THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES
OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
Volumes Previously Published

1928-1932. THE GENESIS OF THE NEW DEAL
1933. THE YEAR OF CRISIS
1934. THE ADVANCE OF RECOVERY AND REFORM
1935. THE COURT DISAPPROVES
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1938. THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE FOR LIBERALISM
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THE CALL TO BATTLE STATIONS

1942
HUMANITY ON THE DEFENSIVE

1943
THE TIDE TURNS

1944-45
VICTORY AND THE THRESHOLD OF PEACE
Introduction

IN THE course of the year 1943, the ultimate outcome of the war became certain. The question at the end of 1943 was no longer whether the United Nations would win the war. The questions were when would they win, and could they, after they had won, win the peace?

In terms of the military progress of the war, 1943 was, as the title of this volume indicates, the year of the turning of the tide. The series of bitter and humiliating defeats of 1942 had been ended. The process of desperate holding while we gathered strength was coming to a close. By the middle of 1943, in nearly every important theater of war, the Allies were on the offensive. As the President had promised throughout 1942, the United Nations were striking the enemy “wherever and whenever we can meet them.” The events of the year translated into heartening and concrete action the earlier planning of the President and the Allied leaders. Military successes followed quickly, one after another, during 1943.

On February 4, 1943, after a siege of 162 days, the Russians drove the Nazis back from Stalingrad—a feat which Roosevelt cabled to Stalin was “one of the proudest chapters in this war of the peoples united against Nazism and its emulators.”

On May 9, 1943, the Allied troops in North Africa crushed the Germans in Tunisia. This cleared the Mediterranean for our shipping, and provided a springboard for the invasion of Sicily and Italy.

On July 9, 1943, Sicily was invaded by American and British troops.

On July 25, 1943, Mussolini resigned.

On September 3, 1943, the mainland of Italy was invaded.

On September 3, 1943, Italy unconditionally surrendered.

By the summer of 1943, the Battle of the Atlantic against German submarines had been won.

In the Pacific we were pressing the offensive all along the line. We moved to occupy strategic positions from which we would
launch attacks at the heart of the Japanese Empire. Guadalcanal and Buna were mopped up in the early months of 1943. Later in 1943 we landed by amphibious assaults in the Solomons, Russell Islands, New Georgia, Bougainville, New Guinea, Tarawa, and other areas of the Central and Southwest Pacific. We were destroying more Japanese planes and ships than they could replace; we were winning in the war of attrition.

By July, 1943, in a fireside chat, the President could proudly refer back to his prophecy in the State of the Union Address of January, 1942. Then, in the dark days just after Pearl Harbor, he had said: "The militarists of Berlin and Tokyo started this war. But the massed, angered forces of common humanity will finish it." In July, 1943, he could say, "Today that prophecy is in the process of being fulfilled. The massed, angered forces of common humanity are on the march."

They were, indeed, on the march toward Berlin and Tokyo. But, as the President frequently reminded the American people during 1943, there was still a long road ahead, and they still had a great many things to do.

The prime, immediate business, of course, was the military planning for final victory — planning which, during 1943, occupied much of the President’s energy and time, outlining the great offensives of 1944. For 1943 was the year of great military conferences — three between Roosevelt and Churchill alone at Casablanca, Washington, and Quebec; one among Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek at Cairo; and one among Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin at Teheran. In these conferences, and in the multitudinous meetings with his military leaders in Washington as the blueprints for victory were nearing completion, the President was in a real sense the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States. Of course he did not seek to override the decisions of his trained professional military leaders in the detailed conduct of the war. But, especially when there were differences of opinion among the professionals, it was he who made the final decisions; and it was his leadership which dominated the major decisions which involved international diplomacy or politics.
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At the international conferences, military decisions were reached which determined the strategy of victory. Obviously they could not be announced when made. Eventually they were disclosed in terms of death and destruction. They are well known now, and are discussed in this volume. They covered every continent and every sea. They were the coordinated strategy of the military leadership of all Nations fighting Hitler.

The President had other major responsibilities to be performed. Closely tied up with military leadership was the leadership at home. As the leader on the home front, he had to assure victory in the great battle of production, which in 1943 reached its climax and gave us the edge which insured victory. His leadership and the unprecedented efforts of management and labor in the battle of production were successful. By the middle of 1943, the fighting weapons — which softened up Germany and reduced parts of it to ruins from the air, which carried our troops across the English Channel into the heart of Germany, and in the Pacific carried us back into the Philippines, which found their way into the great Russian offensives — were rolling off the lines. The fighting weapons were rolling off in numbers which caused Stalin later to say that without American production the war would have been lost.

As in 1942, so in 1943, the all-important problem of stabilization beset the President. Again, in his 1943 public papers and addresses, the battle against inflation loomed larger than any other current domestic issue. In 1942, holding the line on the fighting fronts had been the paramount military objective. By 1943, as the pressures on our economy at home increased almost to the breaking point, holding the line had become the paramount economic objective.

Both lines were held.

Military planning, maintaining production, assuring economic stabilization, acting as spokesman of the democracies and chief propagandist for the United Nations — all these were responsibilities of the President throughout 1943. All these are reflected in this volume. It was the same role of leadership as in 1942, working up to the climax which was coming in 1944.
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In the dark days of 1942, when America's fighting forces had their backs against the wall, the President inspired the Nation to keep alive its faith and confidence in victory. After the tide had turned, his task of leadership was to warn the American people against overconfidence, to convince them not to rest on their oars but to work harder and sacrifice more until victory was finally won.

But the public papers and addresses in 1943, and later, in 1944, sharply demonstrate still a new and imperative aspect of the leadership of Franklin D. Roosevelt. It was an aspect which, occupied as he was by a myriad of other urgent responsibilities, he could have overlooked; but he did not. This aspect, more important in the long run and for more people throughout the world than any other, involved leadership in planning for peace.

Even while the war was reaching its climax, even while victory was still apparently years away, while he might have understandably put off thinking about peace and postwar America and the postwar world, President Roosevelt led the way in blocking out the blueprint for universal peace, and for strengthening democracy at home.

On December 9, 1941, in his first fireside chat to the people of the United States after the declaration of war with Japan, the President had stated, "We are going to win the war and we are going to win the peace that follows." Even before Pearl Harbor, the President had begun to think and talk and act about the postwar world. With Prime Minister Churchill in August, 1941, he had stated basic postwar objectives in the Atlantic Charter. In 1941, too, he had talked of the need for planning to avoid a postwar depression, and the need for a postwar program to improve the Nation's health and educational standards.

Throughout 1942, even during the darkest days of defeat when peace and victory were still so far away, the President became the focal point for unifying what was ultimately to become the United Nations. The very first document appearing in the 1942 volume is the Joint Declaration of the United Nations — a name which he personally was responsible for giving to the Allies. And in his addresses throughout that year, he talked of the peace
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which was to come, and the general principles which were essential to govern a world at peace.

The same kind of planning was going on in Washington for our own national, postwar economy. As early as November 13, 1942, the President began the planning for returning veterans—laying the foundations for the G.I. Bill of Rights.

Although I know that even before 1943 the President had often thought of, and in private conversation had often dwelt on, postwar problems—both domestic and international—his public statements on these subjects before 1943 had been infrequent, and had embodied only general and inchoate ideas. With the military victories which came in 1943, however, there was a marked change in the President’s emphasis. As the public papers and addresses included in this volume show, the President began in earnest to join with the other Nations in planning for the peace. It was in this year that the President actively assumed world leadership in laying the foundations for the postwar world.

Many of those who in April, 1945, watched with prayerful hope and joy the assembling of fifty Nations at San Francisco have largely forgotten the long series of events which culminated in that meeting. Perhaps the rapidity and ruthlessness with which one single Nation has thwarted the principles declared at San Francisco have wiped out recollection and appreciation of all that preceded San Francisco.

The story is told in the documents contained in this volume, and in the next volume, of how the foundations were laid upon which the final structure at San Francisco was built. It is the story of Nations learning to walk in the paths of mutual trust and common desire for peace. It is the story of the leadership and planning which went into the personal conferences among the “Big Three” and between Roosevelt and Churchill; it is the story of patient, tolerant efforts toward mutual understanding among the three leading powers of the world; it is the story of the stumbling but determined steps which were taken toward worldwide cooperative action in food and agriculture, in currency and banking, in relief and rehabilitation and in other fields—all
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long before San Francisco. It is the story particularly of the role which Roosevelt played, the story of his leadership in this world-wide drama.

This aspect of his leadership was aimed at the years to follow the war; it had to be directed toward making impossible any future war. This task required convincing the American people that the objective of world peace could never be reached unless they were willing to drop the last vestige of isolationism, and unless they were willing to invest in the enterprise their wealth, resources, prestige, and, if necessary, their blood. It required the finding of common ground on which all Nations—large and small, powerful and weak—could eventually come together and live in peace.

At Yalta and at San Francisco, this common ground began to be staked out. This volume and the next volume contain the formal documents and some explanatory discussion of how the common ground came to be laid out. Unfortunately, as this is being written in 1949, weeds are growing in that ground—in profusion. But the weeds are another story.

It is significant that at his very first press conference in 1943, the President talked explicitly and in detail of the organization of which he dreamed, which would maintain peace. There, on January 1, 1943, just as the tide of war was turning, he had already begun his most daring and difficult of all missions. That first press conference of 1943 and his State of the Union Address to the Congress six days later, when he again spoke of an organization of the United Nations whose function would be to maintain peace, set the pattern for that year—and for his thoughts and activities until his death.

Of course, the President knew full well that no one Nation alone could lead the world from chaotic war into assured peace and decency. And so, at the great conferences of 1943— at Casablanca, at Quebec, at Teheran—conferences of great military significance, the subjects of a postwar organization for peace and other postwar international problems stood side by side on the agenda with military topics. These meetings were important not
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only in a military sense; they were important in that they pro-
vided experience to the great powers in working together for a
common goal. At some of these meetings there were discussed
postwar objectives: making “a peace which will . . . banish the
scourge and terror of war for many generations” — with means
of getting the “active participation of all Nations, large and
small . . . to the elimination of tyranny and slavery, oppression
and intolerance” — with reaching “the day when all peoples of
the world may live free lives, untouched by tyranny, and accord-
ing to their varying desires and their own consciences.”

These quotations from the Declaration of Teheran, December
1, 1943, have a somewhat hollow ring six years later, but they still
express the aspirations of civilized mankind. When published
in 1943 over the signatures of Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin,
they were a great milestone — and they still are — in the history
of the search of man for a way to avoid war.

The President believed, and he frequently said, that the best
way for people to learn to work together was for them to work
together. He did not want them to delay this lesson until after
victory was won; he started while the fighting was still at its
height. It was as early as 1943 that the United Nations Food and
Agriculture Conference took place; that U.N.R.R.A. was started;
that the idea of the later Bretton Woods Conference was de-
veloped.

In a press conference on March 30, 1943, the President dis-
cussed the benefits which came from these international talks
and conferences. He contrasted what was being done with what
had been left undone in the first World War in which “there
had been very little work done on the postwar problems before
Armistice Day.”

He did more than plan, did more than organize, did more
than state general principles. He also led this Nation in setting
an example to the world of the international justice and decency
which he espoused. For, during 1943, at the President’s urging,
Philippine postwar independence was assured; provision was
made for Puerto Rican self-government; and the vestigial rem-
nant of American imperialism in the Far East was eliminated with the voluntary abandonment of extraterritorial rights in China. The President was beginning to put into actual practice the great principles of postwar international conduct.

It was not only postwar international planning to which the President devoted himself during this year. He turned his attention and emphasis to the planning for our own postwar national economy.

Planning for a fuller life for the returning veterans, planning for their education, planning for reconversion of our wartime industrial structure and for the administrative transition to peace—these are examples of far-sighted leadership in 1943. There were many who felt that the President was making a mistake; that it was dangerous to talk of what was to come in the United States after the war, with victory still to be won. This advice the President rejected. He knew that the time to plan for peace was beforehand.

And so, as victory came closer, the planning covered many areas, and became more detailed. The parable which the President used—a parable well designed to bring the idea home to all Americans—was the one about Old Dr. New Deal and Dr. Win-the-War. In his press conference of December 28, 1943—the last one in this volume—he pointed out that in 1933 Dr. New Deal had been called in to save "an awfully sick patient" who was suffering from "a grave internal disorder." Over a period of years of treatment by New Deal measures his ills were cured.

The patient was getting along fine, the President said, and would now be able to resist any new attacks of the same kind of illness he had in 1933. But two years ago, on December 7, 1941, "the patient had a very bad accident—not an internal trouble... he was in a pretty bad smashup—broke his hip, broke his leg in two or three places." He has since been under treatment by "a partner of... Old Dr. New Deal... an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Win-the-War." The result is that "the patient is back on his feet. He has given up his crutches. He isn't wholly well yet, and he won't be until he wins the war." The old internal remedies of Dr. New Deal were fine; but "at the present time,
obviously, the principal emphasis, the overwhelming first emphasis should be on winning the war.”

But here is the point the President emphasized: “When victory comes, the program of the past, of course, has got to be carried on... We must plan for, and help to bring about, an expanded economy which will result in more security, in more employment, in more recreation, in more education, in more health, in better housing for all of our citizens, so that the conditions of 1932 and the beginning of 1933 won’t come back again.”

In the postwar period, old Dr. New Deal was again going to be in charge of the patient. And his pharmaceutical equipment was going to be the measures listed above by the President. Indeed, the list was soon to be formally presented to the Congress as Roosevelt’s broad domestic program for the future — under the title of the Economic Bill of Rights.

That program is essentially still the program of the present Administration in Washington. It was all blueprinted six months before our troops landed on the Normandy beaches — to be presented as soon as we could dispense with the orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Win-the-War.

Leadership in public life is the ability to see what is coming around the corner, to inform the people about it, to devise the best means of meeting it, and to win the people’s approval to meet it. Judged by these standards, the events of 1943 and 1944 showed the qualities of leadership of which Franklin D. Roosevelt was capable — leadership in war, leadership in planning our economic democracy for the future; leadership in working with other Nations, leadership in framing an organization and developing a determined will for permanent peace.

New York, N. Y.
September 20, 1949
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The Tide Turns
New Year's Day Statement

One year ago, 26 Nations signed at Washington the Declaration by United Nations.

The world situation at that moment was grim indeed. Yet on that last New Year's Day, these Nations, bound together by the universal ideals of the Atlantic Charter, signed an act of faith that military aggression, treaty violation, and calculated savagery should be remorselessly overwhelmed by their combined might and the sacred principles of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness be restored as cherished ideals of mankind. They thus created the mightiest coalition in history, mighty not only for its overwhelming material force but still more for its eternal spiritual values. Three other Nations have since joined that coalition.

The unity thus achieved amidst dire danger has borne rich fruit. The United Nations are passing from the defensive to the offensive.

The unity achieved on the battle line is being earnestly sought in the not less complex problems on a different front. In this as in no previous war men are conscious of the supreme necessity of planning what is to come after—and of carrying forward into peace the common effort which will have brought them victory in the war. They have come to see that the maintenance and safeguarding of peace is the most vital single necessity in the lives of each and all of us.

Our task on this New Year's Day is threefold: first, to press on with the massed forces of free humanity till the present bandit assault upon civilization is completely crushed; second, so to organize relations among Nations that forces of barbarism can never again break loose; third, to cooperate to the end that mankind may enjoy in peace and in freedom the unprecedented blessings which Divine Providence through the progress of civilization has put within our reach.
2 (The Eight Hundred and Seventy-first Press Conference (Excerpt). January 1, 1943

*Organization for maintenance of peace.)*

**THE PRESIDENT:** In the first place, a Happy New Year to all of you!

**VOICES:** Happy New Year to you, sir.

**THE PRESIDENT:** I was looking at the front row. The inspection is not bad at all. I don't know — it isn't as large a press conference as usual. *(Laughter)* And one of your colleagues in the front row suggests it's a matter of mind over matter. *(More laughter)*

For late comers I have asked Admiral McIntire to set up in your room out there a little dispensary for today — *(laughter)* which I thought would help in the general merriment.

I haven’t anything except a statement on this particular day, because it’s the first anniversary of the United Nations. One year ago we signed the original declaration — 26 Nations; and three more have signed up since then.

I think it’s a very real and important anniversary, because it means a relationship not merely for the actual running of the war and winning of the war, but necessarily for the post-war period. I think all of us want those United Nations to remain united at the end of the war, just as they are during the war. . . .

**Q.** Mr. President, would you like to expand on what you just said about the postwar period?

**THE PRESIDENT:** Of course, as I think has been intimated before, there are a great many objectives when peace comes, so that we won't go back to the old menace of the prewar period — a
great many things the United Nations ought to and I think will remain united for.

However, there is one thing which at the present time stands out as the most important war objective, and that is to maintain peace, so that all of us, in going through this war, including the men on the fighting fronts and on the seas, will not have to go through another world cataclysm again, and they will have some reasonable assurance that their children won't have to go through it again. Almost all the other things we hope to get out of the war are more or less dependent on the maintenance of peace—all kinds of planning for the future, economic and social, and so forth and so on. It isn't an awful lot of use if there is going to be another world war in ten years, or fifteen years or twenty years. All the planning for the future is dependent, obviously, on peace.

Q. Could we put quotes around that?

THE PRESIDENT: It isn't very well expressed.

Q. That last sentence, sir. (*The President indicated approval, and the reporter read back, "All the planning for the future is dependent, obviously, on peace.")

Q. Mr. President, would you care to say how you think that can be maintained after the war?

THE PRESIDENT: No, no. That's a different thing. In other words, you are talking about details. I am talking about objectives. I think we have got to keep that very firmly in mind on everything we do from now on. The details are not the important thing. The issue is: the objective.

Q. I think that whole thing was very well put, sir. I don't like to press it, but I wonder if we can—?

THE PRESIDENT: Well—(*then turning to Mr. Early*)

MR. EARLY: I think you will need to edit it a little, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Probably needs a little editing. I am not sure that the English is good. (*Laughter*) Jack [Romagna—the official press conference stenographer]—why don't you boys wait; it will take Jack three minutes to type it out, and send it in to me, and then I will send it out.
3. The Annual Budget Message

NOTE: See Item 1 and note, 1942 volume, for the Declaration by United Nations which was signed in Washington, D.C. on January 1, 1942. See Item 1, this volume, for the text of the President's statement honoring the first anniversary of the Declaration.

33 The Annual Budget Message.

January 6, 1943

To the Congress:

I am transmitting herewith a war Budget exceeding 100 billion dollars for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1943. Last year I called the Budget an instrument for transforming a peace economy into a war economy. This Budget presents the maximum program for waging war.

We wage total war because our very existence is threatened. Without that supreme effort we cannot hope to retain the freedom and self-respect which give life its value.

Total war is grim reality. It means the dedication of our lives and resources to a single objective: Victory.

Total war in a democracy is a violent conflict in which everyone must anticipate that both lives and possessions will be assigned to their most effective use in the common effort — the effort for community survival — Nation survival.

In total war we are all soldiers, whether in uniform, overalls, or shirt sleeves.

Budgeting for Total War

War expenditures. The huge and expanding rate of war expenditures shows our determination to equip our fighting forces and those of our allies with the instruments of war needed for victory. Monthly expenditures for war purposes amounted to 2 billion dollars just after Pearl Harbor; they now exceed 6 billion dollars and they will average more than 8 billion dollars a month during the fiscal year 1944. For the whole of the current fiscal
The Annual Budget Message

year total war expenditures are now estimated at 77 billion dollars; for the next fiscal year, at 100 billion dollars. These estimates include the net outlays of Government corporations for war purposes and assume only a small rise in prices.

Victory cannot be bought with any amount of money, however large; victory is achieved by the blood of soldiers, the sweat of working men and women, and the sacrifice of all people. But a 100-billion-dollar expenditure program does reflect a national effort of gigantic magnitude. It calls for vision on the part of those in charge of war production, ingenuity of management, and the skill, devotion, and tenacity of the men on the farms and in the factories. It makes possible the expansion of our armed forces necessary to offensive operations, the production of planes and munitions to provide unquestioned superiority, and the construction of ships which will make it possible for us to strike at the enemy wherever he may be. It reflects the determination of the civilians to "pass the ammunition." Moreover, consumers' goods and services will have to be produced in an amount adequate to maintain the health and productivity of the civilian population. And all of this will have to be done while we are withdrawing millions of men from production for service in the armed forces.

Some persons may believe that such a program is fantastic. My reply is that this program is feasible. If the Nation's manpower and resources are fully harnessed, I am confident that the objective of this program can be reached, but it requires a complete recognition of the necessities of total war by all — management, labor, farmers, consumers, and public servants — regardless of party. Production short of these military requirements would be a betrayal of our fighting men.

This Budget does not include the detailed estimates of war expenditures which would reveal information to our enemies. An additional reason for such action at this time is that rapid developments on far-flung battle fronts make it impossible to submit a detailed war Budget for a year ending eighteen months hence. I shall continue, however, to report on the broad categories of
war expenditures. The following table summarizes our present estimates of war expenditures from general and special accounts and by Government corporations.

### ESTIMATES OF TOTAL EXPENDITURES FOR WAR, FISCAL YEARS 1943 AND 1944

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Object of expenditure</th>
<th>Fiscal 1943</th>
<th>Fiscal 1944</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Munitions</td>
<td>$43</td>
<td>$66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military and civilian pay, subsistence, and travel</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial construction</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other construction</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other, including agricultural lend-lease</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>77</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This spring I shall submit the necessary information upon which the Congress can base war appropriations for the fiscal year 1944. In the meantime there are available about 170 billion dollars of unspent war appropriations and authorizations; about two-thirds of this amount is already obligated or committed. Further appropriations will soon be needed to permit letting of contracts with industry for the next year.

**THE PROCUREMENT OF MUNITIONS.** Total mobilization of all our men and women, all our equipment, and all our materials in a balanced production program will enable us to accomplish the production goals underlying this war Budget.

**Manpower.** Marked progress has been made in mobilizing manpower. In spite of the increase in the armed services, industrial production rose by 46 percent and agricultural production by 15 percent between calendar years 1940 and 1942. Industrial production has not been delayed and crops have not been lost because of lack of manpower except in a few isolated cases. More than 10 million people have been added to the employed or the armed forces since the summer of 1940, 7 million of whom were
unemployed and more than 3 million of whom are additions to the Nation's labor and armed forces.

Manpower mobilization is now entering a much more difficult phase. During the calendar year 1943 approximately 6 million people will be needed above present requirements for the armed services and war production. This number can be obtained by transferring from less essential work, and by drawing into the working force people who have not recently sought employment. Vigorous action is required to mobilize and train our reserve of women and young people, to accelerate the transfer of workers to essential industries, and to reduce harmful turnover and migration of workers in essential industries. It also requires prevention of labor hoarding and elimination of hiring restrictions based on sex, creed, or race. I reiterate my previous recommendation for a unified and adequate rehabilitation service to make available a million persons for war industry and to restore to civil employment persons who are being disabled in the armed forces.

Manpower needs of the armed forces and of war production during the calendar year 1943 can be met without impairment of essential civilian requirements. I stress the important distinction between "essential requirements" and the thousand and one things that are non-essentials or luxuries. The production of these non-essentials wastes manpower at a time when careful economy and greater efficiency in the use of our manpower resources is imperative. Private thought and public discussion of this subject are very necessary.

Equipment. Were it not for an unprecedented program of conversion and the building up of a new war industry during the past two and one-half years, we could not expect to fulfill the war-production program outlined in this Message.

Some progress, but not enough, has been made in spreading war contracts more widely among medium-sized and smaller plants. Further efforts are necessary. In certain cases, of course, saving of manpower and materials requires concentration in those plants best equipped to produce a given commodity.
3. The Annual Budget Message

Materials. Furthermore, war production is limited by our supply of raw materials. The available materials must be transformed into the maximum of striking power. The production of less urgent or the wrong quantity of items, or poor scheduling of production in any single plant or in the munitions program as a whole, results in waste of precious materials. The Nation's war production must be so scheduled that the right items are produced in the right amounts at the right time.

War contracts. The procurement program must achieve maximum production with minimum waste and with the speed essential in time of war. This is the controlling objective not only for the original negotiation of contracts but also for the renegotiation required by law. The law provides for the prevention or recapture of excessive profits, thus supplementing and reinforcing the objectives of the excess profits tax. I believe that control of the costs of production is of equal importance.

The proper negotiation and renegotiation of contracts must strive to reconcile the avoidance of excessive profits with the maintenance of incentives to economical management.

Farm and Food Program. Food is a primary weapon of war. An adequate food supply is, therefore, a basic aspect of a total war program. I have placed in the hands of the Secretary of Agriculture full responsibility for determining and fulfilling the food requirements in this war. Our agricultural production is larger than ever in our history but the needs of our armed services and our Allies are so great that a shortage of certain foods is inevitable. The production of the less-needed commodities must be reduced, while the production of commodities for war and essential civilian use must be increased. It is imperative also that this increased demand for food be adjusted to available supplies. There will be sufficient volume in our bill of fare but less variety. That may hurt our taste but not our health.

To facilitate this program, I am recommending appropriations for Aids to Agriculture totaling 837 million dollars for the fiscal year 1944. Among the major items included in the 837-million-dollar total are 400 million for conservation and use of agricul-
tural land resources; 194 million for parity payments on the 1942 crops; and 96 million for exportation and domestic consumption of surplus commodities. Other large items included are 64 million dollars for payments under the Sugar Act; 38 million for the Farm Security Administration; and 31 million for reductions in interest rates on farm mortgages.

Prior to the 1943 appropriation acts, annual appropriations for parity payments were made a year in advance of actual need, and acreage allotments for the year ahead were used as a factor in determining payments on the crops of the current year. In the 1943 Budget and appropriation acts, provisions were made to insure that all factors used in determining the amount of parity payments on the crops of a given year would pertain to the program of that year. Also, to bring this item into conformity with our general budgetary practice, the annual cash appropriation for parity payments was omitted, but the Secretary was authorized to incur contractual obligations assuring the cooperating producers of cotton, corn, wheat, rice, and tobacco that such payments would be made, if and as necessary, on their 1942 crops.

The appropriation now requested, therefore, is simply the amount estimated to be necessary to compensate the producers of corn, wheat, and certain minor types of tobacco for the disparity between the market returns from the normal yield of their 1942 allotted acreage and the parity price return from that production. It is expected that no parity payments will be necessary on the 1942 crops of cotton, rice, and most types of tobacco.

Since the established national policy is to assure the cooperating producers of these basic crops parity prices on the normal yields of their allotted acreages, I am again recommending that the authority to incur contractual obligations for such payments on future crops be renewed.

On the other hand, I am recommending a reduction of 50 million dollars in the appropriation for conservation and use of agricultural land resources. I am also directing the Secretary of Agriculture to utilize the 400 million dollars still provided under this heading as fully and effectively as the basic law will permit to
3. The Annual Budget Message

encourage greater production of the crops essential to the war effort. This fund will not be used for restriction of production except of less-needed crops. Payments will be made only to those producers who comply fully in their plantings with the stated war-production goals.

For exportation and domestic consumption of agricultural commodities the Budget includes only the permanent annual appropriation of 30 percent of customs revenues provided by law, plus reappropriation of unobligated balances. The food-stamp plan, which is a major item of the current program, will be discontinued shortly. Although other items such as school lunch and school milk projects and the direct distribution of surplus commodities are somewhat expanded, there will be an over-all reduction of about 30 million dollars.

Provision for operations under the Farm Tenant Act and for loans, grants, and rural rehabilitation are continued on about the same level as for the current year. Small farms, like other small war plants, must be encouraged to make a maximum contribution to the war. I hope the Congress will give as much sympathetic consideration to these smaller and poorer farmers as it has given to the smaller and poorer industrial concerns.

Because no one can immediately foresee all the needs we may encounter in fulfilling our essential war requirements for agriculture, various loan and purchase operations, involving contingent liabilities which cannot be exactly predetermined, may be necessary.

CIVILIAN CONSUMPTION. In spite of a 100-billion-dollar war program, civilians can be supplied with an average of about $500 worth of goods and services during the next year. This implies an average reduction of almost 25 percent in civilian consumption below the record level of the calendar year 1941. Even then most of us will be better fed, better clothed, and better housed than other peoples in the world. Do not let us assume from that statement, however, that there is no need for great improvement in the living conditions of a large segment of our population.

It is the responsibility of the Government to plan for more
production of essential civilian goods and less of non-essential
goods. Production and distribution of goods should be simplified
and standardized; unnecessary costs and frills should be elimi-
nated. Total war demands simplification of American life. By
giving up what we do not need, all of us will be better able to
get what we do need.

In order to distribute the scarce necessities of life equitably we
are rationing some commodities. By rationing we restrict con-
sumption, but only to assure to each civilian his share of basic
commodities.

The essentials for civilian life also include a good standard of
health and medical service, education, and care for children in
wartime as well as in peace.

THE STABILIZATION PROGRAM. We must assure each citizen the
necessities of life at prices which he can pay. Otherwise, rising
prices will lift many goods beyond his reach just as surely as if
those goods did not exist. By a concerted effort to stabilize prices,
rents, and wages we have succeeded in keeping the rise in the
cost of living within narrow bounds. We shall continue those
efforts, and we shall succeed. By making effective use of all meas-
ures of control, we shall be able to stabilize prices with only a
limited use of subsidies to stimulate needed production.

Some would like to see the controls relaxed for this or that
special group. They forget that to relax controls for one group is
an argument to relax for other groups, thereby starting the cost-
of-living spiral which would undermine the war effort and cause
grave postwar difficulties. Economic stabilization for all groups
—not for just the other fellow—is the only policy consistent
with the requirements of total war. I have read of this bloc, and
that bloc, and the other bloc, which existed in past Congresses.
May this new Congress confine itself to one bloc—a national
bloc.

Stabilization goes beyond effective price control. Under war
conditions a rise in profits, wages, and farm incomes unfortu-
nately does not increase the supply of goods for civilians; it
merely invites the bidding up of prices of scarce commodities.
3. The Annual Budget Message

The stabilization of incomes and the absorption of excess purchasing power by fiscal measures are essential for the success of the stabilization program. I am confident that the Congress will implement that program by adequate legislation increasing taxation, savings, or both. Thus, we will help to "pay as we go" and make the coming peace easier for ourselves and our children.

CIVILIAN CONTROLS IN TOTAL WAR. Total war requires nothing less than organizing all the human and material resources of the Nation. To accomplish this all-out mobilization speedily, effectively, and fairly we have had to adopt extensive controls over civilian life. We use the Selective Service System to man the armed forces. We are systematizing the movement of labor to assure needed manpower to war industries and agriculture. We regulate prices, wages, salaries, and rents; we limit consumer credit; we allocate scarce raw materials; and we ration scarce consumer goods—all to the end of providing the materials of war and distributing the sacrifices equitably.

Such regulations and restrictions have complicated our daily lives. We save rubber, metal, fats—everything. We fill out forms, carry coupons, answer questionnaires. This is all new. We have overdone it in many cases. By trial and error we are learning simpler and better methods. But remember always that reaching the objective is what counts most. There is no easy, pleasant way to restrict the living habits—the eating, clothing, heating, travel, and working habits—of 130 million people. There is no easy, pleasant way to wage total war.

About 400,000 civilian employees of the Federal Government are engaged in the task of civilian administration for total war. They direct and schedule war production; handle the procurement of food, munitions, and equipment for our armed forces and our Allies; supervise wartime transportation; administer price, wage, rent, labor, and material controls and commodity rationing; conduct economic and propaganda offensives against our enemies; and do necessary paper work for the armed forces.

Besides these Government employees, millions of men and women volunteers—who draw no pay—are carrying out tasks of
war administration, many of them after long hours at their regular occupation. These patriotic citizens are serving on draft boards, on war price and ration boards, in the civilian defense organization, the war bond campaign, and many other activities. They deserve the gratitude of their countrymen.

More than 1,600,000—or approximately three-fifths—of all Federal civilian employees are engaged directly in war production. They build and load ships, make guns and shells, repair machines and equipment, build arsenals and camps, sew uniforms, operate airports and signal systems. These are the workers in navy yards, arsenals, storage depots, military airfields, and other operating centers. It is scarcely ethical to try to make people believe that these workers are holding down armchair or unnecessary Government jobs.

This huge organization, created overnight to meet our war needs, could not be expected to function smoothly from the very start. Congressional committees and many individuals have made helpful suggestions. Criticism is welcome if it is based on truth. We will continue our efforts to make the organization more fully effective.

Compensation of Federal employees. Last month the Congress took temporary and emergency action, which will expire April 30, 1943, relative to compensation for Federal employees. The legislation removed inequities, lengthened the work week to conserve manpower, increased payment for longer hours, and provided bonus payments for certain employees. The pay increases should be met largely by reducing the total number of employees proportionate to the increase in the work week.

In the present appropriation requests and expenditure estimates for the fiscal years 1943 and 1944, no allowance has been made for any cost increase resulting from the adjustment in Federal salaries.

The problems of Federal salary administration need further study in the early days of the new Congress for enactment of more permanent legislation for the duration of the war.
3. The Annual Budget Message

"Non-war" expenditures. I am making recommendations in the usual detail for so-called "non-war" appropriations for the fiscal year 1944. This classification includes the same items as in former years.

Actually, the "non-war" classification now has little, if any, meaning. Most of these expenditures are related to the war effort and many are directly occasioned by it. This "non-war" category includes, for instance, expenditures for war tax collections, for budgeting, disbursing, and auditing war expenditures, and for statistical and scientific services to war agencies. It includes also such items as the control of white pine blister rust, which I recently discussed. Expenditures for controlling this threat to our timber resources are necessary to avoid possible loss of millions of dollars in lumber from trees which require more than 50 years to reach maturity.

All counted, there are less than 850,000 civilian employees of the Federal Government, including the Postal Service, who are engaged in these so-called "non-war" activities.

A few weeks ago I transmitted to the Congress a comprehensive report on "non-war" expenditures during the past decade. This document demonstrated the important reductions which had been made in these expenditures, especially since the start of the defense program.

The table on p. 17 summarizes reductions analyzed in the report, to which it is now possible to add revised estimates for the fiscal year 1943 and estimates for 1944 as developed in this Budget.

The table shows a reduction of 36.7 percent in "non-war" expenditures in the next fiscal year compared with 1939. In appraising these reductions, it should be borne in mind that large items, such as veterans' pensions and social-security grants, are controlled by legal or other commitments. In fact the outstanding increase for the fiscal year 1944 is for the Veterans Administration, for which expenditures are estimated at 879 million dollars, or 265 million dollars higher than in the current year. Most of
3. The Annual Budget Message

the increase is for insurance for our fighting forces in the present war.

The most important reductions recommended for the coming year relate to work relief and general public works. Because of present high levels of employment, I am able to recommend elimination of the Work Projects Administration. This action under present conditions does not cast upon the State and local governments more than the proper burden of financing the relief of those who are unable to work. Expenditures for general public works will be greatly curtailed. Continuing projects are directly related to war needs. Others have been discontinued as rapidly as this could be done without risking the loss of the investment already made.

I shall be glad to cooperate with the Congress in effecting further reductions in "non-war" expenditures through the necessary revision of underlying legislation and in every other way. It should be pointed out to the Congress and to the Nation, however, that we are fast approaching the subsistence level of government — the minimum for sustaining orderly social and economic processes — and that further reductions will necessarily be of much smaller magnitude than those already achieved.

My recommendations contemplate that in the fiscal year 1944,
3. The Annual Budget Message

96 cents of every dollar expended by the Federal Government will be used to pay war costs and interest on the public debt, and only 4 cents for all the so-called "non-war" purposes.

INTEREST. War financing has raised the requirement for interest on the public debt from 1,041 million dollars in 1940, the fiscal year before the defense program started, to an estimated 1,850 million dollars for the current year and 3,000 million dollars for the fiscal year 1944 under existing legislation.

FINANCING TOTAL WAR

THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL FUNDS. Financing expenditures which will exceed 100 billion dollars is a task of tremendous magnitude. By meeting this task squarely we will contribute substantially to the war effort and clear the ground for successful reconstruction after the war. An adequate financial program is essential both for winning the war and for winning the peace.

Financing total war involves two main fiscal problems. One problem is to supply the funds currently required to pay for the war and to keep the increase in Federal debt within bounds. The second problem is caused by the disbursement of 100 billion dollars a year to contractors, war workers, farmers, soldiers, and their families, thus adding many billions to the people's buying power, at a time when the amount of goods to be bought is declining steadily. A large portion of this excess buying power must be recovered into the Treasury to prevent the excess from being used to bid up the price of scarce goods and thus undermine the stabilization program by breaking price ceilings, creating black markets, and increasing the cost of living.

We cannot hope to increase tax collections as fast as we step up war expenditures or to absorb by fiscal measures alone all excess purchasing power created by these expenditures. We must, therefore, provide a substantial portion of the needed funds by additional borrowing, and we must also use direct controls, such as price ceilings and rationing, for the protection of the consumer. Nevertheless, the more nearly increases in tax receipts follow in-
increases in expenditures, the better we safeguard our financial integrity and the easier the administration of price control and rationing. All of these measures are interrelated. Each increase in taxes and each increase in savings will lessen the upward pressure on prices and reduce the amount of rationing and other direct controls we shall need.

The revenue acts of the past three years, particularly the Revenue Act of 1942, have contributed greatly toward meeting our fiscal needs. In the fiscal year 1944, total general and special receipts under present law are estimated at 35 billion dollars, or almost six times those of the fiscal year 1940. But the increase in expenditures has been even more rapid.

I believe that we should strive to collect not less than 16 billion dollars of additional funds by taxation, savings, or both, during the fiscal year 1944.

On the basis of present legislation, we expect to meet 34 percent of total estimated Federal expenditures by current receipts during the fiscal year 1944. If the objective proposed in this Message is adopted, we shall meet approximately 50 percent of expenditures during the fiscal year 1944.

THE NEED FOR A BALANCED AND FLEXIBLE REVENUE SYSTEM. I hope that the Congress in working out the revenue program will consider that the fiscal measures must be designed not only to provide revenue, but also to support the stabilization program as well by deterring luxury or non-essential spending. The cost of the war should be distributed in an equitable and fair manner. Furthermore, care should be taken that the fiscal measures do not impair but actually promote maximum war production. Finally, it is more important than ever before to simplify taxation both for taxpayers and for those collecting the tax, and to put our taxes as far as feasible on a pay-as-you-go basis.

I cannot ask the Congress to impose the necessarily heavy financial burdens on the lower and middle incomes unless the taxes on higher and very large incomes are made fully effective. At a time when wages and salaries are stabilized, the receipt of
very large net incomes from any source constitutes a gross inequity undermining national unity.

Fairness requires the closing of loopholes and the removal of inequities which still exist in our tax laws. I have spoken on these subjects on several previous occasions.

The Congress can do much to solve our problem of war finance and to support the stabilization program. In the past, wars have usually been paid for mainly by means of inflation, thereby shifting the greatest burden to the weakest shoulders and inviting postwar collapse. We seek to avoid both. Of necessity, the program must be harsh. We should remember, however, that it is a war for existence, and not taxation, which compels us to devote more than one-half of all our resources to war use. An effective program of war finance does not add to the total sacrifices necessitated by war, but it does assure that those sacrifices are distributed equitably and with a minimum of friction.

We should remember, furthermore, that helping to finance the war is the privilege mainly of those who still enjoy the receipt of incomes as civilians during the war. It is a modest contribution toward victory when we compare it with the contribution of those in the fighting forces.

By the end of the current fiscal year, the public debt will total 135 billion dollars. By June 30, 1944, it will be about 210 billion dollars under existing revenue legislation. Before the present debt limit of 125 billion dollars is reached, the Congress will be requested to extend that limit. To do this is sound, for such a debt can and will be repaid. The Nation is soundly solvent.

Preparing for Total Victory

Preparing for total victory includes preparing the base on which a happier world can be built. The tremendous productive capacity of our country, of all countries, has been demonstrated. Freedom from want for everybody, everywhere, is no longer a Utopian dream. It can be translated into action when the fear of aggression has been removed by victory. The soldiers of the fighting forces and the workmen engaged in military production want
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to be assured that they will return to a life of opportunity and security in a society of free men.

The economic stabilization program, although born of war necessity, will greatly facilitate postwar reconstruction. A determined policy of war taxation and savings will aid in making postwar problems manageable by reducing the volume of additional borrowing and supporting the stabilization program. Because of the unavoidable magnitude of interest-bearing debt, taxes probably will never revert to their prewar level. But substantial reduction from the war level will, nevertheless, be possible and will go hand in hand with a greater human security if the underlying fiscal structure is kept sound.

I shall be happy to meet with the appropriate committees of the Congress at any and all times in regard to the methods by which they propose to attain the objectives outlined in this Message. We are at one in our great desire quickly to win this war and to avoid passing on to future generations more than their just share of its sacrifices and burdens.

4 ("The Spirit of This Nation Is Strong—the Faith of This Nation Is Eternal")—Address to the Congress on the State of the Union.

January 7, 1943

Mr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker, Members of the Seventy-eighth Congress:

This Seventy-eighth Congress assembles in one of the great moments in the history of the Nation. The past year was perhaps the most crucial for modern civilization; the coming year will be filled with violent conflicts—yet with high promise of better things.

We must appraise the events of 1942 according to their relative importance; we must exercise a sense of proportion.

First in importance in the American scene has been the in-
spiring proof of the great qualities of our fighting men. They have demonstrated these qualities in adversity as well as in victory. As long as our flag flies over this Capitol, Americans will honor the soldiers, sailors, and marines who fought our first battles of this war against overwhelming odds—the heroes, living and dead, of Wake and Bataan and Guadalcanal, of the Java Sea and Midway and the North Atlantic convoys. Their unconquerable spirit will live forever.

By far the largest and most important developments in the whole world-wide strategic picture of 1942 were the events of the long fronts in Russia: first, the implacable defense of Stalingrad; and, second, the offensives by the Russian armies at various points that started in the latter part of November and which still roll on with great force and effectiveness.

The other major events of the year were: the series of Japanese advances in the Philippines, the East Indies, Malaya, and Burma; the stopping of that Japanese advance in the mid-Pacific, the South Pacific, and the Indian Oceans; the successful defense of the Near East by the British counterattack through Egypt and Libya; the American-British occupation of North Africa. Of continuing importance in the year 1942 were the unending and bitterly contested battles of the convoy routes, and the gradual passing of air superiority from the Axis to the United Nations.

The Axis powers knew that they must win the war in 1942—or eventually lose everything. I do not need to tell you that our enemies did not win the war in 1942.

In the Pacific area, our most important victory in 1942 was the air and naval battle off Midway Island. That action is historically important because it secured for our use communication lines stretching thousands of miles in every direction. In placing this emphasis on the Battle of Midway, I am not unmindful of other successful actions in the Pacific, in the air and on land and afloat—especially those on the Coral Sea and New Guinea and in the Solomon Islands. But these actions were essentially defensive. They were part of the delaying strategy that characterized this phase of the war.
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During this period we inflicted steady losses upon the enemy — great losses of Japanese planes and naval vessels, transports and cargo ships. As early as one year ago, we set as a primary task in the war of the Pacific a day-by-day and week-by-week and month-by-month destruction of more Japanese war materials than Japanese industry could replace. Most certainly, that task has been and is being performed by our fighting ships and planes. And a large part of this task has been accomplished by the gallant crews of our American submarines who strike on the other side of the Pacific at Japanese ships — right up at the very mouth of the harbor of Yokohama.

We know that as each day goes by, Japanese strength in ships and planes is going down and down, and American strength in ships and planes is going up and up. And so I sometimes feel that the eventual outcome can now be put on a mathematical basis. That will become evident to the Japanese people themselves when we strike at their own home islands, and bomb them constantly from the air.

And in the attacks against Japan, we shall be joined with the heroic people of China — that great people whose ideals of peace are so closely akin to our own. Even today we are flying as much lend-lease material into China as ever traversed the Burma Road, flying it over mountains 17,000 feet high, flying blind through sleet and snow. We shall overcome all the formidable obstacles, and get the battle equipment into China to shatter the power of our common enemy. From this war, China will realize the security, the prosperity and the dignity, which Japan has sought so ruthlessly to destroy.

The period of our defensive attrition in the Pacific is drawing to a close. Now our aim is to force the Japanese to fight. Last year, we stopped them. This year, we intend to advance.

Turning now to the European theater of war, during this past year it was clear that our first task was to lessen the concentrated pressure on the Russian front by compelling Germany to divert part of her manpower and equipment to another theater of war.

After months of secret planning and preparation in the utmost
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detail, an enormous amphibious expedition was embarked for
French North Africa from the United States and the United
Kingdom in literally hundreds of ships. It reached its objectives
with very small losses, and has already produced an important
effect upon the whole situation of the war. It has opened to at-
tack what Mr. Churchill well described as “the under-belly of
the Axis,” and it has removed the always dangerous threat of an
Axis attack through West Africa against the South Atlantic
Ocean and the continent of South America itself.

The well-timed and splendidly executed offensive from Egypt
by the British Eighth Army was a part of the same major strategy
of the United Nations.

Great rains and appalling mud and very limited communica-
tions have delayed the final battles of Tunisia. The Axis is rein-
forcing its strong positions. But I am confident that though the
fighting will be tough, when the final Allied assault is made, the
last vestige of Axis power will be driven from the whole of the
south shores of the Mediterranean.

Any review of the year 1942 must emphasize the magnitude
and the diversity of the military activities in which this Nation
has become engaged. As I speak to you, approximately one and a
half million of our soldiers, sailors, marines, and fliers are in serv-
ice outside of our continental limits, all through the world. Our
merchant seamen, in addition, are carrying supplies to them and
to our allies over every sea lane.

Few Americans realize the amazing growth of our air strength,
though I am sure our enemy does. Day in and day out our forces
are bombing the enemy and meeting him in combat on many
different fronts in every part of the world. And for those who
question the quality of our aircraft and the ability of our fliers,
I point to the fact that, in Africa, we are shooting down two
enemy planes to every one we lose, and in the Pacific and the
Southwest Pacific we are shooting them down four to one.

We pay great tribute—the tribute of the United States of
America—to the fighting men of Russia and China and Britain
and the various members of the British Commonwealth—the
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millions of men who through the years of this war have fought our common enemies, and have denied to them the world conquest which they sought.

We pay tribute to the soldiers and fliers and seamen of others of the United Nations whose countries have been overrun by Axis hordes.

As a result of the Allied occupation of North Africa, powerful units of the French Army and Navy are going into action. They are in action with the United Nations forces. We welcome them as allies and as friends. They join with those Frenchmen who, since the dark days of June, 1940, have been fighting valiantly for the liberation of their stricken country.

We pay tribute to the fighting leaders of our allies, to Winston Churchill, to Joseph Stalin, and to the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Yes, there is a very great unanimity between the leaders of the United Nations. This unity is effective in planning and carrying out the major strategy of this war and in building up and in maintaining the lines of supplies.

I cannot prophesy. I cannot tell you when or where the United Nations are going to strike next in Europe. But we are going to strike—and strike hard. I cannot tell you whether we are going to hit them in Norway, or through the Low Countries, or in France, or through Sardinia or Sicily, or through the Balkans, or through Poland—or at several points simultaneously. But I can tell you that no matter where and when we strike by land, we and the British and the Russians will hit them from the air heavily and relentlessly. Day in and day out we shall heap tons upon tons of high explosives on their war factories and utilities and seaports.

Hitler and Mussolini will understand now the enormity of their miscalculations—that the Nazis would always have the advantage of superior airpower as they did when they bombed Warsaw, and Rotterdam, and London and Coventry. That superiority has gone—forever.

Yes, the Nazis and the Fascists have asked for it—and they are going to get it.
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Our forward progress in this war has depended upon our progress on the production front.

There has been criticism of the management and conduct of our war production. Much of this self-criticism has had a healthy effect. It has spurred us on. It has reflected a normal American impatience to get on with the job. We are the kind of people who are never quite satisfied with anything short of miracles.

But there has been some criticism based on guesswork and even on malicious falsification of fact. Such criticism creates doubts and creates fears, and weakens our total effort.

I do not wish to suggest that we should be completely satisfied with our production progress — today, or next month, or ever. But I can report to you with genuine pride on what has been accomplished in 1942.

A year ago we set certain production goals for 1942 and for 1943. Some people, including some experts, thought that we had pulled some big figures out of a hat just to frighten the Axis. But we had confidence in the ability of our people to establish new records. And that confidence has been justified.

Of course, we realized that some production objectives would have to be changed — some of them adjusted upward, and others downward; some items would be taken out of the program altogether, and others added. This was inevitable as we gained battle experience, and as technological improvements were made.

Our 1942 airplane production and tank production fell short, numerically — stress the word numerically — of the goals set a year ago. Nevertheless, we have plenty of reason to be proud of our record for 1942. We produced 48,000 military planes — more than the airplane production of Germany, Italy, and Japan put together. Last month, in December, we produced 5,500 military planes and the rate is rapidly rising. Furthermore, we must remember that as each month passes by, the averages of our types weigh more, take more man-hours to make, and have more striking power.

In tank production, we revised our schedule — and for good and sufficient reasons. As a result of hard experience in battle,
we have diverted a portion of our tank-producing capacity to a stepped-up production of new, deadly field weapons, especially self-propelled artillery.

Here are some other production figures:

In 1942, we produced 56,000 combat vehicles, such as tanks and self-propelled artillery.

In 1942, we produced 670,000 machine guns, six times greater than our production in 1941 and three times greater than our total production during the year and a half of our participation in the first World War.

We produced 21,000 anti-tank guns, six times greater than our 1941 production.

We produced ten and a quarter billion rounds of small-arms ammunition, five times greater than our 1941 production and three times greater than our total production in the first World War.

We produced 181 million rounds of artillery ammunition, twelve times greater than our 1941 production and ten times greater than our total production in the first World War.

I think the arsenal of democracy is making good.

These facts and figures that I have given will give no great aid and comfort to the enemy. On the contrary, I can imagine that they will give him considerable discomfort. I suspect that Hitler and Tojo will find it difficult to explain to the German and Japanese people just why it is that “decadent, inefficient democracy” can produce such phenomenal quantities of weapons and munitions — and fighting men.

We have given the lie to certain misconceptions — which is an extremely polite word — especially the one which holds that the various blocs or groups within a free country cannot forego their political and economic differences in time of crisis and work together toward a common goal.

While we have been achieving this miracle of production, during the past year our armed forces have grown from a little over 2,000,000 to 7,000,000. In other words, we have withdrawn from the labor force and the farms some 5,000,000 of our younger
workers. And in spite of this, our farmers have contributed their share to the common effort by producing the greatest quantity of food ever made available during a single year in all our history.

I wonder is there any person among us so simple as to believe that all this could have been done without creating some dislocations in our normal national life, some inconveniences, and even some hardships?

Who can have hoped to have done this without burdensome Government regulations which are a nuisance to everyone — including those who have the thankless task of administering them?

We all know that there have been mistakes — mistakes due to the inevitable process of trial and error inherent in doing big things for the first time. We all know that there have been too many complicated forms and questionnaires. I know about that. I have had to fill some of them out myself.

But we are determined to see to it that our supplies of food and other essential civilian goods are distributed on a fair and just basis — to rich and poor, management and labor, farmer and city dweller alike. We are determined to keep the cost of living at a stable level. All this has required much information. These forms and questionnaires represent an honest and sincere attempt by honest and sincere officials to obtain this information.

We have learned by the mistakes that we have made.

Our experience will enable us during the coming year to improve the necessary mechanisms of wartime economic controls, and to simplify administrative procedures. But we do not intend to leave things so lax that loopholes will be left for cheaters, for chiseler, or for the manipulators of the black market.

Of course, there have been disturbances and inconveniences — and even hardships. And there will be many, many more before we finally win. Yes, 1943 will not be an easy year for us on the home front. We shall feel in many ways in our daily lives the sharp pinch of total war.

Fortunately, there are only a few Americans who place appetite above patriotism. The overwhelming majority realize that
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the food we send abroad is for essential military purposes, for our own and Allied fighting forces, and for necessary help in areas that we occupy.

We Americans intend to do this great job together. In our common labors we must build and fortify the very foundation of national unity — confidence in one another.

It is often amusing, and it is sometimes politically profitable, to picture the City of Washington as a madhouse, with the Congress and the Administration disrupted with confusion and indecision and general incompetence.

However — what matters most in war is results. And the one pertinent fact is that after only a few years of preparation and only one year of warfare, we are able to engage, spiritually as well as physically, in the total waging of a total war.

Washington may be a madhouse — but only in the sense that it is the Capital City of a Nation which is fighting mad. And I think that Berlin and Rome and Tokyo, which had such contempt for the obsolete methods of democracy, would now gladly use all they could get of that same brand of madness.

And we must not forget that our achievements in production have been relatively no greater than those of the Russians and the British and the Chinese who have developed their own war industries under the incredible difficulties of battle conditions. They have had to continue work through bombings and blackouts. And they have never quit.

We Americans are in good, brave company in this war, and we are playing our own, honorable part in the vast common effort.

As spokesmen for the United States Government, you and I take off our hats to those responsible for our American production — to the owners, managers, and supervisors, to the draftsmen and the engineers, and to the workers — men and women — in factories and arsenals and shipyards and mines and mills and forests — and railroads and on highways.

We take off our hats to the farmers who have faced an unprecedented task of feeding not only a great Nation but a great part of the world.
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We take off our hats to all the loyal, anonymous, untiring men and women who have worked in private employment and in Government and who have endured rationing and other stringencies with good humor and good will.

Yes, we take off our hats to all Americans who have contributed so magnificently to our common cause.

I have sought to emphasize a sense of proportion in this review of the events of the war and the needs of the war.

We should never forget the things we are fighting for. But, at this critical period of the war, we should confine ourselves to the larger objectives and not get bogged down in argument over methods and details.

We, and all the United Nations, want a decent peace and a durable peace. In the years between the end of the first World War and the beginning of the second World War, we were not living under a decent or a durable peace.

I have reason to know that our boys at the front are concerned with two broad aims beyond the winning of the war; and their thinking and their opinion coincide with what most Americans here back home are mulling over. They know, and we know, that it would be inconceivable — it would, indeed, be sacrilegious — if this Nation and the world did not attain some real, lasting good out of all these efforts and sufferings and bloodshed and death.

The men in our armed forces want a lasting peace, and, equally, they want permanent employment for themselves, their families, and their neighbors when they are mustered out at the end of the war.

Two years ago I spoke in my Annual Message of four freedoms. The blessings of two of them — freedom of speech and freedom of religion — are an essential part of the very life of this Nation; and we hope that these blessings will be granted to all men everywhere.

The people at home, and the people at the front, are wondering a little about the third freedom — freedom from want. To them it means that when they are mustered out, when war pro-
duction is converted to the economy of peace, they will have the right to expect full employment—full employment for themselves and for all able-bodied men and women in America who want to work.

They expect the opportunity to work, to run their farms, their stores, to earn decent wages. They are eager to face the risks inherent in our system of free enterprise.

They do not want a postwar America which suffers from undernourishment or slums—or the dole. They want no get-rich-quick era of bogus "prosperity" which will end for them in selling apples on a street corner, as happened after the bursting of the boom in 1929.

When you talk with our young men and our young women, you will find they want to work for themselves and for their families; they consider that they have the right to work; and they know that after the last war their fathers did not gain that right.

When you talk with our young men and women, you will find that with the opportunity for employment they want assurance against the evils of all major economic hazards—assurance that will extend from the cradle to the grave. And this great Government can and must provide this assurance.

I have been told that this is no time to speak of a better America after the war. I am told it is a grave error on my part.

I dissent.

And if the security of the individual citizen, or the family, should become a subject of national debate, the country knows where I stand.

I say this now to this Seventy-eighth Congress, because it is wholly possible that freedom from want—the right of employment, the right of assurance against life’s hazards—will loom very large as a task of America during the coming two years.

I trust it will not be regarded as an issue—but rather as a task for all of us to study sympathetically, to work out with a constant regard for the attainment of the objective, with fairness to all and with injustice to none.

In this war of survival we must keep before our minds not only
the evil things we fight against but the good things we are fighting for. We fight to retain a great past—and we fight to gain a greater future.

Let us remember, too, that economic safety for the America of the future is threatened unless a greater economic stability comes to the rest of the world. We cannot make America an island in either a military or an economic sense. Hitlerism, like any other form of crime or disease, can grow from the evil seeds of economic as well as military feudalism.

Victory in this war is the first and greatest goal before us. Victory in the peace is the next. That means striving toward the enlargement of the security of man here and throughout the world—and, finally, striving for the fourth freedom—freedom from fear.

It is of little account for any of us to talk of essential human needs, of attaining security, if we run the risk of another World War in ten or twenty or fifty years. That is just plain common sense. Wars grow in size, in death and destruction, and in the inevitability of engulfing all Nations, in inverse ratio to the shrinking size of the world as a result of the conquest of the air. I shudder to think of what will happen to humanity, including ourselves, if this war ends in an inconclusive peace, and another war breaks out when the babies of today have grown to fighting age.

Every normal American prays that neither he nor his sons nor his grandsons will be compelled to go through this horror again.

Undoubtedly a few Americans, even now, think that this Nation can end this war comfortably and then climb back into an American hole and pull the hole in after them.

But we have learned that we can never dig a hole so deep that it would be safe against predatory animals. We have also learned that if we do not pull the fangs of the predatory animals of this world, they will multiply and grow in strength—and they will be at our throats again once more in a short generation.

Most Americans realize more clearly than ever before that modern war equipment in the hands of aggressor Nations can
bring danger overnight to our own national existence or to that of any other Nation—or island—or continent.

It is clear to us that if Germany and Italy and Japan—or any one of them—remain armed at the end of this war, or are permitted to rearm, they will again, and inevitably, embark upon an ambitious career of world conquest. They must be disarmed and kept disarmed, and they must abandon the philosophy, and the teaching of that philosophy, which has brought so much suffering to the world.

After the first World War we tried to achieve a formula for permanent peace, based on a magnificent idealism. We failed. But, by our failure, we have learned that we cannot maintain peace at this stage of human development by good intentions alone.

Today the United Nations are the mightiest military coalition in all history. They represent an overwhelming majority of the population of the world. Bound together in solemn agreement that they themselves will not commit acts of aggression or conquest against any of their neighbors, the United Nations can and must remain united for the maintenance of peace by preventing any attempt to rearm in Germany, in Japan, in Italy, or in any other Nation which seeks to violate the Tenth Commandment—"Thou shalt not covet."

There are cynics, there are skeptics who say it cannot be done. The American people and all the freedom-loving peoples of this earth are now demanding that it must be done. And the will of these people shall prevail.

The very philosophy of the Axis powers is based on a profound contempt for the human race. If, in the formation of our future policy, we were guided by the same cynical contempt, then we should be surrendering to the philosophy of our enemies, and our victory would turn to defeat.

The issue of this war is the basic issue between those who believe in mankind and those who do not—the ancient issue between those who put their faith in the people and those who put their faith in dictators and tyrants. There have always been those
who did not believe in the people, who attempted to block their forward movement across history, to force them back to servility and suffering and silence.

The people have now gathered their strength. They are moving forward in their might and power — and no force, no combination of forces, no trickery, deceit, or violence, can stop them now. They see before them the hope of the world—a decent, secure, peaceful life for men everywhere.

I do not prophesy when this war will end.

But I do believe that this year of 1943 will give to the United Nations a very substantial advance along the roads that lead to Berlin and Rome and Tokyo.

I tell you it is within the realm of possibility that this Seventy-eighth Congress may have the historic privilege of helping greatly to save the world from future fear.

Therefore, let us all have confidence, let us redouble our efforts.

A tremendous, costly, long-enduring task in peace as well as in war is still ahead of us.

But, as we face that continuing task, we may know that the state of this Nation is good — the heart of this Nation is sound — the spirit of this Nation is strong — the faith of this Nation is eternal.

5 The President’s Statement on Farm Mobilization Day. January 12, 1943

All over the world, food from our country’s farms is helping the United Nations to win this war. From the South Pacific to the winter front in Russia, from North Africa to India, American food is giving strength to the men on the battle lines, and sometimes also to the men and women working behind the lines. Somewhere on every continent the food ships from this country are the life line of the forces that fight for freedom. This afternoon we have heard from some of the military and civilian fight-
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ers who look to us for food. No words of mine can add to what they have said.

But on this Farm Mobilization Day I want to round out the picture and tell you a little more about the vital place that American farmers hold in the entire war strategy of the United Nations.

Food is a weapon in total war — fully as important in its way as guns or planes or tanks. So are other products of the farm. The long-staple cotton that goes into parachutes, for example, the oils that go into paints for the ships and planes and guns, the grains that go into alcohol to make explosives also are weapons.

Our enemies know the use of food in war. They employ it cold-bloodedly to strengthen their own fighters and workers and to weaken or exterminate the peoples of the conquered countries. We of the United Nations also are using food as a weapon to keep our fighting men fit and to maintain the health of all our civilian families. We are using food to earn the friendship of people in liberated areas and to serve as a promise and an encouragement to peoples who are not yet free. Already, in North Africa, the food we are sending the inhabitants is saving the energies and the lives of our troops there. In short we are using food, both in this country and in Allied countries, with the single aim of helping to win this war.

Already it is taking a lot of food to fight the war. It is going to take a lot more to win the final victory and win the peace that will follow. In terms of total food supply the United Nations are far stronger than our enemies. But our great food resources are scattered to the ends of the earth — from Australia and New Zealand to South Africa and the Americas — and we no longer have food to waste. Food is precious, just as oil and steel are precious. As part of our global strategy, we must produce all we can of every essential farm product; we must divide our supplies wisely and use them carefully. We cannot afford to waste any of them.

Therefore the United Nations are pooling their food resources and using them where they will do the most good. Canada is sending large shipments of cheese, meats, and other foods on the
short North Atlantic run to Britain. Australia and New Zealand are providing a great deal of the food for American soldiers stationed in that part of the world. Food from Latin America is going to Britain.

Every food-producing country among the United Nations is doing its share. Our own share in food strategy, especially at this stage of the war, is large, because we have such great resources for production; and we are on direct ocean lanes to North Africa, to Britain, and to the northern ports of Russia.

American farmers must feed our own growing Army and Navy. They must feed the civilian families of this country and feed them well. They must help feed the fighting men and some of the war workers of Britain and Russia and, to a lesser degree, those of other Allied countries.

So this year, as never before, the entire Nation is looking to its farmers. Many quarters of the free world are looking to them too. American farmers are a small group with a great task. Although 60 percent of the world's population are farm people, only 2 percent of that population are American farmers. But that 2 percent have the skill and the energy to make this country the United Nations' greatest arsenal for food and fiber.

In spite of the handicaps under which American farmers worked last year, the production victory they won was among the major victories of the United Nations in 1942. Free people everywhere can be grateful to the farm families who made that victory possible.

This year the American farmer's task is greater, and the obstacles more formidable. But I know that once more our farmers will rise to their responsibility.

This farm mobilization is the first day ever dedicated by a President to the farm people of the Nation. I know that the whole country joins with me in a tribute to the work farmers already have done, in a pledge of full support in the difficult task which lies ahead for farmers, and in a prayer for good weather to make farmers' efforts more fruitful.

Our fighting men and allies, and our families here at home can
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rely on farmers for the food and other farm products that will help to bring victory.

NOTE: The foregoing statement of the President was read over all the major radio networks by James F. Byrnes, Director of Economic Stabilization. The Secretary of Agriculture and spokesmen for various United Nations countries also participated in the same broadcast observing Farm Mobilization Day.

6  The Eight Hundred and Seventy-fifth Press Conference. Joint Conference by the President and Prime Minister Churchill at Casablanca.

January 24, 1943

(Results of Conference — Agreement that unconditional surrender will be required of the enemy — Statement of the Prime Minister on the Conference and the progress of the war — Meeting of Generals de Gaulle and Giraud — American troops.)

THE PRESIDENT: This meeting goes back to the successful landing operations last November, which as you all know were initiated as far back as a year ago, and put into definite shape shortly after the Prime Minister's visit to Washington in June.

After the operations of last November, it became perfectly clear, with the successes, that the time had come for another review of the situation, and a planning for the next steps, especially steps to be taken in 1943. That is why we came here, and our respective staffs came with us, to discuss the practical steps to be taken by the United Nations for prosecution of the war. We have been here about a week.

I might add, too, that we began talking about this after the first of December, and at that time we invited Mr. Stalin to join us at a convenient meeting place. Mr. Stalin very greatly desired to come, but he was precluded from leaving Russia because he was conducting the new Russian offensive
6. *Eight Hundred and Seventy-fifth Press Conference*

against the Germans along the whole line. We must remember that he is Commander in Chief, and that he is responsible for the very wonderful detailed plan which has been brought to such a successful conclusion since the beginning of the offensive.

In spite of the fact that Mr. Stalin was unable to come, the results of the staff meeting have been communicated to him, so that we will continue to keep in very close touch with each other.

I think it can be said that the studies during the past week or ten days are unprecedented in history. Both the Prime Minister and I think back to the days of the first World War when conferences between the French and British and ourselves very rarely lasted more than a few hours or a couple of days. The Chiefs of Staffs have been in intimate touch; they have lived in the same hotel. Each man has become a definite personal friend of his opposite number on the other side.

Furthermore, these conferences have discussed, I think for the first time in history, the whole global picture. It isn't just one front, just one ocean, or one continent — it is literally the whole world; and that is why the Prime Minister and I feel that the conference is unique in the fact that it has this global aspect.

The Combined Staffs, in these conferences and studies during the past week or ten days, have proceeded on the principle of pooling all of the resources of the United Nations. And I think the second point is that they have reaffirmed the determination to maintain the initiative against the Axis powers in every part of the world.

These plans covering the initiative and maintenance of the initiative during 1943 cover certain things, such as united operations conducted in different areas of the world. Second, the sending of all possible material aid to the Russian offensive, with the double object of cutting down the manpower of Germany and her satellites, and continuing the very great attrition of German munitions and materials of all kinds.
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which are being destroyed every day in such large quantities by the Russian armies.

And, at the same time, the Staffs have agreed on giving all possible aid to the heroic struggle of China — remembering that China is in her sixth year of the war — with the objective, not only in China but in the whole of the Pacific area, of ending any Japanese attempt in the future to dominate the Far East.

Another point. I think we have all had it in our hearts and our heads before, but I don't think that it has ever been put down on paper by the Prime Minister and myself, and that is the determination that peace can come to the world only by the total elimination of German and Japanese war power.

Some of you Britishers know the old story — we had a General called U. S. Grant. His name was Ulysses Simpson Grant, but in my, and the Prime Minister's, early days he was called "Unconditional Surrender" Grant. The elimination of German, Japanese, and Italian war power means the unconditional surrender by Germany, Italy, and Japan. That means a reasonable assurance of future world peace. It does not mean the destruction of the population of Germany, Italy, or Japan, but it does mean the destruction of the philosophies in those countries which are based on conquest and the subjugation of other people.

While we have not had a meeting of all of the United Nations, I think that there is no question — in fact we both have great confidence that the same purposes and objectives are in the minds of all of the other United Nations — Russia, China, and all the others.

And so the actual meeting — the main work of the Conference — has been ended. Except for a certain amount of resultant paper work, it has come to a successful conclusion. I call it a meeting of the minds in regard to all military operations, and, thereafter, that the war is going to proceed against the Axis powers according to schedule, with every indication that
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1943 is going to be an even better year for the United Nations than 1942.

The Prime Minister: I agree with everything that the President has said, and I think it was a very happy decision to bring you gentlemen here to Casablanca to this agreeable spot, Anfa Camp, which has been the center—the scene—of much the most important and successful war conference which I have ever attended or witnessed. Nothing like it has occurred in my experience, which is a long while—the continuous work, hours and hours every day from morning until often after midnight, carried on by the staffs of both sides, by all the principal officers of the two Nations who are engaged in the direction of the war.

This work has proceeded with an intensity, and thoroughness, and comprehensiveness, the like of which I have never seen, and I firmly believe that you will find that results will come from this as this year unfolds. You will find results will come from it which will give our troops, and soldiers, and fliers the best possible chance to gather new victories from the enemy. Fortune turned a more or less somber face upon us at the close of last year, and we meet here today at this place—we have been meeting here—which in a way is the active center of the war direction. We wish indeed it was possible to have Premier Stalin, and the Generalissimo, and others of the United Nations here, but geography is a stubborn thing; and the difficulties and the preoccupations of the men engaged in fighting the enemy in other countries are also very clear obstacles to their free movement, and therefore we have had to meet here together.

Well, one thing I should like to say, and that is—I think I can say it with full confidence—nothing that may occur in this war will ever come between me and the President. He and I are in this as friends and partners, and we work together. We know that our easy, free conversation is one of the sinews of war—of the Allied powers. It makes many things easy that would otherwise be difficult, and solutions can be
reached when an agreement has stopped, which would otherwise be impossible, even with the utmost good will, of the vast war machinery which the English-speaking people are operating.

I think that the press here have had rather a hard, provoking time, because it isn’t possible to have everything organized at once when you throw yourselves on a shore. Some of our earliest and brightest hopes have not yet been fulfilled, and you gentlemen have no doubt felt baffled in the work you want to do, and therefore a trial is imposed upon you. I beg you to rise to the level of that; namely, not to allow the minor annoyances of censoring, et cetera, make you exaggerate these details. To keep your sense of proportion is a patriotic duty.

Tremendous events have happened. This enterprise which the President has organized — and he knows I have been his active lieutenant since the start — has altered the whole strategic aspect of the war. It has forced the Germans to fight under the very greatest difficulties. And I think that it gives us in a very marked way the initiative. Once we have got that precious treasure into our hands, we must labor hard to keep it. Hitler said you never could tell what would happen, because he wasn’t dealing with competent military experts but with military idiots and drunkards. He said he didn’t know where he was, and that was a preliminary forecast of the explanation which he will no doubt offer to the Nazi Party for the complete manner in which he has been hoodwinked, fooled, and outmaneuvered by the great enterprise which was launched on these shores.

We are still in full battle, and heavy action will impend. Our forces grow. The Eighth Army has taken Tripoli, and we are following Rommel — the fugitive of Egypt and Libya — now wishing, no doubt, to represent himself as the deliverer of Tunisia. The Eighth Army has followed him a long way — 1,500 miles — from El Alamein where I last saw them, now to Tripoli. And Rommel is still flying before them. But
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I can give you this assurance—everywhere that Mary went the lamb is sure to go.

I hope you gentlemen will find this talk to be of assistance to you in your work, and will be able to build up a good and encouraging story to our people all over the world. Give them the picture of unity, thoroughness, and integrity of the political chiefs. Give them that picture, and make them feel that there is some reason behind all that is being done. Even when there is some delay there is design and purpose, and as the President has said, the unconquerable will to pursue this quality, until we have procured the unconditional surrender of the criminal forces who plunged the world into storm and ruin.

The President: I think, the Prime Minister having spoken of the Eighth Army, that you should know that we have had a long talk with General [Harold R. L. G.] Alexander, Admiral [Sir Andrew] Cunningham, [Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur] Tedder. [Lieutenant] General [Dwight D.] Eisenhower has been here, as has [Major] General [Carl] Spaatz—[Lieutenant] General [Mark W.] Clark too. We have had a pretty good picture of the whole south shore of the Mediterranean, at firsthand.

This afternoon there will be given to each of you a communiqué from the Prime Minister and myself, which is really the formal document stating the history of this conference, and the names of all the people who have taken part; nothing very much in it in addition to what we have talked about as background for you all.

You will want to know about the presence of General [Henri Honoré] Giraud, and General [Charles] de Gaulle. I think that all that should be said at this time is that the Prime Minister and I felt that here we were in French North Africa and it would be an opportune time for those two gentlemen to meet together—one Frenchman with another Frenchman. They have been in conference now for a couple of days, and we have emphasized one common purpose, and that is the...
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liberation of France. They are at work on that. They are in accord on that, and we hope very much that as a result of getting to know each other better under these modern, new conditions, we will have French armies, and French navies, and French airmen who will take part with us in the ultimate liberation of France itself.

I haven't got anything else that relates to the United Staffs conferences, but — it is purely personal — but I might as well give it to you as background. I have had the opportunity, during these days, of visiting a very large number of American troops. I went up the line the other day and saw combat teams and the bulk of several divisions. I talked with the officers, and with the men. I lunched with them in the field, and it was a darn good lunch. We had to move the band, because it was a very windy day, from leeward to windward, so we could hear the music.

From these reviews we went over to a fort. Actually, it was at the mouth of Port Lyautey where the very heavy fighting occurred and where a large number of Americans and Frenchmen were killed. Their bodies, most of them, lie in a joint cemetery — French and American. I placed a wreath where the American graves are, and another wreath where the French graves are.

I saw the equipment of these troops that are ready to go into action at any time; and I wish the people back home could see it, because those troops are equipped with the most modern weapons that we can turn out. They are adequately equipped in every way. And I found them not only in excellent health and high spirits, but also a very great efficiency on the part of officers and men, all the way from top to bottom. I am sure they are eager to fight again, and I think they will.

I'd like to say just a word about the bravery and the fine spirit of the French whom we fought — many of whom were killed. They fought with very heavy losses, as you know, but the moment the peace came and fighting stopped, the French Army and Navy, and the French and Moroccan civil popula-
tion have given to us Americans wholehearted assistance in carrying out the common objective that brings us to these parts—to improve the conditions of living in these parts, which you know better than I do have been seriously hurt by the fact that during the last two years so much of the output, especially the food output of French North Africa, has been sent to the support of the German Army. That time is ended, and we are going to do all we can for the population of these parts, to keep them going until they can bring in their own harvests during this coming summer.

Also, I had one very delightful party. I gave a dinner party for the Sultan of Morocco [Sidi Mohammed] and his son. We got on extremely well. He is greatly interested in the welfare of his people, and he and the Moroccan population are giving to us the same kind of support that the French population is.

So I just want to repeat that on this trip I saw with my own eyes the actual conditions of our men who are in this part of North Africa. I think their families back home will be glad to know that we are doing all we can, not only in full support of them, but in keeping up the splendid morale with which they are working at the present time. I want to say to their families, through you people, that I am mighty proud of them.

This is not like a press conference in Washington. We have 200 to 250 that crowd into one rather small room, and it is almost impossible there to meet everyone personally. You are an elite group, and because it is not too big a group, the Prime Minister and I want to meet all of you.

One thing, before we stop talking—on the release date of this thing—sometimes I also am under orders. I have got to let General McClure decide the release date. There are certain reasons why it can't be for a few days, but as I understand it, one of your problems is the bottleneck at Gibraltar. I think you have enough background to write your stories and put them on the cables, and General McClure will decide what
6. Eight Hundred and Seventy-fifth Press Conference

the actual release date will be. I told him that it should be just as soon as he possibly could.

NOTE: After the die had been cast in North Africa, high-level discussions were necessary to determine precisely where and how the Axis should next be attacked. The President sent two urgent invitations to Stalin in an attempt to get him to join with Churchill in a "Big Three" meeting, and it was hoped that Khartoum would be a satisfactory meeting spot for such a conference, but Stalin pleaded that he was too preoccupied with the Russian front at that time. During December 1942, it was decided to hold a Roosevelt-Churchill conference in North Africa, and reconnaissance by General Eisenhower and British staffs selected a spot close to the city of Casablanca for the meeting.

The President left Washington on January 9, and returned January 31, the entire trip consuming 16,965 miles. The following was the itinerary for the trip:

January 9-10: Train from Washington, D. C., to Miami, Florida.

January 11: By clipper plane from Miami to Trinidad.

January 12: By clipper plane from Trinidad to Belém, Brazil.

January 13: By clipper plane from Belém, Brazil, to Bathurst, Gambia (Africa).

January 14: By C-54 air transport plane from Bathurst to Casablanca.

January 14-21: In Casablanca.

January 21: By automobile and jeep, inspection trip to Rabat, Morocco and Port Lyautey, and return to Casablanca.

January 24: By automobile (with Winston Churchill) to Marrakech.

January 25: By C-54 air transport plane from Marrakech to Bathurst.

January 27: By C-54 plane from Bathurst to Monrovia, Liberia, and return to Bathurst.

January 27: By clipper plane from Bathurst to Natal, Brazil.

January 28: In Natal for conference with President Vargas of Brazil.

January 29: By clipper plane from Natal, Brazil, to Trinidad.

January 30-31: By clipper plane from Trinidad to Miami, and by train from Miami to Washington, D. C.

The President's flight to the Conference at Casablanca marked the first time he had traveled by air since his flight from Albany to Chicago to accept his first nomination by the Democratic National Convention in 1932 (see Item 131, pp. 647-659, 1928-1932 volume). The journey was also precedent-shattering because Roosevelt became the first President ever to leave the United States in wartime and the first President since Abraham Lincoln to visit an active theater of war.

By the time the President, Churchill and their staffs assembled
6. Eight Hundred and Seventy-fifth Press Conference

at Casablanca, it was apparent that the North African operation was a success. Tunisia had not been captured as quickly as hoped, but huge quantities of German men and matériel were lured into Tunisia. As a result, the total German and Italian killed and captured numbered 349,206 at the close of the North African campaign, and nearly 200,000 tons of enemy matériel were destroyed on land alone. The crucial military decision faced at Casablanca was whether to proceed immediately with the plan to invade France during 1943, or to establish Allied air and ground forces more firmly for such an effort in 1944. In face of the facts that the Axis still controlled the entire southern coast of Europe from Spain to Turkey, and could still imperil Allied use of the Mediterranean, and because America’s great mobilization of forces had not yet reached its peak, it was concluded at Casablanca that the next assault would be against Sicily. Sicily was also picked because of its proximity to North Africa, where troops and ships were available, because its capture would eliminate a serious Axis threat to Allied shipping in the Mediterranean, and because in Allied hands Sicily would provide excellent air bases to protect Mediterranean shipping. A further political consideration in favor of attacking Sicily was the chance that its capture would knock Italy out of the war.

The conferees at Casablanca did not lose sight of the central feature of Allied strategy—the invasion of western Europe. It was decided to hasten the build-up of forces in the United Kingdom, and to take positive measures to weaken German resistance through strategic air bombardment. The American and British air force commanders were directed at Casablanca to launch around-the-clock air assaults against the Germans on the continent, with the following order of priority being established for long-range heavy bomber targets: submarine construction yards, the aircraft industries, transportation, oil plants, and other critical enemy war industries.

Armament production and the economic aspects of the war were also reviewed at the Casablanca Conference. At a time when all agencies and services naturally felt that different needs were paramount, it became necessary to reappraise where the most critical shortages existed, from the standpoint of broad strategy. It did not take the conferees long to recognize that the most critical shortage was in escort vessels—destroyers and destroyer escorts to protect our convoys to Russia, and escorts for our transatlantic transport ships.

Although the major purpose of the Casablanca Conference was to map out future military strategy, it was quite natural that the tangled French political situation should thrust itself into consideration at Casablanca. After much persuasion,
General de Gaulle agreed to come to Casablanca for conversations with General Giraud, the President and Churchill. No firm agreement was consummated between the French factions, but the President induced de Gaulle and Giraud to shake hands for the news photographers and to join in the group picture of the Conference.

On January 21, the President motored northeastward up the coast to visit troops in Rabat and Port Lyautey, Morocco. At Rabat, the President lunched in the open with some 20,000 soldiers of General Mark Clark’s Fifth Army. Later, the President sent the following message to General Eisenhower, which was read as an Order of the Day to all officers and men of the U. S. forces in North Africa:

“My brief visit to North Africa has given me increased assurance and a deep feeling of pride in the leaders and men of the American armed forces.

“The officers and men who landed with the initial assault, those who are now carrying on at the front in Tunisia, and those who are training themselves for future combat are deserving of the highest commendation.

“I could not but note your alertness, your smartness and the pride you take in yourselves and your splendid equipment. I return to the United States with renewed confidence that the American soldier, equipped with the best equipment that the world can produce, led by men who have proven themselves in battle and all imbued with the will to win, shall be victorious.

“Officers and men in the armed forces in North Africa, I commend you!”

As an upshot of the Casablanca Conference, General Eisenhower was advised on January 23 that he would command the Allied forces in the invasion of Sicily “with the target date as the period of the favorable July moon.” Actually, the invasion of Sicily was launched on July 10, 1943.

With Generals de Gaulle and Giraud finally together in Casablanca, on January 24 the President and Prime Minister Churchill held their joint press conference, the text of which is printed above. The important element of the press conference was, of course, the President’s firm statement that he and Churchill would accept nothing less than unconditional surrender of Germany, Japan and Italy. This was the President’s own statement, made at the press conference without prior consultation with Churchill, but of course was strongly supported by Churchill.

Robert E. Sherwood, in his book Roosevelt and Hopkins, points out that the phrase “unconditional surrender” was contained in the notes which the President used for the conference, indicating that it was a considered statement rather than given on the spur of the moment. Furthermore, he restated the principle on numerous occasions thereafter — vowing that there would be and could be no negotiated peace or compromise with the Nazis and Fascists.

Some commentators have contended that the “Unconditional
Surrender” formula lengthened the war by increasing the intransigence of the opposition. In pointing out his main reason for using the concept of “Unconditional Surrender,” the President later stated in a press conference:

“Practically all Germans deny the fact they surrendered in the last war, but this time they are going to know it. And so are the Japs.” (See Item 55, 1944-1945 volume.)

