22, 1946, at 15.35.

Decoded by Broz.

Mr. RUSSELL. General Modelski, here is another document which you turned over to the committee dated August 26, signed by Komar, marked "Secret." This document refers to a report which you apparently made concerning social and political problems in the Philippine Islands.

General MODELSKI. In June 1946, I was suddenly appointed Polish Ambassador to the Philippines to take part in the Day of Independence. After my return, I wrote a report about what I had seen and afterwards I mentioned that there will be Communists fighting. Then I was blamed for using the word "Communist"; that they are not Communists.

Mr. RUSSELL. The Polish Government objected to the use of the word "Communist"; they wanted them characterized as guerillas being interested in the liberation of the Philippines?

General MODELSKI. Yes. They did not accept my report.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this document be introduced into the record as Exhibit 7.

Mr. Wood. So ordered.

EXHIBIT 7<sup>7</sup>

POLISH ARMY  
 CHIEF COMMAND  
 General Staff Division II  
 No. 0262/II  
 August 26, 1946

SECRET  
 Copy No. 1

MILITARY ATTACHÉ AT THE EMBASSY OF THE POLISH REPUBLIC IN WASHINGTON,  
 GEN. MODELSKI

1. Social and political problems of the Philippines are treated in your report very superficially.

Material available to us from other sources would indicate rather that the independence of the Philippines, although declared officially on July 28 of this

<sup>6</sup> See appendix, p. 66, for photostat of original document.

<sup>7</sup> See appendix, p. 67, for photostat of original document.

year by the United States, is essentially very problematical, even totally fictitious, which otherwise would follow also, in a sense, from your report, where you write that the country is essentially rich by natural resources but the population, nevertheless, is poor and works hard.

As far as the "Guerilla" evaluation goes, it must be characterized as a movement for liberation of colonial people.

Because we have in a sense precise information, we ask you to give a deeper and more objective analysis of this situation in that country, with a detailed description of how the bulk of the people feel and think.

2. In the matter of paying tribute to Captain Sattgasta of the United States Army, we reached an agreement with the Ministry of Culture and Art. This Ministry assigned the matter to the Chief Administrator of Museums and Protection of Monuments for positive action.

3. Your nomination for an Air Attaché and that by Colonel Alef for a Deputy remain suspended and will be decided, as well as the matter of an Air Mechanic in accordance with your wishes.

4. In answer to the inquiry by Colonel Alef, we advise you that field mail 70603-D was changed to "No. 2697 Brzeg. Slask," and to this address the letters may be sent. On the other hand, the unit 31899 is dissolved. If the detailed data concerning persons were known (surname, name, date, and month of birth, date of mobilization) to whom the correspondence of American citizens was addressed, an attempt could be made to find them in Poland and to report their addresses to persons who are interested in the United States.

5. Changes of the Generals' caps are not established.

6. Copy of the book by Strumpf-Wojtowicz will be sent.

CHIEF OF THE SECOND DIVISION OF THE  
GENERAL STAFF OF THE POLISH ARMY,

(Signature) W. KOMAR, *Colonel*.

Mr. RUSSELL. The next document is dated September 11, 1946, from Warsaw, and is signed by S. Zymierski, Marshal of Poland. It is addressed to General Modelski, at the Embassy of the Polish Republic in Washington, D. C. It states that he has—

commissioned General of the Army Karol Swierczewski, the Second Deputy Minister of the National Defense, to conduct an inspection of the work of your office up to the present time. In this connection, you are ordered hereby to conform with the instructions and advices of General of the Army Karol Swierczewski.

What did he advise you, General?

General MODELSKI. He told me that I did not understand the politics in the United States and of new Poland. He read my reports and made remarks and told me, "You may be back to a new Poland because you don't understand the United States."

Mr. RUSSELL. Did he give you any instructions?

General MODELSKI. Yes; he wanted me to obtain information about the whole United States military forces.

Mr. RUSSELL. The location of military units?

General MODELSKI. Yes, and schools; military schools. He wanted to get all this.

Mr. RUSSELL. It was more or less a repetition of your basic instructions received before you left Moscow?

General MODELSKI. Yes.

Mr. RUSSELL. Who is this Gen. Karol Swierczewski?

General MODELSKI. He was formerly commanding general of the International Brigade in Spain.

Mr. RUSSELL. Was he a native Pole or a Russian?

General MODELSKI. He was born in Poland. He left there perhaps in 1920, and stayed in Russia up to the outbreak of the war. He came here once to give the banner to West Point and to take part in the Slav Congress.

Mr. RUSSELL. What was the purpose of the inspection?

General MODELSKI. To teach me that I don't understand the aims of American policy.

Mr. RUSSELL. Did he criticize the fact?

General MODELSKI. Yes; and he was in very good connection with my deputy, Colonel Alef, and always they were together.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this document be introduced into the record and marked "Exhibit 8."

Mr. Wood. So ordered.

# EXHIBIT 8<sup>s</sup>

WARSAW, *September 11, 1946.*

POLISH ARMY  
CHIEF COMMAND  
Number 0230/II

MILITARY ATTACHÉ AT THE EMBASSY OF THE POLISH REPUBLIC IN WASHINGTON,  
MAJ. GEN. MODELSKI

I have commissioned General of the Army Karol Swierczewski, the Second Deputy Minister of National Defense, to conduct an inspection of the work of your office up to the present time.

In this connection, you are ordered hereby to conform with the instructions and advices of General of the Army Karol Swierczewski.

[Seal of the Ministry of  
National Defense]

MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE,  
(S) ZYMIERSKI  
MICHAŁ ZYMIERSKI,  
*Marshal of Poland.*

General MODELSKI. And General Swierczewski wanted to compel me to go with him to meet Americans of Polish descent. I was obliged to follow his order but refused.

Mr. RUSSELL. Did General Zymierski order you to return to Poland after the inspection?

General MODELSKI. No. He told me Warsaw was afraid. If they will tell me exactly to return that I will refuse.

Mr. RUSSELL. The next document is dated December 30, 1946, marked "Secret" and signed by Marjan Spychalski. He signed this document as Major General. It indicated that he is of the opinion that the environment in the United States is beginning to have an influence on you.

General MODELSKI. That is a reproach perhaps for me.

Mr. RUSSELL. This document draws your attention to the fact that your task is to show the development of military life in the United States?

General MODELSKI. Yes.

Mr. RUSSELL. This document also criticizes your trip to the Philippine Islands?

General MODELSKI. Yes.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this document be introduced into the record as Exhibit 9.

Mr. Wood. Without objection, so ordered.

<sup>s</sup> See appendix, p. 68, for photostat of original document.



EXHIBIT 9<sup>9</sup>

POLISH ARMY  
CHIEF COMMAND  
L. P. 0713/II

WARSAW, *December 30, 1946.*

SECRET  
Copy No. —

MILITARY ATTACHÉ AT THE EMBASSY OF THE POLISH REPUBLIC IN WASHINGTON,  
MAJ. GEN. MODELSKI

Upon evaluation of your reports thus far received, I must state that they are chaotic and of little value, both from the point of the contents and the presentation.

The method of thematic treatment of the problems touched upon in your reports shows that you are under the influence of your environment and lose to a considerable degree the feeling of the objective and the materialistic evaluation of the situation and the intentions of the American policy.

It would be, from all points of view, a desirable thing that you analyze the events, coming down to their source and evaluating them quietly, critically, and free from the thinking habits of the large capitalistic world. Then your material would throw for us a true light on the problems which interest us.

Your work must be based on the many-sided collection of data and information, independently from the sources of the American Poles concerning the entire military, economic and political life of the United States.

Your reports must be permeated with objectives and must contain essential information and reliable data.

I draw your attention to the fact that your primary task is to follow the development of the military life of the United States, keeping in the first place an eye on the affairs connected with training, organization, and armament of the units of the forces, especially of the Federal militia.

To these matters you should direct the attention and the main weight of the work of the office of the Attaché.

As to the rest, your travel to the Philippines was completely unfounded. In the future, I direct you to settle in advance with me any travel of a diplomatic representative character.

MAJOR GENERAL, DEPUTY COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE POLISH ARMY  
CHARGED WITH POLITICAL-EDUCATIONAL MATTERS.

(S) Marjan Spychalski  
MARJAN SPYCHALSKI, *Engr.*

Typed in 2 copies

Copy No. 1—to the addressee

" " 2—a/a (for files)

Sporz. J. K. 14.12.46 r.

Druk. B. I. Nr. dz. 13.

Mr. WHEELER. General Modelski, the next document is dated February 24, 1947, from the Polish Army to General Modelski, in Washington, D. C., signed by Komar, Brigadier General. The document states:

I ask you to send a general list of your informers indicating:

1. Name and surname of the informer.
2. Age.
3. Precise address.
4. Method of contact with him.
5. His previous work.
6. Remuneration.
7. Opinion.

<sup>9</sup> See appendix, pp. 69 and 70, for photostat of original document.

It further states:

Upon reading, must be destroyed.

General Modelski, will you identify this document and explain it to the committee?

General MODELSKI. It is evidence of spying. They wanted me to have agents. I never had any agents, but I wrote to them that I did. It is very interesting, please look at that [indicating document]. It was addressed to me but sent to two others. Not only I received that but Colonel Alef, too. Two copies were sent and I got only one. Therefore, in my opinion, the other was sent to Colonel Alef.

Mr. RUSSELL. You didn't comply with the instructions to destroy the document?

General MODELSKI. No.

Mr. RUSSELL. Did Colonel Alef ever make an effort to ascertain whether you had destroyed it?

General MODELSKI. No.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this document be introduced into the record as Exhibit 10.

Mr. Wood. So ordered.

# EXHIBIT 10<sup>10</sup>

POLISH ARMY  
Chief Command  
General Staff Division II  
Number 0930/II  
February 24, 1947

TOP SECRET  
Copy Number 1

MILITARY ATTACHÉ AT THE EMBASSY OF THE POLISH REPUBLIC IN WASHINGTON,  
MAJ. GEN. MODELSKI

I ask you to send a general list of your informers indicating:

1. Name and surname of the informer.
2. Age.
3. Precise address.
4. Method of contact with him.
5. His previous work.
6. Remuneration.
7. Opinion.

*Upon reading, must be destroyed.*

CHIEF OF THE SECOND DIVISION OF THE  
GENERAL STAFF OF THE POLISH ARMY,  
(Signature)  
KOMAR, *Brigadier General.*

Typed in 3 copies

Copy 1-2—w/g

" 3—a/a. (for files)

Sporz. M.Z. 15.2.47

Druk. E.B. Nr. dz. 26.

Mr. WHEELER. The next document is dated February 24, 1947, in which you are requested to analyze the organization of the Ministry of National Defense—that is, the Ministry of the Land, Air, and Navy Forces. I ask that this document be introduced into the record and marked "Exhibit 11."

Mr. Wood. Without objection, so ordered.

<sup>10</sup> See appendix, p. 71, for photostat of original document.

EXHIBIT 11<sup>11</sup>

POLISH ARMY  
Chief Command  
General Staff Division II  
No. 0931/II  
February 24, 1947

SECRET  
Copy No. 1

MILITARY ATTACHÉ AT THE EMBASSY OF THE POLISH REPUBLIC IN WASHINGTON,  
GEN. MODELSKI

In connection with the complete unification of the armed forces of the U. S. A., please analyze the organization of the Ministry of National Defense—that is, the Minister of the Land, Air, and Navy Forces.

CHIEF OF THE SECOND DIVISION OF THE  
GENERAL STAFF OF THE POLISH ARMY,

(S) W. Komar  
(—) KOMAR, *Brig. Gen.*

Typed in 2 copies

Copy No. 1—to the addressee  
Copy No. 2—a/a (for files)  
Sporz. M. Z. 21.2.47 r.  
Druk. E. B. Nr. dz. 30

Mr. WHEELER. The next document is dated March 24, 1947, from the Chief of Staff of the Polish Army to the military attaché of the Polish Republic in Washington. It is signed by Komar, brigadier general. The communication requests that General Modelski furnish detailed organization of the fleet on lower echelons; detailed organization of the navy air force; organization and exploitation of the submarine units; characteristics and methods of training of the navy personnel. General Modelski, will you identify this for the committee, please?

General MODELSKI. Yes.

Mr. WHEELER. Did you make any attempt to obtain any of the information requested in this communication, General Modelski?

General MODELSKI. No; my information was only fictitious, or from the newspapers.

Mr. WHEELER. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this document be introduced into the record and marked "Exhibit 12."

Mr. WOOD. So ordered.

EXHIBIT 12<sup>12</sup>

POLISH ARMY  
Chief Command  
General Staff Division II  
No. 01051/II  
March 24, 1947

SECRET  
Copy No. 1

MILITARY ATTACHÉ AT THE EMBASSY OF THE POLISH REPUBLIC IN WASHINGTON,  
GEN. MODELSKI

Please send the following data concerning the American Navy:

- a. Detailed organization of the fleet at lower echelons,
- b. Detailed organization of the Navy air force,
- c. Organization and exploitation of the submarine units,
- d. Characteristics and methods of training navy personnel.

CHIEF OF THE SECOND DIVISION OF THE  
GENERAL STAFF OF THE POLISH ARMY,

(S) Wackw  
(—) KOMAR, *Brig. Gen.*

Typed in two copies

Copy No. 1—to the addressee  
" " 2—a/a (for files)  
Sporz. M.Z. 11.3.47 r.  
Druk. E.B. Nr.dz.14

<sup>11</sup> See appendix, p. 72, for photostat of original document.

<sup>12</sup> See appendix, p. 73, for photostat of original document.



Mr. WHEELER. The next document is dated May 5, 1947, and signed by Michal Zymierski, Marshal of Poland. This document again calls your attention to the fact that you are submitting to undesirable influences in the United States and that you should collaborate more closely with Colonel Alef. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this document be introduced into the record and marked "Exhibit 13."

Mr. WOOD. So ordered.

EXHIBIT 13<sup>13</sup>

MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE  
Number 10253/II

Warsaw, May 5, 1947  
TOP SECRET  
Copy No. —

MILITARY ATTACHÉ AT THE EMBASSY OF THE POLISH REPUBLIC IN WASHINGTON,  
MAJ. GEN. MODELSKI

To be delivered personally [in handwriting]

On the basis of your reports, I repeat that in spite of all my suggestions and instructions to you, you persist to accept uncritically the influence of the environment directed by the financial circles, which at the present time rule the United States.

From your reports and evaluations, it follows that frequently you are not able to draw a line between various events, facts or information coined by the government and the actual intentions and tendencies of American policies. As a result, your presentation of the economic and political situation of the United States does not offer a real picture of American actuality but reflects only the propaganda of the ruling circles.

Keeping constant contact, official and social, with persons of various world opinions belonging to outstanding political groups is part of your official duties and must enable you to arrive at a many-sided and personal judgment concerning the sum total of events which take place in the life of the United States. Allowance given to you for representation is designed for this purpose and must be used to the benefit for the service.

Your analyses evaluations, and reports concerning the situation in the United States received thus far differ from the opinions of Colonel Alef on the same matter. With a view of improving the information service of the office of the Attaché, and to achieve a more broad coverage of the entire American life, I direct you to collaborate closely with Colonel Alef and look for an objective and essential evaluation of military problems, as well as the economic and political life in the United States.

MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE,  
(S) Zymierski  
MICHAL ZYMIERSKI, *Marshal of Poland.*

Typed in 2 copies

Copy No. 1—to the addressee

" " 2—a/a (for files)

Sporz. M. Z. 28.5.47.

Druk. D. I. Nr. dz. 138.

Mr. RUSSELL. The next document is dated May 31, 1947, signed by Brigadier General Komar, formerly identified in the documents as colonel. This document requests General Modelski to report, before the end of June, on all questions and problems which had been assigned to him by the intelligence forces in Poland. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this document be introduced into the record and marked "Exhibit 14."

Mr. WOOD. So ordered.

<sup>13</sup> See appendix, p. 74, for photostat of original document.

EXHIBIT 14<sup>14</sup>

POLISH ARMY  
Chief Command  
General Staff Division II  
No. 01374/II  
May 31, 1947

SECRET  
Copy No. 1

MILITARY ATTACHÉ AT THE EMBASSY OF THE POLISH REPUBLIC IN WASHINGTON,  
MAJ. GEN. MODELSKI

Please report, before the end of June of this year, on all questions and problems which were assigned by us and on which we did not receive any answer thus far.

CHIEF OF THE SECOND DIVISION OF THE  
GENERAL STAFF OF THE POLISH ARMY,

(S) Wackw  
(—) KOMAR, *Brig. Gen.*

Typed in 2 copies

Copy No. 1—to the addressee

" " 2—a/a (for files)

Sporz. M. Z. 28.5.47.

Druk. E. B. Nr. dz. 278.

Mr. WHEELER. The next document is dated May 31, 1947, from the Polish Army to General Modelski, signed "Komar, Brigadier General." The document has reference to a previous report submitted by General Modelski to the Polish Army in which he indicated that the regular army should be 2,431,000 strong. General Komar states this figure does not agree with the previous report in which General Modelski stated that the regular armed forces be established at 1,070,000. General Komar also states that Modelski's information does not agree with the information which they possess from other sources. General Komar further states that the Army of the United States has been subdivided into seven armies, instead of six, and requests a map indicating the new subdivision, together with data, explaining the motives and purposes of the change. Will you look at this document, General, and tell the Committee if it is a true photostatic copy of the original?

General MODELSKI. Yes; it is true.

Mr. WHEELER. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this document be introduced into the record and marked "Exhibit 15."

Mr. WOOD. So ordered.

EXHIBIT 15<sup>15</sup>

POLISH ARMY  
Chief Command  
General Staff Division II  
No. 01375/II  
May 31, 1947

SECRET  
Copy No. 1

MILITARY ATTACHÉ AT THE EMBASSY OF THE POLISH REPUBLIC IN WASHINGTON,  
MAJ. GEN. MODELSKI

I. According to your report Number L. 64/I. M. secret /46, the regular army should be 2,431,000 strong. This figure does not agree with your previous report, L. 52/I. M. secret/46, in which you have indicated that the Army asked in its program for National Defense that its regular forces be established at 1,070,000 men.

<sup>14</sup> See appendix, p. 75, for photostat of original document.

<sup>15</sup> See appendix, p. 76, for photostat of original document.



These figures (both in the first and the second report) do not agree either with the information which we possess from other sources. In connection with the above, please verify your data and make a new report concerning the strength of the regular army, indicating the source of your information.

II. In connection with the new sub-division of the United States territory into 7 armies instead of 6 (as reported, No. 6/L. 64/I. M. secret/46), please send a map indicating new sub-division, together with the data explaining the motives and purposes of the change.

CHIEF OF THE SECOND DIVISION OF THE GENERAL STAFF,

(S) Wackw

(—) KOMAR, *Brigadier General*.

Typed in 2 copies

Copy No. 1—to the addressee

Copy No. 2—a/a (for files)

Sporz. M. Z. 27. 5. 47.

Druk. D. I. Nr. dz. 172.

Mr. WHEELER. The next document is dated May 31, 1947, from the Polish Army to General Modelski, Washington, D. C., signed by Komar, brigadier general. The letter is more or less a reprimand from General Komar to General Modelski, in which Komar states that Modelski's information is based upon newspaper stories. He also states that General Modelski is not supplying information previously requested by Komar. Mr. Chairman, it is requested that this document be introduced into the record and marked "Exhibit 16."

Mr. WOOD. So ordered. The Chair would now like to adjourn the hearing until tomorrow, Friday, April 1, 1949, at 9:30 a. m.

#### EXHIBIT 16<sup>18</sup>

POLISH ARMY  
Chief Command  
General Staff Division II  
No. 1373/II  
May 31, 1947

SECRET  
Copy No. 1

MILITARY ATTACHÉ AT THE EMBASSY OF THE POLISH REPUBLIC IN WASHINGTON,  
MAJ. GEN. MODELSKI

#### *Evaluation of Material for the Period from February 1 to April 30, 1947.*

Material received from you, namely, all material (with the exception of that relating to the German problem), is based exclusively on the press. Although this has an information value, nevertheless, it does not contain what is in the first place most important for us, namely: information to be reported on certain dates, as it follows from the enumeration of problems sent to you by the letter, Number 0827/II. The press is, of course, a very important source of information; however, it can not be the only source.

Without neglecting the matters which are studied continuously and the current matters, please take up, in accordance with the above-mentioned letter No. 0827/II, the matters which must be reported on definite dates.

Up to the end of May, we did not receive any material concerning:

a. Matters to be reported on certain dates:

1. Organization of artillery,
2. Organization of armored branches,
3. Organization of the air forces,
4. Numerical strength of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

b. Matters under continuous study:

1. Information about outstanding personalities, [May also mean about large enterprises—translator's note.]
2. Radio industry,
3. Commerce,

<sup>18</sup> See appendix, p. 77, for photostat of original document.

4. Financing of the occupation zone in Germany (capital and its penetration into Germany),
5. Import-Export Bank,
6. International Monetary Fund,
7. War industry,
8. Communication—transport.

Working with data referring to these problems, especially relating to the matters to be reported on certain dates, please consider it to be very urgent and the primary task of your office.

CHIEF OF THE SECOND DIVISION OF  
GENERAL STAFF OF THE POLISH ARMY,  
(S) Wacłkw  
(—) KOMAR, Brigadier General.

Typed in 2 copies

Copy No. 1—to the addressee

Copy No. 2—a/a (for files)

Sporz. M. Z. 27.5.47.

Druk. D. I. Nr. dz. 173.

Whereupon the hearing adjourned as ordered until the following day.





DOCUMENTARY TESTIMONY OF GEN. IZYADOR MODELSKI,  
FORMER MILITARY ATTACHÉ OF THE POLISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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FRIDAY, APRIL 1, 1949

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,  
*Washington, D. C.*

EXECUTIVE SESSION

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a. m. in room 226, Old House Office Building, Hon. John S. Wood, (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Subcommittee of one, Hon. John S. Wood, chairman; staff members, Louis J. Russell, senior investigator; and William A. Wheeler, investigator, being present.

MR. RUSSELL. Mr. Chairman, since the witness was sworn yesterday and this is a continuation of that hearing, there is no necessity to swear him again today.

MR. WOOD. You may proceed.

MR. WHEELER. The next document the general turned over to the Committee is dated October 17, 1947, addressed to Gen. W. Komar in reply to General Komar's communication of October 12, 1947, signed by General Modelski, entitled "The Opinion of Military Circles." General Modelski, will you identify and explain the document to the committee?

General MODELSKI. Yes; there were three opinions. Yes; that it true.

MR. WHEELER. Where did you obtain the information?

General MODELSKI. My personal opinion. They asked me about the Cominform created in Belgrade at the end of 1947. They were asking me what the military circles in the United States thought about the Cominform.

MR. WHEELER. In other words, Komar sent you a telegram on October 12, 1947, requesting the information regarding the feeling of American military men toward the creation of the Cominform?

General MODELSKI. Requesting what the American people militarily are thinking about. I told them that the people are thinking the Comintern never died.

MR. WHEELER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have this document entered into the record as Exhibit 17.

MR. WOOD. So ordered.

EXHIBIT 17<sup>17</sup>

CODED MESSAGE NO.

Where to: Warsaw

To Whom: General W. Komar

In answer to your message of October 12, 1947.

TOP SECRET

Making of copies forbidden.

Sent October 17, 1947.

## 2. The opinion of Military Circles:

The Belgrade Act has also a military aspect: to divert the attention from the main purpose and direct it to the purposes of secondary importance in foreign affairs; namely, to Italy and France. This view was manifested by the American headquarters by opposition to sending troops to Palestine, which represents in the international situation more than a secondary purpose of employment of military units.

Truly, the Soviet Union, thanks to its central position, has the strategic advantage of the possibility to select the desirable direction of the attack or attacks, and of dispersing the forces of a possible enemy or enemies, but, on the other hand, does not have the freedom of the sea and in the last analysis, will itself be subject to a similar dispersion.

The old application of the strategy of retreat using space (Napoleon or Hitler) does not play a role any longer in modern strategy.

The consequences of the Belgrade offensive will be: Passing of the law concerning Universal Military Training, increase of the military budget, development of the military preparedness of the United States—that is, the abstaining from any financial or export aid which could strengthen the [Soviet] Union and the Eastern Bloc; in brief—the sharpening of the economic war.

The next report will be devoted to the opinion of the Diplomatic circles.

Maj. Gen. I. MODELSKI.

Mr. WHEELER. The next document is dated October 16, 1947, addressed to Gen. W. Komar from General Modelski. It is a reply to the message of October 12, 1947, which General Modelski testified that General Komar sent him requesting political, military, and diplomatic information. Will you identify this document as a photostatic copy of the original turned over to this Committee?

General MODELSKI. That is true.

Mr. WHEELER. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this document be entered into the record and marked "Exhibit 18."

Mr. WOOD. So ordered.

EXHIBIT 18<sup>18</sup>

TELEGRAM

General W. KOMAR

Warsaw

SECRET

Washington, October 16, 1947

*In reply to the message of October 12, 1947*

1. Opinion of political circles: The Cominform in Belgrade is in the nature of a propaganda maneuver, which is without doubt an offensive designed to maintain Communist movements in Greece and France. It is not the resurrection of Comintern because it "never died."

As an official expression of the views of the government of Slavic countries, it will undoubtedly intensify the economic and political war which is going on and will not add to the maintenance of peace since the Western Bloc will not permit the annihilation of the Marshall Plan. Just on the contrary, the increasing conflict will lead rather to the collapse of the rehabilitation of Eastern Europe at the expense of the loss of the possibility of marketing and exporting of coal. Without the help of the West, there could be no rehabilitation of the East. The economic and political concept of the Eastern Bloc is destined gradually but

<sup>17</sup> See appendix, p. 78, for photostat of original document.

<sup>18</sup> See appendix, p. 79, for photostat of original document.

surely to die because of an economic collapse and also other differences in the views of the world of the people inhabiting Europe taken as a whole.

Only a universal revolution in Western Europe may draw that part of Europe into the economic and political orbit of the Soviet Union, but there are no indications of that and this will not succeed.

The offensive by the Eastern Bloc is another great stumbling for the policy of the Soviet Union in the international field which leads to a world war rather than to world peace. As to the export of Polish coal on which the Polish government bases its economic policy of the rehabilitation of the country, although this coal is cheaper and is badly needed for the rehabilitation of Western Europe, it may be replaced by another coal although it will be more expensive.

Tomorrow I will report the opinions of the military circles.

GENERAL OF THE DIVISION,

Dr. I. MODELSKI,

*Military and Air Attaché.*

Mr. WHEELER. The next document is dated October 18, 1947, addressed to General W. Komar, from General Modelski, and it is an answer to the third part of the telegram sent by General Komar on October 12, 1947, to General Modelski, wherein he requests the opinion of diplomatic circles. Will you identify this document as a photostatic copy of the original which you have in your possession?

General MODELSKI. Yes.

Mr. WHEELER. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this document be entered into the record and marked "Exhibit 19."

Mr. WOOD. So ordered.

EXHIBIT 19<sup>19</sup>

TELEGRAM

General W. KOMAR

In answer to your telegram of October 12, 1947.

SECRET

Washington, October 18, 1947.

3. *Opinion of the Diplomatic Circles here (Latin America)*

The Warsaw-Belgrade Act is a test of the political support of the economic war declared against the Marshall Plan.

The first answer of the United States is the resignation of the Under Secretary of State Clayton and the threatening economic boycott of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. One of the coming answers will be the interruption of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union by the South American countries. The undoubted loss by the Soviet Union of the economic war will cause the political collapse of the Union and under the present condition Russia is not yet prepared for military action.

As experience up to now shows, communism is not in a position to be able to get control of any nation and win it to the cause of the conception of a Communist world without using for this purpose armed forces. Only by the use of armed forces has Russia achieved this in Eastern Europe either as an allied power or as an occupying power.

The act of political intimidation by the Manifesto of December 6 of the current year has caused an opposite effect.

The western hemisphere will also afford to the United States full military support.

Latin America possesses a good, although small, army, organized and trained with the aid of instructors from the United States.

The United States, considerably strengthened in its position, will not give in and will not undertake a false compromise.

The act of Belgrade is evidence of Soviet weakness and is the beginning of the decrease of the political influence of the Soviet Union.

Regardless of the outcome of the political and economic war changes going on, and aside from the fact whether the Soviet Union will withdraw from the United Nations or not, the problem of the settlement of the frontiers must be in the long run decided at a general peace conference of the United Nations.

General of the Division,  
I. MODELSKI.

<sup>19</sup> See appendix, p. 80, for photostat of original document.

Mr. WHEELER. The next document submitted to the Committee is dated January 2, 1947, from the Polish Army to Major General Modelski, military attaché, Embassy of the Polish Republic, Washington, D. C. It consists of five pages in Polish and bears the signature of General Komar. The document is entitled "Evaluation of the Reports for the Months of August, September, and October 1946." The document is a reprimand to General Modelski in which it is stated that the Polish Government has found many discrepancies and exaggerations in the evaluation of the reports, particularly with reference to the atomic bomb, and, in a majority of cases, the lack of objectivity. Throughout the report, General Modelski is criticized for giving false information. Will you look at this document and identify it for the Committee as a photostatic copy of the original document?

General MODELSKI. Yes; that is so.

Mr. WHEELER. Do you have any comment, General?

General MODELSKI. Yes; when I came here, it was not easy for me to do what they asked me to do, and afterward Colonel Alef told me that I am not trying; that my purpose was to stay here as long as possible to uncover or prevent activities of my deputy. Therefore I sent newspaper reports, but I wanted to show to the Polish Government in Warsaw that all information they possess, sent to them from other sources or from Colonel Alef, was untrue. It was not an easy job to present a picture this way. Therefore, perhaps you will see the manner in which I reported the Lewis strike. Colonel Alef told me that is the beginning of a revolution but I wrote that is untrue because the strike of Lewis will not do any harm to the United States security. I wrote them that there is no trouble, even if there is a lack of soft coal, because America possesses a big oil and gas line from Texas. They then asked me to send a report about the oil pipes but I did not answer.

Mr. WHEELER. Since this communication was addressed to you and you were criticized for the information you supplied, and for your inaccuracies in reporting information, could you conclude that Komar had other contacts in the United States?

General MODELSKI. Yes.

Mr. WHEELER. Do you know of any other parallel units?

General MODELSKI. Yes, Colonel Alef's. I assume countries from the iron curtain also received similar instructions.

Mr. WHEELER. Did you ever read any of Colonel Alef's reports which he submitted to Komar?

General MODELSKI. Never, although I asked him many times.

Mr. WHEELER. Do you know whether he submitted intelligence reports?

General MODELSKI. Absolutely.

Mr. WHEELER. Do you know of anyone else, besides Colonel Alef, who attempted to supply classified information to the Polish or Russian Government?

General MODELSKI. I am quite sure of that.

Mr. WHEELER. But you can't name them?

General MODELSKI. All attachés behind the iron curtain supply information to their respective governments, and because the Russian director of intelligence service of so-called internal and external—Marshal Beria, he is chief of so-called security, Minister in Russia,

but all external and internal security, together with military intelligence service, is dependent upon him. He is a source to give orders, behind the iron curtain.

Mr. WHEELER. Do you know his first name?

General MODELSKI. No; I don't remember.

Mr. WHEELER. Did you ever contact him personally?

General MODELSKI. No; because I was sent abroad.

Mr. WHEELER. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this document be introduced into the record and marked "Exhibit 20."

Mr. WOOD. So ordered.

#### EXHIBIT 20<sup>20</sup>

POLISH ARMY  
Chief Command  
General Staff Division II  
No. 0724/II  
January 2, 1947

SECRET  
Copy No. 1

MILITARY ATTACHÉ AT THE EMBASSY OF THE POLISH REPUBLIC IN WASHINGTON,  
MAJ. GEN. MODELSKI

*Evaluation of the reports for the months of August, September, and October, 1946*

#### *General Consideration*

The military, political, and economic situations of the United States are not objective but express your personal attitudes.

Information is one-sided, often without indication of the source and, in addition, the influence is evident of certain large capitalistic American circles of well-known type.

In the reports it is necessary to distinguish two tasks which, in part, are overlapping in the working out of details.

The first part—data and information in the military field; the second—political and military generalizations.

With reference to the first part, which represents a subject matter that interests us, in the first place we need information complying with certain basic requirements: It must be objective, systematic, thorough, concrete, and worked out in accordance with the plan.

Some data and information as, for instance, the part concerning the budget, some particulars in the field of aircraft, and others, are useful contributions for the study of these problems and were used correspondingly.

However, it is necessary to state that a considerable part of the information received does not comply with the above-mentioned requirements.

Our Bureau of Studies found in them many discrepancies, exaggerations in evaluation, particularly with reference to the atomic bomb, and in the majority of cases, lack of objectivity.

#### *Particular Considerations*

In the report of August 26, 1946, we find information concerning new military inventions of the United States of America. Likewise, on 8 pages of the report of September 5, 1946, the information concerning the atomic bomb is reported. In the last-named report, we read: "The gale produced by the explosion of the bomb (atomic) in comparison with the natural gale on land having a velocity of 5 miles per hour reaches 30 to 40 miles per hour velocity. (Page 1)"

These data do not agree with the actual situation because the velocity of the gale on land is 32-39-46 miles per hour and not 5 miles per hour. A velocity of 4-7 miles per hour is no more than a breeze. See Air Navigation, P. V. H. Weems Lieutenant Commander, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1942, p. 400.

Thus a gale produced by the explosion of the atomic bomb with a velocity of 30-40 miles per hour does not appear so terrible.

<sup>20</sup> See appendix, pp. 81-85, for photostat of original document.



On page 3 of your report we read: "Explosion of an atom bomb produces in the center of the explosion a fire bullet several tens of hundreds of degrees. The temperature of the center of this bullet amounts to millions of degrees C. The scientists evaluate the temperature of this bullet at from 3,000 to 9,000 degrees C. The beams of fire on the circumference reached 13,700 degrees."

Aside from the fact that the second sentence of the above-quoted paragraph is, in general, not understandable, the next sentence, where the evaluation by the scientist is stated, contradicts the previous one.

On page 6 of the report of September 5, 1946, the strength of the Infantry Division is stated as being 14,037. However, in fact, it amounts to 13,404. Insofar as the strength of new Infantry Divisions is concerned, the figure 17,000 is approximately correct but not in details, and in addition, new T/Os of the Infantry Division are patterned after the British Divisions with minor changes.

In all reports, especially where you speak of the strategic military position of the United States, of the preparedness of the armed forces, and atomic weapons, we find often generalizations and overrated statements. For instance, in the report of August 26, 1946, on page 4, we read that new researches brought about an invention "of particles so-called *messon*—with the *unheard of gravity* exceeding that of the particles relieved by the atom bomb. This is like an attempt to create a *new device*, an atomic superbomb, that is a cosmic bomb."

Likewise, the Bikini experiment is overrated. Even from the world press it is known that the results at Bikini do not give any reason for using superlatives. In your report of September 5, 1946, on page 2 we read: "The power of the force of pressure (at the explosion of the atomic bomb) is simply *beyond comprehension*," and at this occasion the velocity of this pressure is stated at 30–40 miles per hour. It is an obvious overstatement, because if we consider that the velocity of a storm reaches 75 miles per hour, and a wind with a velocity of 30–40 miles per hour, the above-mentioned Commander Weems described as a moderate gale! In view of all this, all the discussions in the report concerning the terrible effects of this pressure are not convincing.

#### *The Military Budget of the U. S. A.*

Report of September 19, 1946 (on the basis of the letter of Wallace) :

Army and Navy	13,000 million dollars (\$13,000,000,000)
Expenses of the military activities	5,000 million dollars (\$5,000,000,000)
Debts and welfare of veterans	10,000 million dollars
Total	28,000 million dollars (\$28,000,000,000)

Report of October 13, 1946:

Budget for all the armed forces	11,383 million dollars (\$11,383,000,000)
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Report of November 14, 1946: (According to Rex Collier, "The Sunday Star")

Budget of the National Defense	28,000 million dollars
Army and Navy	13,150 million dollars

In this are included the expenses of demobilization and reparation caused by the war emergencies.

Report of October 14, 1946: (According to speech of Secretary of War Patterson)

Budget of the National Defense	18,500 million dollars
Of this:	
Army	5,000 million dollars
Navy	3,000 million dollars

The budget of the government expenses of the United States, according to the report of the National City Bank of New York, "Economic Conditions Governmental Finance United States Securities," of September, 1946:

War Department	8,060 million dollars
Navy Department	5,150 million dollars
Terminal leave of enlisted personnel	2,418 million dollars
U. S. Maritime Commission	290 million dollars
War Shipping Administration	412 million dollars
Other (includes UNRRA)	2,178 million dollars

National Defense Subtotal	18,508 million dollars
Veterans' Pensions and Benefits	6,205 million dollars

To summarize, the Bureau of Studies, in comparing these figures, is facing the problem: Which of the figures are the correct ones? Who is the wrong informant and wants to pass the wrong information—Wallace, Collier, Patterson, or somebody else.

Evaluation of the position of President Truman as a person ruling the United States, who has behind him the entire American population is, according to our opinion, false. It seems to us also that Truman did not gain any authority after the speeches of Mr. Wallace and, on the contrary, lost a lot of his prestige.

The role of the Trade Unions is mistakenly interpreted, and the name of "Fifth Column" simply does not stand any criticism. The sentence that the action of the Trade Unions is met by a decisive reaction of "sound citizens" raises before us the question—which part of the citizens do you consider sound?

Information concerning the amendment of the Constitution—namely, concerning the terms of office of members of the Congress, and concerning the possibility of declaring an aggressive war by the United States requires an additional report on the sources of this information (Report 03/I. M., Section 7, of August 28, 1946). If the prospect of war between the United States and the Soviet Union is involved, we do not share your views expressed in the report of September 5, 1946, page 7, that: "We are already on the eve of a possible conflict. . . ."

It is true that on the West there are certain influential groups of war mongers, which were branded in the speeches by Marshal Stalin. These groups are inciting war, but taking it in general, it is a blackmailing and an attempt to intimidate. No war is threatened in the very near future.

In the existing situation, it is necessary, with full objectivity, to establish that the Soviet Union does not intend any aggression, in contrast to what is suggested in many of your reports, but the opposite—it is its intent to strengthen the lasting peace in the world.

In the report of August 26, 1946, on page 6 you state the opinion of American military leaders which, in our opinion, is not decent and rather cynical, stating that: "The only trouble at the present time is the helplessness with regard to the Constitution, which does not permit any aggressive war by the United States." Doesn't this form an objective expression of the intention of aggression, at least of these circles?

You often refer to data derived from research made by the Gallup Poll Institution which, in our opinion, not only investigates but creates the public opinion of the United States, and its conclusions are after "pia desideria" (wishful thinking), in the interest of influence on behalf of certain persons. That the results of the research and investigations of the Gallup Poll are not objective is shown, for instance, by the similar investigations by other institutions such as the Center of Research of public opinion at the University of Denver, Colorado, which conducted questionnaires on the subject of whether the United States and the Soviet Union must decide to go to war. Eighty-seven percent of the answers all over the United States were to the effect that neither the Soviet nor the American people want any war and will not decide for it. Only 9 percent admitted the possibility of an armed conflict.

Generally speaking, our Bureau of Studies deems a considerable part of the information to be unimportant and, as a whole or in part, not well organized; therefore, it cannot in the majority of cases use this data and information as material, or as supplementary material, or for comparison.

2. In accordance with the order of the Marshal, you must in the first place get busy with the military affairs, supplying us with data concerning the following:

1. Military doctrine of the United States,
2. Organization of the land army, air force and navy :
  - a. numerical strength—methods of recruiting,
  - b. distribution, paying special attention to bases,
  - c. armament and technical equipment, particularly with regard to the land army:
    - liaison—(means—kind of equipment)
    - engineers—(means—kind of equipment)
    - artillery—(equipment—technical data)
    - armored forces—(equipment—technical data)
3. Detailed analysis of military schools:
  - a. kinds of schools,
  - b. number of schools,
  - c. length of schooling, theoretical training, means and equipment,
  - d. distribution of schools,

- e. administration and program of the school training—new doctrines,
- f. practical training during the school term and upon graduation—(kind, length, requirements)
- 4. Corps of Officers and Non-Coms:
  - a. recruiting—(method of, requirements, limitations of admittance if any),
  - b. theoretical and practical training,
  - c. morale,
  - d. financial standing.

CHIEF OF THE SECOND DIVISION OF THE  
GENERAL STAFF OF THE POLISH ARMY,

(S) Wackw.

(—) KOMAR, *Brig. Gen.*

Typed in 2 copies

Copy No. 1—to the addressee

“ “ 2—a/a (for files)

Sporz. K. J. 14.12.46 r.

Druk. B. I. Nr. dz. 14.

Mr. WHEELER. The next document is dated May 5, 1947, from the Polish Army to General Modelski in Washington, D. C., and bears the signature of Komar, Brigadier General. The document is entitled “The Evaluation of Material from November, 1946 to January, 1947.” Again General Komar criticizes information General Modelski has forwarded to General Komar, and states that most of his information is in the nature of newspaper reports, and further criticizes General Modelski for referring to the results of the Gallup Poll. General Komar also requests additional information concerning the organization and strength of the National Guard; information concerning coal, natural gas and other gas fuel; also asks to be informed concerning all public appearances and statements of official leaders and important personalities in the U. S. A. Can you identify this document for the record, General?

General MODELSKI. That is true, yes.

Mr. WHEELER. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this document be introduced into the record and marked “Exhibit 21.”

Mr. WOOD. It is so ordered.

#### EXHIBIT 21<sup>21</sup>

POLISH ARMY

Chief Command

General Staff Division II

No. 01252/II

May 5, 1947

SECRET

Copy No. 1

MILITARY ATTACHÉ AT THE EMBASSY OF THE POLISH REPUBLIC IN WASHINGTON,  
MAJ. GEN. MODELSKI

The Evaluation of Material from November, 1946, to January, 1947

#### *General Observations*

Your reports bring lots of material, but they are mostly in the nature of chronicle remarks [in the nature of newspaper reporting]. This method of obtaining and treating of the subject matter presents distinct difficulties in making use of them as informative, comparative, and supplementary material.

An example which may be used in this connection is the small doses of information in 17 reports concerning the defense of the border lines.