Immediately after the press conference on January 24, the President and Prime Minister Churchill drove to Marrakech, and the following day the President made the eight-hour flight to Bathurst. After a day spent aboard the U. S. cruiser Memphis, and following a trip up the Gambia River on the British lend-lease tug H.M.S. Aimwell, the President made a four-hour airplane trip early in the morning of January 27 from Bathurst to Liberia, in order to keep an engagement for lunch with President Edwin Barclay of Liberia. The President landed at Roberts Field, and then motored fifty miles to the Liberian capital, Monrovia. In addition to lunching with President Barclay he inspected some of the 69,000-acre Firestone rubber plantation which was supplying the United States with many pounds of critical war material. The President also inspected American Negro troops in Liberia. He returned to Bathurst and just before midnight on January 27 his clipper plane took off for the transatlantic flight to Natal, Brazil, where he met with President Getulio Vargas of Brazil in a series of conferences (see Item 8 and note, this volume, for an account of the meetings with President Vargas and the remainder of the President’s journey back to Washington, D. C.).

For additional data on the Casablanca Conference, see Items 7, 10, 16 and 17, this volume.

7. Casablanca Conference

(OFFICIAL COMMUNIQUÉ ON THE CASABLANCA CONFERENCE. JANUARY 26, 1943)

The President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain have been in conference near Casablanca since January 14.

They were accompanied by the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the two countries; namely,

FOR THE UNITED STATES:

General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the United States Army; Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief of the

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United States Navy; Lieutenant General H. H. Arnold, commanding the United States Army Air Forces, and

FOR GREAT BRITAIN:

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord; General Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff.

These were assisted by:

Lieutenant General B. B. Somervell, Commanding General of the Services of Supply, United States Army; Field Marshal Sir John Dill, head of the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington; Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, Chief of Combined Operations; Lieutenant General Sir Hastings Ismay, Chief of Staff to the Office of the Minister of Defense, together with a number of staff officers of both countries.

They have received visits from Mr. Murphy [Robert Murphy, United States Minister in French North Africa] and Mr. Macmillan [Harold Macmillan, British Resident Minister for Allied Headquarters in North Africa]; from Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander in Chief of the Allied Expeditionary Force in North Africa; from Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, naval commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force in North Africa; from Major General Carl Spaatz, air commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force in North Africa; from Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark, United States Army [commander of the United States Fifth Army in Tunisia], and, from Middle East Headquarters, from General Sir Harold Alexander, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, and Lieutenant General F. M. Andrews, United States Army.

The President was accompanied by Harry Hopkins [chairman of the British-American Munitions Assignments Board] and was joined by W. Averell Harriman [United States defense expeditor in England].

With the Prime Minister was Lord Leathers, British Minister of War Transport.

For ten days the combined staffs have been in constant session,
meeting two or three times a day and recording progress at intervals to the President and Prime Minister.

The entire field of the war was surveyed theater by theater throughout the world, and all resources were marshaled for a more intense prosecution of the war by sea, land, and air.

Nothing like this prolonged discussion between two allies has ever taken place before. Complete agreement was reached between the leaders of the two countries and their respective staffs upon war plans and enterprises to be undertaken during the campaigns of 1943 against Germany, Italy, and Japan with a view to drawing the utmost advantage from the markedly favorable turn of events at the close of 1942.

Premier Stalin was cordially invited to meet the President and Prime Minister, in which case the meeting would have been held very much farther to the east. He was unable to leave Russia at this time on account of the great offensive which he himself, as Commander in Chief, is directing.

The President and Prime Minister realized up to the full the enormous weight of the war which Russia is successfully bearing along her whole land front, and their prime object has been to draw as much weight as possible off the Russian armies by engaging the enemy as heavily as possible at the best selected points.

Premier Stalin has been fully informed of the military proposals.

The President and Prime Minister have been in communication with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. They have apprised him of the measures which they are undertaking to assist him in China's magnificent and unrelaxing struggle for the common cause.

The occasion of the meeting between the President and Prime Minister made it opportune to invite General Giraud [General Henri Honoré Giraud, High Commissioner of French Africa] to confer with the Combined Chiefs of Staff and to arrange for a meeting between him and General de Gaulle [General Charles de Gaulle, Fighting French Commander]. The two generals have been in close consultation.
8. Meeting of Roosevelt and Vargas

The President and Prime Minister and their combined staffs, having completed their plans for the offensive campaigns of 1943, have now separated in order to put them into active and concerted execution.

NOTE: See Item 6 and note, this volume, for the joint press conference held by the President and Prime Minister Churchill at Casablanca. For other data on the Casablanca Conference, see Items 10, 16, and 17, this volume.

8 Joint Statement on the Meeting of President Roosevelt and President Vargas of Brazil.

January 29, 1943

The President of Brazil and the President of the United States met Thursday at an unannounced location in Brazil. The two Presidents had lunch together, inspected and reviewed Army, Navy, and Air Forces of the two Nations. They passed the evening in conference on problems of the World War as a whole and especially the joint Brazilian-United States effort. They discussed the continuing submarine danger from the Caribbean to the South Atlantic. President Vargas announced greatly increased efforts on the part of his country to meet this menace.

President Roosevelt informed his colleague of the very significant results of the conference in Casablanca and of the resolve that the peace to come must not allow the Axis to attack civilization in future years. Mr. Roosevelt demonstrated that the North African expedition has for the present eliminated the possibility of the threat of a German-held Dakar to American freedom at the narrow point of the Atlantic. Both President Vargas and President Roosevelt are in complete agreement that it must be permanently and definitely assured that the coasts of West Africa and Dakar never again under any circumstances be allowed to become a blockade or an invasion threat against the two Americas.

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8. Meeting of Roosevelt and Vargas

The two Presidents said:

“This meeting has given us an opportunity to survey the future safety of all the Americas. In our opinion each of the Republics is interested and affected to an equal degree. In unity there is strength. It is the aim of Brazil and of the United States to make the Atlantic Ocean safe for all. We are deeply grateful for the almost unanimous help that our neighbors are giving to the great cause of democracy throughout the world.”

* * *

(The above statement is supplemented by the following “Memorandum for the Press” from President Roosevelt):

President Roosevelt believed that the Casablanca Conference was so vital to the war effort that he should delay for a short time his return to the United States so that he might talk informally to President Vargas of Brazil about the conference, and discuss several details of additional mutual aid.

President Roosevelt on his journey to Africa and on his return has had many opportunities to visit and inspect vital points of the “Ferry Command” which is doing a most difficult job every day in sending planes and quantities of vital equipment from America to the Middle East, to North Africa, to Russia, to the air squadrons in China, and to the Burma front.

The Presidents of the two Nations—the United States and Brazil—are old friends and their talks were timely and profitable, in every way.

NOTE: Following the historic Casablanca Conference and a brief visit to Liberia, the President flew to Natal, Brazil, in order to meet with President Getulio Vargas of Brazil. This was the second meeting of the President with President Vargas on Brazilian soil, the first having taken place in 1936 on Roosevelt’s way to the Inter-American Conference at Buenos Aires, Argentina (see Items 222 and 223, pp. 597-603, 1936 volume).

The President arrived in Natal on the morning of January 28, and the meeting with President Vargas was held aboard a U. S. destroyer in the Potengi River harbor in Natal. American and Brazilian military, naval and air force officials participated in the conferences, but the two Presidents had numerous opportunities to confer privately. After a day-long series of parleys aboard the destroyer, the President and his party went ashore
8. Meeting of Roosevelt and Vargas

at the close of the afternoon to visit the city of Natal and inspect its great air bases and military and naval installations. Following dinner aboard the destroyer, the conferences continued, and Presidents Roosevelt and Vargas spent the night aboard, staying up late for additional talks and again meeting privately for brief conversations on the morning of January 29.

In their meeting, the President and President Vargas agreed among other things to redouble counter-offensive action against the rising U-boat raids on Allied shipping. The two Presidents stated firmly that Dakar should never again become a potential Axis threat to world shipping (see Item 10, this volume, for the President's press conference remarks pertaining to his visit to Brazil).

Following his return from Natal to Rio de Janeiro, President Vargas issued the following statement on his meeting with President Roosevelt:

"We conferred at length over all points relating to our common interest and particularly over the cooperation of Brazil and the United States.

"I can assure you that our agreement was complete on all points we discussed.

"I found President Roosevelt in the best of health and spirits, his intense activity demonstrating a firm decision to carry forward the crusade in which we are all engaged. President Roosevelt was frankly optimistic over the outcome of the battle.

"We discussed the affairs of the war and the problems which may present themselves after peace. The greatest part of the conversations was devoted to the necessity of winning the war and on this theme was centered cooperation between Brazil and the United States, which is an integral cooperation without restrictions.

"Once we are at war our cooperation is complete. All that the United States may judge necessary we will continue to give."

After his departure from Natal, the President made one more stop before returning to American soil. On January 29, he stopped briefly on the island of Trinidad, in the British West Indies, where he received an enthusiastic reception from the populace. The President also inspected American Army and Navy forces which had been stationed on Trinidad in accordance with the destroyer-bases deal with Great Britain (see Item 63 and note, 1941 volume). He then arrived by plane at Miami, whence he proceeded by train to Washington, D. C. and arrived in Washington January 31 at the end of the 22-day, 17,000-mile trip.
9. Relinquishment of Extraterritorial Rights in China

9 (The President Transmits to the Congress a Treaty for the Relinquishment of Extraterritorial Rights in China. February 1, 1943)

To the Senate:

I transmit herewith a treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of China for the relinquishment of extraterritorial rights in China and the regulation of related matters signed at Washington by the Secretary of State and the Ambassador of China on January 11, 1943, and a supplementary exchange of notes also concerning matters related to extraterritorial rights which was signed by them at the same time and which according to its terms is made an integral part of the treaty.

I enclose for the information of the Senate a copy of the report of the Secretary of State laying the treaty before me, in which its provisions are reviewed.

The two main objectives of the treaty as pointed out in the concluding paragraph of the Secretary’s report are the abolition of the extraterritorial system in China and the regulation of certain related matters. The more important among the latter are restated from the treaty and the exchange of notes in the report of the Secretary of State.

The treaty and the exchange of notes have my approval.

Accomplishment of the abolition of the extraterritorial system in China is a step in line with the expressed desires of the Government and the people of the United States. The spirit reflected by the treaty will, I am sure, be gratifying to the Governments and the peoples of all the United Nations.

I ask the advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification of the treaty, together with the exchange of notes which accompanies it.

NOTE: For a century China had been exploited by foreign Governments and economic interests. An integral part of this exploitation was a series of treaties which provided for “extraterritoriality” —
that is, the right of foreigners to live and do business in China under their own laws and courts, exempt from Chinese law and taxation. These were unequal treaties, for Chinese were not granted the same rights abroad. Naval patrols, gunboats, and garrisons were maintained by the United States and other foreign countries in order to protect this system of extraterritoriality.

It was an act of simple justice and of respect for the sovereignty of the Chinese Republic that the United States should relinquish these extraterritorial rights. While China was fighting side by side with the United Nations against the Japanese aggressors after so many years of fighting alone, her right to rule her country without foreign interference or domination in any section seemed too clear for argument. At the same time that the American treaty with China was being negotiated, Great Britain was also negotiating a similar treaty by which she too surrendered her extraterritorial rights in China.

On February 11, 1943, after a brief debate in the United States Senate in which Senators from both political parties enthusiastically supported the objectives of the treaty, the treaty was unanimously ratified by the Senate.

(See Items 111, 136 and notes, this volume, on repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Laws.)

10 (The Eight Hundred and Seventy-sixth Press Conference (Excerpts). February 2, 1943

(Purpose of Casablanca Conference — Review of the trip — Visit to Brazil — Hemisphere security — Hope for meeting with Stalin — American troops in Africa — The spirit of the French.)

THE PRESIDENT: I thought today that the first thing I want to do before we get down to warlike things, is to thank the press and the radio of the United States for living up so very faithfully to the requests of the Offices of Censorship and Information, in regard to keeping the movements of the Commander in Chief and the other high-ranking officers secret [referring to the President's trip to Casablanca from which he returned on January 31, 1943]. It was beautifully done, and I am very appreciative of it; and I think you all ought to know that I do appreciate how well it was covered.
Incidentally, on the whole trip — the 22 days — we were literally in constant touch, even when in the air, with Washington. I got various dispatches and things which were answered immediately, such as, for example, the coal strike, which as you know took only a few hours between the time that I was told of the conditions before the reply came back from me somewhere in Africa — the appeal to the miners to go back to work.

The conference, in fact the whole trip, was essentially a military conference — military, naval, and air. And everything else had to be thought of in that particular light. In other words, it was a conference to win the war, to make plans for the winning of the war, as far as one can plan ahead, which in this particular case was the calendar year 1943.

I want to emphasize what I said in the Annual Message to Congress — just a short paragraph:

(Reading): “I cannot prophesy. I cannot tell you when or where the United Nations are going to strike next in Europe. But we are going to strike — and strike hard. I cannot tell you whether we are going to hit them in Norway, or through the Low Countries, or in France, or through Sardinia or Sicily, or through the Balkans, or through Poland — or at several points simultaneously. But I can tell you that no matter where and when we strike by land, we and the British and the Russians will hit them from the air heavily and relentlessly. Day in and day out we shall heap tons upon tons of high explosives on their war factories and utilities and seaports.”

And it was in fulfillment of that statement that we have worked with the other Combined Staffs, and have reached a unanimous agreement.

And, of course, we are in complete touch with Mr. [Joseph] Stalin, and the Generalissimo [Chiang Kai-shek]. I understand, although I didn’t discover it until I got back, that there were certain people that thought we could very easily have Mr. Stalin and the Generalissimo in the same conference, forgetting, of course, the fact — which most people caught on to afterwards — that Russia is not at war with Japan, and that
China, while officially at war with Germany is so located geographically that China can do nothing in the way of an offensive against Germany. However, a little thought on the part of anybody thinking it through will obviate mistakes — happy thought — perhaps in the future.

The total mileage covered was 16,965.

And then just a few — what do you call them? — human interest touches. I had a birthday party in a plane, 8,000 feet above Haiti, including a cake with six candles around it, and one in the middle. (Laughter) And a lot of very nice presents which my companions had discovered in Trinidad.

Now I have been trying to think up some other things that happened. When we were in Casablanca, quite a lot of people, including General Patton, were very much worried over air attacks, the general theory being that we ought to move from place to place about every 48 hours. But we were so comfortable in Casablanca, the accommodations were so delightful, that we decided to risk it and stay right there. And while we were there, we only had two “yellow” alerts, which was doing pretty well. And, needless to say, there were no German planes that actually arrived.

All kinds of rumors — oh, Washington wasn’t a patch to Casablanca, and that’s saying an awful lot — (laughter) rumors that we were having an important conference with General Franco of Spain. And then there was a rumor that was generally believed, that King Victor Emmanuel of Italy had come over to arrange a surrender. Then there was another story that the Emperor Haile Selassie had arrived in Casablanca to confer with us.

Then, we were very well taken care of. We had an entire regiment of infantry, with barbed wire and all the accessories that surrounded the place where we were.

The Secret Service was extremely efficient, and devised some new gadgets for our protection. They felt that the Moorish population, which of course is about 90 percent of all Morocco, represented a very slim risk; but that some of the
French "brethren"—(*laughter*) might have got so excited about their own political affairs—a little like Washington—(*more laughter*) while I was traveling around by automobile to review the troops.

So I had in the jeep in front of me a couple of Secret Servicemen, and whenever they saw a European along the roadside ahead of me, just as they got to the European they both, "Oh, look! Look—look!"—(*laughter, as the President demonstrated the action by raising his eyes and pointing with his arm to the ceiling*) with their hands pointing up, evidently at an airplane. Whereupon, the suspects (*more laughter*) on the road said, "Ah! What is it?"

And then another stunt that they worked out in the jeep. One of them, when they came to a little group of people that they thought might be suspicious, would pretend to fall out of the jeep, getting halfway out, and his companion would grab him and haul him back, thereby diverting attention from the fellow in the next car. (*Laughter*)

On the last day, I suppose, frankly, largely because we wanted to see it—there wasn’t any particular official reason—we went down to Marrakech, which is one of the most amazing cities that I have ever been in. We went down there because Winston Churchill had been there about ten years before, on a little pleasure trip. He said it was a most amazing place. Well, they have this old tower that was built, I think, to celebrate the capture of Spain by the Moors. Well, whatever the date is, I don’t know; but it is somewhere between 1100 and 1300. Here is this city, which is in what might be called an enlarged oasis—which, by the way, I suppose the best definition of an oasis is that it isn’t dry—(*laughter*) and you can look out and see this whole chain of the Atlas Mountains—snow-covered. I think it’s one of the most beautiful sights I have ever seen.

And the Prime Minister doesn’t collect stamps, but he paints. And he had brought his painting tools—I don’t know what you call them—with him. We got there around sunset,
and I think he started some sketches of this wonderful scene. I left him at five o'clock the next morning. His whole outfit was ready, and he was going to spend the day in Marrakech painting, and hop off that night for what was then, of course, undisclosed, for Cairo, and thence up to Syria for a meeting. I don’t know where the meeting was actually held. I think it was just across the border, in Adana, Turkey. He is going there to talk with President Inonu and his Prime Minister, in regard to a closer relationship with Turkey in the prosecution of the war. Well, you have had that story already.

Oh, yes, I must tell you about the WAACs. We found five WAACs—I think the only ones in Africa. And there they were, doing the telephone work, and the stenographic work for the staff meeting. And I had them in to dine—all five—I had a nice little party for them. They had had a perfectly amazing experience. They had all been on the same ship in December, and the ship was torpedoed. And two of them were taken off in boats. The other three couldn’t get into the boats, and they were taken in tow by a British destroyer, I think. And finally all five of them were safely landed in Africa without any clothes whatsoever. They had nothing except what they had on their backs! And their names were Louise Anderson, Ruth Briggs, Mattie Pinette, Martha Rogers, and Aileen Drezmal.

We had a grand visit from the Sultan of Morocco, his Grand Vizier, his Chief of Protocol, and the Crown Prince. I told him I hoped he would come to Washington and see us all; and he said he would, he was going to try to do it just as soon as the war was over.

I don’t think there is anything else that I can think of that hasn’t already—

Q. (interposing) Mr. President, could you tell us a little more about the Brazil phase of the trip?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think you all got the highlights of that.

In the first place, at Casablanca, as a part of the military agreements, we formally reemphasized what we had all been
10. Eight Hundred and Seventy-sixth Press Conference
talking about before, and that is we don't think there should
be any kind of a negotiated armistice, for obvious reasons.
There ought to be an unconditional surrender. Well, you all
got that.

We got down to Brazil, and the highlights of that were two
things. The first was the very greatly increased effort of Brazil
in combating the submarine danger in the South Atlantic.
And the other was what had been started before, but never
before formalized, and that was eliminating in the peace any
future threat from the African coast against the portion of
this hemisphere that lies closest to the African coast, which is
a distance of only 1,650 miles—something like that—it's
awfully close.

And I think that it is just as well to have that clearly under-
stood by people, not only in this hemisphere but also the peo-
ple who have territories of various kinds on the African coast.
We don't want to have to go through this again. We want to
eliminate military, naval, and air threats from one hemi-
sphere against the other hemisphere. . . .

Q. Mr. President, did you enjoy the meals that the Army served
you while you were over there?

THE PRESIDENT: I ate it all! (Laughter) I had a real appetite. . . .

Q. Mr. President, I believe in your communiqué after the Casa-
blanca Conference you said that Premier Stalin had been in-
formed of your decisions. Have you heard from him since?

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, yes. Oh my, yes.

Q. Is he in agreement with your decisions which you and the
Prime Minister reached?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't think we can talk about agreement or
disagreement on any of those things. Of course they are highly
confidential—part of the war effort; and things are going ex-
tremely well. When I say that, please don't infer from my
unwillingness to read you the telegrams between Mr. Stalin
and myself (laughter) that anything is going wrong. It is going
extremely well.

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Q. Mr. President, do you hope to meet with Mr. Stalin at some later time?

The President: Hope springs eternal! (laughter)...

Q. Mr. President, what did you get out of seeing those American troops there? What was your reaction to them individually? How did they look to you?

The President: Oh, they were magnificent. I don’t know — I had a sort of a feeling up there — these two divisions and combat teams and everything — I felt closer to having tears in my eyes than at any other time, because they were headed up for the front fairly soon, and nearly all of those troops that I reviewed had had actual combat experience in the landing back in November.

There was this port — Fort Mehdia — I think it’s just at the mouth of the river, at Port Lyautey. And it was an amazing illustration of the fact that you can’t win a war just with artillery. It’s an old, old Moorish fort, that is hundreds of years old. It’s made of sun-baked brick — a great tower, and very high, thick walls.

Well, this is not derogatory to the American Navy, but it’s an illustration: part of the American Navy stood offshore — eight or ten thousand yards — and hammered the living lights out of it — firing, firing, firing. They knocked off a corner of the tower. They knocked off the top of a wall, and they dropped shells all afternoon all over this old, sun-baked brick fort.

And there were about — as I remember it — about 400 French troops in it, who the night before had been told — the night of November 7 — by their commanding officer that the Americans were about to land. And they all cheered. They were just thrilled by the fact that the United States was going to use North Africa as a striking point against the Germans.

About two hours later, the commanding officer, who had assumed that there would be no opposition to our landing, gets orders from his general — definite orders — that the American landing was to be opposed.
And he went out and told his men in the fort about the orders he had gotten, and he said, "We have to obey orders. We are soldiers." They immediately resisted, as soon as our boats started to land, and gave us some pretty heavy casualties in the landing.

And the next day, the Navy shelled the place very heavily, killing a large number of them. And it wasn't until, as I remember it, the third day that the Army got some artillery ashore and fired at this same fort at point-blank range. And it wasn't — this sounds like old-fashioned warfare of two hundred, three hundred years ago — until our artillery had made a definite breach in the inner wall — the land side of the wall of this fort — that the final action took place. And part of our infantry surrounding the fort dashed in through this breach, and actually took the fort by assault.

And as I remember the figures very roughly, we lost 94 men killed, and the French, out of a garrison of 400, lost about 200.

Well, most of those — all of our boys, and a good many of the French, are buried in two cemeteries which are side by side — one with the French Tricolor flying over it, and the other with the Stars and Stripes flying over it.

But the interesting thing about it was that those Frenchmen who had fought with extraordinary bravery — and that was true all over — it was true of Casablanca, where our casualties were very heavy — several thousand killed — but when the order "cease fire" took place, there was a complete fraternizing of both forces. In other words, the Frenchmen had carried out their duty. They had obeyed their orders. They didn't want to fight us. From that time on, even the families of the men that were killed came to our people and said, "Yes, I suppose it had to happen, because we had to obey orders." It was a very interesting example of the complete loyalty of the French to their own command, and an understanding of it by their families. And today there is, on the whole, a very good feeling between the French troops and the French Navy with our people. . . .
11. Congratulations on Victory at Stalingrad

NOTE: See Item 6 and note, this volume, for the joint press conference held by the President and Prime Minister Churchill at Casablanca. For other data on the Casablanca Conference, see Items 7, 16 and 17, this volume.

11 (The President Sends a Message of Congratulations to Marshal Stalin on the Russian Victory at Stalingrad. February 4, 1943

As Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States of America, I congratulate you on the brilliant victory at Stalingrad of the armies under your supreme command. The 162 days of epic battle for the city which has forever honored your name and the decisive result which all Americans are celebrating today will remain one of the proudest chapters in this war of the peoples united against Nazism and its emulators.

The commanders and fighters of your armies at the front and the men and women who have supported them in factory and field have combined not only to cover with glory their country's arms, but to inspire by their example fresh determination among all the United Nations to bend every energy to bring about the final defeat and unconditional surrender of the common enemy.

12 (The Interdepartmental Committee to Consider Cases of Subversive Activities by Federal Employees Is Established. Executive Order No. 9300. February 5, 1943

By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 1753 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, Title I of the First War Powers Act, 1941 (Public Law 354, 77th Congress), and as President of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. There is hereby established, within the Department of Jus-
12. Committee to Consider Subversive Activities

tice, an Interdepartmental Committee whose composition, powers, functions, and responsibilities are defined herein.

2. The Committee shall consist of five members appointed by the President from among the officers or employees of the departments, independent establishments, and agencies of the Federal Government. The Committee shall choose its own officers.

3. The Committee shall serve as an advisory and coordinating agency in all matters pertaining to the investigation and disposition of complaints of subversive activity on the part of employees of the executive branch of the Federal Government excepting those who are on conditional appointment subject to the results of an investigation which is still pending, and shall initiate such measures as are best suited in its judgment to assure fair and prompt disposition of complaints and to protect the interests of the Government of the United States: Provided, however, that the Committee shall take no action concerning employees of the Department of the Navy or the Department of War except upon request from the Secretary of the Navy or the Secretary of War, respectively.

4. The departments, independent establishments, and agencies of the Federal Government shall refer all complaints within the purview of paragraph 3 of this Order, hereinafter referred to as complaints, together with all available information pertaining thereto, to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the Department of Justice, for information or investigation.

5. The Committee shall consider general classes of complaints, or particular complaints, upon request of the Department of Justice, and shall recommend to the Department appropriate policies to govern the investigation of such complaints.

6. The Committee shall receive all completed investigative reports made by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, on complaints and shall advise the departments, independent establishments, and agencies concerning the procedures for determining action thereon.

7. The departments, independent establishments, and agen-
12. Committee to Consider Subversive Activities

cies of the executive branch of the Government are directed to report to the Committee, within a reasonable period of time, the procedures followed and action taken on all cases referred by the Committee. The Committee in turn shall report forthwith to the Federal Bureau of Investigation the action taken by the employing department, independent establishment, or agency.

8. Upon request from an employing department, independent establishment, or agency, the Committee may review the record in any case within the purview of paragraph 3 of this Order and return an advisory opinion concerning the disposition of the case.

9. Whenever the requirements of internal security appear to the Committee to have been insufficiently considered in connection with the disposition of an investigative report, the Committee may review the case upon its own motion and transmit its recommendation to the employing department, independent establishment, or agency.

10. In time of war or other national emergency, upon a finding that internal security will be endangered by recourse to the procedures authorized elsewhere in this Order, the Committee may recommend to the President such special action in exceptional cases as internal security may require.

11. Nothing contained in this Order shall be construed to limit the authority of any department, independent establishment, or agency to suspend any employee as provided by law, to bar an immediate arrest and the transfer to court jurisdiction of any case in which the Department of Justice finds that such action is warranted, or to restrict the powers and responsibilities of the Civil Service Commission in connection with its review of disciplinary or administrative action against an employee.

12. The Department of Justice is hereby directed to furnish such clerical, stenographic, and other assistance and supplies as may be necessary to the operation of the Committee. Members of the Committee shall serve without compensation in such capacity.
12. Committee to Consider Subversive Activities

NOTE: To protect its own security, particularly in wartime, any government must exclude from its employ those persons who would subvert or overthrow the government's institutions. By the foregoing Executive Order, the President established an Interdepartmental Committee on Employee Investigations and set up procedures whereby disloyal persons in the employ of the government were to be discharged.

The United States Civil Service Commission had the responsibility for supervising loyalty investigations of candidates for government employment. The burden of weeding out subversive individuals already in government service had fallen on the individual departments and agencies with the assistance of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In order to coordinate this work, the Attorney General in April 1942 set up an informal interdepartmental committee to advise and assist the agencies in their handling of cases investigated by the F.B.I. The above Executive Order established this committee on a permanent basis and defined its functions and procedures.

Official representatives of the following Government agencies were appointed by the President to serve on the Interdepartmental Committee on Employee Investigations: Department of the Treasury, Department of the Interior, Civil Service Commission, Federal Reserve Board, and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

It is clear from the terms of the Executive Order that the Committee's function was basically advisory and coordinative. Its jurisdiction extended to all agencies, except the War and Navy Departments. The Secretaries of War and Navy by specific legislation had been authorized in the interest of national security to remove summarily any employee without regard to any provisions of laws, rules or regulations governing the removal of employees.

Most of the Committee's work fell into three categories: (1) advice and assistance while a case was being processed by the agency; (2) formal review of the entire record of a case and rendition of an advisory opinion upon request of the agency; (3) review of agency action upon motion of the Committee.

From the establishment of the Committee until September 30, 1945, 671 cases came within the purview of the Committee, and of these 24 resulted in the discharge of federal employees. (During the same period, of course, the Civil Service Commission excluded from Government service a substantially larger number of applicants on the ground of suspected disloyalty.) Aside from the 24 cases which directly resulted in discharge of federal employees, action was suspended in 143 cases because of resignation or suspension for reasons not within the purview of the
13. $25,000 Net Salary Limitation

Order, disciplinary action was taken in 3 cases, 104 cases received attention in the agencies, and a large portion of the remainder resulted in exoneration of the employees involved.

In summing up its accomplishments, the Executive Secretary stated in a report to the Attorney General: “The aggregate information contained in the reports convinces the Committee that there is no real basis for supposing that Government service harbors any significant number of persons who are members of organizations which advocate the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence, or who personally so advocate. With exceptions fortunately rare indeed, the Government worker is loyal.”

13 The President Urges the Congress Not to Repeal $25,000 Net Salary Limitation.

February 6, 1943

You have written me that there is a proposal before the Ways and Means Committee to amend the Public Debt Bill by adding a provision which in effect would nullify the Executive Order issued by me under the Act of Oct. 2, 1942 (price and wage control), limiting salaries to $25,000 net after taxes. You ask whether I care to submit any views with reference to this proposal.

It is my earnest hope that the Public Debt Bill can be passed without the addition of amendments not related to the subject matter of the bill. I believe it is of importance that this should be done. However, should the committee think otherwise, I will later, in response to your invitation, submit my views as to the merits of the proposal.

Hon. Robert Doughton,
Chairman, House Ways and Means Committee

NOTE: The foregoing statement of the President was in response to a communication to the President from Representative Robert L. Doughton, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee. Representative Doughton had asked the President whether he wished to submit his views concerning a pending proposal to amend the
14. Thirty-third Anniversary of Boy Scouts

Public Debt Bill by nullifying the Presidential Order which had, in general, limited annual salaries to $25,000 after taxes.

The proposal to limit net salaries to $25,000 annually had first been made by the President in his seven-point anti-inflation program announced on April 27, 1942, in a message to the Congress (see Item 47, 1942 volume). The subsequently enacted Stabilization Act of 1942 gave to the President the authority to adjust wages or salaries, and the President, by Executive Order No. 9250 (which established the Office of Economic Stabilization), had limited net salaries to $25,000 (see Item 97 and note, 1942 volume).

As indicated by the President in the foregoing statement, he later communicated to the House Ways and Means Committee a more comprehensive statement of his views on salary limitation when it was apparent that the Committee still opposed the $25,000 salary limitation. He did so in a letter to the Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee on February 15, 1943 (see Item 19 and note, this volume).

The Congress rejected the recommendations of the President. It attached a rider to the Public Debt Act of 1943 by which it terminated further executive effort to limit annual salaries (see Item 96 and note, this volume, for the President's statement condemning the rider to the Public Debt Act).

14 The President Greets the Boy Scouts on Their Thirty-third Anniversary.

February 7, 1943

Fellow Scouts and Scouters:

Today, with the Nation at war, we observe the thirty-third birthday of the Boy Scouts of America. The job of winning the war and assuring a decent and lasting peace is the concern of every American.

I heartily approve the slogan adopted for the Boy Scouts for 1943 — to "toughen up, buckle down, carry on to victory." I am informed that to date more than 327 of those who have been decorated for heroism by our country have been identified as having had scout training.

The leaders of our armed forces in training camps and on the
15. *Forty-eight Hour Minimum Wartime Work Week*

battle fronts have emphasized the value of scout training in developing knowledge and skill, as well as courage, self-reliance, resourcefulness, and initiative which are proving to be so essential in our determination to win the war.

I have always been a staunch believer in scouting, and now, in time of war, as your honorary president, I urge everyone connected with scouting, boys and men, to see to it that scouting is maintained at its full strength and effectiveness as a practical contribution to the war effort.

Certainly those who help to make boys physically strong, mentally awake, and morally straight in these times deserve the appreciation of all who are leaders in America. I am confident that full cooperation will be accorded leaders of the Boy Scouts of America, who are dealing with a most important aspect of our manpower problem.

So I bring greetings on this the thirty-third birthday to all the members of the Boy Scouts of America and say:

“Reach out and make it possible for every boy who wants to be a cub or a Scout to have a meeting place and the necessary leadership as a service to your country. Carry on! Make your slogan for 1943 — ‘Toughen up, buckle down, carry on to victory’ — a definite and vital part of all of your activities.”

15 Establishment of a Minimum Wartime Work Week of Forty-eight Hours. Executive Order No. 9301. February 9, 1943

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes, as President of the United States, and in order to meet the manpower requirements of our armed forces and our expanding war production program by a fuller utilization of our available manpower, it is hereby ordered:

1. For the duration of the war, no plant, factory, or other place of employment shall be deemed to be making the most effective
15. **Forty-eight Hour Minimum Wartime Work Week**

utilization of its manpower if the minimum work week therein is less than 48 hours per week.

2. All departments and agencies of the Federal Government shall require their contractors to comply with the minimum work week prescribed in this Order and with policies, directives, and regulations prescribed hereunder, and shall promptly take such action as may be necessary for that purpose.

3. The Chairman of the War Manpower Commission shall determine all questions of interpretation and application arising under this Order and shall formulate and issue such policies, directives, and regulations as he determines to be necessary to carry out this Order and to effectuate its purposes. The Chairman of the War Manpower Commission is authorized to establish a minimum work week greater or less than that established in section 1 of this Order or take other action with respect to any case or type of case in which he determines that such different minimum work week or other action would more effectively contribute to the war effort and promote the purposes of this Order.

4. All departments and agencies of the Federal Government shall comply with such policies, directives, and regulations as the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission shall prescribe pursuant to this Order, and shall so utilize their facilities, services, and personnel, and take such action under authority vested in them by law, as the Chairman determines to be necessary to effectuate the purposes of this Order and promote compliance with its provisions.

5. Nothing in this Order shall be construed as superseding or in conflict with any Federal, State, or local law limiting hours of work or with the provisions of any individual or collective bargaining agreement with respect to rates of pay for hours worked in excess of the agreed or customary work week, nor shall this Order be construed as suspending or modifying any provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act (Act of June 25, 1938; 52 Stat. 1060; 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.) or any other Federal, State, or local law relating to the payment of wages or overtime.
NOTE: Under the stabilization program, the cost of living and wages and salaries were maintained in reasonable balance during the war. The 48-hour wartime work week was a part of the stabilization program, inasmuch as the increased production which resulted therefrom was another check on inflation. More important, however, was the fact that the lengthened workweek helped to solve serious manpower shortages in critical areas.

Paul V. McNutt, Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, announced that the new Order would take effect immediately in thirty-two labor shortage areas; the Order was made applicable to other areas as the need arose.

Thus, in addition to stepping up production, the Order secured more work out of a limited labor supply, and helped release manpower for the armed forces, war industries, and essential farm work.

16 ("The Peoples of All the United Nations . . . See the Utter Necessity of Our Standing Together After the War to Secure a Peace Based on Principles of Permanence" — Address to the White House Correspondents’ Association. February 12, 1943

It is nearly two years since I attended the last dinner of our White House Correspondents’ Association. A great deal of water has flowed over the dam since then.

And several people have flown over the water [referring to his trip to Casablanca and back; see Item 10, this volume. Ed. note].

Two years ago — many months before Pearl Harbor — I spoke to you of the thought that was then uppermost in our minds — of the determination of America to become the arsenal of democracy. Almost all Americans had by that time determined to play their full part in helping to save civilization from the barbarians. Even then, we were in the midst of the historic job of production — a job which the American people have been performing with zest and skill and, above all, with success.
Tonight, as I speak to you, we are in the war, and another thought is uppermost in our minds. That is our determination to fight this war through to the finish—to the day when United Nations forces march in triumph through the streets of Berlin, and Rome, and Tokyo.

Last September, as some of our publisher friends here tonight knew at the time, I made a tour of inspection through this country. I saw war plants at work. I saw Army and Navy training camps and flying fields. I saw American men and women—management and labor alike—working with the objective of beating production schedules. I saw American soldiers and sailors and fliers doing the job of training for the fighting that lay ahead.

Now I have returned from one of the fronts overseas, where the production from American factories and the training given in American camps are being applied in actual warfare against the enemy. I have seen our troops in the field. I have inspected their superb equipment. I have talked and laughed and eaten with them.

I have seen our men—the Nation’s men—in Trinidad, in Belém and Natal in Brazil, in Liberia, in Gambia. We must remember that in these places there is no actual fighting, but there is hard, dangerous, essential work, and there is a tremendous strain on the endurance and the spirit of our troops. They are standing up magnificently under that strain. And I want them to know that we have not forgotten them.

I have seen our men—and some of our American women—in North Africa. Out there it is war. Those men know that before this war is over, many of them will have given their lives to their Nation. But they know also that they are fighting to destroy the power of the enemies of this country, that they are fighting for a peace that will be a real and lasting peace and a far better world for the future.

Our men in the field are worthy of the great faith, the high hopes that we have placed in them. That applies as well to the men of our Navy, without whom no American expeditionary force could land safely on foreign shores. And it applies equally
16. Address to White House Correspondents' Association

to the men of our merchant marine who carry the essential munitions and supplies, without which neither the United States nor our allies could continue the battle.

No American can look at these men, soldiers or sailors, without a very great emotion and great pride — and a deep sense of our responsibility to them.

Because of the necessary secrecy of my trip, the men of our armed forces in every place I visited were completely surprised. And the expression on their faces certainly proved that.

I wish that I could pay similar surprise visits to our men in the other fields of operations. And don't let anybody assume, because I have said that, that next month I am flying to Guadalcanal. But I wish I could see our men, and our naval bases, and the islands of the Pacific, and Australia, on the mainland and the islands of Alaska, the islands of the Atlantic, the two Guianas, the Canal Zone, Iceland, Britain, Central Africa, the Middle East, India, Burma, and China. I wish I could tell them face to face that their Government and their people are very proud of the great job that they are doing, in helping to strengthen the vise that is slowly but surely squeezing the breath out of our enemies.

In every battalion, and in every ship's crew, you will find every kind of American citizen representing every occupation, every section, every origin, every religion, and every political viewpoint.

Ask them what they are fighting for, and every one of them will say, "I am fighting for my country." Ask them what they really mean by that, and you will get what on the surface may seem to be a wide variety of answers.

One will say that he is fighting for the right to say what he pleases, and to read and listen to what he likes.

Another will say he is fighting because he never wants to see the Nazi swastika flying over the old First Baptist Church on Elm Street.

Another soldier will say that he is fighting for the right to work, and to earn three square meals a day for himself and his folks.
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And another one will say that he is fighting in this world war so that his children and his grandchildren will not have to go back to Europe, or Africa, or Asia, or the Solomon Islands, to do this ugly job all over again.

But all these answers really add up to the same thing; every American is fighting for freedom. And today the personal freedom of every American and his family depends, and in the future will increasingly depend, upon the freedom of his neighbors in other lands.

For today the more you travel, the more you realize that the whole world is one neighborhood. That is why this war that had its beginnings in seemingly remote areas—China—Poland—has spread to every continent, and most of the islands of the sea, involving the lives and the liberties of the entire human race. And unless the peace that follows recognizes that the whole world is one neighborhood and does justice to the whole human race, the germs of another world war will remain as a constant threat to mankind.

Yes, I talked with many people in our armed forces, along the coast and through the islands of the Western Hemisphere, and up the coast of West Africa. Many of our soldiers and sailors were concerned about the state of the home front. They receive all kinds of exaggerated reports and rumors that there is too much complaining back here at home, and too little recognition of the realities of war; that selfish labor leaders are threatening to call strikes that would greatly curtail the output of our war industries; that some farm groups are trying to profiteer on prices, and are letting us down on food production; that many people are bitter over the hardships of rationing and priorities; and especially that there is serious partisan quarrel over the petty things of life here in our Capital City of Washington, D. C.

I told them that most of these reports are just gross exaggerations; that the people as a whole in the United States are in this war to see it through with heart and body and soul; and that our population is willing and glad to give up some of their shoes, and their sugar, and coffee, and automobile riding—and privileges and profits—for the sake of the common cause.
I could not truthfully deny to our troops that a few chislers, a few politicians, and a few — to use a polite term — publicists — fortunately a very few — have placed their personal ambition or greed above the Nation’s interests.

Our troops know that the Nazis and the Fascists and the Japanese are trying hard to sell the untruths of propaganda to certain types of Americans. But our troops also know that even if you pile up a lot of molehills of deception one on top of the other, you still cannot make a mountain big enough, or high enough, or solid enough to fool many people, or to block the road to victory and to an effective peace.

I think a fundamental of an effective peace is the assurance to those men who are fighting our battles, that when they come home they will find a country with an economy firm enough and fair enough to provide jobs for all those who are willing to work.

I am certain that private enterprise will be able to provide the vast majority of those jobs, and in those cases where this cannot be accomplished that the Congress of the United States will pass the legislation that will make good the assurance of earning a living.

There are still a few men who say we cannot achieve this and other honorable, reasonable aims for the postwar period. And in speaking of those professional skeptics — those men of little faith — there comes to my mind an old word in our language — the word “pettifoggers.”

The formal dictionary definition and derivation of the word are neither here nor there. To most of us “pettifogger” brings to mind a man who is small, mean and tricky, and picayune. In a word — petty. It is the type of man who is always seeking to create a smoke screen and fog, for the purpose of obscuring the plain truth. And you and I know some pettifoggers.

Today, those pettifoggers are attempting to obscure the essential truths of this war. They are seeking to befog the present and the future, and the clear purposes and the high principles for which the free world now maintains the promise of undimmed victory.

To use one example, in a small sector of the world’s surface —
in North Africa—we are now massing armies—British, French, and American—for one of the major battles of this war.

The enemy’s purpose in the battle of Tunisia is to hold at all costs their last bridgehead in Africa, to prevent us from gaining access to the Straits that lead to Nazi-dominated Europe.

Our prime purpose in this battle of Tunisia is to drive our enemies into the sea.

The British First Army in this battle, commanded by General Anderson, contains many veterans of Flanders and Dunkirk. Those men have a score to settle with the Nazis, and they are going to even that score.

The British Eighth Army, commanded by General Montgomery, has to its eternal credit the smashing defeat of Marshal Rommel’s Army, and the now historic fifteen-hundred-mile pursuit of those once triumphant Nazi-Fascist forces.

The enemy in Tunisia will be attacked from the south by this great Eighth Army, and by the French forces who have made a remarkable march all the way across the Sahara Desert under General Le Clerc, one of General de Gaulle’s officers. From the west the enemy will be attacked by the combined forces of British and Americans, together with French troops under the command of General Giraud.

And I think that we take a certain satisfaction tonight that all of these forces are commanded by General Eisenhower. I spent many hours in Casablanca with this young general—a descendant of Kansas pioneers. I know what a fine, tough job he has done, and how carefully and skillfully he is directing the soldiers under him. I want to say to you tonight—and to him—that we have every confidence in his leadership. High tribute was paid to his qualities as a man when the British Government, through Mr. Churchill, took the lead at Casablanca in proposing him for the supreme command of all the great Allied operations which are imminent in North Africa.

The deputy to General Eisenhower is General Alexander, one of Britain’s greatest fighting men. He commanded all the British forces in the Middle East, including the Eighth Army that won
the decisive battle at El Alamein. He and General Montgomery planned that engagement and the stupendous advance that followed. At this moment — as I speak to you tonight — General Alexander is standing at the right hand of General Eisenhower planning new military operations.

These important facts reveal not merely cooperation but active collaboration between the United Nations. Let these facts be duly noted by our enemies.

Our soldiers in Tunisia are well trained and equipped, but they are facing for the first time actual combat with formidable opponents. We can be absolutely certain that they will conduct themselves as bravely and as effectively as did those young Americans under General Pershing who drove Germany's best troops through the Argonne forest and across the River Meuse.

I think we should be prepared for the fact that Tunisia will cost us heavily in casualties. Yes, we must face that fact now, with the same calm courage as our men are facing it on the battlefield itself.

The enemy has strong forces, and strong positions. His supply lines are maintained at great cost, but Hitler has been willing to pay that cost because he knows the consequences of Allied victory in Tunisia.

The consequences are simple. They are the actual invasions of the continent of Europe. And we do not disguise our intention to make these invasions. The pressure on Germany and Italy will be constant and unrelenting. The amazing Russian armies in eastern Europe have been delivering overpowering blows; we must do likewise in the west. The enemy must be hit and hit hard from so many directions that he will never know which is his bow and which is his stern.

And it was made clear also at Casablanca that all Frenchmen outside of France, for we know little of what is happening in France, but all Frenchmen who can, are uniting in one great paramount objective — the complete liberation of France and of the French people who now suffer the torture of the Nazi yoke. As each day passes, a spirit of unselfishness is more greatly unit-
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ing all Frenchmen who have the opportunity to strike that blow for liberation.

In the years of the American Revolution, and the French Revolution, the fundamental principle that guided our democracies was established. Indeed the whole cornerstone of our democratic edifice was the principle that from the people and the people alone flows the authority of government.

It is one of our war aims, as expressed in the Atlantic Charter, that the conquered populations of today—shall again become the masters of their destiny. There must be no doubt anywhere that it is the unalterable purpose of the United Nations to restore to conquered peoples their sacred rights.

French sovereignty rests with the people of France. Its expression has been temporarily suspended by German occupation. Once the triumphant armies of the United Nations have expelled the common foe, Frenchmen will be represented by a government of their own popular choice.

And it will be a free choice in every way. No Nation in all the world that is free to make a choice is going to set itself up under a Fascist form of government, or a Nazi form of government, or a Japanese war-lord form of government. For such forms are the offspring of seizure of power followed by the abridgment of freedom. Therefore—and this is plain logic—the United Nations can properly say of these forms of government—Nazism, Fascism, Japanism—if I might coin a new word—the United Nations can properly say to that form of government two simple words, "Never again."

For the right of self-determination included in the Atlantic Charter does not carry with it the right of any Government anywhere in the world to commit wholesale murder, or the right to make slaves of its own people, or of any other peoples in the world.

And the world can rest assured that this total war, this sacrifice of lives all over the globe, is not being carried on for the purpose, or even with the remotest idea of keeping Quislings or Lavals in power anywhere on this earth.
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The decisions that were reached, and the actual plans that were made at Casablanca were not confined to any one theater of war, or to any one continent, or ocean, or sea. Before this year is out I think it will be made known to the world, in actions rather than in words, that the Casablanca Conference produced plenty of news; and it will be bad news for the Germans and Italians—and the Japanese.

We have lately concluded a long, hard battle in the Southwest Pacific, and we have made notable gains. That battle started in the Solomons and New Guinea last summer. It has demonstrated without question our superior power in planes, and most importantly in the fighting qualities of our individual soldiers and sailors.

American armed forces in the Southwest Pacific are receiving powerful aid from Australia and New Zealand, and also directly from the British themselves.

We do not expect to spend the time that it would take to bring Japan to final defeat merely by inching our way forward from island to island across the vast expanse of the Pacific. It would take too many years.

Great and decisive actions against the Japanese will be taken to drive the invader from the soil of China. Yes, important actions are going to be taken in the skies over China—and in the skies over Japan itself.

The discussions at Casablanca have been continued in Chungking with the Generalissimo by General Arnold, and have resulted in definite plans for offensive operations.

Remember that there are many roads that lead right to Tokyo. And we are not going to neglect any of them.

In an attempt to ward off the inevitable disaster that lies ahead of them, the Axis propagandists are trying all their old tricks, in order to divide the United Nations. They seek to create the idea that if we win this war, Russia, and England, and China, and the United States are going to get into a cat-and-dog fight.

This is their final effort to turn one Nation against another, in the vain hope that they may settle with one or two at a time—
that any of us may be so gullible and so forgetful as to be duped into making "deals" at the expense of our allies.

To these panicky attempts — and that is the best word to use: "panicky" — to escape the consequences of their crimes, we say — all the United Nations say — that the only terms on which we shall deal with any Axis Government, or any Axis factions, are the terms proclaimed at Casablanca: "unconditional surrender." We know, and the plain people of our enemies will eventually know, that in our uncompromising policy we mean no harm to the common people of the Axis Nations. But we do mean to impose punishment and retribution in full upon their guilty, barbaric leaders.

The Nazis must be frantic — not just panicky, but frantic — if they believe that they can devise any propaganda that would turn the British and the American and the Chinese Governments and peoples against Russia — or Russia against the rest of us.

The overwhelming courage and endurance of the Russian people in withstanding and hurling back the invaders — the genius with which their great armies have been directed and led by Mr. Stalin and their military commanders — all speak for themselves.

The tragedy of the war has sharpened the vision and leadership of the peoples of all the United Nations, and I can say to you from my own full knowledge that they see the utter necessity of our standing together after the war to secure a peace based on principles of permanence.

You can be quite sure that if Japan should be the first of the Axis partners to fall, the total efforts and resources of all the United Nations would be concentrated on the job of crushing Germany.

And, on the other hand, lest there be any question in Nazi or Japanese minds that we are wholly one in the prosecution of the war to a complete victory over our enemies, the Prime Minister wished, at Casablanca, to make a formal agreement that if Germany should be conquered before Japan, all British Empire resources and manpower would, of course, join with China and
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us in an out-and-out final attack on Japan. And I told Mr. Churchill that no formal statement of agreement along those lines was in the least bit necessary, that the American people accept the word of a great English gentleman and that it is obvious and clear that all of us are completely in accord in our determination to destroy the forces of barbarism in Asia, as well as in Europe and in Africa. In other words, our policy toward our Japanese enemies is precisely the same as our policy toward our Nazi enemies: it is a policy of fighting hard on all fronts, and ending the war as quickly as we can, on the uncompromising terms of unconditional surrender.

Today is the anniversary of the birth of a great, plain American. The living memory of Abraham Lincoln is now honored and cherished by all of our people, wherever they may be, and by men and women and children throughout the British Commonwealth, and the Soviet Union, and the Republic of China, and all of our sister American Republics, and indeed in every land on earth where people love freedom and will give their lives for freedom.

President Lincoln said in 1862, “Fellow citizens, we cannot escape history. We of this Congress and this administration will be remembered in spite of ourselves. No personal significance or insignificance can spare one or another of us. The fiery trial through which we pass will light us . . . in honor or dishonor, to the latest generation.”

Today, eighty years after Lincoln delivered that message, the fires of war are blazing across the whole horizon of mankind—from Kharkov to Kunming—from the Mediterranean to the Coral Sea—from Berlin to Tokyo.

Again—we cannot escape history. We have supreme confidence that, with the help of God, honor will prevail. We have faith that future generations will know that here, in the middle of the twentieth century, there came a time when men of good will found a way to unite, and produce, and fight to destroy the forces of ignorance, and intolerance, and slavery, and war.
Q. Perhaps you will tell us something about your trip to Africa.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, on this African trip, there are certain things that I suppose everybody ought to realize—it is rather difficult to realize—and that is that in a world war there are a lot of Nations involved. You can't leave things to the military, otherwise nothing gets done. Now that's a dreadful thing to say, but the fact is that if you get almost all Admirals and Generals from different Nations, or even one Nation, talking over future plans, they spend a month or two in talking about why each plan or suggestion won't work—get just a series of Noes.

On the other hand, if you get certain laymen to stick pins into them all the time—prod them, if you like—and say you have got to have an answer to this, that, and the other thing within so many days, you get an answer. And that is true in this war—partly true in the last war.

And that is why, after the November landing in North Africa, Winston Churchill and I started the military and the naval and the air to work on plans; and by about the first of January we found that it wouldn't be until late spring before they had plans, if they were left to themselves. It's a perfectly natural thing; they are all technicians.

So we decided that we would have them meet. I am afraid we met so that we could stick the pins in. And the result was that, when we got there, we gave them a week to bring out
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plans that were based on technical things — war operations — during the balance of the war. And at the end of a week they were substantially completed; and in the next three days they were actually put down on paper and approved by everybody.

Well, of course, it also emphasized what we had come to learn a year ago, when Churchill was here in January and again in June, and that is that the military or the naval can’t simply say, “Now we are going to do this,” press a button and have it done in a week or two weeks, or a month or two months, or three months. No human being can do that, where large operations overseas are involved.

And I suppose it’s perfectly obvious to all of us by now, that the lesson of last fall, when everybody was yelling for a second front, has been pretty well learned. The second front had been not only planned but was in process of being organized and put through. But it took from July until November to perfect and actually put into operation the landings in North Africa. Well, of course, that is true with any large body of men, or even any large transportation problem for the Navy.

And another thing — when we got there on the fourteenth of January, Mr. Churchill and I decided it would be a great chance to see if we couldn’t bring General Charles de Gaulle and General Henri Honoré Giraud together.

I said, jokingly, “Now we’ll call Giraud the bridegroom, and I’ll produce him from Algiers next Saturday afternoon. And you get the bride — de Gaulle — from London, and we will get them down here, and we’ll have a shotgun wedding.” (Laughter)

Well, Saturday afternoon came, and I had my man there, but Winston couldn’t produce the bride. (Laughter) And it took — oh — until the following Friday morning before we could get de Gaulle there.

And then came the two days of conversations between them. And Churchill and I kept discreetly out of it, except
that we got every afternoon a report of no progress; except that they had said, "Après vous, Gaston" — "Après vous, Alphonse" — and got nowhere. (Laughter)

So we got down to Sunday morning, and we were to leave — Churchill and I — at noon; and after great effort I got them to sign two very simple sentences. The first was that the one great objective that they both could agree on was the liberation of France. The second was that they would continue to meet together and confer, so that they could work as closely in unity as possible toward that objective. I had to pull off some little dramatics to get them to do it.

Then we went out on the lawn to get photographed. And we had — some of you may have seen it — the row of four chairs: Churchill, de Gaulle, and me, and Giraud. Some of you people in the East have seen a little photographer that used to follow me around the country in the old days— Sammy Schulman. He is a great boy, Sammy is. And there he was in Army uniform, in front of us with his camera. And I worked it out beforehand with Sammy. After the pictures of the four of us were taken, Sammy Schulman in the front row said, "Oh, Mr. President, can we have a picture of the two Generals shaking hands?" (Laughter) So I translated Sammy to Giraud, and Giraud said, "Mais, oui," and he got right up and held out his hand. It took Churchill and myself five minutes to persuade de Gaulle to get on his feet to shake hands. And we got them to do it. And I think you have all got that picture. If you run into a copy of the picture, look at the expression on de Gaulle's face! (Laughter) However, the main point was that we got them together.

And, of course, on North Africa, there have been an awful lot of sincere people — especially what we call "liberals"— who were awfully upset by certain events in North Africa. Well, there are two things that have to be made perfectly clear, and the first is that we have a line of communications from Casablanca — oh, about a thousand miles long to get to the fighting front, and about 700 miles long from the land-
17. *Eight Hundred and Seventy-ninth Press Conference*

ing port of Oran, and about 500 miles long from Algiers. We are going through country which until you have been there— I had no idea of it until I got there—is a country that is so heterogeneous.

Morocco, for instance, is not a French colony. It's only in the last thirty-one years that there has been a French Protectorate over what is known officially as the Riffian Empire of Morocco, with a Sultan who is the spiritual and the temporal leader.

The Moors represent ninety-something percent of the population. And the French rule the place with a very light hand. They are good colonizers, only they are not colonizing there. They are doing well. They are building roads for Morocco. They are improving agriculture. They are gradually putting in education, but they so far give no vote to the Moorish population, which is over 90 percent.

Now they like the French who are there over them, because the French understand them. They have had experience, and they don't want any change. And the Sultan is an intimate friend of the French Governor.

Well, it's a perfectly simple thing; this French Governor—Auguste Noguès—is all for one party. He is a very definite partisan. He is for Noguès. (*Laughter*) And what he wants is to keep his position as Governor of Morocco, in a beautiful marble palace built by Maréchal Lyautey in the old days right near to the Sultan, in Rabat. Noguès has been there for seven or eight years, and he is no more pro-Hitler than I am, or pro-Laval. He is pro-Noguès—and the palace.

Well, it's much better in the rear of our armies to keep a perfectly nice, quiet position in Morocco than it is to go off chasing rainbows as to the future of France.

Well, as to the future of France, I think everybody is agreed that we must not exercise any influence by any act or deed today—by recognizing this, that, or the other individual as to what that future has got to be. It has got to be chosen by the people of France at the end of the war. And that is
why you have the great efforts by de Gaulle to be recognized as what he calls "L'esprit de France," "L'âme de France"—"The spirit of France," "The soul of France." Nobody is going to do that, because it would give an unfair advantage. Giraud wants to be recognized as the representative of France all over the world. I said, "No. That will give you an unfair advantage. Let France choose her own government. In the meanwhile, run your own little bailiwick wherever you may happen to be."

There has been so much ink spilled by people in this country—and people who talk on the Hill, and elsewhere—about it, and they don't know one blessed thing about it. You have to go there to understand it.

Now things are going along all right. What I want is the support of General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Now that is, after all, the main thing now, with the definite assurance that we are going to let France choose its own form of government at the end of the war. With the one proviso, you might say, that neither France nor any other Nation should be allowed to choose a Nazi or a Fascist form of government. I think that is fairly clear.

Then the other principal thing—except I was very much interested to see the development of different types of colonization in West Africa. It hasn't been good.

And on the way back—you know, it's an amazing thing. On Wednesday I flew 650 miles in the morning, down to Liberia. I had the President of Liberia to lunch with me at our camp. I flew back to Gambia in the afternoon. I left. I had supper on a cruiser that was in the harbor. I got on a plane at 10:30 P.M. I got to Natal, Brazil, in the morning, and I had lunch with President Vargas that day.

It's an amazing thing: Wednesday in Liberia, Thursday in Brazil!

And I don't like flying! (Laughter)
Not one bit. The more I do of it, the less I like it.
It has been a great menace, more than we realize in this
war, the fact that the Germans had it in their power to take over Dakar and use it as a raider and submarine base. It's a direct threat against Brazil and this continent, the West Indies, and so forth.

And I think when the war is over, we have got to take certain steps. First, to demilitarize western Africa all the way down. And second, possibly to have a strong point either in Dakar or Bathurst, where we will have sufficient air strength, and sufficient Navy, and sufficient airfields, and so forth, to prevent any aggressor Nation in the future from reestablishing a threat against this continent.

Well, as to details I have no idea; it isn't worth talking about. But you have an objective. When people ask the details about an objective, I say, "I am not interested," or "I am not ready to talk," or "We haven't studied the methods and the details." We can all agree on the objectives. I never worry very much if we have a six months' debate in the press or Congress as to methods or details, as long as we are agreed on objective.

I think that is one of the things that would help the country an awful lot if we could all bring it out. The objective is the principal thing. And most of us, 90 percent of us, I think, can agree on the objective. Make it clear that the other part of it is good space-filler, and of real use, because it makes people think. All right. But no hard feelings over a difference on detail, if we are agreed on the objective.

NOTE: For other references to the 6, 7, 10, and 16, and notes, this Casablanca Conference, see Items volume.
The President Sends a Letter of Encouragement to a Victim of Infantile Paralysis.

February 14, 1943

My dear Miss Lawrence:

I am asking an old friend, Basil O'Connor, president of the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis, to bring you a message tonight at the Victory Dinner so appropriately tendered to you at Town Hall Club in New York City.

Your courage and faith and determination in overcoming the after-effects of infantile paralysis and thereby restoring to the public the opportunity of enjoying your beautiful art — all result in a victory — your victory — which is an inspiration to everyone at any time.

But today when all we love and cherish is jeopardized by those who take their rules of life from the brutality of barbarism and preach and practice that all but the physically perfect should be summarily liquidated, your victory exposes with the light of truth the godlessness of the lie they teach.

In the days ahead, while we fight for life itself, those whose trials and sorrows may be many and heavy will courageously carry on in the spirit you have so nobly exhibited.

Mirrored in your great victory for many years to come, those beset with burdens and harassed with handicaps will see the glory and the satisfaction of the good fight — well won.

From an old veteran to a young recruit my message to you is "Carry on."

Cordially yours,

NOTE: The President was a symbol of encouragement for the thousands of people who, like him, had been afflicted with infantile paralysis. As one who had spectacularly risen above his physical handicaps after having been stricken by the disease, the President offered to other victims concrete inspiration for the future.

That was one of the great accomplishments of his visits to Warm Springs, Georgia, where so many hundreds of patients received com-
18. Encouragement to Infantile Paralysis Victim

fort, hope, and courage from the President. He used to join with them in many of their exercises and chores, and in their amusements and recreation.

The President made conscious efforts to show himself and talk with men and women and children who had been afflicted, in an effort to buoy them up and give them faith in themselves.

I learned this early in my association with him. Back in the summer of 1930 as Governor of New York he was making a tour of the Barge Canal of the State. The small boat on which we were traveling was moored to the side of the Canal. He noticed, in the little crowd which had gathered on the shore around the boat, a young woman with her small boy at her side. The boy had obviously been a victim of polio, and was crippled in one leg. The Governor called them over and inquired minutely about the boy’s condition and about the disease which had attacked him. Then he said, “You are lucky—it has hit you only in one leg. See, both of my legs are gone.” And he smiled, and patted the boy and shook hands with the mother and told them not to lose hope, that the boy had just as much of a chance in life as any other boy.

I have never forgotten the look of courage and faith and self-reliance and affection in the faces of the boy and his mother as they watched this crippled man who had become Governor of New York and who already was being mentioned for the Presidency of the United States.

The most spectacular instance of this characteristic of the President I saw in the summer of 1944. He had come to Hawaii to meet Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur. He spent one afternoon inspecting a naval hospital outside Honolulu. He was wheeled through the various wards of the hospital and we followed on foot. Many of the boys had been seriously wounded in the islands of the Pacific. There were many amputees among them and others who would be seriously crippled for the rest of their lives.

He slowed down in these wards, talking to as many of the boys as he could at their bedside from his wheelchair. He insisted on being wheeled into every ward which contained an amputee. While he never said so, we were all sure that the reason he insisted on showing himself to all these wounded veterans was to give them courage and hope for the future by letting them see that he, too, could not walk any better than they—that he too had to be wheeled around—this President of the United States.

Marjorie Lawrence, the opera singer, made her debut at the Metropolitan Opera Company in December, 1935. At the height of her successful career, in the spring of 1941 while in Mexico, she contracted infantile paralysis. As a result of the illness her legs were
paralyzed. After a valiant fight, Miss Lawrence returned to the Metropolitan Opera in January, 1943, to sing the role of Venus in Tannhäuser—a part which she could perform because Venus reclines on her throne throughout.

The foregoing letter of the President was sent to Miss Lawrence at the testimonial dinner which was tendered in her honor shortly after her return to the Metropolitan Opera. Miss Lawrence made a steady recovery from her illness. In December, 1943, she walked a few steps—for the first time in over two years. On December 11, 1947, at Chicago, Miss Lawrence left her wheel chair for her first standing operatic appearance in over six years.

19 (A Letter to the House Ways and Means Committee on Salary Limitation.

February 15, 1943

Some days ago you wrote me that there was a proposal before your committee to amend the Public Debt Bill by adding a provision nullifying the Executive Order issued by me under the Act of October 2, 1942, limiting salaries to $25,000 after taxes, and asked if I cared to submit any views with reference to the proposal. In reply I told you that I hoped the Public Debt Bill could be passed without adding amendments not related to the subject, but that if the committee thought otherwise I would later write you my views.

In a message to the Congress on April 27, 1942, I stated:

"Discrepancies between low personal incomes and very high personal incomes should be lessened; and I therefore believe that in time of this grave national danger, when all excess income should go to win the war, no American citizen ought to have a net income, after he has paid his taxes, of more than $25,000 a year."

Thereafter the Treasury advised the committee:

"To implement the President's proposal, the Treasury now recommends the enactment of a 100 percent war supertax on that part of the net income after regular income tax which exceeds a personal exemption of $25,000. . . . It is recommended that for the purpose of the supertax,
joint returns be made mandatory and that a personal exemption of $25,000 for each spouse be allowed, or in effect $50,000 for the married couple."

So far as I know, neither house of the Congress acted upon the recommendation.

When the Act of October 2, 1942, was passed, it authorized me to adjust wages or salaries whenever I found it necessary "to correct gross inequities and also aid in the effective prosecution of the war." Pursuant to this authority, I issued an Executive Order in which, among other things, it was provided that in order to correct gross inequities and to provide for greater equality in contributing to the war effort no salary should be authorized to the extent that it exceeds $25,000 net after the payment of taxes. Provision was made for certain allowances in order to prevent undue hardships.

The legality of the Executive Order was attested by the Attorney General prior to its issuance. No Executive Order is issued without such approval.

The regulation issued under this Order with my approval was so worded that it affected only gross salaries in excess of $67,200, the amount of taxes due upon such salaries reducing them to approximately $25,000 net. I could not exercise the discretion vested in me by the Congress to adjust salaries without finding that it is a gross inequity in wartime to permit one man to receive a salary in excess of $67,200 a year while the Government is drafting another man and requiring him to serve with the armed forces for $600 per year.

I believed it a gross inequity for the president of a corporation engaged in the production of materials for the Government to receive a salary and bonus of $500,000 a year while the workers in the corporation were denied an increase in wages under the provisions of the law and my Executive Order. The correction of such inequities, I believed, would aid in the effective prosecution of the war.

I call your attention to the fact that the limitation of salaries was, by the language of the Order, limited to the war period, and
that the law upon which the Order was based expires June 30, 1944, and can be continued only by the affirmative action of the Congress. Therefore no fair argument can be made that the limitation was intended either by the Congress or by the Executive to become permanent law. The intention was made plain in my original Message. I then and there affirmed my belief that this limitation should be made "in time of this grave national danger when all excess income should go to win the war."

This desire to limit personal profits during wartime is no new thought. Its origin is neither alien nor obscure. It is in accord with the solemn pledges of the Republican Party and the Democratic Party.

In 1924, just after our soldiers had returned from the first World War and the leaders of both parties were conscious of the views of the returning soldiers as to war profiteering, the Republican Party declared in its platform:

"We believe that in time of war the Nation should draft for its defense not only its citizens but also every resource which may contribute to success. The country demands that should the United States ever again be called upon to defend itself by arms the President be empowered to draft such material resources and such services as may be required and to stabilize the prices of services and essential commodities, whether utilized in actual warfare or private activity."

The Democratic Party platform the same year solemnly pledged:

"In the event of war in which the manpower of the Nation is drafted, all other resources should likewise be drafted. This will tend to discourage war by depriving it of its profits."

I repeat, this was in 1924, not 1928, and that these were the platforms of the Republican and Democratic Parties.

I agree with those who say that the limitation of salaries does not deal adequately with the problem of excessive personal profits and that the limitation should extend to all income. My Executive Order endeavored to correct the inequity to the extent of the power granted me. The Congress can, however, make the
limitation adequate by extending it to the coupon clipper as well as the man who earns the salary.

Therefore, I urge the Congress to levy a special war supertax on net income from whatever source derived (including income from tax-exempt securities), which, after payment of regular income taxes, exceeds $25,000 in the case of a single person and $50,000 in the case of a married couple.

If the Congress does not approve the recommendation submitted by the Treasury last June that a flat 100 percent supertax be imposed on such excess incomes, then I hope the Congress will provide a minimum tax of 50 percent, with steeply graduated rates as high as 90 percent. The exact amount of the exemptions to be allowed and the exact rate of taxation to be applied are necessarily arbitrary, and these are matters the Congress must decide.

If taxes are levied which substantially accomplish the purpose I have indicated, either in a separate bill or in the general revenue bill you are considering, I shall immediately rescind the section of the Executive Order in question. The Congress may appropriately provide that such taxes should take the place of the $25,000 limitation imposed by Executive Order.

I trust, however, that without such tax levies the Congress will not rescind the limitation and permit the existence of inequities that seriously affect the morale of soldiers and sailors, farmers and workers, imperiling efforts to stabilize wages and prices, and thereby impairing the effective prosecution of the war.

Hon. Robert Doughton,
Chairman, House Ways and Means Committee

NOTE: The foregoing letter of the President to Representative Robert L. Doughton, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, was the President's second communication to the Committee in opposition to the proposal to repeal the limitation of all salaries to $25,000 after taxes. (See Item 13 and note, this volume, for the President's first letter of February 6, 1943, criticizing this proposal.) Nevertheless, the Congress attached a rider to the Public Debt Act of
20. Eight Hundred and Eightieth Press Conference

1943 eliminating the President's power to limit net salaries to $25,000. (See Item 36 and note, this volume, and references cited therein, for a detailed account of the basis of the President's power to limit salaries, and his statement condemning the rider to the Public Debt Act of 1943.)

20 (The Eight Hundred and Eightieth Press Conference (Excerpts). February 16, 1943

(Fall of Kharkov — Senate confirmation of subordinate Federal employees — Curtailment of non-war expenses — Abolition of National Resources Planning Board — Need for planning for postwar transition.)

Q. How did you survive? [Referring to the dinner at the White House Correspondents’ Association’s smoker, a few days before]

THE PRESIDENT: Fine. A very sober dinner. (Laughter)

Q. (aside) Where?

Q. Disappointingly so?

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, not in wartime.

Bill [Hassett, Assistant Press Secretary], what have you got?

MR. HASSETT: I don’t know a thing.

THE PRESIDENT: What?

MR. HASSETT: I regret I haven’t got a thing.

MR. DONALDSON: All in.

THE PRESIDENT: Can’t you think something up?

MR. HASSETT: I would have to go and collect it pretty quick. Does it necessarily need to be true?

THE PRESIDENT: This fellow Hassett isn’t any good. He says he can’t think anything up. (Laughter)

(Then to Mr. Godwin): You look extremely quiet today.

(Then to May Craig): What are you thinking, May?

(Chuckling)

MISS MAY CRAIG: I couldn’t tell you.

THE PRESIDENT: Starting something?

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MISS MAY CRAIG: Yes.

MR. MERRIMAN SMITH: *(loudly, and a little unrestrained)* Mr. President, we have been asking—

THE PRESIDENT: *(interposing)* Now—now—now—*(with mock gestures of straightening out his coat)* *(Much laughter)*

MR. MERRIMAN SMITH: *(continuing)* we have been asking Bill Hassett for two days now about Marshal [Semyon K.] Timoshenko. Can you help us?

THE PRESIDENT: Ask Mona Lisa! *(Laughter)*

[Mr. Hassett, the previous day, in answering this same question, had said he had checked with the President and got nothing but a Mona Lisa smile.]

Q. Where is she? *(More laughter)*

Q. Is she one of the "sweet young things"?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes—one of the "sweet young things."

MR. GODWIN: Working for O.W.I. [Office of War Information], Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: *(turning to Mr. Elmer Davis, O.W.I. head)* How about that, Elmer?

MR. DAVIS: We could use her. *(More laughter)*

Q. Mr. President, Moscow has just announced the official fall of Kharkov to the Russian troops. Would you care—


Q. *(continuing)* About a half-hour ago.

THE PRESIDENT: That's fine. They have got two or three strong points now that they have recaptured. And, of course, every strong point that is recaptured, that gets out of the Germans' control as a strong point—a junction point—along that whole line, makes it more difficult for the Germans later on in the spring to undertake any counteroffensive. So, from the point of view of the safety of the Russians against a counteroffensive, I think it has a great deal of significance. Rostov gone—Kharkov—and Kursk.

Q. Mr. President, if they lose the strong point on the line which they are now defending, and they retire to a line shorter than
Moscow south, would it still make it more difficult for them to launch an offensive from that new line?

The President: It depends a little bit. As I understand it, on the southern half of the line, these points that have fallen to the Russian armies, back of them on the west is rather flat country, where it would be difficult for the Germans to conduct an offensive between the present line—the Kharkov line—and the next line from the west.

Q. Mr. President, is there anything you can say on prospects on the Hill that there will be some legislative limitation to prevent the $25,000 net limit from operating?

The President: I think you had better ask Mr. [Robert] Doughton [Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee]. You can intimate to Mr. Doughton that you have got an idea that he got a letter from me today [see Item 19]. Maybe he will let you see it.

Q. Today, sir?

The President: Yes.

Q. Mr. President, have you familiarized yourself with Senator Kenneth McKellar's bill which would take 70,000 Government employees out of civil service and require their confirmation by the Senate?

The President: Only what I read in the paper.

Q. Well, I figured out that if there was debate in the Senate on one appointment out of a hundred, and they limited the debate to five minutes to each side, which is pretty short for the Senate—

The President: (interjecting) You are right.

Q. (continuing) — it would take 45 minutes a day for every legislative day for an entire year to pass those one out of a hundred. I would like to ask whether you think the Senate in wartime could be better employed? (Laughter)

The President: I think there's a little line in the Bible that says, "Thou hast said it." (Laughter) That's not a bad idea. I don't think there have been columns written about topics of that kind the way they have about topics affecting the executive
branch of the Government. I think you have got a great field of action there—(laughter) especially those of you who have to write those pieces so often a week. I think there's something for you to go after. Good idea.

Q. Could I ask you another question, not as President but as a citizen of New York? You see, the real idea in that is that the two Senators from each State will pass on the appointments from those States—the nominations—and that is proportionate to the population. So the State of New York would get about 7,000 nominations. And if the two Senators from that State took ten minutes apiece to consider them, it would take them six hours per day, six days a week for an entire year to pass on them. (Laughter) Now those are accurate figures, and I would like to ask whether, as a constituent of the two Senators from New York, you approve of that?

THE PRESIDENT: As a taxpayer, I am deeply interested. (Laughter) Got any more? This is good.

Q. That's enough.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, think up some more.

You know, I will tell you what it's like. We all have been working, in the last two or three years, on the same old subject of cutting down on the non-war expenditures of the Government. Well, we are getting down now so that we are talking about $\frac{3}{2}$ percent of the total expenditures of the United States. And we are going to have pages and pages of the Congressional Record that will talk about the reduction of that $3\frac{1}{2}$ percent to 3.4 percent—pages and pages.

If you would just figure out—make an estimate of how many pages, hours, and minutes are devoted to the discussion of saving one-tenth of one percent—this is perfectly proper—and then figure out the cost in time, salaries of members of Congress, their clerks, their committees, and the printing of the Congressional Record, just see whether actually in saving one-tenth of one percent on the amount of non-war expendi-
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tures, it doesn't cost more than the saving itself. That's a nice point. Check up on it.

Well, for instance, things like this: I saw the other day that they voted in committee to abolish the National Resources Planning Board — they have got a perfect right to do it — but they have been engaged in all kinds of postwar planning. Any amount of planning has been done.

Among other things, they have gone into all the details of what we have talked about before as the "backlog," so that when a lot of people leave the munitions factories at the end of the war, and a lot of soldiers come home, they will have some jobs waiting to be done that are peacetime jobs.

Now I suppose most people, because they don't all think things through — most people don't — why should they? — get an idea that all Congress has to do is start making an appropriation for some public works, and that the day after the appropriation is made somebody down here will let the contract for the particular project, and the second day they will begin to hire a lot of people to carry it out.

Well, of course, actually, when Congress makes an appropriation for a given public project, unless it has been all engineered and architected, and the specifications drawn beforehand, necessarily it's just like any private individual building a building. It takes months before you can actually let the contract. And after you have let the contract to the successful bidder, as soon as he knows he is going to do it, it may take him another month or two, or even more, before he gets his materials on the job, before he has hired his people. And there is a big lag.

Well, we found that in 1933 and 1934, when we went in for a program of public works, that it was a long time after a project was decided on by the Congress — and it is the Congress, properly, that decides on the project — before the dirt began to fly and people began to be employed.

The National Resources Planning Board these last few years has been working on problems of that kind, getting
them engineered and architected, and specifications all ready, so that if the Congress, when the time comes, decides on the project, we will save months by all this preliminary work at very low proportionate cost getting the thing started.

Well, in the same way, this Planning Board — I know "planning" is not a popular term — has been working on all kinds of things that can't be put through just by legislation. It will take a great deal more than legislation, such as what are we going to do with a great many new communities that we have set up in this country? We put in factories and powder plants, and so forth and so on — munitions plants, we might say, out on the prairies. We have taken a small village and turned it into a great industrial center, in many places. What are we going to do with it at the end of the war? Are we going to try to put something else in it? Are we going to plan what kind of thing should go in it? Or are we going to wait for a directive, after the crisis has developed?

And I am inclined to think that keeping on getting ready for the postwar period is going to save the Nation, I would say, almost several billion dollars in time, in lack of employment, in the uncertainty of employees. Those are all translatable into terms of dollars, first and last.

On the other side, if we wait to do our postwar studying until after there is a postwar period, we are going to lose a great deal of money. Well, the money doesn't come out of the Government, it comes out of the pockets of the people of this country.

And I might put it this way: that in this respect I am in a role that I am not often played up in by some people. I am the great saver of money, the one watchdog on the pockets of the people of this country; and that the spendthrifts, in the last analysis, if we don't plan ahead, are going to be those people in the legislative branch of the Government who vote to end planning.

I don't care how planning is done. They can abolish the National Resources Planning Board, if they set up some
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other organization to do the work. It is perfectly immaterial as to who does it, as long as it gets done. And that is up to the Congress. . . .

NOTE: See Item 22 and note, this volume, for the President's further comments on the proposal of Senator McKellar that federal employees whose salaries exceeded $4500 per year should be subject to confirmation by the Senate.

For additional references to the work of the National Resources Planning Board, see note to Item 125 and references cited therein, pp. 502-503, 1939 volume; Item 5, pp. 36-37, 1940 volume; Item 18, 1941 volume; Item 8, 1942 volume; and Item 28, this volume.

21 The Eight Hundred and Eighty-first Press Conference — Joint Conference of the President and Mme. Chiang Kai-shek (Excerpts).
February 19, 1943

(Introduction of press — Remarks of Mme. Chiang Kai-shek — Problems of supplying China — China as a base against Japan.)

(Three chairs were placed in front of the center window, away from the President's desk. Madame Chiang occupied the chair in the center, Mrs. Roosevelt was at her right, and the President at her left.)

THE PRESIDENT: May I take this opportunity, not to introduce Madame Chiang to you, but introduce all of you to her.

Madame Chiang, this is nearly our one thousandth press conference in ten years, and the fact that the press and I are on speaking terms after all those years is perhaps a good sign. We still talk to each other. I think we rather like each other. (Laughter)

You have got a very representative group here. There is no country in the world, I think, that has more newspapers on a population basis — and magazines — than we have. They are very live wires. But I can tell the press something besides that, and that is that I wish that we — the press and myself — knew
21. *Eight Hundred and Eighty-first Press Conference*

half as much about China as Madame Chiang knows about us, as a special envoy. That is very different from most special envoys who come to this country. And her visit to us is going to be of real help in the days to come, because the people of China well over a century have been, in thought and in objective, closer to us Americans than almost any other peoples in the world — the same great ideals.

China, in the last — less than half a century has become one of the great democracies of the world, remembering always that their civilization is thousands of years older than ours. And that is why I feel that we in this country have a great deal more to learn about China than China has to learn about us.

Madame Chiang knows this country, and I am going to ask her, therefore — as an old friend — just to say a few words. . . .

(*Then to Madame Chiang*) And so I present to you the American press.

MADAME CHIANG KAI-SHEK: Mr. President, Mrs. Roosevelt, ladies and gentlemen of the press: I haven’t made any preparations for a speech. I don’t know what I am supposed to say to you today, but I confess that I have often heard that the pen is mightier than the sword. And when I saw all those pencils flashing across the pages as the President spoke, I must confess that whereas I had been to all the fronts in China, and have never felt any fear so far as Japanese swords are concerned, I do not know whether I felt fear or not when I saw all your pencils flashing across the pages. (*Laughter*)

However, I don’t think I do, because I see flashes of smiles coming from your faces, so I feel that I am amongst friends, and that I have nothing to fear from the press, although I understand that there are such questions as “catch” questions. (*Laughter*) I don’t think you are going to heckle me with them. I am sure you won’t.

I want to say one thing to you, and that is that we in China have always had social democracy throughout these thousands of years, and that we are now depending on our press,
now and in the future, so that in time we shall really realize not only social democracy but political democracy as well; because, as I said, the pen is mightier than the sword, and from what I have seen of your American press, I am sure that our hopes of the Chinese press will also be realized.

I am particularly referring to the President's trip to Casablanca. I am sure that all of you knew about it, and yet there was not a single word in the press about it. And I think that shows beautiful cooperation between the Administration and the press. And it is particularly necessary, during these war days, that there should be such cooperation. And I want to congratulate you on your tact, and on your integrity.

Thank you. (Applause) . . .

Q. Madame Chiang, has the President asked you to remain here to act as “liaison officer” between him and Congress?

MADAME CHIANG: I don't think the President needs me, or anybody else, for that purpose. (Laughter)

Q. Madame Chiang, this is a big question, I know; what is the first thing that you think we can do to help China?

THE PRESIDENT: (interposing) I can answer that: with more munitions. We are all for it. That is unanimous.

MADAME CHIANG: The President is right.