<sup>21</sup> See appendix, pp. 86–88, for photostat of original document.



In order to facilitate the work of our Bureau of Studies, and in order to give us a broad picture of the problems treated, I ask you to organize the reports in the following form:

a. A comprehensive [synthetic] treatment of the whole of the subject matter for problems which exist for a long time and for which the facts are established;

b. Presentation of the subject matter within a certain period on the basis of the information received within the indicated period.

Reports coming under Clause a, please supplement by reports covering a certain period, bit by bit, with the obtaining of material and development of events.

At great length you often refer to the results of the so-called "Investigation of Public Opinion of the Gallup Institute."

We wrote you about this, and insist that the findings of the Gallup Institute are not controlling. Please compare them with the investigations of other American institutes engaged in the analysis of public opinion, which will to some extent help you to be oriented and evaluate the way of thinking of the American people. To rely exclusively on the Gallup Institute is one-sided and insufficient.

Together with the information, will you please always indicate the source of it.

#### *Specific Observations*

*L. 38/I. M. 46/T. jn. (secret), of November 14, 1946*

It is not important that: "Building of more heavy men of war is in full blast," but it would be important to indicate the type of these vessels, their tonnage and armament. The report must be supplemented with the following material:

1. Technical and tactical data concerning vessels assigned to the so-called "atom war."

2. On what in particular is the change of the old vessel to the new based?

3. What data are available concerning the U. S. Navy in the Mediterranean?

*L. 31/I. M. 46/secret, of November 15, 1946*

The report on the budget of the land army of the U. S. A. and of the Navy is made exhaustively.

*L. 43/I. M. 46/secret, of November 18, 1946*

The report contains scattered information and individual items which do not give the whole picture of the problem. It could be a fragment in the survey of the American press concerning the Polish Western frontier. Reported as separate information, it can not be used at all.

*L. 28/I.M. 46/secret, of November 21, 1946*

As a supplement, please send the terms of the plan of the Army and Navy for 6 months' training of youth and the results of this plan.

*L. 49/I.M. 46/secret, of November 23, 1946*

In addition, please report:

1. Data concerning the National Guard and the organization of the Reserves (organization, numerical strength, methods, and quality of training, leaders).

2. The names of the ships of the line which are slated for liquidation.

3. Data concerning the building of "quick-fire ranges":

a. Whether they are in use, and how many.

b. Program of building.

*L. 52/I.M. secret/46, November 25, 1946*

The Lewis coal strike was evaluated properly and to the point. Please send the following data:

a. What is the attitude of the coal concerns with regard to the use of gas instead of bituminous coal;

b. What bases are to be found in Persia, their distribution and strength.

*L. 59/I.M. secret/46, December 11, 1946*

1. The problem of the use of some other kind of fuel instead of coal is very important. Please follow the technical side of the transition to natural gas and other gas fuel.

2. Page 1, line 8 from the bottom reads: "According to the official report, coal is used by 50.4% of industry; oil, 10.2%." Please find out whether it is crude or refined, and if it is refined, what type?

*L. 60/I. M. secret/46, December 14, 1946*

Please follow and inform us concerning all public appearances and statements of official leaders and important personalities in the U. S. A. concerning the German problem.

*L. 61/I. M. secret/46, December 17, 1946.*

The subject matter of the report is treated one-sidedly and, therefore, can not be used. The reports of the Gallup Institute are not at all conclusive as far as the public opinion in the United States concerning the relations with U. S. S. R. is involved.

CHIEF OF THE SECOND DIVISION OF THE  
GENERAL STAFF OF THE POLISH ARMY,

(S) WACLKW

(—) KOMAR, *Brig. Gen.*

Typed in 2 copies

Copy No. 1.—to the addressee

Copy No. 2—a/a (for files)

Sporz. M. Z. 29. 4. 47

Druk. E. B. Nr. dz. 174.

Mr. WHEELER. The next document is dated June 30, 1946, from the Polish Army to General Modelski, and bears the signature of W. Komar, colonel, wherein it states that General Modelski's plan to visit Polish settlements in different cities of the United States was approved. The document continues:

In making such visits the fact must be kept in mind that Polish immigrants in the United States are essentially very sensitive with regard to the sentimental ties with Poland. This aspect has been, and is, used by the London agents active in these places.

General Modelski, this communication indicates that there are close ties between the Polish people in the United States and London agents. General, would you identify the London agents?

General MODELSKI. They are all who refuse to do anything with Russia; they are the people of the Polish Government in exile.

Mr. WHEELER. In other words, London agents could be classified as being in the Polish underground.

General MODELSKI. Not perhaps that way. When they sent me here, they were sure that I would influence Americans of Polish descent who were sympathetic to the exile government in England to transfer their sympathy to the present Polish Government.

Mr. WHEELER. In other words, in referring to the London agents, they mean individuals who are against the Communist government?

General MODELSKI. Yes.

Mr. WHEELER. In other words, there is a move afoot to counteract the present government?

General MODELSKI. Yes.

Mr. WHEELER. And could be termed as an underground movement?

General MODELSKI. That it true.

Mr. WHEELER. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this document be introduced into the record and marked "Exhibit 22."

Mr. Wood. So ordered.

EXHIBIT 22<sup>22</sup>

POLISH ARMY  
Chief Command  
General Staff Division II  
No. 0176/II  
June 30, 1946

SECRET  
Copy No. 1

MILITARY ATTACHÉ AT THE EMBASSY OF THE POLISH REPUBLIC IN WASHINGTON,  
MAJ. GEN. MODELSKI

At the outset, I advise you in general what the attitude of the Marshal was to letters (of June 10 and June 13) addressed by you to him.

The Marshal did not take cognizance of these letters because:

a. They have the character of private letters;

b. In the official matters, he requires the official form of correspondence.

1. Evaluation of the atmosphere and terrain as factors, which are difficult to establish, is completely covered by the available information and, therefore, your intention not to undertake at the *beginning* any political action was met here with approval.

Where some contacts are established, as is for instance the case with the group of Haller followers, political aspects must more and more characterize these contacts. Such approach, bit by bit, must apply also in any other case.

2. In view of the above, your plan to visit Polish settlements in different cities of the United States also was approved.

In making such visits, the fact must be kept in mind that Polish immigrants in the United States are essentially very sensitive with regard to the sentimental ties with Poland. This aspect has been, and is, used by the London agents active in these places.

3. The plan to enlarge the personnel of the Attaché in Washington by Naval and Air Attachés is seriously considered.

The request for a Liaison Officer for the Military Attaché was taken favorably. On June 15, Major Edward KIERYYS left Warsaw on his way, via London, to Washington in order to take this office.

THE CHIEF OF THE SECOND DIVISION OF THE GENERAL STAFF,  
(S) Wackw  
W. KOMAR, *Colonel*.

Typed in 2 copies

Copy No. 1—to the addressee

Copy No. 2—a/a (for files)

Sporz. K. E.

29.7.46 r.

Druk. B. I.

Nr. dz. 75.

Mr. WHEELER. Mr. Chairman, the next document is undated and appears to be a questionnaire sent to an official of the Polish Government. General Modelski, I would like for you to identify the document and explain it to the Committee, please.

General MODELSKI. Yes. Although it is not secret, it is very important for the Communist regime. In my opinion it was ordered by Russia, because they sent many Russian people to Poland; they wore Polish uniforms and they ordered them to become Polish citizens. In this way they wanted to fight all foes of communism from past Polish history—from the beginning of the first war, who fought against the Communists. Afterward they wanted to know, not only from me perhaps but from all people living in Poland, who their relations were and their acquaintances abroad. That is a document to get more people to serve Russian or Communist interests. Therefore, they ask your biography, and all items must be answered. That is very interesting because in that way they find the people to be picked for Communist services.

<sup>22</sup> See appendix, p. 89, for photostat of original document.

Mr. RUSSELL. In other words, the Russian Government sent its own fifth column to Poland, and is trying to create one here through the use of a questionnaire such as this. Also in other countries?

General MODELSKI. Yes.

Mr. WHEELER. General Modelski, did you submit an answer to the document which you have just reviewed?

General MODELSKI. I did not.

Mr. RUSSELL. The document states: "Were you or your relatives convicted or indicted and investigated, or arrested or punished by court, administrative or disciplinary authorities, when, where, and what for." Will you explain that sentence?

General MODELSKI. In my opinion, they are looking for some people to be used for their work, because in Poland some of the security police are former criminals. It is an easy way to get into the service.

Mr. RUSSELL. What do they mean by "punished by administrative authorities"?

General MODELSKI. Because in Poland there is punishment by court and administrative, too, and they are all officials, civil or military. They wanted to know all about everyone—his past.

Mr. RUSSELL. Was this questionnaire sent to Polish citizens or to people from Russia who had accepted Polish citizenship?

General MODELSKI. They sent it to both.

Mr. RUSSELL. But some of the questions are solely directed to the Russians?

General MODELSKI. Exactly.

Mr. RUSSELL. Two of the questions are directed to the Russians or persons who had been citizens of Russia, as the one which states: "Whether served in the Red Army, when, where, and in what position. Military status at the present time." The other question is, "Nationality, citizenship. Whether you were a citizen of any other country and when you have accepted Polish citizenship." Those two questions were directed specifically at Russians who had accepted Polish citizenship?

General MODELSKI. They do not want to collaborate with Polish officers. Therefore, they sent the Russians to take over top offices.

Mr. RUSSELL. Had some of the persons been sent into Poland prior to the time of the partition?

General MODELSKI. They took many hundred thousand people from Poland, as they did before the First World War, and they sent them all to Siberia or into deep Russia.

Mr. RUSSELL. What I was referring to in connection with the questionnaire which we have just discussed was the fact that some of these people of Russian descent who had accepted Polish citizenship had been sent to Poland prior to the time the country was divided between Russia and Germany?

General MODELSKI. Yes. In 1939, when they invaded Poland, and after the defeat of Germany, when they occupied Poland in 1944.

Mr. RUSSELL. In other words, Russia has had a fifth column in Poland since 1939?

General MODELSKI. Yes, since 1939. That is the way they are trying to do, and therefore they ask about what Americans of Polish descent are doing. They told me—this way we will disrupt the United States, but I saw it was impossible because the majority of the Amer-



ican Polish people here are constantly against Communists. However, the Communist-controlled government desires to exploit the American Poles and have Polish organizations work on behalf of the Communists, such as the American Slav Congress.

Mr. WHEELER. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this document be introduced into the record and marked "Exhibit 23."

Mr. WOOD. It is so ordered.

EXHIBIT 23<sup>23</sup>

Write legibly, clearly, and only in ink

FORM NO. 3

## BIOGRAPHY

For-----

(Military rank, surname, name, and the name of the father)

Must be filled according to the form, in one's own hand, without crossing out and without corrections, under the obligation to make clear the following questions:

Year and month of birth, indicating kind of family into which born, and the occupation of the parents prior to 1939. During the occupation of Poland (their address), whether any relatives lived abroad, when, how long, and what his or her means of subsistence was, and the reason for return to Poland.

Whether you have acquaintances or relatives abroad in foreign offices, missions, or among citizens of other countries.

Marital status, occupation of the wife, her parents, brothers, and sisters before the war and up to the present time.

Trade or profession of persons answering this questionnaire. Date began to work independently, how long worked or was employed, and work during the occupation of the Polish state by German Fascists, kind of real property possessed and where it is located.

Party affiliation, indicating to which parties or political groups belongs or belonged, where, when, and why left these, to which political or military organizations belonged at the time of German occupation of Poland.

Service in the Army: When and in what unit, how long, in what position and with what rank (Russian, Austrian, Polish, German).

Whether served in the Red Army, when, where and in what position (last position). Military status at the present time.

Whether you yourself or your relatives served in the Anders Army and other Polish units formed abroad after 1939.

Participation in the war 1914-1921, where, when and in what participated. To which social organizations belonged before September 1, 1939.

Whether you or your relatives were convicted or indicted and investigated, or were arrested or punished by court, administrative or disciplinary authorities, when, where and what for.

Nationality, citizenship. Whether you were a citizen of any other country and when you have accepted Polish citizenship.

Place of residence (precise address).

Mr. RUSSELL. General, I have a document here, addressed to the military attaché Polish Embassy in Washington, addressed to you. The document states, "To be delivered personally." Would you explain what this document is?

General MODELSKI. It is a letter from General Komar. Before they tried to do all they could to get me back to Warsaw. I said, every time, that I was ill and the doctors told me it was impossible for me to take a trip by ship or plane although I am still working, but only do what is necessary. I wanted to get many documents from Warsaw if possible. I provoked them many times, and then Warsaw ceased, in 1947, to answer. When they ceased to ask me about anything, they didn't answer any of my reports and I continued sending them every week. Then they tried to convince me that I was wrong. Then

<sup>23</sup> See appendix, p. 90, for photostat of original document.

General Paskiewicz, he was my former friend, wrote me a letter. That letter was sent to General Komar, and he knew very well what General Paskiewicz had written to me, and they told me that I am against Russia; that I am prowestern; that Modelski is a bad man, an agent of the United States and Great Britain; that in Poland, in all fields, it is going better and better and the people who are ruling Poland are the best Poles. He told me, "Because you are boss in the United States, it is of great importance." They told me, "You are doing the best things for Poland and you must be convinced of it." He tried to influence me this way. I answered that letter. I told him I was staying here. Afterward, General Komar wrote to me a very pleasant letter that he didn't know anything about my trouble with my deputy because all reports were sent to him. Afterward I blamed my deputy—he tried to get me back to Poland.

Mr. WHEELER. Is this the letter you refer to?

General MODELSKI. Yes; that is what I have answered.

Mr. WHEELER. In other words, you felt that Komar was not sincere in writing this—that it was just his idea of getting you back to Poland?

General MODELSKI. Yes. He said, "You have written something with which we are not in accord. It is not a bad job you have done, but you must follow our instructions." In those letters they are trying to get an appeasement with me. He said, "Come back, all will be settled," and he told me I would have two weeks.

Mr. WHEELER. Do you think if you went to Poland you would ever have returned to the United States?

General MODELSKI. No.

Mr. WHEELER. What would have happened?

General MODELSKI. There would have been a trial. I would be accused of being an American agent, a Fascist.

Mr. WHEELER. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this document be introduced into the record and marked "Exhibit 24."

Mr. Wood. So ordered.

#### EXHIBIT 24<sup>24</sup>

[Memo]

MILITARY ATTACHÉ AT THE EMBASSY OF THE POLISH REPUBLIC IN WASHINGTON,  
GENERAL MODELSKI

To be delivered personally [In handwriting]

Received on December 10, 1947 [In handwriting]

[Letter]

DEAR GENERAL: From General Paskiewicz I learned that your general disposition leaves much to be desired. Information included in the letter to General Paskiewicz throws a new light on the relations prevailing in your office.

I regret that I was not informed in detail concerning the situation while your deputy was in Warsaw. Still more, I am surprised that you, up to the present time, were silent concerning your relationship with your deputy since, as is evident from the letter, this situation was not created all of a sudden but has developed over a considerable period of time.

I have not the slightest doubt that in your so responsible branch of work the strict execution of orders and directives of the superior, conscientious and unswerving discipline, and harmonious work of the entire unit are essential elements securing the proper functioning of the office of the Attaché for the good of our army and country.

<sup>24</sup> See appendix, pp. 91-94, for photostat of original document.



After reading your letter, I have a clear idea that the created situation makes it impossible for you to work quietly and efficiently. Improper attitude and conduct of Colonel Alef towards you, his superior, is obviously an inadmissible thing from the point of military discipline as well as the good of the service. Please believe me, General, that I will not fail to draw from the above a proper conclusion and will undertake proper steps in the future. You should not, however, be taken up too much with this whole matter, and I sincerely advise you not to take it to heart too seriously.

I know that you have good intentions and the best will to serve the cause which we all are serving. We are approaching you with full trust, which we have otherwise several times expressed to you.

The evaluation of your reports from the angle of our needs should not offend you. The purpose of this evaluation is to give you a possibility to direct the work of the office of the Attaché in accordance with our urgent needs, which flow from the actually existing situation. It is difficult for me, in a short letter, to discuss the sum total of matters and problems which piled up during your absence for one year and a half from the country. I judge that the best thing would be if you would visit us for a couple of weeks.

I am sure that your direct presence and personal many-sided explanation will contribute lots of interesting and valuable material to all these problems, which can not be exhaustively reported and discussed in the official reports.

We also will be able to discuss in general all the headaches and affairs of your office and, at this opportunity, we will settle definitely the question of the improper atmosphere of work in your office.

I leave it up to you to decide whether you will take with you Colonel Alef.

Thus, until we meet, I wish you all good luck.

(Signature same as that in letters signed by KOMAR)

P. S.—Of course, please send your work: "The United States, Russia, and Poland" and do it as soon as possible.

Mr. WHEELER. When did you leave the Embassy, on what date?

General MODELSKI. On August 15, 1948.

Mr. WHEELER. Were you given an official notice to return to Poland?

General MODELSKI. Yes; they told me because I have exchanged cablegrams with them, regarding my physical capacity—therefore, I will not return.

Mr. WHEELER. Did they ever send you a communication stating that you were relieved from duty as military attaché?

General MODELSKI. They sent, perhaps, in June 1948, that because I am so ill and not able to do my work, they will give me illness leave to stay here, and another man, who was not mentioned, will take my place. I answered I would never accept it.

Mr. WHEELER. Who took your place?

General MODELSKI. Major Olkiewicz.

Mr. WHEELER. What do you know of Major Olkiewicz's background?

General MODELSKI. He was an officer—he took part in the battle against the Germans. After the defeat in 1939, he was in a prison camp in eastern Prussia—a young officer, a Pole.

Mr. WHEELER. Was he a Communist?

General MODELSKI. In my opinion, yes; although when I asked him, he said, "I am a Pole. You must accept me."

Mr. WHEELER. The next document is undated, and marked "Secret." It bears no signature. I would like to have you examine this document and state whether or not it is a true photostatic copy of the original.

General MODELSKI. Yes; it is so. It is a request for information from the Polish Government.

Mr. WHEELER. Did it originate from General Komar?

General MODELSKI. It was sent because there was to be a conference, a peace conference, and they wanted me to perhaps prepare information for this.

Mr. WHEELER. Did the document originate from General Komar?

General MODELSKI. Yes; from Komar.

Mr. WHEELER. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this document be introduced into the record, and marked "Exhibit 25."

Mr. WOOD. It is so ordered.

EXHIBIT 25<sup>25</sup>

SECRET

Copy No. —

## DESIRATA [Information Required]

## FOR THE MILITARY MISSION CONCERNING THE AFFAIRS OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE TO BE SUPPLIED BY THE POLISH AGENCIES ABROAD

In connection with the approaching peace conference concerning the treaty with the Germans, for the purpose of preparing of material for the Military Mission in Paris, a Military Mission was established within the Chief Command of the Polish Army for the affairs of the peace conference. Besides the material available on the spot in Poland, the Mission needs some material from abroad, namely:

(a) Information concerning the views of individual statesmen, politicians, and military leaders concerning our Western boundaries, stated officially or unofficially (at meetings, in the press or in social conversations).

(b) Any observation on the subject matter made by leaders of political parties or representatives of political organizations, by scholars, journalists, or other persons playing important roles in public life.

(c) Articles or excerpts from the daily and the periodical press relating to the same question.

(d) Books and publications treating of the question of post-war organization of Europe, with specific reference to Central Europe, and especially to the Polish-German relations.

(e) All sources relating to German propaganda with regard to the shifting of our Western boundary or other problems of interest for our future. The most important thing is to find out the arguments which may be used by Germans on the eve of the peace conference in the struggle concerning the boundaries, and the attempt to obtain for them better peace conditions.

(f) Personal observations and impressions obtained in a given country on the basis of private conversations with persons having contact with political or military sources, or in any other way.

(g) Information and material concerning the attitude of the above-mentioned circles and persons concerning the settlement of the Polish-Czech frontier and, in general, concerning the problem of friendship of the Slavic nations and governments.

In view of the importance and urgent need of this information and the need for an exhaustive report on the problems from all points of view (military, political, historical, and economic), the Military Mission for the affairs of the peace conference requests you to make all efforts to include in the information as much as possible of data on the above subject matter and to report them in the most urgent manner.

Typed in 4 copies

Copies 1-4-w/g (according to the order)

Sporz. M. J.

Druk. B. I.

Nr. dz. 30

Mr. WHEELER. The next document is dated January 24, 1947. It is a coded message to General Modelski from General Komar. It ap-

<sup>25</sup> See appendix, p. 95. for photostat of original document.

pears to be a routine message wherein General Modelski is instructed to follow instructions precisely, and not to undertake on his own accord any action designed in any broader way. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this document be introduced into the record, and marked "Exhibit 26."

Mr. Wood. So ordered.

EXHIBIT 26<sup>28</sup>

Subject to return to the Code Division within 48 hours

TOP SECRET  
Making of any copies forbidden  
Copy No. —

## CODED MESSAGE NO. 62

From: Warsaw; sent, January 24, 1947; received, January 24, 1947.

Taken by the Code Division: January 24, 1947, at 2200 o'clock.

Gen. MODELSKI: In answer to your coded message of January 13 of this year, we advise you that in the matter of Western boundaries, the Potsdam Agreement is binding on us.

The general outline of your action was given to you by Minister Olszewski.

Please follow the instructions precisely and do not undertake on your own accord any action designed in any broader way.

Gen. KOMAR.

No. 743

25.1.47

Decoded January 25, 1947, at 1100 o'clock.

Decoded by Broz.

Mr. WHEELER. The next document is dated February 18, 1947, from the Polish Army to General Modelski, and bears the signature of General Komar. It is stamped "Top secret." General Komar in this communication states that information he previously requested concerning the characteristics of the attachés of foreign countries and their personnel had not been complied with and requested that General Modelski expedite the matter and send the material with the next mail. General Modelski, why did General Komar insist upon having information concerning attachés of foreign countries?

General MODELSKI. Because in my opinion they wanted to know the customs and habits of people to approach them. We have many connections here, and I remember that perhaps Colonel Alef has acquaintances with some. I am not speaking about behind the iron curtain, but Colonel Alef looked to get connection with some attachés from Latin America. Then they asked me to send all characteristics. In my opinion, he is very clever.

Mr. WHEELER. In other words, General Komar wished to know if any of the attachés were favorable to the Soviet Government or Polish Government; if so, they might be able to assist you in the future in acquiring information?

General MODELSKI. Yes.

Mr. WHEELER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce this document into the record, and mark it "Exhibit 27."

Mr. Wood. It is so ordered.

<sup>28</sup> See appendix, p. 96, for photostat of original document.

EXHIBIT 27<sup>27</sup>

POLISH ARMY  
 Chief Command  
 General Staff Division II  
 No. 0885/II  
 February 18, 1947

SECRET  
 Copy No. 1

MILITARY ATTACHÉ AT THE EMBASSY OF THE POLISH REPUBLIC IN WASHINGTON,  
 MAJ. GEN. MODELSKI

1. In connection with the fact that our letter No. 0444/II (circular letter No. 10), concerning the characteristics of the Attachés of foreign countries and their personnel, was not complied with thus far, please expedite the matter and send this material in the next mail.

2. With the letter of December 20, 1946, No. 0134/A, we have sent the article by R. Sidorski under the title, "The Watch on the Oder and the Niesse" to be used in the press.

In this connection, we expect from you a report on the results and ask you to send press clippings together with the reports.

3. In addition to the letter No. 0571/II of November 29, 1946, I advise you that up the present time, we have not received anything on this subject matter.

I remind you of this matter and ask you to treat it as an urgent one.

CHIEF OF THE SECOND DIVISION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE POLISH ARMY.

(Signature)

(—) KOMAR, *Brig. Gen.*

Typed in 2 copies :

Copy No. 1—to the addressee

" " 2—a/a (for files)

Sporz. M. Z. 13. 2. 47 r.

Druk. B. I. Nr. dz. 11.

Mr. WHEELER. Are you acquainted with Ignace Zlotowski?

General MODELSKI. Yes. I understand his real name is Goldman or Goldberg.

Mr. WHEELER. He is an atomic scientist, is that correct?

General MODELSKI. Yes. He was at one time associated with Joliot-Curie.

Mr. WHEELER. Joliot-Curie presently in charge of the atomic bomb project in France and is a self-admitted member of the Communist Party?

General MODELSKI. Yes.

Mr. WHEELER. Do you personally know Ignace Zlotowski?

General MODELSKI. I met him here first, because before the war I had never heard of him.

Mr. WHEELER. What was he doing here?

General MODELSKI. He came here first as a deputy of the embassy.

Mr. WHEELER. He was connected with the embassy?

General MODELSKI. Yes.

Mr. WHEELER. Do you know if he was engaged in espionage on behalf of the Polish Government?

General MODELSKI. In my opinion, I am sure of that.

Mr. WHEELER. Why?

General MODELSKI. Because I am repeating what I have said before. My instructions excluded atomic bombs. There is no mention about that.

Mr. WHEELER. You believe that Ignace Zlotowski had charge of the unit attempting to acquire atomic information in the United States?

General MODELSKI. Yes.

<sup>27</sup> See appendix, p. 97, for photostat of original document.

Mr. WHEELER. Do you believe this information was to be forwarded to Poland or to Russia directly?

General MODELSKI. I am unable to answer, but there was opportunity to send it perhaps through to Warsaw and to Russia.

Mr. WHEELER. Did you report to the Army Intelligence your knowledge of Zlotowski?

General MODELSKI. I informed the United States Intelligence that he is a Communist and that he has come here not for a trip.

Mr. WHEELER. You informed our Military Intelligence?

General MODELSKI. Yes; that he is a scientist and that it is not a diplomatic trip; that he is coming here for some other purpose. I tried to speak with him, but it was impossible to speak as Pole to Pole. I have shown him my reports.

Mr. WHEELER. Zlotowski read your reports?

General MODELSKI. Yes; because I wanted to know what his attitude might be toward the United States.

Mr. WHEELER. What is his attitude?

General MODELSKI. I showed him some of my reports and he is very eager; afterwards he said it was untrue.

Mr. WHEELER. In other words, his opinion was the same as Komar's?

General MODELSKI. The same line.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. Chairman, the committee is well aware of Ignace Zlotowski's activities in the United States, on which we have a detailed report. However, I would like to exclude the report from this hearing and present the information at a future hearing which will involve Mr. Zlotowski.

Mr. WOOD. So ordered.

Mr. WHEELER. Do you know any other individuals who engaged in espionage activities in the United States?

General MODELSKI. Personally, I do not know as I refused to obey Colonel Komar's orders.

Mr. WHEELER. Would you give the committee background information concerning Alef?

General MODELSKI. Alef hated Poland. He didn't consider himself a Pole. Before the war he told me he was born in Poland. I don't know if this is true, but he speaks Polish very well. Before the war he told me he was a soldier, but not an officer.

Mr. WHEELER. Did Colonel Alef attend any school in Moscow?

General MODELSKI. I think so.

Mr. WHEELER. Did he ever tell you the name of the school?

General MODELSKI. No; he never told me, but everyone who is sent for espionage must be prepared for it.

Mr. WHEELER. Was he a member of the International Brigade in Spain?

General MODELSKI. I don't know, but I know he went to Russia during the war when the Germans attacked Russia, and afterward came back.

Mr. WHEELER. What year was that?

General MODELSKI. The war broke out in 1941. As I remember, he went to Russia and back to Poland.

Mr. WHEELER. Would you say Alef was a spy, indoctrinated in Russia?



General MODELSKI. In my opinion, he was one of the most prominent.

Mr. WHEELER. Was there any connection between Colonel Alef and other members of the satellite nations?

General MODELSKI. He very often visited the Russian, Yugoslavian, and Czechoslovakian Embassies. Colonel Alef was very sure of himself; he called you stupid Americans.

Mr. WHEELER. Colonel Alef called us stupid Americans?

General MODELSKI. Yes; because it was so easy to obtain information.

Mr. WHEELER. Did you ever have any political assignments other than here? Were you ever an ambassador to another country except the United States, for the Polish Government?

General MODELSKI. Only to the Philippine Islands.

Mr. WHEELER. When were you assigned to the Philippine Islands?

General MODELSKI. In June 1946, and before that I was sent to London. That was my first assignment from that Government, head of a military mission to London.

Mr. WHEELER. During the time you were in the Polish Army before the capitulation of Poland, did the Polish Army set up espionage units in foreign countries before the war, while you were in the Polish Army?

General MODELSKI. In Germany, because we were going to war with them.

Mr. WHEELER. When did you enter the Polish Army?

General MODELSKI. From the beginning 1918, I became a Polish soldier.

Mr. WHEELER. And you rose to the rank of general? When did you officially leave, what year?

General MODELSKI. In 1926 when the Government changed hands and I was jailed.

Mr. WHEELER. How long did you stay in jail?

General MODELSKI. I was arrested in 1926 during the coup d' état.

Mr. WHEELER. How long were you under arrest?

General MODELSKI. Not so long—3 weeks.

Mr. WHEELER. What did you do after that?

General MODELSKI. They asked me to be loyal to the new regime, and I refused.

Mr. WHEELER. What happened then?

General MODELSKI. In 1928, in October, they released me from the army.

Mr. WHEELER. What did you do after 1928?

General MODELSKI. I was president of so-called General Haller Association. He was commander of the Polish armies in France. I became president of former soldiers who fought beside the Allies.

Mr. WHEELER. How long were you connected with that organization?

General MODELSKI. Until the outbreak of the war in 1939.

Mr. WHEELER. What was your position when Germany invaded Poland?

General MODELSKI. I was president of that association.

Mr. WHEELER. After the partition of Poland, when did you become associated with the Communist-controlled Polish Government?



General MODELSKI. Shortly after the Teheran and Yalta Conferences.

Mr. WHEELER. Is the exiled Polish Government presently in London?

General MODELSKI. It is existing now although the United States and Great Britain withdrew recognition. It is now recognized by five countries.

Mr. WHEELER. What countries recognize the exiled Polish Government?

General MODELSKI. Spain, Ireland, Cuba, Syria, the Vatican, and Lebanon.

Mr. WHEELER. How long were you associated with the present Polish Government?

General MODELSKI. Until I resigned from the Polish Embassy in Washington, D. C., because I could no longer be affiliated with the Communist-controlled Polish Government.

Mr. WHEELER. In your opinion, why do you think the Communist-controlled government drafted you to the important position you held? I feel that the position of military and air attaché in the United States is probably one of the highest positions the Polish Government has to offer.

General MODELSKI. Shortly before the war broke out, I publicly announced that it was necessary for Poland to align itself with the Western Powers and Russia, against our common foe, Germany. Therefore, when the Russian Government actually took over Poland, they considered that I could be trusted because of my previous stand before our entry into the Second World War.

Mr. WHEELER. During that time you were advocating appeasement with the Russians, and you later discovered that appeasement was impossible?

General MODELSKI. Yes; that is true.

Mr. WHEELER. And your primary purpose was for the defeat of Germany?

General MODELSKI. Yes; because of the fact that I knew that we were to fight Germany.

Mr. WHEELER. When you arrived in the United States you turned all your information over to the Military Intelligence?

General MODELSKI. Yes. At once.

Mr. WHEELER. And you cooperated with the United States Government fully from the time you arrived, and you still are cooperating?

General MODELSKI. That is true.

Mr. WHEELER. Are you now actively engaged in the so-called resistance movement against the government now in Poland?

General MODELSKI. I am not engaged in a resistance movement, and I am not a friend. I am looking in the past to the Government prior to 1926. I fought against the exiled Polish Government then. As a soldier I will forget all that happened before.

Mr. RUSSELL. General Modelski, we have entered 27 documents into the official record. Have you examined the photostatic copies of all 27 documents?

General MODELSKI. Yes.

Mr. RUSSELL. And they are photostatic copies of the original Polish documents which you retained in your possession after you left the Polish Embassy?

General MODELSKI. That is true.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that the English translation of the documents be entered into the text of the hearing and that the photostats of the original documents in the Polish language be attached to the record of the hearing as an appendix. I also request that a biographical sketch of Gen. Izyador Modelski, Ignace Zlotowski, Lt. Col. Gustaw Alef-Bolkowiak, Brig. Gen. Wacław Komar, Marshal Mikhail Rola-Zymierski, Maj. Gen. Marjan Spychalski, Bronisław Konstantine (alias Bill K. Gebert, alias Bolesław Konstanty Gebert, alias Bolesław Gebert), Leo Krzyski, and Gen. Karol Swierczewski, be entered into the official record.

Mr. WOOD. So ordered.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. Chairman, this concludes the hearing at the present time.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the special subcommittee adjourned.)

(By permission of the chairman, certain sections of General Modelski's testimony have been deleted and are being retained in the executive files of the committee.)

## APPENDIX

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(As ordered by the chairman, the appendix contains biographical sketches of Dr. Ignace Zlotowski, Lt. Col. Gustaw Alef-Bolkowiak, Brig. Gen. Wacław Komar, Marshal Mikhail Rola-Zymierski, Maj. Gen. Marion Spychalski, Bronisław Konstantine (alias Bolesław Gebert, alias Bill K. Gebert), Leo Krzycki, and General Karol Świerczewski, and the exhibits introduced in the attached testimony.

### GENERAL IZYADOR RUDOLF MODELSKI

Personal data : Born May 10, 1888, Lwów, Poland.

Education : Graduate, University of Lwów, Doctor of Philosophy, 1916 ; graduate, Superior Military College.

#### CAREER

1914-17: Was in Polish Army and active in the campaign against Czarist Russia.

1917-18: Member of Polish underground in Warsaw. Collaborated with General Tadeusz Rozwadowski and Colonel Władysław Sikorski in an uprising against the Germans and Austrians then occupying Poland.

1918-20: As a lieutenant colonel in the victorious Polish Army and a commander of the 79th Infantry Regiment, he fought against the Soviet invasion of Poland.

1926-28: When Marshal Piłsudski assumed leadership of Polish Government in May 1926 by a coup d'état, General (then Colonel) Modelski remained loyal to the former government and was arrested and jailed by Piłsudski and released shortly thereafter. He was dismissed from the Army in 1928.

1929-39: Head of the Association of General Haller's Veterans.

1939-48: Joined General Sikorski in France and was appointed Deputy Minister of National Defense of the Polish Government in France. Fought on the French front as a divisional commander and was evacuated to England from Dunkirk. While in England, served in various capacities for the Polish armed forces. In 1945 he retired from the Polish Army in England. In July 1945, left England and returned to Poland. In November 1945 he was appointed chief of a Polish military mission to England for the repatriation of Polish troops. Returned to Poland in December 1945. In February 1946 he was appointed Polish Military Attaché to the United States. On August 15, 1948 he resigned as Polish Military Attaché and remained in this country.

### DR. IGNACE ZLOTOWSKI

Personal data : Born May 20, 1907, Warsaw, Poland.

Education : Graduate in chemical engineering, Polytechnic Institute, Warsaw, 1930 ; doctor in technical sciences, Polytechnic Institute, Warsaw, 1934.

Languages : Russian, German, French.

Publications : Numerous scientific studies in Polish, French, Czech, British, and American journals ; contributor to the National Academy's "Annual Tables on Physical Constants" (Princeton, N. J.).

#### CAREER

1930-33: Instructor, Polytechnic Institute, Warsaw.

1933: Research work, Radium Institute, Warsaw.

1934-36: Collaborated with Madame Curie and, after her death, with her daughter Irene, at Radium Institute, Paris.

1936-38: Collaborated with Mr. and Mrs. Joliot-Curie at Laboratory of Nuclear Chemistry, College of France, Paris.

1937-39: Associate professor in physical chemistry and nuclear physics, University of Warsaw.

1938-39: Research work Magnetic Institute, Academie des Sciences, Bellevue, France.

1939-40: Research work, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique Appliquee, Paris.

1940: Research work, Centre de Documentation, Ministere de l'Instruction Publique, Paris.

1941-42: Research assistant, University of Minnesota.

1942-44: Assistant professor, Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, N. Y.

1942-46: Professor, Ecole Libre des Hautes Etudes, New York.

1943: Attached to electrical engineering department, Ohio State University.

1944-46: Professor, Ohio State University, July 1944 to January 1, 1946.

1946: Chief American section, Foreign Ministry, Warsaw, July; alternate delegate, United Nations General Assembly, second part of first session, New York, October.

(The latest information the committee has regarding Dr. Zlotowski is that he is in Poland.)

#### LIEUTENANT COLONEL GUSTAW ALEF-BOLKOWIAK

Personal data: Born February 3, 1916, Lwow, Poland.

True name: Aleksiei Oyseevich FRUMKIN.

Served as Foreign Liaison Officer in the Polish Army under General Zymierski.

Officer of the NKVD; was active in the part of Poland occupied by the Soviets in 1939. In 1942 or 1943, was parachuted into Poland as an organizer of the Communist underground activities. He was appointed as a Lieutenant Colonel in the Soviet-sponsored Polish Army and, as Colonel Alef, was in charge of the Foreign Section of the Polish General Staff, organizing agencies of the Military Attachés at the Warsaw Government's legations and embassies abroad.

Left Poland on December 11, 1945, for England, and subsequently visited France, Germany, and Italy for conferences with Polish liaison officers and representatives of the Warsaw Government. Also visited Palestine during this assignment.

When in Palestine, Colonel Alef represented himself as an official of the Polish Government. He presented himself as a hero of the fighters of the Warsaw Ghetto during the German occupation.

He pretended in Palestine that he was active in the Jewish underground under the pseudonym "Bolek," but Jewish underground leaders from Warsaw, who are now in Palestine, denied his participation in the Warsaw Ghetto underground; later he was recognized by some Jewish refugees from Poland as former NKVD officer. The Jewish press in Palestine denounced him as a "representative of the NKVD" and his mission to Palestine ended with a discredit to the Warsaw government.

On February 26, 1946, was appointed Assistant Military Attaché of the Polish Embassy in Washington, D. C., where he remained until March 8, 1948, when he departed for Poland. He was then appointed Polish Military Attaché in Belgrade, Yugoslavia.

#### BRIGADIER GENERAL WACLAW KOMAR

Head of the Polish Intelligence of the General Staff, and a former commander of the 129th International Brigade in Spain.

No other information is available at this time on General Komar.

#### MARSHAL MICHAL ROLA-ZYMIERSKI

Personal data: Born September 4, 1890, Krakow, Poland, son of railroad conductor.

Education: Completed studies in middle school and studied law and political economy at Jagiellonski University of Krakow.

#### CAREER

1911-14: Reserve officer in Austrian Army.

1914: Active duty in Austrian Army.

1916: Joined Polish Legions, commanded Second Brigade. Changed original name of Lyzwinski to Zymierski.

1920: Fought in war against Russia, commanded Second Infantry Division of Polish Army.

1921: Continued military studies in Paris.  
 1924: Accepted post of Vice-Minister of War under Sikorski.  
 1926: Rebelled against Pilsudski. Sentenced to seven years' imprisonment.  
 1930: Released from prison.  
 1930-39: Resided in Paris.  
 1939: Returned to Poland and eventually joined the partisan movement as a private.  
 1944: Named Commander-in-Chief of Polish Armed Forces and Minister of National Defense by the Lublin Provisional Government, with rank of full General.  
 1945: Decreed a Marshal in May 1945. Named Minister of War of the new Government of National Unity in June 1945. Reportedly visited Russia in 1944, 1945, and 1948. Visited Yugoslavia in October 1946.

#### MAJOR GENERAL MARION SPYCHALSKI

Personal data: Born December 6, 1909, Lodz, Poland, son of workman father and peasant mother.

Education: Degree of Engineer, Warsaw Polytechnic.

#### CAREER

Prior to World War II was Chief of Planning Section of Municipality of Warsaw.

1941: Fought in underground movement.

1942: Chief of Staff, People's Army, with rank of colonel.

1944: Mayor of Warsaw. In November 1944, headed Polish delegation to Moscow.

1945: Promoted from colonel to brigadier general in February 1945. In March 1945, appointed Deputy Commander-in-Chief of Polish Army for political education. Present at signing of Soviet-Polish Treaty of Friendship in Moscow in April 1945. In July 1945, promoted from brigadier general to major general.

1946: Named First Vice-Minister of National Defense.

BRONISLAW KONSTANTINE (ALIAS BOLESLAW KONSTANTY GEBERT, ALIAS BOLESLAW GEBERT, ALIAS BILL K. GEBERT)

Personal data: Born July 22, 1894, Tatrowy, Poland.

#### CAREER

Member of National Committee, Communist Party of the United States.

Vice-President, International Workers' Order (IWO), New York; resigned August 11, 1947. President, Polonia Society (IWO), resigned August 11, 1947.

1947: Founder and editor, *Glos Ludowy* (People's Voice), Detroit, Michigan. Left United States for Poland, August 16, 1947. Secretary, Central Committee, Polish Trade Unions (KCZZ), Warsaw, appointed November 1947.

1948: Member, Organizational Committee, Eighth Polish Trade Union Congress, Warsaw, January 3, 1948. Visited Stockholm, Sweden, to study Swedish labor conditions. Alternate delegate, United Nations General Assembly, Third Session, Paris, France, September 1948.

1949: Deputy Secretary General, World Federation of Trade Unions, elected February 1, 1949, Warsaw, Poland.

#### LEO KRZYCKI

Personal data: Born August 10, 1881, Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Presently resides at 3360 South 37th Street, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

President, American Slav Congress.

Additional information on Leo Krzycki will be supplied at a future hearing.

#### GENERAL KAROL SWIERCZEWSKI

A Soviet citizen and member of the NKVD. He was known as "General Walter," as commander of a brigade in the Spanish Civil War. General Swierczewski was appointed by the Soviet Government as an officer in the Moscow-sponsored Polish Army. After his return from the United States he was killed by partisans in Poland.





WOJSKO POLSKIE

Nr 2/na Dowództwo  
Biuro Generalnego Adm. II

Nr 8344

14. 1944

INSTRUKCJA

Tajna

Egz. Nr. 1

DLA ATTACHE WOJSKOWEGO PRZY AMBASADZIE R.P. W WASHINGTONIE.

Polonia Stanów Zjednoczonych.