Q. Madame Chiang, I am going to ask this question, and if it is an improper one I know the President will correct me— (laughter) but my impression is that there is more unanimity of opinion in support of the Chinese than of almost any other people, and the one question that I have heard was that the Chinese people are not supporting their own war with manpower as well as they might. Now if that is a question that the President would like to—me to ask, and you can discuss that—throw a light on something—

MADAME CHIANG: (interposing) I cannot quite understand it. That the Chinese Government—

Q. (interposing) Perhaps I can put it this way. The one tenor of question that I heard around the Capitol yesterday, after your two magnificent speeches, was that the Chinese are not
utilizing their manpower to the full extent. And that question might well be publicly answered—and if you care to discuss it now, this is a good time.

MADAME CHIANG: We are using as much manpower as there are munitions to be used. We can’t fight with bare hands. We have fought with no overhead protection throughout five and a half years. But we can’t go there and fight with our bare hands, although we have fought with nothing but swords in hand-to-hand combat. But it is not true when it is said that China is not supporting the front with her manpower, because we are.

Q. Thank you . . .

Q. Madame Chiang, would you care to speak about the American Air Force in China, what it means both in morale and in active support?

MADAME CHIANG: Yes. I can’t pay sufficiently high tribute to the American Volunteer Group—when they first came out to us.

We were being terrifically bombed in Chungking, because our Chinese Air Force had only a few hundred planes in the beginning of the war; and as time went on those planes dwindled. Russia at first sent us planes. Later, they themselves became hard pressed, and less and less planes came. And as you know, planes like everything else wear out, only they wear out quicker; and we could get no reinforcements.

Then the American Volunteer Group came, and they not only helped us materially, because they made it possible for our people to feel that America is really heart and soul with us in our common cause to fight against aggression, but the planes actually kept the enemy planes from bombing indiscriminately certain civilian centers, such as Chungking. Not all China, because the Air Force was not large enough.

But I think the greatest help was the feeling on the part of our Chinese people that we have not fought and bled alone, and that America was helping us, and that America is really our ally.

Now as the President has just said, we need munitions. We
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have got manpower. We have even got trained pilots, but we haven't got the planes, nor have we the gasoline. And the point is, how are we going to get them? But the President has solved so many difficult questions, he has come through so many great crises with flying colors, that I feel that I can safely leave that answer to him. (Laughter)

The President: Madame Chiang, you are absolutely 100 percent right on what we want to do, and what we are trying to do; and I might even say what we are beginning to do, in addition to the present very small number of planes that are operating in China.

But I think that if you will look at the old map again — as I have said so often — you will realize that while we can fly planes to China, we have to fly all the other things that make planes go into China, to keep them running. It's a problem of transportation. We can't fly there directly across the ocean. We can't fly there from Russia. And therefore we have to fly in from the southwest. And it means that a transport plane has to get itself in, and the gasoline to get it in, and enough gasoline to get it back again for another load, and still have something left over to leave in China to keep the fighting planes going.

I don't suppose that there is any one task that is being studied more by transportation people — the military people — than the problem of getting the wherewithal with the plane to go into China.

And all I can say is that we are doing the best we can, and we are definitely going to increase that aid — I hope and I think — reasonably fast. It is not even merely a sentimental question. It's an actual problem of winning the war. And we are just as keen to knock out Japan as China is, and we are going to help in every way, from every possible angle and direction.

I think I suggested it the other day, that the Japanese line at the present time, all the way from Burma to the Dutch Indies, out to the Solomons and the north through the Man-
8. Eight Hundred and Eighty-first Press Conference
dated Islands, is a very long way from Tokyo, besides being a
long way from here. And I think I suggested the other day,
in what I said at the White House Correspondents' Associa-
tion dinner, that it isn't enough just to move forward inch by
inch, island by island. If we took one island, in the advance
from the south, once a month—twelve of them a year—I
figured out it would take about fifty years before we got to
Japan.

And therefore, obviously, just looking at the map—you
don't have to be learned in strategy—it's a perfectly obvious
thing to a layman that the way to hit Japan is to cut that line.
And that is our objective, to cut the Japanese line up near the
top of the line. And today that can be done, and we are going
to do it more and more by using China as a base of operations;
and with that, of course, if the base of operations can be estab-
lished with sufficient equipment.

And it is not only cutting the line, but it means hitting
Japan in the Japanese islands themselves; and that is a per-
factly definite policy.

If I were a member of the Chinese Government, I would
say, “But when?” “How soon?” “Why not a little more?”; and
I say that as a member of the American Government too. Just
as fast as the Lord will let us, with the best brains that we can
bring to bear on it.

Now that, I think, is a very simple summary of what we are
trying to do, without going into the details of the method and
the military operations themselves. Everybody in Washing-
ton, I might say, is pledged to hurry it up and increase it, and
make China a large and an important base—probably in the
long run the most important base of operations against our
common enemy.

Q. Mr. President, could you permit direct quotes of the phrase,
“Just as fast as the Lord will let us?”

THE PRESIDENT: No, I wouldn't. A lot of people wouldn't like to
have the name of the Lord taken in vain. (Laughter) . . .

Q. Madame Chiang, might I ask if you could give us any sug-
gestions as to how that aid might be stepped up? Do you have anything specific you might suggest to us?

MADAME CHIANG: The President just said that "as fast as the Lord will let us." Well, I might add on to that, "The Lord helps those who help themselves." *(Laughter)*

THE PRESIDENT: Right.

Q. Madame Chiang, do you object to being quoted directly about the Lord?

MADAME CHIANG: I think I shall follow the President exactly.

Q. Mr. President, at the time you first announced this seven and a half million Army substantially, I believe you added the other categories up, and I think that the total figure was 10,-800,000. Is there any change in that?

THE PRESIDENT: Did that include officers?

Q. Yes, sir — 750,000.

THE PRESIDENT: Absolutely right.

Q. Well, sir, the "farm bloc" — if you recognize that term — seems to think that you can't have that Army and do the spring planting — can't have that Army and food this year. I think that is probably a correct statement of their case. Is that worrying you at all?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, of course.

Let me tell you a nice story, and as an illustration. I was talking to one of the newspapermen in North Africa who had come back from Russia:

It was in the spring of 1942, after they had withstood the Germans all through the winter of 1941-42, the Russian line having been pushed back from twenty miles from the city to nearly a hundred miles from the city. Nevertheless, Moscow was in real danger, even in the spring of 1942; and they had gone through a very tough winter. They didn't have enough fuel, and they hadn't laid in enough food.

So the Russian authorities took — I think it was 300,000 school children, between the ages of twelve and eighteen; and they took them out to a radius of perhaps a hundred miles from the city, all the way out. And they planted every acre
of fields as soon as the ice was out of the soil. And as soon as they had done that, they put them into the forests. And they took pretty good care of these children — it was war — of course, not as well as they had taken care of them in time of peace. And they cut wood until harvest-time came, and then they put them back in the fields to harvest all the food that they possibly could. Then they put them back in the woods again.

And in that way Moscow was supplied, by autumn, with enough wood to keep people warm. I mean reasonably warm — not the way we heat our homes. And they had enough food to live on — men, women, and children — in this great city with millions of people in it.

They didn’t have enough manpower there to put grown-up people, either men or women, into this work. The men were fighting, or running the transportation — and the women were running the transportation, and fighting, and all the utilities, and they were in the munitions factories which still remained in Moscow.

And the result — this fellow said to me that during the winter of 1942-43, this winter, there has been relatively less suffering, and fewer problems of food and heat than the previous winter. I use that as a little illustration.

And I thought I was a little previous about six months ago! I said once that I thought that the younger people in the villages and towns of this country could help the farmers of this country very, very materially. We have sporadic examples, like the case of the town in California, where they had a crop all ripening inside of one week.

And they couldn’t get labor.

The whole town turned out — the drugstore fellow, the soda-water fellow, the doctor, the lawyer, the newspapermen — the linotype man and the editor — and the women of the town. Not a large number, I think twelve hundred people in the town. But they all turned out and helped pick the crop. And the result was that at the end of the week the crop was in.
22. Plan to Subject Federal Employees to Senate Confirmation

Now we haven't done nearly enough of that. That doesn't mean that that is the solution of it, but at least it will help in the problem of getting in the harvest for our needs, and the needs of our allies — food that we ship abroad.

Q. Thank you, Mr. President.
Q. Thank you.
Q. (aside) Let's go, boys.
Q. Thank you, Madame Chiang.

NOTE: For additional references to aid to China, see Item 140 and note, pp. 585-595, 1940 volume; Items 68, 82, and notes, 1941 volume; Items 15, 17, and notes, 1942 volume; Items 50, 128, 138, and notes, this volume; Items 70, 82, and notes, 1944-1945 volume.

22 The President Opposes the Plan to Require Confirmation of Federal Employees Whose Salaries Exceed $4,500 a Year. February 20, 1943

My attention has been called to the provisions of S. 575. I desire to express my unqualified opposition to this proposed legislation.

The proposal for Presidential nomination and Senate confirmation of all employees receiving more than $4,500 per annum presupposes Congressional responsibility for the operations of executive agencies. An agency head is responsible for the success or failure of his program. This accountability is dissipated if responsibility for the appointment of employees is divided.

Under our form of government the appointment of those officers who, in a fundamental sense, determine policy has generally been subject to Senate confirmation. But determination of policy is not synonymous with the exercise of administrative discretion. Neither does it include work performed by the vast number of technical and scientific personnel who occupy positions which fall above a salary figure of $4,500 or any other arbitrary amount.
22. Plan to Subject Federal Employees to Senate Confirmation

The practice of the Federal Government with respect to the selection and appointment of non-policy-determining employees has evolved over a period of sixty years. This development culminated in the passage of the Ramspeck Act of 1940 requiring the appointment of practically all such employees on the basis of merit under the Civil Service Act. To turn the clock back by reversing this decision would be folly in time of peace. In war it would be little less than tragic.

Equally important are the practical considerations which make this bill undesirable. More than 33,000 positions would be subject to Presidential nomination and Senate confirmation under the terms of the proposed legislation. I do not have the time personally to examine the qualifications of the individuals whose appointments would in such circumstances have to be approved by me.

It is equally evident that the Congress does not have the time. Senate confirmation would either become a rubber-stamp process or a task of such magnitude as to leave little time for the conduct of legislative business and to delay appointments to essential war jobs.

The experience with confirmation of War Manpower Commission appointments as required by its appropriation act is significant. On January 11, 1943, thirty names were nominated to the Senate. No action was taken until February 15, when twenty-one names were confirmed and one was sent back to the committee.

At the present time, almost six weeks after the submission of the nominations, action still remains to be taken in eight cases. If the proposed bill is enacted into law, with the inevitable multiplication of delays of this character, the American people will not fail to realize that it is the legislative branch of the Government that is thus holding up vigorous prosecution of the war program.

This bill, if enacted into law, would also adversely affect the recruitment of persons for key positions. It would lay all of us open to the charge that we are playing politics with the war program. We cannot permit confidence in the Government to be
Plan to Subject Federal Employees to Senate Confirmation

undermined in this manner. Neither can we afford to add the obstacle of Senate confirmation to other difficulties which confront us in our efforts to secure the best talent of the Nation for the Government service.

During the past two and a half years, in the face of a steadily dwindling reserve of manpower, the Government service has expanded from less than one million employees to approximately three million. Undoubtedly in view of the large numbers involved, the limited supply and the speed required, mistakes have been made. Corrective steps have been taken and will continue to be taken to eliminate abuses and to strengthen the machinery for the application of the merit principle to the recruitment, advancement, and removal of employees.

In our zeal to correct mistakes, however, we should not make the error of undermining the entire administrative structure that has been erected for the conduct of the war. Confirmation of administrative, professional, and technical employees by a legislative body is the very antithesis of the merit system and would sweep away years of civil service progress.

For these reasons I urge that this bill not be enacted into law.

NOTE: The enactment of the proposal, sponsored by Senator Kenneth D. McKellar of Tennessee, to require Senate confirmation of all Federal employees whose salaries were over $4,500 a year would have gravely crippled the civil service system and would have thrown Federal employment open to political pressures. Fortunately, the proposal did not become law.

Since the establishment of the Civil Service Commission in 1883, there had been a steady extension of the merit system in Government. Yet this bill would have substituted political tests for the qualification of merit. Under its terms not only would new appointees have been subject to Senate confirmation, but current incumbents of positions would have had to be confirmed to retain their offices. Under the latter requirement, it was likely that a number of able and conscientious civil servants would have lost their jobs because they were not "politically acceptable" to their home-state Senators.

It would have been a practical impossibility for the Senate to review the qualifications of the 33,000 appointees who would have fallen into this category. Further, such a provision would have made it more difficult for the Federal Govern-
23. Address on Washington's Birthday

ment to recruit personnel, and would have tended to discourage qualified personnel from Government service.

This proposal was another effort on the part of Senator McKellar to turn the T.V.A. into a political instrument for patronage which he might dispense. Throughout its years of operation, personnel of the T.V.A. has been selected wholly on the basis of merit, regardless of political considerations. The construction of dams under difficult foundation conditions, the design, construction, and operation of chemical and munitions plants, and the operation of a gigantic power system could only be carried on effectively if the T.V.A. Board were authorized to put such tasks in the hands of men who were competent as technicians and managers. Some 80 percent of the T.V.A.'s key employees who would have been affected by the bill were residents of the State of Tennessee and would have had to be politically satisfactory to Senator McKellar.

In the case of the T.V.A., the President did not feel that Senator McKellar of Tennessee, to whom "Senatorial courtesy" would have given a virtual veto power over the continued employment of the T.V.A. personnel, should have such power. The President felt that to throw these T.V.A. technical, scientific, and specialized positions open to Senatorial confirmation and political patronage would have wrecked the efficient administration of this great enterprise.

Following the President's letter, the Congress continued to consider and debate the McKellar proposal, but it was not passed.

23 (Radio Address on Washington's Birthday.
February 22, 1943

Today this Nation, which George Washington helped so greatly to create, is fighting all over this earth in order to maintain for ourselves and for our children the freedom which George Washington helped so greatly to achieve. As we celebrate his birthday, let us remember how he conducted himself in the midst of great adversities. We are inclined, because of the total sum of his accomplishments, to forget his days of trial.

Throughout the Revolution, Washington commanded an army whose very existence as an army was never a certainty from one week to another. Some of his soldiers, and even whole regiments,
could not or would not move outside the borders of their own States. Sometimes, at critical moments, they would decide to return to their individual homes to get the plowing done, or the crops harvested. Large numbers of the people of the colonies were either against independence or at least unwilling to make great personal sacrifice toward its attainment.

And there were many in every colony who were willing to cooperate with Washington only if the cooperation were based on their own terms.

Some Americans during the War of the Revolution sneered at the very principles of the Declaration of Independence. It was impractical, they said — it was "idealistic" — to claim that "all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights."

The skeptics and the cynics of Washington's day did not believe that ordinary men and women have the capacity for freedom and self-government. They said that liberty and equality were idle dreams that could not come true — just as today there are many Americans who sneer at the determination to attain freedom from want and freedom from fear, on the ground that these are ideals which can never be realized. They say it is ordained that we must always have poverty, and that we must always have war.

You know, they are like the people who carp at the Ten Commandments because some people are in the habit of breaking one or more of them.

We Americans of today know that there would have been no successful outcome to the Revolution, even after eight long years — the Revolution that gave us liberty — had it not been for George Washington's faith, and the fact that that faith overcame the bickerings and confusion and the doubts which the skeptics and cynics provoked.

When kind history books tell us of Benedict Arnold, they omit dozens of other Americans who, beyond peradventure of a doubt, were also guilty of treason.

We know that it was Washington's simple, steadfast faith that kept him to the essential principles of first things first. His sturdy
23. Address on Washington's Birthday

sense of proportion brought to him and his followers the ability to discount the smaller difficulties and concentrate on the larger objectives. And the objectives of the American Revolution were so large — so unlimited — that today they are among the primary objectives of the entire civilized world.

It was Washington's faith — and, with it, his hope and his charity — which was responsible for the stamina of Valley Forge — and responsible for the prayer at Valley Forge.

The Americans of Washington's day were at war. We Americans of today are at war.

The Americans of Washington's day faced defeat on many occasions. We faced, and still face, reverses and misfortunes.

In 1777, the victory over General Burgoyne's army at Saratoga led thousands of Americans to throw their hats in the air, proclaiming that the war was practically won and that they should go back to their peacetime occupations — and, shall I say, their peacetime "normalcies."

Today, the great successes on the Russian front have led thousands of Americans to throw their hats in the air and proclaim that victory is just around the corner.

Others among us still believe in the age of miracles. They forget that there is no Joshua in our midst. We cannot count on great walls crumbling and falling down when the trumpets blow and the people shout.

It is not enough that we have faith and that we have hope. Washington himself was the exemplification of the other great need.

Would that all of us could live our lives and direct our thoughts and control our tongues as did the Father of our Country in seeking day by day to follow those great verses:

"Charity suffereth long, and is kind; charity envieth not; charity vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up,
"Doth not behave itself unseemly, seeketh not her own, is not easily provoked, thinketh no evil:
"Rejoiceth not in iniquity but rejoiceth in the truth."
23. *Address on Washington’s Birthday*

I think that most of us Americans seek to live up to those precepts. But there are some among us who have forgotten them. There are Americans whose words and writings are trumpeted by our enemies to persuade the disintegrating people of Germany and Italy and their captives that America is disunited—that America will be guilty of faithlessness in this war, and will thus enable the Axis powers to control the earth.

It is perhaps fitting that on this day I should read a few more words spoken many years ago—words which helped to shape the character and the career of George Washington, words that lay behind the prayer at Valley Forge.

"Blessed are the poor in spirit: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.
"Blessed are they that mourn: for they shall be comforted.
"Blessed are the meek: for they shall inherit the earth.
"Blessed are they which do hunger and thirst after righteousness: for they shall be filled.
"Blessed are the merciful: for they shall obtain mercy.
"Blessed are the pure in heart: for they shall see God.
"Blessed are the peacemakers: for they shall be called the children of God.
"Blessed are they which are persecuted for righteousness' sake: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.
"Blessed are ye, when men shall revile you, and persecute you, and shall say all manner of evil against you falsely, for my sake.
"Rejoice, and be exceeding glad: for great is your reward in heaven: for so persecuted they the prophets which were before you."

Those are the truths which are the eternal heritage of our civilization. I repeat them, to give heart and comfort to all men and women everywhere who fight for freedom.

Those truths inspired Washington, and the men and women of the thirteen colonies.

Today, through all the darkness that has descended upon our Nation and our world, those truths are a guiding light to all.

We shall follow that light, as our forefathers did, to the fulfillment of our hopes for victory, for freedom, and for peace.
24. Twenty-fifth Anniversary of Red Army

24 Message to Marshal Stalin on the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the Red Army.

February 22, 1943

On behalf of the people of the United States, I want to express to the Red Army, on its twenty-fifth anniversary, our profound admiration for its magnificent achievements, unsurpassed in all history.

For many months, in spite of tremendous losses in men, supplies, transportation, and territory, the Red Army denied victory to a most powerful enemy. It checked him at Leningrad, at Moscow, at Voronezh, in the Caucasus, and finally, at the immortal battle of Stalingrad, the Red Army not only defeated the enemy but launched the great offensive which is still moving forward along the whole front from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The enforced retreat of the enemy is costing him heavily in men, supplies, territory, and especially in morale.

Such achievements can only be accomplished by an Army that has skillful leadership, sound organization, adequate training, and above all, the determination to defeat the enemy, no matter what the cost in self-sacrifice.

At the same time, I also wish to pay tribute to the Russian people from whom the Red Army springs, and upon whom it is dependent for its men, women, and supplies. They, too, are giving their full efforts to the war and are making the supreme sacrifice.

The Red Army and the Russian people have surely started the Hitler forces on the road to ultimate defeat and have earned the lasting admiration of the people of the United States.
Opening of Red Cross Fund Drive

25 The President Opens the Red Cross Fund Drive. February 28, 1943

Just a few weeks ago I was privileged to visit a part of the North African theater of war, and to see and talk with our soldiers and sailors who man that front. Among these men in North Africa are the sons and brothers and husbands and friends of many of you who are listening at this moment. I wish it were somehow possible to share my experience with you, because I know what it would mean to you to have the chance to clasp the hand of some relative or friend thousands of miles from home, and to wish him well.

There is one way for you, however, to reach this hand of love and friendship across the ocean. For wherever our fighting men are—all over the world—the American Red Cross is by their side, extending always the arm of helpfulness and comfort.

At home, we have grown accustomed to the role of the Red Cross in every national emergency, in every local catastrophe—a generous friend to those overtaken by tragedy. Even our enemies know about the American Red Cross, because it has never let international boundaries act as the limits of its mercy.

The American Red Cross begins today the greatest single crusade of mercy in all history. It is undertaking a task unprecedented—because this war is unprecedented. We undertake this greatest of all Red Cross crusades in the name of mercy—now that we are engaged in a war to decide whether all our concepts of mercy and human decency are strong enough to survive.

In the Axis Nations, mercy and decency are regarded as synonyms for weakness and decadence.

In our land it is from our great tradition of mercy that we take part of our strength.

Each one of you who has a friend or relative in uniform will measure the significance of this crusade in your own heart. You—at your house today—know better than anyone else what it means to be sure that the Red Cross stands at the side of our
soldiers or sailors or marines wherever they may be. All of us—one hundred and thirty millions—know how indispensable to victory is the work of this great agency which goes on every minute of every day—everywhere on earth where it is needed.

By proclamation, I have designated the month of March as Red Cross Month. To make sure that every American boy on every fighting front has everything he needs which the Red Cross can supply, it will require at least one hundred and twenty-five million dollars.

That is all that we need to know—we will not fail.

26 (The President Recommends That the People of Puerto Rico Be Authorized to Elect Their Own Governor. March 9, 1943

To the Congress:

Several months ago the Governor of Puerto Rico recommended that the organic law of Puerto Rico be amended so as to permit the people of Puerto Rico to elect their own Governor. This recommendation was brought to me by the Secretary of the Interior with his approval. The Governor's suggestion has been under consideration since that time.

It has long been the policy of the Government of the United States progressively to reinforce the machinery of self-government in its territories and island possessions.

Puerto Rico has universal suffrage and an elective legislature which considers and enacts measures governing its internal affairs. Laws enacted by its legislature, however, including laws of purely local concern, have been subject to approval or disapproval by Governors appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States.

In accordance with the general policy of this Government, I recommend to the Congress that it consider as soon as possible an amendment of the organic law of Puerto Rico to permit the
people of Puerto Rico to elect their own Governor, and to redefine the functions and powers of the Federal Government and the Government of Puerto Rico, respectively.

I have appointed a committee composed of an equal number of Puerto Ricans and of continental residents to advise me concerning changes in the organic law.

The recommendations of this Committee will be promptly submitted to the Congress for its consideration.

NOTE: In the foregoing message to the Congress, the President asked for an amendment to the organic law of Puerto Rico to permit the Puerto Rican people to elect their own Governor. At the same time, he appointed a committee composed of an equal number of Puerto Ricans and of residents of the United States to recommend other changes in the organic law, to be submitted to the Congress.

The committee met in Washington from July 19 to August 7, 1943. It unanimously recommended that the people of Puerto Rico be given an opportunity to exercise freely the powers of local self-government, and to elect their own Governor. Subsequent to the receipt of this report, the President, on September 28, 1943, sent a further message to the Congress renewing his earlier recommendations for additional self-government for Puerto Rico, summarizing the reports of the committee which he had appointed in March to investigate and make recommendations, and generally reviewing the history of the Government of Puerto Rico (see Item 105 and note, this volume, for the text of the President's message of September 28, 1943).

27. Foreign Information Functions of O.W.I.

Under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by Title I of the First War Powers Act, 1941, approved December 18, 1941 (Public Law 354, 77th Congress), and as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy and as President of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:
27. Foreign Information Functions of O.W.I.

1. The Office of War Information will plan, develop, and execute all phases of the Federal program of radio, press, publication, and related foreign propaganda activities involving the dissemination of information. The program for foreign propaganda in areas of actual or projected military operations will be coordinated with military plans through the planning agencies of the War and Navy Departments, and shall be subject to the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Parts of the foreign propaganda program which are to be executed in a theater of military operations will be subject to the control of the theater commander. The authority, functions, and duties of the Office of War Information shall not extend to the Western Hemisphere, exclusive of the United States and Canada.

2. The military order of June 13, 1942, establishing the Office of Strategic Services, is hereby modified to the extent necessary to make this Order effective.

NOTE: Before the Office of War Information was created (see Item 67 and note, 1942 volume), foreign information and psychological warfare conducted by the United States in foreign countries had been handled by the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs and the Coordinator of Information. The Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, both before and after the establishment of the O.W.I., confined its activities to Latin American countries (see Item 72 and note, 1941 volume). Until the establishment of the O.W.I., the Coordinator of Information handled the principal foreign information and psychological warfare activities for all countries in the world except Latin America (see Item 64 and note, 1941 volume).

When the Office of War Information was created, the foreign information activities of the Coordinator of Information were transferred to the new organization. A military order of June 13, 1942, established the Office of Strategic Services, which succeeded to the intelligence and other functions of the former Coordinator of Information and thereafter operated under the Joint Chiefs of Staff (see Item 68 and note, 1942 volume).

Late in 1942, disagreements arose between the O.W.I. and the O.S.S. over the question of proper handling of psychological warfare abroad. Because propaganda was necessarily a strong strategic weapon, it had to be related to military operations. Nevertheless, the President felt that with the exception of the operations in Latin
America, all domestic and foreign information and propaganda programs should be under the control of the Office of War Information. The foregoing Executive Order spelled this out explicitly; at the same time it recognized the need for coordinating foreign propaganda with military plans.

Differences between the O.S.S. and the O.W.I. were gradually worked out and the two organizations ultimately worked together effectively. For example, O.S.S. agents in enemy countries disseminated material which had been compiled by the O.W.I.'s foreign representatives; the Research and Analysis Division of the O.S.S. provided the O.W.I. with political and military information concerning enemy countries; and the two organizations linked their efforts in combat propaganda in many theaters of war.

The Overseas Branch of the Office of War Information, under the capable direction of Robert E. Sherwood, was a powerful factor in transmitting the voice of America abroad. At the close of the war, seven out of every eight O.W.I. employees were engaged in overseas operations all over the world. The facilities used were short-wave radio broadcasts, cable and radio news for the Allied and neutral press, publications, newsreels, and documentary films.

In cooperation with the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, the O.W.I. leased all eighteen of the privately owned short-wave broadcast transmitters located in the United States. Eighteen more high-power transmitters were constructed by the O.W.I., and additional transmitters were located overseas. For example, two medium wave transmitters were located in Algeria; and a strong short-wave transmitter on Oahu was reinforced by a medium-wave transmitter on Saipan. For broadcasts beamed to the European zone, arrangements were made with the British Broadcasting Corporation to have American programs relayed. Close working relationships were also built up with the British Ministry of Information and the “Political Warfare Executive,” which controlled British psychological warfare. Cooperation with the British was even closer in the field armies in Europe, where the various psychological warfare representatives of both Nations worked side by side in the same sections of the Army.

As the first waves of American troops were landing in North Africa, O.W.I. representatives made a number of broadcasts in French from American battleships to the North African population. Additional broadcasts and leaflets circulated the appeal of the President to the French people on the day of the North African invasion (see Item 115 and note, 1942 volume); they also broadcast the statement of General Eisenhower. The O.S.S., O.W.I., the Army and the Navy, and British psychological warfare
representatives continued their activities after the landing of the troops and were particularly successful in encouraging surrenders of enemy troops during the Tunisian campaign.

Psychological warfare was also effective in Sicily and Italy. Strong evidence of its success was the warning of the Japanese Government that Italy's surrender in September, 1943, was partially due to British and American propaganda aimed at the disintegration of the home front.

A fresh recruitment drive early in 1944 enabled the O.W.I. to build up a staff of 1,200 in London to prepare the way for the cross-Channel invasion of Normandy. The work consisted of aiding underground forces, dropping newspapers and leaflets by plane on occupied territories, and distributing a wide variety of books, pamphlets, newspapers, magazines, and films all over Europe. Beginning on April 30, 1944, the American broadcasting station in Europe, with several powerful transmitters in England, was able to cover nearly all of Europe. Nearly 300 of the O.W.I. staff followed the invading armies in psychological warfare units, conducting front-line propaganda against German troops and assisting the liberated civilians to reestablish their press and radio which had been in collaborationist hands for such a long time. The powerful long-wave station, Radio Luxembourg, was utilized after its capture in the fall of 1944.

In the Pacific theater, similar psychological warfare was carried on against Japan. Working closely with the Philippine Government, liberation propaganda was broadcast for the Philippines. Short-wave radio broadcasts were initially beamed from Australia, and later from an advance base in New Guinea. The O.W.I. magazine, *The Free Philippines*, was forwarded by submarine and distributed by Filipino guerrillas. Similar services were performed in China and Burma.

The last and most significant weapon of psychological warfare employed by the O.W.I. in the Pacific theater was the dropping of 3,000,000 leaflets on the cities of Japan, containing the text of the Japanese surrender offer and the reply of Secretary of State Byrnes.
Message to the Congress Transmitting National Resources Planning Board Reports on Postwar Plans and Security, Work, and Relief Policies. March 10, 1943

To the Congress:

To assist the Congress in the development and consideration of appropriate legislation to achieve normal employment, to give assurance for all our people against common economic hazards, and to provide for the development of our national resources, I am transmitting herewith two reports of the National Resources Planning Board.

The first, "National Resources Development—Report for 1943" presents the results to date of the Board's work on postwar plans and a record of wartime planning activities. The Board proposes measures to meet the problems of the transition period from war to peace and for the longer-range development of an expanding economy. It is appropriate that each year the immediate programs contained in the Budget of the United States should be considered by the Congress in the light of much longer-range plans and programs. To facilitate such use of this report, I recommend that the report be printed, in accordance with past custom.

We can all agree on our objectives and in our common determination that work, fair pay, and social security after the war is won must be firmly established for the people of the United States of America.

Men in the armed forces and all those engaged in the war effort rightly expect us to be considering their future welfare.

We fight today for security for our Nation and at the same time we can endeavor to give our citizens and their families security against attacks from without, and against fear of economic distress in old age, in poverty, sickness, involuntary unemployment, and accidental injuries. We need to look forward
to the accomplishment of these objectives — world peace, democratic society, and a dynamic economy.

The second report transmitted herewith, on "Security, Work, and Relief Policies," has been developed over the last three years by the National Resources Planning Board, at my request, with the cooperation of the Federal agencies concerned and with the help of citizens with special knowledge and competence in this field. It reviews the accomplishments and experience of the last ten years, pointing out some of the weaknesses of our security system, and suggesting ways of improving and strengthening the whole program.

Because of their basic importance to our national welfare during the war and after the war, it is my earnest hope that the Congress will give these matters full consideration during this session. We must not return to the inequities, insecurity, and fears of the past, but ought to move forward toward the promise of the future. When the Congress has agreed on procedures for the consideration of these problems, the executive agencies responsible for the administration of programs in these fields are prepared to provide the Congress with all assistance within their power in devising appropriate ways and means to accomplish these high purposes.

**NOTE:** In the foregoing message to the Congress, the President transmitted the last two — and in many respects the most far-reaching — reports of the National Resources Planning Board. The Board itself was unfortunately terminated on July 1, 1943, by reason of the refusal of the Congress to appropriate further funds for its continuance (see Item 20, this volume, for the President's comments on the value of the Board's work, and the necessity for carrying on postwar planning).

In its report entitled "National Resources Development — Report for 1943," the Board again set forth the nine-point "New Bill of Rights." Parts of this program were later dramatized by the President in formulating his "Economic Bill of Rights" in the 1944 State of the Union message, and in the Chicago speech of the 1944 campaign (see Items 4 and 100, 1944-1945 volume). This nine-point Bill of Rights had first been included in the "National Resources Development — Report for 1942" which the President had
transmitted to the Congress on January 14, 1942 (see Item 8 and note, 1942 volume).

To carry forward these principles, the Board recommended a comprehensive postwar program, including, among other things, the creation of a national transportation agency, with legislation providing for the consolidation of the railroads into a limited number of regional systems; the development of an expanded and integrated system of airports and airways designed for both passenger and freight service; river and harbor development; enlargement of the network of major pipelines for fuel supply; urban redevelopment; housing; and improvements in communications and the supply of electric power.

The Board listed the following three “essential safeguards of democracy” in any postwar plan:

1. Measures to prevent the rise of new industrial oligarchies during the war or during the readjustment following the cessation of hostilities, including enforcement of the anti-trust laws to break up monopolies and to provide opportunities for small business enterprise.

2. Measures to uphold the right of labor to collective bargaining, fair wages and hours, healthful and effective working conditions, and responsibility in organization.

3. Measures to maintain the fair share of the farmers in the benefits of an expanding economy with opportunities for higher standards of living and greater security.

In its report on “Security, Work and Relief Policies,” the Board recommended a modification, broadening, and extension of the Nation’s social security system, strengthening of the old age and survivors’ insurance program, the establishment of a federal works program on a permanent basis, and the creation of a single national unemployment compensation fund. The Report advocated public social services to meet the need for more adequate medical care, the expansion of state and local child welfare services (with federal assistance), free school lunches, and many other programs designed to broaden security.
29. Reception for New Senators and Representatives

29 Informal, Extemporaneous Remarks at Reception for New Senators and Representatives. March 10, 1943

(Speaker Sam Rayburn, who had acted all evening as a "Master of Ceremonies," rapped on a chair for attention)

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Speaker! (Laughter)

SPEAKER RAYBURN: Mr. President, you have given us a grand party, and we have all enjoyed it. You have met Senators and Members here tonight that it is hard for you to meet.

THE PRESIDENT: I don't know why "Father" Rayburn wants to put you all to bed so early. (Laughter)

SPEAKER RAYBURN: Well, now, it has been perfectly grand for all of us too, I know, for the new Members — 108 of them — to meet and greet you, and we have enjoyed it very, very much. It is most gracious and fine of you to do it.

And now, if you want to say "good night" to us in any form which you desire, why we are all ready.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, all you "freshmen" — some of whom are older than I am! — it's grand to make your acquaintance.

You know, during the last Congress things were pretty busy at the White House, and I honestly believe there were thirty to forty of the new Congressmen in the last session whom I never met at all.

I know perfectly well that you realize some of my problems. You don't really get the truth from the columnists, because they say that I am overburdened and overworked. I am not working as hard, so far as appointments go — so far as seeing people goes — as I did before the war started, nothing like it.

Now I haven't an excess of "gray matter," but I do have to have a little bit more time to think and to read. The amount of literature that I get from the General Staff, the needs of the Army, and manpower, the size of the Army and Navy, and things like that, the amount of stuff that I have to read today does take

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29. Reception for New Senators and Representatives

an awful lot of time. And it limits my schedule in the morning—when I see people—to about five or six people—five or six different appointments in the course of the morning, instead of the ten or fifteen, or twice as many as I used to put in before the war. And that honestly is the only reason that I can’t see you people of the Senate and House as much or as often as I used to. It isn’t because of any greater burden on me, but it’s the necessity of doing more reading. In some ways I feel as if I had gone back to school. As far as the work goes, it isn’t any heavier, but it’s a little bit different character of work.

And so I know that you will bear with me and be lenient, if it takes any of you who want to see me about something important a long, long time before you can get in. You will have to take the will for the deed. I am doing the best I can. I do wish to goodness that I had more time, as I did before, to see personally the members of the House and Senate.

I think that part of it is my fault, so my secretaries tell me. When somebody comes in on a ten-minute appointment, I start to do the talking. I get enthusiastic, and the result is that at the end of ten or fifteen minutes my visitor hasn’t had a chance to get in a word edgewise. And that is something I am trying to school myself to omit, to try to let the other fellow talk, instead of my doing it. And that is about the hardest thing I have to do in this life, because as some of you who have been here before know, I love to talk. It’s an unfortunate characteristic.

So I say, please bear with me, and if you do come in, say to me quite frankly, “Now listen, before you talk, Mr. President, let me have my say.” I think it would be a grand thing.

I do hope, honestly, that you will come in and see me, just as often as you can get by!

It’s grand to see you. Thanks ever so much for coming.

NOTE: The foregoing extemporaneous remarks were delivered by the President to the group of 108 freshman Senators and Representatives present at an informal White House reception. The affair was held in the State Dining Room of the White House, and the President had a chance to get to know and chat with the new Congressmen in a way which promoted better relationships.
Two years ago, on March 11, 1941, the Lend-Lease Act was approved.

Hitler had promised his people that this war would be a short one, a single-front war — that our aid would be too little and too late.

Such also were the promises of the military Junta of Japan. Time has given the lie to their promises. Our promises have stood the test of time.

For today, as we observe the second anniversary of the Lend-Lease Act, the United Nations are on the offensive.

Two years ago the question was — where would the Axis strike next? Now, the question is — where will the United Nations strike next? The enemy will receive its answers on battlefields of our own choosing.

As we strike again and again, lend-lease and reciprocal aid will contribute increasingly to the inevitable defeat of the Axis.

And this mutual aid has become more than a joint weapon of war. In the smoke of battle, lend-lease is helping to forge the unity that will be required to make a just and lasting peace.

NOTE: The foregoing statement of the President was read by the Vice President at the annual Lend-Lease luncheon, given by Lend-Lease Administrator Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., on March 11, 1943 — the second anniversary of the enactment of the Lend-Lease Law. For further references to the establishment and operation of the lend-lease program, see Item 145, pp. 606-615, Item 152 and note, pp. 668-678, and Item 157, p. 710, 1940 volume; Items 15, 17, 28, 37, 52, 76, 82, 96, 105, 111, 123, and notes, 1941 volume; Item 31, 1942 volume; Items 98, 119, and 124, this volume; and Item 31, 1944-1945 volume.
31. Eight Hundred and Eighty-third Press Conference

31 The Eight Hundred and Eighty-third Press Conference (Excerpts). March 12, 1943

(Thailand and United Nations' policy on territorial acquisition — Federal deposit insurance — The Ruml Plan for tax collections.)

THE PRESIDENT: I want to give you something here that I think will be of great value, if there could be some kind of a story about it. It relates to a statement made by the Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek, way back on the twenty-sixth of February, but I suppose that communications out of China are a bit difficult, and I don’t believe we have heard about it over here. I haven’t seen anything printed about it. It might have been.

In regard to Thailand, which we used to call Siam, the Generalissimo sent this message to the people of Thailand.

In a way it does relate to the general point of view of the United Nations in regard to territory grabbing.

It’s addressed to the soldiers and citizens of Thailand, and I will summarize it for you: Chiang expresses his understanding of the difficult situation that Thailand found itself in when Japanese aggression invaded them; but today the situation has become a world-wide struggle, and China’s feelings toward Thailand have continued on a basis of peace for more than one thousand years. There are three million Chinese living within the borders of Thailand, and China has always considered Thailand a sister country, and wants to do everything after the war that it can to restore the prosperity and the independence of Thailand. And the message speaks of the United Nations’ conference declaration on January 1, 1942, dedicating the United Nations to the liberation of all the Nations in captivity under Japan and Germany and other Axis countries, in order that they might have political independence restored to them.

And I think this probably is your lead: He states that he can, therefore, give his solemn word that China as well as her allies have no territorial ambitions in Thailand, and have no
intentions of undermining her sovereignty and independence. The Thais, however, should recognize the fact that the territory and freedom of Thailand can only be restored to her through the victory of China and her allies.

That is a pretty simple, straight declaration of the policy not only of China but also of the United Nations, in regard to Thailand.

Q. Mr. President, do you have a report from Leo Crowley on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's operations?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I have had it for about a week. I have it here on my desk. This is an analysis of the banking developments in the past ten years. I will just give you one or two high points.

It says that from the serious asset impairment that the banks suffered in 1933, they have now recovered to the strongest asset position of record, which I think is worth playing up, because as you all know the more confidence we can establish on the part of people in the banking system of this country in time of war, as well as in time of peace, the better it is. The banking system is so constituted because of these assets that it seems ready to meet any war demands that may be made.

As a part of this, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation has saved from loss more than one and a quarter million depositors, that is to say 98.8 percent of the depositors in 390 insured banks that remained closed at the time of the closing of the banks.

Notwithstanding the loss — the assumption by the Corporation of $50,000,000 of losses that would otherwise have fallen on the depositors in these 390 banks, the Corporation itself has accumulated a surplus of $325,000,000. The Corporation could be liquidated today, and could repay all of the insurance assessments paid by the banks, and the entire contribution of the Government, together with a dividend on the contribution of the Government of 7 percent.

Well, that's not a suggestion that we should liquidate the
31. Eight Hundred and Eighty-third Press Conference

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, but it just shows that if we would liquidate it we would come out in very, very nice shape. This insurance of deposits today is providing full protection for more than—this is a perfectly amazing figure—more than 65,000,000 accounts in the banks in this country. That is a very amazing thing. The bank loans in the prosecution of the war to agriculture and industry are very definitely promoting production of food and essential civilian and war goods. It's rather an interesting report. It's worth a story on.

Q. Mr. President, everybody is thinking about income taxes now. Did you ever—

THE PRESIDENT: (interposing) I am, too. (Laughter)

Q. (continuing) I thought so. Did you ever express yourself, or will you, on—I don't like to say the "Ruml Plan," but any plan for getting on a current payment basis—

THE PRESIDENT: (interposing) No, I don't think so. After all it's rather squarely a Congressional function. I know—

Q. (interjecting) Talk about it in principle.

THE PRESIDENT: (continuing) We talked about it in theory a couple of months ago. And the fact, of course, still remains: the individual, especially in the higher brackets, does save a great deal of money in taxes to the Government through the Ruml Plan. In other words, the richer individual taxpayer will pay less money to the Government, under the Ruml Plan—actual drawing of checks out of his bank payable to the Collector of Internal Revenue. Now that seems to be pretty well established. Instead of which, of course, in other countries—England, for instance, where the war is going on—the more people had, the more they contributed to the Government. Period.

And I don't think I need say anything else, except to bring out that simple fact, that in most of the cases the richer the person, the greater the income of the person, the more saving they make out of actual tax payments to the Government in the year 1943. . . .
Q. I would like to ask you if you have any comment to make on
this other query from my office the other night, saying that
Erika Mann, the daughter of the German novelist, Thomas
Mann, was making a lecture tour in which she was saying
that Premier Joseph Stalin was present at Casablanca, and
that the press was going to be awfully sore about it when they
found out.

THE PRESIDENT: (laughing) He must have been under the table.
(Loud laughter) We didn't see him. Pretty clever stunt if he
was. (More laughter)

Q. Mr. President, when you came back from Casablanca you
were asked whether you planned to see Premier Stalin, and
you said that “Hope springs eternal.”

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Q. Is there any more definite news on that?

THE PRESIDENT: No. Not yet. (Laughter)

Q. Thank you, Mr. President.

NOTE: For an account of the back-
ground, establishment and accom-
plishments of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, see note to
Item 149, pp. 438-439, 1933 volume.

32 (The Eight Hundred and Eighty-eighth
Press Conference (Excerpts). March 30, 1943

(Conferences with Sir Anthony Eden — Postwar problems in main-
tenance of peace — Foundation for United Nations.)

THE PRESIDENT: Sir Anthony Eden has left, and we decided that
it was probably better not to give out one of those formal
statements by the two of us. And he asked me to just talk to
you all informally about it.

We are in entire agreement. He has had these series of
conferences with a lot of people, the Secretary of State and
his advisers, and the members of the Senate and the House;
and he took a little trip to see some of the camps.
32. *Eight Hundred and Eighty-eighth Press Conference*

We talked about everything—current military and political affairs, and other questions arising out of the war relating to the present and the future.

I think I can say for both of us that they disclose very close similarity of outlook on the part of the two Governments, and a very fruitful meeting of the minds on all the matters that came under discussion.

We talked about the practical problems that will arise on the surrender of the enemy—problems that will face the Governments of the United States, and United Kingdom, and China, and Russia, and all of the other United Nations, primarily in safeguarding the world from future aggression.

I think I ought to make it clear that these conversations are exploratory. The object of them was *not* to reach final decisions, which were, of course, impossible at this stage; but to reach a large measure of general agreement on objectives. So as to take time by the forelock, and as a result of these conferences, they will be of great aid in further conferences between all of the United Nations.

I also want to make it very clear that these conferences are by no means confined to the United Kingdom and the United States. They are merely one small part of the long series of conferences between the other United Nations.

We have already talked, for example, rather intimately about these various subjects, with China, and with one or two of the South American Republics. Mr. Eden himself has been to Russia and talked in regard to many of these problems with Mr. Stalin, Mr. Molotov, and other members of the Russian Government.

I hope and expect that we will be continuing discussions along these lines with the Russian Government in the very near future, and with other members of the United Nations. And therefore, you might put it this way: These conversations constitute one method of working toward the unity of the United Nations, which is going along extremely well.

Some people ought to take note of that.
32. Eight Hundred and Eighty-eighth Press Conference

And the other method, of course, is through the more formal gathering, such as we will have next month with the United Nations, in regard to the subject of food, to be followed a little later by a similar one in regard to relief; and possibly a little later by another exploratory conference in regard to finances.

So you see, the thing is progressing in a very satisfactory way.

If some of you go back — some of you can, like myself — go back to 1918, the war came to a rather sudden end in November, 1918. And actually it's a fact that there had been very little work done on the postwar problems before Armistice Day. Well, during Armistice Day and the time that the Nations met in Paris early in 1919, everybody was rushing around trying to dig up things.

And the simile I used to Mr. Eden the other day was that — I was here at the time — the tempo seemed to be that of the lady who is told at noon that she is to accompany her husband on a month's trip on the three o'clock train that afternoon. Well, I have seen ladies trying to pack for a month's trip in three hours, and that was a little bit the situation over here, and everywhere else, in making preparations for the Versailles Conference. Everybody was rushing around grabbing things out of closets and throwing them into suitcases. Some of the large portions of things taken out of the cupboards were not needed at all.

I have forgotten how many experts we took to Versailles at that time, but everybody who had a "happy thought," or who thought he was an expert got a free ride. (Laughter)

And that is why I think that this whole method that is going on now is a very valuable thing, in an exploratory way, and incidentally — as I remarked the other day — in the process of getting to know each other.

If you want to be didactic and put it in terms of figures, I would say that so far, in all of the conferences that we have held with other members of the United Nations — this is
not just the British—they come into it too—but we are about 95 percent together. Well, that’s an amazing statement. It happens to be true. I wish some people would put that in their pipes and smoke it. (*Laughter*)

So it was a very good conference.

Q. Could you tell us anything about that 5 percent?

The President: Well, every additional conversation eliminates a little bit more of the 5 percent.

Q. Mr. President, when you say it applies to the others as well, that includes Russia, does it not?

The President: Yes.

Q. And China?

The President: And China.

Q. Mr. President, you spoke of plans to have conversations with Russia in the near future. Is there anything more specific we can have on that? This summer, do you plan—

The President: (*interposing*) No—not today. (*Laughter*)

Q. Is hope still “springing eternal” about Mr. Stalin?

The President: Yes.

Q. Do you expect a surprise visit—

The President: (*interposing*) What?

Q. Do you expect to be surprised by somebody arriving?

The President: You never can tell.

Q. Mr. President, do these talks you have had look toward the signatures on any agreements smaller than that of the United Nations as a whole?

The President: I don’t like to reduce things to signed documents. A general plan will cover everything pretty well. Get away from the formalities. Let’s get on with the work. You know, you can do a lot by gentlemen’s agreements, and we have got 31 people who are gentlemen in this particular kind of show.

Q. “Pact” is a bad word to use, isn’t it?

The President: Yes. Yes. It’s a headline word—doesn’t mean a thing.
The President Vetoes a Parity Computation Bill on the Ground That It Is Inflationary.
April 2, 1943

To the Senate:

I am returning S. 660, generally known as the Bankhead bill, unsigned. It is a bill to exclude in the determination of parity price any deduction for any subsidy payment, parity payment, incentive payment, or other payments made with respect to any agricultural commodity.

I am compelled to this action by the deep conviction that this measure is inflationary in character. It breaks down the barriers we have erected and which we must maintain in order to avoid all the disasters of inflation. It is wholly inconsistent with our stabilization program and, therefore, dangerous alike to our constructive farm policy and to our whole war effort.

In my Message of September 7, 1942, I advised the Congress that “our entire effort to hold the cost of living at its present level is now being sapped and undermined by further increases in farm prices and in wages, and by an ever-continuing pressure on prices resulting from the rising purchasing power of our people.” I requested the Congress “to pass legislation under which the President would be specifically authorized to stabilize the cost of living, including the price of all farm commodities.”

I further stated: “The purpose should be to hold farm prices at parity, or at levels of a recent date, whichever is higher. . . . And in determining whether a commodity has reached parity, we should include all the benefits received by the farmer from his Government under the A.A.A. program, allocable to the particular commodity. For it is unfair to give the farmer a parity price and in addition give him far more than parity.”

To this view I still hold.

My suggestion regarding the calculation of parity was not novel. It had received the previous approval of the Congress.
33. Veto of a Parity Computation Bill

Under an amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 (Public Law No. 74, 77th Congress) the Commodity Credit Corporation was directed to make loans on certain 1941 crops at the rate of 85 percent of the parity price for the commodity as of the beginning of the marketing year. In approving that Act on May 26, 1941, I stated: “I have taken up the construction of the law with certain legislative leaders chiefly responsible for it and have received from them letters stating that for the 1941 crop the broad intention is that parity payments should, if necessary, be so curtailed as to avoid a price above parity if added to the loan and the soil conservation payments. I am, therefore, confident that in the pending appropriation bill this clear interpretation and intent will be carried out.” That interpretation and intent were expressly embodied in the then pending agricultural appropriation act (87 Cong. Rec. p. 5903).

When the Congress had under consideration the bill making appropriations for the Department of Agriculture for this fiscal year, the Senate approved an amendment providing that in computing parity payments, deductions should be made for the payments made to producers by the Government during this fiscal year under the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act. There was considerable disagreement between the House and Senate with respect to the amendment, but the Senate amendment was finally incorporated in the appropriation bill (Public Law 74, 77th Congress). Therefore, under the law enacted by the Congress last July in computing parity, benefits must be included.

Under the original Emergency Price Control Act the Administrator was forbidden to establish maximum prices which would reflect less than 110 percent of parity to producers. Under the Stabilization Act of October 2, 1942, the Congress authorized the Administrator to establish prices which will reflect to producers of agricultural commodities the parity price for such commodity or the highest price received by such producers for such commodity between January 1, 1942, and September 15, 1942, whichever is the higher. “Parity,” one would assume, bears the same meaning in both acts.
The meaning of "parity" under the original Emergency Price Control Act had been established by administrative interpretation. Furthermore, the Price Administrator's construction had been upheld by the Attorney General prior to the introduction of the Act of October 2, 1942. This administrative ruling authorized the Price Administrator to include parity, allotment, and soil conservation payments received by the producers of agricultural products in determining whether prices reflected 110 percent of parity to the producers. The Congress was advised of this interpretation before it passed the Act of October 2, 1942 (see p. 37, Hearings before Senate Banking and Currency Committee, S. J. Res. 161, 77th Congress, 2d Session).

When the Act of October 2, 1942, was under consideration in the House of Representatives, an amendment was offered similar to the bill which is now submitted to me which would have excluded any deduction for parity or soil conservation payments in computing parity. This amendment was rejected (88 Cong. Rec. p. 7622).

It cannot, therefore, be fairly said that I ignored either the law or the legislative intent of the Congress when I directed, in my Executive Order No. 9250 of October 3, 1942, that appropriate deductions for Government payments should be made in computing parity prices.

I have referred to the legislative history only because of some of the criticisms of my action. I know that some members of the Congress differ with my interpretation of the law. I credit them with sincerity. I ask that they credit me with equal sincerity.

Let us consider the merits of the proposal.

The Act of October 2, 1942, directs the President to issue a general order stabilizing prices, wages, and salaries, which affect the cost of living; and, except as otherwise provided in this Act, this stabilization shall be on the basis of the levels which existed on September 15, 1942. It is impossible to control the cost of living unless all of its vital elements are stabilized.

The time has come when all of us—farmers, workers, managers, and investors—must realize that we cannot improve our living standards in a period of total war. On the contrary, we
must all cut our standards of living for the duration. We must adopt simple wartime standards. If we do, none of us need want for the real necessities of life. We can all have enough if we do not try to get too much. We can only make sure that the present balance does not change materially for the worse; and that those on the lower rungs of the economic ladder are not ground down below the margin of existence. Further we cannot go during the war. After the war our objective will be not only to restore, but to raise our standards of living.

In the past no one has fought harder than I to help the farmers get parity prices for their crops. With pride I recall that the parity idea was first put into law during my Administration. And by the Act of October 2, 1942, the farmers were guaranteed 90 percent of parity prices for all basic crops, not only during the war, but for at least two years from the first day of January following the declaration of the termination of the war.

But it must be recognized that parity prices are only means to get parity income for the farmers. That income goal has been attained for the cooperating producers of all basic crops. This bill would go beyond the goal of parity income and give to these producers an unwarranted bonus at the expense of the consumer.

A few crops have not reached parity price in the open market, but farm prices generally are above parity. Between August, 1939, and January, 1943, the prices that farmers received for the crops they sold rose nearly 107 percent, while the prices that farmers paid for the things they bought increased only 26 percent.

Farm prices which were 30 percent below parity at the beginning of the war in August, 1939, rose to 15 percent above parity in January, 1943. Farm prices, which at the beginning of World War I were only 1 percent below parity, soared 111 percent between 1914 and 1919, but the prices the farmers paid also soared 96 percent, so that the farmers never got more than 107 percent of parity for their crops during the last war contrasted with the 115 percent of parity they are now receiving.
33. *Veto of a Parity Computation Bill*

Thus the farmer, far from being worse off than he was in the last war, is substantially better off. But he will not remain better off if we set loose an inflationary tornado.

The American farmer, I am convinced, does not want inflation. He knows that deflation inevitably follows inflation. The farmer wants neither; he prefers stabilization. He recalls all too bitterly the deflation in the value of his land, the debts, the anxieties, the foreclosures, the evictions, and the heartaches which followed in the wake of the inflation after the last World War.

Parity price is only part of the picture. Other factors have contributed to bring about a striking increase in farm income. Between 1939 and 1942 farm production increased 20 percent, and during this period unit costs rose only one-fourth as much as unit prices. As a result farm income in terms of purchasing power is higher than in 1919, higher than 1929, higher than it has ever been in our history. Stabilization will protect that purchasing power. Inflation will destroy it.

Farm income has risen faster than non-farm income, though both have risen substantially. Since 1939, the average income of the farmer has risen approximately 45 percent more than the average income of the non-farm population. This is particularly significant in view of the very substantial increases which have occurred in the income and purchasing power of the non-farm groups during the same period. The dollar income, the purchasing power, and the parity income of the farmer are all far higher than they were at their peak during the last war. Let us protect the farmer’s present favorable position, rather than to commence tampering with it.

I realize, of course, that during much of the last two decades farm prices and farm incomes were inequitably low. No one should begrudge the farmer the progress which the figures I have cited reveal. Nor do these figures prove that every farm and every acre is free of price problems. But, as in the case of substandard industrial wages or industrial production involving abnormally high costs, we must deal with these situations specially on their merits and not imperil our stabilization program by
general price or wage increases. The figures I have cited do reflect a favorable situation extending to every farm region and virtually every crop.

It is true that farmers generally are encountering increasing difficulty in securing necessary farm labor, farm equipment, and fertilizer. Higher prices cannot, when steel is scarce, create new machinery; higher prices cannot, when manpower is short, create additional workers. In fact, higher prices for crops like wheat and corn might actually divert labor and machinery away from the production of other essential crops, such as soybeans, flax, grain sorghum, beans, and potatoes.

Furthermore, the present prices for wheat and corn are satisfactory from a production standpoint. Our farmers have already indicated their patriotic intention to plant a substantially increased acreage to these crops. The Government is determined to do everything within its power to see that the farmers have the labor and machinery necessary to harvest those crops.

The present relatively favorable position of the farmers can be held only if our general stabilization program succeeds. The general stabilization program can succeed only if all groups except those on the very margin of subsistence are willing to recognize that for the duration they not only cannot expect to improve their living standards, but must indeed be willing to bear their fair share of the cost of stabilization.

There has been an increase in the cost of living since May, 1942. This increase is due mainly to our failure to bring food costs under control. But the War Labor Board is resolutely adhering to the Little Steel formula which compensates labor, in its wage rates, for the increase in the cost of living which occurred between January 1, 1941, and May 1, 1942.

The Board believes that if the formula is broken now it will start an inevitable inflationary spiral that would ultimately cancel out whatever gains labor has made, and place an intolerable burden on widows and old folks with fixed incomes, and on teachers and unorganized workers in low-paid occupations.

It will become impossible to hold this line if the cost of living
is still further increased—not from imperative war needs, but by the action of the Congress in departing from its declared policy to stabilize all prices and wages.

The Bankhead bill departs from the declared policy of the Act of October 2, 1942. It departs from the only practical basis on which any sound stabilization program can proceed. That basis is faithful adherence to the present balanced relationships between wages and prices. To change the present delicately balanced price relationships would not merely change, but would jeopardize the entire stabilization program.

It is difficult to forecast the actual price increase which would result under the Bankhead bill, and the estimates I have received differ widely. They all agree, however, that they will be substantial, although there is some difference of opinion as to the time when they will occur. It cannot be denied, however, that the Bankhead bill takes from the Government the power to prevent very substantial increases in food prices. That is its only purpose.

Under the Bankhead bill the price of sugar could rise a cent and a half a pound, the price of bread might go up a cent a loaf and the price of flour proportionately. The price of corn could rise almost 10 percent, which might not necessitate, but would certainly call forth a demand for higher prices for hogs, and livestock, poultry, eggs, milk, and other dairy products. That demand would be particularly insistent in the case of poultry, eggs, milk, and other dairy products where customary feed cost ratios would be substantially reduced.

The Bankhead bill would certainly deprive the Government of the power to prevent these price increases—increases which might swell the cost of living more than 5 percent, add more than a billion dollars to the consumers’ food budget, and several hundred million dollars to the cost of feeding the armed forces and of supplying our allies.

If by this bill you force an increase in the cost of the basic foodstuffs, and as a result the National War Labor Board increases wages, no one can tell where increases will stop or what
33. Veto of a Parity Computation Bill

those increased wages will ultimately cost the farmers and all people of the Nation. If the price of food goes up, if wages rise, it will necessarily result in increasing the cost of our armaments, ships, and planes. We should have to borrow even greater sums to meet the increased cost of the war, and after the war an excessive burden of debt would have to be borne by all the people, including those now in uniform.

We are only beginning to feel the cruel effects of total war. Men happy with their families must give up good and well-paid jobs to become soldiers for $600 a year with only modest allowances for their dependent wives and their children. We who remain in civilian life to produce the food and supplies for them, and an irreducible minimum for ourselves, must not quarrel among ourselves in a vain effort to better or even hold our position at the expense of the other fellow. We must adhere loyally to our stabilization program and sanction no exceptions save in the case of genuine hardship and distress.

I appeal to the considered judgment of the Congress to reject the Bankhead bill which I am returning unsigned. It will not help the farmer with his immediate war difficulties. It will make it infinitely harder for the farmer to protect himself from wartime inflation and postwar chaos. It will add to the burdens of those most heavily burdened. It will make the winning of the war more difficult and gravely imperil our chances of winning the peace.

NOTE: Throughout the war, the President firmly stood against special interest groups who, for the benefit of their own interests, sought to raise particular prices. Strenuous efforts were made during the war to cause the Congress to enact legislation which would have skyrocketed food prices. Sometimes these efforts succeeded and the legislation was passed. Time and again the President vetoed such legislation, and reiterated his determination to hold the line against inflation (see, for example, Item 72 and note, this volume, and Item 12 and note, 1944-1945 volume).

Under the Executive Order of October 3, 1942, establishing the Office of Economic Stabilization (see Item 97 and note, 1942 volume), the President set forth the following policy for computing parity prices:
Committee for Congested Production Areas

"Appropriate deductions shall be made from parity price or comparable price for payments under the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act, as amended, parity payments under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, as amended, and governmental subsidies."

Thus, within the policy of achieving "parity" (i.e., comparable purchasing power with the farmer's 1909-1914 level) for the American farmer, the President ordered that the Government subsidies paid to farmers and used to hold the price line should be deducted in computing parity prices.

When this policy of computing parity prices was applied in setting ceiling prices on potatoes and flour, the special interest groups undertook a pressure campaign in the Congress. The Bankhead bill, prohibiting the deduction of subsidies paid to farmers in the computation of parity prices, was rushed through the Senate on February 25, 1943, by the overwhelming vote of 78-2. A companion measure passed the House of Representatives on March 24, 1943, by a vote of 149-40.

The President, in the foregoing message, vetoed this inflationary bill. Although the Congress had originally passed the bill by huge majorities, the veto was not overridden. In the Senate, despite the 78-2 record vote for the original measure, the bill, after the veto, was referred back to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, where it subsequently died.

At the time of the passage of the Bankhead Bill, the President was already considering the issuance of the famous "Hold-the-Line" Order (see Item 35 and note, this volume), which tightened up wage control and created stronger barriers against inflation. One of the factors in the success of the President's veto, and the indisposition of the Congress to over-ride it, was the knowledge that stronger administration action against inflation was pending.

34 Establishment of the Committee for Congested Production Areas. Executive Order No. 9327. April 7, 1943

By virtue of the authority conferred on me by the Constitution and statutes and especially by the First War Powers Act, 1941, in order to promote the successful prosecution of the war by providing for the more effective handling of governmental problems in congested production areas, it is hereby ordered:
Committee for Congested Production Areas

1. For the purposes of this Order a congested production area is an area which, by reason of a large increase in population and activity due to the war, is lacking in adequate services or facilities.

2. There is established a Committee for Congested Production Areas (herein referred to as the Committee), consisting of the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, as Chairman, and one member designated by the President from each of the following departments and agencies: Department of War, Department of the Navy, War Production Board, Federal Works Agency, National Housing Agency, and War Manpower Commission. The Committee shall meet from time to time at the call of the Chairman, and any action or decision taken or approved by the majority in attendance at any meeting shall be deemed to be the action of the Committee. The Chairman and each member or his designated alternate shall have one vote.

3. In order to deal effectively with problems arising out of congestion in congested production areas, it shall be the duty and responsibility of the Committee
   (a) To designate those areas which are to be considered congested production areas for the purposes of this Order and to modify or terminate such designations as it may deem advisable;
   (b) To cooperate with and supplement the efforts of State and local governments with respect to such problems in such areas;
   (c) To coordinate the activities of all Federal agencies insofar as they affect problems arising out of congestion in such areas;
   (d) To prescribe such policies and action as may be necessary to effectuate such coordination.

4. The Committee shall employ a suitable person as Director to carry out the decisions and policies of the Committee and administer its affairs. The Director may employ such personnel as the Committee may deem necessary.

5. The Director may designate, subject to the approval of the
Committee, an Area Director for each congested production area. Such Area Director shall be responsible to the Director and, under the general policies of the Committee, shall be responsible for securing coordination of all Federal agencies which deal with problems arising out of congestion within his area. He shall promptly report to the Director any problems or situations which he is unable to resolve, and the Director shall advise with the Federal agencies concerned to the end that coordination may be secured. The Area Director may recommend to the Director such policies and action as he deems advisable to further the purposes of this Order and facilitate the prosecution of the war.

6. Each Area Director, after consultation with local, State, and Federal officials in the area, and with the approval of the Director, shall designate an Area Advisory Council which may include representatives of the State government, local governments, and local communities in his area, and Federal agencies having supply or operating facilities in the area which are directly related to the war program. The Area Advisory Council shall meet upon the call of the Area Director for the purpose of advising with him concerning problems arising out of congestion within his area.

7. In order that the purposes of this Order may be carried out with a minimum of delay, coordination shall be secured as far as possible at the area level, and appropriate authority shall be delegated by the several departments and agencies concerned to their respective supervisory officials within such areas, and the names of such officials shall be reported to the Director. The policies and decisions of the Committee with respect to any congested production area shall be controlling on all Federal agencies to which they apply. Appropriate orders and instructions shall be issued by the departments and independent agencies affected to insure compliance with the policies and decisions of the Committee.

8. This Order shall continue in effect until the termination of Title I of the First War Powers Act, 1941.
NOTE: As thousands of war workers were drawn quickly to production centers, there came all the dangers and inconveniences of overcrowding. An enormous strain was put on community facilities unequipped for so large and so sudden an influx. In many cases, retail stores, restaurants, hospitals, schools, housing, transportation, and recreational facilities were wholly inadequate to bear the burden unexpectedly thrust upon them. The difficulties and uncertainties in the daily lives of the war workers and their families were soon felt adversely in essential war production. The results were rapid labor turnovers, absenteeism, and lowered worker morale. The problem was made more acute by the natural unwillingness of private enterprise to build facilities or engage in business in a market which would be only temporary and which could be expected to end with the war.

The President had earlier recognized the need for additional housing and community facilities for defense centers, and the Congress had appropriated funds for this purpose. (See Item 8 and note, 1941 volume.) The National Housing Agency (see Item 24 and note, 1942 volume) had begun a program of public and private construction of housing for war workers. The Federal Works Agency, the Office of Defense Health and Welfare Services, the National Resources Planning Board, and the United States Public Health Service had also taken measures to provide adequate community facilities. But these individual agencies working separately could not provide a coordinated solution to the problem; nor was there sufficient cooperation among the Federal agencies on the one hand and the State and local governments on the other.

Early in 1943, at the request of the Army and Navy Munitions Board, Robert Moses (New York City Park Commissioner) made a survey of congested war production areas. Shortly thereafter, the Subcommittee on Congested Areas of the House Committee on Naval Affairs held comprehensive public hearings. Taking these two surveys as a basis, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox proposed to the President that a coordinating agency be created. The President then signed the foregoing Executive Order which went even beyond the recommendations of the surveys and provided broader powers for dealing with the situation.

Because the Committee for Congested Production Areas was a coordinating rather than an operating agency, its staff was small.

Area representatives were stationed in the localities designated as "congested." The C.C.P.A. operated in the following areas:
### Committee for Congested Production Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas</th>
<th>Date of initial operation</th>
<th>Date of withdrawal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hampton Roads, Va.</td>
<td>May 20, 1943</td>
<td>Nov. 10, 1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Diego, Calif.</td>
<td>May 20, 1943</td>
<td>Dec. 31, 1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco, Calif.</td>
<td>May 20, 1943</td>
<td>Dec. 31, 1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Portland-South Portland, Maine</td>
<td>May 20, 1943</td>
<td>Oct. 31, 1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Newport, R. I.</td>
<td>May 20, 1943</td>
<td>Oct. 31, 1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunswick, Georgia</td>
<td>July 22, 1943</td>
<td>Feb. 19, 1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charleston, S. C.</td>
<td>July 22, 1943</td>
<td>Aug. 15, 1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*St. Mary’s County, Md.</td>
<td>Aug. 1, 1943</td>
<td>Dec. 31, 1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile, Ala.</td>
<td>Sept. 10, 1943</td>
<td>Nov. 30, 1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beaumont-Orange, Tex.</td>
<td>Dec. 3, 1943</td>
<td>Sept. 11, 1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles, Calif.</td>
<td>Dec. 3, 1943</td>
<td>Feb. 29, 1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pascagoula, Miss.</td>
<td>Apr. 12, 1944</td>
<td>Oct. 31, 1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key West, Fla.</td>
<td>Apr. 12, 1944</td>
<td>Dec. 31, 1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knoxville, Tenn.</td>
<td>Apr. 12, 1944</td>
<td>Sept. 30, 1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muskegon, Mich.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Areas which were not officially declared “congested” but where C.C.P.A. work was otherwise authorized.

Although these eighteen areas included only 10 percent of the country’s population, they comprised the sites of performance of 41 percent of all shipbuilding contracts, 30 percent of all aircraft contracts, and a total of 20 percent of all war supply contracts. There were, of course, additional congested areas. But the Committee concentrated on those which, during its short life, presented the most acute problems of congestion.

During its operation, the Committee helped to identify and solve local problems with respect to water supply, sewage, streets, roads and bridges, police and fire protection, housing, medical care, education, food, fuel, recreation, and transportation. Necessary priorities were secured from the W.P.B.; the U.S. Public Health Service was frequently asked to intervene in cooperation with state and local health departments to improve health conditions; and in other cases it assisted in expediting the flow of needed construction materials and labor for urgent community projects.

Congressional funds for the continuance of the Committee for Congested Production Areas were provided to cover operations only through December 31, 1944. After that date the Committee was liquidated. The C.C.P.A. had succeeded in reducing labor turnover.
“Hold-the-Line” Order on Prices and Wages

and absenteeism; and, in most congested areas, it had succeeded in increasing the availability of essential community facilities—all of which helped in the production of materials for war.

White House Statement and Executive Order to “Hold the Line” on Prices and Wages. Executive Order No. 9328.
April 8, 1943

Statement:

The Executive Order I have signed today is a hold-the-line Order.

To hold the line we cannot tolerate further increases in prices affecting the cost of living or further increases in general wage or salary rates except where clearly necessary to correct substandard living conditions. The only way to hold the line is to stop trying to find justifications for not holding it here or not holding it there.

No one straw may break a camel’s back, but there is always a last straw. We cannot afford to take further chances in relaxing the line. We already have taken too many.

On the price front, the directions in the Order are clear and specific.

All items affecting the cost of living are to be brought under control. No further price increases are to be sanctioned unless imperatively required by law. Adjustments in the price relationships between different commodities will be permitted if such adjustments can be made without increasing the general cost of living. But any further inducements to maintain or increase production must not be allowed to disturb the present price levels; such further inducements, whether they take the form of support prices or subsidies, must not be allowed to increase prices to consumers. Of course, the extent to which subsidies and other pay-
"Hold-the-Line" Order on Prices and Wages

ments may be used to help keep down the cost of living will depend on Congressional authorization.

Some prices affecting the cost of living are already above the levels of September 15, 1942. All of these cannot be rolled back. But some of these can and should be rolled back. The Order directs the reduction of all prices which are excessively high, inequitable, or unfair. The Stabilization Act was not intended to be used as a shield to protect prices which were excessively high on September 15, 1942.

On the wage front the directions in the Order are equally clear and specific.

There are to be no further increases in wage rates or salary scales beyond the Little Steel formula, except where clearly necessary to correct substandards of living. Reclassifications and promotions must not be permitted to affect the general level of production costs or to justify price increases or to forestall price reductions.

The Order also makes clear the authority of the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission to forbid the employment by an employer of any new employee except in accordance with regulations of the Chairman, the purpose being to prevent such employment at a higher wage or salary than that received by the employee in his last employment unless the change of employment will aid in the prosecution of the war.

It further calls the attention of all agencies of the Federal Government and of State and municipal authorities concerned with the rates of common carriers and public utilities to the stabilization program in the hope that rate increases will be disapproved and rate reductions ordered so far as may be consistent with Federal and State laws.

For some time it has been apparent that this action must be taken because of the continued pressure for increased wages and increased prices. I have heretofore refrained from acting because of the contention of the supporters of the Bankhead bill that under the Act of October 2, 1942, I had no authority to place
ceiling prices on certain commodities at existing levels. My views on that question were set forth in my message of April 2, vetoing the Bankhead bill.

The Senate did not vote upon the question of passing the bill over the veto. Its author moved to recommit the bill to the Committee on Agriculture, stating that there were not sufficient votes to override the veto.

I am advised that weeks or months from this date the bill may be reported for consideration. I am also advised that in the history of the Congress no bill vetoed by a President and recommitted to a committee has ever become law.

I cannot wait to see whether the Committee at some future date will again report the bill to the Senate. I cannot permit a continuance of the upward spiral of prices.

Some groups have been urging increased prices for farmers on the ground that wage earners have unduly profited. Other groups have been urging increased wages on the ground that farmers have unduly profited. A continuance of this conflict will not only cause inflation but will breed disunity at a time when unity is essential.

Under the Act of October 2, 1942, Congress directed that so far as is practicable, wages, salaries and prices should be stabilized as of the level of September 15. Under that direction inflation has been slowed up. Now we must stop it.

We cannot stop inflation solely by wage and price ceilings. We cannot stop it solely by rationing. To complete the job, Congress must act to reduce and hold in check the excess purchasing power. We must be prepared to tax ourselves more, to spend less and save more. The details of new fiscal legislation must be worked out by the appropriate committees of the House and the Senate. The executive departments stand ready to submit suggestions whenever the committees desire.

I am exerting every power I possess to preserve our stabilization program.

I am sure the Congress will cooperate.
"Hold-the-Line" Order on Prices and Wages

Executive Order:

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes, and particularly by the First War Powers Act, 1941, and the Act of October 2, 1942, entitled "An Act to Amend the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, to Aid in Preventing Inflation, and for Other Purposes," as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, and in order to safeguard the stabilization of prices, wages, and salaries, affecting the cost of living on the basis of levels existing on September 15, 1942, as authorized and directed by said Act of Congress of October 2, 1942, and Executive Order No. 9250 of October 3, 1942, and to prevent increases in wages, salaries, prices, and profits, which, however justifiable if viewed apart from their effect upon the economy, tend to undermine the basis of stabilization, and to provide such regulations with respect to the control of price, wage, and salary increases as are necessary to maintain stabilization, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. In the case of agricultural commodities the Price Administrator and the Administrator of Food Production and Distribution (hereinafter referred to as the Food Administrator) are directed, and in the case of other commodities the Price Administrator is directed to take immediate steps to place ceiling prices on all commodities affecting the cost of living. Each of them is directed to authorize no further increases in ceiling prices except to the minimum extent required by law. Each of them is further directed immediately to use all discretionary powers vested in them by law to prevent further price increases direct or indirect, to prevent profiteering and to reduce prices which are excessively high, unfair, or inequitable. Nothing herein, however, shall be construed to prevent the Food Administrator and the Price Administrator, subject to the general policy directives of the Economic Stabilization Director, from making such readjustments in price relationships appropriate for various commodities, or classes, qualities or grades thereof, or for seasonal variations or for various marketing areas, or from authorizing such support
prices, subsidies, or other inducements as may be authorized by law and deemed necessary to maintain or increase production, provided that such action does not increase the cost of living. The power, functions, and duties conferred on the Secretary of Agriculture under section 3 of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 (Public Law 421, 77th Congress) and under section 3 of the Act of October 2, 1942 (Public Law 729, 77th Congress) are hereby transferred to, and shall be exercised by the Food Administrator.

2. The National War Labor Board, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and other agencies exercising authority conferred by Executive Order No. 9250 or Executive Order No. 9299 and the regulations issued pursuant thereto over wage or salary increases are directed to authorize no further increase in wages or salaries except such as are clearly necessary to correct substandards of living, provided that nothing herein shall be construed to prevent such agencies from making such wage or salary readjustments as may be deemed appropriate and may not have heretofore been made to compensate, in accordance with the Little Steel formula as heretofore defined by the National War Labor Board, for the rise in the cost of living between January 1, 1941, and May 1, 1942. Nor shall anything herein be construed to prevent such agencies, subject to the general policies and directives of the Economic Stabilization Director, from authorizing reasonable adjustments of wages and salaries in case of promotions, reclassifications, merit increases, incentive wages, or the like, provided that such adjustments do not increase the level of production costs appreciably or furnish the basis either to increase prices or to resist otherwise justifiable reductions in prices.

3. The Chairman of the War Manpower Commission is authorized to forbid the employment by any employer of any new employee or the acceptance of employment by a new employee except as authorized in accordance with regulations which may be issued by the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, with the approval of the Economic Stabilization Director, for
35. "Hold-the-Line" Order on Prices and Wages

the purpose of preventing such employment at a wage or salary higher than that received by such new employee in his last employment unless the change of employment would aid in the effective prosecution of the war.

4. The attention of all agencies of the Federal Government, and of all State and municipal authorities, concerned with the rates of common carriers or other public utilities, is directed to the stabilization program of which this Order is a part so that rate increases will be disapproved and rate reductions effected, consistently with the Act of October 2, 1942, and other applicable Federal, State, or municipal law, in order to keep down the cost of living and effectuate the purposes of the stabilization program.

5. To provide for the consistent administration of this Order and Executive Order No. 9250, and other orders and regulations of similar import and for the effectuation of the purposes of the Act of October 2, 1942, the Economic Stabilization Director is authorized to exercise all powers and duties conferred upon the President by that Act, and the Economic Stabilization Director is authorized and directed to take such action and to issue such directives under the authority of that Act as he deems necessary to stabilize the national economy, to maintain and increase production and to aid in the effective prosecution of the war. Except insofar as they are inconsistent with this Order or except insofar as the Director shall otherwise direct, powers and duties conferred upon the President by the said Act and heretofore devolved upon agencies or persons other than the Director shall continue to be exercised and performed by such agencies and persons.

6. Except insofar as they are inconsistent with this Order, Executive Order No. 9250 and the regulations issued pursuant thereto shall remain in full force and effect.

NOTE: The foregoing hold-the-line Order was one of the most important of the many steps in the vigorous program of the President to hold down the cost of living and stabilize the national economy (see Items 12, 47, 91, 92, and 97, 1942 volume, for earlier Presidential
35. "Hold-the-Line" Order on Prices and Wages

statements and actions). The issuance of the foregoing Executive Order illustrated the struggle between the farm and labor blocs which had played so large a part in the problem of stabilization. The President throughout this struggle held firmly to his conviction that if the cost of living (particularly food prices) could be stabilized effectively, labor could be persuaded to forego additional wage demands.

Following the passage of the Stabilization Act of 1942 and the establishment of the Office of Economic Stabilization on October 3, 1942, powerful pressures were exerted by various economic interests to achieve price or wage increases.

Early in 1943, ex-Senator Prentiss M. Brown was appointed as Administrator of the O.P.A. to succeed Leon Henderson. There had been conflict between the O.P.A. and the Congress under Mr. Henderson’s administration, and one of the major tasks which Senator Brown faced was to improve Congressional understanding of and cooperation with the stabilization effort. The new Administrator’s efforts in this direction, however, were unfortunately misinterpreted as the substitution of a “soft” policy for a “tough” policy on prices. This was a signal for outside interests to increase their pressure on the O.P.A. to relax price controls and to raise price ceilings.

While business groups were attacking price controls, farm and labor groups sought to improve their own positions. A powerful movement developed in the Congress to raise farm prices, resulting in the passage of the Bankhead bill by an overwhelming vote (see Item 33 and note, this volume, for an account of the Bankhead bill and the President’s veto message of the bill). Simultaneously, labor groups demanded higher wages in order to offset recent rises in the cost of living. The demand of the United Mine Workers of America for higher wages in the bituminous coal mines precipitated a crisis in the spring of 1943 (see Items 45 and 46 and notes, this volume).

Against this background, the President moved decisively to preserve and bolster the stabilization program. He stood firmly against further breaks in the controls over both wages and prices. Upon the establishment of the Office of Economic Stabilization (see Item 97 and note, 1942 volume), the National War Labor Board (see Item 6 and note, 1942 volume) had been charged with jurisdiction over stabilizing wages. The “Little Steel formula” (see Item 6 and note, 1942 volume) was a barrier against general wage increases; but discretion still remained in the hands of the National War Labor Board to adjust wages upward in order to correct specific inequalities or inequities. Under the terms of the “hold-the-line” Order, the latitude of the National War Labor Board to make such upward adjustments was sharply restricted.

Following the issuance of the hold-the-line Order, the O.P.A. be-
gan a program to roll back the cost of living. Within two months the prices of 39 commodities had been rolled back, and aggressive steps had been taken to check black market operations. On May 7, the O.P.A. announced a 10-percent reduction in retail prices of beef, veal, pork, lamb, mutton, coffee, and butter. On June 15, the President set forth the plan to grant limited subsidy payments to processors in order to hold down the consumers’ cost of living without interfering with necessary food production and marketing (see Items 63, 70, and 72, and notes, this volume, for further accounts of the subsidy plan). Through the use of subsidies and other expedients, the President was able to “keep the lid” on wages by keeping the cost-of-living index down.

In the three and a half years following the issuance of the hold-the-line Order (until the killing of O.P.A. controls by the coalition of Republicans and conservative Democrats in the summer of 1946), rent, food, fuel, ice, electricity, and other items which comprise approximately two-thirds of the moderate-income family’s expenditures, had increased very little, and, in some cases, even decreased.

The following table and graph show the comparative price rises in World War I and World War II by percentages, enabling the reader to see the way in which the hold-the-line Order effectively checked substantial increases in the cost of living. A reference to the graph will show the reader that price rises leveled off after the issuance of the hold-the-line Order; and that the lifting of controls in 1946 caused prices to shoot up.

### PERCENT INCREASES IN THE CONSUMERS’ PRICE INDEX FOR MODERATE-INCOME FAMILIES IN LARGE CITIES IN THE UNITED STATES, BY GROUPS FOR SELECTED PERIODS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>All Items</th>
<th>Food</th>
<th>Apparel</th>
<th>Rent</th>
<th>Fuel, Elec. and Refrig.</th>
<th>House furnishings</th>
<th>Miscellaneous</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average 1914 to Dec. 1918</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>111.9</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>99.7</td>
<td>60.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average 1914 to June 1920</td>
<td>108.1</td>
<td>126.2</td>
<td>200.4</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>179.6</td>
<td>94.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1939 to March 1943</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1939 to June 1946</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percent Increase

CONSUMERS' PRICE INDEX
IN TWO WORLD WARS
FOR MODERATE INCOME FAMILIES IN LARGE CITIES
1935-39 * 100

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS

*ESTIMATES OF WORLD WAR II AND POSTWAR UNDERSTATEMENT BY THE INDEX WERE NOT INCLUDED. SEE MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW FOR MARCH 1947
36. Criticism of Rider Method of Legislation

This table and graph are an eloquent tribute to the steadfast determination of the President to prevent inflation during the period of our greatest war production, and to resist special interest pressures, any one of which might well have started the fatal upward spiral of inflation.

By making it abundantly clear to business, labor, and farm groups alike that the President intended to make every economic group “stay put” in the relative position it found itself as of early 1943, the hold-the-line order reduced the intergroup rivalry for bigger shares in the “national economic pie” which had been the main source of previous crises in the stabilization program. In effect, the new Order provided a firm foundation for a political and economic balance.

36. The President Criticizes the Rider Method of Legislation and the Termination of His Authority to Limit Salaries. April 11, 1943

The Public Debt Act of 1943 is before me for signature. This bill increases the limitation on the face amount of obligations issued under the Second Liberty Bond Act that may be outstanding at any one time from 125 billion dollars to 210 billion dollars.

I pointed out the need for this increase in my Budget Message on January 6. A bill to authorize the increase was introduced in the House of Representatives on January 25 by Chairman Doughton of the Ways and Means Committee. The Treasury informed the Ways and Means Committee that the present debt limit would be insufficient to cover the necessary bond issues which would be required during the month of April.

The Treasury has advised me that, to permit the execution of its war financing plans the Public Debt Act must become effective without further delay. I am accordingly allowing the bill to become law without my signature, in order to avoid embarrassment to our war financing program.

If the circumstances were otherwise, I should veto the bill. Even so, I cannot permit this legislation to become effective
36. Criticism of Rider Method of Legislation

without registering my protest against the attachment to this bill of an irrelevant and unwarranted rider.

There was attached to this bill in the House a provision which would have taken from the President the right to stabilize salaries until they were raised above $67,200 or the annual rate paid on December 7, 1941, whichever was the greater. This rider would have destroyed the entire stabilization program. It would obviously have been unfair to stabilize wages, and yet leave salaries free to rise to $67,200.

This patently indefensible provision was eliminated in the Senate. But instead of dropping it altogether, the Senate substituted a provision removing from the Act of October 2, 1942, the President’s authority, granted in terms by that Act to reduce wages or salaries “to the extent that he finds necessary to correct gross inequities and also to aid in the effective prosecution of the war.” The effect of this provision, which was accepted in conference, is to terminate the authority given to and exercised by me to prevent the payment during the war of salaries in excess of $67,200.

The reasons which prompted me to exercise the authority conferred upon me are fully explained in the letter which I sent to Chairman Doughton of the Ways and Means Committee on February 15. As I explained in my letter, I agree with those who say that the limitation on salaries does not deal adequately with the problem of excessive incomes. Practical limitations ought by appropriate taxation to be placed on all income, earned and unearned. I urged and would have welcomed a special tax measure applicable to all excessive incomes from whatever source derived in place of the flat $67,200 salary limitation.

But the Congress has chosen to rescind my action limiting excessive salaries without even attempting to offer a substitute. The result is that Congress has authorized the drafting of men into the Army for $600 a year regardless of whether they are earning $1,000 or $100,000 a year, but has refused to authorize the reduction in the salary of any man not drafted into the Army no matter how high his income may be.
36. Criticism of Rider Method of Legislation

At the same time the stabilization program enacted by the Congress requires wage increases to be denied to workers earning $1,500 a year even when their employers are willing to pay those wage increases. The essence of stabilization is that each should sacrifice for the benefit of all. This principle the Congress has failed to recognize.

Some two or three thousand persons who on September 15, 1942, were receiving salaries in excess of $67,200 may continue to receive them. About 750 persons will be able to receive salaries in excess of $100,000; about 30 persons, salaries in excess of $250,000; and 3 or 4 persons, salaries in excess of $500,000.

One hundred and thirty million Americans can make the stabilization program work even though a relative handful of persons are not obliged to cooperate as they should. The exemption accorded these excessively high salaries does not help morale, but American morale is too strong to be permanently injured by this ill-considered action.

The Act of October 2, 1942, set up a stabilization program covering wages, salaries, and prices. It could, of course, be revised or repealed by the Congress but subject, under the Constitution, to the approval or veto by the President.

The Congress, however, did not adopt this constitutional method.

It chose to take away the authority of the President to adjust salaries which were grossly inequitable, not by a separate law, but by attaching a rider to a bill increasing the debt limit.

This system of attaching riders to bills relating to a wholly different subject has been used by former Congresses in a number of notable cases. Such abuses of sound legislative procedure have been protested by many former Presidents, and the practice has been condemned by sound opinion. It is noteworthy that the Constitutions of many States require that a proposed law shall relate to only one subject.

In this particular case the problem is easy to understand.

If I veto this bill, with its rider, the Treasury's war financing plans may be seriously retarded. I have no means of assuring
criticism of rider method of legislation

prompt action by the Congress prior to a great bond issue, the sale of which is about to start. I have no means of preventing indefinite delay if either branch of the National Legislature should decide to recommit the measure to a committee for further study.

If I sign the bill I would be accused of giving my approval to salaries which most persons regard as excessive in the midst of a war for the survival of this Nation.

Thus the Congress has successfully and effectively circumvented my power to veto.

All that remains to me is to permit the act to become a law without my signature.

I am doing this with two earnest objections. The first is against the practice of attaching extraneous riders to any bill. The second is to make clear to the country that I still hope and trust that the Congress, at the earliest possible moment, will give consideration to imposing a special war supertax on net income, from whatever source derived, which after the payment of all taxes exceeds $25,000.

I still believe that the Nation has a common purpose—equality of sacrifice in wartime.

NOTE: An unattractive page in the history of the home front during the war was the bitter dispute which arose over the President's comparatively mild proposal for domestic sacrifice embodied in his suggestion that net incomes be limited to the hardly uncomfortable maximum of $25,000 a year after taxes. In his seven-point anti-inflation message of April 27, 1942, to the Congress, he had stated that "in time of this grave national danger, when all excess income should go to win the war, no American citizen ought to have a net income, after he has paid his taxes, of more than $25,000 a year" (see Item 47, 1942 volume). Although the Treasury Department formulated a specific plan to implement the President's proposal, the Congress refused to act on the recommendation.

The Stabilization Act of 1942, which the President approved October 2, 1942, authorized the President to adjust wages or salaries whenever he found it necessary to correct gross inequities or aid in the effective prosecution of the war. Acting under this legislative authority, the President issued Executive Order No. 9250, establish-
fully sought to persuade the Congress to enact the necessary legislation which would allow extension of the limitation to all income as well as salaries. The failure of the Congress to do so did create an unfair discrimination between those whose income was derived from salaries and those whose income came from other sources.

In his Budget Message of January 6, 1943 (see Item 3, this volume), the President pointed out the need for increasing the public debt limit. Legislation to accomplish this was introduced by Chairman Doughton of the House Ways and Means Committee on January 25. The bill provided that the public debt limit be increased from 125 billion dollars to 210 billion dollars; that the Secretary of the Treasury be authorized to utilize banks and trust companies in connection with the redemption of United States savings bonds; and that relief be provided for losses incurred in connection with the redemption of United States savings bonds.

This very necessary bill was passed by the Congress. But the Congress added a rider repealing all the regulations which had been promulgated with respect to the $25,000 limitation, and divesting the President of his authority in this respect.

As the President indicated in the foregoing statement, the financial situation made it imperative that he not veto the bill so its debt limit features would be enacted. On Feb-
February 28, 1943, the remaining borrowing authority under the existing debt limit was 8.160 billion dollars, and it was estimated that by April 12 it would be down to 6 billion dollars. On March 12, 1943, the President had announced a program designed to raise 13 billion dollars of new funds during the month of April in a Second War Loan Drive. At the time, war expenditures were being made at an average rate of more than 200 million dollars a day in excess of the daily revenue from taxes. It was essential that the Treasury be empowered to borrow the money necessary for the huge war expenditures.

The President strongly felt that during a period when wages of working men and women were being stabilized and men were being drafted into the armed forces at $600 per year, net incomes after taxes should not be tolerated over $25,000. Added to this was the President's objection on constitutional grounds to the rider method of legislation, a form of shotgun action on the part of the Congress which forced the acceptance of a manifestly bad bill because it was tacked onto a bill that had to be signed in order to win the war.

The President could not possibly veto the bill. Therefore he issued the foregoing statement, and allowed it to become a law without his signature (57 Stat. 63).

37. Address at Dedication of the Thomas Jefferson Memorial, Washington, D. C.
April 13, 1943

Today, in the midst of a great war for freedom, we dedicate a shrine to freedom.

To Thomas Jefferson, Apostle of Freedom, we are paying a debt long overdue.

Yet, there are reasons for gratitude that this occasion falls within our time; for our generation of Americans can understand much in Jefferson's life which intervening generations could not see as well as we.

He faced the fact that men who will not fight for liberty can lose it. We, too, have faced that fact.

He lived in a world in which freedom of conscience and freedom of mind were battles still to be fought through — not prin-
Dedication of Thomas Jefferson Memorial

ciples already accepted of all men. We, too, have lived in such a world.

He loved peace and loved liberty—yet on more than one occasion he was forced to choose between them. We, too, have been compelled to make that choice.

Generations which understand each other across the distances of history are the generations united by a common experience and a common cause. Jefferson, across a hundred and fifty years of time, is closer by much to living men than many of our leaders of the years between. His cause was a cause to which we also are committed, not by our words alone but by our sacrifice.

For faith and ideals imply renunciations. Spiritual advancement throughout all our history has called for temporal sacrifices.

The Declaration of Independence and the very purposes of the American Revolution itself, while seeking freedoms, called for the abandonment of privileges.

Jefferson was no dreamer— for half a century he led his State and his Nation in fact and in deed. I like to think that this was so because he thought in terms of the morrow as well as the day—and this was why he was hated or feared by those who thought in terms of the day and the yesterday.

We judge him by the application of his philosophy to the circumstances of his life. But in such applying we come to understand that his life was given for those deeper values that persist throughout all time.

Leader in the philosophy of government, in education, in the arts, in efforts to lighten the toil of mankind—exponent of planning for the future, he led the steps of America into the path of the permanent integrity of the Republic.

Thomas Jefferson believed, as we believe, in Man. He believed, as we believe, that men are capable of their own government, and that no king, no tyrant, no dictator can govern for them as well as they can govern for themselves.

He believed, as we believe, in certain inalienable rights. He,
as we, saw those principles and freedoms challenged. He fought for them, as we fight for them.

He proved that the seeming eclipse of liberty can well become the dawn of more liberty. Those who fight the tyranny of our own time will come to learn that old lesson. Among all the peoples of the earth, the cruelties and the oppressions of its would-be masters have taught this generation what its liberties can mean. This lesson, so bitterly learned, will never be forgotten while this generation is still alive.

The words which we have chosen for this Memorial speak Jefferson's noblest and most urgent meaning; and we are proud indeed to understand it and share it:

"I have sworn upon the altar of God, eternal hostility against every form of tyranny over the mind of man."

NOTE: As the President pointed out during one of his press conferences (see Item 148, pp. 604-607, 1938 volume), there had been a long delay in the authorization of a memorial for Thomas Jefferson. The delay appeared to have been caused by political reasons. After President Roosevelt's first inaugural in 1933, there arose renewed interest in the project; and the Congress in 1934 authorized the construction of the Thomas Jefferson Memorial on the edge of the Tidal Basin in Washington. The President delivered an address at ground-breaking ceremonies on December 15, 1938 (see Item 159, pp. 645-647, 1938 volume).

The dedication of the Thomas Jefferson Memorial was held on Jefferson's birthday. The entire ceremony, including the President's address, lasted fifteen minutes and was staged with the simplicity which Jefferson himself would have liked.

Two years later, the President had prepared an address for delivery on Jefferson Day, 1945, in which he set forth the hopes of humanity for enduring peace. The President died the afternoon before this Jefferson Day speech was to have been delivered (see Item 148, 1944-1945 volume, for the text of this undelivered address).
I don’t have to tell the Warm Springs family how very happy I am to be back with you again. I have really stolen these few moments—just twenty-four hours. I am not here. You may read about it in another week. In other words, I am perpetrating what the newspapers call a “scoop” for your benefit—seven or eight days ahead of time.

I am awfully happy in the knowledge, in the White House, that all goes well in Warm Springs. I haven’t got much time, as you may realize; and I was thinking today, as we motored from Fort Benning, that the last time I was here was on the thirtieth of November, 1941. At that time, because of certain things that happened in Washington and Tokyo, I had failed to arrive on Thanksgiving Day. I came a week later, and we had a family party in this room.

The next morning, one of those psychological things happened—what you and I would call a hunch. I telephoned to Washington to the Secretary of State, and I said to him, “You know, I am worried. I don’t know why I am worried, but I am too far away from Washington.”

And he said, “I know just how you feel, because I am worried too. There has been no news in the past twenty-four hours to cause additional worry, but I am just worried and I wish you were here in Washington.”

And so the next day I left here and went back. And when I got him on the phone, I said, “You know, I think we are all rather silly, but I had a feeling that something is hanging over our heads.”

And just one week later came the unwarranted surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.

Well, things have gone a lot better since then. And one thing I think we can make a pretty good guess about, and that is that here at Warm Springs we are going to have, in the days to come,
Extemporaneous Remarks at Warm Springs

a great many more men in uniform. After all, infantile paralysis is not a respecter of age; and in the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, including the WAACs, WAVES, and the other girls, we are going to have, out of more than seven million Americans, a good many cases of infantile paralysis, even if we don't have any great epidemic in this country.

And Warm Springs is preparing to do all it can to undertake to care for our boys in uniform, and our girls in uniform, even if we have to take half a hundred more patients than we think we have room for. And in doing that, we must always remember that we still have a duty to the civilian population of the country; because after all, the work we are taking part in — doctors, patients, physiotherapists, management, and everyone else — is creating a very profound effect, not just here but all over the United States.

We are doing pioneering work, and other people who haven't got the same advantages we have here are in large measure copying what we are doing in all the different localities, in counties and States all through the country. That means a very definite effect on the health and well-being of all the people throughout the Nation — grown-ups, boys and girls. And that is why I said in the White House I am very happy to know this constructive work is keeping on going at Warm Springs. I don't need to tell you that it makes my heart glad.

I can be here only for dinner. I have to leave for other parts — training stations, camps, and everything else, just to keep in touch with the great war effort that this whole Nation is engaged in.

I hope I can come back in the autumn, but that is no promise. I am not the master of my own calendar. So, I do hope to see you this autumn, and it doesn't make much difference whether it is Thanksgiving Day or not, as I find I can come here in April and still have turkey and cranberry sauce.

So I do hope to see you all very soon. And may I suggest we carry out the old tradition. I am going over by the door and stand, and meet all of you boys and girls who have come here
since I was here last, and all of you other boys and girls—and that will do my heart good, too.

NOTE: It was the President's custom to spend every Thanksgiving at Warm Springs. In 1941, relations with Japan forced the President to postpone his visit for a week, and also to leave sooner than expected to return to Washington. In 1942, war duties kept him at his desk in Washington, but in April, 1943, the President was able to visit Warm Springs on his tour of training camps and war plants and on his way to Mexico (see note to Item 40, this volume, for the itinerary of the President's trip).

39. Solid Fuels Administration for War

April 19, 1943

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. Whenever used in this Order:
   (a) The term “solid fuels” includes all forms of anthracite, bituminous, sub-bituminous, and lignitic coals (including packaged and processed fuels, such as briquettes).
   (b) The term “solid fuels industries” means the development, production, preparation, treatment, processing, storage, shipment, receipt, and distribution of solid fuels within the United States, its territories and possessions, but does not include the transportation of solid fuels.
   (c) The term “transportation” means transportation as defined in the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, and in Executive Orders Nos. 8989 and 9156.
   (d) The terms “distribution” and “shipment” exclude transportation, and the terms “distribute” and “ship” exclude transport.
(e) The term "directive" includes order, regulation, and any other similar instrument.

2. There is established within the Department of the Interior a Solid Fuels Administration for War, at the head of which shall be a Solid Fuels Administrator, hereinafter referred to as the Administrator. The Secretary of the Interior shall serve ex-officio as Administrator.

3. The Administrator shall:
   (a) Subject to the provisions of this Order, establish basic policies and formulate plans and programs to assure for the prosecution of the war the conservation and most effective development and utilization of solid fuels in the United States and its territories and possessions, issue necessary policy and operating directives to parties engaged in the solid fuels industries, and appoint such general, regional, local, or functional solid fuels industries committees or councils as the Administrator finds necessary, Provided that no directive issued hereunder shall conflict with any directive which has heretofore been issued or may hereafter be issued (1) by the Chairman of the War Production Board pursuant to paragraph 1 of Executive Order No. 9125 of April 7, 1942, or (2) by the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission pursuant to Executive Orders Nos. 9139 of April 18, 1942, 9279 of December 5, 1942, and 9301 of February 9, 1943.
   (b) Serve, as far as practicable, as the liaison and channel of communication between parties engaged in the solid fuels industries and the several departments and agencies of the Federal Government on matters directly involving the functions of the Administrator.
   (c) Obtain from the Departments of War and the Navy, the several divisions and branches of the War Production Board, such other Federal and State departments and agencies as may be appropriate, and from any other sources, private or governmental, any information, statistics, and data necessary to effectuate the purposes of this Order.
   (d) (1) Prepare estimates as to the quantities of solid fuels
which the Administrator deems necessary to meet direct and indirect military, and essential industrial and civilian requirements and submit such estimates with recommendations to the War Production Board.

(2) Recommend to the War Production Board any program for distribution of solid fuels which the Administrator deems necessary to meet direct and indirect military, and essential industrial requirements.

(3) Prepare and submit to the War Production Board recommendations as to the kinds and quantities of materials needed by parties engaged in the solid fuels industries to make available solid fuels in such quantities as the Administrator deems necessary to meet direct and indirect military, and essential industrial and civilian requirements.

(e) Subject to the direction of the Chairman of the War Production Board, exercise the powers, authority, and the discretion conferred upon the Chairman by paragraph 1 of Executive Order No. 9125 of April 7, 1942, by issuing, and taking appropriate action to enforce, such directives to the solid fuels industries as the Administrator may deem necessary, in order to:

(1) Provide adequate supplies of solid fuels for direct and indirect military, and essential industrial and civilian requirements;

(2) Effect the proper distribution of such amounts of materials as the Chairman of the War Production Board may allot for the solid fuels industries.

(f) Compile data and make continuing surveys with respect to the effect of the prices charged for solid fuels upon the efficient wartime operations of the solid fuels industries and the maintenance of adequate supplies of solid fuels for direct and indirect military, and essential industrial and civilian requirements. On the basis of such surveys, the Solid Fuels Administrator shall consult with and recommend to the Price Administrator, for consideration in light of the provisions of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, such upward or downward
adjustments in the schedule of prices charged for solid fuels as will, in the judgment of the Solid Fuels Administrator, assure the efficient wartime operation of the solid fuels industries and the maintenance of adequate supplies of solid fuels for direct and indirect military, and essential industrial and civilian requirements. In order to enable the Solid Fuels Administrator to make appropriate recommendations, the Price Administrator shall advise with the Solid Fuels Administrator prior to the establishment or alteration by the Price Administrator of any schedule of prices to be charged for solid fuels.

(g) Be advised of all plans or proposals which deal with the civilian rationing of solid fuels and consult with rationing authorities in the development of such plans or proposals; and determine, after advising with the War Production Board, the areas and the times within which such rationing should be effective and the amount of solid fuels available for such purpose.

(h) Prepare and submit to the Office of Defense Transportation recommendations concerning the provision of transportation facilities adequate for the transportation and distribution of the solid fuels necessary to meet direct and indirect military, and essential industrial and civilian requirements.

(i) Prepare and submit to the War Shipping Administration recommendations concerning the provision of vessels and related facilities adequate for the transportation and distribution of the solid fuels necessary to meet direct and indirect military, and essential industrial and civilian requirements.

(j) Request the War Manpower Commission to take such action as it deems appropriate to meet the manpower problems of the solid fuels industries in the light of the over-all manpower needs of the Nation, when the ability of the solid fuels industries to make available solid fuels in such quantities as the Administrator deems necessary to meet direct and indirect military, and essential industrial and civilian requirements is represented to be impaired or endangered by a shortage of manpower.
39. Solid Fuels Administration for War

(k) Formulate and submit any necessary policy recommendations to the appropriate Federal departments and agencies, after consultation with them, concerning plans and procedures with respect to foreign solid fuels activities.

4. In the performance of his functions, the Administrator shall consult with the appropriate authorities in the Federal departments and agencies whose functions affect the solid fuels industries in advance of any action proposed to be taken by him which may affect any such department or agency in the performance of its functions.

5. The several Federal departments and agencies shall supply such information and data as the Administrator may require in performing his functions and shall advise with the Administrator before undertaking any action which might affect the continuous, ready availability of solid fuels for direct and indirect military, and essential industrial and civilian requirements. In order to assist him in carrying out the purposes of this Order, the Administrator may establish committees or designate groups of advisers, representing two or more departments or agencies of the Federal Government, or States.

6. The Administrator may appoint a Deputy Administrator to whom he may delegate, subject to such departmental supervision and direction as he may determine, any and all power, authority, and discretion conferred upon him by this Order. The Administrator may designate either the Deputy Administrator or the Acting Secretary of the Interior to serve as Acting Solid Fuels Administrator in the absence of the Administrator. The Administrator and Deputy Administrator may (a) exercise the powers, authority, and discretion conferred upon them by or under the provisions of this Order through such personnel of the Solid Fuels Administration for War and the Department of the Interior, and in such manner as the Administrator or Deputy Administrator may determine, and (b) accept the services of other departments, agencies, and officials of the Government in carrying out the purposes of this Order. The Administrator, within the limits of such funds as may be allocated or appro-
39. Solid Fuels Administration for War

priated for the purpose, may employ necessary personnel and make provision for necessary supplies, facilities, travel, and services.

7. In the performance of his functions the Administrator shall, to the fullest extent compatible with efficiency, utilize appropriate existing agencies, facilities, and services of the Department of the Interior.

8. The Office of Solid Fuels Coordination for National Defense established pursuant to letter of the President dated November 5, 1941 (changed to the Office of Solid Fuels Coordinator for War by letter of the President dated May 25, 1942), is abolished, and its personnel, records, property, and funds are transferred to the Solid Fuels Administration for War, effective fifteen days from the date of this Order. All directives, agreements, recommendations, and other documents issued or entered into under the functions, duties and authorities of the Solid Fuels Coordinator for War shall remain in force as the responsibility of the Administrator until such time as he may revoke, alter, or otherwise change such documents under provisions of this Executive Order.

9. The Administrator shall keep the President informed with respect to the progress made in carrying out this Order and perform such related duties as the President may from time to time assign or delegate to him.

10. Nothing in this Order shall be deemed to limit in any way the statutory powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission with respect to rates, charges, statistics, accounts, car service (including emergency service powers), or operating authority, or in any way to limit or restrict the functions and authority, and the exercise thereof, of the Federal Power Commission under the Natural Gas Act, the Federal Power Act, Executive Order No. 8202 of July 13, 1939, and Presidential Directives of September 26, 1942, and October 22, 1942, concerning electric service for war plants and establishments.

11. Nothing in this Order shall be deemed to limit in any way the authority of the Departments of War and Navy to initiate or
39. Solid Fuels Administration for War

carry out directly, without review or approval by the Administrator, any action relating to solid fuels or the solid fuels industries which either department deems to be a matter of military necessity or expediency and which arises in such areas and is of such military urgency as to require special or secret disposition.

12. Any provision of any prior Executive Order conflicting with this Executive Order is superseded to the extent of such conflict.

NOTE: By letter of November 5, 1941, to Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes, the President had established the Office of Solid Fuels Coordinator for Defense (see Item 109 and note, 1941 volume). On May 25, 1942, the President changed the title of the office to Office of Solid Fuels Coordinator for War.

This Office was active in encouraging various industries using coal to purchase and stock-pile coal during late 1941 and 1942. This was done in order to meet the rising demand of war production and to avoid some of the anticipated difficulties in transportation which contributed to coal shortages during the first World War. The powers of the Solid Fuels Coordinator for War, however, were generally limited to collecting information and making recommendations. The powers of persuasion served the Solid Fuels Coordinator well enough during peacetime and during the early months of the war. At that time increased production in the anthracite and bituminous coal fields exceeded the earlier requirements of war production. But more centralized and firmer authority was needed when shortages of equipment and skilled labor threatened to result in shortages of coal.

There was a direct parallel in the defense and war periods between governmental action in relation to petroleum control and governmental controls over solid fuels. On May 23, 1941, the President by letter to the Secretary of the Interior had named Secretary Ickes as Petroleum Coordinator for National Defense (see Item 47 and note, 1941 volume). After Pearl Harbor, the title of this Office was changed to Petroleum Coordinator for War. The Petroleum Coordinator was vested with powers similar to those of the Solid Fuels Coordinator; and it became apparent during 1942 that it was necessary to strengthen and to set them forth more specifically in an Executive Order. Accordingly, the President on December 2, 1942, established the Petroleum Administration for War by the issuance of Executive Order No. 9276 (see Item 131 and note, 1942 volume). The foregoing Executive Order for the control of solid fuels was patterned closely
after the Executive Order relating to petroleum.

By its terms, authority over functions concerning solid fuels was centralized in the Solid Fuels Administration for War. The power of determination in the broader fields of transportation, manpower, materials, price, and labor relations, however, remained in the agencies then handling these functions; provision was made in the Order for the Solid Fuels Administrator to make recommendations to these agencies, based on solid fuels needs.

While in general there was enough coal to meet demands in the regions west of the Mississippi River, coal shortages threatened many of the most vital points in our war economy east of the Mississippi River. To insure a more effective distribution of the available coal supply, the Solid Fuels Administration for War instituted several measures: coal was allocated and moved to the more urgent areas; many long-haul movements of coal were prohibited when potential coal supplies were closer by; the use of alternative and more plentiful types of coal was encouraged; and cars of bituminous coal in transit were diverted to areas suffering from emergency shortages. In a number of cases the public was forced to use substitute fuels, and the winter emergencies produced a number of discomforts. On the whole, however, the Solid Fuels Administration for War was able to move coal quickly enough to alleviate the worst shortages. Inadequate supplies of anthracite in the northeastern States resulted in a number of local shortages, and bituminous coal, normally used by industry, was rushed into these emergency areas. Bituminous coal was also diverted for domestic purposes into some of the southeastern States and into Michigan. Some of these domestic shortages resulted from a decline in the supply of firewood, from conversion to coal by users of oil and gas, and from the great population shifts incident to war.

As the war progressed, manpower shortages in the coal mines became increasingly serious. To make matters worse, production per man declined as the younger men were drawn into the armed forces. The average age of miners rose to nearly fifty years. Nevertheless, by increasing the number of working hours, a record production was achieved in 1944. By the end of the war, the number of workers in the bituminous and anthracite mines had declined to the lowest point in half a century.

Sustained production in the coal mines was seriously impaired by recurring strikes. On several occasions the Government was forced to take over the coal mines in order to insure continued production. (See Items 30, 103, and 116 and notes, 1941 volume, and Items 44, 45, 66, and 120 and notes, this volume, for accounts of labor disputes in the coal mines.)
40. Address at Monterrey, Mexico

40 Address at Monterrey, Mexico.

April 20, 1943

Señor Presidente de La Republica Mexicana, my friends and good neighbors:

Your Excellency's friendly and cordial expressions add to the very great pleasure that I feel at being here on Mexican soil.

It is an amazing thing to have to realize that nearly 34 years have passed since Chief Executives of our two countries have met face to face. I hope that in the days to come every Mexican and every American President will feel at liberty to visit each other just as neighbors visit each other — just as neighbors talk things over and get to know each other better.

Our two countries owe their independence to the fact that your ancestors and mine held the same truths to be worth fighting for and dying for. Hidalgo and Juarez were men of the same stamp as Washington and Jefferson. It was, therefore, inevitable that our two countries should find themselves aligned together in the great struggle which is being fought today to determine whether this world shall be free or slave.

The attacks of the Axis powers during the past few years against our common heritage as free men culminated in the unspeakable and unprovoked aggressions of December 7, 1941, and of May 14, 1942, and the shedding of blood on those dates of citizens of the United States and of Mexico alike.

Those attacks did not find the Western Hemisphere unprepared. The 21 free Republics of the Americas during the past ten years have devised a system of international cooperation which has become a great bulwark in the defense of our heritage and the defense of our future. That system, whose strength is now evident even to the most skeptical, is based primarily upon a renunciation of the use of force, and is based on the enshrining of international justice and mutual respect as the governing rule of conduct by all Nations everywhere.

In the forging of that new international policy the role of Mexico has been outstanding. Mexican Presidents and Foreign
Ministers have appreciated the nature of the struggle with which we are now confronted at a time when many other Nations much closer to the focus of infection were blind.

The wisdom of the measures which the statesmen of Mexico and the United States and of the other American Republics have adopted at inter-American gatherings during recent years has been amply demonstrated. They have succeeded because they have been placed in effect, not only by Mexico and the United States, but by all except one of the other American Republics.

You and I, Mr. President, as Commanders in Chief of our respective armed forces, have been able to concert measures for common defense. The harmony and the mutual confidence which have prevailed between our armies and navies is beyond praise. Brotherhood in arms has been established.

The determination of the Mexican people and of their leaders has led to production on an all-out basis of strategic and vital materials so necessary to the forging of the weapons destined to compass the final overthrow of our common foes. In this great city of Monterrey, I have been most impressed with the single-minded purpose with which all the forces of production are joined together in the war effort.

And too, Mexican farm workers, brought to the United States in accordance with the agreement between our two Governments, the terms of which are fully consonant with the social objectives that we cherish together, are contributing their skill and their toil to the production of vitally needed food.

But not less important than the military cooperation and the production of supplies needed for the maintenance of our respective economies has been the exchange of those ideas and of those moral values which give life and significance to the tremendous effort of the free peoples of the world. We in the United States have listened with admiration and with profit to your statements and addresses, Mr. President, and to those of your distinguished Foreign Minister. We have gained inspiration and strength from your words.

In the shaping of a common victory our peoples are finding
40. Address at Monterrey, Mexico

that they have common aspirations. They can work together for a common objective. Let us never lose our hold upon that truth. It contains within it the secret of future happiness and prosperity for all of us on both sides of our unfortified borders. Let us make sure that when our victory is won, when the forces of evil surrender — and that surrender shall be unconditional — then we, with the same spirit and with the same united courage, will face the task of the building of a better world.

There is much work still to be done by men of good will on both sides of the border. The great Mexican people have their feet set upon a path of ever greater progress so that each Nation may enjoy and each citizen may enjoy the greatest possible measure of security and opportunity. The Government of the United States and my countrymen are ready to contribute to that progress.

We recognize a mutual interdependence of our joint resources. We know that Mexico's resources will be developed for the common good of humanity. We know that the day of the exploitation of the resources and the people of one country for the benefit of any group in another country is definitely over.

It is time that every citizen in every one of the American Republics recognizes that the Good Neighbor policy means that harm to one Republic means harm to each and every one of the other Republics. We have all of us recognized the principle of independence. It is time that we recognize also the privilege of interdependence — one upon another.

Mr. President, it is my hope that in the expansion of our common effort in this war and in the peace to follow we will again have occasion for friendly consultation, in order further to promote the closest understanding and continued unity of purpose between our two peoples.

We have achieved close understanding and unity of purpose, and I am grateful to you, Mr. President, and to the Mexican people, for this opportunity to meet you on Mexican soil, and — to call you friends.

You and I are breaking another precedent. Let these meetings
between Presidents of Mexico and the United States recur again and again and again.

NOTE: When the President visited President Avila Camacho in Mexico, it was the first meeting between the Presidents of the two countries since 1909. In 1941, they had made plans for a joint fishing trip in the Gulf of Mexico, but the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor had caused the abandonment of these plans.

President Camacho also accompanied President Roosevelt on his visit to the Naval Training Center at Corpus Christi, Texas, where many Mexican air cadets in addition to those of other countries were being trained (see Item 42, this volume, for the President’s extemporaneous remarks at Corpus Christi, Texas).

En route and returning from his trip to Mexico, the President visited a number of war plants and training camps. His itinerary for the trip was as follows: April 13, departed from Washington, D. C.; April 14, Marine Corps “boot camp” for recruit training at Parris Island, S. C.; April 15, Maxwell Field, Ala. (Air Forces training center); April 15, Fort Benning, Ga.; April 15-16, Warm Springs, Ga. (see Item 38 and note, this volume); April 17, Fort Oglethorpe, Ga. (WAAC training center); April 17, Camp Forrest, Tenn.; April 18, Camp Joseph T. Robinson, Ark.; April 18, Camp Gruber, Okla.; April 19, Douglas Aircraft assembly plant, Tulsa, Okla.; April 20, Monterrey, Mexico; April 21, Naval Training Center, Corpus Christi, Texas (see Item 42, this volume); April 22, Fort Worth, Texas; April 23, en route to Colorado Springs, and Denver, Col.; April 24, Camp Carson at Colorado Springs, and Remington Cartridge plant, Lowry Field, and Fitzsimons General Hospital at Denver, Col.; April 25, Fort Riley, Kans.; April 26, Martin Bomber plant, Omaha, Neb.; April 27, Jefferson Barracks, Mo., and Republic fighter plane plant at Evansville, Ind.; April 28, Fort Knox, Ky.; April 29, return to Washington, D. C.

During the trip, the President covered approximately 7,600 miles.

41 Statement on the Execution of the Tokyo Raiders by the Japanese. April 21, 1943

It is with a feeling of deepest horror, which I know will be shared by all civilized peoples, that I have to announce the barbarous execution by the Japanese Government of some of the
members of this country's armed forces who fell into Japanese hands as an incident of warfare.

The press has just carried the details of the American bombing of Japan a year ago. The crews of two of the American bombers were captured by the Japanese. On October 19, 1942, this Government learned from Japanese radio broadcasts of the capture, trial, and severe punishment of those Americans. Continued endeavor was made to obtain confirmation of those reports from Tokyo. It was not until March 12, 1943, that the American Government received the communication given by the Japanese Government stating that these Americans had in fact been tried and that the death penalty had been pronounced against them. It was further stated that the death penalty was commuted for some but that the sentence of death had been applied to others.

This Government has vigorously condemned this act of barbarity in a formal communication sent to the Japanese Government. In that communication this Government has informed the Japanese Government that the American Government will hold personally and officially responsible for these diabolical crimes all of those officers of the Japanese Government who have participated therein and will in due course bring those officers to justice.

This recourse by our enemies to frightfulness is barbarous. The effort of the Japanese war lords thus to intimidate us will utterly fail. It will make the American people more determined than ever to blot out the shameless militarism of Japan.

I have instructed the Department of State to make public the text of our communication to the Japanese Government.

NOTE: During the first raid on Tokyo, led by Gen. Doolittle (see Item 46 and note, 1942 volume), two of the B-25 planes and their crews were forced down in enemy territory after the bombs had been dropped. Eight of the airmen were taken into custody by the Japs, and three of them were executed on October 15, 1942. The other five American airmen were placed in solitary confinement in the Japanese prison of Kiangwan; and were denied adequate facilities, such as food, clothing, and sanitary accommodations. As a direct result of this treatment, one of the five surviving airmen died of malnutrition and
dysentery on December 1, 1943. After V-J Day the remaining four were liberated and returned to the United States.

The country was shocked to hear of the brutal treatment given the American aviators, who were in full uniform and entitled to be treated as prisoners of war in accordance with the terms of the Geneva Convention to which Japan had subscribed. In the foregoing statement, the President was voicing the indignation of the Nation. A full and formal protest had been transmitted to the Japanese Government by our State Department in a note of April 12, 1943.

On many occasions, the President announced his determination that all Axis war criminals be brought to justice after the United Nations had won the war. True to the President's promise, on January 18, 1946, four Japanese officers who figured in the execution of these American airmen, and the mistreatment of the others in prison, were brought to trial by a United States Military Commission. They included a lieutenant general who had appointed the "military court" that tried the Americans; a captain and a lieutenant who had prosecuted the Americans before the court; and a captain who had been commandant of the Kiangwan Military Prison, and had also been commander of the six-man firing squad of Japanese military executioners. These four Japanese war criminals were tried, convicted, and sentenced.

42. Remarks to Naval Air Cadets

Informal, Extemporaneous Remarks to Naval Air Cadets at Corpus Christi, Texas.

April 21, 1943

I am glad that all cadets of the naval training station are hearing what I have to say, because what I have to tell you concerns them, as well as those here in this mess hall.

I regard this as one of the great American historic meetings. I think you will remember this just as long as you live, for we have just received a President on American soil — the President of our sister Republic.

I want to tell you that yesterday was one of the high points of my life. We had a perfectly magnificent reception in Monterrey. And today we are especially very happy to greet the Presi-
dent of Mexico, because here among us are a large number of Mexican cadets, as well as many other cadets from sister American Republics.

The President of Mexico would like very much — when we go out of here — to shake hands with his own cadets.

I feel that from the point of view of continental defense and unity of purpose, that the kind of mutual training we are doing with cadets from sister Republics, both in the Army and the Navy, means a wide and long step forward in the relations of this hemisphere.

Let the good work go on!

NOTE: See note to Item 40 for the itinerary of the President’s trip to training camps, war plants, and to Warm Springs and to Mexico.

43 Message of Greeting to the Nation’s Businessmen. April 26, 1943

Through you I wish to extend greetings to the businessmen of the Nation as represented by members of the United States Chamber of Commerce assembled in your annual meeting and War Council.

Our form of Government, based as it is on a system of free enterprise, is meeting successfully the challenges of the totalitarian Governments. We are meeting the test because there is unity of purpose on the part of our people in all walks of life. In a democracy, difference of opinion as to methods of reaching an objective may be expected, but on the over-all task of defeating the Axis powers there is united determination.

Only by teamwork on the part of labor and management could we have reached the present high peak of production so essential to the successful prosecution of the war; our factories are now turning out munitions of war which in quantity and effectiveness
far exceed the expectations of our enemies when they decided to make war upon us and our way of life.

But we are not satisfied. We must not be satisfied. More cooperation, more teamwork, and more production, all the way from the farms and mines through the assembly lines, will enable us to win the war more quickly.

The gains we are making in the production of war goods are the fruits of cooperation between management and employees in their devotion to a common cause. Members of the United States Chamber of Commerce may well be proud of the contribution they have made under your able leadership. I have had opportunity to know of and cause to appreciate that leadership.

American business is meeting the challenge of war and meeting it in a way that brings comfort to our people, and fear to our enemies.

Honorable Eric Johnston,
President,
United States Chamber of Commerce.

44 (The Eight Hundred and Ninety-second Press Conference (Excerpts). April 29, 1943

(Message to John L. Lewis on coal strike — Trip to war plants and training camps.)

(Held immediately upon the return of the President from Mexico.)

THE PRESIDENT: Before we talk about the trip, I have got one very simple telegram to John L. Lewis, which I will read. There isn’t anything else to add to it.

(Reading): “The controversy between the United Mine Workers of America and the operators of the coal mines has been certified to the National War Labor Board for settlement.

“The officials of the United Mine Workers were invited by the Board to recommend a person for appointment to the panel charged with investigating the facts. They ignored the invitation. The Board
then appointed Mr. David B. Robertson of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen to represent the employees; Mr. Walter White to represent the operators, and Mr. Morris L. Cooke to represent the public.

"The personnel of this panel assures an impartial investigation of the facts to be used by the Board in its determination of the controversy, in accordance with the law.

"The officials of the United Mine Workers of America have ignored the request of the Board that they present their case to the National War Labor Board panel, and likewise have ignored the request of the Board that the strikers be urged to return to their work. I am advised that many thousands of miners are out on strike, and strikes are threatened at many other mines which are now in operation.

"The procedure that has been followed in this case by the Board is, I am assured, in exact accord with that followed in all other controversies of this character.

"In view of the statements made in telegrams to me from some members of the United Mine Workers that O.P.A. price regulations have been disregarded, and that the cost of living has gone up disproportionately in mining areas, I have directed the O.P.A. to make an immediate investigation of the facts, and wherever a violation of law is disclosed by that investigation, to see that the violators of the law are prosecuted.

" Strikes and stoppages in the coal industry that have occurred and are threatened are in clear violation of the 'no-strike' pledge.

"These are not mere strikes against employers of this industry to enforce collective bargaining demands. They are strikes against the United States Government itself.

"These strikes are a direct interference with the prosecution of the war. They challenge the governmental machinery that has been set up for the orderly and peaceful settlement of all labor disputes. They challenge the power of the Government to carry on the war.

"The continuance and spread of these strikes would have the same effect on the course of the war as a crippling defeat in the field.

"The production of coal must continue. Without coal our war industries cannot produce tanks, guns, and ammunition for our armed forces. Without these weapons our sailors on the high seas, and our armies in the field, will be helpless against our enemies.

"I am sure that the men who work in the coal mines, whose sons and brothers are in the armed forces, do not want to retard the war effort to which they have contributed so loyally, and in which they with other Americans have so much at stake.
44. Eight Hundred and Ninety-second Press Conference

"Not as President — not as Commander in Chief — but as the friend of the men who work in the coal mines, I appeal to them to resume work immediately, and submit their case to the National War Labor Board for final determination.

"I have confidence in the patriotism of the miners, and I am sure that when they realize the effect that stopping work at this time will have upon our boys at the front, they will return to their jobs.

"The enemy will not wait while strikes and stoppages run their course. Therefore, if work at the mines is not resumed by ten o'clock Saturday morning [May 1, 1943], I shall use all the power vested in me as President and as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy to protect the national interest and to prevent further interference with the successful prosecution of the war."

... Then, the trip to Mexico. ... It was a good trip. ... In talking to the press associations yesterday, there were a number of things about which I tried to point out the comparison between this trip and the one last September. And I would say it really lay in the thought that last September the Army was having growing pains, and now they have got over the growing pains and are about grown up.

One thing that I didn’t mention to the press associations yesterday, and that was about the women in industry. You remember that last fall I was greatly surprised at the large percentage of women in the aviation plants. Well, that is true of other plants that are turning out munitions. In the aviation plants at that time they got as high as around 30 percent of women. Today they are running between 30 and 50 percent—one plant had actually more women than men. And the new workers that are coming in all the time, in most of the plants, have a percentage of women running well above 50 percent—as high as 60 and 65 percent, which of course will help tremendously in the manpower and womanpower problem.

Then the various camps seem to have shaken down into a normal procedure. Now, they are getting straightened out the problems—when you start any new camp—of housekeeping; that is to say, food and clothing, and all the neces-
sary supplies to keep the very large number of men going in the camps. They are making large savings too, as, for example, in food, which was looked into by a special Army board about a month and a half ago; and the new regulations in effect will save a great many millions of dollars.

NOTE: For additional data on the coal strike, see Items 45, 46, and notes, this volume, and references cited therein. For the President's trip to Mexico and to training camps and war plants, see Items 40, 42, and notes, this volume.

45 White House Statement and Executive Order on Seizure of Coal Mines. Executive Order No. 9340. May 1, 1943

Statement:

ON THURSDAY, April 29, I sent a telegram to John L. Lewis, and Thomas Kennedy, President and Secretary-Treasurer of the United Mine Workers, pointing out that the coal strikes were a direct interference with the prosecution of the war, and challenged the governmental machinery set up for the orderly and peaceful settlement of labor disputes, and the power of the Government to carry on the war. [Note: This telegram is printed in Item 44, this volume.]

I said that the continuance and spread of the strikes would have the same effect on the course of the war as a crippling defeat in the war. I appealed to the miners to resume work immediately, and to submit their case to the National War Labor Board for final determination.

I stated that if work were not resumed by ten o'clock Saturday morning, I should use all the power vested in me as President and Commander in Chief to protect the national interest and to prevent further interference with the successful prosecution of the war.
45. Seizure of the Coal Mines

Except in a few mines the production of coal has virtually ceased. The national interest is in grave peril.

I have today by appropriate Executive Order directed the Secretary of the Interior, who is the Fuel Administrator and in whose Department is the Bureau of Mines and the Bituminous Coal Division, to take possession of and operate the coal mines, for the United States Government.

I now call upon all miners who may have abandoned their work to return immediately to the mines and work for their Government. Their country needs their services as much as those of the members of the armed forces. I am confident that they do not wish to retard the war effort; that they are as patriotic as any other Americans; and that they will promptly answer this call to perform this essential war service.

I repeat that an investigation of the cost of living is now being made in the mining areas, and that the Government will insist that the prices be held in accordance with the directions of my recent Executive Order, and violations of the law promptly prosecuted.

Whenever the miners submit their case to the War Labor Board, it will be determined promptly, fairly, and in accordance with the procedure and law applicable to all labor disputes. If any adjustment of wages is made, it will be made retroactive.

The production of coal must and shall continue.

Executive Order:

Whereas widespread stoppages have occurred in the coal industry and strikes are threatened which will obstruct the effective prosecution of the war by curtailing vitally needed production in the coal mines directly affecting the countless war industries and transportation systems dependent upon such mines; and

Whereas the officers of the United Mine Workers of America have refused to submit to the machinery established for the peaceful settlement of labor disputes in violation of the agreement on the part of labor and industry that there shall be no strikes or lockouts for the duration of the war; and
45. Seizure of the Coal Mines

Whereas it has become necessary for the effective prosecution of the war that the coal mines in which stoppages or strikes have occurred, or are threatened, be taken over by the Government of the United States in order to protect the interests of the Nation at war and the rights of workers to continue at work:

Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, it is hereby ordered as follows:

The Secretary of the Interior is authorized and directed to take immediate possession, so far as may be necessary or desirable, of any and all mines producing coal in which a strike or stoppage has occurred or is threatened, together with any and all real and personal property, franchises, rights, facilities, funds, and other assets used in connection with the operation of such mines, and to operate or arrange for the operation of such mines in such manner as he deems necessary for the successful prosecution of the war, and to do all things necessary for or incidental to the production, sale, and distribution of coal.

In carrying out this Order, the Secretary of the Interior shall act through or with the aid of such public or private instrumentalities or persons as he may designate. He shall permit the management to continue its managerial functions to the maximum degree possible consistent with the aims of this Order.

The Secretary of the Interior shall make employment available and provide protection to all employees resuming work at such mines and to all persons seeking employment so far as they may be needed; and upon the request of the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of War shall take such action, if any, as he may deem necessary or desirable to provide protection to all such persons and mines.

The Secretary of the Interior is authorized and directed to maintain customary working conditions in the mines and customary procedure for the adjustment of workers' grievances. He shall recognize the right of the workers to continue their membership in any labor organization, to bargain collectively through
45. Seizure of the Coal Mines

representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, provided that such concerted activities do not interfere with the operations of the mines.

Possession and operation of any mine or mines hereunder shall be terminated by the Secretary of the Interior as soon as he determines that possession and operation hereunder are no longer required for the furtherance of the war program.

NOTE: The bituminous coal industry was the center of a series of sharp labor disputes which sporadically threatened the war effort and taxed the facilities of the National War Labor Board. It will be recalled that a strike in 1941 in the captive coal mines had wrecked the National Defense Mediation Board (see Item 116 and note, 1941 volume).

The President on several occasions was required to intervene in these controversies in the bituminous coal industry.

A two-year contract had been signed between bituminous coal miners and operators in 1941; its expiration date was March 31, 1943. Before this contract expired, the miners presented certain proposals to be included in the new contract. These proposals covered a $2-a-day increase, a minimum daily rate of $8, an increase in vacation payments, payment for travel time from the mine portal to working places and return, and several improvements in working conditions. The proposals were not accepted by the operators.

As time started to run out on the old contract, and it seemed that an agreement would not be reached before March 31, the President on March 22 dispatched identical telegrams to John L. Lewis (President of the United Mine Workers) and to Charles O'Neill and ex-Senator Edward R. Burke (negotiators for the northern and southern coal operators). In these telegrams, the President stated:

"The dispute between the United Mine Workers and the bituminous operators must be settled like any other labor dispute under the national no-strike agreement of December 26, 1941, by the peaceful means set forth in the Executive Order No. 9017 of January 10, 1942; that is, by collective bargaining, conciliation, and final determination, if necessary, by the National War Labor Board.

"From the telegrams I have read from the committees representing the operators and from the press reports of various proposals made at the conference, it is evident that the time remaining before the expiration of the contract on March 31 is too short.

"I therefore request the mine workers and the operators to follow the plan adopted at my suggestion in 1941, that is, to continue the uninterrupted production of coal under the terms and conditions of existing contracts until
the differences that now separate the parties are peacefully and finally resolved with the understanding that if the new agreement includes any wage adjustments, such adjustments shall be computed and applied retroactively from April 1, 1943. If any wage adjustments are made they must, of course, be made in accordance with the act of October 2, 1942, and Executive Order No. 9250. It would be unfair to the mine workers and to the operators unduly to prolong the period of uncertainty, and I am, therefore, asking everyone concerned to proceed with all speed consistent with the complete and fair-minded settlement of the dispute. If it is referred to agencies of the Government I shall make the same request of those in charge of such agencies.

"If there is a wage adjustment within the standards set forth in the Act of October 2, 1942, and Executive Order No. 9250, the question of undue hardship to individual operators resulting from the agreement to make such adjustments retroactive to April 1, 1943, will be given due consideration by the agencies of the Government concerned with costs and prices."

On March 24, 1943, the President was informed that a joint agreement had been concluded between the operators of the Appalachian Joint Conference and the United Mine Workers of America to continue the mines in operation for thirty days after April 1. The negotiators also announced that they had accepted the President's suggestion to make retroactive to April 1, 1943, such adjustment as might be finally agreed upon.

But the negotiators could arrive at no agreement during the early weeks of April. Accordingly, the case was certified to the National War Labor Board on April 22. On April 24, the Board directed the parties to continue under the old contract "until the differences which now separate the parties are peacefully and finally resolved, with the understanding that if the new agreement includes any wage adjustments, such adjustments shall be computed and applied retroactively from March 31, 1943."

The National War Labor Board set up a tripartite panel to hear the dispute, but the United Mine Workers of America ignored the invitation to recommend a person for appointment to the panel. On April 28, panel hearings began; but representatives of the United Mine Workers failed to appear. News was received that mine stoppages were already in progress. So the hearings were recessed.

Faced with this situation, the President on April 29, 1943, sent identical telegrams to John L. Lewis and Thomas Kennedy of the United Mine Workers. The text of these telegrams appears in Item 44, this volume.

In defiance of this request of the President, a general strike in the bituminous coal mines began on May 1. Accordingly, the President promptly issued Executive Order No. 9340 and directed the Secretary of the Interior to take over and operate the mines. The following night, May 2, 1943, the President delivered a fireside chat explaining the circumstances surrounding
46. Fireside Chat on Taking Over Coal Mines

the seizure of the coal mines. (See Item 46 and note, this volume, for
the text of the President’s May 2 address and subsequent develop-
ments in the 1943 bituminous coal mines controversy.)

46 (“There Can Be No One Among Us—No One Faction—Powerful Enough to Interrupt the Forward March of Our People to Victory” —Fireside Chat on the Federal Seizure of the Coal Mines. May 2, 1943

I am speaking tonight to the American people, and in particular to those of our citizens who are coal miners.

Tonight this country faces a serious crisis. We are engaged in a war on the successful outcome of which will depend the whole future of our country.

This war has reached a new critical phase. After the years that we have spent in preparation, we have moved into active and continuing battle with our enemies. We are pouring into the world-wide conflict everything that we have—our young men, and the vast resources of our Nation.

I have just returned from a two weeks’ tour of inspection on which I saw our men being trained and our war materials made. My trip took me through twenty States. I saw thousands of workers on the production line, making airplanes, and guns and ammunition.

Everywhere I found great eagerness to get on with the war. Men and women are working long hours at difficult jobs and living under difficult conditions without complaint.

Along thousands of miles of track I saw countless acres of newly plowed fields. The farmers of this country are planting the crops that are needed to feed our armed forces, our civilian population, and our allies. Those crops will be harvested.

On my trip, I saw hundreds of thousands of soldiers. Young
men who were green recruits last autumn have matured into self-assured and hardened fighting men. They are in splendid physical condition. They are mastering the superior weapons that we are pouring out of our factories.

The American people have accomplished a miracle.

However, all of our massed effort is none too great to meet the demands of this war. We shall need everything that we have and everything that our allies have—to defeat the Nazis and the Fascists in the coming battles on the continent of Europe, and the Japanese on the continent of Asia and in the islands of the Pacific.

This tremendous forward movement of the United States and the United Nations cannot be stopped by our enemies.

And equally, it must not be hampered by any one individual or by the leaders of any one group here back home.

I want to make it clear that every American coal miner who has stopped mining coal—no matter how sincere his motives, no matter how legitimate he may believe his grievances to be—every idle miner directly and individually is obstructing our war effort. We have not yet won this war. We will win this war only as we produce and deliver our total American effort on the high seas and on the battle fronts. And that requires unrelenting, uninterrupted effort here on the home front.

A stopping of the coal supply, even for a short time, would involve a gamble with the lives of American soldiers and sailors and the future security of our whole people. It would involve an unwarranted, unnecessary, and terribly dangerous gamble with our chances for victory.

Therefore, I say to all miners—and to all Americans everywhere, at home and abroad—the production of coal will not be stopped.

Tonight, I am speaking to the essential patriotism of the miners, and to the patriotism of their wives and children. And I am going to state the true facts of this case as simply and as plainly as I know how.

After the attack at Pearl Harbor, the three great labor organi-
izations—the American Federation of Labor, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, and the Railroad Brotherhoods—gave the positive assurance that there would be no strikes as long as the war lasted. And the President of the United Mine Workers of America was a party to that assurance.

That pledge was applauded throughout the country. It was a forcible means of telling the world that we Americans—135,-000,000 of us—are united in our determination to fight this total war with our total will and our total power.

At the request of employers and of organized labor—including the United Mine Workers—the War Labor Board was set up for settling any disputes which could not be adjusted through collective bargaining. The War Labor Board is a tribunal on which workers, employers, and the general public are equally represented.

In the present coal crisis, conciliation and mediation were tried unsuccessfully.

In accordance with the law, the case was then certified to the War Labor Board, the agency created for this express purpose with the approval of organized labor. The members of the Board followed the usual practice which has proved successful in other disputes. Acting promptly, they undertook to get all the facts of this case from both the miners and the operators.

The national officers of the United Mine Workers, however, declined to have anything to do with the fact finding of the War Labor Board. The only excuse that they offer is that the War Labor Board is prejudiced.

The War Labor Board has been and is ready to give this case a fair and impartial hearing. I have given my assurance that if any adjustment of wages is made by the Board, it will be made retroactive to April first. But the national officers of the United Mine Workers refused to participate in the hearing, when asked to do so last Monday.

On Wednesday of this past week, while the Board was proceeding with the case, stoppages began to occur in some mines. On Thursday morning I telegraphed to the officers of the United
Mine Workers asking that the miners continue mining coal on Saturday morning. However, a general strike throughout the industry became effective on Friday night.

The responsibility for the crisis that we now face rests squarely on these national officers of the United Mine Workers, and not on the Government of the United States. But the consequences of this arbitrary action threaten all of us everywhere.

At ten o’clock yesterday morning the Government took over the mines. I called upon the miners to return to work for their Government. The Government needs their services just as surely as it needs the services of our soldiers, and sailors, and marines—and the services of the millions who are turning out the munitions of war.

You miners have sons in the Army and Navy and Marine Corps. You have sons who at this very minute—this split second—may be fighting in New Guinea, or in the Aleutian Islands, or Guadalcanal, or Tunisia, or China, or protecting troop ships and supplies against submarines on the high seas. We have already received telegrams from some of our fighting men overseas, and I only wish they could tell you what they think of the stoppage of work in the coal mines.

Some of your own sons have come back from the fighting fronts, wounded. A number of them, for example, are now here in an Army hospital in Washington. Several of them have been decorated by their Government.

I could tell you of one from Pennsylvania. He was a coal miner before his induction, and his father is a coal miner. He was seriously wounded by Nazi machine-gun bullets while he was on a bombing mission over Europe in a Flying Fortress.

Another boy, from Kentucky, the son of a coal miner, was wounded when our troops first landed in North Africa six months ago.

There is still another, from Illinois. He was a coal miner—his father and two brothers are coal miners. He was seriously wounded in Tunisia while attempting to rescue two comrades whose jeep had been blown up by a Nazi mine.
These men do not consider themselves heroes. They would probably be embarrassed if I mentioned their names over the air. They were wounded in the line of duty. They know how essential it is to the tens of thousands — hundreds of thousands — and ultimately millions of other young Americans to get the best of arms and equipment into the hands of our fighting forces — and get them there quickly.

The fathers and mothers of our fighting men, their brothers and sisters and friends — and that includes all of us — are also in the line of duty — the production line. Any failure in production may well result in costly defeat on the field of battle.

There can be no one among us — no one faction — powerful enough to interrupt the forward march of our people to victory.

You miners have ample reason to know that there are certain basic rights for which this country stands, and that those rights are worth fighting for and worth dying for. That is why you have sent your sons and brothers from every mining town in the Nation to join in the great struggle overseas. That is why you have contributed so generously, so willingly, to the purchase of war bonds and to the many funds for the relief of war victims in foreign lands. That is why, since this war was started in 1939, you have increased the annual production of coal by almost two hundred million tons a year.

The toughness of your sons in our armed forces is not surprising. They come of fine, rugged stock. Men who work in the mines are not unaccustomed to hardship. It has been the objective of this Government to reduce that hardship, to obtain for miners and for all who do the Nation's work a better standard of living.

I know only too well that the cost of living is troubling the miners' families, and troubling the families of millions of other workers throughout the country as well.

A year ago it became evident to all of us that something had to be done about living costs. Your Government determined not to let the cost of living continue to go up as it did in the first World War.
Your Government has been determined to maintain stability of both prices and wages—so that a dollar would buy, so far as possible, the same amount of the necessities of life. And by necessities I mean just that—not the luxuries, not the fancy goods that we have learned to do without in wartime.

So far, we have not been able to keep the prices of some necessities as low as we should have liked to keep them. That is true not only in coal towns but in many other places.

Wherever we find that prices of essentials have risen too high, they will be brought down. Wherever we find that price ceilings are being violated, the violators will be punished.

Rents have been fixed in most parts of the country. In many cities they have been cut to below where they were before we entered the war. Clothing prices have generally remained stable.

These two items make up more than a third of the total budget of the worker’s family.

As for food, which today accounts for about another third of the family expenditure on the average, I want to repeat again: your government will continue to take all necessary measures to eliminate unjustified and avoidable price increases. And we are today taking measures to “roll back” the prices of meats.

The war is going to go on. Coal will be mined no matter what any individual thinks about it. The operation of our factories, our power plants, our railroads will not be stopped. Our munitions must move to our troops.

And so, under these circumstances, it is inconceivable that any patriotic miner can choose any course other than going back to work and mining coal.

The Nation cannot afford violence of any kind at the coal mines or in coal towns. I have placed authority for the resumption of coal mining in the hands of a civilian, the Secretary of the Interior. If it becomes necessary to protect any miner who seeks patriotically to go back and work, then that miner must have and his family must have—and will have—complete and adequate protection. If it becomes necessary to have troops at the mine mouths or in coal towns for the protection of working miners.
and their families, those troops will be doing police duty for the sake of the Nation as a whole, and particularly for the sake of the fighting men in the Army, the Navy, and the Marines — your sons and mine — who are fighting our common enemies all over the world.

I understand the devotion of the coal miners to their union. I know of the sacrifices they have made to build it up. I believe now, as I have all my life, in the right of workers to join unions and to protect their unions. I want to make it absolutely clear that this Government is not going to do anything now to weaken those rights in the coal fields.

Every improvement in the conditions of the coal miners of this country has had my hearty support, and I do not mean to desert them now. But I also do not mean to desert my obligations and responsibilities as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

The first necessity is the resumption of coal mining. The terms of the old contract will be followed by the Secretary of the Interior. If an adjustment in wages results from a decision of the War Labor Board, or from any new agreement between the operators and miners, which is approved by the War Labor Board, that adjustment will be made retroactive to April first.

In the message that I delivered to the Congress four months ago, I expressed my conviction that the spirit of this Nation is good.

Since then, I have seen our troops in the Caribbean area, in bases on the coasts of our ally, Brazil, and in North Africa. Recently I have again seen great numbers of our fellow countrymen — soldiers and civilians — from the Atlantic seaboard to the Mexican border and to the Rocky Mountains.

Tonight, in the face of a crisis of serious proportions in the coal industry, I say again that the spirit of this Nation is good. I know that the American people will not tolerate any threat offered to their Government by anyone. I believe the coal miners will not continue the strike against their Government. I believe that the coal miners as Americans will not fail to heed the clear
call to duty. Like all other good Americans, they will march shoulder to shoulder with their armed forces to victory.

Tomorrow the Stars and Stripes will fly over the coal mines, and I hope that every miner will be at work under that flag.

NOTE: Once again in March, 1943, labor disputes flared in the Nation's bituminous coal mines, when it became apparent that the United Mine Workers and representatives of the operators would be unable to reach agreement on terms for a new contract. The old contract expired on April 1, 1943, and the President requested and obtained an agreement that the mines would continue in operation for thirty days after April 1.

The miners, late in April, walked out in defiance of the Government (see Item 45 and note, this volume). Accordingly, the President issued Executive Order No. 9340 on May 1, 1943, and, in the foregoing address, spoke to the miners of the Nation over the radio.

As he was on his way to the Oval Room to make the foregoing address, the President received word that John L. Lewis had concluded an agreement with Secretary of the Interior Ickes for the striking miners to return to work in two days. The President decided to proceed with the address despite this last-minute news.

On May 6, 1943, the National War Labor Board resumed its hearings. The Board directed the operators and miners to bargain collectively in consultation with the Board. The only response of the miners was a telegram to the Secretary of the Interior announcing they would continue work in the mines until midnight of May 31, 1943.

On May 25, 1943, the National War Labor Board issued a directive order which denied the union's request for a general increase of $2 per day. From data published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Board found that the miners had received substantial increases in wage rates since April, 1941. It found that only in the industries producing locomotives, ships, petroleum, and automobiles were average hourly earnings higher than in the bituminous coal industry, and in no instance more than seven cents higher. The Board pointed out that the peacetime standards of the bituminous coal miners had been preserved because the miners had received a wage rate increase of 15 percent or more in the period from January 1, 1941, to May 15, 1942.

On other issues, the Board denied payment for time spent from the portal of the mine to working places and return (portal-to-portal pay); granted an increase from $20 to $50 in payment for vacation time; and granted certain improvements in working conditions of the miners. The labor members of the National War Labor Board dis-
sent from the majority decision.

After the issuance of the Board's directive order, widespread strikes in the bituminous coal mines began again on June 1, 1943, and the Board ordered the parties to cease negotiations until the strikes were called off.

On June 2, 1943, the President received the following report on the bituminous coal dispute from Wayne L. Morse, Compliance Officer of the National War Labor Board:

Mr. President:

"The National War Labor Board, by unanimous vote, hereby refers to you, for such action as you deem appropriate, the existing dispute between the United Mine Workers of America and the coal operators. As you know, several hundred thousand workers are out on strike in violation of the no-strike pledge; in defiance of directive orders of the National War Labor Board; and in spite of the Executive Order of May 1 which placed the mines under Federal management pending a final determination of the case by the War Labor Board. This strike has no parallel, since Pearl Harbor, insofar as a reckless and wanton disregard of the no-strike agreement is concerned. Viewed from the standpoint of its damage to the war effort and its serious threat to the maintenance of Government by law and order, this strike probably has no parallel in American history.

"You will find attached to this letter a detailed statement of the steps which have been followed by the Government in its various attempts to settle this case. This statement shows that the Mine Workers of America have been accorded exactly the same treatment by the Government in the handling of this case as has been accorded tens of thousands of other workers involved in labor disputes. It has been the position of the War Labor Board throughout that exactly the same rules and policies for settling wartime labor disputes should be applied in this case as in any other. However, at each step of this procedure on the part of the Mine Workers under the leadership of their officers there has been a direct repudiation of the no-strike, no-lockout agreement.

"The Union has followed a policy through the history of the case of insisting that negotiations be carried on either under the threat of a strike or with a strike in progress. On the other hand, every other great labor organization and every responsible labor leader in America has adhered to the no-strike agreement. They have accepted the obligation to carry on their negotiations without threatening to interrupt the production of vital war material if negotiations were not carried out according to their dictates.

"It is the opinion of the War Labor Board that the fundamental issue in this case involving the supremacy of law is perfectly clear and must be met by the Government.

"This morning, Mr. President, the War Labor Board in a telegram to the parties, a copy of which is attached, directed that all negotiations between the parties on the issues referred to them by the Board's directive order of May 25, 1943, should cease until the Mine Workers return to work in compliance with the Board's order. This is in accordance with the well-established policy of the Board that no proceedings conducted under the auspices or direction of the Board can be carried on while either party to a dispute stands in violation of the no-strike, no-lockout agreement.

"The War Labor Board, Mr. Presi-
47. Eight Hundred and Ninety-fourth Press Conference

dent, stands ready to proceed with this case in accordance with its policies just as soon as the strike is ended.

"Yours respectfully,
WAYNE L. MORSE"

Upon the receipt of this statement by the National War Labor Board, the President on June 3, 1943, made the following statement:

"Most of the Nation's coal mines are closed because of a general strike which has taken place in defiance of the Government of the United States. I have instructed the Secretary of the Interior, who has possession of the mines for the Government, to proceed to reopen the mines.

"The Secretary of the Interior will continue to operate the mines under the terms and conditions of work which obtained under the old contract which was extended by order of the War Labor Board plus those new terms and conditions which have been approved by the Board and which were announced by the Board's order of May 25.

"As President and Commander in Chief I order and direct the miners who are not now at work in the mines to return to their work on Monday, June 7, 1943. I must remind the miners that they are working for the Government on essential war work and it is their duty, no less than that of their sons and brothers in the armed forces, to fulfill their war duties.

"Just as soon as the miners return to work, the disposition of the dispute between the miners and the operators will forthwith proceed, under the jurisdiction of the War Labor Board and in accordance with the customary and established procedures governing all cases of this sort."

(For an account of subsequent developments and Presidential actions in the bituminous coal mines disputes of 1943, see Items 66 and 120 and notes, this volume.)

47 (The Eight Hundred and Ninety-fourth Press Conference (Excerpts). May 7, 1943

(Success of War Loan Drive — Second mission to Moscow — Coal miners as Government employees — End of era of financial exploitation in Latin America.)

THE PRESIDENT: I want to say a word in commendation of the Treasury Department. The Secretary of the Treasury sent me this morning the latest figures on the last bond issue. They have completed the Second War Loan Drive with a total sale of Government securities of $18,300,000,000, which is more than $5,000,000,000 over the goal that was set.

It is rather interesting to analyze those figures a little. More
than $13,000,000,000 came from investors other than commercial banks, as compared with the original goal in that category of $8,000,000,000; in other words, that subscription by investors other than commercial banks shows the largest increase. Also, the savings of the people that were invested—in other words, the average individual, like you and me—came to the extent of $3,000,000,000 by direct purchases; and another $3,500,000,000 through the purchases by insurance companies and savings banks, which of course act in a very true sense as the repository of the savings of millions of people, through insurance premiums.

The people participated to a much larger extent in the Second War Loan than in the First War Loan of last December. The figures I have given you show that the sales to individuals are almost double those of last December, which means that since what they call technically the "E" bonds have been issued by the Treasury for about two years, that over $10,000,000,000 have been put into those savings bonds, meaning a total—I think this figure is quite a significant one—of over 50,000,000 Americans.

And another interesting thing is that people who today are at work or in the armed services—which is about 60,000,000 people—five-sixths of them own one or more bonds. . . .

I don't think there's anything else.

Somebody is sure to ask me the question about the second mission to Moscow. (Laughter)

Mr. Joseph E. Davies is leaving, almost at once, on a mission to Moscow. He will not be gone very long; he is coming right back. He is carrying with him a letter from me, of which he himself does not know the contents. And I assume that, after it is opened over there, he will learn what is in it, and they may talk to him about it, and he will come back.

It is a special mission. It has nothing to do with a regular mission to Moscow.

And what is in the letter—I will forestall somebody who is about to say something—he doesn't know, and you don't
47. *Eight Hundred and Ninety-fourth Press Conference*

know. And number three, your guesses were nearly always wrong in the past. (*Laughter*)

Q. Do we understand you told him to whom the letter is addressed?

**THE PRESIDENT**: It is addressed to Mr. Joseph Stalin. (*Laughter*) . . .

Q. Mr. President, under your Executive Order to Secretary Ickes, are the coal miners employees of the Government? If so, have they the right to strike against the Government?

**THE PRESIDENT**: Well, you've got two questions in there. The first is, are they employees of the Government? I should say yes on that. On the second, I would say that I have been in the Government for a great many years, and I can't recollect any strike by Government employees against the Government. . . .

Q. Mr. President, can you say something about your talks with the President of Bolivia, Enrique Penaranda?

**THE PRESIDENT**: We had a very satisfactory conference. And there is no question about it, that all through the Latin American Republics, people are looking ahead.

One phase of that, for example, relates to what I said down in Mexico, about the era of exploitation being over. I apologized to him on behalf of the thing that happened a great many years ago—way back in 1926 or 1927—when certain Americans went down to Bolivia and told them they needed a lot of money. Well, Bolivia had not realized that, up to that time; but these Americans were such good salesmen that they persuaded Bolivia that they did need the money. And so we lent them some money on bonds at 8 percent. Also, about another 8 percent that went to the houses of issue. Bolivia only got 92 instead of 100 on their bonds, and of course, obviously, were completely unable to repay either the 8 percent interest or the principal.

And I apologized on behalf of my fellow citizens of that age—rather an interesting era in our history—and I told
47. Eight Hundred and Ninety-fourth Press Conference

him that if I had anything to do with it again we would never lend money to anybody on that basis again. . . .

NOTE: Despite the lend-lease and other assistance which the United States had extended to Russia to aid in the fight against Nazism, there was not the same frank and open relationship with Russia on the part of many of our military and diplomatic leaders as existed with Great Britain. The President, however, in sincere and patient attempts to arrive at fuller understandings with Russia, recognized that a free exchange of views on a personal basis was necessary, not only to insure the quicker winning of the war, but also to pave the way for international peace after the war.

Tension between Russia and the Allied powers rose during early 1943 as it became apparent that it would be impossible to launch the cross-channel invasion of France prior to 1944. Under these circumstances the President felt that a meeting with Stalin would be advisable in order to straighten out many of the misunderstandings which had arisen between the two countries. The President further felt that a franker exchange of views might result if a Roosevelt-Stalin meeting might precede a Big Three meeting in which Churchill were included.

The President therefore persuaded Hon. Joseph E. Davies, who had been Ambassador to Russia before the second World War and was respected by the Russians, to deliver a letter to Marshal Stalin asking for a personal meeting between Roosevelt and Stalin. (The President’s reference in the foregoing press conference to a “second mission to Moscow” refers to the autobiography of Davies, later made into a motion picture, entitled “Mission to Moscow.”)

When Mr. Davies arrived in Moscow, he conferred at length with Marshal Stalin, who finally became convinced that the only purpose for the suggested meeting was a friendly one. It was decided that Roosevelt and Stalin and their staffs should try to meet about July 15, 1943. However, relations with Russia became strained again following the Trident Conference because of the delay in the invasion of France (see Item 53 and note, this volume for an account of the Trident Conference), and the meeting was not held. The first meeting among Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill took place at the Teheran Conference (see Item 128 and note, this volume).
48. Congratulations to Gens. Eisenhower and Giraud

48 Messages of Congratulations to General Eisenhower and General Giraud on the Victory in Tunisia. May 9, 1943

General Dwight D. Eisenhower:

My warm personal congratulations to you on the great success of the recent operations in North Africa. The power and coordination with which the Allied forces are crushing our enemies in Tunisia is a tribute to your leadership. The unprecedented degree of Allied cooperation makes a pattern for the ultimate defeat of the Axis.

Convey to General Alexander my appreciation of the splendid manner in which he directed the ground armies of three Nations in a series of devastating blows against the enemy. My congratulations to Air Marshal Tedder on his overwhelming air victory; to Admiral Cunningham on the destruction of the Axis shipping by his naval craft; to General Montgomery on the culmination of his odyssey; and to General Anderson for his perfect teamplay.

General Henri Honoré Giraud:

I express the admiration of the people of America in saluting the brilliant contributions of the French forces under your command which culminated yesterday in the capture of Tunis and Bizerte. Soldiers of France have demonstrated that they waited only the opportunity to spring back at their Nazi oppressors. This precedent, so victoriously established, is the beginning of the day when the United Nations, working in concert, will restore France to its people.

NOTE: Accounts of the background of the North African invasion, the initial landings, and the political and diplomatic issues involved are included in Items 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 123, 124, and 126 and notes, 1942 volume.

On April 7, 1943, the American patrols joined with elements of the British Eighth Army which had pursued Rommel from El Alamein. Thus the final phases of the Tunisian campaign began. While the ground forces of the Americans and
British were exerting pressure, on April 5, the Allied air forces commenced a heavy attack on Axis transport aircraft in Sicily and Tunisia, and during a two-week period 147 transport planes and 31 vessels were damaged or destroyed, and Axis reinforcement of the Cape Bon Peninsula was mortally delayed.

Fighting through heavily mined areas, units of the American Second Corps, the British First Army, and the British Eighth Army pushed steadily toward Tunis and Bizerte. A spectacular thrust by the American First Armored Division on May 3 penetrated to Mateur, twenty miles from Bizerte. The American Second Corps captured Bizerte on May 7, and the British forces surrounded a large group of Axis troops which surrendered on May 9. Approximately 252,000 German and Italian troops and a huge amount of equipment were captured.

The Allied victory in Tunisia cleared the Mediterranean for Allied shipping, provided a rebirth of the French Army, hardened the American troops for battle, and showed the firm unity among the Allied troops. It showed the kind of coordination possible between air and ground efforts, and provided an effective springboard for the invasion of Sicily. (See Items 73 and 74 and note, this volume.)

49 Message to the Congress Urging Funds for War Housing. May 13, 1943

Since last I communicated with the Congress on the subject of war housing in May, 1942, much has happened in the war and much has happened in housing.

It is a noteworthy fact in relation to the whole war effort that under the existing war-housing program more than three million workers in intense war production have been provided or are being provided with necessary shelter. In addition to placements in existing structures, the present program embraces more than a million and a half units of construction, approximating twice the total volume of homes built in the United States in a better-than-normal building year. The size of this program, founded as it is upon minimum absolute need, affords some measurement of the disastrous impairment of war production that would confront us if war housing were not provided in sufficient volume and on time.
49. Funds for War Housing

It is hard to build houses in time of war. It is even harder in time of war to combine the building of houses with maximum economy in the use of men, money, and materials. It is therefore encouraging to know that more than half of the necessary war-housing accommodations thus far projected is being provided through the more effective use of existing structures; that another substantial portion is being attained through the prudent and economical repair, enlargement, or "conversion" of existing dwellings so that they may shelter additional war workers; that only about two-fifths of the need is being supplied by new construction; and that more than one-half of this new construction is being financed with private funds.

Housing used to be divided among several agencies and several programs. Today, as a product of the reorganization and unification of the housing agencies fourteen months ago, the National Housing Agency is pursuing one unified housing program under which all of our housing resources and techniques are being focused upon the winning of the war. There is no room now for any kind of housing but war housing.

I have been particularly gratified to see that this new spirit with regard to housing activities pervades the Congress. Certain recent and interesting reports of investigatory Congressional committees have emphasized in a most striking fashion the acute continuity of the need for even more war housing in specified critical areas. Generally speaking, proposals in the Congress for the effective use of our manpower are linked with proposals for the adequate provision of war housing wherever needed.

The war is not over. War production and the employment of men and women in war plants have not reached their peak, even where the plants are completed. The constant rearrangements in the nature and disposition of our total working force, produced by the increasing inroads of Selective Service, develop gaps that must be filled in part by the migration of women and older workers, and consequently intensify old needs or develop new needs for war housing.

Even after making every reasonable allowance for the use of local labor supply, including the training of new types of workers,
the best estimates indicate an in-migration of 1,100,000 war workers into areas of war-production activity during the fiscal year 1944. These workers must be housed or they cannot do their job.

It is not proposed to house even the majority of these workers with Federal funds. Almost two-thirds of them will be taken care of by placement in existing structures, and a large part of the balance will be served by privately financed construction encouraged and insured by the Government. The Congress will recall that to serve workers in-migrating during the fiscal year 1943, it recently increased the authorization of one branch of the National Housing Agency to insure private investment in war-housing construction by $400,000,000. Likewise, it is contemplated that recommendations for additional authorizations for private financing will be forthcoming, to serve a large portion of the workers who will in-migrate during the fiscal year 1944. This further expansion of private financing will maintain and confirm in the war-housing program the principles which point toward maximizing our utilization of existing resources, and particularly the resources of small enterprise, during the war. We are allocating to private initiative as large a segment of the war-housing program as it possibly can produce under war conditions and war risks.

But in order to meet that portion of the needs of 1,100,000 workers migrating to war centers during the fiscal year 1944, which cannot be met in any other way, some publicly financed war-housing construction is essential. The main vehicle for this purpose has been the Act of October 14, 1940, as amended, known as the Lanham Act. The funds under this Act, and under other acts to provide war housing, are practically all committed to serve needs arising during the fiscal year 1943. I am therefore suggesting to the Congress at this time the enactment of legislation providing an increase of $400,000,000 in the authorization contained in the Lanham Act, as amended. A substantial portion of these funds will be returned to the Government in the form of rents during the emergency and realizations thereafter. In
making this recommendation, I am sure that the Congress and the National Housing Agency will continue to look upon all phases of the war-housing problem as part of a total and unified picture.

No expenditure of funds can be too large if that expenditure is necessary to win the war, or to win it with a greater economy in time and lives. But I cannot refrain from pointing out how small a fraction of the cost of the war is involved in all the appropriations of money and use of materials for war housing, particularly when measured against the contribution which the shelter of war workers is making toward the winning of the war. If the total outlays for war housing were regarded as part of the cost of the plants in which the workers produce, or the cost of the munitions and war implements which they fabricate, these outlays would shrink to very minor proportions in this proper perspective. But the cost to the war effort, in delay and blood and treasure, if decent and sufficient shelter were not provided for those who produce, would be great beyond calculation.

In view of the urgency of the need for more war housing now, I suggest that the proposed expansion receive the earliest consideration of the Congress.

NOTE: In the foregoing message to the Congress, the President urged the authorization of an additional $400,000,000 for war housing needs under the Lanham Act. The Lanham Act (54 Stat. 1125) had been signed by the President on October 14, 1940, and was the basis for the defense and wartime expenditure of close to $1,500,000,000 for the housing of workers engaged in essential war industries. The initial authorization under the Lanham Act had been for only $150,000,000; and by subsequent amendments, this had been raised to $1,200,000,000 at the time the President made the foregoing request. (See Item 59 and note, 1941 volume, and Item 56 and note, 1942 volume, for an account of previous amendments to the Lanham Act.)

In considering this additional authorization, the Congress heard testimony of officials of the War Department, the Navy Department, the Maritime Commission, the War Production Board, the War Manpower Commission, and the National Housing Agency. Local officials, labor, management, and building groups concerned with war housing also testified. The Congress recognized the need for
additional funds, but the legislation as finally enacted raised the authorization by $300,000,000 rather than the $400,000,000 which the President had requested. This was the final wartime amendment to the Lanham Act, and made the total authorization of $1,500,000,000 available under the Act. The President approved this amendment to the Lanham Act on July 7, 1943 (57 Stat. 387).

Defense housing under the Lanham Act had initially been carried on under the supervision of the Federal Works Agency. On February 24, 1942, it had been transferred to the National Housing Agency in the general unification of the housing agencies of the Government brought about by Executive Order No. 9070. (See Item 24 and note, 1942 volume, for an account of the establishment of the National Housing Agency and an account of the wartime accomplishments in the field of housing.)

50. Messages to Stalin and Chiang Kai-shek

50. The President Sends Personal Messages to Marshal Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. May 13, 1943

The message to Stalin:

Thank you for your message of congratulation on the performance of our forces in liberating Tunisia.

Now that we have the initiative, it is reasonable to expect further successes on both the Eastern and Western Fronts and further supplies, including air.

The message to Chiang Kai-shek:

For the Allied forces in the African theater of war, I should like to express appreciation of your message of congratulation on the complete destruction of the enemies of liberty in Africa.

We hope in the near future to take, together with your gallant Army, the initiative in Asia and bring to an end the war which you have for many years carried on successfully in spite of all difficulties.
51. Letter to Congress on Pending Tax Bills

51 Letter to the Congress on Pending Tax Bills. May 17, 1943

The revenue bills recently passed by the House and the Senate contain certain provisions putting taxpayers on a pay-as-you-go basis by means of collection at the source and current payment of the income tax. Needed relief is also given to millions of men and women in our armed forces.