1. Stwierdzić i obserwować działalność polskich organizacji w Stanach Zjednoczonych. Szczególnie obserwować poprzez swoich "rezidentów" polskie organizacje reakcyjne, ustalić ich łączność z podobnymi kołami Londynu i stwierdzić ich ślady doprowadzające do Polski, jak drogi przesłuchania agentów i dywersantów.
2. Za pomocą ludzi oddanych idei demokratycznej utrzymywać kontakt z polskimi organizacjami demokratycznymi, podtrzymywać ich walkę przeciwko reakcji zmierzającą do stworzenia demokratycznego bloku całej Polonii. Akoja uświadamiająca i propagandowa winna zdemonstrować politykę kliki emigracyjnej, gdyż w jej rękach Polonia jest przedmiotem gry politycznej przeciwko Rządowi Jedności Narodowej. Wtym momencie w porzuceniu Polonii dla nas jest odwołanie się do pamięci Tadeusza Kościuszki. W tym roku obchodzić 200-tą rocznicę urodzin bohatera Polski i Ameryki.
3. Obserwować działalność polskich organizacji takich jak P.C.K. i różne Fundusze Społeczne. Określić ich stosunek do Polski i kół emigracyjnych. Dokład i jakimi sposobami rozprowadza się fundusze.
4. Stwierdzić zamiary organizacji międzynarodowych /UNRRA i Y.M.C.A./ w stosunku do Polski.
5. Stwierdzić stosunek Stanów Zjednoczonych i różnych ugrupowań politycznych do polskich organizacji demokratycznych i reakcyjnych. Ich stopień i formy podtrzymywania działalności polskiej reakcji.
6. Łączność polskich organizacji reakcyjnych w Stanach Zjednoczonych z kliką wojskową Andersa /działalność biura informacyjnego Matuszewskiego/.
7. Określić i obserwować stosunek finansjery amerykańskiej do Polonii i Kraju.
8. Poruszyć opinię amerykańską i Polonii ustępliwością amerykańskich władz okupacyjnych w Niemczech. Duży odsetek władz okupacyjnych - to byli emigranci niemieccy. Pod ich przykryciem prasa niemiecka w amerykańskiej strefie okupacyjnej ..//..

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2/14/44

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EXHIBIT 1

Page 2

prowadził zdecydowaną kampanię antypolską.

9. Biorąc za podstawę Netę Rządu Polskiego z dnia 14.2.46 r. przeprowadzić kampanię przeciwko tworzeniu przez władze amerykańskie polskich kompanii wartowniczych lub innych polskich jednostek wojskowych. Specjalnie podkreślić należy, że jest niedopuszczalnym aby ktokolwiek z tych jednostek nosił odznaki i dystynkcje Wojska Polskiego.

10. Zapewnić sobie możliwość otrzymywania poufnych wydawnictw politycznych szczególnie wydawanych przez Polonię.

W celu zdobycia informacji odnośnie powyższych kwestii zorganizować odpowiednią sieć informacyjną w skupiskach emigracji i siedzibach polskich organizacji. Wykorzystać trzeba w pierwszym rzędzie następujące organizacje demokratyczne:

- a/. Amerykańsko-Polska Rada Pracy, której prezesem jest członek partii socjalistycznej KRZYCKI Leon,
- b/. Stowarzyszenie Poloni przy Międzynarodowym Związku Robotników - prezes GEBERT Bolesław,
- c/. "Liga Kościuszkowska" z siedzibą w DETROIT /Michigan/,
- d/. Kongres Amerykańskich Słowian.

Powyższe organizacje nie zamykają listy organizacji demokratycznych, które są lojalnie ustosunkowane do Rządu Jedności Narodowej. Dla uzyskania pełnego oświetlenia działalności kół emigracyjno-reakcyjnych trzeba obowiązkowo mieć swoich informatorów w tychże organizacjach jak:

- a/. Związek Narodowy Polski, posiadający łączność z elementami sanacyjnymi w Polsce,
- b/. Zjednoczenie Polskie Rzymsko-Katolickie,
- c/. Inne organizacje korzystające z poparcia wpływowej części kolonii polskiej w Ameryce.

Celem walknięcia w wpływowe stowarzyszenia amerykańskie i zainteresowania poszczególnych grup problemem Polski należy wykorzystać elementy opozycyjne w stosunku do obecnego prezydenta.

Dla uzyskania rozległych informacji Attache zorganizuje sieć "rezydentów" na których nakłada obowiązek dostrzeżenia agentów.

Attache Wojskowy nie kontaktuje się bezpośrednio z agentami.

Odbito w 2-eh egz.  
Egz. Nr. 1. - adres.  
2. - a/a  
Spora. 13.3.46 r.  
I.S.



MINISTER OBRONY NARODOWEJ  
*Michał Żymierski*  
MICHAŁ ŻYMIERSKI  
KANCLERZ POLSKI

W.I.J.  
W.G.W.  
2/14/49

WOJSKO POLSKIE

Naczelne Dowództwo  
Szef Sztabu Armii I

Tajne

Egz. Nr. 1...

## INSTRUKCJA

O KOMPETENCYACH I ZAKRESIE DZIAŁALNOŚCI ATTACHE WOJSKOWEGO  
PRZY AMBASADZIE R.P. W WASHINGTONIE.

1. Attache Wojskowy przy Ambasadzie R.P. w Waszyngtonie podlega w zakresie reprezentacji i wystąpień politycznych Ambasadorowi R.P.  
Attache Wojskowy jest doradcą Ambasadora R.P. w zakresie spraw wojskowych.
2. Attache Wojskowy kieruje całokształtem prac w zakresie przedstawięlistwa wojskowego na terenie Stanów Zjednoczonych, w prasie swego 1-go z-cę przygotowuje zawieranie kontaktu z Kanadą, Argentyną i Brazylią, gdzie zostaną wysłani Attache Wojskowi.
3. Attache Wojskowy przezwycięża trudności bezpośredniej komunikacji Attacheatów poszczególnych państw północnej i południowej Ameryki z Krajem i jest odpowiedzialny, by w zadaniach kurierskich nie posługiwano się środkami obcych misji dyplomatycznych.
4. Attache Wojskowy wykonuje przez swego 1-go z-cę następujące prace:
  - kontroluje prace Attache Wojskowego w Meksyku,
  - zaopatruje ten Attacheat w materiały z Kraju,
  - zbiera i przekazuje korespondencję tego Attacheatu.
5. Wszystkie misje dyplomatyczne delegowane do Ameryki Północnej i Południowej będą przejeżdżały przez Waszyngton, udając się na miejsce przeznaczenia.  
Attache:
  - nawiązuje kontakt z Attache Wojskowym przydzielonym do tych misji,
  - przez swego 2-cę:
    - da poszczególnym Attacheom operatywne instrukcje, korzystając z doświadczenia, jakie uzyskał, przygotowując w tych krajach teren dla pracy Attacheatu,
    - ustali sposób kontroli pracy,
    - ustali sposób korespondencji.
6. Attache Wojskowy w Waszyngtonie współpracuje jaknajściślej z 1-mym z-cę, aby w razie nieobecności Attache ten ostatni mógł go zastępować.

M. M. 1946



MINISTER OBRONY NARODOWEJ

*Michał Ziemski*  
Michał Ziemski  
AMBASADA POLSKA

Odbite w 2-ach egz.

Egz. Nr 1 - adres

" " 2 - a/s

Sporz. 13.3.46 r.

A.L.

W.S.T.  
W.S.T.  
2/14/49

EXHIBIT 3  
Page 1

WOJSKO POLSKIE

Ministerstwo Spraw Wojskowych

Biuro Głównego Sztabu Wojskowego

22. marca 1944

INSTRUKCJA /ogólna/

DLA ABIAORA Wojskowego przy AMBASADACH R.P. W WARSZAWIE.

Wzrostają instrukcje /ogólna/, wydane dla Abiaora Wojskowego w STANACH ZJEDNOCZONYCH, omawiająca warunki pracy w wiadomości i podaje zasadnicze kwestie w których należy informować II-ji Oddziału Int.Gen.R.P. Podaje również niektóre metody i formy prowadzenia pracy. Metody i formy omawiane w Abiaorze Wojskowego będą uzupełnione od warunków pracy, sytuacji wewnętrznej Kraju i osobistych walorów wykonawcy.

LINIE WYKONANIA STANÓW ZJEDNOCZONYCH.Żył Brońsze Stanów Zjednoczonych.A. Lotnictwo.

- 1/ Ogólna ilość formacji lotniczych i ich dylokacja, bojowy i ilościowy stan formacji /ludzi i sprzętu/ a/ n/5 stopa, b/ stan faktyczny.
- 2/ Typy samolotów posiadanych na obszarze formacji lotniczych i ich charakterystyka a/ konstrukcyjna, b/ bojowa. Ilość samolotów 1-iej i 2-iej linii.
- 3/ Możliwość potencjalne rozwoju formacji lotniczych. a/ materiał ludzki, b/ produkcja sprzętu lotniczego. Ilość i kierunek eksportu samolotów.
- 4/ Dylokacja zasobników i sprzętów lotniczych, ich wyposażenie techniczne i charakterystyka.
- 5/ Sprób naprowadzania personelu i samolotów lotniczych, program i okres nauki.
- 6/ Lotnictwo cywilne.
- 7/ Dwa typy samolotów.
- 8/ Dwa egzemplarze techniczne z samolotów lotniczych, pokładowe i jedne z samolotów: dane techniczne i rozmiar możliwości. Rozmiar, kierunek pracy lotniczej z ludźmi i sprzętem samolotów i samolotów bez pilotów.
- 9/ Regulacyjny bojowy i naprowadzanie lotnicze z innymi rodzajami broni.

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EXHIBIT 3  
Page 23. Wojska lądowe

1. Piechota: stan liczebny, dyslokacja, organizacja, regulamin bojowy, siła ognia, stan wyszkolenia, uzbrojenie, stan moralny i wojenny, korpus oficerów. Rola i znaczenie piechoty w ogólnych siłach zbrojnych, czy istnieje tendencja zwiększenia tej roli i ilościowego rozmieszczenia się piechoty - tendencja odwrotna czy też status quo.
2. Artyleria i wojska pancernie. Organizacja, dyslokacja, stan wyszkolenia, regulaminy bojowe, uzbrojenie /dane techniczne, bojowe, charakterystyka i.t.d./, Rozmiar produkcji i stosunków "v-1", "v-2". Rola i znaczenie artylerii i wojsk pancernych w ogólnych siłach zbrojnych, czy istnieje tendencja zwiększenia wagi i znaczenia tych broni w stosunku do innych - tendencja odwrotna czy też status quo.
3. Wojska powietrzne i łączności. Organizacja, stan wyszkolenia, wyposażenie techniczne, charakterystyka sprzętu. Czy istnieje tendencja rozmieszczenia czy też zmniejszenia roli i ilości tych wojsk w ogólnych siłach zbrojnych.
4. Służba sanitarna. Organizacja, nowe metody leczenia i.t.d.

4. Marynarka wojenna

1. Ogólna charakterystyka floty wojennej /podwodnej i nadwodnej/.
2. Tonnaj floty w roku bieżącym. Straty poniesione w czasie wojny.
3. Ilość jednostek bojowych w/g kategorii - wyporność, siła i klasa okrętów.
4. Organizacja jednostek marynarki wojennej.
5. Zaopatrzenie bazy morskiej Floty wojennej i charakterystyka.
6. Stosunki - techniczne wyposażenie, ilość żołdów, ich moralność.
7. Plan budowy nowych jednostek floty.

5. Jednostki chemiczne

1. Organizacja i dyslokacja jednostek chemicznych.
2. Typy używanego uzbrojenia i ich niemożliwość właściwości bojowe.
3. Nowe wynalazki broni chemicznych, ich charakterystyka i wpływ na charakter przyszłej wojny.

6. Wyszkolenie poza wojskowe

1. Wyszkolenie wojskowe w szkołach i innych instytucjach. Program szkolenia, jakie wzięły pod uwagę się szkoleniu bojowemu w outlookach programu ogólnego.

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2. Kola i organizacje i stowarzyszenia z charakterem politycznym;  
wiek członków: 18 lat i więcej. Wiek członków: 18 lat i więcej.

## F. A. M. S. G. M. P. C. O. R. I. O. N. E.

1. Společnost nametávacího materiálu vyrobila 100 kusů, z nichž 20 kusů bylo  
kvalitní, zbytek vadný.
2. Dýslova je 1 nametávací jednotka.
3. Dýslova je 1 kusom vrchního materiálu.

US 6,000,000

1. Strefa polityczna /złoty mostowy/.
2. Kształna władza ustawodawcza i wykonawcza.
3. Prawo wyborcze.
4. Podział administracyjny.
5. Ilość członków w parlamencie /Izba Reprezentantów i Senat/.
6. Zakres działalności Sekretarstwa Stanu, Rada Ministrów, Kongresu.
7. Stosunek poszczególnych władz i ich zakres do władz państwowych.
8. Nazwiska najważniejszych przedstawicieli władz państwowych.
9. Polityczne prawa i obowiązki.

**Synonym:** *Helicoverpa*.

1. Prowadzić badania, regulować tryb obywateli.
2. Jak najmniej reagować na skargi i uwagi i nieporozumienia.
3. Wstrzymać i pogodzić politycznych przeciwników wrocie bud-  
żetu.
4. Rządzić, system planowy, oświatowy.
5. Głównym trybem i kierownictwem.
6. Stworzyć, demokratyzację, systemy - i jak nie ma systemu.
7. Zarząd polityczny, forma rządowa polityczna, system  
rządu na ludność.

[illegible]

1. *Bostrychia australis*, Kuhn, *Icones fungorum*, 1911, p. 111, fig. 111.
2. *Bostrychia australis*, Kuhn, *Icones fungorum*, 1911, p. 111, fig. 111.
3. *Bostrychia australis*, Kuhn, *Icones fungorum*, 1911, p. 111, fig. 111.
4. *Bostrychia australis*, Kuhn, *Icones fungorum*, 1911, p. 111, fig. 111.
5. *Bostrychia australis*, Kuhn, *Icones fungorum*, 1911, p. 111, fig. 111.

1. *Chlorophyllum* *chlorophyllum*, a greenish-yellow, crystalline substance, soluble in alcohol, ether, and chloroform.
2. *Chlorophyllum* *chlorophyllum*, a greenish-yellow, crystalline substance, soluble in alcohol, ether, and chloroform.
3. *Chlorophyllum* *chlorophyllum*, a greenish-yellow, crystalline substance, soluble in alcohol, ether, and chloroform.
4. *Chlorophyllum* *chlorophyllum*, a greenish-yellow, crystalline substance, soluble in alcohol, ether, and chloroform.
5. *Chlorophyllum* *chlorophyllum*, a greenish-yellow, crystalline substance, soluble in alcohol, ether, and chloroform.

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6. Budowa nowych zakładów przemysłowych /zwłaszcza wojskowych/.
7. Osiągnięcia techniczne w przemyśle.
8. Wyszkoli konstruktorów, inżynierów naukowych i laboratoriów.

#### Podvoiki.

1. Organizacja polityczek państwowych, w jakim celu, na jakich warunkach, teraźnia i wysokość polityczki.
2. Sposób rozpraszania bomb politycznych w społeczeństwie.
3. Jak reaguje społeczeństwo na ogłoszenia polityczki.
4. Loteria fantowa i podobne.

#### Radion ogólnodostępne, wysyłane i obrotowe.

1. Prędkość umiarkowanie czytania i pisanie. System umiarkowania. Długość - ilość słuchaczy.
2. Wykazanie, naświetlenie polityczki w literaturze, muzyce i filmie.
3. Sposób czytania i słuchania.
4. Sposób tworzenia w kraju polityczki i wiadomości publicznych.
5. Wykazanie, naświetlenie polityczki w literaturze, muzyce. Sposób tworzenia i kompetencje radion w tym zakresie.

#### Sposób poruszania się w kraju.

1. Zarządzenie i metody, regulujące poruszanie się w kraju, zwłaszcza w stracie granicznej/.
2. Dokumenty potrzebne w podróży w kraju i w wyjazdach zagranicą.
3. Sposób wykonywania dokumentów podróży /np: bilety/ i ich ceny.
4. Kontrola władz kolejowych i towarzystw okrętowych. Rozkład jazdy pociągów osobowych na najważniejszych liniach.
5. Przechowywanie bagażu, bagażnicy, restauracje, hotele - sposób postępowania.
6. Sposób postępowania z wiadomościami, telegramami, telefonami i t.p.

#### Wzrost polityczki ogólnodostępnej.

1. Ogólna ilość ogólnodostępnej.
2. Dokumenty i postępowanie władz w stosunku do ogólnodostępnej, ich prawa polityczne. Najbardziej uprawnione osoby.
3. Stosunek władz i ogólnodostępnej do ogólnodostępnej polityczki.
4. Dokumenty potrzebne i wymagające na ogólnodostępnej. Sposób ich otrzymywania.
5. Metody ogólnodostępnej polityczki i pracy dla ogólnodostępnej.
6. Sposób otrzymywania polityczki i wymaganej dla ogólnodostępnej.

#### Wzrost polityczki ogólnodostępnej, polityczki, polityczki i t.p.

1. Wzrost polityczki i polityczki w wyjazdach polityczki polityczki.

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nianych zakładów dla obywateli i cudzoziemców.

#### Abonamenty radiowe.

1. Warunki nabycia i korzystania z aparatów radiowych.
2. Ilość radiabonentów, sposoby i warunki rejestracji, warunki odbioru i nadawania na własnych aparatach.
3. Ilość szkół radiowych, termin nauki, jakich fachowców szkoli. Warunki przyjęcia do szkół dla obywateli i cudzoziemców.

#### POLITYKA ZAGRANICZNA.

1. Tendencje w polityce międzynarodowej i orientacje poszczególnych polityków.
2. Układy międzynarodowe /jawne i tajne/ o charakterze politycznym i wojskowym oraz ekonomicznym.
3. Stopień zainteresowania poszczególnych warstw społecznych polityką zagraniczną.
4. Wpływy i zależności polityki innych państw. /Anglii, ZSRR i t.d./.
5. Polityka kolonialna.
6. Akredytowanie obojch przedstawicielstw misji, Konferencje prasowe.
7. Kredyty o znaczeniu ekonomicznym i wojskowym, udzielane innym państwom - wysokość, termin i warunki spłaty.

#### Tworzenie Rezydentur

Tworząc sieć informacyjną, należy zwrócić uwagę na to, aby sieć ta była siornowana z osobnych nie świadomych ze sobą rezydentur i aby miała oddzielnych informatorów. Szczególną uwagę należy zwrócić na dobranie rezydentów i zorganizowanie takiego aparatu, który byłby ruchliwy, operatywny i miał możliwość dostarczania odpowiednich informacji, stosownie do otrzymanego zadania.

Przeprowadzanie organizacji placówek elecie rezydentom. Skład rezydentur powinien być minimalny i nie należy zbyt nie rozszerzać sieci informacyjnych kosztem ilości informatorów. Rozszerzanie sieci informacyjnych może spowodować wejście na jej ślad i sbytnię nieruchomości, a tym samym istność jej wykrycia.

Do pracy wywiadowczej angażować ludzi wysoko postawionych i o szerokich znajomościach towarzyskich, mogących dostarczać materiały wywiadowcze.

Wybór rezydenta powinno wyprzedzić gruntowne i wszechstronne zbadanie jego działalności, pozycji towarzyskiej, przekonań politycznych oraz ujemnych i dodatnich stron jego charakteru.

Zbadanie osłowiaste może być przeprowadzone drogą:

- a/ osobistej obserwacji, w kontaktach służbowych i przypadkowych spotkaniach towarzyskich.
- b/ zapoznania się z opinią jego środowiska i jego politycznej działalności.

Tworzenie rezydentur dokonywać w zależności od wytyczonego celu i poprzednio ustalonego zadania.

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Nie angażować do pracy wywiadowczej ludzi przypadkowych i niedoświadczonych.

Postępowanie w werbowaniu może doprowadzić do niepożądanych rezultatów. Należy pamiętać, że dobór kadr wpływa na sukces pracy wywiadowczej.

#### ORGANIZACJA ŁĄCZNOŚCI

##### 1. Wewnątrz rezydentur /placówek/.

Łączność w rezydenturach utrzymuje się tylko z góry w dół. Każdy członek rezydentury zna tylko swego bezpośredniego przełożonego i osobnika, z którym jest związany w pracy /łącznika, gospodarza sakonspiratorskiego lokalu/ w zależności od warunków.

Do równoległej łączności między poszczególnymi informatorami, względnie członkami rezydentur nie wolno dopuszczać. Rezydent kieruje pracą swojej placówki przez:

- osobiste wskazówki,
- łączników,
- skrzynkę pocztową.

Wybór sposobu utrzymania łączności w każdym oddzielnym wypadku, będzie zależał od charakteru wykonawcy i warunków lokalnych.

Należy unikać częstych spotkań rezydenta z informatorami, jeżeli nie są związane między sobą służbą względnie stosunkami przyjacielskimi.

##### 2. Łączność Attache Wojskowego z rezydentami.

Attache Wojskowy kieruje pracami rezydentów przez osobiste spotkania z nimi albo pośrednio przez ludzi zaufanych. Reszta członków rezydentury nie powinna znać swego "gospodarza" /Attache/.

Attache Wojskowy powinien unikać częstych spotkań z rezydentami w publicznych miejscach i punktach nie mających nic wspólnego z oficjalnymi wystąpieniami Attache Wojskowego. Spotkania w miejscach, w których Attache nie występuje służbowo służyć osobom zaufanym po uprzednim opracowaniu spotkania. Szczególną uwagę zwrócić na wybór miejsca spotkania jak również na ustalenie hasła. Spotkania dostosować do warunków miejscowych, niedopuszczać do niepożądanych i lekkomyślnych spotkań organizacyjnych.

#### KONSPIRACJA PRACY

Passport dyplomatyczny i warunki oficjalnego pobytu Attache Wojskowego, oczywiście oddziałają na prowadzenie pracy wywiadowczej i stwarzają pewny "dach" nieoficjalnej działalności wywiadowczej. Jednak należy pamiętać, że Attache będzie znajdował się pod stałą i ścisłą kontrolą ze strony kontrwywiadu i kół reakcyjnych polskiej emigracji i b. agencje londyńskiego rządu. Dlatego Attache powinien kontrolować swoją działalność w/g instrukcji wywiadowczej. Niepoinformować w pracy bezpośrednio lub pośrednio ludzi, nie mających żadnej styczności ze służbą wywiadowczą.

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Specjalną uwagę zwrócić na wezwanie ludzi do służby wywiadowczej. Dotychczas proponując werbunkową dawać później t.j. po dokładnym zbadaniu danego osobnika i próbnym okresie w którym powinien straszyć zadania odebrane, nie mając charakteru wywiadowczego.

Praktyka pokazuje, że niektórzy nasi oficjalni przedstawiciele, z lekkomyślnością organizowali pracę wywiadowczą, nie były powściągliwi odnosili się do zagadnienia werbowania, organizowali spotkania t.j. b. Wyjawiali swą działalność przed pracownikami poselstwa, nie mającymi nic wspólnego z naszą pracą i rezultatów działalności dochodził do wiadomości niepożądanych osób.

Taki pracownik okazywał się skompromitowany i powinien opuścić posterunek dyplomatyki. Dlatego też, Attaché powinien mieć swą działalność z punktu widzenia konspiracji i wychodzić z tego założenia. Musi wypracować swój plan działania. Stała uciekać instrukcji i kontrolować działalność tym, którym powierzył wykonanie określonych zadań. Tylko stała kontrola swojej działalności i działalności powierzonych mu osób, samoli Attaché są w stanie dobrze prowadzić wywiad i niepożądanie skompromitowania się.



*Handwritten signature: Naczelnik*  
*Handwritten initials: JH*

Wzrost 1.75 m.  
Ciężar ciała 60 kg.  
Ciężar ciała 60 kg.  
Ciężar ciała 60 kg.  
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WOJSKO POLSKIE

Naczelne Dowództwo

Szef Główny Oddział II

Nr. 035/2

7 27. 6. 1946

EXHIBIT 4

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T a j a s e

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ATTACHE WOJSKOWY

przy AMBASADZIE R.P. W WASHINGTONIE

Gen. Dym. W O D B L S K I

1. Sprawa pobytu BORA-KOMOROWSKIEGO w St. Zjednoczonych. Na skutek pierwszych konkretnych wiadomości o pobycie BORA w St. Zjednoczonych, M.S.Z. wystosowało do Ambasady St. Zjednoczonych ostry protest przeciwko występowaniu tych czynników urzędowych St. Zjedn., która coraz wyraźniej zaczęła tej wiary nadawać charakter oficjalny. Do tej pory Rząd St. Zjednoczonych nie zareagował ani na naszą Notę, ani nie wpłynął na zmianę nastawienia swoich czynników oficjalnych w stosunku do Bora. Dowodem tego, że Bora traktuje się jeszcze jako "Naczelny Wódz" i oficjalnego przedstawiciela nie uznawanej i nie reprezentowanej grupy emigracyjnej jest m.in. fakt przyjęcia go przez gen. RISENOWERA - nie wyszczególniając pozatym całej jego aktywności wykazywanej przy poparciu Związku Narodowego Polski między 3 maja b.r. a obecnie. Na podstawie innych wiadomości jest mi wiadomym, że wojskowa grupa emigracyjna dały również do pozyskania opinii i uznania dla swoich zamiarów w niektórych państwach Ameryki Południowej. Głównym celem tej akcji Bora, wydaje się być - chęć utrzymania nie rozdzielonych jednostek wojskowych poza zasięgiem wpływów i obserwacji Kraju przez zachowanie dynamicznego ośrodka reakcyjnego. Powyższa akcja nie napotyka do tej pory na poważniejsze trudności. Wprost przeciwnie - wystąpienie senatora THOMASA przewodniczącego senackiej komisji wojskowej, potwierdza, że sprawa przyjęcia przez dowództwo amerykańskie oddziałów Polskich na Zachodzie Europy, może się stać rzeczywistością. Tej akcji musimy się przeciwstawić z wyłączeniem całej energii. W dyspozycji Ob. Generała stoją następujące środki przeciwdziałania:
  - a/ zażądanie wyjaśnienia i określenia przez Ministerstwo Wojny, w jakim charakterze najwyższe czynniki wojskowe pojmują Bora, oraz zażądanie poinformowania, jakie oficjalne rozmowy przeprowadzone z Borem i stopień zaangażowania Ministerstwa Wojny w planie Bora, o oddaniu oddziałów polskich sił zbrojnych pod dowództwo amerykańskie. Żądanie to znajduje pełne uzasadnienie, swatywszy, iż w grę wchodzi Polacy, pełniący służbę w jednostkach polskich i będących w dużym procencie w wieku poborowym.
  - b/ Nawiązanie bezpośrednich i pośrednich kontaktów z tymi członkami Kongresu i Senatu, którzy przeciwdziałają się idei przyjęcia oddziałów polskich pod dowództwo amerykańskie, podtrzymując i dopingując ich w wystąpieniach na ten temat.
  - c/ We współdziałaniu z Attache Prasowym Ambasady, publikować artykuły w amerykańskiej prasie polskiej, podające w prawdziwym świetle postać Bora na tle:

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EXHIBIT 4  
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- powstania warszawskiego,
  - działalności W.S.Z. w Kraju i kontaktów emigracyjnego dowództwa wojskowego z nimi,
  - spowodowanego rozbroja jednostki narodu.
2. Następnym zagadnieniem zasadniczej wagi - to sprawa polyczki amerykańskiej dla naszego Rządu. Nie jest to wprowadzić zagadnieniem wchodzącym w zakres Waszej działalności, jednak autorytetowi Waszego stopnia i funkcji, jak również Waszej powadze przypisuję nie mniejsze znaczenie niż fachowym przedsięwzięciom specjalistów. Dlatego też pragnęlbym, aby Ob.General dołączył swoje wysiłki do wysiłków innych osób, pracujących zasadniczo na tym odcinku. Rozmowy na temat polityki zostały podjęte ponownie. Celem jej sfinalizowania i osiągnięcia najlepszych warunków, należy odpowiednio urobić opinię amerykańską, a przede wszystkim koła zainteresowane w niej, t.j. wyższe sfery wojskowe, przemysłowców i finansjerę. Na tym odcinku pragnę zwrócić uwagę na znaczenie osobistego oddziaływania "zainteresowanych" kołach. W tej akcji korzystając z współpracy z Attaché Francuskim, należy się posługiwać konkretnymi materiałami jakie znajdują się w Jego dyspozycji.
  3. Wśród wszystkich zagadnień opracowywanych w zakresie prac Attaché na terenie St.Zjednoczonych, pragnę zwrócić uwagę na znaczenie problemów związanych z przemysłem amerykańskim. Wyszczególnienie tych problemów będących dla nas o zasadniczym znaczeniu, zostało podane w instrukcji.
  4. Do niniejszej poczty zostały dołączone dwa ordery, które proszę przesłać do mjr. KLONOWSKIEGO. Są to dwa krzyże przyznane dwóm obywatelom meksykańskim, Ob.SYLBESTRE OTTE i Ob.Nestor SANCHEZ FERNANDES, za ich pracę i zasługi oddane w Brygadzie im.J.Dąbrowskiego, w czasie walk w Hiszpanii. Mjr. KLONOWSKI powinien udekorować obu meksykańczyków w ramach najbliższej uroczystości państwowej.
  5. W sprawie listy oficerów amerykańskich /przysłanej przez płk. Aleja/, proponowanych przez Ob. KMECIEKA do odznaczenia orderami polskimi podaję, że lista ta została już przekazana do rozpatrzenia i ewentualnego zatwierdzenia.
  6. Dalszy pracownik dla Attache'atu już został wyznaczony i w najkrótszym czasie zostanie odkomenderowany do Waszej dyspozycji. Jest nim mjr.KIERTS - znający bardzo dobrze język angielski jak i St.Zjednoczonych.
  7. Płk. ALEP zwrócił się z prośbą o nadesłanie do Attache'atu kompletu orderów i odznaczeń polskich dla celów propagandowych. Ponieważ do tej chwili nie zostały mi wszystkie odznaczenia dostarczone - czekam do czasu ich skompletowania, po czym je wyślę.

Odbito w 3 egz.  
Kop. Nr. 1 - adres  
" " 2 - a/arch.  
" " 3 - a/a  
Bpory. K.B.  
24.6.46 r.  
Druk. B.I.  
Nr. 44.26.

Sędz. O. 11. 11. 11. W. P.



WOJSKO POLSKIE

Ministerstwo Obrony  
Biuro Głównego Oficera

02/1

13

8

1946

ATTACHE WOJSKOWY

PREZYDENCJATAM B.P. W WASHINGTONIE  
Gen. dyw. M O D E L S K I

T a j a c e

Egz. Nr. 1.

Celem rozpracowania zagadnienia emigracji polskiej w poszczególnych krajach Europy i poza Europą, należy nam dostarczyć potrzebny materiał wg poniżej podanego schematu:

- 1/ Ogólna ilość emigrantów z podziałem na:
  - a/ emigrację w przed 1939 r.,
  - b/ " " po 1939 r.,
  - c/ oddziaływanie nowej emigracji na starą,
  - d/ Polaków - obywateli polskich,
    - obywateli danego państwa, ale z pochodzących polskiej przynależności narodowej,
    - zasymilowanych.
- 2/ Układ społeczny:
  - a/ wieś /rolnicy, robotnicy rolni/,
  - b/ przemysł,
  - c/ handel,
  - d/ wolne zawody
 warunki, stopa życiowa, stosunki między grupami społecznymi.
- 3/ Stosunek emigracji do ustroju i społeczeństwa miejscowego oraz traktowanie emigracji przez władze i społeczeństwo.
- 4/ Organizacje polityczne: program, stan ilościowy, stosunek do innych partii i do Rządu J.N.
- 5/ Organizacje: zawodowe, społeczne, kulturalne - stosunek do Rządu Jedności Narodowej.
- 6/ Rozmieszczenie /większe sgrupowania/, znaczenie lokalne i ogólne, w danym kraju.
- 7/ Przegląd grup, organizacji, jednostek:
  - a/ współpracujących z Rz. J.N.
  - b/ przychylonych
  - c/ wrogich
- 8/ Możliwości użycia emigracji /emigrantów/ dla:
  - celów politycznych,
  - " - wywiadu.
- 9/ Kartaoteka wybitniejszych osobistości.

Odbito w 10 egz.

Egz. Nr. 1 - Sam. roads.

10- a/e

Spors. L. E. 10. 8. 46 r.

Druk. B. I. Nr. 44. 21.

Siedz. Oddz. II B. Gen. W. P.

M. J. K.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Zachodziłoby pytanie, do jakiego stopnia S.T.  
choć wyraża jedność i wyrażał powrotem celom organizmowi. Zatem  
Zachodziłoby od wejścia polskiego do tego pojęcia.  
Cela mianem osobistych kontaktów i obliczenia między  
I S.T.

PMR. Pochłoty kontaktuje Washington w tej sprawie.  
Czekamy odpowiedzi.

Jeśli modelis grąpiasiarscia odpowiedz proci odpowiednia  
interwencje. Zalechy nam na wyjezdzie naszego generała w pociągach  
własnie.

### References

27.4250

22.8405

Rozwyfrowano 22.8.46r 5.15.35

Rogersview **Brook**

English: 10

Figure 1. The effect of the concentration of the inhibitor on the rate of polymerization.

mean  $\pm$  SD

IV-5



WOJSKO POLSKIE

University of Illinois at Chicago

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216-217-218-219-220-221-222-223-224-225-226-227-228-229-230-231-232-233-234-235-236-237-238-239-240-241-242-243-244-245-246-247-248-249-250-251-252-253-254-255-256-257-258-259-260-261-262-263-264-265-266-267-268-269-270-271-272-273-274-275-276-277-278-279-280-281-282-283-284-285-286-287-288-289-290-291-292-293-294-295-296-297-298-299-300-301-302-303-304-305-306-307-308-309-310-311-312-313-314-315-316-317-318-319-320-321-322-323-324-325-326-327-328-329-330-331-332-333-334-335-336-337-338-339-340-341-342-343-344-345-346-347-348-349-350-351-352-353-354-355-356-357-358-359-360-361-362-363-364-365-366-367-368-369-370-371-372-373-374-375-376-377-378-379-380-381-382-383-384-385-386-387-388-389-390-391-392-393-394-395-396-397-398-399-400-401-402-403-404-405-406-407-408-409-410-411-412-413-414-415-416-417-418-419-420-421-422-423-424-425-426-427-428-429-430-431-432-433-434-435-436-437-438-439-440-441-442-443-444-445-446-447-448-449-450-451-452-453-454-455-456-457-458-459-460-461-462-463-464-465-466-467-468-469-470-471-472-473-474-475-476-477-478-479-480-481-482-483-484-485-486-487-488-489-490-491-492-493-494-495-496-497-498-499-500-501-502-503-504-505-506-507-508-509-510-511-512-513-514-515-516-517-518-519-520-521-522-523-524-525-526-527-528-529-530-531-532-533-534-535-536-537-538-539-540-541-542-543-544-545-546-547-548-549-550-551-552-553-554-555-556-557-558-559-560-561-562-563-564-565-566-567-568-569-570-571-572-573-574-575-576-577-578-579-580-581-582-583-584-585-586-587-588-589-590-591-592-593-594-595-596-597-598-599-600-601-602-603-604-605-606-607-608-609-610-611-612-613-614-615-616-617-618-619-620-621-622-623-624-625-626-627-628-629-630-631-632-633-634-635-636-637-638-639-640-641-642-643-644-645-646-647-648-649-650-651-652-653-654-655-656-657-658-659-660-661-662-663-664-665-666-667-668-669-670-671-672-673-674-675-676-677-678-679-680-681-682-683-684-685-686-687-688-689-690-691-692-693-694-695-696-697-698-699-700-701-702-703-704-705-706-707-708-709-710-711-712-713-714-715-716-717-718-719-720-721-722-723-724-725-726-727-728-729-730-731-732-733-734-735-736-737-738-739-740-741-742-743-744-745-746-747-748-749-750-751-752-753-754-755-756-757-758-759-760-761-762-763-764-765-766-767-768-769-770-771-772-773-774-775-776-777-778-779-780-781-782-783-784-785-786-787-788-789-790-791-792-793-794-795-796-797-798-799-800-801-802-803-804-805-806-807-808-809-810-811-812-813-814-815-816-817-818-819-820-821-822-823-824-825-826-827-828-829-830-831-832-833-834-835-836-837-838-839-840-841-842-843-844-845-846-847-848-849-850-851-852-853-854-855-856-857-858-859-860-861-862-863-864-865-866-867-868-869-870-871-872-873-874-875-876-877-878-879-880-881-882-883-884-885-886-887-888-889-890-891-892-893-894-895-896-897-898-899-900-901-902-903-904-905-906-907-908-909-910-911-912-913-914-915-916-917-918-919-920-921-922-923-924-925-926-927-928-929-930-931-932-933-934-935-936-937-938-939-940-941-942-943-944-945-946-947-948-949-950-951-952-953-954-955-956-957-958-959-960-961-962-963-964-965-966-967-968-969-970-971-972-973-974-975-976-977-978-979-980-981-982-983-984-985-986-987-988-989-990-991-992-993-994-995-996-997-998-999-1000-1001-1002-1003-1004-1005-1006-1007-1008-1009-1010-1011-1012-1013-1014-1015-1016-1017-1018-1019-1020-1021-1022-1023-1024-1025-1026-1027-1028-1029-1030-1031-1032-1033-1034-1035-1036-1037-1038-1039-1040-1041-1042-1043-1044-1045-1046-1047-1048-1049-1050-1051-1052-1053-1054-1055-1056-1057-1058-1059-1060-1061-1062-1063-1064-1065-1066-1067-1068-1069-1070-1071-1072-1073-1074-1075-1076-1077-1078-1079-1080-1081-1082-1083-1084-1085-1086-1087-1088-1089-1090-1091-1092-1093-1094-1095-1096-1097-1098-1099-1100-1101-1102-1103-1104-1105-1106-1107-1108-1109-1110-1111-1112-1113-1114-1115-1116-1117-1118-1119-1120-1121-1122-1123-1124-1125-1126-1127-1128-1129-1130-1131-1132-1133-1134-1135-1136-1137-1138-1139-1140-1141-1142-1143-1144-1145-1146-1147-1148-1149-1150-1151-1152-1153-1154-1155-1156-1157-1158-1159-1160-1161-1162-1163-1164-1165-1166-1167-1168-1169-1170-1171-1172-1173-1174-1175-1176-1177-1178-1179-1180-1181-1182-1183-1184-1185-1186-1187-1188-1189-1190-119

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ST. LOUIS, Mo., July 27 (AP)—

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1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 2679, 26

1. Reprezentanci społeczni i polityczni Filipin w Waszyngtonie poinformowali nas bardzo powściągliwie.  
Z laudacji kłódną posiadane przez nas materiały wykazywały raczej to, że nieśmiałość Filipin, osłabienie proklamowana oficjalnie w dniu 28 sierpnia b.r. przez rząd Stanów Zjednoczonych, w gruncie rzeczy jest bardzo problematyczna jeśli nie zupełnie fikcyjna, że wykazywały wręcz w pewnym sensie i z Waszego raportu, gdzie pisałeś, że kraj nieśmiały bogaty w złoża kopaliniane - i nieśmiało jednak uboga i ciężko pracująca.  
Jeśli chodzi o "Guerilla" oceniana jest, jako ruch wywołujący kolonialnego narodu.  
Ponieważ mamy w pewnym sensie sprzeczne informacje, prosimy Was o głębszą i obiektywną analizę sytuacji w tym kraju, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem nastrojów ogółu ludności.
2. W sprawie odnawiania kpt. SAMPOBANA z Armii St. Zjednoczonych porównaliśmy się z Min. Kultury i Sztuki. Ministerstwo przekazało sprawnie Generalnej Dyrekcji Musulów i Ochrony Zabytków do pożytecznego zaistnienia.
3. Terminacja Wasza na Ateneo Itonilago i ptk. ALEPA na zastępco zastąpiła udeślniając jak również sprawnie mechanizm lotniskowego błądów - zastąpiła zgodnie z Waszym życzeniem.
4. W odpowiedzi na zapytanie ptk. ALEPA powiedzieliśmy, że pociski polowa 70603 D zostały zniszczone na "W. 2694" Eraseg. Błask" i pod tym adresem mogą być kierowane listy.  
Natomiast jednostka 51809 jest reorganizowana. Niejako dokładnie dane osób/nazwiska, indg. Sata i Adejeda wrościnia, data zasilizowania/ do których były kierowane Korepondencje obywatelskie, możemy milować odznaczyć ich w Polsce i podać ewentualnie ich adresy osobom zainteresowanym w St. Zjednoczonych.
5. Poprawki na poprawkach generalistycznych nie są jeszcze ukończono.
6. Szeregularz księgi Stramer - Wzrostowa będzie wstawiać.

Genf Oddy, II. Sci. Gen. W. P.

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472 J. J. J. J. J.



KOD. IT 3

WYDZIAŁ POLSKIEJ  
AMBASADY W WASHINGTON

Warszawa, dnia

19 6

ATTACHE WOJSKOWY przy AMBASADzie N.P.  
w Waszyngtonie.

Gen. Izw. M O D E L S K I

Polecałem II Viceministrowi Obrony Narodowej  
Generalowi Broni Karolowi Swieroszewskiemu prze-  
prowadzenie inspekcji dotykającej pracy Waszego  
Attache'atu.

W związku z tym, rośnięuję Was ściśle zastosować  
się do instrukcji i słów Gen. Broni Swieroszewskiego.



MINISTER OBRONY NARODOWEJ  
*Michał Żymierski*  
Michał Żymierski  
MARZALEC POLSKI

WYSTĘP POLSKIEGO  
WYŚWIETLENIA

EXHIBIT 9  
Page 1

Przebieg, daty "40" grudnia 1947

T a j a s

Reg. Nr...

ATTACHE WOJSKOWY  
Przy AMBASADZIE R.P. w WASHINGTONIE  
Gen. Bp. MODELSKI

Dostarczając Ważne dotychczasowe raporty, muszę stwierdzić, że są one chaotyczne i mało wartościowe zarówno pod względem treści jak i układu.

Sposób tematycznego ujęcia zagadnień poruszonych w raportach świadczy, że ulegacie wpływowi środowiska, tracąc w znacznym stopniu poczucie obiektywizmu w realnej ocenie sytuacji i datów polityki amerykańskiej.