I am eager, as I am sure the whole country is eager, to see our taxes put on a pay-as-you-go basis at the earliest possible moment. Ever since 1941 the Treasury has consistently recommended provisions designed to this end. Such provisions would help hold the line against inflation.

The Senate bill, however, provides for the cancellation of a whole year’s taxes. This cancellation would result in a highly inequitable distribution of the cost of the war and in an unjust and discriminatory enrichment of thousands of taxpayers in the upper income groups. Such groups would be enriched by the cancellation of taxes already owing by them. The Senate bill would give to a man with an income of $2,000 a year a cancellation of taxes equaling less than four weeks’ income after taxes; a man with an income of $100,000 would receive a cancellation equaling twenty months’ income after taxes. The latter would have canceled more than all war tax increases since 1939, and would thus escape financial contribution to the war effort.

The fact that the upper income groups may pay just as many dollars into the Treasury in 1943 on account of their liability for 1943 does not detract from their enrichment nor change the result that they would have permanently escaped tax on 1942 income.

A program of the proportions necessary to finance the war and to curb inflation must inevitably reach far down into the income scale. Tax rates for taxpayers in the upper income groups are already so high that substantial additional taxation cannot be imposed upon these groups. The effect of the remis-
sion of taxes contained in the Senate bill would therefore be a transfer of a substantial part of the cost of the war from the upper income to the middle and lower income groups upon whom tax increases must be chiefly imposed. Others, including those now on the battle fronts, would later be obliged to shoulder the burden from which our most fortunate taxpayers have been relieved.

The so-called anti-windfall provisions of the bill do not go to the heart of this basic inequity. Although they would reduce the total amount of forgiveness, the reduction would be made in an inequitable way. It would be made at the expense of people whose businesses have been dislocated by the war as much as it would be at the expense of those who have been enriched by war profits. It would also be at the expense of many people whose incomes have increased since 1940 not because of the war, but because they have just arrived at their greatest earning capacity. Those who have always had large incomes get the greatest windfall and they are untouched by the anti-windfall provisions of the Senate bill.

I am writing you now so that you may know my views and in the hope that a bill may be worked out in conference that I can sign. I have recommended pay-as-you-go taxation. I have not insisted upon any particular formula for transition to a pay-as-you-go basis. I believe that there should be substantial adjustments to ease this transition. But there are limits beyond which I cannot go. I cannot acquiesce in the elimination of a whole year's tax burden on the upper income groups during a war period when I must call for an increase in taxes and savings from the mass of our people.

NOTE: For two years, the Administration had recommended that income tax payments be placed on a current basis by withholding of taxes from wages and salaries, rather than continuing the system of making taxes payable on the income of the preceding year. But, as indicated in the foregoing letter, the President opposed full cancellation of one year's tax which might result from the transition. His reasons were that such cancellation would grant excessive relief to tax-
payers in a year of record national income, enrich thousands of taxpayers in the upper income groups, and superimpose the forgiven taxes upon the already existing inflationary pressures (see also Item 31, this volume).

The bill which was finally passed was the Current Tax Payment Act of 1943, approved by the President on June 9, 1943 (57 Stat. 126). The new Act contained three major features: It provided for withholding of income tax at the source on wages and salaries; it provided for filing of declarations and payment of estimated tax currently by those individual income taxpayers whose taxes would exceed the amounts withheld; and it provided for effecting a transition from the delayed system of income tax payments to the current payment system.

The method of transition, however, did not fully comply with the recommendation of the President embodied in the foregoing letter. In general, the Current Tax Payment Act of 1943 provided for canceling three-quarters of one year’s tax. Under this system, a disproportionate gain was accorded, as indicated in the President’s letter, to the upper income groups.

In addition, the Act granted members of the armed forces of the United States and other United Nations a $1,500 exemption from gross income for service pay received while in active service. The Act further provided that the estate of a deceased member of the armed forces who died while in active service was relieved from payment of income taxes of the deceased person which were unpaid at the time of his death. Certain other provisions of the Act served to lighten the tax liabilities of members of the armed services.

(For other Presidential statements regarding wartime taxation, see Items 36 and 113 and notes, 1941 volume; Items 4 and 91, 1942 volume; and Item 14 and note, 1944-1945 volume.)

52 A Letter to the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture. May 18, 1943

In your capacity as chairman of the United States delegation, and as temporary chairman of the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture, will you convey to the delegates assembled my heartfelt regret that I cannot be present in person to welcome them upon this historic occasion. Urgent matters in the prosecution of the war make it impossible for me to attend,
and until we have won the unconditional surrender of our enemies the achievement of victory must be pressed above all else.

Nevertheless, I hope that later I shall be able to meet the delegates and express to them personally my profound conviction of the importance of the task on which they are about to embark.

This is the first United Nations conference. Together, we are fighting a common enemy. Together, also, we are working to build a world in which men shall be free to live out their lives in peace, prosperity, and security.

The broad objectives for which we work have been stated in the Atlantic Charter, the Declaration of United Nations, and at the meeting of the 21 American Republics at Rio de Janeiro in January, 1942. It is the purpose of this Conference to consider how best to further these policies in so far as they concern the consumption, production, and distribution of food and other agricultural products in the postwar period.

We know that in the world for which we are fighting and working the four freedoms must be won for all men. We know, too, that each freedom is dependent upon the others; that freedom from fear, for example, cannot be secured without freedom from want. If we are to succeed, each Nation individually, and all Nations collectively, must undertake these responsibilities:

They must take all necessary steps to develop world food production so that it will be adequate to meet the essential nutritional needs of the world population. And they must see to it that no hindrances, whether of international trade, of transportation, or of internal distribution, be allowed to prevent any Nation or group of citizens within a Nation from obtaining the food necessary for health. Society must meet in full its obligation to make available to all its members at least the minimum adequate nutrition. The problems with which this Conference will concern itself are the most fundamental of all human problems—for without food and clothing life itself is impossible.

In this and other United Nations conferences we shall be
52. U.N. Conference on Food and Agriculture

extending our collaboration from war problems into important new fields. Only by working together can we learn to work together, and work together we must and will.

Hon. Marvin Jones,
United Nations Food Conference,
Hot Springs, Va.

NOTE: The United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture was called at the invitation of the President to consider the possibilities of action to achieve freedom from hunger throughout the world.

The Conference met at Hot Springs, Va., from May 18 to June 13, 1943. It was a milestone, not only because of the importance of the subject which the Nations of the world came together to consider, but also because it led to the establishment of the first of the several permanent special agencies of the United Nations—the Food and Agriculture Organization.

The Hot Springs Conference was attended by 163 delegates representing 44 Nations. The foregoing letter of the President was read to the Conference by Judge Marvin Jones, Assistant to the Director of Economic Stabilization and Judge of the United States Court of Claims, who served both as Chairman of the United States delegation and as President of the Conference.

Four central problems were considered by the Hot Springs Conference: consumption levels and requirements; means to expand production and adapt it to consumption needs; improvement of distribution; and recommendations for continuing and carrying forward the work of the Conference. Four technical sections were created, supported by committees, to investigate each of these problems.

In considering these problems, the Conference focused on both the short-term food emergency which would follow the liberation of many countries and the longer-range objectives to be achieved. It was agreed that the largest demands in war-devastated areas would at first be for cereals and other foods best adapted to maintain energy and alleviate hunger. After this, the conferees stated that the emphasis should be shifted to the production of foods containing first-class protein and other protective qualities necessary to good health.

The Conference recognized the interdependence of consumption and production problems, and the futility of producing more food unless men and Nations had the means to acquire it for consumption. It declared that freedom from want could not be achieved without
53. Eight Hundred and Ninety-ninth Press Conference

a world-wide balance and expansion of economic activity. This meant that national and international action was necessary to raise the general level of employment and purchasing power in all countries. Measures to eliminate excessive short-term fluctuations in food prices, production, and distribution were also discussed.

At a comparatively early stage of the Conference it was agreed that a permanent international organization in the field of food and agriculture should be established. Its functions should include acting as a center of information and advice on both agricultural and nutrition problems and maintaining a service of international statistics. As a step toward the creation of the permanent organization, the Hot Springs Conference resolved that an Interim Commission be set up in Washington, D. C., to consider a specific plan for permanent organization.

Prior to the adjournment of the Conference, the delegates were invited to Washington, where the President, on June 7, 1943, welcomed them. (See Item 57 and note, this volume, for the President’s address to the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture; see also Item 144 and note, 1944-1945 volume, for a further account of the work of the Food and Agriculture Organization.)

53 (The Eight Hundred and Ninety-ninth Press Conference—Joint Conference of the President and Prime Minister Churchill (Excerpts). May 25, 1943

(The President introduces Churchill—Churchill reviews the progress of the war—Daylight bombing—Churchill on Hitler, on Italy, Japan, and submarine warfare.)

THE PRESIDENT: We are awfully glad to have Mr. Churchill back here. I don’t have to tell him that. All he has to do is to read the papers, and look into the faces of any American. He is very welcome.

I don’t think we have very much to tell you, except that we are making exceedingly good progress, and considering the size of our problems—the global nature of the war—
these discussions have been done in practically record time.
   And so I am going to turn the meeting over to Mr. Churchill, and I think that he will be willing to answer almost—with stress on the almost—any question. *(Laughter)*

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, in Australia there is a very great fear as to the Japanese threat in that area. What is your feeling about the matter?

THE PRIME MINISTER: The threat is certainly, in our opinion, less serious than it was when I saw you last in this room—December 23, 1941.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, what can you tell us generally about the plans for the future, probably beginning with Europe?

THE PRIME MINISTER: A very expansive topic *(laughter)*, and one which leads very early to difficult country; but our plans for the future are to wage this war until unconditional surrender is procured from all those who have molested us, and this applies equally to Asia and to Europe. It used to apply, until quite recently, to Africa.

THE PRESIDENT: I think that word “molestation,” or “molesting” is one of the best examples of your habitual understatement that I know. *(Laughter)*

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, could you say anything about how well satisfied you are with the way things are going on the fighting fronts?

THE PRIME MINISTER: I am very much more satisfied than I was when I was here last. *(Laughter)* It was here that the President handed me the telegram of the surrender of Tobruk. And as I have mentioned to him, I don’t think there was any Englishman in the United States so unhappy, as I was that day, since Burgoyne surrendered at Saratoga. *(Laughter)*

   But the situation is very different now. The plans which were made then in June, and before June, and the movements of troops which were set in motion before June last, enabled us to alter the balance of the affairs in Africa entirely. And we opened our Alamein offensive on the twenty-
third of October. The United States and British descent upon North Africa began on the eighth of November, and since then we have already had a very great measure of success, culminating in decisive victory of proportions equal to any of the great victories that have been won: complete obliteration of the enemy.

And too, while this has been going on, our Russian ally, who in June last year was subject to the beginning of a very heavy and possibly deadly offensive by the Germans, and it seemed that they might well lose the Caucasus, has gained another series of successes, culminating in Stalingrad.

And Hitler has been struck with two immense blows, tremendous shattering blows: in Tunisia, and at Stalingrad. And from every point of view we must regard the last ten or eleven months as examples of highly successful war—a perfectly indisputable turning of the tide.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, on this question of Russia. After you spoke to Congress, Senator Albert B. Chandler of Kentucky issued a statement saying that while you had promised Great Britain would stay to fight Japan to the end, you could not promise Russia would. Of course, there are reasons for this, but do you care to say anything? In your opinion of Russia's self-interest, would it lead her to fight Japan after the European war?

The Prime Minister: Oh well, it's one of those oversights that I haven't been placed in the position to give directions to Russia, as he mentions. (Laughter)

And I have this feeling, that those people have been doing such a tremendous job facing this enormous mass—they have done what nobody else was in a position to do: torn a large part of the guts out of the German Army. And they have suffered very grievous losses. They are battling with, as I said to the Congress, 190 German divisions—not up to strength, of course—and 28 satellite divisions from the different countries that Hitler gathered around him in his attack on Russia. They are bearing all that weight, and I
certainly have not felt that I ought to suggest to my Government asking more of them.

But their strength may grow as time goes on. They must know that Japan has watched them with a purely opportunist eye. But it isn't for me to make any suggestions to them at all.

They have been grand Allies; and of course they have shown it in heroic fashion. They have struck blows that no one else could strike, and they have endured losses that no one power has ever been capable of enduring, and continuing an effective and even a growing factor in the field.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, what do you think of the dissolution of the Comintern?

THE PRIME MINISTER: Well, I like it—(laughter) I like it.

Q. To get back to Russia, sir, are you confident that the Russians will be able to hold out this year, as they have in past years?

THE PRIME MINISTER: I certainly think that they have a much better prospect of holding out this year than they had the previous time. Indeed, I must express my full confidence that they will hurl back any attack which is made upon them.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, in the light of developments since your speech to Congress, would you care to make any general statement concerning the experiment of bombing Germany into submission?

THE PRIME MINISTER: Well, I haven't had very much time to go on with the experiment since I spoke to Congress. (Laughter)

We have had the heaviest raid we have ever had, the raid on Dortmund, where 2,000 tons were cast down upon them with, I believe, highly satisfactory results.

And also, it has been an extremely good week for the United States Air Forces in the United Kingdom. They made, I think, four heavy daylight attacks, which are judged to be extremely successful. Precision bombing in the daylight, of course, in proportion to the weight of bombs dropped, produces a more decisive effect—more than the
night bombing, because it goes to more specific targets precise and accurate.

**THE PRESIDENT:** You know, I think that's something that hasn't been brought out, and that is that the night bombing over Europe carries more weight of explosives; but of course being night-time the precision of the actual bombing can't be so great as the day bombing, which carries less explosives but with more precision because it's daylight. On the whole, the combination of the two, day and night, is achieving a more and more satisfactory result.

**THE PRIME MINISTER:** It's like running a twenty-four-hour service. *(Laughter)* . . .

**Q.** Mr. Prime Minister, the last time you spoke to us you used a term that I have remembered, because you said that you were not going to rely on an internal collapse of Germany, rather would you rely on an external knockout, at that time. Well, since then you have worked on Germany and the occupied countries a good deal, and there are constantly recurring evidences that the German people may be getting close to "had enough." We still are working for this knockout, but have you any further light on that for us—on the internal collapse?

**THE PRIME MINISTER:** I stand pat on the knockout. *(Laughter)* But, of course, any windfall will be gratefully accepted. *(Laughter)*

**Q.** Mr. Prime Minister, some quarters interpret your remarks to Congress on bombing to mean that other methods, which you said should not be excluded, should be postponed until the termination of the experiment.

**THE PRIME MINISTER:** Oh, no. That would be a most distorted deduction to draw. I said there is no reason why the experiment should not be continued, provided other methods are not excluded—I mean other simultaneous methods, or current methods, are not excluded.

**Q.** Mr. Prime Minister, whenever you and the President confer, the rumor always goes around that you are about to pick an
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Allied commander in the European theater. Could you tell us whether you have done that?

THE PRIME MINISTER: Done what?

Q. Picked an Allied commander for the European theater?

THE PRIME MINISTER: Well, we have an Allied commander in the theater that is at present in force in Northwest Africa.

Q. I was thinking of the next one, sir? (Laughter)

THE PRIME MINISTER: No step of that kind has been taken at the present moment, because the great preparations that are going forward—

Q. (interposing) Mr. Prime Minister, back to Australia—

THE PRIME MINISTER: (continuing)—haven't got to the point where the executive commander has to be chosen.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, this may be an oversight, or you might not have been informed of this either, but I am curious to know what you think is going on in Hitler's mind now? (Laughter)

THE PRIME MINISTER: I have very little doubt that if he could have the past back he would probably play his hand a little differently. I think he would have hesitated long, before he rejected all the repeated peace efforts that were made by Great Britain, which even brought the name of our Government into disrepute, so far did we go on the path of trying to placate and appease.

But he then got out of the period where he was restoring his country to its place among the countries of Europe. He had achieved that, but that wasn't what he was after at all. Appetite unbridled, ambition unmeasured—all the world! There was no end to the appetite of this wicked man. I should say he repents now that he did not curb his passion before he brought such a great portion of the world against him and his country.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, do you think it's a sound assumption that he still has a mind? (Laughter)

THE PRIME MINISTER: I have no reason to suppose that he isn't in control of his faculties, and of the resources of his country.
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But, of course, I haven't the same facilities of acquainting myself with what is going on there, as I fortunately have on what is going on in the United States. (*Laughter*)

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, do you care to say anything about Mussolini, and Italy? Is there any hint or news that you can bring us on that?

The Prime Minister: You know as much as I do about that. I think they are a softer proposition than Germany but I wouldn't count on anything but the force of arms. It may be aided at any time by a change of heart on the part of the enemy's countries, a weakening of morale.

Nobody proposes to take the native soil of Italy away from the Italian people. They will have their life. They will have their life in the new Europe. They have sinned—erred—by allowing themselves to be led by the nose by a very elaborate tyranny which was imposed upon them so that it gripped every part of their life. The one-party totalitarian system, plus the secret police applied over a number of years is capable of completely obliterating the sense of personal liberty.

And thus they were led by intriguing leaders, who thought they had got the chance of five thousand years in aggrandizing themselves by the misfortunes of their neighbors who had not offended them in any way, into this terrible plight in which they find themselves.

I think they would be very well advised to dismiss those leaders, and throw themselves upon the justice of those they have so grievously offended. We should not stain our names before posterity by cruel and inhuman acts. We have our own reputation to consider. But after all it really is a matter for them to settle among themselves, and settle with their leaders.

All we can do is to apply those physical stimuli—(*laughter*) which in default of moral sanctions are sometimes capable of inducing a better state of mind in recalcitrant individuals and recalcitrant Nations. (*Laughter*)

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, there has been a lot of interest in the
experts from India you brought with you. Would you care to comment about the situation in India, or China?

THE PRIME MINISTER: Well, I am very anxious to increase the intensity of the war effort against Japan, and therefore brought these commanders in chief in order that they could meet with the United States officers, and particularly with those who have been serving with such effect in China, like General Chennault and General Stilwell, and the high officers here, because it is evident that the war in that theater must be prosecuted with the very greatest vigor, and on the best lines. And we have been talking a great deal about that, and thinking a great deal, and have arrived at conclusions which I believe are sound—are good.

When I saw you last, in December, 1941, or January, 1942, of course, this question of priority—which was first and which was second of the two great theaters and antagonists—assumed a much more sharp form than at the present time. Our resources have greatly expanded. If the war continues on both fronts the war will be waged with equal force as our resources grow. Instead of being consecutive our efforts will be concurrent, and that great degree of effort will be capable of being applied at the same time in both directions. They have been already applied.

The forces that we have are becoming very respectable in munitions, and in men trained to war of all kinds; but as I pointed out to Congress, the problem is one of application, and that problem of application is limited by distance, and the U-boat war, the amount of shipping, the character of the communications, the vast distances of the ocean. Our forces are growing and gathering their ambition, but to apply it is a matter of time, and it is exceedingly difficult to apply.

But we follow out this principle, that all soldiers must be engaged, and ships and airplanes must be engaged on the widest possible fronts, the broadest possible superficies, and maintain the fighting with the utmost intensity, because we are the stronger animal; we are the stronger combination;
we are shaking the life out of the enemy; and as we are able to continue, we will not give him a moment’s surcease.

This is particularly true of the air, where they are already beginning to fail to keep up at all to the necessary strength on the various fronts. Neither Japan nor Germany is able to maintain equality with Britain, the United States, and Russia on all fronts.

Still less are they able to do so in the field of production. Immense plurality—the superiority of production—is on our side. And although it takes a certain number of months after planes are made before they come into action—perhaps a good many months, having regard to all the distances to be covered, and to the large ground staffs that have to be transported—but in spite of that, at the end of certain periods, the great superiority in numbers of our manufacture and of our training is bound to have effect, which so far as the air war is concerned will be decisive.

Whether the deciding of the air war will entail a similar ending of the other forms of warfare has yet to be seen. But the air was the weapon with which these people chose to subjugate the world.

This was the weapon they struck at Pearl Harbor with. This was the weapon with which the Germans boasted they would terrorize all the countries of the world. And it is an example of poetic justice that this should be the weapon in which they should find themselves most outmatched and first outmatched in the ensuing struggle.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, have you anything to say about the submarine side of the situation?

THE PRIME MINISTER: I am very much encouraged by all that has happened there since the turn of the year. Really, it has been very encouraging. The output from the United States’ shipyards is prodigious and has fulfilled all hopes, hopes which, when the plans were first made and published, seemed to be excessive. But they have been made good. The movement of supplies across the ocean has been on an increasing scale. The
surplus of new building over sinkings over the last six months has been substantial, especially in the later months; and the killings of U-boats have improved and reached a very high pitch — never better than in the last month. . . . That is due, of course, to the decreasing numbers of U-boats, but it is also due to the improved methods, and some wonderful things that have been thought of on both sides of the Atlantic. And, of course, we interchange everything immediately. Anything we have we share and bring into action. A lot of clever people are thinking a lot about these things.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, there is a great deal more confidence in the Allied commanders in the field than there was a year ago. Would you care to comment on that?

THE PRIME MINISTER: Well, they have had a chance to come into action on reasonable terms. Indeed, on advantageous terms, because we struck with superior forces at the right spot. We — as your Confederate general [Nathan Bedford Forrest, a Cavalry commander in the Civil War] used to say, “We got there fustest with the mostest.” (Laughter)

Q. (aside) That’s right.

THE PRIME MINISTER: (continuing) And also, because our troops have — since I was here last — been equipped with all the best weapons. You have only got to turn the industry of the United States and Britain over from peace to war. It undoubtedly takes a couple of years or more to get it running, but when it does run it gives you a flow of weapons which certainly neither Germany nor Japan possibly can beat us.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, would you undertake to make a prediction on the progress of the war for the rest of this year? I have in mind this statement you and the President made at Casablanca, on new and heavier blows against all of the Axis members in 1943?

THE PRIME MINISTER: Well, I think that seems to be a very sound prediction, and couched in terms which are unexceptionable from the point of view of military security. (Laughter).

Q. Thank you very much, sir.
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THE PRIME MINISTER: Thank you very much.
(The newspapermen started to leave slowly, and the Prime
Minister climbed on his chair and gave the V for Victory
sign with his fingers.)

THE PRESIDENT: May I say one word, please? Don't get the idea
that our conferences are concluded. They are not. They are
continuing. (Laughter)

THE PRIME MINISTER: We have a lot of ground to cover.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

NOTE: After the successful com-
pletion of the Tunisian campaign
early in May, it again became
necessary for the American and
British heads of state and their
staffs to reach a complete meeting
of the minds on future plans. Prime
Minister Churchill and his entou-
rage arrived in Washington on May
11 for the two-week conference
which came to be known as the Tri-
dent Conference, one which Gen-
eral Marshall stated after the war
"may prove to be one of the most
historic conclaves of this war."

At the Trident Conference, the
target date for the invasion of
France (Operation OVERLORD) was
set at May 1, 1944. General Eisen-
hower was directed to move seven
of his seasoned divisions to the
United Kingdom after November
1, 1943, including four American
and three British divisions, despite
the fact that he would be conduct-
ing a campaign in Italy at the same
time. It was agreed to move from
three to five divisions of American
troops from the United States to
the United Kingdom every month
in a steady stream for the build-up.

A good deal of the Conference
was devoted to mapping more defi-
nite details of the air offensive
against Germany. Air attacks by the
American Eighth Air Force and the
R.A.F. were ordered stepped up to
reach a peak on April 1, 1944, in
order to sweep German fighter
planes from the skies and soften up
targets for the invading forces. It
was decided to hit at German oil
resources in the great Ploesti oil
fields; such an attack was carried
out on August 1, 1943, by 178 B-24
heavy bombers. The American
losses in bombers were severe, but
the raid and subsequent ones struck
a telling blow at Germany's ability
to wage mechanized warfare.

The Trident Conference also
stressed the campaign against
Japan, both from the Chinese main-
land and from the sea approaches
to the south and to the east. It was
decided to build up the flow of ma-
tériel to China by the air route
over the "hump," and to extend
further aid to China through land
and air operations. Admiral Nimitz
and General MacArthur in the Pa-
cific were directed to clean the Japa-
nese out of the Aleutians, and proceed against the Marshall Islands, some of the Carolines, the rest of the Solomons and New Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago. The United States submarine campaign and the thrusts by aircraft carrier task forces against Japanese lines of communication were ordered to be intensified.

Plans were laid at the Conference to have the British launch an operation against the Azores Islands, to provide bases for the anti-U-boat campaign in the Atlantic, and to provide a new air base for the ferrying of bombers and transport planes at an immense saving of ships, aircraft, lives, and an estimated one hundred million gallons of high octane gas yearly through shortening of the route. As it turned out, successful diplomatic negotiations with Portugal fortunately made it unnecessary to carry out this operation.

Finally, the Conference directed General Eisenhower to push his campaign in the Mediterranean area until Italy would be forced to withdraw from the war.

(See Items 91 and 92, this volume, for accounts of the Quadrant Conference in Quebec during August 1943. For other joint Roosevelt-Churchill press conferences, see Item 141, 1941 volume; Items 6 and 92, this volume; and Item 70, 1944-1945 volume.)

54 《The President Telegraphs Union Leaders Directing Them to End the Rubber Strike in Akron. May 26, 1943

The National War Labor Board has reported to me concerning the serious strikes existing in several rubber plants in Akron, Ohio. From the point of view of the Nation these strikes are inexcusable and must therefore be accepted by the country and by your Government for what they basically are: namely, a defiance of the War Labor Board, a challenge to Government by law, and a blow against the effective prosecution of the war. Further, these strikes constitute a flagrant violation of the no-strike pledge. They must not be permitted to continue any longer. In the midst of a war calling for the supreme sacrifice of many in the ranks of our armed forces, it is shocking to the Nation to discover that any group within our citizenry would impede, for a single
moment, the production of the materials of war needed for our war effort. Economic sacrifices, whether real or not, do not justify the strike action taken by the members of your union. The War Labor Board has already called your attention to the fact that orderly procedures exist for a review of your grievances, but those procedures cannot be made available to you in the face of a strike against the security of this Nation. As I have stated before, the decisions of the War Labor Board are binding upon all employers and all employees, and a defiance of the Board cannot be permitted. Therefore, as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, I direct all picketing to cease and all employees now out on strike at the rubber plants to return to work at once. If this strike is not ended by 12 o'clock noon, Thursday, May 27, 1943, your Government will take the necessary steps to protect the interests of the Nation, the legal rights and properties of the companies involved, and the rights of the patriotic workers who desire to work. I hereby request and delegate you to notify the members of your Union accordingly and make clear that each and every one of them now out on strike should consider that this telegram is also addressed to the individual striker.

NOTE: The following letter to the President from Wayne L. Morse, public member, National War Labor Board, sets forth the background of the strikes at the rubber companies in Akron, Ohio:

"The National War Labor Board by unanimous vote has instructed me to transmit to you the facts and circumstances surrounding the existing strikes at the plants of three of the large rubber companies in Akron, Ohio.

"The situation may be summarized as follows:

"1. Approximately 48,000 workers are out on strike in protest of a decision of the National War Labor Board which granted a general wage increase of less amount than the workers believed they should have received. The strike has been in progress since May 22.

"2. As soon as the strike was called, the National War Labor Board and other vitally interested Government agencies and departments, such as the Army, Navy, Army Air Forces, and the War Production Board, called upon the strikers to return to work in conformance with the no-strike policy. However, all attempts to get the strikers back to work have failed.

"3. The strike has not been authorized by the International Officers of the United Rubber Workers of America, C.I.O. In fact, Mr. Sherman H. Dalrymple, International President of the Union, has disclaimed the strike and directed the strikers to return to work. Other union officials have made clear to the War Labor Board that they too deplore the strike. The Executive Board of the International Union has
issued a statement condemning the strike and directing that the men return to work.

"4. As this letter is being written, telephonic reports from Akron continue to come in to the effect that it is probable that within the next few hours one or more of the local unions out on strike will return to work. However, the serious damage which this strike is causing to the production of vitally needed war materials is so great that the War Labor Board believes that it cannot justify any further delay in asking you to intervene in the case. The War and Navy Departments have submitted sufficient information to the Board as to the effects of this strike on the war effort to convince us that its continuation cannot be countenanced by this Government.

"5. Irrespective of the workers' disappointment and dissatisfaction with the decision of the War Labor Board, the fact remains that they are striking against the Board and, thereby, against their Government, simply because they do not like a decision which was reached as a result of the operation of the orderly and judicial procedures provided for in Executive Order 9017. It is to be noted that prior to the general three-cent wage increase granted by the War Labor Board's decision, the straight time hourly earnings of these workers averaged $1.15 to $1.20, and if overtime is included, it is close to $1.30. These wages are above the average of wage rates in the Akron area. It is the view of the War Labor Board that these workers have received exceedingly fair treatment and that, therefore, the country has the right to expect them to proceed without further delay with the production of materials of war.

"6. These workers know that the orderly procedures of the National War Labor Board provide for petitions for review and appeal in those cases in which either party believes that the Board has committed error. However, the Board has made clear to these workers as it has in all similar cases in the past, that it will not give further judicial consideration to their claims unless and until they are back at work. "Therefore, in the interest of our national security, the War Labor Board by unanimous vote submits this case to you for such action as you deem appropriate."

The Akron factories manufactured such items as barrage balloons, self-sealing gasoline tanks, life belts, airplane de-icers, tank treads, gas masks, anti-aircraft guns, and machine-gun clips, as well as all types of combat and civilian tires. The main plants affected were those of B. F. Goodrich Company, Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, and Firestone Tire and Rubber Company.

The workers were striking against a decision of the National War Labor Board which had granted a wage increase of three cents an hour, cutting down a recommendation by a panel of the National War Labor Board which had recommended an eight-cent-an-hour increase.

Following the dispatch of the President's telegram, the Akron strikers began to drift back to work. By the start of the shift which commenced two hours after the deadline set in the President's telegram — 12 noon, May 27 — the workers had returned to their jobs.

(See Item 6 and note, 1942 volume, for an account of the establishment and functions of the National War Labor Board.)
55. *New Committee on Fair Employment Practice*

55. A New Committee on Fair Employment Practice Is Established. Executive Order No. 9346. May 27, 1943

In order to establish a new Committee on Fair Employment Practice, to promote the fullest utilization of all available manpower, and to eliminate discriminatory employment practices, Executive Order No. 8802 of June 25, 1941, as amended by Executive Order No. 8823 of July 18, 1941, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"Whereas the successful prosecution of the war demands the maximum employment of all available workers regardless of race, creed, color, or national origin; and

"Whereas it is the policy of the United States to encourage full participation in the war effort by all persons in the United States regardless of race, creed, color, or national origin, in the firm belief that the democratic way of life within the Nation can be defended successfully only with the help and support of all groups within its borders; and

"Whereas there is evidence that available and needed workers have been barred from employment in industries engaged in war production solely by reason of their race, creed, color, or national origin, to the detriment of the prosecution of the war, the workers' morale, and national unity:

"Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes, and as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, I do hereby reaffirm the policy of the United States that there shall be no discrimination in the employment of any person in war industries or in Government by reason of race, creed, color, or national origin, and I do hereby declare that it is the duty of all employers, including the several Federal departments and agencies, and all labor organizations, in furtherance of this policy and of this Order, to eliminate discrimination in regard to hire,
tenure, terms or conditions of employment, or union membership because of race, creed, color, or national origin.

"It is hereby ordered as follows:

"1. All contracting agencies of the Government of the United States shall include in all contracts hereafter negotiated or renegotiated by them a provision obligating the contractor not to discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because of race, creed, color, or national origin and requiring him to include a similar provision in all subcontracts.

"2. All departments and agencies of the Government of the United States concerned with vocational and training programs for war production shall take all measures appropriate to assure that such programs are administered without discrimination because of race, creed, color, or national origin.

"3. There is hereby established in the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President a Committee on Fair Employment Practice, hereinafter referred to as the Committee, which shall consist of a Chairman and not more than six other members to be appointed by the President. The Chairman shall receive such salary as shall be fixed by the President not exceeding $10,000 per year. The other members of the Committee shall receive necessary traveling expenses and, unless their compensation is otherwise prescribed by the President, a per diem allowance not exceeding $25 per day and subsistence expenses on such days as they are actually engaged in the performance of duties pursuant to this Order.

"4. The committee shall formulate policies to achieve the purposes of this Order and shall make recommendations to the various Federal departments and agencies and to the President which it deems necessary and proper to make effective the provisions of this Order. The Committee shall also recommend to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission appropriate measures for bringing about the full utilization and training of manpower in and for war production without discrimination because of race, creed, color, or national origin.

"5. The Committee shall receive and investigate complaints
of discrimination forbidden by this Order. It may conduct hearings, make findings of fact, and take appropriate steps to obtain elimination of such discrimination.

“6. Upon the appointment of the Committee and the designation of its Chairman, the Fair Employment Practice Committee established by Executive Order No. 8802 of June 25, 1941, hereinafter referred to as the old Committee, shall cease to exist. All records and property of the old Committee and such unexpended balances of allocations or other funds available for its use as the Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall determine shall be transferred to the Committee. The Committee shall assume jurisdiction over all complaints and matters pending before the old Committee and shall conduct such investigations and hearings as may be necessary in the performance of its duties under this Order.

“7. Within the limits of the funds which may be made available for that purpose, the Chairman shall appoint and fix the compensation of such personnel and make provision for such supplies, facilities, and services as may be necessary to carry out this Order. The Committee may utilize the services and facilities of other Federal departments and agencies and such voluntary and uncompensated services as may from time to time be needed. The Committee may accept the services of State and local authorities and officials, and may perform the functions and duties and exercise the powers conferred upon it by this Order through such officials and agencies and in such manner as it may determine.

“8. The Committee shall have the power to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be appropriate or necessary to carry out the provisions of this Order.

“9. The provisions of any other pertinent Executive Order inconsistent with this Order are hereby superseded.”

NOTE: The Committee on Fair Employment Practice was established by Executive Order No. 8802 on June 25, 1941 (see Item 58 and note, 1941 volume). Its objective was to prevent discrimination in employment on account of race, color, creed, or national origin. Originally, the Committee was placed in the Labor Division of the
Office of Production Management and the War Production Board; on July 30, 1942, it was placed under the War Manpower Commission.

The foregoing Executive Order established the Committee as an independent unit in the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President. In addition to the added prestige which came from its independence, the Committee was given additional powers to enable it to operate more effectively. For example, it was given specific power to conduct hearings, make findings of fact, receive and investigate complaints of discrimination, and to take appropriate steps to obtain elimination of such discrimination.

Eighty percent of the complaints handled by the F.E.P.C. involved allegations of discrimination against Negroes. During the depression, Negro industrial employment had declined and a high percentage of Negroes were on relief rolls during the 1930's. Between April, 1940, and April, 1944, Negro civilian employment increased by one million persons. Not a small part of the credit for this increase is due to the F.E.P.C., as well as to an enlightened recognition by employers that they could not get the job of war production done if they excluded such a large supply of workers from participation in the war effort.

While it was estimated that in 1940 Negroes comprised only 2½ to 3 percent of all workers in war production, by November, 1944, war industries reporting to the War Manpower Commission reported that 8.3 percent of the workers in war industries were non-white. (About 96 percent of non-whites are Negroes.) In addition to the rise in total number of Negroes, the number of Negroes working as skilled craftsmen, foremen, and semi-skilled workers increased from half a million to one million during this four-year period.

Figures showing employment of Negroes in Government service also indicated the success of the F.E.P.C., aided by the Civil Service Commission. Gains were registered not only in total percentage of Negroes, but also in their higher classifications. No longer were Negroes confined to custodial jobs; they were able to obtain a larger percentage of clerical, administrative, fiscal, and professional positions.

The remainder of the complaints involving minority groups which the F.E.P.C. handled concerned Mexican-Americans in the Southwest, aliens (see also Item 2, 1942 volume) and recently naturalized citizens, Jews and other religious minorities, and Japanese-Americans. Many of the cases involving Japanese-Americans were handled in cooperation with the War Relocation Authority. (See Item 37 and note, 1942 volume, for discussion of the work of the War Relocation Authority.)

During the five years of its operation, the F.E.P.C. settled nearly 5,000 cases by amicable negotiation.
Many strikes caused by racial differences were also settled with its assistance. Discouraged by the shortage in the labor market, the announcement of a firm national policy against discrimination, and the direct intervention of the F.E.P.C., discriminatory employment practices were greatly reduced. Nevertheless, old prejudices could not be uprooted overnight, and in a great many cases resistance and defiance were met at every turn. Two cases, after the F.E.P.C.'s efforts had failed, were referred to the President. The fact that only two cases were thus referred is a tribute to the conscientious persistence of the F.E.P.C. in carrying out the national policy.

There were fifteen regional and subregional offices located in major industrial centers, which performed the bulk of the Committee's work. Informal negotiations, community educational efforts, public hearings, court decisions, continued enunciation of the national policy, and repeated intervention by the F.E.P.C. — all played their part in reducing discriminatory employment practices.

By Executive Order No. 9664, issued December 18, 1945, President Truman authorized the continuance of the Fair Employment Practice Committee during the re-conversion period. Work of the Committee continued until the end of the fiscal year; and it was terminated on June 30, 1946.

The accomplishments of the F.E.P.C. during the war are underlined by the developments since V-J Day. A number of States have enacted laws establishing "little F.E.P.C.'s." Many of the employment gains secured by minority groups under the Fair Employment Practice Committee have been retained, in spite of the revival of discriminatory practices in some industries and localities.
56. Office of War Mobilization

1. There is established in the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President an Office of War Mobilization which shall be under the direction of a Director of War Mobilization (hereinafter referred to as Director), to be appointed by the President.

2. There is established in the Office of War Mobilization the War Mobilization Committee (hereinafter referred to as the Committee), of which the Director shall be the Chairman and with which he shall advise and consult. The Committee shall consist, in addition to the Director, of the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chairman of the Munitions Assignments Board, the Chairman of the War Production Board, and the Director of Economic Stabilization. The Chairman shall request the heads of other agencies or departments to participate in the deliberations of the Committee whenever matters specially affecting such agencies or departments are under consideration. It shall be the duty of the heads of the agencies and departments to supply necessary data to the Director and the Committee.

3. It shall be the function of the Office of War Mobilization, acting in consultation with the Committee and subject to the direction and control of the President,

(a) To develop unified programs and to establish policies for the maximum use of the Nation's natural and industrial resources for military and civilian needs, for the effective use of the national manpower not in the armed forces, for the maintenance and stabilization of the civilian economy, and for the adjustment of such economy to war needs and conditions;

(b) To unify the activities of Federal agencies and departments engaged in or concerned with production, procurement, distribution, or transportation of military or civilian supplies, materials, and products and to resolve and determine controversies between such agencies or departments, except those to be resolved by the Director of Economic Stabilization under Section 3, Title IV, of Executive Order 9250; and

(c) To issue such directives on policy or operations to the Federal agencies and departments as may be necessary to carry
out the programs developed, the policies established, and the
decisions made under this Order. It shall be the duty of all
such agencies and departments to execute these directives, and
to make to the Office of War Mobilization such progress re-
ports as may be required.

4. The Office of War Mobilization may perform the functions,
exercise the powers, authority, and discretion conferred on it by
this Order through such officials and such agencies, and in such
manner, as the Director, subject to the provisions of this Order,
may determine. The Director shall receive such compensation as
the President shall provide; and within the limits of funds which
may be made available, may employ necessary personnel and
make provision for supplies, facilities, and services necessary to
discharge his responsibilities.

All prior Executive Orders insofar as they are in conflict here-
with are amended accordingly.

NOTE: Teamwork and speed are
essential in modern war — whether
on the battlefield, in the factory,
on the farm, or in governmental
administration. The creation of the
Office of War Mobilization was
prompted by a desire to bring
greater unity and speed into the
work of the war agencies.

By establishing the Office of Eco-
nomic Stabilization on October 3,
1942 (see Item 97 and note, 1942
volume), the President had pro-
vided a coordinating authority over
prices and wages. But there re-
mained many areas of administra-
tion and governmental functions
not included in the operations of
the Office of Economic Stabiliza-
tion. There continued to exist a
diffusion of energies, and some-
times confusion and interagency

conflicts in civilian war administra-
tion. The problem was to preserve
the necessary balance among pro-
duction, procurement, transporta-
tion, and distribution of military
and civilian supplies, materials, and
products, and at the same time to
continue the stabilization of the
national economy and achieve the
most effective use of the Nation's
manpower and natural and indus-
trial resources.

The excess of demand over the
supply of the resources of the Na-
tion aggravated the conflicts be-
tween agencies and interests. The
War Production Board (see Item 9
and note, 1942 volume) had been
given authority in determining the
distribution of these resources, but
there was need for an agency di-
rectly at the Presidential level with
power to cover the entire field and to enforce its decisions in a way that W.P.B. did not do.

There was another compelling reason for the establishment of an agency at this level. The President was occupied with far-reaching problems of military and naval strategy and was engaged in the handling of relations with our allies not only in terms of the present but also with an eye to the future. He needed additional help in order to give to home-front problems the attention which they required. His particular need was for an official at the White House level who could solve interagency difficulties as a personal representative of the President, and who had authority, when necessary, to crack quarreling heads together.

For a considerable time, the Congress, through several committees — particularly the "Truman Committee" (Senate Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program) and the "Tolan Committee" (House Committee Investigating National Defense Migration) — had urged the creation of a strong top-level war mobilization agency. Public interest and pressure for the creation of such an agency were increased in late 1942 and early 1943 by a number of overpublicized interagency disputes.

As a result, Senators Kilgore and Pepper and Representative Tolan introduced companion bills in the Senate and House to create an Office of War Mobilization. The sub-committee on war mobilization of the Senate Military Affairs Committee joined in the drive for this legislation. Most of these Congressional proposals, however, envisaged one super-agency which would incorporate all existing war agencies. But the President believed that such an agency would not only not solve the problem but merely impose another top-heavy administrative structure at the apex of the Government. Further, he felt that the legislative proposals would create an organization which would be less flexible and less responsive to immediate executive needs. Therefore, the President issued the foregoing Executive Order establishing the new agency in line with his own views. The action received public and Congressional approval.

The President appointed James F. Byrnes, up to that time Economic Stabilization Director, as the Director of the Office of War Mobilization. The new Office relieved the President of many burdensome details. By maintaining only a small staff and declining to assume operating functions, it maintained an objective approach toward agency points of view. Such impartiality and freedom from operating detail was a necessary element in the success of the O.W.M. The small size of the new agency also enhanced its prestige.

The War Mobilization Committee, established by the foregoing Executive Order, held frequent meetings in the early period of the
O.W.M. At the time he issued the Executive Order the President stated: "In addition to its regular meetings, the Committee will meet from time to time with me in the Cabinet Room." The President presided over some of the early meetings of the War Mobilization Committee. The Committee not only provided a useful means for developing unified policies and integrated programs but also served as an instrument to effectuate speedy execution of O.W.M. decisions. Its functions were advisory in nature.

One of the early achievements of the O.W.M. was a general coordination of the war procurement program then being undertaken by a number of Federal agencies. In response to direct requests from the O.W.M., procurement review boards were established in June and July of 1943 in the War Department, Navy Department, Maritime Commission, and Office of Lend-Lease Administration, with the O.W.M. represented on each of these boards. A further step in the coordination of procurement occurred on September 24, 1943, when the President established the Joint Production Survey Committee within the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This Committee was designed to establish close working relationships between the O.W.M. and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The President directed the Joint Production Survey Committee to advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning problems raised by the O.W.M. which related to the military production program and to cooperate with the O.W.M. to promote economies in matériel and manpower.

The coordinating authority of the O.W.M. was expanded in July, 1943, with the creation of the Office of Economic Warfare. Executive Order No. 9361 provided that "the functions of the Office of War Mobilization shall include the authority to arrange for the unification and coordination of the activities of the Federal Government relating to foreign supply, foreign procurement, and other foreign economic affairs in conformity with the foreign policy of the United States as defined by the Secretary of State." (See Item 77 and note, this volume.) Although the major burden of the O.W.M.'s responsibilities concerned the home front, it was obviously impracticable to draw a sharp line between domestic and international activities, particularly in the economic sphere. For this reason, the O.W.M. assumed jurisdiction over many foreign economic issues.

Even before the invasion of France, the O.W.M. began to plan for demobilization and the necessary postwar adjustments in the economy. At the suggestion of the President (see Item 113 and note, 1944-1945 volume) it established an "Advisory Unit for War and Post-War Adjustment Policies" composed of Bernard M. Baruch and John M. Hancock, which, among
other things, made recommendations for policies in terminating war contracts. During the war over 350,000 contracts had been made between the Government and about 40,000 prime contractors, with many thousands of additional contracts between the prime contractors and their subcontractors. In order to free working capital for reconversion and postwar uses, to terminate these war contracts speedily when the war was ended, and to secure a unified policy among the various Government agencies in respect to these objectives, the Director of War Mobilization established a Joint Contract Termination Board on November 12, 1943, headed by John M. Hancock. This Board, at first a sub-unit under Messrs. Baruch and Hancock, was later succeeded by the Office of Contract Settlement, following the passage of the Contract Settlement Act of 1944. The policies and program of the Joint Contract Termination Board served as useful guides to the Office of Contract Settlement.

In February, 1944, the Baruch-Hancock unit published its "Report on War and Post-War Adjustment Policies," dealing with surplus property disposal, means of curtailing war production and resuming civilian production, the disposition of wartime controls, the human side of demobilization, and the termination of war contracts mentioned above. This report proved of great practical significance in shaping reconversion legislation. It was another of the monumental contributions to the solution of war and postwar problems which were made by Mr. Baruch.

Two other subsidiary agencies, when created, were placed under the direction of the O.W.M. On February 19, 1944, the President by Executive Order No. 9425 established the Surplus War Property Administration (see Item 13 and note, 1944-1945 volume); and on February 24, 1944, the President by Executive Order No. 9427 established the Retraining and Reemployment Administration under the O.W.M. (see Item 16 and note, 1944-1945 volume).

In addition to furnishing the President with a chief of staff for the home front, the O.W.M. made substantial progress in synchronizing production and procurement with military strategy, and balancing the various objectives of war production. It also reconciled some of the overlapping responsibilities between production and manpower agencies, and, in general, succeeded in achieving greater speed and teamwork in wartime administration.

In the spring and summer of 1944, the Congress considered numerous plans for the creation of a new executive agency to deal with problems of reconversion. It passed, and on October 3, 1944, the President signed, the War Mobilization and Reconversion Act of 1944 (58 Stat. 785), which created the Office
of War Mobilization and Reconversion. Upon the passage of this Act, the President by Executive Order No. 9488 immediately transferred the staff of the Office of War Mobilization to the new agency (see Item 81 and note, 1944-1945 volume, for an account of the background, development, and functions of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion). In effect, the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion was merely a continuation of the Office of War Mobilization with enlarged functions. This fact in itself represented a high Congressional tribute to the success of O.W.M.

57 "Freedom from Want and Freedom from Fear Go Hand in Hand"—Address to the Delegates of the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture. June 7, 1943

It gives me great pleasure to welcome to the White House you who have served so splendidly at the epoch-making United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture.

I use that word "epoch-making" advisedly. The Conference could not have failed to be significant, because it was the first United Nations Conference; but it has succeeded even beyond our hopes. It is truly epoch-making because, in reaching unanimity upon complex and difficult problems, you have demonstrated beyond question that the United Nations really are united—not only for the prosecution of the war, but for the solution of the many and difficult problems of peace. This Conference has been a living demonstration of the methods by which the conversations of Nations of like mind, contemplated by Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement, can and will give practical application to the principles of the Atlantic Charter.

You have been dealing with agriculture, the most basic of all human activities; and with food, the most basic of all human needs. Twice as many people are employed in work on food and agriculture as in work in all the other fields of human activity
put together. And all people have, in the literal sense of the word, a vital interest in food.

That a child or an adult should get the nourishment necessary for full health is too important a thing to be left to mere chance.

You have recognized that society must accept this responsibility. As you stated in your declaration, “The primary responsibility lies with each Nation for seeing that its own people have the food needed for health and life; steps to this end are for national determination. But each Nation can fully achieve its goal only if all work together.” And on behalf of the United States I gladly accept this declaration.

You have gone beyond the general recognition of principles, to deal in specific terms with specific tasks and specific projects. You have examined the needs of all countries for food and other agricultural products, both as they will exist, or rather, to put it this way, as they will exist in the short-run period of recovery from the devastation of war — the few years when the fighting stops — and as they will exist over the longer run, when our efforts can be fully devoted to expanding the production of food, so that it will be adequate for health the world over, and all through the years to come.

You have surveyed with courage and with realism the magnitude of these problems, and you have reached unanimous agreement that they can, and must — and will — be solved.

It is true that no Nation has ever had enough food to feed all of the people as we now know that human beings should be fed. But neither have Nations representing over 80 percent of the world’s two billion inhabitants ever before been joined together to achieve such an aim. Never before have they set out to bend their united efforts to the development of the world’s resources so that all men might seek to attain the food they need.

For the short run, you have pointed out steps that have to be taken, both in increasing supplies and in maintaining the economy of use and coordination of distribution.

In considering our long-range problems, you have surveyed
our knowledge of the inadequacy in the quantity and the quality of the diet of peoples in all lands. You have pooled our knowledge of the means of expanding our output, of increasing our agricultural efficiency in every Nation, and of adjusting agricultural production to consumption needs. In the fields of both production and consumption you have recognized the need for the better utilization of the knowledge we now have, and for extending still further the boundaries of our knowledge through education and research.

You have called upon your Governments individually and collectively to enlarge and improve their activities in these fields.

For the perfection and the rapid execution of these plans, you have recommended the creation of a permanent United Nations organization, and for that I specially thank you. To facilitate and hasten the creation of that organization, and to carry on the work that you have begun until it is permanently set on its feet, you have established an Interim Commission. The Government of the United States is honored that you have asked that the Interim Commission have its seat in Washington, and will be glad to take the preliminary action for the establishment of that Commission which you have entrusted to it.

Finally, you have expressed your deep conviction that our goal in this field cannot be attained without forward action in other fields as well. Increased food production must be accompanied by increased industrial production, and by increased purchasing power. There must be measures for dealing with trade barriers, international exchange stability, and international investment. The better use of natural and human resources must be assured to improve the living standard; and, may I add, the better use of these resources without exploitation on the part of any Nation. Many of these questions lie outside of the scope of the work that you have undertaken, but their solution is none the less essential to its success. They require, and I think they shall receive, our united attention.

In the political field, these relationships are equally important. And they work both ways. A sound world agricultural program
57. Address to U.N. Conference on Food and Agriculture

will depend upon world political security, while that security will in turn be greatly strengthened if each country can be assured of the food it needs. Freedom from want and freedom from fear go hand in hand.

And so I think that our ultimate objective can be simply stated: It is to build for ourselves, meaning for all men everywhere, a world in which each individual human being shall have the opportunity to live out his life in peace; to work productively, earning at least enough for his actual needs and those of his family; to associate with the friends of his choice; to think and worship freely; and to die secure in the knowledge that his children, and their children, shall have the same opportunities.

That objective, as men know from long and bitter experience, will not be easy to achieve. But you and I know, also, that throughout history there has been no more worth-while, no more inspiring challenge.

That challenge will be met.

You have demonstrated beyond question that free peoples all over the world can agree upon a common course of action, and upon common machinery for action. You have brought new hope to the world that, through the establishment of orderly international procedures for the solution of international problems, there will be attained freedom from want and freedom from fear. The United Nations are united in the war against fear and want, as solidly and effectively as they are united on the battle front in this world war against aggression.

And we are winning that war by action and by unity.

NOTE: The United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture had assembled at Hot Springs, Virginia, on May 18, 1943 (see Item 52 and note, this volume, for the President's letter of greeting to the Conference, and an account of the deliberations of the Conference). Several days before the final adjournment of the Hot Springs Conference, the delegates were invited to the White House where they were welcomed by the President. The foregoing address to the Conference was delivered in the East Room of the White House. The delegates then reassembled at Hot Springs, and the Conference adjourned on June 13, 1943.

Among other actions, the Con-
58. Warning to Axis Against Use of Poison Gas

ference resolved to establish an Interim Commission which would lay the framework for a permanent organization in the field of food and agriculture, including forestry and fisheries. This Interim Commission convened in Washington, D. C., on July 15, 1943. It submitted its report in August, 1944.

The Interim Commission weighed the arguments against deferring the establishment of a permanent organization until after the war—such as the shortage of qualified personnel and the preoccupation of the Nations with measures directly related to the winning of the war. Nevertheless, it recognized that unless the permanent organization were actually in existence as soon as the war stopped, many pressing problems of nutrition, food, and agriculture would have to be met without the benefit of concerted international efforts. Accordingly, the Interim Commission recommended that the permanent Food and Agriculture Organization be established as soon as possible.

The Interim Commission also formulated and recommended a constitution for the new Food and Agriculture Organization, setting forth its functions and purposes. In a message to the Congress on March 26, 1945, the President transmitted the First Report of the Interim Commission, along with the proposed constitution, and recommended that the Congress authorize the acceptance of the constitution and the participation of the United States in the work of the Food and Agriculture Organization. (See Item 144 and note, 1944-1945 volume, for the President's message and an account of the establishment of the Food and Agriculture Organization.)

58 (The Axis Is Warned Against the Use of Poison Gas. June 8, 1943)

From time to time since the present war began there have been reports that one or more of the Axis powers were seriously contemplating use of poisonous or noxious gases or other inhumane devices of warfare.

I have been loath to believe that any Nation, even our present enemies, could or would be willing to loose upon mankind such terrible and inhumane weapons. However, evidence that the Axis powers are making significant preparations indicative of such an intention is being reported with increasing frequency from a variety of sources.
58. Warning to Axis Against Use of Poison Gas

Use of such weapons has been outlawed by the general opinion of civilized mankind. This country has not used them, and I hope that we never will be compelled to use them. I state categorically that we shall under no circumstances resort to the use of such weapons unless they are first used by our enemies.

As President of the United States and as Commander in Chief of the American armed forces, I want to make clear beyond all doubt to any of our enemies contemplating a resort to such desperate and barbarous methods that acts of this nature committed against any one of the United Nations will be regarded as having been committed against the United States itself and will be treated accordingly. We promise to any perpetrators of such crimes full and swift retaliation in kind and I feel obliged now to warn the Axis armies and the Axis peoples, in Europe and in Asia, that the terrible consequences of any use of these inhumane methods on their part will be brought down swiftly and surely upon their own heads. Any use of gas by any Axis power, therefore, will immediately be followed by the fullest possible retaliation upon munition centers, seaports, and other military objectives throughout the whole extent of the territory of such Axis country.

NOTE: The Chemical Warfare Service of the United States Army had manufactured and stored sufficient poison gas for retaliatory use in the event Axis powers should resort to this form of warfare. Captured documents and interrogation of enemy prisoners of war indicate that Hitler himself prohibited the use of poison gas by the Nazis because of his fear of the retaliation which the President indicated in the foregoing statement. As the United Nations gained air superiority, of course such retaliation would have been swift and thorough. (See also Item 60, 1942 volume, on the question of the use of poison gas by the Japanese.)
May I take this opportunity to say what I have had in my heart for a long time. We are very happy to have President Morinigo here, because we have great reasons to be grateful to Paraguay for the magnificent stand they have taken and for the solidarity of their armies.

I shall never forget, not so long ago — it seems many years — at the conference in Rio de Janeiro, we needed positive action. We had all agreed on the one subject — on that action for solidarity: breaking off relations with the Axis powers.

At that time at that meeting, the Foreign Ministers of Paraguay, acting on instructions from their President, stepped forward at just the right moment and the right timing, and pledged Paraguay in this great effort of all the Americas — the thought of the hemisphere — that we should break off relations with the brigands of modern civilization.

Paraguay acted in accordance with an old slogan of mine, "Do not only the right thing, but do it at the right time," and thereby gave heart to all of our sister Republics. From that time on we have had closer dealings with Paraguay than ever before in our history.

I do not have to speak, outside of this room perhaps, about the great bravery, the plain, the sheer bravery of the armies of Paraguay. Throughout all these years — many, many years, more than centuries — the soldiers of Paraguay representing their Nation can, I think, be called the bravest soldiers in all the Americas, because they have had the thought of maintaining their independence as the first thought in all their minds. They have lost thousands of the best blood of Paraguay in battle, and they have come through with their independence.

The General and President, as I put it, is one of the most distinguished generals of that magnificent army. We think of him
not only as the President of the Republic, but also as the leader of the armies of Paraguay in their latest war. We hope they will not have to go through wars of that kind again. We hope that all of the Republics will work together to see that they do not have to defend their independence any more.

During these years, because of geography, it has been very difficult for us to go to Paraguay. We thought of it as an interior Republic, far up one of the greatest rivers of the continent. And yet, with the advent of airplanes, and the advent of better roads, we look forward to the day when more Americans can go there, and go there as a natural and logical part of their visits to the other countries of the hemisphere.

I hope that those relations—not merely communication, but trade and everything else that goes with it—are going to increase. We think that we have broken the ice, not only in our Pan-American or diplomatic relations, but also in regard to getting to know each other better.

And so I hope that in the years to come Paraguay and the United States will become closer personal friends than we have ever been before. Toward that end this Government—the Government and President—are going hand in hand; and may this association be carried out more greatly, more usefully—spiritually, economically, materially, in every way.

We recognize Paraguay very definitely as one of the great Republics of the Americas.

And so it gives me great pleasure to propose a toast to His Excellency the President of Paraguay.
60. Transfer of Patrol Ship to Greek Government

Address on the Transfer of an Anti-Submarine Patrol Ship to the Greek Government.
June 10, 1943

Mr. Ambassador:

To most of us gathered here on this occasion, the year 1940 seems a long time ago. Yet in that year occurred an event which shall herald for all time the fact that mere force is not enough to banish man's desire and man's determination for freedom, nor man's willingness to sacrifice life itself that freedom may live.

History will proclaim the date of that event as October 28, 1940. We know the location of the southern peninsula of the Balkans — an area about the size of New York State. For far more than two thousand years, poets have sung of this land as the Kingdom of Hellas — known to us as Greece.

Although we had begun to prepare for the evil fates which were to befall the world in 1940, the United States was for the most part an apprehensive onlooker at the terrible pageant of history. In April of that year we saw the treachery against Norway, in May the unprovoked murder of Rotterdam, the fall of The Netherlands, and the capitulation of Belgium. In June of that year, Axis hordes marched into Paris as the banner of liberty hung at half-staff throughout the world. On September 27 of that year, Germany, Italy, and Japan signed the pact under which they were to force the blessings of the New Order on a neatly parcel-ed-out globe.

And then came October 28, 1940.

In Athens, the people and the Government were given three hours in which to decide whether to accept Axis slavery or to resist an Axis onslaught from the skies. I repeat — the people and the Government of Greece were given three hours, not three days, or three weeks. If they had been given three years, their choice would have been the same.

Today, Greece is a land of desolation, stripped bare of all
the essentials of living. Thousands have died of hunger. Thousands are dying still. Today, Greece is a gaunt and haggard sample of what the Axis is so eager and willing to hand to all the world.

But within their own land, and upon other shores, the Greeks are fighting on. They will never be defeated. And the day will come when liberated Greeks will again maintain their own Government within the shadow of the Acropolis and the Parthenon.

As an expression of our hopes and our prayers that this day may be hastened, the Government and the people of the United States offer a token of our warm friendship for the Government and the people of Greece. This ship of war, built by American hands in an American yard, is delivered under the terms of Lend-Lease to fighting Greeks wherever they may be. As a part of the Royal Hellenic Navy — and christened King George Second — may she add even more luster to the glory that is Greece.

NOTE: The submarine chaser transferred to the Greek Government under the Lend-Lease Act was identical with the vessels transferred to Norway and The Netherlands in 1942 (see Items 80 and 93, 1942 volume). The ceremonies addressed by the President were held at the Washington Navy Yard.

61 (The Nine Hundred and Second Press Conference (Excerpts). June 11, 1943
(Surrender of Pantelleria — Statement to the Italian people.)

THE PRESIDENT: There’s a very good piece of news this morning.
We had a flash this morning that Pantelleria has surrendered.
The message came out of the clear a short time ago. The reason, apparently, that they have surrendered was that they haven’t enough water left; and white flags were flying.
I think it’s rather worth while to point out that Pantelleria, which we have taken apparently without any great loss of life, is what the Italians called their “Gibraltar,” at the narrow part of the Mediterranean. They did a great deal of
boasting about the strength of it, about domination of the Mediterranean from it. And apparently now it is in the hands of the British and ourselves. . . .

This seems to be an opportune time to say a word, through the press and over the air, to the Italian people. I think that they should be reminded that the present effect of the British-American campaign against their country is a perfectly logical and inevitable result of the ruthless course that has been pursued during these last years by Mussolini, who, in forming the military alliance with Germany, has betrayed his own country in a struggle for personal power and aggrandizement.

These acts were not the acts of the Italian people. The succession of these irresponsible acts were committed by his personal Fascist regime, in the name of Italy, but not actually representing the Italian people, who are on the whole, by and large, a people devoted to peace. It was well shown in the completely unprovoked declaration of war by Italy, something I referred to once as a "stab in the back."

Of course, we have no choice but to prosecute the war against the Government of Mussolini and the armed forces of Mussolini until we have complete victory.

And I think it is fair to say that all of us — I think I can speak for all the United Nations — are agreed that when the German domination of Italy is ended and the Fascist regime is thrown out, that we can well assure the Italian people of their freedom to choose the kind of non-Fascist, non-Nazi kind of government that they wish to establish. Obviously, they can't do anything about it until Fascism is put down, and the Germans leave their territories.

The United Nations, I think, certainly have the intention — the hope — that Italy will be restored to real nationhood, and take her place as a respected member of the European family of Nations, with emphasis on the word "respected."

And when the Germans are driven out of Italy, and Fascism is abolished, only then will the good judgment — the ultimate good judgment of the Italian people themselves become evident. . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly I think all of us feel a lot better about the progress of the war than we did the last time we were together in this room. On the whole, things are going pretty well.

I am always appalled, of course—I am just as impatient as you are—by the difficulties of staging another operation in the war, either in the Pacific or in the Atlantic, without spending the tremendous amount of time that is necessary in preparation—even a minor operation—that takes weeks and months to get it so organized that there is a reasonable chance for its success on the "D" Day. That is why we all have to remember that things can't end in a military way in any short period of time. The only quick ending to a war of this kind, of course, will be the collapse of the enemy; and as Mr. Churchill has said so often, that is something we can't put our faith in, or base our plans on. In all probability it is going to take a long time before the Axis powers collapse—Pacific and Atlantic.

In the meantime we have, of course, an awful lot of problems at home. But every time I go through the country, or go to North Africa—(laughter) and come back here, I have a perfectly natural feeling about the futility of so many of the things that one has to spend an awful lot of time on in Washington, D. C. The people of the country are all right. Well, we have been going through the most awful growing pains in Washington, as you know. And we are going to keep on, because we are growing all the time; we certainly haven't...
reached maturity in waging war. There are always new problems that keep coming up.

The problem of the last year that seemed of importance in Washington today is of relatively minor importance. Oh, we have all talked—I have too—and printed—I have too—(laughter) columns and columns, for example, about the question of manpower. Well, a lot of people got completely panicky about manpower. And both last September's trip, and last April's trip, where I went out through the country, I came back to Washington, and I said to a lot of friends, "Don't talk to me about manpower any more, because the manpower question has been solved by womanpower." Now that is a simple fact. You go into plant after plant—aviation plants and tank plants—and you will find women who are in those plants up to a very high percentage, in some cases over 50 percent. It is working out extraordinarily well.

And some of the impressions of a neophyte as I was, going around, are interesting.

I said to one of the old West Pointers in one of the places where they had a lot of WAACs, "How are you getting on with all these 'gals' around here?"

And he said, "We have put in 750 more. We not only need them, we can use them very usefully to release manpower as opposed to womanpower for the various fronts."

And he said, "Incidentally, we old West Pointers, they have taught us something. We were sloppy. They salute better than we do. (Laughter) They are snappier in every way. They have improved the morale of this post 50 percent."

And then I went into one of the plane factories in Omaha, and I said to one of the old-type foremen, "You have been in this business for a long time; how do you like having all these 'gals' around here, in places 50 percent of them?"

"Well," he said, "it has done something to us. I don't know what it is," he says, patting his chin. "Look at my face."

I said, "What's the matter?"

He said, "I used to shave twice or three times a week, but
I have to shave every day now." (Laughter) He says, "My wife is kicking about it."

I said, "Why? Because there are so many girls around?"

He said, "No, not that, but I wear a clean shirt every day, and it means more wash back home." (Laughter)

Well, there are all sorts of little human touches, and a great many other things, to show that we are solving things in ways that we hadn't planned for. . .

I take it that you are all more or less interested in finance. Well, the money is coming in pretty well. We have got to keep it going at the same speed of that last War Loan, oversubscribed about five billion dollars—a little thing like that. (Laughter) It was a tremendous success, and of course, obviously, the more money we can raise in the process of war, keeping values down as far as we can, the less we will have to pay after the war is over, not just ourselves but our children and grandchildren.

And it is terribly important of course, in my judgment, to prevent inflation. We know what has happened to those countries which have gone into inflation. Their future is not very bright. In some other countries, however, they have had a pretty firm grip on inflation. There have been all kinds of protests by people who really don't think it through, on the Hill and in some of the papers, which in effect are policies in favor of inflation.

We have this unexpended gap at the top of national income. Well, if people want something they will pay any old price for it, and therefore the more that that gap can be absorbed in various ways the less danger of inflation there is. However, some people are pursuing the policy on the Hill of why shouldn't we go ahead and increase the price to the farmers and then increase wages, the old vicious spiral. . .

I think some of you will remember that back in 1932 and 1933 the purchasing power of the dollar was in a very serious situation, and we wanted to turn it in the opposite direction; and with the enthusiastic help of business in 1933 and 1934,
we did raise the index figure from about — I think it was 68 to about 84 in those two years.

Well, immediately that restored confidence. We weren't afraid of what would happen to the buying power of our dollar if we put it into business or anything else.

And what I hope is that we can get through this war without materially changing the buying power of the dollar that we get in our pay checks. That is why on taxes, for example, I hope that we will be able to continue just the way we have been going, with some increases in taxes, but also in the continuation of what has been so far a great success, in the sale of war bonds. And we have had perfectly wonderful cooperation from business as a whole, every kind of association and individual business, in carrying that out.

And I don't have to tell you that I am awfully happy the way the relationship between business as a whole and the Government has been going on. We have had complete cooperation. . . .

63 (The Nine Hundred and Fourth Press Conference (Excerpts). June 15, 1943

(Loose thinking and gossip in Washington, D. C. — Stabilization — Food costs and subsidies — "Czars" — The inflationary spiral.)

Q. Mr. President, can you forecast as to what is going to happen to O.P.A.?

THE PRESIDENT: So far as I know, it's going on.

Q. It isn't going to be split up, so far as you are concerned?

THE PRESIDENT: No, no. Oh, perhaps I could put it this way:

There's a lot of loose thinking abroad in Washington. Perhaps "abroad in Washington" doesn't fit together. Perhaps it's an anachronism, or something like that. I will say "in Washington." Leave out "abroad." You know some of the things I have said about Washington. The people are very
apt to get confused by the trees, don't see the forest as a whole. The largest thing that we are after in all this discussion is a very old thing which hasn't yet been solved, and that is keeping the cost of living down. You can't eat your cake and have it too, when people are shying off from keeping the cost of living down.

You all know what would happen if we started the spiral of inflation in this country. If the cost goes up on the things that the consumer buys, then, of course, the next step would be to give higher wages. And then the cost of food would go up again, and you would have to increase the cost of food. Then you would go around the circle again; you would have to equalize it by increasing the cost of wages again.

We all know, too, what would happen to our savings if the cost of living went up. I don't want to put a dollar in the bank and pull it out again in two or three years with a buying power of only fifty cents. I think that is sort of silly.

So in some way, in trying to keep the cost of living down, we ought to analyze what we have done.

Well, we have stabilized the cost of rents, which represents from 22 to 33 percent of the average family's income. Well, that is pretty well taken care of all over the country.

And then there is another, around 33 percent, the cost of clothing and furniture and things like that. Well, that has been pretty well stabilized.

And then you have got another, the third third—which is a rough figure—the cost of food. That has not been stabilized. But of course—well, when May Craig or I go to the A. and P.—

MAY CRAIG: (interjecting) Safeway.

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, excuse me. I don't go to that chain, but it's all right. (Laughter)

When we go there, of course, it looms pretty big, because we are paying out cash, and we think that that third that goes into food is the largest item, and almost the only item—it's a psychological thing—that is, in the cost of living.
Now, of course, there are one or two things that are bound to happen, if the cost goes up on the necessities of life. I am not talking about strawberries in January, I am talking about the things that keep body and soul together. If those prices are allowed to go up without any effective regulation, you have got your spiral started.

Now on the other hand, if we set a ceiling on the prices of necessities in the food line, it is perfectly possible that because of short crops or because the actual cost of production—that is to say, the farmer's cost—that has gone up a lot, and the processing cost has gone up a bit, and the distribution cost has gone up a bit, you have a perfectly legitimate figure that you have got to sell to the public at, which is much higher, unless somebody pays the difference between that higher price and the ceiling price. Well, that's what we would like to do.

It's only fair to the farmer, and to the processor, and the distributor, that they get their money back, and that the farmer's prices should not go down, and the processor and the distributor should at least come out even, with even a small profit. But that may bring the price beyond the ceiling, and somebody has to pay that differential.

Well, I wish somebody could give me some method of doing that. I have asked that question of a lot of people, "Can you find a method of doing it?" And they all come back to the same old thing. They call it a subsidy, or you can call it a differential, where the Government will pay it.

Well, it might cost us a billion dollars and a half—I am just taking figures I have read in the papers—additional in the war effort, in order to keep the cost to the consumer of the essential food articles down below that ceiling. Well, on a hundred-billion-dollar budget of running this war, a billion and a half or two billion is \( \frac{11}{2} \) or 2 percent of the total cost of running the war. It has been done successfully in other places, with perhaps a little simpler problem.

But if anybody can devise a method that is better than that,
we are only too willing to look into it. But nobody has ever done it yet. That is a method; and nobody has given any other method. Now when you come down to where I am talking about Washington not thinking things through, I have had, of course, a great many with "happy thoughts" in them.

We know perfectly well that what we need is a properly organized administration, and I think probably without any question there have been a great many delays that have been caused by two or three agencies having to look into the situation, and sometimes you find a month or six weeks or two months of delays before you get a decision. That is absolutely true, as we have groped our way into this thing, during the past year. I think it is only about two weeks ago when we set up the new organization of the Office of War Mobilization. That is one of their particular functions, to coordinate the three or four different groups that have to do with portions of this problem.

But on the other hand, it has been suggested of course, by people who don't always think things through, that the mere fact of having some sort of glorified "czar" would cure the whole thing.

And one of the best illustrations of that is that when this suggestion was made to me, I said to the gentleman who suggested it, "Well now, what sort of things would the czar do?"

"Well," he said, "a friend of mine in a certain State had a carload of food that he wanted to send to the processor, or the distributor, and he knew that the carload of stuff would be about ripe for shipping the following Monday. So he put in his order for a freight car.

"Now," he said, "the railroad people said he couldn't have a freight car, and what I want is a czar who will be able to say to Mr. Eastman [Director of the Office of Defense Transportation], 'I have got to have that freight car there next Monday.'"

Well, you see how perfectly absurd the whole thing is. Mr. Eastman would come back and say, "I am awfully sorry but
I have got — just to take any old figure — I have got a million freight cars and I have got demands for a million and a half. So I have got to parcel them out in the fairest way I possibly can. I have got to try to make a million cars do the duty of one million and a half. That means that quite a lot of people are not going to be served when they want to be served. It's a condition and not a theory. I have only got a million cars."

So I said to this gentleman, I said, "In other words, you would have a food czar with authority to say to Mr. Eastman, 'Whether you like it or not, Mr. Eastman, you have got to transport food ahead of anything else. I am the food czar.'"

Well, pretty soon I guess, Donald Nelson would say to Mr. Eastman, "I am moving some very much needed spare parts for airplanes from the Middle West to the seaboard, in order to ship them over to Africa, and I want a hurry-up order."

Mr. Eastman would say, "I am awfully sorry but I have had to give those cars to the food fellow."

And somebody else would say — the Army or the Navy — in time of war — they have got to have a car to take this, that, and the other thing that is needed by the Army and Navy in Europe or the Southwest Pacific.

Mr. Eastman would have to say, "I am terribly sorry but the food czar won't let me."

You see what a perfectly impossible situation it is.

Now as a matter of fact, this new organization of the O.W.M. — as I said, it's only about two weeks old — and one of their principal duties is to coordinate the O.P.A. and the Food Administrator and the Department of Agriculture, and see that they speak to each other before any of these important decisions are reached, and do it right away and get out a decision much more quickly than we have been doing it in the past. In other words, use a rule of judgment, instead of the rule of "happy thought."

Q. Mr. President, in that connection, there has been a good deal of discussion about these subsidies, or what have you, up on the Hill, and with some of the Administrators who have been
carrying the ball in that regard. If Congress doesn't suggest anything more constructive, do you intend to ask them for subsidies to handle that?

**The President:** I think I would put it this way. As I have said before, I think that there is a way of holding the cost of essential foods down to a ceiling. Now if they have a better way—a "better 'ole"—I would be tickled to death. But nobody has suggested the "better 'ole" yet.

**Q.** Mr. President, it has occurred to some of us that a rather large group on the Hill would like to have all prices go right straight up to a demand level.

**The President:** Yes, yes.

**Q.** That seems to be their "better 'ole."

**The President:** Yes, it's the spiral.

Well, of course, whom does that affect? It affects primarily two groups. The first group it doesn't bother much, because they work for a fluctuating pay, which of course would almost of necessity go up if the cost of living went up; and I suppose in that group belong the industrial occupations chiefly, and probably they represent about half the population of the country.

Well, in the other half of the population—you are in it, and I am in it. If the cost of food goes up 100 percent, do you think that your salaries are going up 100 percent? Do you think they would give me double my salary? Take the white-collar group—there are over six million white-collar workers alone in this country. Now, their salaries don't go up with the cost of living. They never have, and I don't believe they ever will. You have got the clerks, the stenographers, in the small towns and the big towns. Theirs don't go up in accordance with the cost of living. So, as the cost of living goes up, you are bearing down very unjustly on at least half the population of this Nation.

**Q.** Do the people on the Hill seem convinced by that?

**The President:** I think they are beginning to think about it more.
Q. Mr. President, does Mr. [Chester] Davis think he has all the power he needs to do his food job?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't know. I have heard nothing to the contrary. The only thing I have heard from him lately was, "For goodness' sake don't give me the O.P.A. job!" (Laughter)

The President Directs the Detroit Race Rioters to Disperse. Proclamation No. 2588.

June 21, 1943

WHEREAS, the Governor of the State of Michigan has represented that domestic violence exists in said State which the authorities of said State are unable to suppress; and

WHEREAS, it is provided in the Constitution of the United States that the United States shall protect each State in this Union, on application of the Legislature, or of the Executive, when the Legislature cannot be convened, against domestic violence; and

WHEREAS, by the law of the United States in pursuance of the above, it is provided that in all cases of insurrection in any State or of obstruction of the laws thereof, it shall be lawful for the President of the United States, on application of the Legislature of such State, or of the Executive, when the Legislature cannot be convened, to call forth the militia of any other State or States and to employ such part of the land and naval forces of the United States as shall be judged necessary for the purpose of suppressing such insurrection and causing the laws to be duly executed; and

WHEREAS, the Legislature of the State of Michigan is not now in session and cannot be convened in time to meet the present emergency, and the Executive of said State under Section 4 of Article IV of the Constitution of the United States, and the laws passed in pursuance thereof, has made due application to me in the premises for such part of the military forces of the United States
States as may be necessary and adequate to protect the State of Michigan and the citizens thereof against domestic violence and to enforce the due execution of the laws; and

Whereas, it is required that whenever it may be necessary, in the judgment of the President, to use the military forces of the United States for the purposes aforesaid, he shall forthwith, by proclamation, command such insurgents to disperse and retire peacefully to their respective homes within a limited time;

Now, therefore, I, Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, do hereby make proclamation and I do hereby command all persons engaged in said unlawful and insurrectionary proceedings to disperse and retire peacefully to their respective abodes immediately, and hereafter abandon said combinations and submit themselves to the laws and constituted authorities of said State;

And I invoke the aid and cooperation of all good citizens thereof to uphold the laws and preserve the public peace.

NOTE: The race riots in Detroit in June, 1943, were probably the worst the country had experienced since the East St. Louis, Ill., disturbances in the first World War. Federal troops of the Sixth Service Command aided the city police, home guards, and State troops in quelling the rioting. Not many hours after the President's proclamation, complete order had been restored, and the Federal troops were then withdrawn.

65 Message to Stalin Paying Tribute to Russia on the Second Anniversary of the Nazi Attack on Russia. June 22, 1943

Two years ago tomorrow, by an act of treachery in keeping with the long record of Nazi duplicity, the Nazi leaders launched their brutal attack upon the Soviet Union. They thus added to their growing list of enemies the mighty forces of the Soviet Union. These Nazi leaders had underestimated the extent to which the Soviet Government and people had developed and strengthened
Return of Coal Miners to Work

their military power to defend their country and had utterly failed to realize the determination and valor of the Soviet people.

During the past two years the freedom-loving peoples of the world have watched, with increasing admiration, the history-making exploits of the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the almost incredible sacrifices which the Russian people are so heroically making. The growing might of the combined forces of all the United Nations which is being brought increasingly to bear upon our common enemy testifies to the spirit of unity and sacrifice necessary for our ultimate victory.

This same spirit will, I am sure, animate us in approaching the challenging tasks of peace which victory will present to the world.

Marshal Joseph V. Stalin
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R.,
The Kremlin, Moscow.

Statement of the President on the Return of Coal Miners to Work. June 23, 1943

It is a good thing that the miners are returning to their work. This is the third time within a short period that the production of coal has been interrupted.

As a result of these three interruptions war production has been slowed down.

Aside from United Mine Workers coal mining, the making of war munitions and supplies has gone ahead extremely well. Aside from United Mine Workers coal mining, the no-strike pledge by organized labor has been well kept, the few small, unauthorized strikes which have occurred having affected only a very small fraction of 1 percent of production.

The action of the leaders of the United Mine Workers coal miners has been intolerable—and has rightly stirred up the anger and disapproval of the overwhelming mass of the American people.
The mines for the time being of course will continue to be operated by the Secretary of the Interior under the Executive Order of May 1. The terms and conditions of employment will be those announced by the National War Labor Board in its directive of June 18. There has been no promise or commitment by the Government to change those terms and conditions in any way.

Before the leaders of the United Mine Workers decided to direct the miners to return to work, the Government had taken steps to set up the machinery for inducting into the armed services all miners subject to the Selective Service Act, who absented themselves without just cause from work in the mines under Government operation.

As the Selective Service Act does not authorize the induction of men above 45 years into the armed services, I intend to request the Congress to raise the age limit for non-combat military service to 65 years. I shall make that request of the Congress so that if at any time in the future there should be a threat of interruption of work in plants, mines, or establishments owned by the Government, or taken possession of by the Government, the machinery will be available for prompt action.

**NOTE:** Strikes and threats of strikes in the bituminous coal mining industry, precipitated by the United Mine Workers of America, in defiance of the Government, resulted in the personal intervention of the President on a number of occasions (see Items 45 and 46 and notes, this volume, for prior accounts of the President's role in the bituminous coal mines disputes of 1943).

Following a strongly worded statement which the President issued on June 3, 1943 (printed in the note to Item 46, this volume), John L. Lewis recommended to the Policy Committee of the United Mine Workers that the miners return to work on June 7, and work was then resumed. The National War Labor Board thereupon reopened efforts to bring the miners and operators together to agree on a new contract. On June 18, the National War Labor Board issued a new order, which was reported by the Chairman of the Board to the President on June 22, 1943, as follows:

"**Dear Mr. President:**

"On June 18, the National War Labor Board issued its order in the bituminous coal case directing the parties to enter into agreements based on the
old Appalachian Agreements with certain special wage adjustments within the stabilization program.

"We have received from the operator groups a telegram of June 19 in which they accept the order of the Board and offer to put it into effect. We have also received from them a second telegram in which they say they have met with the United Mine Workers on June 19 and 20 but have not been able to reach any conclusion 'due to the fact that the United Mine Workers of America are unwilling to make a contract until their claim for pay for portal to portal travel time is satisfied.' We have not received any communication from the United Mine Workers.

"As you know, the refusal of the Mine Workers to accept the order of the Board was followed on Monday by interruption of production in the coal mines, which in accordance with your Executive Order of May 1, 1943, are now in the possession of the Secretary of the Interior for operation.

"Although the War Labor Board was not unanimous in voting for the directive order of June 18, it is unanimous in advising you that in its opinion the directive order should be enforced and that all the powers of Government necessary for its enforcement should be exercised.

"A copy of our directive order of June 18, together with the telegrams above referred to, are forwarded to you herewith.