Byłoby rzeczą ze waszechniar wskazać, byście rozpoznawali zjawiska, docierając do ich źródła, a oceniali je spokojnie, z umiarem, z pewnej odległości, wolni od nawyków myślowych świata wielkapoczątkowego.

Wtedy, materiały Wasze rzucą nam prawdziwe światło na te zagadnienia, które nas interesują.

Praca Wasza winna polegać na waszechnym zbieraniu wiadomości i informacji, niezależnie od odnośnika Polonii Amerykańskiej, o całokształcie życia wojskowego, gospodarczego i politycznego St. Zjednoczonych.

Raporty Wasze winny być nacechowane obiektywnością i mają zawierać rzeczowe informacje i sprawozdanie wiadomości.

Zwracam uwagę, że podług Waszym zadaniem, jest śledzenie rozwoju życia wojskowego St. Zjednoczonych, mając na względzie przede wszystkim kierunki szkolenia, organizacji i umbrojenia jednostek z wojskami Federalnej Gwardii Narodowej włącznie.

verte

- 2 -

E-Z-N-IT  
nr 2

Tym więc zagadnieniom należy poświęcić w pierwszym rzędzie uwagę i gros pracy Attache'atu.

Pozatym, Wasz wyjazd na Filipiny, był zupełnie niewskazany.

W przyszłości - polecam wszelkie wyjazdy o charakterze dyplomatyczno-representacyjnym - uprzednio uzgadniać ze mną.

Instytut Narciarski  
Wojska Polskiego  
do Spraw Politycznych

*[Signature]*  
Gen. dyw.

Odbito w 2 egz.

Exz. Nr. 1 - adres

" " 2 - s/a

Sporz. d. k. 14.12.46 r.

Druk. B. I. Nr. 82.13.

WOJSKO POLSKIE

Naczelne Dowództwo  
Sztab Generalny (D.O.G.)

Nr. 0350

24. luty 1947 r.

SECRET

Scisłe tajemnica

Mgs.Nr. 1.....

ATTACHE WOJSKOWY  
przy AMBASADZIE R.P. w WASHINGTONIE  
Gen.dyt. MODELSKIProszę przysłać szczegółowy wykaz Waszych  
informatorów uwzględniając:

- 1/ nazwisko i imię informatora
- 2/ wiek
- 3/ dokładny adres
- 4/ sposób kontaktowania się z nim
- 5/ dotychczasowa praca,
- 6/ wynagrodzenie
- 7/ opinia.

Po przeczytaniu należy zniszczyć.

Odbito w 3 egz.  
Mgs.Nr. 1-2-3/s. rozd.  
" " 3-4/s.  
Sporn. M.Z. 15.2.47  
Druk. S.B. Nr.ds. 26.

SZEF ODDZIAŁU II SZT.GEN.W.P.

*Wojciech*  
/-/ KOMAR  
Gen. Bryg.

EXHIBIT 12

WÓJSKO POLSKIE

Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej  
Szefstwo Generalnego Głównego BiuraNr. 0331/1  
Zm. 1. 1947 r.T a j n e

Egz.Nr.1.

ATTACHE WOJSKOWY  
przy AMBASADZIE R.P. w WASHINGTONIE  
Gen. M C D N L S K I

W związku z tym, że unifikacja sił zbrojnych  
U.S.A. została dokonana, proszę rozpracować organizację  
Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, oraz Ministerstwa  
Sił Lądowych, Lotnictwa i Marynarki.-

SZEF ODDZIAŁU II SZT.GEN.W.P.


KOMAR  
Gen.Bryg.

Odbito w 2 egz.

Egz.Nr.1-adres

" " 2-a/s.

Egz.Nr.2-11.47r.

Druk. R.B. Nr. 48. 10.





## WOJSKO POLSKIE

Naczelne Dowództwo  
Sztab Generalny Oddział II

Nr. 0051

14 = 14.03.47 1947

Dokument 12

T a j n e

Egz. Nr. 1...

ATTACHE WOJSKOWY  
przy AMBASADZIE R.P. w WASHINGTONIE  
Gen. MODELSKI

Proszę o przysłanie następujących danych,  
dotyczących amerykańskiej marynarki wojennej: -

- a) Szczegółowa organizacja flot na szczeblach  
niższych,
- b) Szczegółowa organizacja lotnictwa marynarki,
- c) Organizacja i eksploatacja jednostek podwodnych,
- d) Charakterystyka i metody wykształcenia personelu  
Marynarki.

Odbito w 2 egz.

Egz. Nr. 1-adres

" 2-s.a.

Sporz. M.Z. 11.3.47r.

Druk. E.B. Kr.ds.10

SZEF ODRZĄDU II SET. GEN. W.F.

Wojewódzki

/-/ K O M A R  
Gen. BRYG.

MINISTERSTWO OBRONY NARODOWEJ

WARSZAWA

ATACHE WARSZAWY

panu AMBASADOROWI K.P. w WASHINGTONIE  
Gen. dyw. MODELSKI*dot. walk ekonomicznych*

Proszę oświadczyć dotychczasowych oraz i nakazach, stwierdzeń na podstawie własnych sprawozdań, że w dotychczasowej bezkrytycznej ocenie wpływów stoczenia i charakteru podlegających przez kasa finansowa, rządowi obecnie Stany Zjednoczonej.

Wypis z Waszych sprawozdań i ocen, że obecnie nie maście żadnych rzeczywistych zmian, faktów i kierunków, których wiadomości od rzeczywistych danych i tendencji polityki amerykańskiej.

W rezultacie, Wasze przedstawienie sytuacji i poglądów politycznej St. Zjednoczonych nie tworzą pełnego obrazu rzeczywistych ci amerykańskiej i stanowią jedynie odbicie propagandy koł rządzących.

Utrzymywanie stałych stosunków ekonomicznych i towarzyskich z ludźmi o różnym światopoglądzie i należącej do różnych grup politycznych, należy do Waszych obowiązków służbowych i powinno umożliwić Was wyrobienie wszechstronnego i właściwego sądu o charakterze i sytuacji gospodarczych - życia St. Zjednoczonych. Przyznany Was doświadczeń reprezentacyjnych, przeoczony jest dla tego celu i nie ma być z politykiem dla służby wykorzystany.

Wasze dotychczasowe analizy, oceny i wnioski, dotyczące sytuacji w U.S.A. różnią się od opinii ptk. ALEFA w tymże sprawie.

Mając na względzie uprawnienia sprawozdawcze Atachatu, oraz - wzywania szerszego zaopiniowania szefostwa życia amerykańskiego, polecam nawiązać współpracę z ptk. ALEFEM i dążyć do obiektywnej i rzeczowej oceny zagadnień ekonomicznych oraz życia gospodarczo-politycznego St. Zjednoczonych.



MINISTER OBRONY NARODOWEJ

Michał Ziemski  
KANCELARZ PRASO

Odbito w 2 egz.

Egz. Nr. 1 - adres


" 2 - a/c

Sporz. J.N. G. G. 67.

Druk. D.I. Nr. 138.

  
**WOJSKO POLSKIE**  
 Ministerstwo Obrony  
 Sztab Główny, Oddział II

*Sl. 21374*  
*Woj. 2*

  
**ATTACHE WOJSKOWY**  
 przy AMBASADZE R.P. w WASHINGTONIE  
Gen. Dym. M O D E L S K I

T a j n y  
zps. Nr. 77

Proszę o załatwienie wszystkich kwestii i zagadnień poruszonych przez nas, na które dotychczas nie dostaliśmy odpowiedzi, - do końca sierpnia b.r.

Odešlo w 3 egz.  
Egz. Nr. 1 - adres  
2 - a. d.  
Sporz. M. G. 28.6.47.  
Brak. W. B. Nr. 44.278.

SZEF ODDZIAŁU II SZT. GEN. W. P.

*Woj. 2*  
 /-/ **K O M A R**  
 Gen. Bryg.



WOJSKO POLSKIE  
Kwatera Główna  
ul. Długa 10, Warszawa

SECRET

Tajna

Łęka 20.4.

ATTACHE WYKONCOWY  
przy Ambasadzie R.P. w WASHINGTONIE  
Gen. dyw. M O D E L S K I

Ogrom materiałów, za okres I.II. - 30.IV.47.

Otrzymałem przez nas materiały /prawie wszystkie, z wyjątkiem zagadnienia niemieckiego/ oparte są tylko na prasie. Postałała ona wprawdzie wartość informacyjną, lecz nie zawisła tego, na czym nam w pierwszym rzędzie zależy, to jest - kwestji terminowych, wpływających z wykazu zagadnień przesłanego nam pismem Nr.0827/II. Jest rzeczą zrozumiałą, że prasa jest ważnym źródłem informacji, jednak nie może być źródłem jedynym.

Nie odwracając uwagi od spraw stałych i bieżących proszę przystąpić w myśl w/w pisma 0827/II do spraw terminowych.

Do końca kwietnia nie otrzymaliśmy żadnych materiałów odnośnie:

a/ sprawy terminowe:

- 1.-organizacja artylerii,
- 2.- " " broni pancernej,
- 3.- " " lotnictwa,
- 4.-stan liczbowy Armii, Marynarki i Lotnictwa.

b/ Sprawy stałe:

- 1.-ewidencja wielkich jednostek,
- 2.-przemysł radiowy,
- 3.-handel,
- 4.-finansowanie strefy okupacyjnej Niemiec /kapitał i jego penetracja w Niemczech/,
- 5.-Bank Importowo-Eksportowy,
- 6.-Wigdaynrodowy Fundusz Salutowy,
- 7.-przemysł korozeniowy,
- 8.-komunikacja - transport.

Oprócz tych wakujących danych, zwłaszcza, jeżeli chodzi o sprawy terminowe, proszę traktować jako b.pilne, jako pierwsze zadanie Attachatu.

SMIF ODEKLAŁ II LST.GEN. P.P.

/-/K O M A R  
Gen. brvc.

Obito = 2 egz.  
Egz. Nr. 1 - adres  
2 - a/a

Sporz. L. 2. 27.5.47.  
Druk. P. 1. Nr. 62.173.



SYNPROGRAM Nr.

Dokład W A R S Z A W A

Do kogo General W. KOMAR

Na temat. depeszy z dn. 13.I.1947.

Ścisła Tajna.

cały tekst odpisów wstrzymano.

Kop. 17.5.1947

## B. Opinia Kół Wojskowych.

Alt belgradski ma również aspekt wojskowy; odwrócenia uwagi od celu głównego i skierowania jej na całą ważną lewą w obecnej sytuacji drugorzędną, a to na Włochy i Francję. Tym poglądom wreszcie dał już wyraz Stas amerykański, sprzeciwiając się wysyłce wojsk do Palestyny, która w obecnej sytuacji przedstawia więcej anitali drugorzędny cel rozwoju wojskowego.

Wypowiedź Żeligowskiego dzięki swojemu centralnemu położeniu na przewagę strategiczną w momencie wyboru dowolnego kierunku ataku czy też ataków i rozprzeczania się ewentualnego przeciwnika czy też przeciwników, to z drugiej strony, nie dysponując swobodą wyboru, ostatecznie sam będzie musiał ulec tam rozprzeczaniu.

Dawne stosowanie strategii przestrzennego odwrotu /Napoleon czy Hitler/ nie odegra już tej roli w nowoczesnej strategii.

Konsekwencją ofensywy belgradskiej będzie: przejęcie ustawy o powołaniu i służbie wojskowej, podniesienie budżetu wojskowego i przywrócenie gotowości bojowej St. Ij. oraz wzmocnienie wszelkiej pomocy finansowej i ekwipunku, który mógłby wzmocnić Żeligowskiego i blok wschodni, krótko mówiąc - zacząć nie wojny gospodarczej.

Na następny raport poświęcę opinii Kół dyplomatycznych.

Gen. dyw. I. MODELSKI

SECRET

EXHIBIT 13

Tajne

Washington, 16.I. 1947.

General W. REMAR

WARSZAWA.

Na temat Depeszy z dn. 15.I. 1947.

1. Główna kół politycznych: Biuro informacyjne w Belgradzie to miejsce natężonej propagandy, niewątpliwie ofensywnej w celu podtrzymania reakcji komunistycznych we Włoszech i Francji. Nie jest to odrębne środowisko, który "nawet diad".

Jako wyraz oficjalnej rzadów bliskim słowiańskiego niewątpliwie zastępcy on towarzyszy się wojna gospodarczo-polityczna i nie przesylni się do utrzymania pokoju, gdyż blok zachodni nie dopuści do załamania się planu Marshall'a, który przeciwnie nasuwa się konflikt doprowadzi do załamania się planów odbudowy w Europie wschodniej na skutek utraty możliwości eksportu węgla. Bez pomocy zachodu nie ma odbudowy wschodu. Europejska gospodarczo-polityczna bloki wschodniego jest skazana na powolną ale pewną śmierć na skutek załamania gospodarczego i innych jeszcze różnic poglądów na świat ludzi zamieszkujących Europę, jako załoga.

Tylko powstająca rewolucja w Europie zachodniej może wciągnąć tę część Europy w orbitę gospodarczo-polityczną Związku Radzieckiego. I na to się nie należy i to się nie uda.

Rok ofensywy bloku wschodniego jest drugim wielkim potknięciem się polityki Związku Radzieckiego na terenie międzynarodowym, obliczającym swą wojnę antyali pokój światowy.

Jeżeli chodzi o węgiel polski, na ekspansję którego rząd polski opiera swoją politykę gospodarczą odbudowy kraju, to węgiel ten, jednolity badany i tak potrzebny dla odbudowy Europy zachodniej może być zastąpiony innym, chociażby droższym węglem.

Jutro nadam opinię kół wojskowych.

General Dywizji Dr. I. MODELSKI  
Attache wojskowy i lotniczy.

Depesza.

05.17.15

Tajne.

Washington, 18.X.1947.

Generał W. KOMAR

Na temat depeszy z dn. 12.X.47.

3/ Opinia tutaj Kół dyplomatycznych /Am. Łacińska/

Akt warszawsko-belgradski jest próbą politycznego podtrzymania wojny gospodarczej, wypowiedzianej planowi Marshalla.

Pierwszą odpowiedzią St.Zj. jest rezygnacja podsekretarza Stanu Claytona i wiasący bojkot gospodarczy Związku i bloku wschodniego. Jedną z następnych będzie zawarcie stosunków dyplomatycznych ze Związkiem przez państwa Ameryki południowej.

Niewątpliwie przegrana Związku w wojnie gospodarczej spowoduje klęskę polityczną Związku, a do akcji militarnej Rosja w obecnych warunkach nie jest jeszcze przygotowana.

Jak praktyka dotychczasowa wykazuje komunizm nie jest w stanie bez użycia do tego celu sił zbrojnych, opanować jakiegokolwiek narodu na ruszes koncepcji świata komunistycznego. Tylko siłą zbrojną dokonała tego Rosja, już to jako aliant już to jako okupant w Europie wschodniej.

Akt zastraszania politycznego manifestem 6 października b.r. wywołał odwrotny skutek.

Reinifera zachodnia udzieli St.Zj. pełnego poparcia także militarnego. Ameryka Łacińska dysponuje świetną, chociaż małą, armią, zorganizowaną i wyszkoloną przy pomocy instruktorów St.Zj.

Stany Zjednoczone niezmiernie wzmocnione w swojej pozycji nie ustąpią i nie pójdą na fałszywy kompromis.

Akt belgradski jest dowodem słabości sowieckiej i jest wstępem do mierzenia wprawy politycznych Związku.

Jakikolwiek będzie wynik toczącej się obecnie wojny politycznej i gospodarczej i niezależnie od tego czy się Związek usunie z O.N.Z. czy też nie, sprawa uregulowania granic musi być ostatecznie rozstrzygnięta na ogólnej konferencji pokojowej narodów Zjednoczonych.

Generał dywizji I. MODELSKI.

WOJSKO POLSKIE

Naczelne Dowództwo  
Szef Główny Oddział II

T a j n e

Egz. Nr. 1.

ATTACHE WOJSKOWY  
PRZY AMBASADZIE R.P. W WASHINGTONIE  
Gen. D y w. M O D E L S K IOcena raportów z miesiąca sierpnia, września i października  
1946 r.Uwagi ogólne

Sytuacja zarówno wojskowa, polityczna jak i gospo-  
darcza Stanów Zjednoczonych naświetlona subiektywnie.

Wiadomości jednostronne, często bez podania źródła,  
prześcym widoczny wpływ pewnych, o znanym obliczu, wielko-  
kapitalistycznych kół amerykańskich.

W raportach należy odróżnić dwie zasadnicze części,  
które przeplatają się w poszczególnych opracowaniach.

Pierwsza część - to dane i informacje z dziedziny  
wojskowej, druga - to uogólnienia polityczne i polityczno-  
wojskowe.

Odnosnie części pierwszej, która przedstawia dla nas  
temat, interesujący nas przede wszystkim, potrzebujemy in-  
formacji odpowiadających pewnym podstawowym warunkom: muszą  
one być obiektywne, systematyczne, prawdziwe, konkretne i  
opracowane planowo.

Niektóre dane i informacje, jak np. o budźcie, pew-  
ne szczegóły z zakresu lotnictwa i inne, są pożytecznymi  
przyczynkami do studiów nad tymi zagadnieniami i zostały  
odpowiednio wykorzystane.

Należy jednak stwierdzić, że poważna część otrzyma-  
nych informacji nie odpowiada wyżej wspomnianym warunkom.

Nasze Biuro Studiów znalazło w nich wiele nieścisłoś-  
ci, przesadę w ocenie, szczególnie jeśli chodzi o broń ato-  
mową, oraz w większości wypadków - brak obiektywizmu.

Uwagi szczegółowe.

W raporcie z 26.8.46 - znajdujemy informacje o no-  
wych wynalazkach wojennych w St. Zjednoczonych A.P. Również  
w raporcie z 5.9.46 podane są na 8-miu stronach informacje  
o broni atomowej. W tym ostatnim raporcie czytamy: "Wicher  
spowodowany wybuchem bomby /atomowej/ w porównaniu z natu-  
ralnym wichrem lądowym, wynoszącym zaledwie 5 mil/godz.,  
osiąga szybkość 30-40 mil/godz. /str. 1./".

Dane te są niezgodne ze stanem faktycznym, bo szyb-  
kość wichru lądowego wynosi 32-39-46 mil na godzinę, nie



KX 117 20

Page 2

mał 5 mil/godz. /wiatr z szybkością 4-7 mil/godz. (test lotnicze Centralnym - Patrol Air Navigation, P. J. S. Jones, Lt Lieutenant Commander, New York New Orleans East Command, Inc, 1942, str. 400).

Wisker więc wyprzedził pomysł wybuchu bomby atomowej; a szybkości 30-40 mil/godz. nie jest zbyt tak groźny.

Na str. 6 raportu czytamy: "Wybuch bomby atomowej w centrum eksplozji wytwarza kłę ogólną kilkadziesiąt stop średnicy. Temperatura centrum tej kuli wynosi miliony stopni C. Uczuci odcieniają temperaturę tej kuli ogólnie na 3000° do 5000° C. Pole ogólnie dających na odległości do 13700 stop."

Abstrahuje od tego, że drugie zdanie przytoczonego ustępu, jest wogóle nieprecyzyjne, to następne zdanie, gdzie jest mowa o ocenie uczuć - przeczy poprzedniemu.

Na stronie 6 raportu z 5.9.46 podany jest stan liczbowy dywizji płochoty na 14.037, faktycznie jednak wynosi on 13.404. Gdy chodzi o stan liczbowy nowych dywizji płochoty, to 17.000 jest w przybliżeniu słowne, ale nie ściśle, przypuszczam nowe stany dywizji płochoty są wzorowane na angielskiej dywizji płochoty z niesłusznymi zmianami.

We wszystkich raportach, szczególnie tam, gdzie mowa o pozycji strategiczno-wojennej St. Zjednoczonych - o gotowości się zbrojących i broni atomowej, spotykamy często ogólnikowe i przesadne określenia, bez podania konkretnych danych.

Np. w raporcie z 26.VIII.46 na str. 4 czytamy, że nowe poszukiwania, doprowadziły do wynalezienia "cząstki tzw. mezon - nie była to potęga zniszczenia, aniżeli cząstki zwolnionej przy bombie atomowej. To jakbyby próby stworzenia nowego potwora, superbomba atomowej to zn. bomby kosmicznej".

Również ocena eksperymentu na atolu Bikini jest przesadna. Nawet z prasy światowej wiadome jest, że wyniki na Bikini nie dają powodów do superlatywów. W raporcie z 5.IX.46 na str. 2 czytamy: "potworność siły podmuchu /przy wybuchu bomby atomowej/ jest wprost nie do pójścia" przyczyna szybkość tego podmuchu jest określona na 30-40 mil/godz. Jest to widoczna przesada, gdy wiemy, że szybkość sztormu wynosi 75 mil/godz., a wiatr o szybkości 30-40 mil wspomniany wyżej komander Weems określa jako moderate gale czyli umiarkowany! Wobec tego wszelkie rozmawiania zawarte w raporcie o strasznych skutkach owego podmuchu nie są przekonujące.

Budżet wojskowy U.S.A.

Raport z 19.IX.46 r. /w/g listu Wallace a/:

Ardea i Marynarka 13.000 milionów dolarów. Likwidacja działalności wojennej - 5.000 mil. dol.

Długi i zaopatrzenie weteranów 10.000 mil. dolarów.

Razem: 28.000 mil. dolarów.



Report z 13.10.46 r.

Saldo dla państwa PAZ Skojarzeń 11,555 mil. dol.

Report z 13.10.46 r.

/W/ę bez Collier i "The Sunday Star"/

Budżet Obrony Narodowej 25,000 mil. dol.

Arma i Marynarka 13,150 mil. dol. - w tym

koszta demobilizacji i reparacji wynikłych ze stanu wojennego

Report z 14.10.46 r.

/W/ę nowy min. Wojny Patterson/

Budżet Obrony Narodowej 18,500 mil. dol.

s tym: Arma 5,000 " "

Marynarka 3,000 " "

Budżet wydatków państwowych U.S.A. według sprawozdania  
The National City Bank of New York, Economic Conditions  
Governmental Finance United States Securities z września  
1946 r.

War Department . . . . . 8,060 mil. dol.

Navy Department . . . . . 5,150 " "

Terminal leave of enlisted

personnel . . . . . 2,416 " "

U.S. Maritime Commissions . . . . . 290 " "

War Shipping Administration . . . . . 412 " "

Other /includes UNRRA/ . . . . . 2,178 " "

National defense subtotal . . . . . 18,508 " "

Veterans pensions and

benefits . . . . . 6,205 mil. dol.

W sumie, porównując te cyfry, Biuro Studiów staje wobec problemu: które dane są prawdziwe? Kto jest ile poinformowany, lub chce ile informować, Wallace, Collier, Patterson czy kto inny. Zgodkę tę może rozwiązać dokładny raport o budżecie.

Ocena sylwetki prezydenta Trumana, jako męsa opatrznościowego U.S.A., mającego na sobie całe społeczeństwo amerykańskie, jest zdaniem naszym - fałszywa. Wydaje nam się również, że Truman nie zyskał na autorytecie po wystąpieniach w Wallace i, a przeciwnie - stracił dużo na prestiżu.

Rola Związków Zawodowych jest wynikiem interpretowania, a miano "S-ej kolumny" nie wytrzymuje krytyki. Zdanie, że akcja Związków Zawodowych napotyka na zdecydowaną reakcję "zdrowego społeczeństwa" - nasuwa nam pytanie, jaką część społeczeństwa uważacie za zdrową.

- 4 -

IT 20

4

Wiedomość o zmianie konstytucji, odcinanie zaszczerstwa trwania mandatu członka Kongresu i zmian postanowień konstytucji, co do możliwości wypowiedzenia przez U.S.A. wojny zaciepnej, wymagała bezwzględnie podania źródła tych wiadomości.  
(raport CG/I.M. pkt. 7 z 28.VIII.46/.

Jeśli chodzi o perspektywę wybuchu wojny między St. Zjednoczonymi i ZSRR, to nie podzielały zdania wyrażonego w raporcie z dnia 8.9.46 r. str. 7, że "jesteśmy już w przededniu ewentualnego konfliktu...". Prawda jest, że istnieje na zachodzie pewna wpływowa grupa podlegająca wojennym, które napiętnował w swych wypowiedziach Marszałek Stalin. Grupa ta, istotnie podlegała, do wojny, ale ogólnie biorąc, jest to strach i próba zastraszenia. W bliższej perspektywie wojna nie grozi. W powstałej sytuacji należy z całym obiektywizmem stwierdzić, że ZSRR nie dąży do agresji, co z wielu Waszych raportów jest sugerowane, ale wręcz przeciwnie - dąży do umocnienia trwałego pokoju na świecie.

W raporcie z dn. 26.8.46 na str. 6 podajecie opinię wojskowych amerykańskich, która naszym zdaniem nie jest wcale dwiema, a raczej symbolizuje - określa - "jakiś jeden kłopot dalszy" jest bezbronność wobec Konstytucji, która nie pozwala na wojnę zaciepną U.S.A." Czy nie jest to jawny wyraz chęci agresji przywołanej tych kłót?

Zbyt często powołujecie się na dane, zaczerpnięte z badań Instytutu Gallupa, który naszym zdaniem nietylko bada, co uważa opinia publiczna St. Zjednoczonych, a jego wyniki są często "nie do desideria" pewnych wpływowych na zachodzie niekiedy liściech kół. Ze wyniki badań Instytutu Gallupa nie są obiektywne, świadczą o tym wyniki podobnych badań w innych instytucjach jak np. Centrum Badań opinii publicznej przy Uniwersytecie w Denver Colorado, który przeprowadził ankietę na temat, czy St. Zjednoczone i ZSRR mają zdecydować się na wojnę. 87% wypowiedzi w całym St. Zjednoczonych brzmiało, że ani naród radziecki, ani amerykański nie pragnie wojny i że nie zdecydują się na nią. Tylko 9% dopatrywało możliwość ubrojenego konfliktu.

Ogólnie biorąc, nasze Biuro Studiów uważa poważną częścią informacji na nieścisłe i tendencyjne, oraz częściowo nieuprzedkowane, a wobec tego, w większości wypadków nie może korzystać z tych danych i informacji ani jako materiału uropekniwego, ani porównawczego.

Zgodnie z rozkazem Ob. Maraszkina, wiadomości w pierwszym rzędzie mają się sprawnie wojna, dostarczając nam dane, dotyczące:

- 1/ Działalność woj. St. Zjednoczonych,
- 2/ Organizacji armii ludowej, lotnictwa i marynarki;  
a. - stanu liczebnego - rodzaju uzbrojenia,  
b. - dyplomacji - umagających bery,

- 5 -

- e.- Uzbrojenia i sprzętu technicznego, a głównie odnośnie armii lądowej:  
 łączności -/środki -rodzaj sprzętu/,  
 saperów -/środki -rodzaj sprzętu/,  
 artylerii -/sprzęt -dane techniczne/,  
 br.pancerniej /sprzęt - dane techniczne/.

### 3/ Drobiazgowego rozpracowania szkolnictwa wojskowego:

- a.- rodzaj szkół,  
 b.- ilość szkół,  
 c.- czas trwania szkolenia teoret., środki i sprzęt,  
 d.- rozmieszczenie szkół,  
 e.- kierunki i programy szkolenia - nowe doktryny,  
 f.- praktyka w czasie szkolenia i po jego zakończeniu /rodzaj, czas trwania - warunki/.

### 4/ Korpusu oficerskiego i podoficerskiego:

- a.- zaciąg /~~skłó~~ -warunki, ew.ograniczenia/,  
 b.- wyszkolenie teoret.i prakt.- poziom;  
 c.- stan moralny,  
 d.- położenie materialne.

SZEFEK ODDZIAŁU II SZT.GEN.W.P.

*Komar*  
 /-/ KOMAR  
 Gen.Bryg.

Odbito w 2 egz.

Kp. Br. 1- adPes

2- a/a

Spis. K.J. 14.12.48 r.

Druk.B.I.Br. 82.14.

WOJSKO POLSKIE

Naczelne Dow. Szef.  
Szef. Generalny Oddział II

Odz. 20

EXHIBIT 21  
Page 1Tajno  
Ez. Nr 4.ATTACHE TOUSPOWY  
przy AMBASADZIE R.P. w WASHINGTONIE  
Gen. dyw. MODELSKITemat materiałow za okres: listopad 45 - styczeń 47 r.Wzrost ogólny

Raporty Wasze przynoszą dużo materiałow, posiadają jednak przeważnie charakter notatek kronikarskich. Ten sposób ujęcia i naświetlenia tematów sprawia pewne trudności w wykorzystaniu ich jako materiałow informacyjnych, porównawczego czy uzupełniającego.

Przykładem w tym względzie może posłużyć np. sorowanie w 17 raportach zagadnienia obrony perymetrycznej.

Dla ułatwienia pracy naszego Biura Studiów i - stworzenia nam przejrzystego obrazu poruszonych zagadnień, proszę o sporządzanie sprawozdań w formie następującej:

- a/ syntetyczne opracowanie całości tematu, dla zagadnień istniejących oddawna z faktami ustaleni.
- b/ opracowania okresowe tematu na podstawie informacji uzyskanych w ściśle określonym czasie.

Sporawozdania odpowiadające pkt. a/ proszę w miarę narastania wydarzeń i rozwoju wypadków, uzupełniać raportami okresowymi.

W dalszym ciągu, przytaczacie dość często na oparcie pewnych tez, wyniki "badań opinii publicznej" Instytutu Gallupa.

Pisaliśmy Wam o tym i powtarzamy, że wyniki uzyskane przez Instytut Gallupa nie są miarodajne, proszę zestawiać je z wynikami innych instytucji amer., zajmujących się badaniem opinii publicznej, co ułatwi Wam w pewnym stopniu zorientowanie się i ocenie nastrojów społeczeństwa amerykańskiego.



- 2 -

EXHIBIT 91  
Page 2

Opieranie się więc tylko na Instytucję Gallupa jest jedyn-  
stronne i niesystematyczne.

Wraz z informacją proszę także podawać źródła.

Uwagi szczegółowe:

1.38/T. M.46/Tin. z dnia 14.11.46.

Nie jest istotnym, że "budowa dalszych potężnych okrętów wo-  
jennych jest w pełnym biegu", lecz istotnym byłoby wskazać  
typy tych okrętów, ich tonaż, uzbrojenie. Raport winien być  
uzupełniony następującym materiałem: 1. dane techniczne i ta-  
ktyczne okrętów dostarczanych do t.zw. "wojny atomowej".  
2. Szacunki konkretnie polegają zmianą starego składu floty na nowy.  
3. Jakie są dane na do floty wojennej U.S.A. na morzu Śród-  
ziemnym.

1.31/T. M.46/Tin. z dnia 15.11.46.

Wykaz budżetu armii lądowej U.S.A. i marynarki wojennej po-  
dany wyczerpująco.

1.43/T. M.46/Tin. z dnia 18.11.46.

Raport stanowi odroczoną informacją, pojedynczy artykuł, który  
nie daje całokształtu zagadnienia. Mogły być fragmenty z  
przeglądu prasy amerykańskiej odczuwać granic zachodnich  
Polski. Podany jako oddzielna informacja, nie może być wyto-  
rzystany.

1.28/T. M.46/Tin. z dnia 20.11.46.

W uzupełnieniu proszę przysłać warunki planu armii i marynarki  
przewidującego sześciomiesięczny okres szkoleń młodzieży  
oraz wyniki tego planu.

1.49/T. M.46/Tin. z dnia 25.11.46.

W uzupełnieniu proszę podać:

1. Dane (osobliwi Narodów) i zorganizowanych Sił (orga-  
nizacja, stan liczbowy, sposób i zakres wychowania, dowódcy)
2. Nazwy okrętów liniowych podlegających likwidacji.
3. Dane o budowie nowych kontraktowych okrętów.



- 3 -

ZP. 17.41

Dok. 3

- a) czy są w użyciu i ile  
b) program budowy.

1.55/T W.T.in/46 z dnia 25.11.46.

Strajk Lewisa oceniony słusznie i trafnie.

Proszę o następujące dane: a) jakie stanowisko zajmują koncerny węglowe w sprawie przejścia z węgla bitumijnowego na gazy,

b) jakie bazy znajdują się na terenie Persji, ich rozmieszczenie i obsada.

1.58/T W.T.in/46 z dnia 11.12.46.

1. Problem przejścia z węgla na innego rodzaju paliwa jest bardzo ważny. Proszę śledzić techniczną stronę przejścia na gaz ziemny oraz paliwa płynne.
2. Strona 1, wiersz 8 od dołu brzmi: "według oficjalnego wy-  
kazu węgla uruchamia 50,4% przemysłu, olej 10,2% , \* + \*  
proszę wyjaśnić olej czy ropa. Jebeli olej to jaki.

1.60/T W.T.in/46 z dnia 14 grudnia 46.

Proszę pilnie śledzić i informować o wszelkich wystąpieniach czynników oficjalnych i wybitnych osobistości U.S.A. odnośnie zapędzenia niemieckiego.

1.61/T W.T.in/46 z dnia 17.12.46.

Temat opracowany jednostronnie i dlatego nie bada się do wykorzystania. Wywiady Instytutu Gallupa nie są wiarodajne jeśli chodzi o opinię społeczeństwa U.S.A. w stosunku do Z.S.R.

Dziś z 8.00.

Gen. J. Modski

Gen. J. Modski

Gen. J. Modski

Gen. J. Modski

GEN. ODEJASE II SET. GEN. W.P.

1/✓ YONAR  
Gen. Bryg.

WOLFE & POLLOCK  
Public Accountants  
Bank Building, Chicago, Ill.

AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK & TRUST COMPANY  
CHICAGO, ILL.

Do Państwa wziętych broni i sprzętu, w tym również  
Do Państwa wziętych broni i sprzętu, w tym również  
Do Państwa wziętych broni i sprzętu, w tym również

Do Państwa wziętych broni i sprzętu, w tym również  
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W tym również broni i sprzętu, w tym również  
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3. Do Państwa wziętych broni i sprzętu, w tym również  
Do Państwa wziętych broni i sprzętu, w tym również  
Do Państwa wziętych broni i sprzętu, w tym również

3rd Oct. 1944

*Handwritten signature*

Obito a 2 gwy.  
22.11.1944  
2- a/g  
Soc. a. 1. 1. 1.  
22.11.1944  
Druk. 1. 1. 1.  
Dr. 1. 1. 1.





Drugi Generale,

Od gen. PASZKIEWICZA dowiedziałem się, że samopoczucie Wasze pozostawia wiele do życzenia, tym bardziej, że stan Waszego zdrowia jest ostatnio niezadowolający. Informacje zawarte w liście do gen. PASZKIEWICZA rzucają nowe światło na stosunki panujące w Waszym Attaszacie.

Żałuję ogromnie, że nie byłem powiadomiony szczegółowo o wytworzonej sytuacji podczas pobytu Waszego następcy w Warszawie. Tym bardziej żałuję, że nie byłem dotychczasowe milczenie, odnośnie wytworzonych stosunków z następcą Waszym, gdyż jak wynika z listu, sprawa ta nie powstała nagle, ale narastała od dłuższego już czasu.

Nie ulega dla mnie żadnej wątpliwości, że na Wasze, tak odpowiedzialne, placówki pracy, ściśle wykonywanie rozkazów i dyrektyw przełożonych, świadoma i bezwzględna dyscyplina oraz harmonijna współpraca całego zespołu, - są podstawowymi elementami, warunkującymi sprawne funkcjonowanie Attaszatu dla dobra naszego Wojska i Ojczyzny.

Po zapoznaniu się z Waszym listem, doskonale zdaję sobie sprawę, że wytworzona sytuacja uniemożliwia



- 2 -

Wam spokojnie i wydajnie pracować. Niewłaściwy stosunek i zachowanie się płk. ALÉPA wobec Was, jego przełożonego, jest oczywiście rzeczą niedopuszczalną ze względu na dyscyplinę wojskową, jak również i - dobro służby. Proszę mi wierzyć, Generale, że nie omieszkam wyciągnąć z powyższego odpowiednio wnioski i przedsięwziąć odpowiednie środki zaradcze na przyszłość.

Nie powinniście jednak przejmować się tą sprawą i szczerze Wam radzę, nie brać jej zbyt do serca.

Wiem, że macie dobrą wolę i najlepsze chęci służenia sprawie, której i my wszyscy służymy. Podobamy do Was z pełną lojalnością, czego daliśmy wreszcie niejednokrotnie wyraz.

Ocena Waszych raportów pod kątem widzenia naszych potrzeb, nie powinna Was trącać. Celem tych ocen jest danie Wam możliwości pokierowania pracą Attachatu w/g naszych wytycznych, wypływających z sytuacji aktualnej i istniejących zapotrzebowań.

Trudno mi jest w krótkim liście omówić całość spraw i problemów, nagromadzonych podczas Waszej półtora roku trwającej nieobecności w Kraju. Sądzę, że najlepiej będzie, jeśli zawitacie do nas na parę tygodni.

Jestem przekonany, że bezpośrednia Wasza obecność i osobiste wszechstronne naświetlenie, wniosła

- 3 -

dnia elektrycznego i cennego materiału do tych wszystkich  
zagadnień, które nie mogą być wycofywane z wyłączeniem  
i uwzględnieniem w sprawozdaniach służbowych. Będziemy też  
mogli szczegółowo omówić wszystkie polskie, smartale-  
nie i sprawy Attachatu, jak również przy tej okazji  
definitywnie uregulujemy i uźródlowimy kwestię niewła-  
ściwej atmosfery pracy w Waszym Attachacie.

Sprawy w. zabraniam ze sobą p.k. ALEPA -  
porostawiam Waszemu uszanowaniu.

A więc - do zobaczenia się. Życzę wszystkim  
go dobrego i łączę serdeczny uścisk szani.

*Wacław*

P.S. Proszę Waszą: St. Zjednoczone, Rosja i Polska -  
przysyłajcie koniecznie i to jaknajwcześniej.

# PROJEKT ZADANIA

W związku ze zbliżającą się konferencją dotyczącą spraw wojny i pokoju, w szczególności przygotowania materiałów dla delegacji wojskowej o Baryżu, utworzone zostało w Ministerstwie W.P. Biuro Wojskowe do spraw konferencji pokojowych. Oprócz materiałów, które są do wytworzenia na miejscu w Pałacu, potrzebne są dla Biura materiały z zagranicy, a mianowicie -

- a) Informacje, dotyczące podjętych pracowniowych między stowami, politykimi i dowódców wojskowych na wyprawie amerykańskiej granic zachodnich, wyprzedzających oficjalnie lub nieoficjalnie (na szczytach, w prasie lub rozmowach twórczych).
- b) Uwagi na temat, wypowiedziane przez liderów partii lub przedstawicieli organizacji politycznych, prasy, oświaty, publicystów lub inne osoby, odgrywające w życiu publicznym poważniejszą rolę.
- c) Artykuły lub wzmianki z prasy, codziennej i periodycznej, w odniesieniu do tego samego zagadnienia.
- d) Książki i wydawnictwa, traktujące o warunkach organizacyjnych Europy po wojnie z uwzględnieniem o planowych warunkach Europy zachodniej, a głównie o warunkach państw odnowionych.
- e) Wszelkie źródła, dotyczące propagandy niemieckiej w kierunku przesłania oświecenia granicy zachodniej lub innych problemów, mających wpływ na naszą przyszłość. Chodzi tu głównie o wyłożenie argumentów, jakimi mogą się posługiwać Niemcy w przededniu konferencji pokojowej, w walce o granice i uzyskanie dla siebie najlepszych warunków pokojowych.
- f) Własne obserwacje i wyznaczenia, ustalane na tematyce wojny, na podstawie rozmów prywatnych z ludźmi, mającymi kontakty ze sferami politycznymi czy wojskowymi, lub w inny sposób.
- g) Informacje i materiały dotyczące ustosunkowania się w/wymienionych kół i osób do zagadnienia granicy - polsko-niemieckiej i - w ogóle problemu przyjaźni między państwami słowiańskimi.

Ze względu na wagę i pilność tych spraw oraz konieczność wyczerpującego opracowania zagadnień i to z różnych punktów widzenia (wojskowego, polityczno-historycznego i ekonomicznego), Biuro Wojskowe do spraw konferencji pokojowych przeło o dotychczasowe, by informacje objęły jaknajwiększą ilość zagadnień na temat wyżej podany i by były one jak najbardziej jaknajbardziej drogą.

Odbito w 4 egz.  
Egz. Nr. 1 - w/g rozkazu  
Egz. Nr. 2 -  
Druk. B. I.  
Nr. dz. 30

--doc--

JULY 26

WOJSKO POLSKIE

Ministerstwo Obrony

Szef Biura Głównego

KOD. T. 7

T a j e m n o

Egz. Nr. 1.

ATTACHE WOJSKOWY

przy AMBASADzie R.P. w WASHINGTONIE  
Gen. Dym. M O D E L S K I

1. W związku z tym, że pismo nasze Nr. 0444/II /okólnik Nr. 10/ dotyczący charakterystyki Attache państw obcych i ich personelu, nie zostało dotychczas załatwione, proszę o przyspieszenie sprawy i nadesłanie materiałów najbliższą pocztą.
2. Pismem z dnia 20.XII.1946, Nr. 0134/A przesłaliśmy artykuł R. Siderskiego, zatytułowany "Straż nad Odrą i Nisą" dla wykorzystania go w prasie.  
W związku z tym, oczekuję powiadomienia nas o wynikach, oraz proszę o przysłanie wraz z powiadomieniem-wyników z prasy.
3. W ślad za pismem naszym Nr. 0571/II z dnia 29.XI.1946 - zawiadamiam, że dotychczas nie otrzymaliśmy nic na ten temat.  
Spieszę przypomnieć tę sprawę i proszę o potraktowanie jej jako pilną.

SZEFEK ODDZIAŁU II SZT. GEN. R.P.

*Wojewoda*  
/-/ KOMAR  
Gen. Bryg.

Odbito w 2 egz.

Egz. Nr. 1 - adres

" 2 - a/s

Sporz. M.Z. 13.2.47 r.

Druk. R.I. Nr. 35.11,





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