"Respectfully,
"WILLIAM H. DAVIS, Chairman"

In general, the bituminous coal miners refused to accept the order of the National War Labor Board issued on June 18, 1943. This Board order, concurred in by the public and industry members of the Board but not by the labor members, had permitted a few increases in wage rates for certain classes of labor and had granted increases in vacation pay from $20 to $50, but denied the union demands for portal-to-portal travel time and a general $2-a-day wage increase. The Board indicated that a $2-a-day wage increase would give the bituminous coal miners a total increase of 46.9 percent in wages since 1941, which "would fly in the face of decision after decision of the Board in which we have had to limit the wage increases—in most of the great war industries."

Coincidental with the President's statement of June 23, printed above, the United Mine Workers issued an order on June 23 directing the bituminous coal miners to return to work, with the stipulation that work would continue only under Government operation and not beyond October 31, 1943.

At the end of the summer it appeared that efforts to achieve a settlement in the bituminous coal industry were bearing fruit. On October 12, 1943, the Government relinquished control of the coal mines and they were returned to the operators. New strikes flared up at the end of October, however, necessitating further action by the President to insure production in the coal mines (see Item 120 and note, this volume).
67. President Urges More Purchases of War Bonds

67 (The President Urges Additional Purchases of War Bonds. June 24, 1943

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Through you, as Secretary of the Treasury, I want to congratulate the American people on the way in which they have supported the voluntary pay-roll savings plan.

I am proud of the fact that 27,000,000 patriotic Americans are regularly investing more than $420,000,000 a month to help pay the cost of the war. And since all of this money comes from wages and salaries — nearly 90 percent from people earning less than $5,000, and the bulk of it from those working in war plants — I do not hesitate to say that the pay-roll savings plan is the greatest single factor we now have in protecting ourselves against inflationary spending.

This is a great record, both from the standpoint of curbing inflation and from the standpoint of financing the war. However, I heartily endorse your present drive to improve that record, and I agree it must be improved if we are to keep pace with the increasing demands of the war.

I therefore join you in calling upon the American people — and upon labor and management particularly — to do still more. Additional people should be convinced of the necessity of participating. Everyone now on the pay-roll savings plan should materially increase the amount of bonds he is buying. We originally asked for 10 percent, but now we need considerably more.

I hope every American on a payroll will figure out for himself the extent to which he can curtail his spending, and will put every dollar of additional saving thus made into the pay-roll savings plan.

Sincerely yours,

The Honorable,
The Secretary of the Treasury

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NOTE: The foregoing statement was one of a series which the President made in support of the purchase of defense and war savings bonds and stamps. See Item 34 and note, 1941 volume, Items 47 and 99 and note, this volume, and Items 42 and 115 and notes, 1944-1945 volume, for additional addresses and statements of the President on defense and war savings bonds and stamps, on the voluntary pay-roll savings plan, and on various war loan drives.

68. Nine Hundred and Fifth Press Conference (Excerpts). June 25, 1943

(New steam pipe for White House — Smith-Connally Act — Coal mine take-over — Overconcern for property rights — Congressional responsibility in the event of inflation.)

THE PRESIDENT: I have only got a hot-weather story for you, showing my tender solicitude for the White House press. About twenty years ago, there was a President of the United States who really did think about dollars and cents. This end of the White House Executive Offices is heated by a steam line from the State Department. So President Coolidge went over to Camp Meade and dug up some old pipe and brought it over here. And, by gosh, it has lasted twenty years. It was all right, and it was a good economy. However, it has got to a very old age now; it is just about gone.

And they tell me that the Executive Offices in the White House are going to freeze next winter unless we get a new steam pipe; it is losing about a thousand pounds of steam a week. So, carrying out President Coolidge's thought of economy, I felt that that loss of steam was a pretty serious thing; so don't be surprised and write some pertinent pieces about spending Government money when you see the street all dug up, because we have got to lay a new steam line if you fellows are going to have any comfort next winter at all. (Laughter) So you can put it entirely on yourselves and the solicitude of the President to see that you don't freeze to death.
And it is going to cost about $25,000, but I don't see any way out. Incidentally, it doesn't mean buying any new pipe because we have got it in the stock pile of the — what is it? — Park Service. So it's a very important item to all of you.

Q. You say that's the only story you have, sir?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes! (Laughter)

Q. When are you going to take us into your confidence on the anti-strike bill?

THE PRESIDENT: I am going to — er — sometime before midnight.

Q. Before you said that, Mr. President, you said, "I am going to."

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I am going to take you into my confidence sometime before midnight. (Laughter)

Q. Are you going to take Congress into your confidence before midnight?

THE PRESIDENT: That might give you an intimation. It might be called almost a leading question. (Laughter)

Q. Yes.

Q. Mr. President, in this coal mine dispute, do you recognize and accept any October 31 deadline of the employees working for the Government?

THE PRESIDENT: No. I am trying to mine coal, keep it mined, and keep on mining it. We have got to do it some way. It will be cold if we don't. In other words, perhaps a great many of us — I sometimes do — get away from the fact that we are at war, that the existence, the life of the Nation is very much at stake.

Just the same way, I was a little interested, for instance, in the editorial in *The New York Times* this morning. Well, it's one of those editorials that started off with the thought that was uppermost in the mind of the writer, and it talked about the loss of property by the coal mining companies. In other words, that was the first thing that occurred to the writer — the loss of property.

Now there isn't going to be any loss of property to the coal mine owners under Government operation. They are going to come out at least even, and probably with a profit. And they are going to get their mines back. But I am just using it
as a psychological illustration that hits us all. This is war.

Well, I am all for saving property, naturally, but the question at issue is not the property end of things. They are going to get their property back. They are not going to be out of pocket on account of Government operation. The question doesn't arise. There may be some technical things and details as to how they are going to be compensated, but the big thing is that this is war. If necessary we have to give our property, and if necessary we have to give our lives. And I am just using it as an illustration of a frame of mind that proves that some people in this country don't know that the United States is at war.

Q. Well, Mr. President, I think one of the things that may have motivated that editorial writer is that nobody in the Government has said that the operators are going to get their mines back, and that they are going to get their profits.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, put it the other way around. Who in the world thought they weren't going to get their mines back? Have we ever said that?

Q. One of the conditions of John L. Lewis's return to work was that the Government operate the mines.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, obviously somebody has got to operate the mines. We have got to get the coal out. I don't care who operates the mines as long as we try to get the coal out to try to win the war. It's a serious thing. We are going to be cold next winter if we don't get the mines in operation. It may take two months or three months to get them into full operation. That is why Ickes said yesterday we might have to ration coal to make good the loss caused by strikes.

Q. Mr. President, there is still talk on the Hill about a food czar.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, you know I hate to say that anything is a red herring. Supposing we had the angel Gabriel as food czar, with full powers. Is he going to get more food to the people at present cost? The real thing is—if you talk about anything else it comes pretty close to being a red herring—
the real question is: Are you for inflation, or aren't you? Now that, in the last analysis, is the thing.

Put in a food czar! Sure! He is faced with two situations, the 1943 situation and 1944. Now we are all in favor of plans for growing a great deal more in 1944. That is grand. But that doesn't take care of things in 1943, or the beginning of 1944 until the new crops come on. A food czar won't do it, or a joint committee of Congress can't do it.

The question is: Are we going to try to keep prices down, or are we going into an inflationary spiral?

And there are a lot of people on the Hill that say the easiest way to use up the surpluses in earning power, in income, is to let the whole of prices shoot sky-high.

Well, there was a fellow on the radio the other day who said, let the prices go on up. It will use this surplus of twenty billion dollars, or something like that, in purchasing power.

Sure, he said, it means the richer people will be able to pay the higher prices for food. Well, automatically rents would go up and clothing would go up too. And in effect he said, of course the poorer people will suffer, but what difference does that make? It will get rid of the surplus purchasing power.

Now that was handed out to the American people. Let the poorer people suffer. And the poorer people would suffer, and will suffer — people on reasonably small salaries, the white-collar crowd — their pay won't go up with the increase in prices.

So it comes right down to that one thing: The issue before the Congress and the people is whether we are going to go into the inflationary spiral or not.

Now if Congress wants to do it, 100 percent of the responsibility is going to be on the Congress; and I might just as well be honest. They have a perfect right to adopt an inflationary out-of-hand rise in the cost of living policy, and if they do the country ought to know who does it. That's the real answer. . . .
69. Veto of Smith-Connally Bill

NOTE: See Item 69 and note, this volume, for the President's veto of the Smith-Connally anti-strike bill, and a summary of the provisions of the Smith-Connally Act.

For further references to the 1943 disputes in the coal mines, see Items 44, 45, 46, 66, 120 and notes, this volume.

69 The President Vetoes the Smith-Connally Bill. June 25, 1943

To the Senate:

I am returning herewith, without my approval, S. 796, the so-called War Labor Disputes Bill.

It is not a simple bill, for it covers many subjects. I approve many of the sections; but other sections tend to obscure the issues or to write into war legislation certain extraneous matter which appears to be discriminatory. In the form submitted to me, the accomplishment of its avowed purpose — the prevention of strikes in wartime — could well be made more difficult instead of more effective.

Let there be no misunderstanding of the reasons which prompt me to veto this bill at this time.

I am unalterably opposed to strikes in wartime. I do not hesitate to use the powers of Government to prevent them.

It is clearly the will of the American people that for the duration of the war all labor disputes be settled by orderly procedures established by law. It is the will of the American people that no war work be interrupted by strike or lockout.

American labor as well as American business gave their "no-strike, no-lockout" pledge after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

That pledge has been well kept except in the case of the leaders of the United Mine Workers. For the entire year of 1942, the time lost by strikes averaged only 5/100 of 1 percent of the total man-hours worked. The American people should realize that fact — that 99 and 95/100 percent of the work went forward without strikes, and that only 5/100 of 1 percent of the work was de-
69. *Veto of Smith-Connally Bill*

layed by strikes. That record has never before been equaled in this country. It is as good or better than the record of any of our allies in wartime.

But laws are often necessary to make a very small minority of people live up to the standards that the great majority of people follow. Recently there has been interruption of work in the coal industry, even after it was taken over by the Government. I understand and sympathize with the general purpose of the War Labor Disputes Bill to make such interruptions clearly unlawful.

The first seven sections of the Bill are directed to this objective. Section one provides that the Act may be cited as the War Labor Disputes Act.

Section two relates to definitions.

Section three gives statutory authority to the President to seize war facilities—a power already exercised on several occasions under Executive Order or Proclamation.

Sections four and five of the Bill provide for maintaining existing terms and conditions of employment except as directed by the War Labor Board.

Section six makes it a criminal offense to instigate, direct, or aid a strike in a Government-operated plant or mine.

This would make possible the arrest of a few leaders who would give bond for their appearance at trial. It would assure punishment for those found guilty, and might also have some deterrent effect. But it would not assure continuance of war production in the most critical emergencies.

Section seven gives the National War Labor Board statutory authority and defines its powers.

Broadly speaking, these sections incorporate into statute the existing machinery for settling labor disputes. The penalties provided by the Act do not detract from the moral sanctions of labor’s no-strike pledge.

If the Bill were limited to these seven sections I would sign it. But the Bill contains other provisions which have no place in legislation to prevent strikes in wartime and which in fact would foment slow-downs and strikes.
I doubt whether the public generally are familiar with these provisions. I doubt whether the Congress had the opportunity fully to appraise the effects of these provisions upon war production.

Section eight requires the representative of employees of a war contractor to give notice of a labor dispute which threatens seriously to interrupt war production to the Secretary of Labor, the National War Labor Board, and the National Labor Relations Board in order to give the employees the opportunity to express themselves by secret ballot whether they will permit such interruption of war production.

It would force a labor leader who is trying to prevent a strike in accordance with his no-strike pledge to give the notice which would cause the taking of a strike ballot and might actually precipitate a strike.

In wartime we cannot sanction strikes with or without notice.

Section eight further makes it mandatory that the National Labor Relations Board on the thirtieth day after the giving of the notice take a secret ballot among the employees in the "plants, mines, facilities, bargaining unit or bargaining units," as the case may be, on the question of whether they will stop work. This requirement would open the whole controversy over "bargaining units," a fruitful source of controversy and of bitter jurisdictional strife.

Section eight ignores completely labor's "no-strike" pledge and provides in effect for strike notices and strike ballots. Far from discouraging strikes these provisions would stimulate labor unrest and give Government sanction to strike agitations.

The thirty days allowed before the strike vote is taken under Government auspices might well become a boiling period instead of a cooling period. The thought and energies of the workers would be diverted from war production to vote-getting.

The heads of our military, naval, and production agencies have testified that these provisions are likely to be subversive of the very purpose of the Bill—uninterrupted production.

Section nine of the bill prohibits for the period of the war
political contributions by labor organizations. This provision obviously has no relevancy to a bill prohibiting strikes during the war in plants operated by the Government or to a “War Labor Disputes Act.” If there be merit in the prohibition, it should not be confined to wartime, and careful consideration should be given to the appropriateness of extending the prohibition to other non-profit organizations.

There should be no misunderstanding— I intend to use the powers of Government to prevent the interruption of war production by strikes. I shall approve legislation that will truly strengthen the hands of Government in dealing with such strikes, and will prevent the defiance of the National War Labor Board’s decisions.

I recommend that the Selective Service Act be amended so that persons may be inducted into non-combat military service up to the age of 65 years. This will enable us to induct into military service all persons who engage in strikes or stoppages or other interruptions of work in plants in the possession of the United States.

This direct approach is necessary to insure the continuity of war work. The only alternative would be to extend the principle of Selective Service and make it universal in character.

I recognize that this bill has an entirely praiseworthy purpose to insure full war production. But I am convinced that Section eight will produce strikes in vital war plants which otherwise would not occur. Therefore, I could not properly discharge the duties of my office if I were to approve S. 796.

**NOTE:** In spite of the foregoing veto message, the Congress passed the War Labor Disputes Act (57 Stat. 163) — popularly known as the Smith-Connally Act — over the President’s veto by votes of 56-25 in the Senate and 244-108 in the House of Representatives.

As pointed out by the President Section 8 of the Act served in actual practice to undermine labor’s no-strike pledge given at the Labor-Management Conference (see Item 130 and note, 1941 volume). The effect of this provision of the law was to legalize strikes when a majority of the workers voted by secret ballot in favor of a strike. On repeated occasions thereafter, the National War Labor Board had to
reiterate to the unions that they were still bound by the no-strike agreement, even though the law gave them the right to strike after an election was held.

Section 8 of the Act was based on the premise that workers strike in a fit of hotheaded pique and hence need thirty days to cool off, and that strikes are generally foisted on the unwilling rank and file of workers by union leaders. The fact is, however, that in the thousands of referendums which were held on whether or not to strike, overwhelming votes were cast in favor of striking in all but a tiny fraction of cases. Workers not only demonstrated that they had confidence in union leadership, but they also voted in favor of strikes in order to give their leaders a weapon with which to bargain with management.

The War Labor Disputes Act provided that employers could sue unions which went out on strike without giving the proper notice and holding the necessary elections. Nevertheless, toward the end of the war many strikes were called without giving the requisite notice and without holding an election. Although employers had the legal right to sue for the damages suffered as a result of such strikes, the National War Labor Board found that only two or three employers actually brought such suits. Most employers felt that legal action would be expensive and time-consuming, and would serve as an additional irritant to peaceful employer-employee relations.

As indicated in his veto message, the President approved the general objective of the War Labor Disputes Act and also favored many of its specific provisions, yet for the reasons stated by him, principally by reason of Section 8 of the Bill, he felt constrained to veto it.

70 Exchange of Letters on the Resignation of Chester C. Davis as War Food Administrator. June 28, 1943

Dear Chester:

I have given a good deal of thought to your letter of June sixteenth, and your request to be relieved of responsibility for the future direction of the food program.

No one appreciates more than I do your ability in dealing with agricultural matters. But I am sure that you will agree with me that effective teamwork is absolutely necessary.
70. Resignation of Chester Davis as Food Administrator

Before the Office of Economic Stabilization was established, differences as to prices and wage policies from time to time arose between the various war agencies which frequently had to be brought to me. The Act of October 2, 1942, directed me to stabilize the cost of living so far as practicable on the basis of the levels prevailing on September fifteenth and authorized me to exercise my authority through such department, agency, or officer as I might direct.

Under that Act, and before you accepted the office of Food Administrator, I set up the Office of Economic Stabilization and authorized the Director, among other things, to resolve disagreements which might arise between the Food Administrator and the Price Administrator and to issue to them policy directives. If we are to stabilize all prices we must place the final responsibility in one official. I know of no better method of coordinating the work of the Food Administrator and the Price Administrator, although that method does require a willingness on the part of both Administrators to accept the decisions of the Stabilization Director. The country realizes that stabilization applies not only to food but to many other things, such as rent, clothing, and wage decisions. The broad objective is, of course, to prevent the cost of living from spiraling upward and the purchasing power of the dollar from spiraling downward.

I agree with you that we cannot fully or effectively enforce our price or rationing programs or fully or effectively stabilize the cost of living without an adequate tax and savings program to drain off excess purchasing power. I have emphasized that fact in my Budget Message, in my statement on the hold-the-line Order, and on other occasions. But because the Congress has not yet provided the tax legislation I have requested, I cannot sit back and fail to advocate other measures such as limited consumers’ subsidies which I am convinced can help to prevent the cost of living from getting completely out of hand. Of course you know that I also favor and have advocated such support programs and incentive payments to producers as will enable us to obtain the necessary war production.
70. Resignation of Chester Davis as Food Administrator

I think you will also realize that I did not announce a program of broad general subsidies at my press conference on June fifteenth. I stated my views on limited subsidies in order to maintain farm prices and hold down consumer prices, and stated my willingness to give full and sympathetic consideration to any program which would accomplish these two ends. None has been offered me.

I am truly sorry that you feel unable to continue as Food Administrator subject to the coordinated controls which I have established and which I believe essential for the proper functioning of our war effort. But it would be unfair to you to insist that you remain in your position when you feel that, all things considered, you cannot wholeheartedly support a program to hold down the cost of living.

There can be no disagreement on the program for 1944, which you recently discussed with me. Everybody is agreed that far greater efforts must be made to increase production next year. However, the result of such a program for crops maturing in 1944 will not make itself felt until at least a year from now. What I am concerned with is the objective of keeping the cost of essential foods down for the next twelve or fourteen months. That, it seems to me, is of immediate concern to the country. The pay envelope of tens of millions of our citizens will not compensate them for great increases in their food bills.

In regard to the program for next year, I do not think that it would be advisable for you finally to determine and announce it. Whoever takes over as Food Administrator would then be called on to administer a program which he had no part in determining. That would really be a case of dividing authority.

Very sincerely yours,

Dear Mr. President:

Sometime at your convenience I should like to discuss fully with you the future direction of the food program. After I have completed two undertakings I should like to be relieved of my present responsibility. The two unfinished jobs that I should carry further before leaving are:
Resignation of Chester Davis as Food Administrator

1. Rounding out and announcing the general 1944 food production program, and
2. Holding three meetings in New York, Chicago, and San Francisco that are essential in launching the broad food education program.

These major programs should be well shaped up and under way before the middle of July.

Two main causes have brought me to the reluctant conclusion that I will not be able to serve you satisfactorily in my present capacity:

1. I find that I have assumed a public responsibility while the authority, not only over broad food policy, but day-to-day actions, is being exercised elsewhere.

2. You must have in my position a man who can wholeheartedly advocate and defend the program of broad general subsidies you announced on June 15. I can not do this for the reason that I do not believe such subsidies will be effective in controlling inflation unless they are accompanied here, as they are in England, by current tax and savings programs that drain off excess buying power, and by tight control and management of the food supply. We do not have in this country anything approaching these conditions.

Respectfully yours,

CHESTER C. DAVIS

NOTE: The War Food Administration had been established to determine military and civilian food requirements and to allocate the Nation's farm production resources in order to insure the most efficient production and distribution of food for the war effort (see Item 133 and note, 1942 volume, for an account of the organization and functioning of the War Food Administration). The Office of Economic Stabilization had been created to stabilize prices, wages and the cost of living (see Item 97 and note, 1942 volume). In order to hold the price line on consumer food prices and at the same time guarantee production of farm products necessary for the war effort, the President at his press conference of June 15, 1943, had announced a program of limited subsidies to enable farm producers and processors to secure a margin of profit without forcing consumers to pay inflationary prices for food (see Item 63, this volume, for the President's press conference.
Transfer of P.W.A. Functions to F.W.A.

discussion of stabilization and food subsidies).

Chester C. Davis, the first War Food Administrator, who served for a few months in the early part of 1943, submitted his resignation to the President on the twofold ground that he did not approve of the subsidy program and he did not have sufficient authority over food policy. The President immediately appointed Marvin Jones, Federal Judge and former Chairman of the House Committee on Agriculture, as War Food Administrator. Mr. Jones served with distinction until the termination of the War Food Administration on June 29, 1945.

In a 10,000-word message to the Congress on November 1, 1943 (see Item 121 and note, this volume), the President set forth the basic principles and specific details of the food subsidy program and its relationship to the entire scheme of stabilization of prices. In this message to the Congress, the President amplified his discussion of the stabilization program and food subsidies which was contained in the above letter to the outgoing War Food Administrator, Chester C. Davis.

Transfer of the Functions of the Public Works Administration to the Federal Works Agency. Executive Order No. 9357.

June 30, 1943

By virtue of the authority vested in me by Title I of the First War Powers Act, 1941, approved December 18, 1941 (55 Stat. 838), and as President of the United States, it is ordered as follows:

1. All functions, powers, and duties of the Public Works Administration and of the Commissioner of Public Works, in the Federal Works Agency, together with all records, property (including office equipment, contracts, and other assets), and personnel of the Public Works Administration, and the unexpended balances of the appropriations, allocations, or other funds available or to be made available for the exercise and performance of the said functions, powers, and duties, are hereby transferred to the office of the Federal Works Administrator, and such func-
71. Transfer of P.W.A. Functions to F.W.A.

Tions, powers, and duties shall be administered by or under the direction and supervision of the Federal Works Administrator: Provided, that any personnel found by the Federal Works Administrator to be in excess of the personnel necessary for the administration of such functions, powers, and duties shall be retransferred under existing law to other positions in the Government or separated from the service.

2. This Order shall become effective on July 1, 1943.

NOTE: The Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works—better known as the Public Works Administration—was authorized by Title II of the National Industrial Recovery Act, and was created by Executive Order No. 6176 of June 16, 1933 (see Item 80 and note, pp. 249-251, 1933 volume). During the period of its operation, the P.W.A. participated in the construction of some 35,000 projects, at an estimated cost of approximately $6,000,000,000. By 1943, the Public Works Administration had completed its work except for sixteen projects, and the foregoing Executive Order was for the purpose of liquidating the P.W.A. and providing an administrative simplification of the control over these few unfinished projects.

The purpose of the P.W.A. was to provide useful employment for needy workers, and to secure practical by-products consisting of useful construction of benefit to the Nation. (For an account of the work of the Work Projects Administration and other agencies engaged in work relief, see Item 132 and note, 1942 volume, and references cited therein.)

At one time, the P.W.A. employed as many as 650,000 individuals, but by the outbreak of the war only 1,000 persons were employed by the agency. When the foregoing Executive Order was issued, employment had declined even further.

The P.W.A. made a substantial contribution in strengthening the facilities of the country in transportation, shipping, and power which helped the Nation gird itself for war. For example, the P.W.A. assisted in the construction in New York City of the Triborough Bridge, the Lincoln and Queens Tunnels, and parts of the city’s subways. In Chicago, it completed a sewage-disposal plant at a cost of approximately $60,000,000 and did substantial work on the Outer Drive Bridge and on the city’s subway. A number of power projects, notably Bonneville and Grand Coulee, were partially financed with P.W.A. funds. Among other P.W.A. accomplishments in the field of construction were steam and Diesel power projects, hospitals, public
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buildings, schools, sanitary and municipal service facilities, gas distribution facilities, bridges, post offices, flood control, conservation, and irrigation projects, streets and highways.

For an account of the war public works constructed by the Federal Works Agency, see Item 8 and note, 1941 volume. For additional accounts of the earlier work of the Public Works Administration, see Item 80 (pp. 249-251), Item 89 (pp. 270-271), and Item 117 (pp. 329-337), 1935 volume; Item 28 (pp. 101-104), 1934 volume; Item 8 and note (p. 62), Item 62 (p. 184), Item 89 (pp. 291-294), and Item 92 (pp. 300-303), 1935 volume; Item 2 (p. 25), Item 145 (p. 409), Item 176 (p. 485), and Item 244 (pp. 685-686), 1936 volume; Item 9 and note (p. 33), Item 35 (p. 140), Item 69 (p. 258), Item 103 (p. 343), Item 113 (pp. 369-370), Item 138 (pp. 444-451), and Item 143 (pp. 465-467), 1937 volume; Item 7 (p. 51), Item 28 and note (p. 127), Item 37 (p. 165), Item 80 (p. 393), and Item 123 (pp. 538-549), 1938 volume; Item 10 (p. 76), Item 66 (p. 255), and Item 89 (pp. 372-375), 1939 volume; Item 7 (p. 49) and Item 138 (p. 584), 1940 volume.

72 Veto of Bill Imposing Restrictions on the Commodity Credit Corporation. July 2, 1943

To the House of Representatives:

H. R. 2869, to continue the Commodity Credit Corporation as an agency of the United States, is before me. This measure will become law only over my strenuous objection and protest.

The Congress is aware of my deep interest in the Commodity Credit Corporation. It was created by me under Executive Order issued October 16, 1933, to meet a grave and critical emergency. It has proved to be useful not only in an emergency, but under other conditions. It has an essential function to perform in our war food production program. It should and must be continued.

But this is not a bill to continue the Commodity Credit Corporation. It is a bill to hamstring the Commodity Credit Corporation. It places new and unwarranted restrictions on the use of its funds and on the powers heretofore given to the Administration to stabilize the cost of living. These restrictions would prevent our giving to farmers the assistance they need in carrying
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out our new food production programs, so essential to feed our citizens and our soldiers. They would make it impossible for us to stop the rising cost of living.

As the measure now stands, this is an inflation bill, a high-cost-of-living bill, a food-shortage bill.

There is, for instance, a provision in section 6(a) which prohibits the establishment of a maximum price for any raw or processed agricultural commodity which will reflect to the producers thereof a price less than the support price heretofore or hereafter announced by the War Food Administrator, or less than the higher of the maximum prices provided in section 3 of the Act of October 2, 1942.

I have tried to analyze this section and to translate it into common-sense English. Frankly, I do not know what it means.

If the provision merely means that if the support price is higher than the maximum price established under the Act of October 2, 1942, the commodity must be purchased from the producer at the support price or the farmer must be paid the difference between the support price and the maximum price, the provision would serve no purpose. That is now, as I understand it, the law.

If on the other hand, despite language which looks the other way, the provision were construed to mean that the maximum price must be fixed so as to yield to the producer the support price without the payment of any subsidy, the provision would require the immediate upward adjustments in the ceiling prices for many basic food products. Prices for dry edible beans, cheese, canned vegetables, sugar, and, in some markets, fluid milk would immediately go up because the support prices for these products are higher than their present ceiling prices.

If the provision were so construed, it would not only immediately increase the cost of living but it would make it impossible for us to adopt support programs needed to increase production without causing a still further rise in the cost of living. Undoubtedly if we must in each case weigh the advantages of a support program against the disadvantages of an increase in the cost of
living, many support programs which might otherwise be adopted will be rejected, and other support programs, although finally adopted, will inevitably be delayed.

Section 6(b) of the bill prohibits, with specified exceptions, the making of any subsidy or other payment other than those which have accrued prior to August 1, 1943, if such a payment is designed either (1) to reduce or roll back maximum and support prices or (2) as a substitute for increasing maximum prices or support prices, unless such payments are specifically authorized by the Congress. The specified exceptions are rigidly limited. Subsidies or other payments can be made until the end of the current crop year on any agricultural commodity other than milk or livestock if, prior to June 15, 1943, the Government was committed to make them. Wheat can be sold for feeding purposes at not less than the parity price for corn. Maximum and support prices on domestic fats and oils and oil seeds can be adjusted as necessary to assure adequate production.

Section 7 seeks to subject to the War Food Administration's control all the powers given under section 2(e) of the Emergency Price Control Act in respect to the purchase, sale, storage, and use of foods. I am sure that the War Food Administration is amply capable of handling such a task. But even its hands are shackled by the imposition of rigid restrictions which were included neither in the original Price Control Act nor in the Act of October 2, 1942.

Section 7 provides that purchases can be made only at prices which reflect to the farmer not less than the maximum price provided in the Act of October 2, 1942, or the announced support price, whichever is the higher. No purchases can be made for the purpose of reducing any maximum price. No purchases can be made for the purpose of resale at a loss unless made under a program announced prior to July 1, 1943. Even under preexisting commitments, the Government is not authorized to make purchases which will involve losses in excess of $150,000,000. It apparently prohibits any purchase and sale program involving any loss for the 1944 crop. Commodities purchased are not to be
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sold for less than the maximum price limitations provided in the Act of October 2, 1942, or contrary to section 2(f) of the Price Control Act. It is far from clear that this last restriction does not nullify the exception in section 6 permitting wheat to be sold for feed at the corn parity price.

It is not clear whether the restrictions in sections 6 and 7 are cumulative or whether the Congress wished to draw a distinction between direct subsidies and trading losses resulting from the purchase and resale of foods.

Reputable lawyers could, I am advised, argue that section 6 completely nullifies section 7. If I should agree, then the bill would be even more inflationary. If I should take the contrary view, I may be sure that I will be accused of misconstruing the law.

Many other serious complications and difficulties in administering and construing the bill have been brought to my attention. But if I attempted to deal with all of them here my message would become as complicated and confused as the language of the bill itself.

When farm prices were low, in time of peace, no one in either branch of Government ever suggested that the Commodity Credit Corporation should be forbidden to take losses in its operations. Now, in the critical emergency of war, it is proposed to tie the Corporation's hands in ways undreamed of in less strenuous days.

No matter how this measure is interpreted, it will have a devastating effect upon our economy and our war effort about which I believe the Congress and the American people ought clearly to be warned.

1. This bill blacks out the program to reduce the cost of living. In other words, it completely outlaws the recent reductions in the price of meat and butter which we instituted in order to help get the cost of living back down from the height to which it has risen in recent months.

By this measure, the Congress will compel every housewife to pay 5c a pound more for every piece of butter that goes on her
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table, and to pay higher prices for every pork chop, every ounce of beef, every slice of ham or bacon which goes to feed her family.

2. This measure will make it virtually impossible to institute any additional measures to reduce the cost of living or even to hold the line.

3. The bill denies to the Executive any power to purchase farm products for resale at a loss or to make incentive payments to obtain increased production of foodstuffs without the approval of the Congress. I do not believe that the Congress has had an opportunity to know or to consider how seriously it may cripple our entire food program.

It is proper for the Congress to set the limits within which our food programs must operate and the principles to which they must conform. But there is not time to submit each specific food program for Congressional approval. Crops will not wait for Congressional debate. To require specific approval of each specific program is in effect a prohibition.

In order to obtain a greater production of important war foods it may be necessary to establish special incentives for our farmers. We are asking our agricultural producers to change their farming methods and to grow new crops to which they are unaccustomed and which we need greatly in place of the old crops to which they are accustomed and which we may not need so greatly. It may often be difficult for the War Food Administrator to decide just how great an incentive is required for this purpose. This bill does not prevent the continued use of generous incentive payments to obtain strategic war materials other than food. Yet food is as important as any other strategic war material.

This measure, however, would mean that every additional dollar paid to the farmer to get the extra war crops we need to feed our soldiers abroad would reduce the purchasing power of the limited allowances of their wives and children at home.

Such a restrictive measure would serve only to set the soldier, the worker, and the unorganized consumer at war with the farmer.

The original Price Control Act gave the Government certain
powers to regulate prices. In the summer of last year I informed the Congress that the Administration could not control the cost of living and prevent inflation unless it was given more adequate power to stabilize wages and food prices. Thereafter the Congress passed the Act of October 2, 1942, which authorized me to stabilize prices, wages, and salaries affecting the cost of living so far as practicable on the basis of the levels which existed on September 15, 1942.

The measure now before me virtually nullifies the Act of October 2, 1942. This Government cannot effectively stabilize the cost of living if it cannot stabilize the cost of necessary foods. As a matter of fact this measure even takes from the Government powers which it was given under the first Price Control Act.

As the danger of inflation grows, the Congress would by this bill put new shackles on those whose duty it is to fight inflation. The fight against inflation cannot be won that way.

To get our economy to work I realize that we cannot rigidly freeze all prices or all wages. In some cases we must pay higher prices to producers to get the extra war production which we need because that extra production costs more to produce. We must likewise put more money in the worker's pay envelope when he works longer hours or when he does more skilled or efficient work, or when his pay is insufficient to keep him on a decent subsistence level. But with a well-balanced combination of measures we must keep wage rates and consumers' food prices from rising if we wish to hold down living costs.

Our wage stabilization program is and must be dependent on the stabilization of the cost of living. This is expressly recognized in the Act of October 2, 1942. The Little Steel formula was based on the fact that there had been a rise of approximately 15 percent in the cost of living between January, 1941, and May, 1942, for which rise workers could be compensated by wage increases.

The cost of living is now about 8 percent above the level of May, 1942, and about 6 percent above last September. There has been an increase in the average worker's weekly pay check since September. This increase has come primarily through longer
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hours and through the shift of workers into war industries from lower-paid civilian occupations, although increases in wage rates to correct inequities have played a part. But there are many workers who have enjoyed no increase in earnings.

It is too easy to act on the assumption that all consumers have surplus purchasing power; and that the high earnings of some workers in munitions plants are enjoyed by every worker’s family. This easy assumption overlooks the 4,000,000 wage workers still earning less than 40c per hour, and millions of others whose incomes are almost as low. It ignores the fact that more than 4,000,-

000 families have not had an increase of more than 5 percent in their income during the last eighteen months. It further ignores the millions of salaried, white-collar workers — the school teachers, the clergymen, the State, county, and city officials, the policemen, the firemen, the clerks — whose salaries have remained low, but whose living standards are being cruelly and inequitably slashed by higher food prices. It equally ignores others on fixed incomes — the dependent mother of the soldier boy with her scant $37 per month, the widow living off the proceeds of her husband’s insurance policy, and the old-age pensioner.

These millions are entitled to be protected against skyrocketing food costs. It is my duty to guard them against the ravages of inflation — and I shall guard them unless the Congress shackles my hand.

These unorganized millions must not become the forgotten men and women of our war economy.

The plea has been urged on behalf of industrial workers that if the cost of living is not cut to September, or even to May, 1942, levels, wage rates should be raised to compensate. But to raise wages because living costs have risen will be at best only a temporary solution. Raising wage rates increases the cost of production, both of war goods and of the goods whose prices make up the cost of living. It also increases consumers’ spending power. The combined effect of increased spending power and increased production cost is inevitably a further rise in the cost of living; and at the same time the money cost of the war increases. In short,
to give people more money because prices are rising does not
cure the evil, but makes it worse. This is precisely what is meant
by the “inflationary spiral.”

To prevent this spiral of rising costs and prices we must hold
firm to the stabilization of wage rates. But to do this, we must
assure workers that they can get a fair share of available goods on
legitimate markets, and at prices “so far as practicable on the basis
of the levels which existed on September 15,” as prescribed by
the Act of October 2.

Whatever theoretical choices may conceivably be open to us,
practically we will have only two. We must keep the cost of living
more nearly in line with the level prescribed in the law or we
will not be able to hold the wage line or protect the millions of
men and women living on low salaries and small fixed incomes.
If wages rise, the cost of living will not stand where it is; it will
go up and the inflationary spiral will gain strength.

I do not think that a reduction of all living costs or wage in-
creases to the September level is practicable. We all must be pre-
pared in total war to accept a substantial cut in our accustomed
standards of living. But we must definitely stop the rising trend
of living and push back the price to consumers of important key
commodities in the family market basket.

When I talk of important key commodities I do not mean fur
clothes, or tailored suits or caviar. I mean the necessities of life,
things like bread, milk, butter, sugar, coffee, ordinary meats, fats
and canned foods, things that plain working folk must have. We
must not only keep the price of these necessities down, but we
must increase, when we can, the supply which helps relieve the
pressures for higher prices and helps reduce the temptations of
the black markets. With the improvement in the war against the
submarine we may even be able soon to remove sugar and pos-
sibly later coffee from the ration list. But we cannot hope in a
period of total war to increase the supply of all necessities suf-
ficiently to relieve the price situation.

To reduce the price of key necessities or even to hold some of
them at present levels, we either will have to reduce producers' prices and distributors' margins or we will have to use subsidies.

That does not mean that we can achieve stabilization by subsidies alone, without firm price and wage policies, adequate fiscal measures, and positive programs to assure that adequate supplies of essentials at legitimate prices will be available in the legitimate markets.

But the experience of other countries like Canada and England does demonstrate that limited subsidies can and must be effectively used as a key weapon to control inflation.

The alternative to such action would be more costly to the Treasury and to the people. If we do not take the course of action I have suggested, we shall be charged with having failed to stabilize the cost of living, as the Act of October 2, 1942, directed us to do, and there will be increasing demands from the workers of the Nation for a drastic modification of the Little Steel formula.

If a 10-percent over-all increase in wages should occur as a consequence of our failure to stabilize living costs, that added cost of labor alone would cause an increase of not less than 4½ percent in the general level of prices. That would increase our annual war costs approximately 4½ billion dollars. For we are spending 100 billions per annum for war and every rise of 1 percent in the prices the Government pays adds approximately one billion to the Government's war expenditures. I say approximately because some of the expenditures would not automatically be increased. A 10-percent wage increase would, moreover, increase the cost of living by at least 4½ percent and would cost consumers at least 4 billion dollars a year.

And, what is more, if we should have to abandon the hold-the-line Order and to allow wages to rise we would have no assurance that we would be able to hold living costs stable even at a higher level. Rising costs would continue to press against the price and wage levels and these would be forced higher still. Rising wages would add to the excess purchasing power, and an enlarged inflationary gap would make the fiscal task of absorbing
excess purchasing power by higher taxes and enforced savings unmanageable. Those with meager wages and small fixed incomes would be ground below the margin of fair subsistence.

I need not tell the Congress the devastation which will be wrought, far and wide, on the farmer, the worker, and the businessman, if the fires of inflation ever got out of control. The farmers will never forget the deflation following the last war and the sufferings they then endured.

To protect the farmer it is not necessary to oppress the consumer. The way to protect the farmer is to authorize the Commodity Credit Corporation to pay the farmer what he should get for his products and to sell those products at a loss if need be to keep the cost of living down. That may be a subsidy, but that is the only way to avoid inflation which will be ruinous to farmer and consumer alike. If we prohibit subsidies and allow the cost of living to rise, as this bill does, whatever support prices we make to the farmer will be nullified by the inflation of all prices and all costs.

I have just been informed that the preliminary figures indicate that between May 15 and June 15 there was a decrease of 1 percent in food prices. This is the first decline in the food price index in more than a year. This bill would wipe out that decline and start anew a rise in the cost of living. I cannot by signing it share the responsibility for that rise and its disastrous consequences.

Those in command of our war economy like those in command of our armies must be endowed with adequate authority to meet emergency situations as they arise.

Subsidies to help hold down living costs and at the same time protect the farmer should be applied only in strictly limited and clearly defined circumstances. Such subsidies should be confined to goods essential to the maintenance of a reasonable wartime standard of living for the people. Wherever the grant of subsidies at flat rates would involve gross windfall profits for low-cost producers, processors, or distributors, they should be granted...
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on a differential basis to cover the special burdens of small business and high-cost producers.

I do not intend to permit farm prices and farm incomes to be depressed. Today the aggregate net income of farmers like that of the workers is larger than ever before. As a result of my recommendation of September 7, 1942, that a floor be established for farm prices, Congress by the Act of October 2, 1942, guaranteed to farmers 90 percent of parity on most farm products during the war and for at least two crop years thereafter — a guaranty given to no other group. If further payments to farmers are necessary to enable them to make the added outlays required to increase the production of war crops, those payments should and will be made.

But unless the Congress leaves with the executive branch the means of seeing to it that further increases in producers' prices do not increase the cost of living, the executive branch cannot accept responsibility for holding the wage line or for stopping the inflationary spiral.

If I am to hold the line, my hands must be left reasonably free to hold it even-handedly.

In this task of saving our free economy, Congress and the Executive must work together, as a team. H. R. 2869 marks a definite retreat from economic stability toward uncontrolled inflation. That retreat cannot be made with my approval.

I sincerely hope that if the Congress cannot agree before its recess on legislation which will remove the serious defects in this bill, it will pass a joint resolution continuing the life of the Commodity Credit Corporation and providing the increase in borrowing power until the Congress has time to agree upon an appropriate measure. The officials of the executive departments will welcome an opportunity to furnish information and be of assistance.

I return the bill without my signature.

*NOTE*: The foregoing message was one of the President's longest and most vigorous veto messages. Throughout the war, the President fought constantly against special groups and sectional interests which
72. Veto of Bill Restricting Commodity Credit Corporation

attempted to obtain legislation to benefit themselves. In this particular case, as on several other occasions, the farm bloc tried to prevent the Commodity Credit Corporation from using the important weapon of food subsidies to stabilize the cost of living.

By Executive Order No. 6340, October 16, 1933, the President had established the Commodity Credit Corporation (see Item 140 and note, pp. 404-407, 1933 volume). The purpose of the Commodity Credit Corporation was to support farm prices by loans to farmers which enabled them to retain their products instead of dumping them on the market.

In carrying out the price control and stabilization program, it was apparent that bold measures were needed to hold the line on food prices. Accordingly, on June 19, 1942, the President wrote the Secretary of Agriculture as follows:

"Pending clarification of the policy of Congress on this question, I am asking you to use Commodity Credit Corporation funds, or funds available to the Department . . . for the purpose of making purchases for resale at a possible loss in those instances in which the situation is so critical that some sort of action needs to be taken in the very near future."

In addition, the President wrote in a letter to Price Administrator Leon Henderson:

"I would like to have you work with the Department of Agriculture on this program and render every possible assistance to the end that we maintain the highest possible production of food commodities while holding the cost of living at present levels."

Various programs of the Commodity Credit Corporation were used to help maintain ceiling prices set by the O.P.A. on food staples—such as sugar, coffee, meats, milk, and eggs—and some textiles and cotton. Yet strong pressure groups interested in raising agricultural prices wrote into the bill H.R. 2869 rigid restrictions on the use of subsidies by the Commodity Credit Corporation. These would have crippled the stabilization program.

The President’s veto was sustained by a 228-154 vote in favor of overriding the veto, which fell short of the necessary two-thirds.

In his veto message, the President suggested that if the Congress could not agree on legislation which would remove the serious defects in the bill, it should pass a joint resolution to continue the life of the Commodity Credit Corporation and provide for an increase in its borrowing power. Such a joint resolution was considered by the Congress immediately after the President’s veto of the previous measure had been sustained. On July 16, 1943, the President signed House Joint Resolution No. 147 continuing the Commodity Credit Corporation until December 31, 1943 (see Item 79 and note, this volume).

The series of efforts by the farm bloc to kill food subsidies and to
redefine parity were renewals of the battles involved in passing the Stabilization Act of 1942 (see Items 91, 97 and notes, 1942 volume). The demands of the farm bloc were temporarily checked when the 110 percent parity provision of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 was removed from the Stabilization Act passed in October; yet the farm bloc continued to bring powerful pressure to bear to change the definition of "parity" in order to favor farm groups.

Although the President won this fight to hold the line in July, 1943, the opponents of stabilization did not give up easily. The same issue arose in February, 1944, when pressure groups attempted to check the use of Commodity Credit Corporation funds for keeping down the cost of living. Once again, the President vetoed this crippling legislation, and his veto was again sustained (see Item 12 and note, 1944-1945 volume).

73 The President Announces the Attack on Sicily in the Course of Informal, Extemporaneous Remarks at State Dinner in Honor of General Giraud. July 9, 1943

I have just had word of the first attack against the soft underbelly of Europe.

I am going to ask you not to say anything about it after you leave here, until midnight ends.

American and British forces, and some French observers, have attacked and landed in Sicily. The operations have just begun, and we won’t get definite news until later in the day, but the news will be coming in all the time from now on.

This is a good illustration of the fact of planning, not the desire for planning but the fact of planning, which we have had since the administration began over a year ago in Washington. With the commencing of the expedition in North Africa with complete cooperation between the British and ourselves, that was followed by complete cooperation with the French in North Africa. The result, after landing, was the Battle of Tunis; and
we all know the number of prisoners we took. That was not all planning, that was cooperation. From that time on we have been working in complete harmony, which in effect was the invasion of Europe, which is under way tonight.

There are a great many objectives, and of course the major objective is the elimination of Germany—that goes without saying—the elimination of Germany out of the war. And as a result of this step which is in progress at this moment, we hope it is the beginning of the end. Last autumn, the Prime Minister of England called it "the end of the beginning." I think you can almost say that this action tonight is the beginning of the end.

We are going to be ashore in a naval sense—air sense—military. Once there, we have the opportunity of going in different directions, and I want to tell General Giraud that we haven't forgotten France as one of the directions.

One of our prime aims, of course, is the restoration of the people of France, and the sovereignty of France. Even if a move is not directed at this moment to France itself, General Giraud can rest assured that the ultimate objective—we will do it, and in the best way—is to liberate the people of France, not merely the southern part of France, just for a while, but the people of northern France—Paris.

And in this whole operation, I should say rightly that in the enormous planning we have had the complete cooperation of the French military and naval forces in North Africa. Gradually the opposition cooled, and the older regime is breaking down. We have seen what has happened, or is happening at the present moment in Martinique and Guadeloupe, and becoming worse. Well, that is a very major part toward the big objective. It is going to be worth working for. The Navy, the Army, the merchant ships of Martinique, I hope, will be working with us day in and day out toward the unity of all of our forces.

We haven't won the war yet, but one of the happy things is that with the help of General Giraud, in command of the French forces in North Africa, we have got a unified military situation. Well, that goes a long way; and that is why ever since my friend
74. Assurances to Pope Pius XII on Italian Invasion

and I met at Casablanca last January, I became perfectly sure that under General Giraud's leadership the French military and naval forces in North Africa would more and more work with us, as we have done — not all we want — to help rearm those French forces, and to build up the French strength so that when the time comes, from a military point of view, when we get into France itself and throw the Germans out, there will be a French Army and French ships working with the British and ourselves. That is why it is a very great symbol that General Giraud is here tonight — to come over here to talk to us about his military problems, toward the same objective that all the United Nations have gone — the freedom of France, and with it the unity of France.

So I think everybody here is very happy to drink with me to the success, health, and happiness of General Giraud.

NOTE: In responding to the President's remarks, General Giraud expressed gratification for American assistance in rearming the soldiers of France and referred to the United States as "that great Nation through which peace and freedom will be restored to the world."

74 Pope Pius XII Is Given Assurances on the Allied Invasion of Italian Soil. July 10, 1943

By the time this message reaches Your Holiness a landing in force by American and British troops will have taken place on Italian soil. Our soldiers have come to rid Italy of Fascism and all its unhappy symbols, and to drive out the Nazi oppressors who are infesting her soil.

There is no need for me to reaffirm that respect for religious beliefs and for the free exercise of religious worship is fundamental to our ideas. Churches and religious institutions will, to the extent that it is within our power, be spared the devastations of war during the struggle ahead. Throughout the period of operations the neutral status of Vatican City as well as of the Papal domains throughout Italy will be respected.

I look forward, as does Your Holiness, to that bright day when
the peace of God returns to the world. We are convinced that this will occur only when the forces of evil which now hold vast areas of Europe and Asia enslaved have been utterly destroyed. On that day we will joyfully turn our energies from the grim duties of war to the fruitful tasks of reconstruction. In common with all other Nations and forces imbued with the spirit of good will toward men, and with the help of Almighty God, we will turn our hearts and our minds to the exacting task of building a just and enduring peace on earth.

NOTE: Pope Pius XII had long been a personal friend of the President; in 1936, as Papal Secretary of State, he had an extended visit with the President at Hyde Park. During the first Christmas season after the outbreak of the European war in 1939, the President had addressed to His Holiness an appeal that the moral and spiritual forces of mankind be united for the future re-establishment of world peace on a surer foundation (see Item 170 and note, pp. 606-609, 1939 volume).

As the result of the President's first letter to the Pope, Myron C. Taylor, who had dealt with the Vatican during his service on the Intergovernmental Committee on Political Refugees, was sent to the Vatican as the President's personal representative (see Item 15, pp. 78-79, and Item 20, pp. 101-102, 1940 volume, for additional references to the mission of Myron C. Taylor to the Vatican). The President requested Mr. Taylor to discuss with Pope Pius the four cornerstones of peace which the President had been considering early in 1940 — namely, freedom of religion, freedom of communication of news and knowledge, reduction of armament, and freedom of trade between Nations.

Mr. Taylor was first received at the Vatican on February 27, 1940, and subsequently made six visits ranging from one or two weeks to a year in duration. The President made it clear that Mr. Taylor's mission did not constitute the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Vatican, but rather that it was a personal mission to Pope Pius XII from the President, with Mr. Taylor acting as the President's individual representative.

Following the conquest of North Africa and Tunisia, the invasion of Sicily began on July 10, 1943. Concurrently, the President sent the foregoing message to the Pope, assuring him that the neutral status of Vatican City and the Papal domains throughout Italy would be respected. In a previous message of June 16, 1943, the President had also stated to His Holiness:

"Attacks against Italy are limited, to the extent humanly possible, to military objectives. We have not and will
not make warfare on civilians or against non-military objectives. In the event it should be found militarily necessary for Allied planes to operate over Rome our aviators are thoroughly informed as to the location of the Vatican and have been specifically instructed to prevent bombs from falling within the Vatican City.”

Extreme care was exercised by our military forces to preserve the religious, artistic, and historic shrines, monuments, and other treasures in the invaded countries. It was inevitable, however, that the enemy would attempt to take advantage of this desire of the American forces by using churches and other religious buildings for military purposes. It unfortunately became necessary for our forces occasionally to take firm counter measures against these tactics of the enemy, but only when all other means had been exhausted.

After the liberation of Rome in 1944, the President, on June 14, 1944, dispatched the following message to Pope Pius XII:

“As the onmarch of freedom flung open the gates of Rome, one of my first thoughts was to send back to Your Holiness my trusted representative, Mr. Myron Taylor. I am sure that Your Holiness will welcome him as in the past, knowing that he brings with him not only my personal greetings but also the prayers of the people of the United States for a swift end to this tragic conflict and their resolve to help build a friendly world in which men may live in peace and righteousness.”

Following this message, Mr. Taylor again visited Pope Pius XII after an absence of two years which had been caused by the opposition of Mussolini. The President continued to exchange messages with the Pope and to communicate with him through his personal representative during the ensuing months, as both great leaders devoted themselves to the task of planning for an enduring peace.

75 Statement on Signing a Bill Suspending the Crop Insurance Program. July 12, 1943

The Department of Agriculture Appropriation Bill, which I have today signed, provides no funds for continuing the crop insurance program. I regret exceedingly that Congress failed to provide funds to continue this aid to the farmers of the Nation.

One of the greatest obstacles which confronts the farmer in maintaining a stable income is the hazard of weather.

The crop insurance program was designed to give the farmer protection against having his income wiped out or greatly reduced by unfavorable weather or some other disaster.
This protection is sorely needed by the small farmers, who in most instances have no financial reserve to tide them over until another crop can be made.

The reason assigned for putting an end to crop insurance is that it was too expensive. It was to be expected that in perfecting a program of such magnitude the Government would have to go to much expense, and it would take several years to give it a fair trial. I do not feel that the Department of Agriculture has been given sufficient time to demonstrate the practicability of crop insurance. Any program involving so many complications and such a great amount of educational work with the farmers cannot be placed on a sustaining or entirely satisfactory basis within a few years.

When the Government first experimented with rural free delivery of mail, there were those who said it was too costly and was not practicable. More recently when we began inaugurating a program of rural electrification there were those who said it was not practicable and would prove too costly.

These and other programs, which at first were declared not feasible, are now recognized as a great blessing to our rural population, and they have been made to work on a practical and satisfactory basis.

If we can make crop insurance work, it will, in my opinion, prove one of the greatest steps ever taken by the Government toward making farming a sound and profitable occupation.

Certainly in these times when the farmer is being urged to produce more and assume greater risks, we should not stop a program which is of such tremendous potential value to him.

I certainly hope that when Congress returns from its recess funds will be provided to continue this program, which will mean so much to our farmers and at the same time enable agriculture to be placed on a more stable basis than ever before.

NOTE: Under the terms of the Federal Crop Insurance Act, which had been approved by the President on February 16, 1938 (52 Stat. 72), crop insurance had been made available to farmers on the 1939 wheat crop. This Act, which constituted Title 5 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, was enacted as a result of almost two years
75. Ending of the Crop Insurance Program

of investigation by the President and his agricultural advisers. (See Item 131, pp. 366-368, 1936 volume, for the President's initial establishment of committees to investigate a crop insurance program; see Item 20 and note, pp. 85-91, 1937 volume, for the President's message to the Congress based on the report of his crop insurance committees; and see note to Item 24, p. 92, 1938 volume, and Item 40 and note, pp. 181-183, 1940 volume, for further discussions of the plans and operation of crop insurance for various crops.)

After the President had reluctantly vetoed a bill to extend crop insurance to cotton in 1940, on the ground that the legislation did not provide a self-supporting insurance plan (see Item 40 and note, pp. 181-183, 1940 volume), in a letter to the Secretary of Agriculture dated April 5, 1941, he advocated the extension of crop insurance to cover other crops. This was done through legislation approved June 21, 1941, which extended Federal insurance to cover cotton.

As indicated by the President in the foregoing statement, the Department of Agriculture Appropriation Act for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1944, failed to provide funds for crop insurance except in connection with the liquidation of insurance contracts on the wheat and cotton crops planted prior to July 31, 1943 (57 Stat. 392). The Congress took this action primarily because many farmers had not fully accepted the crop insurance plan in the counties covered by it; as a result, losses to the Government exceeded premiums on wheat by some 50 percent and on cotton by approximately 66 percent. These losses were due to exceptionally poor crops in some of the counties covered by insurance.

As a result of the Congressional action in July, 1943, widespread protests were received from farmers. The Congress on December 29, 1944, enacted an amendment to the Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1938, which the President approved (58 Stat. 918), reinstituting crop insurance commencing with crops planted for harvest in 1945. The new law extended the coverage to flax as well as wheat and cotton, and also authorized a trial insurance program in 1945 to cover corn and tobacco in a limited number of counties. Insurance was provided against loss in yields due to unavoidable causes, including drought, flood, hail, wind, frost, winter-kill, lightning, fire, excessive rain, snow, wild life, hurricane, tornado, insect infestation, plant disease, and such other unavoidable causes as were determined by the Board of the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation.

Under the terms of the Act, the premium rates were made uniform for all farms within a county, with the costs of administration being paid by the Federal Government. Insurance payments were increased in proportion to the progress of the
crop; for example, if a crop were destroyed early in the season, the insurance payment was only a small proportion of what it was at the time of harvest.

The system of crop insurance, plans for which were initiated by the President in 1936, was a means of removing some of the risks of farming and assuring a more stable return. By widespread application of the insurance principle by the Federal Government, along with the spreading of the premium rates among many farms in different sections of the country, it was possible to provide crop insurance at reasonable rates and protect the farmers of the Nation against financial losses due to unavoidable causes.

76  The President Marks Bastille Day.

July 14, 1943

The fourteenth of July is, for all the peoples of the world, devoted to the ideals of Liberty, a day of celebration. We observe it this year, here in the United States, with special fervor. Immortal France has reaffirmed once again, in the most heroic circumstances, her greatness and her glory.

On this anniversary of the winning by the French people of their liberties, I wish to recall again that the fundamental principles which guide our democracies were evolved from the American and the French Revolutions. The keystone of our democratic structure is the principle which places governmental authority in the people, and in the people only. There can be one symbol only for Frenchmen — France herself. She transcends all parties, personalities, and groups: They live indeed only in the glory of French nationhood.

One of our war aims, as set forth in the Atlantic Charter, is to restore the mastery of their destinies to the peoples now under the invaders’ yoke. There must be no doubt, anywhere, of the unalterable determination of the United Nations to restore to the oppressed peoples their full and sacred rights.

French sovereignty resides in the people of France.

Today, this people is shackled by barbaric oppression. In the
freedom of tomorrow, when Frenchmen and their brothers in arms of the United Nations have cleansed French soil of the enemy, the French people will again give expression to their freedom in the erecting of a Government of their own free choice.

Long live Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. May France live forever!

77. Controversy Between Henry Wallace and Jesse Jones

I have come to the conclusion that the unfortunate controversy and acrimonious public debate which has been carried on between you in the public press concerning the administration of foreign economic matters make it necessary, in the public interest, to transfer these matters to other hands.

In the midst of waging a war so critical to our national security and to the future of all civilization, there is not sufficient time to investigate and determine where the truth lies in your conflicting versions as to transactions which took place over a year and a half ago.

My action today is not intended to decide that question. The important thing is to clear the decks and to get on with the war at once. To do this requires a fresh start with new men, unencumbered by interagency dissension and bitterness.

I am persuaded that the present controversy indicates that future cooperative action between your two agencies is impos-
sible, and that without full cooperation between you the pro-
gram of economic warfare cannot be carried out.

I am sure that the American people understand that both of
you have attempted to do your duty as you have seen it; but we
must go forward without any further public debate as to matters
which are now academic so far as winning the war is presently
concerned.

I have therefore issued today an Executive Order of which I
am attaching a copy for your information and guidance.

Very sincerely yours,

* * *

(The following letter was sent to the heads of all Federal departments
and agencies.)

Dear Sir:

On August 21, 1942, I sent to the head of each department
and agency of the Federal Government a letter, copy of which is
attached.

I call your attention to the statement contained in that letter
that “disagreements either as to fact or policy should not be
publicly aired, but are to be submitted to me by the appropriate
heads of the conflicting agencies.” Notwithstanding these posi-
tive instructions, disagreements between agencies have been pub-
licly aired on several occasions.

I realize the nervous strain under which Government officials
are working in wartime but I cannot overlook any further viola-
tions of my instructions. By this letter I do not place any restric-
tion upon your furnishing statements in response to Congres-
sional inquiries. But if when you have a disagreement with an-
other agency as to fact or policy, instead of submitting it to me
or submitting it to the Director of War Mobilization for settle-
ment under the terms of the Order creating that office, you feel
you should submit it to the press, I ask that when you release
77. Controversy Between Henry Wallace and Jesse Jones

the statement for publication, you send to me a letter of resigna-
tion.

If any subordinate of yours violates my instructions in this
regard, I shall expect you to ask for his immediate resignation.

I am sending identical letters to the heads of every department
and agency of the Government.

Sincerely yours,

* * *

The Executive Order:

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and
the statutes of the United States, particularly by the First War
Powers Act, 1941, as President of the United States and as Com-
mander in Chief of the Army and Navy, and in order to provide
for the more effective unification of the agencies concerned with
foreign economic affairs, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. The Board of Economic Warfare, existing pursuant to para-
graph 2 of Executive Order No. 8839, July 30, 1941, as amended
by Executive Order No. 8982, December 17, 1941, is terminated.
There is established in the Office for Emergency Management an
Office of Economic Warfare, at the head of which shall be a Direc-
tor, appointed by the President, who shall exercise the functions,
powers, and duties of the Board of Economic Warfare. The
Director shall receive such salary, travel, subsistence, or other
allowances as the President may determine.

There are transferred to the Office of Economic Warfare for
use in connection with the exercise and performance of its func-
tions, powers, and duties so much of the unexpended balances,
appropriations, allocations and other funds now available for,
as well as all the personnel, property, and records heretofore used
in the administration of the functions, powers, and duties of, the
Board of Economic Warfare.

No part of any funds appropriated or made available under
Public Law 139, approved July 12, 1943, shall be used, directly
or indirectly, after August 15, 1943, by the Office of Economic Warfare for the procurement of services, supplies, or equipment outside the United States except for the purpose of executing general economic programs or policies formally approved in writing by a majority of the War Mobilization Committee and such writing has been filed with the Secretary of State prior to any such expenditure.

2. The United States Commercial Company, the Rubber Development Corporation, the Petroleum Reserve Corporation, and the Export-Import Bank of Washington and their functions, powers, and duties, together with the functions, powers, and duties of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and of the Secretary of Commerce with respect to them are transferred to the Office of Economic Warfare. All personnel, property, records, funds (including all unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, or other funds now available), contracts, assets, liabilities, and capital stock of these corporations, together with so much of the personnel, records, and property of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation used in the administration of these corporations as the Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall determine, are transferred with these corporations to the Office of Economic Warfare for use in connection with the exercise and performance of its functions, powers, and duties. The Director of the Office of Economic Warfare may reconstitute the Boards of Directors of these corporations and take such other action as he deems necessary in respect of them to carry out the purposes of this Order.

3. (a) Until such time as the Congress shall provide other means of financing, the Secretary of Commerce and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation are authorized and directed to supply necessary funds to the corporations transferred to the Office of Economic Warfare by this Order through loans, using for this purpose all the borrowing powers and unobligated funds of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Such funds shall be supplied at such times and in such amounts and in such manner and upon such terms and conditions as the Director of War
77. Controversy Between Henry Wallace and Jesse Jones

Mobilization, on the request of the Director of the Office of Economic Warfare, may from time to time determine. The disbursement of the funds so supplied shall be under the exclusive direction of the Director of the Office of Economic Warfare, except as otherwise provided in this Order.

(b) The functions, powers, and duties and outstanding contracts and obligations relating to activities and transactions in or pertaining to foreign countries, now vested in, or in the name of, any corporation created and organized under Section 5(d) of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act, or of any other corporation organized by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, shall, unless the Director of War Mobilization otherwise determines, be transferred to the corporation or corporations designated by the Director of the Office of Economic Warfare, and the charter and by-laws of the corporations affected by such transfers, so far as necessary, shall be amended accordingly. Following such transfers, no corporations created and organized by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, other than those transferred to the Office of Economic Warfare by this Order, shall exercise any of its powers and functions in regard to any activity or transaction in or pertaining to any foreign country except as ordered by the Director of War Mobilization. The Secretary of Commerce, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and any corporation organized by it, shall execute and deliver all instruments which may be deemed necessary by the Director of War Mobilization to carry out the provisions of this Order.

4. The functions of the Office of War Mobilization shall include the authority to arrange for the unification and coordination of the activities of the Federal Government relating to foreign supply, foreign procurement, and other foreign economic affairs in conformity with the foreign policy of the United States as defined by the Secretary of State. In providing for such unification the Office of War Mobilization may utilize the facilities of other departments and agencies, including the machinery for the coordination of foreign economic affairs established in the Department of State.
5. All prior Executive Orders and directives in so far as they are in conflict herewith are amended accordingly.

NOTE: The foregoing Executive Order was the climax of a difficult and embarrassing controversy between the Board of Economic Warfare and Henry A. Wallace on one hand, and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and Jesse H. Jones on the other. It was inevitable, with the enormous expansion of functions brought by the war, that jurisdictional lines between agencies were not always precisely defined. And in this case, overlapping functions were aggravated by conflicting personalities. It is well known that one of President Roosevelt's characteristics was his reluctance to handle difficult administrative problems by discharges of personnel or other drastic action. But in this case, he took action as rare for him as it was distasteful. He was forced to "discipline" two members of the official family who, though in other respects they held entirely different views, were alike in their zeal in behalf of the war effort.

The foregoing Executive Order established the Office of Economic Warfare, headed by Leo T. Crowley, and abolished the Board of Economic Warfare, formerly headed by Henry A. Wallace. It transferred to the new Office of Economic Warfare various subsidiary corporations of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, headed by Jesse H. Jones, which had been engaged in foreign purchasing and import transactions. The establishment of this Office was part of the President's underlying plan to consolidate the agencies engaged in international economic relations. An even more thorough consolidation of such agencies was effected when the President issued Executive Order No. 9380, establishing the Foreign Economic Administration, on September 25, 1943 (see Item 104 and note, this volume).

In his statement on August 21, 1942 (see Item 84 and note, 1942 volume), the President had issued instructions that disagreements between agencies and agency officials should not be aired publicly but should be submitted to the White House. Henry A. Wallace and Jesse H. Jones failed to abide by these instructions. As a result, the President removed Mr. Wallace as Chairman of the Board of Economic Warfare and abolished the agency. The President also removed Mr. Jones from his directorship of the R.F.C. subsidiary corporations and transferred those corporations to the new Office of Economic Warfare.

The acrimonious and unfortunate personal controversy between Mr. Wallace and Mr. Jones should not obscure the fact that their organizations had successfully performed an enormous job. They succeeded in the stock-piling of critical
and strategic materials, in purchasing such materials abroad in order to prevent their falling into enemy hands; they controlled the export of American commodities to achieve the maximum benefit to friendly countries without too seriously depleting our own war stocks; and they directed economic warfare against the enemy itself (see Items 54, 65, 68, and 71, and notes, 1941 volume, and Items 30 and 53, and notes, 1942 volume, on the program of economic defense and warfare).

Conflict between Mr. Wallace and Mr. Jones had long simmered, and finally burst into a blaze in the summer of 1943. Their disagreements had continued for two years, often under cover and sometimes in the press. A briefer and rather less vigorous clash occurred between the Board of Economic Warfare and the Department of State (see Item 53 and note, 1942 volume). By 1943, there could be no compromise between Mr. Jones and Mr. Wallace. They, and many of their subordinates, considered their own organization as the only proponent of the public good while the agency and officials of the other were wholly wrong, and possibly even sinister. But in the midst of such strongly held positions, two related units, one in each of the warring units—the Metals and Minerals Division of the Board of Economic Warfare and the Metals Reserve Corporation of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation—enjoyed excellent relationships, and worked in harmony even though the rest of their organizations were in such strong disagreement.

The distressing and intolerable controversy between Messrs. Wallace and Jones reached its climax in July, 1943. The immediate event which moved the President to take action against both officials had its inception on June 4, 1943, when the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Appropriations criticized the work of the Board of Economic Warfare during a Senate debate. Mr. Wallace prepared a 28-page statement (with a 2-page covering letter) in reply, held it up for several weeks, and finally released it to the press on June 29, 1943. On July 5, Mr. Jones issued a 30-page public statement in reply to Mr. Wallace. This exchange was more than the President's patience and tolerance could stand. Ten days later, by the foregoing Executive Order, he put a "plague on both houses."

As indicated in the text of the Executive Order, the Office of Economic Warfare was forbidden to expend any funds for the execution of any policy until the policy was first approved in writing by the War Mobilization Committee. The latter Committee comprised the Director of the Office of War Mobilization, the Director of Economic Stabilization, the War Food Administrator, the Secretaries of War and Navy, and the Chairman of the War Production Board. On July
29, the Committee adopted a resolution which endorsed in detail programs previously carried on by B.E.W. and R.F.C. subsidiaries for export and import control, exclusive buying, stock-piling, and economic warfare analysis.

At the time the Office of Economic Warfare was established, its Director requested the Bureau of the Budget to make a study looking toward the further consolidation of international economic agencies. Less than three months later, this consolidation was effected by the establishment of the Foreign Economic Administration (see Item 104 and note, this volume).

78. Joint Message of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to the Italian People. July 16, 1943

At this moment the combined armed forces of the United States and Great Britain under the command of General Eisenhower and his Deputy, General Alexander, are carrying the war deep into the territory of your country. This is the direct consequence of the shameful leadership to which you have been subjected by Mussolini and his Fascist regime.

Mussolini carried you into this war as the satellite of a brutal destroyer of peoples and liberties.

Mussolini plunged you into a war which he thought Hitler had already won. In spite of Italy's great vulnerability to attack by air and sea, your Fascist leaders sent your sons, your ships, your air forces, to distant battlefields to aid Germany in her attempt to conquer England, Russia, and the world.

This association with the designs of Nazi-controlled Germany was unworthy of Italy's ancient traditions of freedom and culture — traditions to which the peoples of America and Great Britain owe so much.

Your soldiers have fought not in the interests of Italy but for Nazi Germany. They have fought courageously, but they have been betrayed and abandoned by the Germans on the Russian front and on every battlefield in Africa from El Alamein to Cape Bon.
Today Germany's hopes for world conquest have been blasted on all fronts. The skies over Italy are dominated by the vast air armadas of the United States and Great Britain. Italy's seacoasts are threatened by the greatest accumulation of British and Allied sea power ever concentrated in the Mediterranean.

The forces now opposed to you are pledged to destroy the power of Nazi Germany — power which has ruthlessly been used to inflict slavery, destruction, and death on all those who refuse to recognize the Germans as the master race.

The sole hope for Italy's survival lies in honorable capitulation to the overwhelming power of the military forces of the United Nations.

If you continue to tolerate the Fascist regime which serves the evil power of the Nazis, you must suffer the consequences of your own choice. We take no satisfaction in invading Italian soil and bringing the tragic devastation of war home to the Italian people. But we are determined to destroy the false leaders and their doctrines which have brought Italy to her present position.

Every moment that you resist the combined forces of the United Nations — every drop of blood that you sacrifice — can serve only one purpose: to give the Fascist and Nazi leaders a little more time to escape from the inevitable consequences of their own crimes.

All your interests and all your traditions have been betrayed by Nazi Germany and your own false and corrupt leaders; it is only by disavowing both that a reconstituted Italy can hope to occupy a respected place in the family of European Nations.

The time has now come for you, the Italian people, to consult your own self-respect and your own interests and your own desire for a restoration of national dignity, security, and peace. The time has come for you to decide whether Italians shall die for Mussolini and Hitler — or live for Italy, and for civilization.

**NOTE:** American bombers roared over the Italian mainland and dropped millions of leaflets carrying the foregoing message to the Italian people. In addition, the radio transmitters of the Office of War Information beamed the message to Italy. No doubt these activities hastened the date of unconditional surrender in Italy.
79. Restriction on Powers of O.P.A.

79 (Statement on Signing a Bill Including Restrictions on Powers of the Office of Price Administration. July 16, 1943

I have today signed House Joint Resolution No. 147, which continues the Commodity Credit Corporation.

The bill includes an amendment to the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 which prohibits the use of grade labeling to inform consumers and which restricts the use of standards in maximum price regulations.

The language in the bill relating to standards is so ambiguous that misconceptions have already arisen as to its effect. The matters involved are of the utmost public concern. The legislation was adopted after only fragmentary debate. In view of the uncertainty created, I feel it necessary to state my own understanding of the amendment, as drawn from the expressed intent of its sponsors.

The language of the bill appropriating funds for the Office of Price Administration was construed as prohibiting the Administrator from making use of standards in any case regardless of how essential they were to price control unless such standards had been previously established by industry acceptance or by Government action. Such a construction would cripple price control because trade standards are frequently lacking or, as in the case of the grades of meats, incompletely established.

I am satisfied this bill has no such meaning. It was presented to the Senate and House to avoid the consequences that would have followed the adoption of the language in the appropriation bill. Senator Taft, who sponsored the language in the appropriation bill and the modification in this bill, stated expressly that the modification preserved power in the Administrator to "standardize" a commodity in any case in which this was "absolutely essential to an effective system of fixing prices." These assurances are in accord with the purpose and the terms of the compromise amendment and must be taken as controlling. It is with this understanding that I have signed the bill.

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79. Restriction on Powers of O.P.A.

NOTE: On July 2, 1943, the President had vetoed a bill sharply restricting the use of subsidies by the Commodity Credit Corporation as a means of keeping down the cost of living (see Item 72 and note, this volume). In his veto message, the President had suggested that the Congress extend the powers and increase the borrowing authority of the Commodity Credit Corporation. The Congress promptly passed a joint resolution continuing the C.C.C. until December 31, 1943, and increasing its borrowing power by $350,000,000 (57 Stat. 566). The new Act also authorized the Federal Reserve Banks to act as depositaries, custodians, and fiscal agents of the Corporation. It further required that the Corporation be fully reimbursed for all losses and costs in connection with operations conducted by it for other Government agencies.

In one important respect, however, the Joint Resolution embodied an ambiguous provision which might have seriously hampered the use by the Office of Price Administration of standards for price control. Clearly, in a number of instances standards were necessary for effective price control; it was meaningless to set price ceilings on a product if its nature or quality were so deteriorated as to make the price excessive. The measure relating to the use of standards had been introduced at the very close of the session of the Congress; no public hearings had been directed to the terms of the particular measure. As a result, there was some conflict between the Senate Committee Report, the contentions on the floor during the brief debate, and the language of the conference report.

In the National War Agencies Appropriation Act of 1944, a provision had been included which, as the President pointed out above, had specifically prohibited the Price Administrator from using standards. Section 5 (b) of the pending bill repealed this provision of the National War Agencies Appropriation Bill, but on the other hand the conference report, read out of context, appeared to reiterate this prohibition. Because the Senate debate indicated one interpretation, and the Committee and conference reports indicated different interpretations, the President issued a statement when signing the bill which rejected the narrow interpretation which the conference report seemed to imply.

As the statutory date of expiration of the Commodity Credit Corporation again drew near at the close of 1943, the Congress once more extended the authority of the Corporation — this time to February 17, 1944 (57 Stat. 643). (See Item 12 and note, 1944-1945 volume, for further discussion of extension of the authority and borrowing power of the Commodity Credit Corporation.)
Q. Mr. President, is there any comment you can make, sir, upon establishing Rome as an open city?

The President: I think the easiest thing is to tell you in general what has been happening for over a year.

We have been very anxious to have Rome declared an open city. However, the Fascists would not do it; and on the contrary, it has become — probably was then — a very important military center. That means they were making munitions, and using airports very close to Rome — actually in Rome, and the use of Rome because it’s a railroad center for transportation of troops, guns, and ammunition down to the south of Rome.

And we used every argument, and pleaded that it be made an open city.

But it didn’t work.

We did our best.

And we still hope that the Germans and the Fascists will make it an open city.

Then, of course, we invaded Sicily, and I had to think about American boys; and it seemed perfectly clear that the danger to all of the American troops, and the British troops, in Sicily was being made greater by the constant influx of troops, and ammunition, and guns, and planes from the north. One of the main centers of supply for all that, of course, were the airplane fields, and especially the marshaling yard in Rome.

With the primary objective of saving American and British lives, the more we could prevent that traffic from operating without interruption the better it would be for American troops; and the particular bombing was, of course, very successful.
81. Summation of the 1944 Budget

But I still hope that Rome can be made an open city.

I am not going into the *quid pro quo* question, because I don’t think that really is the point, in the last analysis. With the aid of Italians, the Germans had destroyed something like four thousand churches — the majority of the four thousand were churches, hospitals, and libraries — in Britain. There wasn’t any compunction there. But I don’t think that really is the essential of the thing. In other words, I don’t believe in destruction merely for retaliation; it’s the wrong basis to put it on. But destruction for the saving of the lives of our men in a great war sometimes is an inevitable necessity.

Well, I don’t know that there is anything much to add to that. . . .

Q. Sir, can this be interpreted as an implementation of your remarks to us at some time in the past, when you warned in effect the Italians, that if they did not get out of the war and overthrow their Fascist masters, that they would have to take the consequences?

The President: I don’t think the two things should be confused. They are really separate things. One is the problem of the entire Nation, which is what you are referring to now, and the other is the problem of a city which is venerated all over the world. . . .

*NOTE:* See Item 74 and note, this volume, for the President’s assurances to Pope Pius that religious monuments and shrines in Italy would be protected as far as possible against military destruction.

81 (Statement by the President on the Summation of the 1944 Budget. July 27, 1943

In line with my former practice I am issuing this Budget summation describing the modifications in the program of the Federal Government resulting from intervening appropriation and
revenue acts since submission of my annual Budget last January. The summation presents a more accurate portrayal than was then possible of prospects for the fiscal year just started, in the light of economic developments and Congressional action.

Such a document is especially appropriate this year because my original Budget of six months ago could not present detailed recommendations for war appropriations so far in advance. These recommendations have been transmitted to the Congress in the form of various supplemental estimates over recent months.

The dominating factor in the fiscal situation is, of course, war expenditures. In presenting a tentative estimate in my Budget Message of last January, I said: "... a 100-billion-dollar expenditure program does reflect a national effort of gigantic magnitude. ... Some persons may believe that such a program is fantastic. My reply is that this program is feasible." The 100-billion-dollar estimate for war expenditures during the fiscal year 1944, including net war outlays of Government corporations, still stands.

This huge war bill reflects the military requirements of our aggressive operations in various far-flung theaters of war. It will provide our armed forces with the crushing superiority in equipment which is needed for successful operation with a minimum sacrifice of the lives of our fighting men.

Total Federal expenditures, excluding debt retirement and trust fund disbursements, for fiscal year 1944 are estimated at 106 billion dollars; net receipts will amount to 38 billion dollars under present legislation. The resultant deficit of 68 billion dollars will be reduced if the Congress enacts additional revenue legislation.

These basic facts of the fiscal situation have tremendous importance for all of us, yet it is extremely difficult for an individual to obtain these summary figures from our highly complex laws and records. I hope that this statement will aid the public in understanding the many intricate factors on which they are based.
81. Summation of the 1944 Budget

Appropriations and Expenditures

The dollars-and-cents figures of the Budget are the monetary expression of our Federal program of action. Appropriations are the legal basis for incurring obligations and for the subsequent expenditure of cash. In many cases actual cash payments are not made in the same year for which the appropriations are made and in which the obligations are incurred. This is particularly true in the case of contracts for war materials. Thus, a rather large portion of the total cash to be paid out in 1944 will be used for contracts and commitments entered into under authority of the appropriations of previous years. Similarly, appropriations for the fiscal year 1944 will be used for placing contracts now, but a substantial part of the work will be completed and paid for in future fiscal years. Hence, for any specific year, there are differences between appropriations, obligations, and cash expenditures.

In some cases when a program such as the construction of ships must extend over a long period, the Congress utilizes so-called "contract authorizations" in lieu of immediate appropriations for the full expenditure ultimately involved. Such authorizations enable the executive departments to place contracts now, leaving the appropriation of cash for a later time when the money will be needed to pay the bills.

War Activities: General and Special Accounts. I recommended war appropriations of 100,711 million dollars in the fiscal year 1944. Congress appropriated 97,633 million dollars and approved 2,000 million dollars of contract authorizations in lieu of recommended appropriations. The net result is a reduction of 1,078 million dollars.

This reduction is distributed as follows: War Department, 390 million dollars; emergency war agencies, 387 million dollars; Lend-Lease Administration, 150 million dollars; War Shipping Administration, 100 million dollars; and Navy Department, 51 million dollars. Congressional action on recommendations for other than war purposes is discussed in a later section.
8i. Summation of the 1944 Budget

War activities: Government corporations. The war activities of Government corporations consist mainly of: (1) financing war plant facilities, (2) purchasing critical materials, (3) facilitating production of essential commodities by incurring losses in purchase and sale operations, or by payment of subsidies, and (4) miscellaneous operations. Since July, 1940, these war corporations have made war commitments of $19,904 million dollars; disbursements, less cash receipts, are $5,584 million dollars. In the fiscal year just completed, net outlays for war purposes were $2,976 million dollars; during the fiscal year 1944 they are estimated at $3,000 million dollars.

As the war program develops, as the plants for which advances were made are amortized or disposed of, and as stock piles are liquidated, Government corporations are reimbursed. Hence, for the war period as a whole, receipts will offset a considerable portion of outlays.

Total war expenditures. War expenditures, including net outlays of Government corporations, amounted to $75 billion dollars for fiscal year 1943, in comparison with the January estimate of $77 billion dollars. Expenditures were therefore 2.9 percent below estimates, primarily because costs of production for many munitions declined more than anticipated. War production has moved from the experimental and pilot stage into mass production and has benefited from technological improvements. Considerable success has been achieved in translating these reductions in cost of production into actual reduction of contract prices.

The 100-billion-dollar expenditure estimate for the fiscal year 1944 is based on present legislation, particularly legislation which establishes the pay and allowances of members of the armed forces, and which deals with prices and wages. It is assumed that the reduction in production costs will level off, but that no general increase in prices will occur. If we should fail in our effort to stabilize the cost of living, or if a substantial general increase in wage rates should take place, war expenditures would, of course, exceed the present estimate. Total war expenditures for
Summation of the 1944 Budget

the fiscal years 1943 and 1944 are subdivided in the following table.

TOTAL WAR EXPENDITURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Fiscal 1944</th>
<th>Fiscal 1943</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Estimated</td>
<td>Actual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munitions and construction</td>
<td>$72</td>
<td>$56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other, including military pay, subsistence, travel, and agricultural lend-lease</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total war expenditures</td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>$75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Monthly war expenditures in June, 1943, had risen to 7.7 billion dollars, the equivalent of an annual rate of over 90 billion dollars.

The total war program, measured by appropriations, contract authorizations, and Government corporation commitments voted since July, 1940, amounts to 330 billion dollars. In addition, construction authorized in terms of tonnage for increase and replacement of naval vessels will, it is estimated, require appropriations of another 14 billion dollars.

Of the 330 billion dollars, 232 billion dollars were appropriated for the three-year period ending last month during which 212 billion dollars have been obligated and most of the remainder has been earmarked for completion of programs already under way. Only 110 billion dollars have, however, been actually spent as of June 30, 1943.

Congress has further appropriated 98 billion dollars for the fiscal year 1944, practically all of which will be obligated or committed by the end of the year, even though much of it will be actually unspent at that time.

The spread between appropriations and obligations on the one hand, and between obligations and cash expenditures on the other, reflects the necessity for the Government and for contractors to plan production many months ahead.
81. Summation of the 1944 Budget

Appropriations and expenditures for other than direct war purposes. The largest single item of appropriation and expenditure for other than direct war purposes is interest on the public debt, which has risen rapidly because of heavy war expenditures. Interest is estimated at 2,700 million dollars in the fiscal year 1944, as compared with 1,808 million dollars for the preceding fiscal year. We are now financing at an average interest cost on new money of less than 2 percent; since personal and corporate income from all new issues is fully taxable, the net cost is even lower.

For all remaining activities of the Federal Government in the general and special accounts, my original and supplemental appropriations for the year just started amounted to 4,745 million dollars, as compared with appropriations by the Congress of 4,630 million dollars.

The Congress decided to discontinue immediately or in the near future the following agencies or activities: the National Resources Planning Board, the Crop Insurance program, the Home Owners' Loan Corporation, and the Bituminous Coal Division in the Department of the Interior. The Secretary of Agriculture has not been authorized to make commitments for parity payments on future crops or to make incentive payments to increase agricultural production. The program of the Farm Security Administration has been curtailed. On the other hand, the Congress appropriated more than I recommended for some items, such as forest protection, research in steel resources, reclamation, and flood relief and flood control.

Expenditures from the general and special accounts for activities other than war, interest on the debt, and statutory debt retirement, it is estimated, will amount to 4,336 million dollars in fiscal year 1944, which will be slightly above the prior year's expenditures, and 15 percent less than in the fiscal year 1942. The most important increases over the fiscal year 1943 are for veterans' pensions and benefits, retirement funds, and refunds. Refunds alone are now estimated at 282 million dollars above the fiscal year 1943; of this increase, 233 million dollars of rise
between January and present estimates is attributable mainly to adjustments for overpayment of income taxes under the Current Tax Payment Act.

**SUMMARY OF EXPENDITURES.** The following tabulation summarizes aggregate Federal expenditures from general and special accounts and by Government corporations in the fiscal year 1943, and for the fiscal year 1944, as estimated last January and as now revised.

### EXPENDITURES EXCLUDING DEBT RETIREMENT AND TRUST FUNDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Fiscal 1944</th>
<th>Fiscal 1943</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Revised</td>
<td>January</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>estimates</td>
<td>estimates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(millions)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>War activities:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General and special accounts</td>
<td>$97,000</td>
<td>$97,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government corporations (net of receipts)</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>2,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interest on the public debt</strong></td>
<td>2,700</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other activities:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General and special accounts</td>
<td>14,336</td>
<td>4,124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government corporations (net of receipts)</td>
<td>1,167</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total expenditures</strong></td>
<td>$105,869</td>
<td>$107,126</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Deduct excess of receipts over expenditures.

† Includes 361 million dollars of refunds primarily attributable to the Current Tax Payment Act which had not been enacted in January.

To determine Federal cash payments to the public, it is necessary to add to the above expenditures trust fund disbursements to the public, and to subtract major intragovernmental transactions, such as interest payments by the Treasury to trust funds, and the accrual of interest on savings bonds. When these adjustments are made, total cash payments to the public in the fiscal year 1943 amount to 79,317 million dollars, and are estimated at 105,397 million dollars for the fiscal year 1944.
81. Summation of the 1944 Budget

Receipts and Debt

Receipts: General and Special Accounts. Actual net receipts amounted to 22,072 million dollars in the fiscal year 1943. They were estimated for the fiscal year 1944 at 33,081 million dollars last January, and are estimated at 38,148 million dollars at this time.

The increase in the January estimate over the previous fiscal year was attributable to the Revenue Act of 1942 and to greater business activity and higher incomes than anticipated. The further increase of 5,067 million dollars between the January and July estimates arises primarily because of larger collection of direct taxes from individuals under the Current Tax Payment Act of 1943. This Act advances the date of payment of individual income tax on rising incomes and requires partial payment of the uncanceled portion of the 1942 tax. At the time of passage of this Act it was estimated that collections for the fiscal year 1944 would be increased by approximately 3,000 million dollars after refunds for overpayment.

A non-recurrent increase of importance in these collections is accounted for by the regulations issued under authority of the recently enacted Current Tax Payment Act, requiring monthly rather than quarterly payments into the Treasury of amounts withheld by employers. Hence, the anticipated lag in payments for the fiscal year 1944 will amount to only one month instead of a quarter of a year.

Direct taxes on corporations in the fiscal year 1944, including the postwar credits, are estimated 835 million dollars lower than in January. Underlying this change is a reduction in the anticipated yield of the excess profits tax, offset partially by an increase in revenue from corporate normal tax and surtax. Factors accounting for this change include relief provisions of the excess profits tax in the 1942 Revenue Act, the renegotiation of war contracts, and changes in the outlook for corporate profits. Larger estimates of miscellaneous receipts are due to refunds
arising from renegotiation of war contracts; these refunds are now expected to be higher than was estimated in the original Budget.

Total receipts of general and special accounts are expected to amount to 40,350 million dollars in fiscal year 1944. This figure includes the amount appropriated to the old-age and survivors' insurance trust fund, and postwar credits for excess profits tax and victory tax. Both of these are currently collected but represent claims against the Federal Government which are deducted to arrive at net receipts.

The foregoing discussion has been based entirely on receipts of general and special accounts. To calculate total receipts from the public it is necessary to include receipts of trust accounts and to exclude transfers such as appropriations to trust accounts. On this basis total Federal receipts from the public were 25,274 million dollars in the fiscal year 1943, and are estimated at 41,898 million dollars for the fiscal year 1944.

PUBLIC DEBT. The direct public debt, excluding obligations of Government corporations, amounted to 137 billion dollars on June 30, 1943. Unless additional tax legislation is enacted, the debt will increase 69 billion dollars in fiscal 1944, bringing the public debt to 206 billion dollars by June 30, 1944. Changes in the cash working balance may alter total debt a year hence.

The increase in the direct Federal debt does not only reflect borrowing from the public. Government trust funds, especially the social security trust funds, are accumulating a temporary surplus in periods of high employment and low disbursements, which is invested in Government bonds. The surplus reflects claims of beneficiaries against the trust funds and is, of course, a liability of the Government even though such investments in Government bonds reduce the need for borrowing from the public during the war period.

The increase in the Federal debt includes the obligations issued in lieu of debt retired by Government corporations. These operations reduce the contingent debt and correspondingly increase the direct debt. They represent refinancing rather than new financing.
Borrowing from individuals and institutions amounted to 61 billion dollars during the fiscal year 1943; it will amount to 63 billion dollars in the fiscal year 1944 unless additional revenue legislation is enacted. Both amounts include that portion of postwar credits against excess profits and victory tax payments which will be claimed after the war.

**The Economic Impact**

Governmental spending of over 100 billion dollars a year has major repercussions on the economy. The amounts spent become incomes of corporations and individuals. If expenditures are financed either by taxing or by borrowing active funds, the volume of spendable funds in the hands of consumers will not increase. If, however, expenditures are financed by borrowing from banks or by borrowing idle funds, the spendable income in the hands of consumers will increase greatly.

Individuals are expected to receive incomes approaching 150 billion dollars during fiscal year 1944, over twice the income payments to individuals in fiscal year 1940. Such a huge rise creates a tremendous increase in demand for goods and services. A considerable portion of this enlarged income and demand for goods results from full employment of many millions of workers who were formerly either unemployed or underemployed, or were not seeking employment in the years before the defense and war effort. Such persons now have money to buy more necessities and even luxuries.

The Government directly or indirectly is employing more than one-half of the total labor force either in military service or in war production. In view of this fact, sooner or later a drastic reduction in the supply of goods and in the services available for civilian consumption was bound to result. These facts did not make themselves felt during the earlier phases of the defense and war effort because our economy was running far below its capacity. Industrial production (measured by the Federal Reserve index of production) increased by 68 percent from fiscal
1940 to fiscal 1943. Thus we were able to increase war production and civilian production at the same time. In recent months the index of production has not increased substantially, which indicates that we are approaching the capacity of production with our available manpower.

I do believe, however, that a further increase in production is possible if Government, management, and labor constructively tackle the problems of the most effective use of our resources. This should be our objective since we shall feel the full impact of the curtailment in less essential civilian supplies as our large cushion of inventories disappears.

We must recognize clearly that war expenditures are creating an increase in the demand for civilian goods while the supply of these very goods is decreasing. Many of us must reduce our accustomed standard of living during wartime because of the absorption of a large portion of our labor force and labor reserve for war service. A reduced standard of living is due to the titanic war effort and not, as some people believe, to taxes, rationing, and other governmental controls. These controls are necessary to achieve maximum war production, to assure equitable distribution of the available civilian supplies, and to prevent economic collapse after the war has been won.

We all know that it takes some time to organize a war economy in the most effective manner. We know, too, that controls and regulations imply many inconveniences which we constantly try to reduce. Curtailments and inconveniences cannot be avoided if we are to help win the war with a minimum of sacrifice in human life. Nobody wants to jeopardize victory or cause avoidable loss of life by waging war with an insufficient number of troops, with poorly trained troops, or with less than the best equipment we can produce.

I recommended in my Budget Message last January a truly stiff program of additional taxes, savings, or both. I continue to support that program. The cost of living cannot be stabilized unless price and wage controls are supported by a further substantial absorption of purchasing power as a deterrent to bidding up
prices and resorting to the black market. The alternative to sta-
bilization is inflation, and inflation is the most inequitable way of
distributing the necessary wartime curtailments. Inflation shifts
the full burden to the shoulders of the people in the weakest
bargaining position, the people whose incomes do not rise with
increasing prices. Inflation also reduces production by creating
unrest and friction.

A war program involving 100 billion dollars of expenditure
during the next twelve months is, I repeat, a gigantic national
effort for victory. That expenditure program must be backed up
by a revenue program of sufficient size to make sure that we do
not disrupt our home front and that we do prepare the way for
an orderly transition to a future peace economy.

82 (The Nine Hundred and Eleventh Press
Conference (Excerpts). July 27, 1943
(1944 Budget summation — Resignation of Mussolini — O.W.I.
broadcasts on King of Italy — Interdependence of “home front” and
war theaters.)

THE PRESIDENT: I have got something rather dry that we had
better talk about first.

In accordance with what I did so often for so many years,
we are going to give you, as soon as this conference is over,
a confidential release for next Sunday morning’s papers,
which is a summation of the 1944 Budget, and a comparison
of the final figures, on the adjournment of Congress, com-
pared with the January 1 original Budget estimates. You
know we have done that several times before, so it really
brings everybody up to date six months later than the original
Budget Message.

And it contains ten pages of words and (to himself) one,
two, three, four — five pages of very interesting figures—
(laughter) in very small type. (More laughter) However, it’s
in accordance with custom, and I think it's pretty good. I think I had better describe the high spots.

The budgetary estimates for the fiscal year 1944 have been revised in the light of legislative and other developments since January. Total expenditures for the year—that is the fiscal year—excluding debt retirement and trust fund disbursements, are now estimated at 106 billion dollars, and net receipts at 38 billion. The expected deficit of 68 billion will carry the public debt just above 200 billion by a year from now—end of June. This deficit will of course be reduced if the Congress enacts new revenue legislation.

In the latest recasting of the program, the War Department is expected to spend less, and the Navy Department and other agencies are expected to spend more for war than was estimated in January. Many factors influenced the revisions. Strategy has been more fully shaped. We now have a more balanced perspective of our military needs and the needs of our allies.

Comparatively few battle casualties thus far have meant correspondingly fewer replacements.

Damage and loss of material have been less than we prepared for.

Production potentialities can now be more accurately measured.

Continued breaking of bottlenecks permits stepping up certain programs.

The hundred-billion-dollar war program is a gigantic national effort for victory. Our efforts to finance it must be equally heroic. We have—that is not meant to be sarcastic, either—we have depended far too heavily on bank credits and otherwise idle funds. This endangers economic stability. To help avoid inflationary consequences and to spread the war costs more equitably, I recommended last January a truly stiff program of additional taxes and savings, and I continue to support that program. The war effort must be backed by revenue measures adequate to protect the home front.
against economic disruption, and to prepare for an orderly transition to peace.

Q. Mr. President, what is your reaction to the change in the Italian Government [the sudden resignation of Benito Mussolini on July 25]?

THE PRESIDENT: Reaction?

Q. Yes, sir.

THE PRESIDENT: I never have reactions. I am much too old. (Laughter)

Q. Mr. President, when you were discussing the bombing of Rome last week, did you have the information that Mussolini would make his exit?

THE PRESIDENT: No. No.

Q. Sir, could you tell us whether there is likely to be any change in our unconditional surrender policy, in respect —

THE PRESIDENT: (interposing) Oh, I think the Secretary of State covered all that pretty well yesterday.

Q. If there should be an unconditional surrender, do you think it likely that we might demand of Marshal Badoglio that Mussolini be delivered to us?

THE PRESIDENT: How did you start that sentence? What word?

Q. Oh; oh.

THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think it’s useful for me to go into the details of hypothetical questions. I could ask — in fact, I do ask myself a very large number of hypothetical questions, and I am wise enough not to give myself the answers. (Laughter) ... [The President frequently referred to such questions as “iffy questions,” and, for obvious reasons, declined to answer them.]

Q. Mr. President, could you say whether the broadcasts of the O.W.I. which have attacked the King of Italy were authorized by you or by the State Department?

THE PRESIDENT: Neither of us. Nor by Bob Sherwood [O.W.I. Overseas Director]; and I think Bob Sherwood is raising a rumpus about it now. It ought never to have been done.
81. *Eight Hundred and Fortieth Press Conference*

81 (The Eight Hundred and Fortieth Press Conference — The Press Is Presented to Queen Wilhelmina. August 7, 1942)

*(Welcome to the Queen — Remarks of Queen Wilhelmina — Steel scrap campaign — New York and Dutchess County primaries.)*

(Her Majesty Wilhelmina, Queen of The Netherlands, was a guest at this Press Conference. As the newspapermen came in, the President and the Queen were both standing behind chairs in front of the desk. Mrs. Roosevelt was also present, and stood to the right of the Queen.)

**THE PRESIDENT:** (to the Queen) I can really see them now. I very rarely see more than the front row.

**MR. DONALDSON:** All in.

**THE PRESIDENT:** I don’t think that you good people have had any advance notice of this, but Her Majesty consented to come here today, not to be asked questions but to have the White House Correspondents’ Association presented to her.

I think you all know that The Netherlands and this country have most of their ideals in common. And it is a very interesting and a very wonderful thing to know that constitutionally in The Netherlands and in this country freedom of expression, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press are a part of the Government. They are recognized by the constitutions of both of our Nations.

And I can only say that in these past three days, all of us — the Congress, the Government — the executive branch — and I think the press — have been made very happy by the presence of this really great head of a Government as our guest — head of an Allied Nation, who is seeing this war through with us.

And so I present all of you gentlemen, and ladies, to Her Majesty, the Queen of The Netherlands. And I have asked her, and she has graciously consented, to say a few words to
HER MAJESTY QUEEN WILHELMINA: I am indebted to the President for inviting me to his press and radio conference, having thus been given the occasion to voice my admiration of all the work the members of the American press and radio have done, not only in the past and happier years, but especially since the outbreak of the present war. I have had the opportunity to read and listen to reports from men and women who are actually in the many scenes of combat with the enemy, and who with complete disregard of their own safety gather their information for the sake of truth and public enlightenment.

The mission of the press and radio is one of great responsibility, more so now than ever, when the future of the world and civilization is in the balance. Its fulfillment is dependent on freedom of speech and a free press—two conditions no dictator ever grants.

In this country, as in all parts of my country, both rights are constitutionally guaranteed and deeply ingrained in the life of the Nation. Where occupation has temporarily abolished them, defeat of the enemy will see them restored. At present, wherever freedom of speech and press continue to exist, the contribution which press and radio make to the effort of those upon whose shoulders has been placed the sacred duty to lead democracy to victory is of immense value, because they share the task of leading mankind toward a brighter morrow. (Applause)

THE PRESIDENT: Now we are going to sit down and proceed with the regular conference. . . .

Donald Nelson wants me to mention the following—it came over the telephone a few minutes ago, so I haven't read it first. I assume it's all right.

(Reading): "We are engaged in an intensive drive to collect all of the scrap possible. We need steel scrap badly to increase present production. We are keeping ahead of the blast furnaces now, but we want to accumu-
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But all through this we have to remember that there is just one front, which includes at home as well as abroad. It is all part of the picture of trying to win the war.

Now, of course, I can’t do anything about it because the thing has got started, and people will continue to refer to the “home front.”

It always reminds me of an example I use about things getting started. I have a little dog who is called Fala—F-a-l-a. But in the beginning, everybody got into their heads that his name was F-a-l-l-a, and you can’t break them of the habit. Same thing goes for “home front.” *(Laughter)* . . .

*NOTE:* See Item 81, this volume, for the President’s statement on the summation of the 1944 Budget. See Item 83, this volume, for the President’s fireside chat on the progress of the war and the plans for peace.


*My fellow Americans:*

*Over* a year and a half ago I said this to the Congress: “The militarists of Berlin and Tokyo started this war. But the massed, angered forces of common humanity will finish it.”

Today that prophecy is in the process of being fulfilled. The massed, angered forces of common humanity are on the march. They are going forward—on the Russian front, in the vast Pacific area, and into Europe—converging upon their ultimate objectives: Berlin and Tokyo.

The first crack in the Axis has come. The criminal, corrupt Fascist regime in Italy is going to pieces.
The pirate philosophy of the Fascists and the Nazis cannot stand adversity. The military superiority of the United Nations — on sea and land, and in the air — has been applied in the right place and at the right time.

Hitler refused to send sufficient help to save Mussolini. In fact, Hitler's troops in Sicily stole the Italians' motor equipment, leaving Italian soldiers so stranded that they had no choice but to surrender. Once again the Germans betrayed their Italian allies, as they had done time and time again on the Russian front and in the long retreat from Egypt, through Libya and Tripoli, to the final surrender in Tunisia.

And so Mussolini came to the reluctant conclusion that the "jig was up"; he could see the shadow of the long arm of justice.

But he and his Fascist gang will be brought to book, and punished for their crimes against humanity. No criminal will be allowed to escape by the expedient of "resignation."

So our terms to Italy are still the same as our terms to Germany and Japan — "unconditional surrender."

We will have no truck with Fascism in any way, in any shape or manner. We will permit no vestige of Fascism to remain.

Eventually Italy will reconstitute herself. It will be the people of Italy who will do that, choosing their own Government in accordance with the basic democratic principles of liberty and equality. In the meantime, the United Nations will not follow the pattern set by Mussolini and Hitler and the Japanese for the treatment of occupied countries — the pattern of pillage and starvation.

We are already helping the Italian people in Sicily. With their cordial cooperation, we are establishing and maintaining security and order — we are dissolving the organizations which have kept them under Fascist tyranny — we are providing them with the necessities of life until the time comes when they can fully provide for themselves.

Indeed, the people in Sicily today are rejoicing in the fact that for the first time in years they are permitted to enjoy the fruits of their own labors — they can eat what they themselves grow,
In every country conquered by the Nazis and the Fascists, or the Japanese militarists, the people have been reduced to the status of slaves or chattels.

It is our determination to restore these conquered peoples to the dignity of human beings, masters of their own fate, entitled to freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom from fear.

We have started to make good on that promise.

I am sorry if I step on the toes of those Americans who, playing party politics at home, call that kind of foreign policy "crazy altruism" and "starry-eyed dreaming."

Meanwhile, the war in Sicily and Italy goes on. It must go on, and will go on, until the Italian people realize the futility of continuing to fight in a lost cause — a cause to which the people of Italy never gave their wholehearted approval and support.

It is a little over a year since we planned the North African campaign. It is six months since we planned the Sicilian campaign. I confess that I am of an impatient disposition, but I think that I understand and that most people understand the amount of time necessary to prepare for any major military or naval operation. We cannot just pick up the telephone and order a new campaign to start the next week.

For example, behind the invasion forces in North Africa, the invasion forces that went out of North Africa, were thousands of ships and planes guarding the long, perilous sea lanes, carrying the men, carrying the equipment and the supplies to the point of attack. And behind all these were the railroad lines and the highways here back home that carried the men and the munitions to the ports of embarkation — there were the factories and the mines and the farms here back home that turned out the materials — there were the training camps here back home where the men learned how to perform the strange and difficult and dangerous tasks which were to meet them on the beaches and in the deserts and in the mountains.
All this had to be repeated, first in North Africa and then in the attack on Sicily. Here in Sicily the factor of air attack was added—for we could use North Africa as the base for softening up the landing places and lines of defense in Sicily, and the lines of supply in Italy.

It is interesting for us to realize that every Flying Fortress that bombed harbor installations at Naples from its base in North Africa required 1,110 gallons of gasoline for each single mission, and that this is the equal of about 375 "A" ration tickets—enough gas to drive your car five times across this continent. You will better understand your part in the war—and what gasoline rationing means—if you multiply this by the gasoline needs of thousands of planes and hundreds of thousands of jeeps, trucks, and tanks now serving overseas.

I think that the personal convenience of the individual, or the individual family, back home here in the United States will appear somewhat less important when I tell you that the initial assault force on Sicily involved 3,000 ships which carried 160,000 men—Americans, British, Canadians, and French—together with 14,000 vehicles, 600 tanks, and 1,800 guns. And this initial force was followed every day and every night by thousands of reinforcements.

The meticulous care with which the operation in Sicily was planned has paid dividends. Our casualties in men, in ships and matériel have been low—in fact, far below our estimate.

All of us are proud of the superb skill and courage of the officers and men who have conducted and are conducting those operations. The toughest resistance developed on the front of the British Eighth Army, which included the Canadians. But that is no new experience for that magnificent fighting force which has made the Germans pay a heavy price for each hour of delay in the final victory. The American Seventh Army, after a stormy landing on the exposed beaches of southern Sicily, swept with record speed across the island into the capital at Palermo. For many of our troops this was their first battle experience, but they have carried themselves like veterans.
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And we must give credit for the coordination of the diverse forces in the field, and for the planning of the whole campaign, to the wise and skillful leadership of General Eisenhower. Admiral Cunningham, General Alexander, and Air Marshal Tedder have been towers of strength in handling the complex details of naval, ground, and air activities.

You have heard some people say that the British and the Americans can never get along well together—you have heard some people say that the Army and the Navy and the Air Forces can never get along well together—that real cooperation between them is impossible. Tunisia and Sicily have given the lie, once and for all, to these narrow-minded prejudices.

The dauntless fighting spirit of the British people in this war has been expressed in the historic words and deeds of Winston Churchill—and the world knows how the American people feel about him.

Ahead of us are much bigger fights. We and our allies will go into them as we went into Sicily—together. And we shall carry on together.

Today our production of ships is almost unbelievable. This year we are producing over 19 million tons of merchant shipping and next year our production will be over 21 million tons. And in addition to our shipments across the Atlantic, we must realize that in this war we are operating in the Aleutians, in the distant parts of the Southwest Pacific, in India, and off the shores of South America.

For several months we have been losing fewer ships by sinkings, and we have been destroying more and more U-boats. We hope this will continue. But we cannot be sure. We must not lower our guard for one single instant.

One tangible result of our great increase in merchant shipping—which I think will be good news to civilians at home—is that tonight we are able to terminate the rationing of coffee. We also expect that within a short time we shall get greatly increased allowances of sugar.

Those few Americans who grouse and complain about the in-
conveniences of life here in the United States should learn some lessons from the civilian populations of our allies—Britain, China, Russia—and of all the lands occupied by our common enemy.

The heaviest and most decisive fighting today is going on in Russia. I am glad that the British and we have been able to contribute somewhat to the great striking power of the Russian armies.

In 1941-1942 the Russians were able to retire without breaking, to move many of their war plants from western Russia far into the interior, to stand together with complete unanimity in the defense of their homeland.

The success of the Russian armies has shown that it is dangerous to make prophecies about them—a fact which has been forcibly brought home to that mystic master of strategic intuition, Herr Hitler.

The short-lived German offensive, launched early this month, was a desperate attempt to bolster the morale of the German people. The Russians were not fooled by this. They went ahead with their own plans for attack—plans which coordinate with the whole United Nations' offensive strategy.

The world has never seen greater devotion, determination, and self-sacrifice than have been displayed by the Russian people and their armies, under the leadership of Marshal Joseph Stalin.

With a Nation which in saving itself is thereby helping to save all the world from the Nazi menace, this country of ours should always be glad to be a good neighbor and a sincere friend in the world of the future.

In the Pacific, we are pushing the Japs around from the Aleutians to New Guinea. There too we have taken the initiative—and we are not going to let go of it.

It becomes clearer and clearer that the attrition, the whittling-down process against the Japanese is working. The Japs have lost more planes and more ships than they have been able to replace.

The continuous and energetic prosecution of the war of attri-
tion will drive the Japs back from their overextended line running from Burma and Siam and the Straits Settlement through the Netherlands Indies to eastern New Guinea and the Solomons. We have good reason to believe that their shipping and their air power cannot support such outposts.

Our naval, land, and air strength in the Pacific is constantly growing. If the Japanese are basing their future plans for the Pacific on a long period in which they will be permitted to consolidate and exploit their conquered resources, they had better start revising their plans now. I give that to them merely as a helpful suggestion.

We are delivering planes and vital war supplies for the heroic armies of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and we must do more at all costs.

Our air supply line from India to China across enemy territory continues despite attempted Japanese interference. We have seized the initiative from the Japanese in the air over Burma and now we enjoy superiority. We are bombing Japanese communications, supply dumps, and bases in China, in Indo-China, in Burma.

But we are still far from our main objectives in the war against Japan. Let us remember how far we were a year ago from any of our objectives in the European theater. We are pushing forward to occupation of positions which in time will enable us to attack the Japanese Islands themselves from the north, from the south, from the east, and from the west.

You have heard it said that while we are succeeding greatly on the fighting front, we are failing miserably on the home front. I think this is another of those immaturities—a false slogan easy to state but untrue in the essential facts.

For the longer this war goes on the clearer it becomes that no one can draw a blue pencil down the middle of a page and call one side "the fighting front" and the other side "the home front." For the two of them are inexorably tied together.

Every combat division, every naval task force, every squadron of fighting planes is dependent for its equipment and ammuni-
tion and fuel and food, as indeed it is for its manpower, on the American people in civilian clothes in the offices and in the factories and on the farms at home.

The same kind of careful planning that gained victory in North Africa and Sicily is required, if we are to make victory an enduring reality and do our share in building the kind of peaceful world that will justify the sacrifices made in this war.

The United Nations are substantially agreed on the general objectives for the postwar world. They are also agreed that this is not the time to engage in an international discussion of all the terms of peace and all the details of the future. Let us win the war first. We must not relax our pressure on the enemy by taking time out to define every boundary and settle every political controversy in every part of the world. The all-important thing now is to get on with the war—and to win it.

While concentrating on military victory, we are not neglecting the planning of the things to come, the freedoms which we know will make for more decency and greater justice throughout the world.

Among many other things we are, today, laying plans for the return to civilian life of our gallant men and women in the armed services. They must not be demobilized into an environment of inflation and unemployment, to a place on a bread line, or on a corner selling apples. We must, this time, have plans ready—instead of waiting to do a hasty, inefficient, and ill-considered job at the last moment.

I have assured our men in the armed forces that the American people would not let them down when the war is won.

I hope that the Congress will help in carrying out this assurance, for obviously the executive branch of the Government cannot do it alone. May the Congress do its duty in this regard. The American people will insist on fulfilling this American obligation to the men and women in the armed forces who are winning this war for us.

Of course, the returning soldier and sailor and marine are a part of the problem of demobilizing the rest of the millions of
Americans who have been working and living in a war economy since 1941. That larger objective of reconverting wartime America to a peacetime basis is one for which your Government is laying plans to be submitted to the Congress for action.

But the members of the armed forces have been compelled to make greater economic sacrifice and every other kind of sacrifice than the rest of us, and they are entitled to definite action to help take care of their special problems.

The least to which they are entitled, it seems to me, is something like this:

First, mustering-out pay to every member of the armed forces and merchant marine when he or she is honorably discharged; mustering-out pay large enough in each case to cover a reasonable period of time between his discharge and the finding of a new job.

Second, in case no job is found after diligent search, then unemployment insurance if the individual registers with the United States Employment Service.

Third, an opportunity for members of the armed services to get further education or trade training at the cost of their Government.

Fourth, allowance of credit to all members of the armed forces, under unemployment compensation and Federal old-age and survivors' insurance, for their period of service. For these purposes they ought to be treated as if they had continued their employment in private industry.

Fifth, improved and liberalized provisions for hospitalization, for rehabilitation, for medical care of disabled members of the armed forces and the merchant marine.

And finally, sufficient pensions for disabled members of the armed forces.

Your Government is drawing up other serious, constructive plans for certain immediate forward moves. They concern food, manpower, and other domestic problems that tie in with our armed forces.

Within a few weeks I shall speak with you again in regard to
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definite actions to be taken by the executive branch of the Government, and specific recommendations for new legislation by the Congress.

All our calculations for the future, however, must be based on clear understanding of the problems involved. And that can be gained only by straight thinking—not guesswork, not political manipulation.

I confess that I myself am sometimes bewildered by conflicting statements that I see in the press. One day I read an "authoritative" statement that we shall win the war this year, 1943—and the next day comes another statement equally "authoritative," that the war will still be going on in 1949.

Of course, both extremes—of optimism and pessimism—are wrong.

The length of the war will depend upon the uninterrupted continuance of all-out effort on the fighting fronts and here at home, and that effort is all one.

The American soldier does not like the necessity of waging war. And yet—if he lays off for one single instant he may lose his own life and sacrifice the lives of his comrades.

By the same token—a worker here at home may not like the driving, wartime conditions under which he has to work and live. And yet—if he gets complacent or indifferent and slacks on his job, he too may sacrifice the lives of American soldiers and contribute to the loss of an important battle.

The next time anyone says to you that this war is "in the bag," or says "it's all over but the shouting," you should ask him these questions:

"Are you working full time on your job?"
"Are you growing all the food you can?"
"Are you buying your limit of war bonds?"
"Are you loyally and cheerfully cooperating with your Government in preventing inflation and profiteering, and in making rationing work with fairness to all?"

"Because—if your answer is 'No'—then the war is going to last a lot longer than you think."
The plans we made for the knocking out of Mussolini and his gang have largely succeeded. But we still have to knock out Hitler and his gang, and Tojo and his gang. No one of us pretends that this will be an easy matter.

We still have to defeat Hitler and Tojo on their own home grounds. But this will require a far greater concentration of our national energy and our ingenuity and our skill.

It is not too much to say that we must pour into this war the entire strength and intelligence and will power of the United States. We are a great Nation—a rich Nation—but we are not so great or so rich that we can afford to waste our substance or the lives of our men by relaxing along the way.

We shall not settle for less than total victory. That is the determination of every American on the fighting fronts. That must be, and will be, the determination of every American here at home.

NOTE: As early as July 11, the President had dictated some notes of what he wanted to talk about in the fireside chat of July 28. He wanted to stress the inseparability of the home front and the fighting fronts, and show how closely related and interdependent they were, one upon the other. In a memorandum of July 19, the President set forth some additional thoughts for the address, including (1) the function of planning and the importance of having an agency like the National Resources Planning Board (funds for which had been denied by the Congress beyond July 1, 1943); (2) the necessity for planning what to do with men in the armed services when they returned to civilian life after the war; (3) rationing, and how the price of sugar had been better controlled during this war than the last war.

The President had asked Bob Sherwood and me to come to Washington and then to accompany him to Shangri-La, his retreat in the Catoctin Mountains of Maryland, in order to work on the speech. Meanwhile, we had obtained from the Army a memorandum containing many interesting facts and figures on the recent landings in Sicily, as well as a description of the status of the various theaters of war. We used this Army memorandum, as well as the notes dictated by the President, to prepare a first draft.

As the speech was getting rounded into practically final form, word was flashed to the President at Shangri-La on Sunday, July 25, that Mussolini had resigned. This, of course, meant that the speech had to be revamped a little in order to include a discussion of this most important piece of war news.
One year ago today the United States Navy opened to this Nation's patriotic womanhood an opportunity for service within its ranks. The wholly voluntary response came in such swelling volume as to constitute a ringing confirmation of the tenet that, in total war, democracy must be fought for and defended by all the people. Once again, the women of this free land stepped forward to prove themselves worthy descendants of those proud pioneer daughters who first nurtured freedom's flame.

Thousands of fighting Navy men are now at battle stations because they were released from vital shore jobs by women within and wholly a part of the naval service. Other thousands will sail to meet the enemy as more women become available to take over these vital jobs ashore.

In their first year, the WAVES have proved that they are capable of accepting the highest responsibility in the service of their country. On behalf of a grateful Nation, I offer birthday congratulations and a hearty "Well done."

NOTE: One of the most colorful, popular, and thoroughly useful innovations in World War II was the utilization of women in uniform as part of the armed forces. The President took a keen personal interest in the development of these women's units, and he was deeply impressed with the excellence and importance of the performance of their duties (e.g., Item 62, this volume; see Item 51 and note, 1942 volume, for an account of the establishment and functions of the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps and its successor, the Women's Army Corps).

On July 30, 1942, the President approved an Act "to expedite the war effort by releasing officers and men for duty at sea and their replacement by women in the shore establishments of the Navy, and for other purposes" (56 Stat. 730). This new branch of the Naval Reserve began operation with an initial plan for 1,000 officers and 10,000 enlisted women. Three years after the President had approved the Act, on July 30, 1945, there were 8,475 women officers and 74,497 enlisted women in the WAVES. Women marines were also recruited under this same statute, and on July 31, 1945, there were 822 women officers and 17,641 enlisted women in the United States Marine Corps. By the same date, there were 857 women
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officers and 8,824 enlisted women—SPARs—in the United States Coast Guard.

In the first World War, a handful of “yeomanettes” had been successfully used in clerical and stenographic positions. But there were initially some misgivings in this war, as to whether women could effectively replace naval officers and men on shore duty. At the outset especially among the old Navy “Regulars,” there was considerable hostility to women in Navy uniform. But the hostility was soon dissipated by their invaluable contribution. They proved soon to be an integral part of the naval establishment.

In the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, women reserves served as parachute riggers, control tower operators, aviation machinist mates, hospital apprentices, radio operators, storekeepers, cooks and bakers, statisticians, clerks, and stenographers; they also served in legal, intelligence, public relations, matériel procurement, personnel, and many other kinds of functions. It was soon discovered that in many cases women possessed superior patience for the hard grind of office routine, the ability to perform many therapy and nursing duties in hospitals and recuperation centers, and that they had superior dexterity in parachute rigging and other duties requiring a fine touch.

Not infrequently, the old Regulars who at first were so distressed at the advent of the WAVES were heard, by the end of the war, to insist that they should be made a permanent component of the Navy.

85 (The President Warns Neutral Nations Against Providing Asylum for War Criminals. July 30, 1943

On August 21, 1942, I issued a statement to the press in which after referring to the crimes against innocent people committed by the Axis powers I stated:

“The United Nations are going to win this war. When victory has been achieved, it is the purpose of the Government of the United States, as I know it is the purpose of each of the United Nations, to make appropriate use of the information and evidence in respect to the barbaric crimes of the invaders, in Europe and in Asia. It seems only fair that they should have this warning that the time will come when they shall
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have to stand in courts of law in the very countries which they are now oppressing and answer for their acts."

On October 7, 1942, I stated that it was "the intention of this Government that the successful close of the war shall include provisions for the surrender to the United Nations of war criminals."

The wheels of justice have turned constantly since those statements were issued and are still turning. There are now rumors that Mussolini and members of his Fascist gang may attempt to take refuge in neutral territory. One day Hitler and his gang and Tojo and his gang will be trying to escape from their countries. I find it difficult to believe that any neutral country would give asylum to or extend protection to any of them. I can only say that the Government of the United States would regard the action by a neutral Government in affording asylum to Axis leaders or their tools as inconsistent with the principles for which the United Nations are fighting and that the United States Government hopes that no neutral Government will permit its territory to be used as a place of refuge or otherwise assist such persons in any effort to escape their just deserts.

NOTE: For other statements of the President relating to the war crimes of individuals in Axis countries, see Item 101 and note, 1941 volume; Items 83 and 100 and notes, 1942 volume; and Item 24 and note, 1944-1945 volume. The pledges of the President that evidence on war crimes would be collected during the war and that the war criminals would be punished for their misdeeds were fulfilled by the trial and punishment of many classes of war criminals following the conclusion of hostilities.
Q. Good morning, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: You'll need two or three notebooks this morning.

Q. Oh—oh.

Q. I only brought one.

THE PRESIDENT: I only try to oblige. (Laughter) What are we doing with a WAVE in here?

Q. (the WAVE) Representing the Navy, sir.

THE PRESIDENT: Grand—grand.

Q. (surveying numerous papers in front of the President) Is this going to be mimeographed?

THE PRESIDENT: No! You had better take it all down! (Cries of "Oh—oh" and laughter)

Q. It's an awful hot day.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. I think I'll read all that, too.

Q. Shall we send out for lunch?

THE PRESIDENT: There's an idea. . . .

Here is a thing that I got at the last minute the other night, and I couldn't put it in the speech, because I didn't have the time. It came at the very last minute, from General Eisenhower.

I spoke of what we were going to do to help the Italian people in Italy. I had this cable from General Eisenhower. I wanted to include some of the facts he sent me, but there wasn't time to get them in. However, I think the American people will be interested to know just what we are doing.

The immediate supply of food for both our troops and the civilian population in Sicily had to be landed across the beaches. Emergency food for the civil population was met
from the Army rations, and continues from military stocks. A stock pile of supplies especially for civilians has been established in North Africa, and is now being moved in. It includes sugar, and flour, and milk for children, olive oil, meat, and an Italian favorite called pasta. A generous amount of medical supplies, and also soap and matches, has been furnished, and the supply will continue.

Public health doctors went with the assault elements. In addition, sanitary, civil supply, transportation, and agricultural experts were also sent in, for the purpose of organizing the food resources of the island itself for the benefit of the population.

They do grow wheat. We are sending other wheat in from Africa, but to supply power for the milling of it we have sent in shipments of Diesel oil to mill the wheat.

To assist in restoring the economy of Sicily, particularly with respect to its own food supply, General Alexander has been authorized to free selected Sicilian prisoners of war, whose labor will assist in the well-being of the local population.

So you can see we are making good on our promises. And our doing that will pay dividends, and will gain the cooperation of Italians as our troops push forward.

I think this is particularly important right now. They are getting the harvest in in Sicily, and they will be harvesting all through Italy during the next few weeks. We hope that this year the Italian people as a whole will be able to keep their own crops, as is happening in Sicily, and not be compelled to let them go through to the Germans.

I have got another one.

I am releasing this "Report on Demobilization and Readjustment of Personnel."

Way back in July, 1942, over a year ago, I appointed an informal conference on postwar readjustment of civilian and military personnel. The conference was selected in order to
include representatives with a wide range of experience and interest.

The members of the conference were Dr. Floyd Reeves, National Resources Planning Board; Dr. Francis Brown, Joint Army and Navy Committee; Dr. Edward Elliott, Chief of Professional and Technical Employment and Training Division of the War Manpower Commission; Dr. William Haber, Director of the Bureau of Program Requirements, War Manpower Commission; Brigadier General Frank T. Hines, Veterans’ Administration; Major General Lewis B. Hershey, the Selective Service; Dr. A. F. Hinrichs, Acting Commissioner of Labor Statistics; Lieutenant Commander Ralph A. Sentman of the Educational Services Section, Bureau of Personnel, Navy Department; Colonel Francis T. Spaulding of the Education Branch, War Department; Mr. Howard Tolley, Chief of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics; Dr. Thomas J. Wooster, Jr., Director of Research, Federal Security Agency; and Mr. Leonard Outhwaite, National Resources Planning Board.

It worked as an independent body, and was entirely free in arriving at its recommendations.

And about three weeks ago they made this report.

After calling attention to the great scope of the problem, the conference expressed its belief that if the problems of demobilization are to be met satisfactorily, the executive and legislative branches of the Government must produce a national policy that will carry out the general activities of that period. It also believes it will be found necessary to establish a central directive agency for dealing with these problems.

A part of the work of the conference was general in character, and set up general objectives or processes of demobilization procedure. But it wasn’t content to deal simply with principles and generalities. Wherever it was found possible to do so, the conference set forth many concrete and practical suggestions. These are well illustrated by its proposals re-
Regarding the mustering-out process that will affect the men and women in the armed services.

They have six recommendations, which are a bit more specific than the ones I made the other night; but the general process, of course, is the same. Well, for instance, they proposed three months of furlough at regular base pay, not to exceed a hundred dollars a month plus family allowances. They are more specific than I was, and also a little bit longer than I was. And I added certain things which they haven’t got in, and they have got certain less important things in that I did not have in— for instance, opportunities for agricultural employment and settlement. Substantially, the objective is exactly the same as mine, although some of the details differ.

The report blocks out a general approach to the problems of demobilization, and recognizes that much work remains to be done both by the executive and legislative branches of the Government. It emphasizes the fact that this work must be commenced now, in order that plans may be fully developed before large-scale demobilization begins.

It calls attention to the fact that many men will be released from the armed forces during the course of the war, and it is desirable that the same general provisions apply to them that apply to those who are a part of the more general process of demobilization at the end of the war.

The report places strong emphasis on the importance of bringing about a rapid conversion of industry from a wartime to a peacetime basis, in establishing full employment as one of the objectives of the demobilization process. It recognizes that the bulk of employment must be furnished by private industry, and that important efforts are being made to this end by various groups in private industry in the country. It recognizes that successful demobilization can only take place if the Federal Government and private industry each perform their proper function.

It points out that the Congress and the Chief Executive
must establish the general policy and provide general machinery for bringing about demobilization, but that individual initiative and group effort will also play an important part in making the machinery work.

Q. Mr. President, are you releasing that with your approval?

The President: Well, not as to every word. In other words, it's a tremendously interesting study. The general objective, yes. As to the details, that is a matter for Congress to work out. The purpose is excellent. And the committee that drew it up, of course, was in its personnel an extremely good committee.

Q. Mr. President, regarding your report to the Nation the other night, there has been some speculation in some quarters as to its political portent, and some of your loyal opposition have released statements on it. Is there any comment that you would like to make, sir?

The President: It reminds me of what a member of the family said this morning. He said, "Why, in your next speech, don't you try it a different way? Suppose a paragraph or two saying, 'The moon is beautiful'? Probably you will be accused of playing politics, because there are a lot of young people that like to sit out under the moon." (Laughter)

Q. Mr. President, there has been some discussion as to whether we ought to deal with the Marshal Pietro Badoglio Government, or with the King of Italy, and so forth; and I wonder whether you might think it useful to clarify that point?

The President: Steve said you would ask that question. I said to him it reminds me a good deal of the old argument as to which came first, the chicken or the egg.

When a victorious army goes into a country, there are two essential conditions that they want to meet, in the first instance. The first is the end of armed opposition. The second is when that armed opposition comes to an end to avoid anarchy. In a country that gets into a state of anarchy, it is a pretty difficult thing to deal with, because it would take an awful lot of our troops.

I don't care with whom we deal in Italy, so long as it isn't
87. Transfer of American Merchant Craft to Britain

a definite member of the Fascist Government, as long as they get them to lay down their arms, and so long as we don't have anarchy. Now he may be a King, or a present Prime Minister, or a Mayor of a town or a village.

We have a great big objective. The first thing is to stop the fighting, and the second thing is to avoid anarchy. Now mind you, that is only the very first step.

You will also remember that in the Atlantic Charter, something was said about self-determination. That is a long-range thing. You can't get self-determination in the first week that they lay down their arms. In other words, common sense.

And I don't think that any controversy is either called for or advisable, because it puts the thing, at this stage of the game, into the "which came first, chicken or egg" category.

87 [A Letter to Prime Minister Churchill on Transfer of American Merchant Craft to Great Britain. August 3, 1943]

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

When you were with us during the latter part of December, 1941, and the first few days of 1942, after we had become active participants in the war, plans for a division of responsibility between your country and mine became generally fixed in certain understandings.

In matters of production, as well as in other matters, we agreed that mutual advantages were to be gained by concentrating, in so far as it was practical, our energies in doing those things which each of us was best qualified to do.

Here in this country in abundance were the natural resources of critical materials.

Here there had been developed a welding technique which enables us to construct standard merchant ships with a speed unequal in the history of merchant shipping.
87. Transfer of American Merchant Craft to Britain

Here we had waiting cargoes to be moved in ships to your island and to other theaters. If your country was to have carried out its contemplated ship construction program it would have been necessary to move large tonnages of raw materials that we have here across the Atlantic to your mills and yards, and then, in form of finished ships, to send them back to our ports for the cargo that was waiting to be carried.

Obviously, this would have entailed a waste of materials and time.

It was only natural for us then to decide that this country was to be the predominant cargo shipbuilding area for us both, while your country was to devote its facilities and resources principally to the construction of combat vessels.

You in your country reduced your merchant shipping program and directed your resources more particularly to other fields in which you were more favorably situated, while we became the merchant shipbuilder for the two of us, and we have built and are continuing to build a vast tonnage of cargo vessels.

Our merchant fleet has become larger and will continue to grow at a rapid rate. To man its ever-increasing number of vessels we foresee present difficulties of no mean proportions. On your side the British merchant fleet has been diminished and you have in your pool as a consequence trained seamen and licensed personnel.

Clearly it would be extravagant were this body of experienced men of the sea not to be used as promptly as possible. To fail to use them would result in a wastage of manpower on your side and, what is of equal importance, a wastage of shipping facilities. We cannot afford this.

In order that the general understanding we reached, during the early days of our engagement together in this war may be more perfectly carried out, and in order as a practical matter to avoid the prodigal use of manpower and shipping that would result from pursuing any other course, I am directing the War Shipping Administration, under appropriate bareboat arrangements, to number to your flag for temporary wartime duty dur-
ing each of the suggested next ten months a minimum of fifteen ships.

I have furthermore suggested to them that this be increased to twenty.

We have been allocating to British services on a voyage-to-voyage basis large numbers of American-controlled ships. What I am now suggesting to you, and what I am directing the War Shipping Administration to carry out, will be in the nature of a substitution to the extent of tonnage transferred for the American tonnage that has usually been employed in your war program.

Details of the arrangements we can properly leave to national shipping authorities for settlement through the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board, whose function it is to concert employment of all merchant vessels, and will in accordance with its usual practice do so in connection with these particular ships.

Always sincerely,

NOTE: Prime Minister Churchill read the foregoing letter to the British House of Commons, with the following comment: "It gives me great pleasure to have read to the House this letter from the President, which I have received his permission to make public. I think it shows the deep understanding of our problems and of the general problems of the war by the head of this most powerful state, and of the intimate and sympathetic relationships prevailing between our two Allied governments."

88 Address to the Philippine People Pledging Their Independence as Soon as Japanese Power Is Destroyed. August 12, 1943

To the people of the Philippines:

On December 28, 1941, three weeks after the armies of the Japanese launched their attack on Philippine soil, I sent a proclamation to you, the gallant people of the Philippines. I said then:
"I give to the people of the Philippines my solemn pledge that their freedom will be redeemed and their independence established and protected. The entire resources, in men and in material, of the United States stand behind that pledge."

We shall keep this promise, just as we have kept every promise which America has made to the Filipino people.

The story of the fighting on Bataan and Corregidor — and, indeed, everywhere in the Philippines — will be remembered so long as men continue to respect bravery, and devotion, and determination. When the Filipino people resisted the Japanese invaders with their very lives, they gave final proof that here was a Nation fit to be respected as the equal to any on earth, not in size or wealth, but in the stout heart and national dignity which are the true measures of a people.

That is why the United States, in practice, regards your lawful Government as having the same status as the Governments of other independent Nations. That is why I have looked upon President Quezon and Vice President Osmeña, not only as old friends, but also as trusted collaborators in our united task of destroying our common enemies in the East as well as in the West.

The Philippine Government is a signatory of the Declaration by the United Nations, along with 31 other Nations. President Quezon and Vice President Osmeña attend the meetings of the Pacific War Council, where the war in the Pacific is charted and planned. Your Government has participated fully and equally in the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture, and a Philippine representative is a member of the Interim Commission created by that Conference. And, of course, the Philippine Government will have its rightful place in the conferences which will follow the defeat of Japan.

These are the attributes of complete and respected nationhood for the Philippines, not a promise but a fact.

As President Quezon himself has told you, "The only thing lacking is the formal establishment of the Philippine Republic." These words of your President were uttered to you with my prior knowledge and approval. I now repeat them to you myself.
89. Roosevelt-Churchill Statement on Anti-Sub Warfare

I give the Filipino people my word that the Republic of the Philippines will be established the moment the power of our Japanese enemies is destroyed. The Congress of the United States has acted to set up the independence of the Philippines. The time will come quickly when that goes into full effect. You will soon be redeemed from the Japanese yoke and you will be assisted in the full repair of the ravages caused by the war.

We shall fight with ever-increasing strength and vigor until that end is achieved. Already Japan is tasting defeat in the islands of the Southwest Pacific. But that is only the beginning.

I call upon you, the heroic people of the Philippines to stand firm in your faith — to stand firm against the false promises of the Japanese, just as your fighting men and our fighting men stood firm together against their barbaric attacks.

The great day of your liberation will come, as surely as there is a God in Heaven.

The United States and the Philippines have learned the principles of honest cooperation, of mutual respect, in peace and in war.

For those principles we have fought — and by those principles we shall live.

NOTE: See Item 146 and note, 1941 volume, for the President's message of December 28, 1941, to the people of the Philippine Islands, and for an account of the development of legislation guaranteeing independence to the Philippines, and the measures taken by the President during the war to preserve continuity in the Philippine Government.

On October 6, 1943, the President sent a message to the Congress asking for further measures to provide for full security for the Philippines and to assist in her physical and economic rehabilitation (see Item 110 and note, this volume).

89 Joint Roosevelt-Churchill Statement on Anti-Submarine Warfare. August 14, 1943

During the month of July very poor results were obtained by the U-boats from their widespread effort against the shipping of the Allies. The steady flow of trans-Atlantic supplies on the
89. Roosevelt-Churchill Statement on Anti-Sub Warfare

greatest scale has continued unmolested, and such sinkings as have taken place in distant areas have had but an insignificant effect on the conduct of the war by the Allies. In fact, July is probably our most successful month, because the imports have been high, shipping losses moderate, and U-boat sinkings heavy.

Before the descent upon Sicily an armada of warships, troop transports, supply ships, and landing craft proceeded through Atlantic and Mediterranean waters with scarcely any interference from U-boats. Large reinforcements have also been landed on that island. Over 2,500 vessels were involved in these operations and the losses are only about 80,000 tons. On the other hand the U-boats which attempted to interfere with these operations suffered severe losses.

Our offensive operations against Axis submarines continue to progress most favorably in all areas, and during May, June, and July we have sunk at sea a total of over 90 U-boats, which represents an average loss of nearly one U-boat a day over the period.

The decline in the effectiveness of the U-boats is illustrated by the following figures:

In the first six months of 1943, the number of ships sunk per U-boat operating was only half that in the last six months of 1942 and only a quarter that in the first half of 1942.

The tonnage of shipping in the service of the United Nations continues to show a considerable net increase. During 1943 new ships completed by the Allies exceed all sinkings from all causes by upwards of 3,000,000 tons.

In spite of this very favorable progress in the battle against the U-boat, it must be remembered that the enemy still has large U-boat reserves, completed and under construction. It is necessary, therefore, to prepare for intensification of the battle both at sea and in the shipyards and to use our shipping with utmost economy to strengthen and speed the general offensive of the United Nations. But we can expect continued success only if we do not relax our efforts in any way.
90. Second Anniversary of Atlantic Charter

NOTE: The foregoing statement was released shortly after the President, Prime Minister Churchill, and their staffs had assembled for the first Quebec Conference. For an account of the first Quebec Conference, see Items 91, 92, 93, and notes, this volume.

90 Statement of the President on the Second Anniversary of the Atlantic Charter.

August 14, 1943

Today, on the second anniversary of the signing of the Atlantic Charter, I would cite particularly two of its purposes and principles on which we base our "hopes for a better future for the world."

First—respect for the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live. When the Atlantic Charter was first signed, there were those who said that this was impossible of achievement. And yet, today, as the forces of liberation march on, the right of self-determination is becoming once more a living reality.

Second—world-wide collaboration with the object of security, for all; of improved labor standards, economic adjustment, and social security.

It happens that today is also the anniversary of the day, in 1935, when our own American Social Security Act became law.

That humanitarian law made a real beginning toward the abolition of want in this country. More than 60 million workers with their own contributions are building security for their old age and for their families in case of death. Several million are already enjoying benefits. However, in all fairness, and in all equity, we should extend these benefits to farmers, farm laborers, small businessmen, and others working for themselves or in occupations specifically excluded by law. We should extend social security to provide protection against the serious economic hazard of ill health.

We are now fighting a great war. We fight on the side of the
91. The First Quebec Conference

United Nations, each and every one of whom has subscribed to the purposes and principles of the Atlantic Charter.

Today, we stand upon the threshold of major developments in this war. We are determined that we shall gain total victory over our enemies, and we recognize the fact that our enemies are not only Germany, Italy, and Japan: they are all the forces of oppression, intolerance, insecurity, and injustice which have impeded the forward march of civilization.

NOTE: For other references to the Atlantic Charter and its interpretation and significance, see Items 74, 76, 77, and 78, 1941 volume; Item 82, 1942 volume; and Items 120 and 121, 1944-1945 volume.

91 Joint Statement of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill on the Quebec Conference. August 24, 1943

The Anglo-American War Conference which opened at Quebec on August 11, under the hospitable auspices of the Canadian Government, has now concluded its work.

The whole field of world operations has been surveyed in the light of the many gratifying events which have taken place since the meeting of the President and the Prime Minister in Washington at the end of May, and the necessary decisions have been taken to provide for the forward action of the fleets, armies, and air forces of the two Nations. Considering that these forces are intermingled in continuous action against the enemy in several quarters of the globe, it is indispensable that entire unity of aim and method should be maintained at the summit of the war direction.

Further conferences will be needed, probably at shorter intervals than before, as the war effort of the United States and British Commonwealth and Empire against the enemy spreads and deepens. It would not be helpful to the fighting troops to
91. The First Quebec Conference

make any announcement of the decisions which have been reached. These can only emerge in action.

It may, however, be stated that the military discussions of the Chiefs of Staff turned very largely upon the war against Japan and the bringing of effective aid to China. Mr. T. V. Soong, representing the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, was a party to the discussions. In this field, as in the European, the President and the Prime Minister were able to receive and approve the unanimous recommendations of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Agreement was also reached upon the political issues underlying or arising out of the military operations.

It was resolved to hold another conference before the end of the year between the British and American authorities, in addition to any tripartite meeting which it may be possible to arrange with Soviet Russia. Full reports of the decisions so far as they affect the war against Germany and Italy will be furnished to the Soviet Government.

Consideration has been given during the Conference to the question of relations with the French Committee of Liberation, and it is understood that an announcement by a number of Governments will be made in the latter part of the week.

NOTE: Shortly after the resignation of Mussolini, announced on July 25, the President, Prime Minister Churchill and their staffs met at the Citadel, Quebec, in what was designated as the Quadrant Conference. Once again, the President unsuccessfully tried to induce Stalin to attend this meeting, and although Stalin refused, he did leave the door open for a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Britain and Russia which took place in October 1943.

The President and Churchill discussed Italian surrender terms during this first Quebec Conference. Shortly after the Conference had gotten under way Roosevelt and Churchill sent a joint message to Stalin which set forth in considerable detail the status of negotiations with Italy and the desire of Marshal Badoglio to enter the war on the Allied side. General Eisenhower was directed to seize Corsica and Sardinia, and attempt to establish air bases in the north of the area of Rome.

One of the most important strategic decisions reached at the Quadrant Conference was that the Normandy invasion of 1944 should be supplemented by an invasion of
the Toulon-Marseilles area of southern France. This diversionary operation was planned with the use of American and newly trained and equipped French forces, and was actually carried out August 15, 1944.

The most important diplomatic accomplishment of the Conference was an agreement between the United States and Great Britain on the text of a Four Nation Declaration (to involve Russia and China as well) providing for the establishment of an effective international organization after the war. This declaration stipulated that such an international organization should be based on the sovereign equality of all Nations, and that pending the establishment of such an organization the four powers would consult in order to maintain peace and security among Nations.

The Quadrant Conference failed in its attempt to reach agreement between the United States and Britain on the knotty issue of the recognition of a French Government in exile. The French Committee of National Liberation in Algiers, at that time largely under the domination of General de Gaulle, was therefore not accorded formal recognition. The President's approach to the French political problem was consistently the same as it had always been—that no abortive action be taken which would preclude the French people after liberation from voting freely for whichever government they chose.

A general air of optimism prevailed at the first Quebec Conference. In addition to the imminent fall of Italy, the naval picture in the Atlantic had brightened perceptibly and it was possible to report that the Allied navies definitely had the upper hand in their war against the U-boats. (See Item 89, this volume, for the joint Roosevelt-Churchill statement on anti-submarine warfare.) Furthermore, the escort vessel shortage was being relieved by superhuman production efforts.

In the discussions concerning the Normandy invasion, the decision was made that the supreme command would go to an American. In regard to the war against Japan, the Conference decided to create a Southeast Asia Command under Lord Louis Mountbatten. General Joseph W. Stilwell was designated as Deputy Supreme Allied Commander in the area.
The Nine Hundred and Fourteenth Press Conference — Joint Press Conference of the President and Prime Ministers Churchill and King (Excerpts). Quebec, Canada.

August 24, 1943

(Introductory remarks by Prime Minister King — Prime Minister Churchill reviews Conference and comments on lack of news — Purpose and value of Conferences — Review of war progress — The President apologizes for lack of headlines — Need for continuance of total effort — Global nature of the war — Tribute to the City of Quebec and to Canadian military efforts — Closing remarks of Prime Minister King.)

The President: Mr. King, you are now the “presiding officer.”

Prime Minister Mackenzie King: Gentlemen of the press, before the Conference breaks up, the President and Prime Minister hope to have an opportunity, in which I am proud indeed to be able to join them, of interchange with you, and also of expressing to you all, our thanks for the helpful cooperation which the press has given in the period of the Conference. . . .

(After an interval for the photographers)

Well, Mr. Churchill, would you like to say a few words to the gentlemen of the press? I call on Mr. Churchill to say a few words to the gentlemen assembled.

Prime Minister Churchill: Well, ladies and gentlemen, until I arrived here I thought that the President was going to follow Mr. Mackenzie King in the proceedings. I didn’t know what I was going to say, and I thought that I would base my remarks in accordance with what he said. Now he has arrived, he tells me that he wishes me to begin. Now he is going to listen to what I have got to say, and he is reserving himself not to make any errors I may make. (Laughter)
Well, I understand this is a talk which is to enable us, as Mr. Mackenzie King in his very happy phrase said, "to interchange greetings," and rather in the same way as we did at Casablanca.

Now I have quite realized that many of you gentlemen, probably the most distinguished body of great representatives that could be gathered together, have felt impatient at the fact that you were all gathered here, and there was so very little to report and write about.

Well, that was inherent in the nature of the task, because these conferences which attract world-wide attention do not themselves yield a matter which can be continually contributive to the press, or to the world. And one hopes that as a result of the decisions taken here, events will occur weeks and months later which will fully justify all the labor which was expended. And it is by those results, which are not available in any form that can be even foreshadowed today, that those who take part in these conferences must be judged; and I hope, therefore, that you will appreciate and sympathize with our difficulties, in the same way as I have tried to show I understand yours.

As an old reporter, newspaperman, war correspondent, when most of you were still unborn, I know the feelings of irritation which come when the trouble taken by the press does not seem to reap a proportionate reward.

But we are fighting a great life-and-death struggle, and I must ask for the patriotism, tolerance, and indulgence of all those who are here to make allowances for that, criticizing anything they think should be criticized, but altogether to make fair allowances for the conditions under which we are doing our work, which are essentially those of secrecy, which are essentially those the results of which, when they can be spoken of at all, should be the subject of considered statement. Therefore, I hope that you will be to our faults a little mild, and to our virtues very kind.

This is the sixth conference I have had with the President;
and I know there are some people who say, “Why is it necessary to have all these conferences?” But I think a much more reasonable way of looking at it would be to say, “How is it they are able to get on with such long intervals between the conferences?”

When you think that our armies are linked together as no two armies have ever been — our fleets, air forces, and armies linked together as never before in history, not only side by side but intermingled very often — and that the operations which they are conducting are being achieved with unexampled rapidity ahead of schedule and ahead of program; and when you think of all the difference it makes to the soldiers who are fighting with all the power at their command — and at which they will have to be kept, at the same time, at the summit and at the center — and that there will have to be a clear marking out of the course ahead, and a detailed study, a deliberate study of all the steps that have to be taken — and what a difference that all makes to the soldier, and how many lives may easily be saved, and what abridgments may be achieved in this long and devastating, desecrating war — then I feel sure that you will agree with me, and with the President, that we are rightly to come together, and to bring our staffs together, to bring not only the head staffs but all the very large staffs together indispensable to the working of modern operations.

A great advantage is achieved by personal contact. I assure you it would not be possible to carry on the complicated warfare we are waging without close, intimate, friendly, personal contacts, and they have been established at every level in the very large organizations which have been brought together here at Quebec.

I certainly must tell you that I have found the work very hard here — very hard. I have hardly had a minute to spare, from the continued flow of telegrams from London to the necessity of dealing with a number of great questions which cannot be hurried in their consideration; and a great many
minor decisions, some of which take just as much time and trouble. All this crowding in has certainly not left me any time to go about and see people, and to make all the exterior contacts which I should like to have done, except for an hour yesterday when I saw a few people.

That, I think, has been true also of our staffs. They have worked at tremendous pressure. Not only the combined conferences, which have been daily and twice a day and so forth, but each of the staffs has had to spend long hours in conclave together among themselves; and, of course, the President has had to sit with his officers, and I with those whom I have brought over. We have had to discuss with them all the movements — the thoughts — the decisions which have been taking place.

Well, we have got to the end of the task. We have reached very good — very sound — I hope very good conclusions. They are certainly unanimous and agreed, and most extreme cordiality prevails.

Now, you must not suppose that is a small thing, because with the best will in the world differences of view must arise, when two great Nations with their immense military forces, with problems in every quarter of the globe, are working together. They must. And it is astonishing what happens, even if you are separated for as much as three months. The differences arise not on principle but on emphasis and priority which, if they are allowed to consider, do not hamper operations therefore.

I never felt more sure about anything than I do about the fact that these conferences are an indispensable part of the successful conduct of the war, and of a shortening of the struggle, and of the saving of bloodshed to the troops. The least we can do for them is to make sure that they go into action under the best conditions and the best planning, that our foresight and deliberations have played their part in all those plans.
Well, on the whole, things are very much better than they were when we met at Casablanca.

They are even better than when we met in Washington last. Now, great operations have been successfully accomplished. All Sicily is prostrate under our authority, and apparently taking to it in a very kindly manner.

Of course, needless to say, the moment one achievement has been made, everyone rightly expects something else to come forward onto the scene; and I have no doubt something else will come, but I am sure you would be the first to silence my lips if you thought I was going in any way to give any indication other than one that would be misleading to the enemy, as you may always hear something that is coming about future operations. Still, I do look forward to great steps being taken to beating down our antagonists one after another.

And I should like to point out that the relations between the British and American armies are different from those between any other large forces in the ages, in that they are working together in the same set of operations.

Now, another reason why we are here only two, instead of three or more, is that of course a very large part of our discussions has naturally and necessarily been concerned with the war against Japan; and those are subjects of special interest to the powers who are belligerent against Japan. That you can see for yourselves.

We have had Mr. T. V. Soong here, and we have made plans for pressing forward with the study not only of short-term action but, of course, long-term; and as we hope, final and decisive actions will have to be taken against that greedy and ambitious Government and people.

Generally speaking, I have every right to give you the groundwork on which you can feel strong and healthy confidence. We are well armed. We are better armed than before—better equipped. We, who began so weak and so in
many ways ill equipped, are now enjoying that superiority in weapons and in material of all kinds.

The U-boat warfare has rolled over from the debit to the credit side. The great outflow of shipping so magnificently and prodigiously produced by the United States and by Canada, together with the heavy sinkings of U-boats and the safe conduct of convoys, has undoubtedly placed us in a position where we can say without any doubt that Britain and the United States will be able to bring the whole of their weight to bear.

And that, combined with the superb exertions of our Russian ally, far away locked in the great land battles in the heart of Europe, those two combined together should give us the very best means of helping all the toiling millions—the anxious, suffering millions of the world, thrown out of their houses, taken from their fields—who through no fault or device of their own have been condemned to toil all these four years.

Thank you very much for listening to what I have had to say. But Mr. Mackenzie King reminds me, quite properly, that four years is from the British point of view, but the Chinese were in for seven years.

Well, let's do our utmost to bring these periods of tribulations to an end; and believe me, the work which we have done here will, I am sure, play a contributory part. It is a satisfactory milestone on the road, and I have no doubt there will be other milestones in the future.

But this, I am certain, has been a most successful Conference; and if you, while not hesitating to mingle corrections with approval, will at the same time give us the best aid you can in making a success of this, and in spreading wide that feeling of confidence which I feel, and which I am sure you are justified in feeling, then I think you might have found this Conference has yielded all that you would have liked from a press point of view, and certainly feel that you have played your part with others in the great groundwork which has ended and is steadily progressing.
92. Nine Hundred and Fourteenth Press Conference

Prime Minister Mackenzie King: Thank you very much.

I invite you, Mr. President, to speak to the ladies and gentlemen of the press.

The President: I think perhaps that I can give away a secret, by explaining that all during the early hours of this morning—I was going to say last night—the three of us were in an apologetic frame of mind to the press. We were honestly trying to give you all some spot news. And we talked for some two hours, trying to devise something along the line of a slogan—a phrase—by which this Conference might be known in the future, but we failed utterly. And that is why we come here in a spirit of apology.

The Prime Minister has well explained why there are certain things that cannot be talked about or printed, and yet I think there is one thing in which the press can help, as the press well knows, to a very great degree. This war is not being run by conferences, it goes far deeper than that. We live in democracies. The war effort in the field has gone extremely well. That is in part due to the conferences of our staffs. And yet, what the men carry, what the men eat, the ships they sail in, that all comes from the unanimity of our war effort, down to the average citizen. And I believe that it is due to the magnificent effort in all our countries, but one which must be kept up very clearly and definitely to the high pitch that it has now arrived at. We cannot afford in any way to assume that military and naval or air men can win the war alone. They need the backing of the people back home. And that is why this Conference, while of very great value, must be implemented by the people in the factories, and the shipyards, and in the fields.

We have had a series of successes. When I think back a little over a year ago—back of Casablanca—June, 1942, when we were meeting in Washington, things looked pretty dark—to the days of Tobruk, to the days of a lack of an offensive on our part. We were still on the defensive, clearly, in almost every part of the world.

And we know that it takes time. We can't order things
done and have them happen overnight, or over the week end. And so, what was planned in June of 1942 didn’t go into effect until November, 1942. And the things that were planned at Casablanca have only just gone into effect, as we realize through the capture of Tunis first, and then Sicily.

I think you can assume that other plans are about to be developed. But that point about the Conference being a detail, if you like, an essential part of winning the war in the shortest possible time ought to be linked with the part that the people of the United Nations must contribute —

PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL: (interjecting) Hear — hear.
THE PRESIDENT: (continuing) — to the earliest and most satisfactory victory.

I think also that there are one or two things that might be assumed. I know the value of controversy making the front page — (laughter) and I think it’s an actual fact that we have gone through this series of conferences without controversy. We have a meeting of the minds, and I believe that that is going to last, not only through the war but for many, many long years after the war is over and peace comes.

In the same way, I think we ought to realize that this is a war throughout the world, that we are looking at it as a world war. Yes, we discussed the Atlantic situation, and the operations in the Mediterranean; but we have discussed equally the operations and the problems in the Southwest Pacific, of China, and even of that very important fact that happened during this Conference, the throwing out, or shall I say the self-removal of the Japs from the only part of this hemisphere that they had a foot in. Therefore, there is no difference, East and West, and below the equator or above the equator. It’s all one broad and general operation. That was one of our problems last night and into the early hours of this morning. We couldn’t say anything that would create a controversy, because there was none.

I can tell you also that not once but a dozen times, Mr. Churchill and I have said this spot is the best yet.
Prime Minister Churchill: (interjecting) Yes.

The President: (continuing) We have come here to Quebec, and we have appreciated the wonderful hospitality of Mr. King —

Prime Minister Churchill: (interjecting) Hear — hear.

The President: (continuing) — and of the Canadian people, because he speaks for them.

I don't think we could find a more delightful spot than here, with its great historic background. I, like Mr. Churchill, wish we had had more time to get about and see things, and do things. I will say that I shall never forget the very excellent eating qualities of Quebec trout. That is something that I shall long remember. All in all, it has been a tremendous success.

We wanted last night to give out some kind of statement that would be — what shall I call it? — a bit exciting. Well, a statement has been prepared. I don't believe there's a "cough in a carload" in it. (Laughter) . . .

In the statement we were compelled, Mr. Churchill and I, to speak of the "fleets, armies, and air forces of the two Nations." The reason for that is that this is a staff conference between the British and American staffs; but I want to point out that it is only because of that restriction that we did not speak of the splendid forces of the Dominion of Canada. They are at the front, as we all know, working with the British and the Americans; and I don't want anybody to think, anywhere in the world, that we have forgotten them — what the Canadians have been doing in this war.

Well, I think that's about all that I can say.

And I merely want once more to thank Mr. King and the people of the Dominion for all that they have done to make this a very busy, but a very happy ten days since we came here.

The Press: Thank you, sir.

Prime Minister Mackenzie King: Gentlemen, just one word before you part.
92. Nine Hundred and Fourteenth Press Conference

I would like to say in your presence to the President and to the Prime Minister of Great Britain, how greatly honored the people of Canada have felt that they should have agreed to hold the meeting which they have just been holding in Canada, and particularly in this historic old city of Quebec.

My colleagues and I were very proud indeed when we received word from Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill that they were agreed upon meeting in this city, in our country. I wish to thank them most warmly for having come here and spent the time that they have spent with us. We all wish that it might be longer. We all wish that there might have been a greater opportunity for our people to have the privilege of seeing them more, as they did yesterday in the city for the Prime Minister, and also for the President. But we have realized that this is a very serious Conference, and that the matters being discussed here are the most important of any that can be discussed in the world at this time, that every moment and hour has been precious.

It has been my privilege to know something of what has been done behind the scenes, and I would just like to assure all of you ladies and gentlemen of the press that there hasn't been a moment in which the thoughts and the minds of these gentlemen and their military advisers have not been directed to the supreme purpose for which they have met and gathered together here.

I am delighted, Mr. President and Mr. Churchill, that you have both found it possible not only to see each other but to see just a bit of the immediate environs of the city, and to carry away many happy memories of the few days that we have had the privilege of having you in our midst.

May I say to you ladies and gentlemen of the press, on behalf of the Government, how deeply we appreciate—the Government of Canada—how deeply we appreciate the very helpful cooperation that you have given to all of us during the period of the Conference. And I want to thank you on behalf of what you have sent out to the world as the picture...
and background in which the Conference is being held, in which you have given the atmosphere in which these deliberations have taken place, and for what you have been able to give of all the proceedings.

You have helped to put our country onto the map of the world, at this time of greatest importance in the history of the world. I thank you for having done it, and for the manner in which you have done it.

NOTE: See preceding Item and Quebec (Quadrant) Conference. note for further data on the first

93 ("We Have Been Forced to Call Out . . . the Sheriff's Posse . . . That Gangsterism May Be Eliminated in the Community of Nations" — Address at Ottawa, Canada. August 25, 1943

Your Excellency Mr. Prime Minister, Members of the Parliament, and all my good friends and neighbors of the Dominion of Canada:

It was exactly five years ago last Wednesday that I came to Canada to receive the high honor of a degree at Queen's University. On that occasion — one year before the invasion of Poland, three years before Pearl Harbor — I said:

"We in the Americas are no longer a far away continent, to which the eddies of controversies beyond the seas could bring no interest or no harm. Instead, we in the Americas have become a consideration to every propaganda office and to every general staff beyond the seas. The vast amount of our resources, the vigor of our commerce and the strength of our men have made us vital factors in world peace whether we choose it or not."

We did not choose this war — and that "we" includes each and every one of the United Nations.

War was violently forced upon us by criminal aggressors who measure their standards of morality by the extent of the death
and the destruction that they can inflict upon their neighbors.

In this war, Canadians and Americans have fought shoulder to shoulder—as our men and our women and our children have worked together and played together in happier times of peace.

Today, in devout gratitude, we are celebrating a brilliant victory won by British and Canadian and American fighting men in Sicily.

Today, we rejoice also in another event for which we need not apologize. A year ago Japan occupied several of the Aleutian Islands on our side of the ocean, and made a great "to-do" about the invasion of the continent of North America. I regret to say that some Americans and some Canadians wished our Governments to withdraw from the Atlantic and the Mediterranean campaigns and divert all our vast supplies and strength to the removal of the Japs from a few rocky specks in the North Pacific. Today, our wiser councils have maintained our efforts in the Atlantic area, and the Mediterranean, and the China Seas, and the Southwest Pacific with ever-growing contributions; and in the Northwest Pacific a relatively small campaign has been assisted by the Japs themselves in the elimination of that last Jap from Attu and Kiska. We have been told that the Japs never surrender; their headlong retreat satisfies us just as well.

Great councils are being held here on the free and honored soil of Canada—councils which look to the future conduct of this war and to the years of building a new progress for mankind.

To these councils Canadians and Americans alike again welcome that wise and good and gallant gentleman, the Prime Minister of Great Britain.

Mr. King, my old friend, may I through you thank the people of Canada for their hospitality to all of us. Your course and mine have run so closely and affectionately during these many long years that this meeting adds another link to that chain. I have always felt at home in Canada and you, I think, have always felt at home in the United States.

During the past few days in Quebec, the Combined Staffs have been sitting around a table—which is a good custom—talking
things over, discussing ways and means, in the manner of friends, in the manner of partners, and may I even say in the manner of members of the same family.

We have talked constructively of our common purposes in this war—of our determination to achieve victory in the shortest possible time—of our essential cooperation with our great and brave fighting allies.

And we have arrived, harmoniously, at certain definite conclusions. Of course, I am not at liberty to disclose just what these conclusions are. But, in due time, we shall communicate the secret information of the Quebec Conference to Germany, Italy, and Japan. We shall communicate this information to our enemies in the only language their twisted minds seem capable of understanding.

Sometimes I wish that that great master of intuition, the Nazi leader, could have been present in spirit at the Quebec Conference—I am thoroughly glad that he wasn’t there in person. If he and his generals had known our plans they would have realized that discretion is still the better part of valor and that surrender would pay them better now than later.

The evil characteristic that makes a Nazi a Nazi is his utter inability to understand and therefore to respect the qualities or the rights of his fellow men. His only method of dealing with his neighbor is first to delude him with lies, then to attack him treacherously, then beat him down and step on him, and then either kill him or enslave him. And the same thing is true of the fanatical militarists of Japan.

Because their own instincts and impulses are essentially inhuman, our enemies simply cannot comprehend how it is that decent, sensible individual human beings manage to get along together and live together as good neighbors.

That is why our enemies are doing their desperate best to misrepresent the purposes and the results of this Quebec Conference. They still seek to divide and conquer allies who refuse to be divided just as cheerfully as they refuse to be conquered.

We spend our energies and our resources and the very lives of
our sons and daughters because a band of gangsters in the community of Nations declines to recognize the fundamentals of decent, human conduct.

We have been forced to call out what we in the United States would call the sheriff's posse to break up the gang in order that gangsterism may be eliminated in the community of Nations.

We are making sure — absolutely, irrevocably sure — that this time the lesson is driven home to them once and for all. Yes, we are going to be rid of outlaws this time.

Every one of the United Nations believes that only a real and lasting peace can justify the sacrifices we are making, and our unanimity gives us confidence in seeking that goal.

It is no secret that at Quebec there was much talk of the post-war world. That discussion was doubtless duplicated simultaneously in dozens of Nations and hundreds of cities and among millions of people.

There is a longing in the air. It is not a longing to go back to what they call "the good old days." I have distinct reservations as to how good "the good old days" were. I would rather believe that we can achieve new and better days.

Absolute victory in this war will give greater opportunities to the world, because the winning of the war in itself is certainly proving to all of us up here that concerted action can accomplish things. Surely we can make strides toward a greater freedom from want than the world has yet enjoyed. Surely by unanimous action in driving out the outlaws and keeping them under heel forever, we can attain a freedom from fear of violence.

I am everlastingly angry only at those who assert vociferously that the four freedoms and the Atlantic Charter are nonsense because they are unattainable. If those people had lived a century and a half ago they would have sneered and said that the Declaration of Independence was utter piffle. If they had lived nearly a thousand years ago they would have laughed uproariously at the ideals of Magna Charta. And if they had lived several thousand years ago they would have derided Moses when he came from the Mountain with the Ten Commandments.
94. Toast to the King at Governor General's Luncheon

We concede that these great teachings are not perfectly lived up to today, but I would rather be a builder than a wrecker, hoping always that the structure of life is growing—not dying.

May the destroyers who still persist in our midst decrease. They, like some of our enemies, have a long road to travel before they accept the ethics of humanity.

Some day, in the distant future perhaps—but some day, it is certain—all of them will remember with the Master, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."

Monsieur le Premier: Ma visite à la ville historique de Québec rappelle vivement à mon esprit que le Canada est une nation fondée sur l'union de deux grandes races. L'harmonie de leur association dans l'égalité peut servir d'exemple à l'humanité toute entière—un exemple partout dans le monde.

NOTE: See Item 105, pp. 491-494, 1938 volume, for the President's address at Queen's University to which he referred in the foregoing address.

94 (The President Offers a Toast to the King at the Governor General’s Luncheon, Ottawa, Canada. August 25, 1943

I wish that I might go with you to the Yukon, and to Alaska. In these days of planes and cars, distances seem nothing. That, perhaps, is the reason why this is my first trip to Canada. One always goes to the nearest places last. But, of course, both in Quebec and here, when anybody has spoken of my visit to this Capital, I cannot help remembering that I started coming to Canada 59 years ago—and meant to every year since.

I won't express any preference for the seashore or the interior, but the seashore is a very charming place. And its fish, while of a different character, are just as beautiful as the fish of Georgian Bay.
I have never been in the Northwest. I am one of those amphibious creatures who has visited Victoria, but never Vancouver; so I have a great deal still to see. Mr. King has talked with me for many years about going to see the Prairie States. I have never had that opportunity.

As a matter of fact, four years ago, when the King and Queen were here and came to Hyde Park, he was able to tell me far more about Canada as a whole than I knew from my own experience. And I hope very much that because I have had the privilege of knowing you for a great many years, that he will come over again one of these days — the sooner the better — to visit you, and visit us below the line.

And so I give a toast to the King.

95 (White House Statement on the Promotion of General Eisenhower and the Award to Him of the Distinguished Service Medal.

August 31, 1943

In a recess appointment the President today designated General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander in Chief of the Allied Forces in North Africa, as a permanent Major General in the United States Army. At present General Eisenhower holds the temporary rank of General and the permanent rank of Colonel.

This promotion is in recognition of General Eisenhower's outstanding services as Commander in Chief of Allied Forces in North Africa. It was under his supervision that the successful landing in North Africa was made by combined British and American forces on November 8, 1942, with all the hazards of amphibious operations.

The Axis' reaction to the occupation of North Africa was immediate and violent and accompanied by the landing of large forces in Tunisia. To meet this issue American, French, and British troops (including the British Eighth Army which had
advanced from Tripolitania) were coordinated under General Eisenhower's leadership to carry out the brilliant campaign which completely destroyed the remaining Axis forces in Africa.

More recently General Eisenhower has directed another critical amphibious operation resulting in the conquest of Sicily. The success of this campaign and the perfection of Allied teamwork, air, ground, and naval, have undoubtedly had a decisive effect on the oppressed people of Europe and the course of the war. Mussolini and the Fascists have been eliminated and the fate of Italy lies in the balance as the continent of Europe trembles under the impact of the forward surge of massive Russian forces and the great aerial bombardment increases in fury with each succeeding week.

Coincident with General Eisenhower's advancement to a permanent major generalcy, the Distinguished Service Medal has been awarded to him with the following citation:

**CITATION FOR DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL (OAK LEAF CLUSTER) FOR GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER**

As Commander in Chief of the Allied Forces in North Africa General Eisenhower has, by skillful planning and direction, made an outstanding contribution to the war effort of the Allied Nations. The organization and leadership of the expedition to occupy North Africa was a notable contribution. Thereafter by his firmness and sound judgment General Eisenhower was successful in the prompt establishment of a well-organized regime in North Africa, including the invaluable participation of French troops in the military operations which followed. In the face of violent Axis resistance in Tunisia he successfully coordinated the British, American, and French air, ground, and naval forces in a decisive campaign which destroyed the last elements of Axis resistance on the African continent. In a brilliant campaign of 38 days General Eisenhower directed the combined operations leading to the conquest of Sicily and reduced Italy to a state of military impotence.
96. Labor Day Statement

Throughout the period of these operations, in preparation and execution, General Eisenhower has displayed conspicuous ability to secure complete unity of command and action of a great allied force, with disastrous consequences to the enemy.

NOTE: The President put a high degree of faith and confidence in General Eisenhower's military ability, which events proved were not misplaced. For additional references by the President to the ability of General Eisenhower as a commander, see Item 124, 1942 volume; and Items 16, 17, 48, and 83, this volume.

96 (Labor Day Statement. September 4, 1943

Fifty-six years ago Labor Day was observed for the first time in the United States. Since then we have fought one World War to victory and now are engaged in another and even greater conflict upon the result of which depends the future of freedom-loving people the world over.

With that priceless heritage at stake we are determined that this World War, too, shall result in victory so that life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall be the lot of man when he wills it and that he be not the downtrodden serf of brutal Axis masters. That determination is shared by all Americans: by workers, by management, and by farmers.

It is altogether fitting that these groups of free Americans are working today, many laboring on round-the-clock shifts, that our fighting men on land, on sea, and in the air may have the weapons with which to bring about victory as speedily as possible.

To make time and thus save lives and suffering, our American workers, employers, and farmers will need not only to maintain their production pace but to increase it. Their record to date has been magnificent and in keeping with the true American spirit of all-out effort for those fighting so valiantly and so successfully in all parts of the world.

That increased production effort will be forthcoming. It will
be given gladly for love of country and for liberty, as it has been given since Pearl Harbor, to set up a record that never has been equaled. We well may be proud of that achievement for it has done much to make possible the successes of the armed forces of the United Nations. Its continuation will spell the defeat of our enemies— the preservation of our way of life.

97 Letter on Resignation of Aubrey Williams

97 Letter to Aubrey Williams on His Resignation from the N.Y.A. and the Liquidation of That Agency. September 7, 1943

Dear Aubrey:

I have your letter of resignation in which you thank me for the opportunity of serving as Administrator of the National Youth Administration. I want to thank you for that service—for the great job you have done in the splendid human and democratic enterprise of giving over four million young people a chance to acquire training and education through work.

I can well understand your statement that you leave the N.Y.A. with regret. I, too, regret the termination of this great activity for American youth. Nevertheless, while Congress brought an end to the N.Y.A.'s existence, nothing can end the long results of its usefulness. It would be difficult to evaluate the proportions of the resource which this training of young men and women has been to America in the war crisis. You have a right to pride and America a reason for appreciation in the fact that at the time its functions ceased N.Y.A. was continuing to render a national war service by supplying 30,000 young people, thoroughly trained in some skill, to essential places in the production program every month.

We may rejoice together in the confidence that whatever is done with respect to young people in the future, we know that through the National Youth Administration a valuable contri-
98. *Nine Hundred and Sixteenth Press Conference*

bution has been made to our knowledge and experience in assisting young Americans to make the greatest use of their capacities for themselves and for their country.

Very sincerely yours,

Hon. Aubrey Williams,
Administrator,
National Youth Administration

*NOTE:* For an account of the activities and accomplishments of the National Youth Administration, see Item 40 and note, and references cited therein, 1941 volume.

98 (The Nine Hundred and Sixteenth Press Conference (Excerpts). September 7, 1943

*(Lend-lease settlement — Transition between end of hostilities and treaties of peace — Possibility of maintenance of peace by force through the U.N.)*

**THE PRESIDENT:** I want to talk about a mistake, for which I apologize. I will tell you the whole story.

When I was up in Quebec, it came the time for the lend-lease report to Congress. And there were several suggested drafts for my "Foreword" that I always send, and on one of the drafts somebody said I had approved it. As a matter of fact, I hadn't seen any of the drafts, and the verbal statement that I had approved it — which I hadn't — went into type, and in type as "Franklin D. Roosevelt," not a signature.

And as such it was sent to the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House, and released.

Now there were two sentences, when I did see it after I got back from Quebec — but a little late. I didn't like the two sentences, not because they haven't got a very large element of truth, but it's a condensation of the truth, and it might be very widely misconstrued. So all I have done is to take the two sentences out.

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They read: "The Congress, in passing and extending the Lend-Lease Act, made it plain that the United States wants no new war debts to jeopardize the coming peace. Victory and a secure peace are the only coin in which we can be repaid."

Well, that is only about a quarter of the truth. For instance, "new war debts to jeopardize the coming peace." What is a debt? Is it money, or is it goods, or is it some other benefit? And the way it's put here, it doesn't do justice to the whole situation. It is perfectly true that in the narrow technical sense we want no new war debts, but at the same time the element of the Lend-Lease Act does mean that other Nations operating with us in its administration will repay us as far as they possibly can. Now that doesn't mean necessarily dollars, because there are all kinds of other repayments which can be made. Therefore, the sentence is not clear.

The same way, "Victory and a secure peace are the only coin in which we can be repaid." Well, a great many people in this country think of a coin as something that you will jingle in your pocket, and of course in the large sense there are all kinds of coins. I wouldn't have put it that way if I had had a chance to see it before it was printed.

Now, that's literally all that happened. That's the whole story. They thought I had approved it—I never saw it—so it was printed. And now the real copy is going up next Monday to Congress.

Q. Mr. President, could you say anything about Mr. Churchill's allusion in his speech at Boston to possible continuance of the Combined Chiefs of Staff after the war?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, let me talk on that.

People are awfully—what will I say?—immature when they talk about "after the war." They have the idea, because of certain precedents, that when the last shot is fired in one area, let us say, there will be an immediate peace conference, or if all the areas stop shooting that there will be immediately a peace conference; there will be a great treaty signed between all the Nations of the world.
I think that it is a pretty fair guess to say that there will be a transition period. You have to remember certain things, and you have to remember that most of the world is pretty well shell-shocked now. Many of you are somewhat shell-shocked. (Laughter) Occasionally, I think that I am a bit shell-shocked. And I think that for the good of humanity perhaps it might be good before we start writing the fair copy of what is going to happen later on, that we should catch our breaths; our handwriting will be better, and what we say will be better if we read it over a good many times, and perhaps for a good many months.

And so I rather look forward to a period of transition between the firing of the last shot and the signing of a formal agreement or treaty. Obviously, there are certain things that will happen during that transition period. One of them is the maintenance of peace. Well, by whom? The victors. The victors will maintain the peace during that transition period, and they will try out things. They will keep their Combined Staffs working, meeting, watching, ready to maintain peace by force if necessary. And the Prime Minister was absolutely right.

Now, that may develop into such a good working plan from a military point of view that the United Nations may say, “Well, that’s pretty good” — the United States and Britain, of course, and other Nations which contribute in a military way to the maintenance of peace. And that, I think, is the way the Prime Minister put it yesterday when he was getting his degree. . . .

NOTE: See note to Item 105, 1941 war lend-lease settlements, volume, for an account of the post-
My fellow Americans:

Once upon a time, a few years ago, there was a city in our Middle West which was threatened by a destructive flood in the great river. The waters had risen to the top of the banks. Every man, woman, and child in that city was called upon to fill sandbags in order to defend their homes against the rising waters. For many days and nights, destruction and death stared them in the face.

As a result of the grim, determined community effort, that city still stands. Those people kept the levees above the peak of the flood. All of them joined together in the desperate job that had to be done — businessmen, workers, farmers, doctors, preachers — people of all races.

To me, that town is a living symbol of what community co-operation can accomplish.

Today, in the same kind of community effort, only very much larger, the United Nations and their peoples have kept the levees of civilization high enough to prevent the floods of aggression and barbarism and wholesale murder from engulfing us all. The flood has been raging for four years. At last we are beginning to gain on it; but the waters have not yet receded enough for us to relax our sweating work with the sandbags. In this war bond campaign we are filling bags and placing them against the flood — bags which are essential if we are to stand off the ugly torrent which is trying to sweep us all away.

Today, it is announced that an armistice with Italy has been concluded.

This was a great victory for the United Nations — but it was also a great victory for the Italian people. After years of war and suffering and degradation, the Italian people are at last coming to the day of liberation from their real enemies, the Nazis.

But let us not delude ourselves that this armistice means the end of the war in the Mediterranean. We still have to drive the
Germans out of Italy as we have driven them out of Tunisia and Sicily; we must drive them out of France and all other captive countries; and we must strike them on their own soil from all directions.

Our ultimate objectives in this war continue to be Berlin and Tokyo.

I ask you to bear these objectives constantly in mind—and do not forget that we still have a long way to go before we attain them.

The great news that you have heard today from General Eisenhower does not give you license to settle back in your rocking chairs and say, “Well, that does it. We’ve got ’em on the run. Now we can start the celebration.”

The time for celebration is not yet. And I have a suspicion that when this war does end, we shall not be in a very celebrating frame of mind. I think that our main emotion will be one of grim determination that this shall not happen again.

During the past weeks, Mr. Churchill and I have been in constant conference with the leaders of our combined fighting forces. We have been in constant communication with our fighting allies, Russian and Chinese, who are prosecuting the war with relentless determination and with conspicuous success on far distant fronts. And Mr. Churchill and I are here together in Washington at this crucial moment.

We have seen the satisfactory fulfillment of plans that were made in Casablanca last January and here in Washington last May. And lately we have made new, extensive plans for the future. But throughout these conferences we have never lost sight of the fact that this war will become bigger and tougher, rather than easier, during the long months that are to come.

This war does not and must not stop for one single instant. Your fighting men know that. Those of them who are moving forward through jungles against lurking Japs—those who are landing at this moment, in barges moving through the dawn up to strange enemy coasts—those who are diving their bombers down on the targets at roof-top level—every one of these men
knows that this war is a full-time job and that it will continue to be that until total victory is won.

And, by the same token, every responsible leader in all the United Nations knows that the fighting goes on twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, and that any day lost may have to be paid for in terms of months added to the duration of the war.

Every campaign, every single operation in all the campaigns that we plan and carry through must be figured in terms of staggering material costs. We cannot afford to be niggardly with any of our resources, for we shall need all of them to do the job that we have put our shoulder to.

Your fellow Americans have given a magnificent account of themselves — on the battlefields and on the oceans and in the skies all over the world.

Now it is up to you to prove to them that you are contributing your share and more than your share. It is not sufficient simply to put into war bonds money which we would normally save. We must put into war bonds money which we would not normally save. Only then have we done everything that good conscience demands. So it is up to you, the Americans in the American homes — the very homes which our sons and daughters are working and fighting and dying to preserve.

I know I speak for every man and woman throughout the Americas when I say that we Americans will not be satisfied to send our troops into the fire of the enemy with equipment inferior in any way. Nor will we be satisfied to send our troops with equipment only equal to that of the enemy. We are determined to provide our troops with overpowering superiority — superiority of quantity and quality in any and every category of arms and armaments that they may conceivably need.

And where does our dominating power come from? Why, it can come only from you. The money you lend and the money you give in taxes buys that death-dealing, and at the same time life-saving power that we need for victory. This is an expensive war — expensive in money; you can help keep it at a minimum cost in lives.
The American people will never stop to reckon the cost of redeeming civilization. They know there never can be any economic justification for failing to save freedom.

We can be sure that our enemies will watch this drive with the keenest interest. They know that success in this undertaking will shorten the war. They know that the more money the American people lend to their Government, the more powerful and relentless will be the American forces in the field. They know that only a united and determined America could possibly produce on a voluntary basis so huge a sum of money as fifteen billion dollars.

The overwhelming success of the Second War Loan Drive last April showed that the people of this Democracy stood firm behind their troops.

This Third War Loan, which we are starting tonight, will also succeed — because the American people will not permit it to fail.

I cannot tell you how much to invest in war bonds during this Third War Loan Drive. No one can tell you. It is for you to decide under the guidance of your own conscience.

I will say this, however. Because the Nation's needs are greater than ever before, our sacrifices too must be greater than they have ever been before.

Nobody knows when total victory will come — but we do know that the harder we fight now, the more might and power we direct at the enemy now, the shorter the war will be and the smaller the sum total of sacrifice.

Success of the Third War Loan will be the symbol that America does not propose to rest on its arms — that we know the tough, bitter job ahead and will not stop until we have finished it.

Now it is your turn!

Every dollar that you invest in the Third War Loan is your personal message of defiance to our common enemies — to the ruthless savages of Germany and Japan — and it is your personal message of faith and good cheer to our allies and to all the men at the front. God bless them!
NOTE: The First War Loan Drive had been conducted between November 30 and December 23, 1942; its goal was to raise about $9,000,000,000 through the sale of securities, Treasury bills, war savings bonds, and tax savings notes. The drive succeeded in raising $12,947,000,000, of which $7,860,000,000 represented sales to investors other than commercial banks.

The Second War Loan Drive was launched by the President on April 7, 1943, and was conducted between April 12 and May 1, 1943. More than a million volunteers participated in this drive. One of its major objectives was to broaden the sale of Government securities by increasing the number of investors. The goal for the Second War Loan Drive was $13,000,000,000; in fact, sales amounted to $18,555,000,000. Purchases by non-bank investors represented $13,476,000,000 of the total sales during the second drive.

The foregoing address of the President formally opened the Third War Loan Drive, which was conducted from September 9 through October 2, 1943. For the first time, commercial banks were excluded from making purchases during this drive and the effort was directed exclusively to the sale of bonds to non-bank investors. The Third War Loan Drive also differed from the first two drives in that it was organized under the direction of State and local war finance committees, with each State chairman reporting to the War Finance Division of the Treasury Department. The goal for the third loan was $15,000,000,000; sales actually amounted to $18,944,000,000, all to non-banking investors.

(See Item 34 and note, 1941 volume; Items 47 and 67 and note, this volume; and Items 42 and 115 and notes, 1944-1945 volume, for other Presidential statements and addresses in connection with war loan drives, the sale of defense and war savings bonds and stamps, and the operation of the voluntary pay-roll savings plan.)

At this stage of the war, the President was beginning to become apprehensive lest the spirit of optimism after the surrender of Italy might cause a production let-down at home. He frequently mentioned this to his associates, and said that he wanted to make clear in his future speeches that although he was confident of ultimate victory, that victory could come only if we kept at the business of war with every ounce of energy and determination that we could bring to bear.

As was usual with addresses on war loan drives, the first draft of the foregoing fireside chat was prepared in the Treasury Department. However, the President spent many hours of his time and effort in revision of this speech. He wanted to impress upon the American people the necessity of not letting down, if we wanted to win the war quickly.
100. Message on Italian Armistice

100 Joint Roosevelt-Churchill Message to Marshal Badoglio and the Italian People on the Armistice with Italy. September 10, 1943

It has fallen to you in the hour of your country's agony to take the first decisive steps to win peace and freedom for the Italian people and to win back for Italy an honorable place in the civilization of Europe.

You have already freed your country from Fascist servitude. There remains the even more important task of cleansing the Italian soil from the German invaders. Hitler, through his accomplice Mussolini, has brought Italy to the verge of ruin. He has driven the Italians into disastrous campaigns in the sands of Egypt and the snows of Russia. The Germans have always deserted the Italian troops on the battlefield, sacrificing them contemptuously in order to cover their own retreats. Now Hitler threatens to subject you all to the cruelties he is perpetrating in so many lands.

Now is the time for every Italian to strike his blow. The liberating armies of the Western World are coming to your rescue. We have very strong forces and are entering at many points. The German terror in Italy will not last long. They will be extirpated from your land and you, by helping in this great surge of liberation, will place yourselves once more among the true and long-proved friends of your country from whom you have been so wrongfully estranged.

Take every chance you can. Strike hard and strike home. Have faith in your future. All will come well. March forward with your American and British friends in the great world movement toward Freedom, Justice, and Peace.
101. War Relocation Authority Segregation Program

101 (A Message to the Senate on the Segregation Program of the War Relocation Authority.

September 14, 1943

The President of the Senate:

Sir:

On July 6, 1943, the Senate considered and agreed to Senate Resolution 166.

The Resolution relates to the program for relocating persons of Japanese ancestry evacuated from west coast military areas, and asks that the President issue an Executive Order to accomplish two things—(1) to direct the War Relocation Authority to segregate the disloyal persons, and the persons whose loyalty is questionable, from those whose loyalty to the United States has been established, and (2) to direct the appropriate agency of the Government to issue a full and complete authoritative statement on conditions in relocation centers and plans for future operations.

I find that the War Relocation Authority has already undertaken a program of segregation. That program is now under way. The first train movements began in early September.

In response to the Resolution I asked the Director of the Office of War Mobilization to issue a full and complete authoritative public statement on conditions in relocation centers and plans for future operations. A short preliminary statement on this subject was issued on July 17, 1943. A full and complete statement is being made public today. Copies of these statements are transmitted with this message.

Thus, both of the steps called for in Senate Resolution 166 have already been taken, and it appears that issuance of a further Executive Order is not necessary for accomplishment of these purposes.

The segregation program of the War Relocation Authority provides for transferring to a single center, the Tule Lake Cen-
ter in northeastern California, those persons of Japanese ancestry residing in relocation centers who have indicated that their loyalties lie with Japan. All persons among the evacuees who have expressed a wish to return to Japan for permanent residence have been included among the segregants, along with those among the citizen evacuees who have answered in the negative, or have refused to answer, a direct question as to their willingness to declare their loyalty to the United States and to renounce any allegiance to any foreign Government. In addition, those evacuees who are found, after investigation and hearing, to be ineligible to secure indefinite leave from a relocation center, under the leave regulations of the War Relocation Authority, are to be included among the segregants.

While the precise number of segregants is not established at this time because a number of leave clearance investigations have not yet been completed, it is established that the disloyal persons among the evacuees constitute but a small minority, and that the great majority of evacuees are loyal to the democratic institutions of the United States.

Arrangements are being completed for the adequate guarding and supervision of the segregated evacuees. They will be adequately fed and housed and their treatment will in all respects be fair and humane; they will not, however, be eligible to leave the Tule Lake Center while the war with Japan continues or so long as the military situation requires their residence there. An appeals procedure to allow for the correction of mistakes made in determining who shall be segregated has been established so that the entire procedure may be fair and equitable.

With the segregation of the disloyal evacuees in a separate center, the War Relocation Authority proposes now to redouble its efforts to accomplish the relocation into normal homes and jobs in communities throughout the United States, but outside the evacuated areas, of those Americans of Japanese ancestry whose loyalty to this country has remained unshaken through the hardships of the evacuation which military necessity made unavoidable. We shall restore to the loyal evacuees the right to re-
turn to the evacuated areas as soon as the military situation will make such restoration feasible.

Americans of Japanese ancestry, like those of many other ancestries, have shown that they can, and want to, accept our institutions and work loyally with the rest of us, making their own valuable contribution to the national wealth and well-being. In vindication of the very ideals for which we are fighting this war it is important to us to maintain a high standard of fair, considerate, and equal treatment for the people of this minority as of all other minorities.

Respectfully,

NOTE: For an account of the establishment and activities of the War Relocation Authority, see Item 37 and note, 1942 volume.

102 Statement of the President Condemning Rider Prohibiting Federal Employment of Three Named Individuals.

September 14, 1943

To the Congress:

On July 12 I reluctantly signed H. R. 2714, the urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act, 1943. I felt obliged to approve it because it appropriates funds which were essential to carry on the activities of almost every agency of Government during the recess of the Congress.

If it had been possible to veto the objectionable rider, which has been attached to this urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act, but which has no relevancy to it, without delaying essential war appropriations, I should unhesitatingly have done so.

This rider prohibited any Government department or agency from employing at any time in the future, after November 15, three named individuals who are now employed by different
Government agencies, unless they are appointed to office by the President and confirmed by the Senate prior to that date.

There is no suggestion that the three named individuals have not loyally and competently performed the duties for which they have been employed. They are sought to be disqualified for Federal employment because of political opinions attributed to them.

The provision aimed at these men does not define the offices they hold and does not seek to make appointment to those offices subject to Senate approval. As a matter of fact, the clause permitting them to remain in Government employment after November 15 subject to Presidential appointment and Senate approval was inserted only after the Senate had refused to accept a provision requiring their immediate removal from Government employment and their permanent disqualification for the Federal service. The Senate rejected the compromise as incorporated in this bill once, and agreed to it only after the House conferees had refused to agree to any bill without a provision aimed at the removal of these three named individuals.

The Senate yielded, as I have been forced to yield, to avoid delaying our conduct of the war.

But I cannot so yield without placing on record my view that this provision is not only unwise and discriminatory, but unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court has defined a bill of attainder as "a legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial." The rider in this bill operates perpetually to disqualify three named individuals from holding office in their Government unless they are nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate before November 15. It is directed at named individuals and not at specified statutory offices. No judicial trials have been held. No impeachment proceedings have been instituted. This rider is an unwarranted encroachment upon the authority of both the executive and the judicial branches under our Constitution. It is not, in my judgment, binding upon them.
NOTE: The foregoing statement involved issues concerning which the President felt strongly. The statement was only one act in an important drama which involved three officials of the Federal government. It also involved certain basic democratic principles of civil liberties and the separation of legislative functions from the judicial and executive functions. The President was convinced that the Congress, by its action which he assailed, was not only violating civil liberties but also usurping the functions both of the judiciary and of the executive. The resultant litigation is a landmark, as well as a complete vindication, of the President's strong stand.

On February 1, 1943, Congressman Dies, Chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, had made a speech in the House of Representatives attacking 39 Government employees as "irresponsible, unrepresentative, crackpot, radical bureaucrats." He had urged Congress to refuse to appropriate money for their salaries. As a result, a special subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations had held hearings in secret executive session on this issue. At these hearings, the individuals thus charged were allowed to testify, but they were not permitted to be represented either by their own lawyers or by counsel representing the agencies employing the accused individuals. This subcommittee had then recommended that appropriations to pay the salaries of Goodwin B. Watson and William E. Dodd, Jr., of the Federal Communications Commission, and Robert Morss Lovett, Governor of the Virgin Islands, should be denied. The House of Representatives had approved this action by attaching the rider described in the President's letter. Although the Senate had voted 69 to 0 against the conference report which insisted on this action, the House would not withdraw from its position. Ultimately, although the Senate several times rejected the conference report, it finally was forced to agree in order to permit the appropriation bill to go through. For without the bill itself, the Government could not have operated and carried on the war.

As indicated above, the President would have vetoed this objectionable provision if it had been possible; but the House, by its use of the rider device, had put him in the same position in which the Senate had found itself. Had he vetoed the bill, vital war appropriations would not have been available. Therefore, he was forced to sign it, and he issued the foregoing statement.

He condemned it on the ground, among others, that it was a bill of attainder. Article I, Section 9, of the Constitution of the United States provides, "No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed."

Since both the President and the Attorney General had taken the
position that the rider was unconstitutional, when Dodd, Watson, and Lovett brought suit to test it, the Attorney General notified the Congress that he would not defend the legislation, although defense of Federal legislation from attacks on constitutional grounds is normally the duty of the Department of Justice. Accordingly, Congress retained its own counsel to defend the rider in the Courts. The Department of Justice intervened in the cases and urged that the rider was invalid. On June 3, 1946, the United States Supreme Court, in the cases of U. S. v. Lovett, U. S. v. Watson, and U. S. v. Dodd, 328 U. S. 303, unanimously held that denial of appropriation to pay these salaries "falls precisely within the category of Congressional actions which the Constitution barred" when it prohibited bills of attainder. The Supreme Court further pointed out that this action punished the three officeholders without a judicial trial, stating, "Those who wrote our Constitution well knew the danger inherent in special legislative acts which take away the life, liberty, or property of particularly named persons, because the legislature thinks them guilty of conduct which deserves punishment. They intended to safeguard the people of this country from punishment without trial by duly constituted courts."

Even after the decision of the highest court in the land, the House Committee on Appropriations took the remarkable action of refusing to recommend the appropriation of funds which would have carried out the Court's judgment. The Committee did so on the unconscionable grounds that there was an "odor" to the Supreme Court decision. Fortunately, a majority of Democrats and a group of rebellious Republicans in the House of Representatives felt differently. Together they voted to pay the necessary appropriation, thereby carrying out the decision of the Supreme Court and following the opinion of the President unequivocally expressed in the foregoing statement.

103. Message to Congress on Progress of War

During the two months' recess of the Congress, many important events have occurred at the war fronts and at home. You return at a time when major battles in Europe and in Asia are beginning to be joined. In recent months, the main tides of conflict
have been running our way — but we could not and cannot be content merely to drift with this favorable tide.

You know from the news of the past few days that every military operation entails a legitimate military risk and that occasionally we have checks to our plans — checks which necessarily involve severe losses of men and materials.

The Allied forces are now engaged in a very hard battle south of Naples. Casualties are heavy. The desperation with which the Germans are fighting reveals that they are well aware of the consequences to them of our occupation of Italy.

The Congress and the American people can rest assured that the landing on Italy is not the only landing we have in mind. That landing was planned at Casablanca. At Quebec, the leaders and the military staffs of Great Britain and the United States made specific and precise plans to bring to bear further blows of equal or greater importance against Germany and Japan — with definite times and places for other landings on the continent of Europe and elsewhere.

On the tenth of July a carefully prepared expedition landed in Sicily. In spite of heavy German opposition it cleared this large and heavily fortified island in 38 days.

British, Canadian, and American losses in killed, wounded, and missing in the Sicilian campaign were 31,158, of which the American forces lost 7,445. The casualties among the Italians and Germans were approximately 165,000, including 132,000 prisoners.

The unmistakably sincere welcome given to the Allied troops by the Italian people has proved conclusively that even in a country which had lived for a generation under a complete dictatorship — with all of its propaganda, censorship, and suppression of free speech and discussion — the love of liberty was unconquerable.

It has also proved conclusively that this war was not waged by the people of Italy on their own choice. All of Mussolini’s propaganda machine could not make them love Hitler or hate us. The less said about the feelings toward Mussolini, the better.
103. Message to Congress on Progress of War

I believe that equal jubilation and enthusiasm will be shown by the people of the other Nations now under the German heel when Nazi Gauleiters and native Quislings are removed through force or flight.

How different was this invading army of the Allies from the German forces that had come into Sicily, ostensibly to "protect it." Food, clothing, cattle, medicines, and household goods had been systematically stolen from the people of Sicily, and sent north to the "master race" in Germany. Sicily, like other parts of Italy and like the other satellite and conquered Nations, had been bled white by the Nazi and Fascist Governments. Growers of crops were permitted to retain only a small fraction of their own produce for themselves and their families.

With the Allied armies, however, went a carefully planned organization, trained and equipped to give physical care to the local population—food, clothing, medicine. This new organization is also now in the process of restoring to the people of Sicily freedoms which, for many years, had been denied to them. I am confident that, within a year, Sicily will be once more self-supporting—and, in addition to that, once more self-respecting.

From Sicily the advance of the Allied armies has continued to the mainland. On the third day of September they landed on the toe of the Italian peninsula. These were the first Allied troops to invade the continent of Europe in order to liberate the conquered and oppressed countries. History will always remember this day as the beginning of the answer to the prayer of the millions of liberty-loving human beings not only in these conquered lands but all over the world.

On July 25—two weeks after our first landings in Sicily—political events in Italy startled the world. Mussolini, the incubus of Italy for a generation, the man who is more responsible for all of the sorrows of Italy than anyone, except possibly Hitler himself, was forced out of office and stripped of his power as a result of his own dismal failures, his wanton brutalities, and the overwhelming demand of the Italian people. This was the first
break in Axis leadership — to be followed, we are determined, by other and similar encouraging downfalls.

But there is one thing I want to make perfectly clear: When Hitler and the Nazis go out, the Prussian military clique must go with them. The war-breeding gangs of militarists must be rooted out of Germany — and out of Japan — if we are to have any real assurance of future peace.

Early last month, the relentless application of overwhelming Allied power — particularly air and sea power — convinced the leaders of Italy that it could not continue an active part in the war. Conversations were begun by them with us. These conversations were carried on with the utmost secrecy. Therefore, much as I wished to do so, I could not communicate the facts of the case to the Congress, or the press, or to those who repeatedly expressed dismay or indignation at our apparent course in Italy. These negotiations turned out to be a complete surprise to nearly everyone, not only to the Axis but to the Italian people themselves.

I am sure that the Congress realizes that there are many situations in this war — and there will be many more to come — in which it is impossible for me to make any announcement or even to give any indication of the policy which we are following. And I ask the American people as well as the Congress to bear with me and with our Chiefs of Staff. It is difficult to remain silent when unjustified attack and criticism come from those who are not in a position to have all the facts.

But the people and the Congress can be sure that the policy which we follow is an expression of the basic democratic traditions and ideals of this Republic. We shall not be able to claim that we have gained total victory in this war if any vestige of Fascism in any of its malignant forms is permitted to survive anywhere in the world.

The armistice with Italy was signed on September 3 in Sicily, but it could not be put into effect until September 8, when we were ready to make landings in force in the Naples area. We had
planned these landings some time before and were determined to go through with them, armistice or no armistice.

Italian leaders appealed to their Army and Navy to end hostilities against us. Italian soldiers, though disorganized and ill supplied, have been fighting the Germans in many regions. In conformity with the terms of unconditional surrender, the Italian fleet has come over to our side; and it can be a powerful weapon in striking at the Nazi enemies of the Italian people.

When Hitler was forced to the conclusion that his offensive was broken, and he must go on the defensive, he started boasting that he had converted Europe into an impregnable fortress. But he neglected to provide that fortress with a roof. He also left various other vulnerable spots in the wall of the so-called fortress — which we shall point out to him in due time.

The British and American Air Forces have been bombing the roofless fortress with ever-increasing effectiveness. It is now our purpose to establish bases within bombing range of southern and eastern Germany, and to bring devastating war home to these places by day and by night as it has already been brought to western Germany.

When Britain was being subjected to mass bombing in 1940 and 1941 — when the British people, including their King and Prime Minister, were proving that Britain “could take it” — the strategists of the Royal Air Force and of our own Army Air Forces were not idle. They were studying the mistakes that Goering and his staff of Nazi terrorists were making. Those were fatal mistakes, as it turned out.

Today, we and the British are not making those mistakes. We are not bombing tenements for the sheer sadistic pleasure of killing, as the Nazis did. We are striking devastating blows at carefully selected, clearly identified strategic objectives — factories, shipyards, munition dumps, transportation facilities, which make it possible for the Nazis to wage war. And we are hitting these military targets and blowing them to bits.

German power can still do us great injury. But that evil power is being destroyed, surely, inexorably, day by day, and if Hitler
does not know it by now, then the last trace of sanity has departed from that distorted mind.

We must remember that in any great air attack the British and Americans lose a fairly high proportion of planes and that these losses must be made up quickly so that the weight of the bombing shall not decrease for a day in the future. In fact, a high rate of increase must be maintained according to plan — and that means constant stepping-up of our production here at home.

In the remarkable raid on the Ploesti oil fields in Rumania we lost 53 of our heavy bombers; and more than 500 of our finest men are missing. This may seem like a disastrously high loss, unless you figure it against the damage done to the enemy's war power. I am certain that the German or the Japanese high commands would cheerfully sacrifice tens of thousands of men to do the same amount of damage to us, if they could. Those gallant and brilliant young Americans who raided Ploesti won a smashing victory which, I believe, will contribute materially to the shortening of the war and thus save countless lives.

We shall continue to make such raids all over the territory of Germany and the satellite countries. With Italy in our hands, the distances we have to travel will be far less and the risks proportionately reduced.

We have reliable information that there is definite unrest and a growing desire for peace among the peoples of these satellite countries — Rumania, Hungary, Finland, and Bulgaria. We hope that in these Nations the spirit of revolt against Nazi dominance which commenced in Italy will burst into flame and become a consuming fire.

Every American is thrilled by the sledgehammer blows delivered against the Nazi aggressors by the Russian armies. This summer there has been no successful German advance against the Russians, as in 1941 and 1942. The shoe today is on the other foot — and is pinching very hard. Instead, the Russians have forced the greatest military reversal since Napoleon's retreat in 1812.

The recapture of Kharkov, Stalino, and other strongholds by the Russians, the opening of the Ukraine and the Donets Basin,
and the freeing of millions of valuable acres and hundreds of inhabited places hearten the whole world as the Russian campaign moves toward the elimination of every German from Russian soil—toward the invasion of Germany itself. It is certain that the campaign in North Africa, the occupation of Sicily, the fighting in Italy, and the compelling of large numbers of German planes to go into combat in the skies over Holland, Belgium, and France by reason of our air attacks, have given important help to the Russian armies along their advancing front from Leningrad to the Black Sea. We know, too, that we are contributing to that advance by making Germany keep many divisions in the Balkans, in southern France, and along the English Channel. I like to think that these words constitute an understatement.

Similarly, the events in the Mediterranean have a direct bearing upon the war against Japan.

When the American and British expeditionary forces first landed in North Africa last November, some people believed that we were neglecting our obligations to prosecute the war vigorously in the Pacific. Such people continually make the mistake of trying to divide the war into several watertight compartments—the western European front—the Russian front—the Burma front—the New Guinea and Solomons front, and so forth—as though all of these fronts were separate and unrelated to each other. You even hear talk of the "air war" as opposed to the "land war" or the "sea war."

Actually, we cannot think of this as several wars. It is all one war, and it must be governed by one basic strategy.

The freeing of the Mediterranean, which we started last fall, will lead directly to the resumption of our complete control of the waters of the eastern Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal. Thus, we shall be enabled to strike the Japanese on another of their highly vulnerable flanks.

As long as Italy remained in the war as our enemy—as long as the Italian fleet remained in being as a threat—a substantial part of British naval strength had to be kept locked up in the Mediterranean. Now that formidable strength is freed to proceed east-
ward to join in the ever-increasing attack upon the Japanese. It has not been sufficiently emphasized that the freeing of the Mediterranean is a great asset to the war in the Far East.

There has been one serious gap in the lines of our globe-girdling sea power. That is the gap between northwest Australia and Ceylon. That gap can now be closed as a result of victory in the Mediterranean.

We face, in the Orient, a long and difficult fight. We must be prepared for heavy losses in winning that fight. The power of Japan will not collapse until it has been literally pounded into the dust. It would be the utmost folly for us to try to pretend otherwise.

Even so, if the future is tough for us, think what it is for General Tojo and his murderous gang. They may look to the north, to the south, to the east, or to the west. They can see closing in on them, from all directions, the forces of retribution under the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, General MacArthur, Admiral Nimitz, and Admiral Lord Mountbatten.

The forces operating against Japan in the various Pacific theaters are just as much interrelated and dependent on each other as are the forces pounding against Germany in Europe.

With the new threats that we offer from the Aleutians, Japan cannot afford to devote as large a proportion of her forces to hold the lines in other areas.

Such actions as the taking of Attu and Kiska do not just happen. They are the results of careful and complete planning which was going on quietly while some of our critics were so perturbed that they had reached the verge of tears over what they called the threatened invasion of Seattle, Portland, San Francisco, and Los Angeles. It was difficult for them to realize that the carefully prepared and crucial tests in the Coral Sea and at Midway and in the Solomons rendered the Japanese toe hold in the Aleutians untenable.

Japan has been hard put to it to maintain her extended lines. She had to withdraw her garrison from Kiska in the face of the oncoming American-Canadian forces because she could not
maintain a steady stream of adequate reinforcements and supplies to the Aleutians.

In the Solomon Islands, with heavy fighting, we have gained so many island air bases that the threat to Australia and New Zealand across the Coral Sea has been practically dissipated. In fact, it is safe to say that our position in that area has become a threat on our part against the Japanese in the seas that lie north of the Solomons and north of New Guinea.

American, Australian, New Zealand, and Dutch forces in a magnificent campaign in New Guinea and the Solomons have destroyed much Japanese strength and have gained for us new bases from which to launch new offensive operations.

After a long period of defensive strategy in Burma, we are determined to take the offensive there. I am also glad to report to you that we are getting more supplies and military help to China. Almost every day word comes that a new air battle has destroyed two and three times more Japanese planes in China and Burma than we ourselves have lost. That process will continue until we are ready to strike right at the heart of Japan itself.

It goes almost without saying that when Japan surrenders, the United Nations will never again let her have authority over the islands which were mandated to her by the League of Nations. Japan obviously is not to be trusted. And the same thing holds good in the case of the vast territories which Japan has stolen from China starting long before this war began.

Since the beginning of our entrance into the war, nearly two years ago, the United Nations have continuously reduced enemy strength by a process of attrition. That means, cold-bloodedly, placing the ever-increasing resources of the Allies into deadly competition with the ever-decreasing resources of the Axis. It means the training and use of the Allied manpower—which is greater than the Axis. It means the use of our superior facilities and ability to make more munitions, and above all, aircraft, more quickly than our enemies can do.

For example, the Allies today on the European front have a definite superiority in almost all weapons of war on any and
103. Message to Congress on Progress of War

every point of the encircling line—more guns, more tanks, more planes, more trucks, more transports, more supply ships, and more warships.

In the Pacific, we have taken a steady toll of Japanese war planes and a steady toll of Japanese ships—merchant ships and naval vessels. The odds are all in our favor—for we grow in strength and they cannot even replace all their losses. It might be called a simple mathematical progression.

However, unless we keep up and increase the tempo of our present rate of production, this greater strength in planes and guns, tanks and ships can all be lost.

Our great production program started during the darkest days of 1940. With the magnificent contribution made by American industry and American labor, it is approaching full production. Britain has already attained full production. Today, the British Empire and the United States, together, are turning out so much of every essential of war that we have definite superiority over Germany and Japan which is growing with every succeeding minute. But we have no minutes to lose.

Realization of the distances we must cover brings to mind problems that every American should realize—problems of transporting from our shores to the actual fighting areas the weapons and munitions of war which we make. Burma and China can be reached only with extraordinary difficulty. Two years ago, most of the planes we sent had to be knocked down, crated, put on board ship, transported, then uncrated and put together again in India, and from there sent up to the fighting front.

In the case of China, they had to be flown over enormous mountains. Even after they were safely delivered there, the planes had to be kept supplied with ground crews, tools, oil, gasoline, and even spare parts. Since the Japs cut the Burma Road, all these supplies have to be flown over hundreds of miles to bases which had to be built in China.

The same slow process was also the rule in the Southwest Pacific.

With the present increased range of airplanes and the establish-
ment of additional bases, we are now flying more of them under their own power than before, but all the things that go to supply them—the gasoline, the tools, the spare parts—still have to be taken by ship to the fighting fronts all over the world. Practically every soldier and all his weapons and equipment have to go by ship. And every time a new forward move develops the whole outfit has to go by ship.

I wonder how many people realize what it means to carry on the war across the Atlantic and the Pacific and through the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean, along lines of supply attacked by submarines and dive bombers at many points.

The combined operation of the British and Americans last November against Morocco and Algeria was in point of numbers the largest military movement over the longest number of miles to landings under fire that history has recorded anywhere.

The ships for such an amphibious operation cannot be loaded in the ordinary way, to be unloaded alongside a comfortable safe wharf. Most of the ships must be "combat loaded" in such a way that the troops go ashore first and are immediately followed in the proper order by guns and ammunition, tanks, trucks and food, medical equipment, and all the supplies of a modern army. Preparations must be made to conduct these landings under enemy fire, and on beaches instead of at docks. People who have seen or planned this kind of operation even over short distances do not speak glibly about landing great expeditions on a few days' notice or on all the beaches of Europe at the same time.

The Members of the Congress have undoubtedly had an opportunity to see at firsthand in their own home districts some of our war factories and plants and shipyards throughout the United States which are now working at full blast turning out the greatest amount of war production in the history of the world.

In June and July we were worried by a reduction in the rate of increase in production. Great as our production had been we could not afford to level off. We had to continue the upward curve and not pause on any plateaus.

I am happy to report that the increase was resumed in August. In this month of September it is even better.
Message to Congress on Progress of War

For example, during the two months of the recess of the Congress our factories produced approximately 15,000 planes. There was an especially important increase in the production of heavy bombers in August. I cannot reveal the exact figures on this. They would give the enemy needed information—but no comfort. However, the total airplane production is still not good enough. We seek not only to come up to the schedule but to surpass it.

During those same two months American shipyards put into commission 3,200,000 tons of large merchant ships—a total of 281 ships, almost five ships a day.

Even as the actual fighting engagements in which our troops take part increase in number, it is becoming more and more evident that this is essentially a great war of production. The best way to avoid heavy casualty lists is to provide our troops with the best equipment possible—and plenty of it.

We have come a great way since this Congress first met in January of this year. But I state only a blunt fact when I tell the Congress that we are still a long, long way from ultimate victory in any major theater of the war.

First: Despite our substantial victories in the Mediterranean, we face a hard and costly fight up through Italy—and a major job of organizing our positions before we can take advantage of them.

Second: From bases in the British Isles we must be sure that we have assembled the strength to strike not just in one direction but in many directions—by land and sea and in the air—with overwhelming forces and equipment.

Third: Although our Russian allies have made a magnificent counteroffensive, and are driving our common enemies back day by day, the Russian armies still have far to go before they get into Germany itself.

Fourth: The Japanese hold firmly established positions on an enormous front from the Kuriles through the mandated islands to the Solomons and through the Netherlands East Indies to Malaysia and Burma and China. To break through this defensive ring we must hit them and hit them hard not merely at one point but at many points, and we must keep on hitting them.
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In all of history, there has never been a task so tremendous as that which we now face. We can do it—and we will do it—but we must plan and work and fight with every ounce of intelligence and energy and courage that we possess.

The Congress has reconvened at a time when we are in the midst of the Third War Loan Drive seeking to raise a sum unparalleled in history—fifteen billion dollars. This is a dramatic example of the scale on which this war still has to be fought, and presents some idea of how difficult and costly the responsible leaders of this Government believe the war will be.

Nothing we can do will be more costly in lives than to adopt the attitude that the war has been won—or nearly won. That would mean a letdown in the great tempo of production which we have reached, and would mean that our men who are now fighting all over the world will not have that overwhelming superiority of power which has dealt so much death and destruction to the enemy and at the same time has saved so many American lives.

That is why I have always maintained that there is no such separate entity as the “home front.” Every day lost in turning out an airplane or a ship at home will have its direct effect upon the men now battling up the leg of Italy or in the jungles of the Southwest Pacific or in the clouds over China.

There have been complaints from some sources about the way this production and other domestic activities have been carried on. Some of these complaints of course are justified. On the other hand some of them come from selfish people who merely do not like to give up some of their pleasures, or a part of their butter or meat or milk.

Fair-minded citizens, however, will realize that although mistakes have been made, the job that has been done in converting peacetime America to a wartime basis has been a great job and a successful one, of which all our people have good reason to be proud.

It would be nothing short of a miracle if this unprecedented job of transforming a peace-loving, unprepared industrial Amer-
ica into a fighting and production machine had been accomplished without some mistakes being made and some people being given cause for complaint.

The Congress is well aware of the magnitude of the undertaking, and of the many gigantic problems involved. For the Congress has been actively involved in helping to work out the solutions to these unprecedented problems.

A few facts will show how vast an enterprise this war has been — and how we are constantly increasing the tempo of our production.

The total amount spent on the war from May, 1940, to date is $128,123,000,000. The bill is now running at the rate of $250,000,000 per day.

Up to September 1, 1943, among the more important items produced and delivered since the armament program started in May, 1940, are the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Airplanes</td>
<td>123,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airplane engines</td>
<td>349,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>53,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery weapons</td>
<td>93,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small arms (rifles, carbines,</td>
<td>9,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>machine guns, etc.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small arms ammunition</td>
<td>25,942,000,000 rounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trucks</td>
<td>1,233,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In most instances more than half of the above total delivered to date was produced during the first eight months of 1943:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Airplanes</td>
<td>52,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>23,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery weapons</td>
<td>40,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small arms (rifles, carbines,</td>
<td>4,638,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>machine guns, etc.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small arms ammunition</td>
<td>13,339,000,000 rounds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The number of fighting ships and auxiliaries of all kinds completed since May, 1940, is 2,380 and 13,000 landing vessels.
103. Message to Congress on Progress of War

In the two and a half years between January 1, 1941, and July 1, 1943, the power plants built for installation in Navy vessels had a horsepower equal to all the horsepower of all hydro-electric plants in the United States in January, 1941.

The completions of Navy ships during the last six months were equal to completions in the entire year of 1942.

We have cut down the time required to build submarines by almost 50 percent.

The anti-aircraft and double-purpose guns produced by the Navy since the defense program started in May, 1940, if fired all together, would throw 4,600 tons of projectiles per minute against the enemy.

The output of under-water ordnance (torpedoes, mines, and depth charges) during the first half of 1943 was equal to the total production of 1942.

During the month of August, 1943, we produced almost as many torpedoes as during all of World War I.

Anyone who has had to build a single factory, tool it up, get the necessary help, set up an assembly line, produce and ship the product will have some idea of what that amount of production has meant.

We have had to raise and equip armed forces approaching ten million men. Simultaneously, in spite of this drain on our manpower, we have had to find millions more men and millions of women to operate our war factories, arsenals, shipyards, essential civilian industries—and the farms and mines of America.

There have been the problems of increasing greatly the output of our natural resources—not only for our own Army and Navy and for our civilians at home, but also for our allies and our own forces all over the world.

Since the outbreak of war in Europe, we have increased our output of petroleum by 66 percent. We have stepped up our bituminous coal production by 40 percent; chemicals by 300 percent; iron ore by 125 percent; hydroelectric power by 79 percent; and steel by 106 percent.

There were the problems of raising and distributing more
food than ever before in our history—for our armed services, for our own people, and to help feed our allies.

There was the formidable problem of establishing a rationing system of the necessities of life which would be fair to all of our people.

There was the difficulty of keeping prices from skyrocketing and fighting off the serious specter of inflation.

There was the problem of transporting millions of men and hundreds of millions of tons of weapons and supplies all over our own country and also to all corners of the world. This necessitated the largest railroad and shipping operations in all history.

There were the problems involved in our vast purchases in foreign countries; in our control of foreign funds, located in this country; in our custody of alien property; in our occupation of liberated areas. There were new problems of communications, of censorship, of war information.

There was the problem of maintaining proper management-labor relations; of fair treatment and just compensation to our millions of war workers; of avoiding strikes; of preventing the exploitation of workers or natural resources by those who would seek to become war profiteers and war millionaires.

There were the problems of civilian defense, of lend-lease, of subcontracting war contracts to smaller businesses, of building up stock piles of strategic material whose normal sources have been seized by the enemy—such as rubber and tin.

There was the problem of providing housing for millions of new war workers all over the country.

And touching all of these, there was the great problem of raising the money to pay for all of them.

No sincere, sensible person doubts that in such an unprecedented, breath-taking enterprise errors of honest judgment were bound to creep in, and that occasional disputes among conscientious officials were bound to occur. And if anyone thinks that we, working under our democratic system, have made major mistakes in this war, he should take a look at some of the blunders made by our enemies in the so-called “efficient” dictatorships.
103. Message to Congress on Progress of War

Even sincere, sensible people sometimes fail to compare the handful of errors or disputes, on the one hand, with the billions of instances where the agencies of Government in cooperation with each other have moved with the precision of a smoothly working machine.

Some people, when a doughnut is placed before them, claim they can see only the hole in it. Sometimes this is an example of sheer individual pessimism; but sometimes it is caused by motives not consonant with war-winning ideals.

The American people as a whole, however, are fair-minded. They have learned to distinguish between the sensational and the factual. They know that there is no so-called “news” when things run right. They know, for example, that a few newspapers and columnists and radio commentators can make controversy create “news” which is eagerly sought by Axis propagandists in their evil work.

Obviously, we never could have produced and shipped as much as we have, we could not now be in the position we now occupy in the Mediterranean, in Italy, or in the Southwest Pacific or on the Atlantic convoy routes or in the air over Germany and France, if conditions in Washington and throughout the Nation were as confused and chaotic as some people try to paint them.

We know that in any large private industrial plant doing a thousandth part of what their Government in Washington is doing, there are also occasional mistakes and arguments. But this is not a good comparison. It is like comparing a motor boat with a battleship.

What I have said is not in any way an apology — it is an assertion and a boast that the American people and their Government are doing an amazingly good job in carrying out a vast program which two years ago was said to be impossible of fulfillment. Luckily the American people have a sense of proportion — and a memory.

As General Marshall has said, in his Biennial Report, “The development of the powerful army of today . . . has been dependent upon vast appropriations and the strong support of the
103. Message to Congress on Progress of War

Congress, and the cooperation of numerous Government agencies."

I urge all Americans to read General Marshall's fine, soldierly record of the achievements of our Army throughout two of the most tremendous years in our history. This is a record which Americans will never forget.

As the war grows tougher and as new problems constantly arise in our domestic economy, changes in methods and changes in legislation may become necessary.

We should move for the greater economic protection of our returning men and women in the armed forces—and for greater educational opportunities for them. And for all our citizens we should provide a further measure of social security in order to protect them against certain continuing hazards of life.

All these things, as well as eventual demobilization, should be studied now and much of the necessary legislation should be enacted. I do not mean that this statement should be regarded in any way as an intimation that we are approaching the end of the war. Such an intimation could not be based either on fact or on reason. But when the war ends, we do not want to be caught again without planning or legislation, such as occurred at the end of the last war.

On all these, and on other subjects, I expect to communicate with this Congress from time to time.

In this critical period in the history of our country and of the world, we seek cooperation between the executive and the legislative branches of the Government to furnish our citizens with the security of the standard of living to which their resources and their skills in management and labor entitle them in all matters which concern this Nation's welfare, present and future—and the first of such matters, obviously, is the winning of this war.

Finally, as the war progresses, we seek a national cooperation with other Nations toward the end that world aggression be ended and that fair international relationships be established on a permanent basis. The policy of the Good Neighbor has shown such success in the hemisphere of the Americas that its extension to
the whole world seems to be the logical next step. In that way we can begin to keep faith with our sons and daughters who are fighting for freedom and justice and security at home and abroad.

NOTE: The foregoing message was sent to the Congress in the form of a progress report on the war, in order to keep the Congress informed after its return from a two-month summer recess. Inasmuch as the message was not delivered in person, the President decided to make it longer than usual. This enabled him to give the Congress a more detailed report on the progress of operations and production.

The President wanted to make this a full-dress report, and he personally spent a great deal of time on this message, which went through six drafts.

104. Foreign Economic Administration

September 25, 1943

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes of the United States, as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, and in order to unify and consolidate governmental activities relating to foreign economic affairs, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. There is established in the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President the Foreign Economic Administration (hereinafter referred to as the Administration), at the head of which shall be an Administrator.

2. The Office of Lend-Lease Administration, the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, the Office of Economic Warfare (together with the corporations, agencies, and functions transferred thereto by Executive Order No. 9361 of July 15, 1943), the Office of Foreign Economic Coordination (except such functions and personnel thereof as the Director of the Budget shall determine are not concerned with foreign economic operations), and their respective functions, powers, and duties are transferred to and consolidated in the Administration.
3. The Administrator may establish such offices, bureaus, or divisions in the Administration as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Order, and may assign to them such of the functions and duties of the offices, agencies, and corporations consolidated by this Order as he may deem desirable in the interest of efficient administration.

4. The powers and functions of the Administration shall be exercised in conformity with the foreign policy of the United States as defined by the Secretary of State. As soon as military operations permit, the Administration shall assume responsibility for and control of all activities of the United States Government in liberated areas with respect to supplying the requirements of and procuring materials in such areas.

5. All the personnel, property, records, funds (including all unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, or other funds now available), contracts, assets, liabilities, and capital stock (including shares of stock) of the offices, agencies, and corporations consolidated by paragraph 2 of this order are transferred to the Administration for use in connection with the exercise and performance of its functions, powers, and duties. In the case of capital stock (including shares of stock), the transfer shall be to such agency, corporation, office, officer, or person as the Administrator shall designate. The Administrator is authorized to employ such personnel as may be necessary in the performance of the functions of the Administration and in order to carry out the purposes of this Order.

6. No part of any funds appropriated or made available under Public Law 139, approved July 12, 1943, shall hereafter be used directly or indirectly by the Administrator for the procurement of services, supplies, or equipment outside the United States except for the purpose of executing general economic programs or policies formally approved by a majority of the War Mobilization Committee in writing filed with the Secretary of State prior to any such expenditure.

7. All prior Executive Orders in so far as they are in conflict herewith are amended accordingly. This Order shall take effect
upon the taking of office by the Administrator, except that the agencies and offices consolidated by paragraph 2 hereof shall continue to exercise their respective functions pending any contrary determination by the Administrator.

**NOTE:** The foregoing Executive Order was designed to meet troublesome problems of administration which beset the functions of economic warfare (see Item 53 and note, 1942 volume, and Item 77, this volume).

During the defense and earlier war periods, a number of Federal departments and agencies had had a hand in the matter of economic warfare. They dealt with such vital international economic functions as relief and rehabilitation of liberated areas, lend-lease, stock-piling of critical materials, export and import control, and preclusive purchases designed to keep strategic materials out of the hands of the enemy. It eventually became apparent that a thorough consolidation of these several agencies engaged in international economic activities was necessary in order to eliminate the confusion of duplicating, and sometimes competing, operations.

By the foregoing Executive Order, the President merged into the new Foreign Economic Administration the following agencies and offices: Office of Lend-Lease Administration (see Item 105 and note, 1941 volume). Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, Office of Economic Warfare (see Item 77 and note, this volume), and the foreign economic operations of the Office of Foreign Economic Coordination of the Department of State. The Office of Economic Warfare had been preceded by the Economic Defense Board, the Board of Economic Warfare, and various subsidiaries of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. In addition, several of the regular Federal departments performed related functions in carrying on the program for economic warfare (see, on economic defense and warfare, Items 54, 65, 68 and 71 and notes, 1941 volume; Items 30 and 53 and notes, 1942 volume; Items 56 and 77 and notes, this volume).

A principal function of the new, consolidated Foreign Economic Administration was the administration of the Lend-Lease Act. This included arrangements for the procurement and transmission of supplies to those countries eligible for lend-lease aid, and for the receipt of reverse lend-lease aid from these foreign countries. The F.E.A., with the aid of the Treasury Department, the War Food Administration, and the War Shipping Administration, supplied foodstuffs, industrial materials, and equipment for lend-lease purposes, while the War and Navy Departments supplied all the military equipment.
for such purposes. (See Item 52 and note, 1941 volume, for a detailed account of lend-lease operations during the war.)

In addition, the F.E.A. continued the program which had been instituted and carried on by the Economic Defense Board, the Board of Economic Warfare, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and the Procurement Division of the Treasury Department, for the procurement and development of strategic and critical materials abroad. Among the items procured were corundum, which aided in grinding the lenses for our bombsights; nickel for hardening steel; quartz crystals to supply parts for military radios; tantalite, which was used in a process to make vacuum tubes; balsa wood for the life rafts of the Navy; mahogany for PT boats and for naval and military aircraft; loofa sponges for the filters of marine engines; and natural rubber.

While none of these items was produced in this country, there were a number of other strategic materials which had likewise to be imported even though tremendous quantities were produced here, such as copper, lead, zinc, and certain fibers. As a result of F.E.A. missions to foreign countries, many new kinds of materials were secured—like cinchona bark, the source of natural quinine for the treatment of malaria. Often these strategic materials were transported into this country by air.

Among supplies secured by the F.E.A. under reverse lend-lease from the British and others were: rubber and tea from Ceylon; cocoa, palm kernels and palm oil, rope fibers, chrome, and asbestos from British Africa; copra from the British islands of the Pacific; and mica, burlap, jute, and other strategic commodities from India.

Through the use of the "blacklist" of Axis sympathizers (see Item 65 and note, 1941 volume), by means of rigid export controls, by measures to prevent smuggling, through trade agreements with neutral countries, and by preclusive purchasing—all under the supervision of the F.E.A.—Axis countries were successfully foreclosed from obtaining supplies which they urgently needed for military purposes. In collaboration with the British, preclusive buying operations were conducted in Spain, Portugal, and Turkey, cutting Germany off from the tungsten necessary for armor-piercing ammunition and high-speed cutting tools, and depriving her of high-quality Turkish chrome needed for armor plate and aircraft engines. Preclusive buying and war trade agreements with Sweden, Spain, Portugal, and Switzerland did not completely block out German supply, but they did cut the supply sharply. As a result of this activity, for example, the danger from such important items as German high-velocity artillery shells used in the 88-millimeter gun was reduced appreciably.
104. Foreign Economic Administration

One of the most interesting examples of the efficacy of this kind of economic war—and of the interdependence between economic and shooting warfare—was represented by the commonplace item of woolen rags. The F.E.A., cooperating with the British, scoured Spain, Turkey, and Portugal and cornered the market in those countries on woolen rags and other woolen goods. Thousands of German casualties through three bitter winters of cold on the Russian front can be directly traced to the lack of the necessary woolen goods for the German soldiers—woolen goods which the Allied buyers had cut off from Germany.

Economic intelligence collected by the F.E.A. was also used and useful. It helped to define strategic bombing objectives for the Army Air Forces. German and Japanese aircraft factories, oil refineries, railroads, shipyards, and supply centers were selected as targets on the basis of intelligence supplied by the F.E.A. Their destruction by the Army Air Forces had a devastating effect on the German and Japanese war potentials. Schweinfurt and other German ball-bearing factory centers were selected as strategic bombing targets at the same time that the F.E.A. was concluding a trade agreement with Sweden which cut ball-bearing shipments to Germany.

The licensing of exports for control purposes was continued by F.E.A. It followed out the program which had been commenced by the Administrator of Export Control in 1940, and later carried on by the Economic Defense Board, the Board of Economic Warfare, and the Office of Economic Warfare. Exports to Latin America were encouraged, and as a result they increased by more than 50 percent over prewar levels, except to Argentina. As the shipping shortage eased and as victory over Germany drew closer, many of the earlier export controls were lightened.

The devastation caused by war and the deliberate destruction of economic resources by the retreating Germans caused terrible shortages and starvation in the liberated areas. The program of the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, designed to relieve these conditions, was carried on for several months by the Foreign Economic Administration prior to the establishment of United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (see Item 123 and note, this volume). Until he assumed office as Director of U.N.R.R.A., Herbert H. Lehman, former Governor of New York, acted as special adviser to the President on relief and rehabilitation.

After U.N.R.R.A. was established, the F.E.A. procured supplies in this country for it, and administered the United States appropriation to U.N.R.R.A. The F.E.A. also had the responsibility for procurement of goods in the United States for the Army's civilian relief
program in liberated and occupied countries.

Shortly after the establishment of the F.E.A., there were transferred to it the functions of foreign food development and production of the War Food Administration and the Commodity Credit Corporation. This move centralized responsibility for this phase of the relief and rehabilitation of the liberated areas.

As our armies crossed the German border and there appeared a possibility the European war might end before the winter of 1944, the President, on September 29, 1944, directed the F.E.A. to accelerate its studies of the German economy and also to develop a program for German economic and industrial disarmament (see Item 78 and note, 1944-1945 volume). Later, the F.E.A. was also ordered to prepare, under State Department direction, recommendations on Germany which would carry out the terms of the Yalta agreement (see Item 134 and note, 1944-1945 volume).

The F.E.A.’s Enemy Branch, which was concerned with disarmament of Germany and the gathering of economic intelligence abroad, was also charged with control of Axis assets abroad. Under this power, the F.E.A. conducted searches for German assets concealed outside of Germany, and succeeded in uncovering a number of “safe havens” where Germans had tried to hide their assets in foreign countries.

The disruptions in the economies of the liberated countries, and the general devastation and confusion caused by military operations, made it necessary to take positive measures to restore normal private trade with the liberated areas. This was done by the F.E.A. Beginning in 1945, through its subsidiary, the U. S. Commercial Company, the F.E.A. took a number of steps for the purpose of facilitating trade with these areas.

Not long after V-J Day, the Foreign Economic Administration was terminated by Executive Order No. 9630, issued by President Truman on September 27, 1945.

By the terms of that Order, the following F.E.A. functions were transferred to the Department of State: lend-lease, participation of this country in U.N.R.R.A., analysis and reporting of economic and commercial information abroad, activities in liberated areas to supply those areas with essential requirements, and planning measures for the control of occupied territories.

The following F.E.A. functions were transferred to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation: the subsidiary corporations formerly a part of the R.F.C. — Rubber Development Corporation, Petroleum Reserves Corporation, U. S. Commercial Company, and their stock, assets, and liabilities — and all F.E.A. functions with respect to the procurement of commodities abroad, except those functions
transferred to the Department of Agriculture.
The F.E.A. food program, machinery, and facilities were transferred to the Department of Agriculture.

The following F.E.A. functions were transferred to the Department of Commerce: export control, facilitation of trade with liberated areas, and all other liquidation functions not transferred to other agencies.

105 Message to the Congress Recommending Self-Government for Puerto Rico.
September 28, 1943
To the Congress:

When sovereignty over Puerto Rico was transferred from Spain to the United States in 1899, the Treaty of Paris did not settle the exact position of Puerto Rico in the orbit of American sovereignty. It left that for determination by the Congress of the United States. After a brief interval of military government, the Foraker Act in 1900 established a framework of colonial government. Under it the Legislative Assembly was given rather limited powers; and the Governor and an appointed Executive Council held the real substance of authority. The inhabitants were to be citizens of Puerto Rico—American nationals, but not citizens.

In 1917 the Puerto Ricans received full American citizenship. At the same time the Congress, by the Organic Act of Puerto Rico, created a full-fledged Legislature, and provided for a much greater participation by Puerto Ricans in the Executive Department of the Government, reserving to the President the power of appointment of only the Governor, the Attorney General, the Commissioner of Education, the Auditor, and the Justices of the Supreme Court. This action of the Congress in 1917 bound Puerto Rico much more closely to the United States, and provided a substantial advance in local self-government.

During the 45 years which have passed since the occupation of the island by the United States the economic situation of the
Puerto Rican people, although materially improved in some respects, has not changed in essential character. Instead of development toward economic self-reliance, there has been a steady tendency to become more dependent upon outside markets for disposal of the single great crop—sugar—and upon outside sources for food, clothing, building materials, and most of the other necessities. Partly because of economic and geographical factors and partly because of tariff preferences and shipping laws, these relationships are, by now, almost wholly with the continental United States.

The population of Puerto Rico has increased from 950,000 to about two millions, making this one of the most densely inhabited areas on earth. Depending upon the obligation implied by our active participation in their development, Puerto Ricans have been encouraged, in so far as they could, to try to attain American standards of life. Wages in Puerto Rico, for instance, are several times as high as those in nearby islands not under our flag; literacy is much higher than in other Caribbean islands; the percentage of those who speak English has grown progressively in every decade; our agencies of public health have made inroads on diseases endemic in the island; and serious attempts have been and are being made to provide better housing and to raise the levels of nutrition.

During the 45 years of our sovereignty, the elements of world military and naval strategy have changed also. When the island was first brought under our flag, the Panama Canal had not yet been dug, and the airplane had not yet been invented. The Caribbean was something of a backwater in the broad current of world affairs. When the present war became imminent, however, it was obvious that the chain of islands running in a great arc from Florida to the shoulder of South America, enclosing the Caribbean Sea, formed a vast natural shield for the Panama Canal, suited in distance and conformation to the uses of the military plane. And of this island shield, Puerto Rico is the center. Its possession or control by any foreign power—or even the
remote threat of such possession—would be repugnant to the most elementary principles of national defense.

It has long been the policy of the Government of the United States progressively to reinforce the machinery of self-government in its territories and island possessions. The principles for which we are now fighting require that we should recognize the right of all our citizens—whether continental or overseas—to the greatest possible degree of home rule and also of participation in the benefits and responsibilities of our Federal system.

Puerto Ricans of all political parties, however divergent their views as to the political future of the island, are united in asking for the right to elect their own Governor. I believe that they are entitled to it.

The Congress will recall that on March 9 of this year I recommended to it "that it consider as soon as possible an amendment of the organic law of Puerto Rico to permit the people of Puerto Rico to elect their own Governor, and to redefine the functions and powers of the Federal Government and the Government of Puerto Rico, respectively." In order to assist in framing the required legislation, in case the Congress should decide to grant this power to the people of Puerto Rico, I appointed a committee composed of an equal number of Puerto Ricans and continental residents. I requested them to make a study of the amendments to the Organic Act necessary to authorize the election of a Governor and to redefine the relationships of the Federal and Insular Governments affected thereby.

That committee met in Washington almost daily for three weeks this last summer. It has sent me a full report of its recommendations in the form of a proposed bill and a summary statement of such bill.

I am forwarding this report of the committee to the Congress for consideration by them. The legislation was drawn by the committee itself, and I am submitting it as a possible guide for such action as the Congress may decide to take.

Under this bill the people of Puerto Rico would be given an opportunity for the free exercise of the powers of local self-gov-
Self-Government for Puerto Rico

Government in all three branches of government—executive, legislative, and judicial. There would be reserved to the President the power to veto only such measures passed by the Legislature as were beyond the proper field of local self-government. There would be a United States Commissioner General in Puerto Rico upon whom would devolve the responsibility for the execution of the laws of the United States, and for the coordination and supervision of the activities of Federal civilian agencies, and their correlation with the activities of insular agencies. He would also have authority to require reports of all activities of the Insular Government for transmittal to the President through the Secretary of the Interior. The fiscal relationship of the Insular Government to the Federal Government would not be altered, nor would the ultimate power of Congress to legislate for the territory. The people of the island would, however, be given assurance of the intention of Congress to obtain the concurrence of the people of the island before imposing upon them any further changes in the Organic Act.

There is no reason why their Governor and other officials should continue to be appointed from without. At this stage of Puerto Rican development, the withholding of this right is no longer necessary. There is no question of Puerto Ricans' ability now to administer their own internal affairs and to assume the attendant responsibility.

It is recommended by the report of the committee that this fact be recognized at once. I agree that this should be done; and suggest that the Congress should consider it as a matter of right and justice for Puerto Ricans.

As to the future, it is not proposed that the political development of Puerto Rico be left to chance. On the contrary, it is recommended by the committee that a continuing Joint Advisory Council, under the chairmanship of the Secretary of the Interior, be appointed to conduct continuing economic and political studies of all the elements of the Puerto Rican situation and of American necessities, to guide us for the future. This Council must report at least once during the life of each Congress.
105. Self-Government for Puerto Rico

In addition to the Secretary of the Interior, the Council would consist of the Governor of Puerto Rico and the Commissioner General, who shall serve ex officio, and also four persons to be appointed by the President of the United States, and five persons to be appointed by the Governor of Puerto Rico.

The Government of Puerto Rico should not be static; it should be changed and developed as conditions warrant. It is equally important that the economic situation of the Puerto Ricans should be improved. I am confident that with patience and cooperation both these objectives can be attained.

NOTE: In a message to the Congress on March 9, 1943, the President recommended that the people of Puerto Rico be allowed to elect their own Governor. In a letter to the Secretary of the Interior on March 8, 1943, the President announced the appointment of a committee composed of an equal number of Puerto Ricans and of residents of the United States to make recommendations concerning changes in the organic law of Puerto Rico (see Item 26 and note, this volume, for the text of the President's earlier message to the Congress and of his letter to the Secretary of the Interior).

The Congress, however, was slow in acting upon the President's recommendations. Feeling strongly that the principles of self-determination and self-government were among the basic principles for which the war was being fought, the President, on September 4, 1944, sent a letter to Representative C. Jasper Bell, Chairman of the House Committee on Insular Affairs, requesting early consideration of this legislation. The recommended legislation was not, however, passed by the Congress during President Roosevelt's lifetime.

On July 25, 1946, President Truman nominated Jesús T. Piñero as Governor of Puerto Rico, and Governor Piñero was inaugurated on September 3, 1946. This represented a step forward in self-government for Puerto Rico, since Governor Piñero was the first native-born Governor of Puerto Rico.

On August 5, 1947, President Truman approved Public Law No. 362, 80th Congress, which amended the Organic Act of Puerto Rico, and generally carried out the recommendations which had been made by President Roosevelt since the spring of 1943. The new Act provided that the people of Puerto Rico would elect their own Governor for a term of four years, beginning with the general election in 1948. It also authorized the Governor to appoint, with the advice
and consent of the Senate of Puerto Rico, all the heads of the Executive Departments. Prior to the passage of this Act, the Governor of Puerto Rico and two of the heads of the Executive Departments (the Commissioner of Education and the Attorney General) had been appointed by the President of the United States and confirmed by the United States Senate.

106 | The President Offers a Toast to the King of Arabia. Dinner for the Minister of Foreign Affairs. September 30, 1943

Your Royal Highness, I think that all of us here realize that tonight is a very historic occasion. In the long history of our country, and in the much longer history of Arabia, there have been no dinners like this. We have come to know each other, and I think our great hosts in both Nations are agreed that in the future we should seek to know each other better.

There are very few Americans in all Arabia, and there are very few Arabians in all America. And so the more we see of each other in the days to come, the more it will mean not merely a diplomatic friendship, but it will mean a personal friendship.

We have much in common. We both love liberty — both Nations. And there is no reason why both Nations should not maintain liberty.

We have much to learn from each other. And so I hope that in the days to come we will be able to discuss things, as friends.

I was telling His Royal Highness, at supper, that I knew that one of their problems in Arabia was an insufficiency of water in many places, and also of not enough trees. And I was telling him of what we in our younger years used to call the Great American Desert, a strip running from the North in our own country to the South, where there was very little water, and where there were very few trees.

I was telling him that some years ago we had undertaken a certain project known as Shelter Belt. Since the outbreak of the
war it has been going only sporadically, yet the people out there have seen what it has already done in many parts of the West. And I might just as well tell the Congress of the United States now that I am going to revive it, if I live long enough. It's a very excellent thing. Something like that should be known and experimented with, and practiced, in many parts of the world.

I use that just as an illustration, because Arabia is a land of great resources—agricultural and surface resources, and subsurface resources. And I want to assure their Royal Highnesses both, that the United States is not a Nation which seeks to exploit any other Nation, no matter what its size.

I wish much that the father of these gentlemen could come himself. I hope some day he will be able to come over here, just as I hope that some day I myself can go and visit him in Arabia.

I think we all know that the King is a very wonderful person. I was reading this afternoon a little magazine, and it was all about the King; and there was one little paragraph at the end that I liked a lot—all of it goes along with my own philosophy.

"Ibn Saud's most engaging quality is a kingly belief in eventual rightness. It did not surprise him greatly when Allah, who sent Arabia its ancient rains, provided also its new oil. Nor will it surprise him greatly if God presently provides also not merely victory but even the bright and honest world that should go with it."

I think with that kind of philosophy, which is an Arabian philosophy and also an American philosophy, that working together we can contribute something toward a brighter world, and a more honest world, in the years to come.

And so I should like to propose the health of the King of Arabia, wishing much that he could be with us tonight.
107. Remarks to Ambassador Gromyko

107 Remarks to Ambassador Gromyko of Russia on His Presentation of Credentials.
October 4, 1943

Mr. Ambassador:

I am happy to receive from Your Excellency the letters by which the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics accredits you as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Government of the United States, and I welcome you in that capacity.

I am deeply gratified at the expression of your determination to develop further the friendly relations of understanding and confidence which so happily exist between our two countries, and continue thereby the work of your distinguished predecessor whose letters of recall you have handed to me. I can assure you, that in the performance of this high task with which your Government has entrusted you, Your Excellency may count upon receiving the full cooperation and support of the Government of the United States.

The fortitude, courage, and self-sacrifice of the armed forces and people of the Soviet Union in their terrible hours of trial have aroused the undying admiration of the American people, and we rejoice with the people of the Soviet Union in the ever growing tide of success which is crowning Soviet arms.

Since the day of the treacherous assault upon your country by Nazi Germany it has been, and it is, the unswerving intention of this country to lend maximum assistance to your gallant armies. Our two countries are united against a common enemy. The Government and people of the United States have bent every effort to bring to bear as speedily and as effectively as possible the might of our armed forces against that enemy.

The enemy has felt, is feeling, and will to an ever increasing degree feel the weight of the combined forces of the United Na-
tions, and when the final and complete victory is achieved, as it will be, I know that every one of the United Nations will have made its full contribution toward that victory.

Our countries are joined together in a high cause, and I fully share your confidence that the unity of purpose which binds our peoples and countries together in the prosecution of the war will be translated into a close and lasting collaboration, together with other like-minded countries, in the establishment of a just and enduring peace.

108 Radio Address on the Opening of the National War Fund Drive. October 5, 1943

My friends and fellow Americans:

We, the people of the United States, know now that ultimate victory is certain — but that it is still a long way off, and that for it we are paying and shall have to pay a great price.

In the genius of the American people — for freedom, and decency, and friendliness among neighbors — lies one of our best weapons for that victory, and certainly our greatest insurance for a peace that will be just and lasting. Our men and our allies know they have made no covenant with our Government alone. They know that they have the backing of all the resources and spirit of the American people themselves. In that conviction alone lies the winning morale which no slave of a dictator can ever know.

That is why I am glad to speak to you tonight about the National War Fund. It is a philanthropic federation with three simple aims; first, to determine the nature and the extent of the war-related needs; second, to see that everybody has a chance to contribute to the funds required; and third, to channel the sums raised for its member agencies wherever American help is currently most needed — to raise enough and on time.

The National War Fund has the hearty approval and support
of all the Government agencies concerned with our management of the war. For the National War Fund, by its unity, its economy, its competent management, and its elimination of waste, duplication, and delay, is playing a part in our total war effort which all of us in Washington regard as an absolute essential.

In its unity of purpose, and its federation of agencies without surrender of State and local freedom of method, of course, the National War Fund combines the American genius for organization, the American capacity for economy, and the best of our American tradition for giving freely, and promptly, and in proportion to our means and the need.

For these reasons, when your local war fund or community chest asks you to give—for our own forces, for our allies, and for the needs at home, I ask all of you to think about it carefully before you give.

I ask you to remember that the U.S.O. is your share of what we are doing for our own fighting men, and the forces behind the lines. I ask you to consider that War Prisoners' Aid does what no Government can do. I ask you to think of United Seamen's Service in terms of the people's debt to the men who took our ships across in the darkest hours of the war. And I ask you not to forget that the people of Russia, and China, and of all the other United Nations—and especially the unfortunate, hungry men and women and children of all the overrun and enslaved countries—see in your personal and friendly concern the brightest ray of hope and the greatest power for good in the world today—the sovereign voice of the people of the United States.

And so I ask you to give thoughtfully, and generously, and proportionately—remembering, as you give, that a share in the National War Fund is a share in winning the war, and in winning the right of free men to live in a better world.

NOTE: The President's War Relief Control Board and its predecessor, the President's Committee on War Relief Agencies, were established to eliminate duplication and competition among domestic and
foreign war relief agencies (see Item 16 and note, 1941 volume, and Item 77 and note, 1942 volume).

In early January, 1943, the President's War Relief Control Board recommended in a report to the President that there be established a National War Fund as a collaborative effort to make a united appeal for local charities and national war philanthropies.

This recommendation was accepted and put into effect. Plans were promptly made for an integrated national war fund drive. The foregoing message of the President opened the first National War Fund Drive; it was a single appeal for funds for various domestic and foreign relief agencies.

The National War Fund conducted three campaigns, one each in the fall of 1943, 1944, and 1945. The total contributions for local and national purposes were approximately $750,000,000 which was distributed to national agencies and by community chests to local war charities.

The proceeds of the National War Fund campaigns financed the U.S.O., the United Seamen's Service, War Prisoners' Aid, Inc., and 27 other major foreign and domestic war-relief agencies.

(For the President's message opening the National War Fund Drive in 1944, see Item 93 and note, 1944-1945 volume.)

109 (Informal, Extemporaneous Remarks at the Dedication of Four Liberator Bombers for Yugoslavian Combat Service. October 6, 1943

Mr. Ambassador, General Giles, members of the first Yugoslav air force trained in this country:

I AM VERY happy to take part in this most interesting ceremony. I am happy also that you gentlemen are going to wear as members of the Yugoslav Air Force the wings of the United States Air Force.

May these planes fulfill their mission under your guidance. They are built with two great objectives. The first is to drop bombs on our common enemy successfully and at the right points. The second is to deliver to your compatriots in Yugoslavia the much-needed supplies for which they have waited so long — food, medicine — yes, arms and ammunition.

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110. Message to Congress on Philippine Self-Government

And so you fare forth on one of the greatest odysseys of this war. I count on you to bear yourselves well. And I am sure you will have every success in this great mission that you are undertaking. Remember always that we are comrades in arms.

NOTE: The foregoing extemporaneous remarks were delivered at Bolling Field, in ceremonies attended by 40 Yugoslav officers and men, trained in the United States to be members of the Yugoslav Air Force.

110 (Message to the Congress Requesting Authority to Proclaim a Free Philippines.
October 6, 1943

To the Congress:

Since the Japanese launched their attack on the Philippine Islands, I have on several occasions addressed messages on behalf of the American people to the courageous people of the Philippines — expressing our admiration of their heroism and loyalty. I have assured them that the Government of the United States of America will see to it that their independence will be promptly established and — still more important — that it will be protected. The resources of the United States, in men and material, stand behind that pledge to the people of the Philippines. We shall keep that promise just as we have kept every promise which the United States has made to the Filipino people.

The Philippine Government, now in the United States, has been collaborating with the rest of the United Nations in the united task of destroying our common enemies in the East and in the West. As I stated on August 12, 1943, the United States, in practice, regards the Philippines as having now the same status as the Governments of other independent Nations — in fact all the attributes of complete and respected nationhood.

I am sure that the American people believe that the Filipino
people have earned the right juridically to be free and independent.

The date now set by statute and by the vote of the people and the Legislature of the Philippine Islands for independence is July 4, 1946. It is possible, however, that the fortunes of war will permit an earlier consummation of this joint will of the American and Filipino peoples.

I, therefore, recommend legislation by the Congress giving the President the authority, after consultation with the President of the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands, to advance the date provided in existing law and to proclaim the legal independence of the Philippines, as a separate and self-governing Nation, as soon as feasible.

If the Congress takes this action, there are several steps which, in my opinion, are necessary to make good our pledge that the independence of the Philippines will be protected in the future and to give them the opportunity of economic rehabilitation which is their due.

I, therefore, also recommend:

1. That the Congress make provision authorizing the President of the United States and the President of the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands to enter into immediate negotiations and take the necessary steps to provide for full security for the Philippines, for the mutual protection of the Islands and of the United States, and for the future maintenance of peace in the Pacific.

2. That the Congress make provision for determining the adjustment necessary in the existing provisions of law which govern the economic relations between the United States and the Philippines, so as to assist in making the Philippines, as an independent Nation, economically secure wherever possible.

3. That the Congress make provision for the physical and economic rehabilitation of the Philippines made necessary by the ravages of war which the invaders have inflicted upon them.

All of this is due to the Filipino people in recognition of their heroic role in this war, the political ties which have bound us
110. Message to Congress on Philippine Self-Government

together, and the bonds of friendship which will join us together in the future.

Such action on the part of the Congress would assure the Philippine people again of our sincerity of purpose, and of our resolution to accord them as soon as feasible the legal status of complete freedom, independence, and nationhood to which, as a member of the United Nations, they are entitled.

NOTE: Under the terms of the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934 (see Item 34 and note, pp. 118-120, 1934 volume), the Philippine people were granted their independence and the Philippine Commonwealth became the Philippine Republic on July 4, 1946. At that time, President-elect Manuel Roxas, who had been elected on April 23, 1946, was inaugurated as the first President of the new Republic.

On various occasions during the war, the President had pledged the American Government to furnish necessary support for the economic rehabilitation of the Philippines and for restoring sovereignty to the Philippines (see Item 146 and note, 1941 volume, and Item 88 and note, this volume).

This message was the result of many conferences which were held at the direction of the President. At this time, the Philippines were under the tyrannical control of the Japanese. The morale of the people of the Islands was low. Japanese propaganda and disloyal collaborationists among the Filipinos had combined to make many of the otherwise loyal people skeptical of the plans and purposes of the United States. In many quarters of the Islands there were fears and doubts as to whether we would ever come to their rescue and whether we would ever live up to our promises.

The President asked me to work on this problem, which had been brought forcibly to his attention by Secretary Stimson. The Secretary had been, many years before, the Governor General of the Philippines, and had later always maintained his great interest in their problems and welfare. Manuel Quezon, who had been the outstanding leader of the people of the Philippines for over a quarter of a century, and who had been brought from Corregidor at the same time as General MacArthur, was in Washington at the time and had kept his old friend, Secretary Stimson, informed of what was going on in the Islands.

I arranged several conferences in the apartment of President Quezon at the Shoreham Hotel in Washington to discuss the matter. At these conferences, in addition to Quezon and his staff, there were Secretary Stimson, Senator Millard Tydings, co-author of the Tydings-
110. Message to Congress on Philippine Self-Government

McDuffie Act and Chairman of the Senate Committee in charge of legislation affecting the Philippines, and I, representing the President.

Quezon was confined to his bed, as he had been for several years. He was suffering from tuberculosis, from which he died on August 1, 1944.

Among the most dramatic episodes of my long experience in Washington were these conferences around the bed of this man whose whole life had been spent in the service of his people. Here he was with not many months to live. I do not know whether he knew that fact as well as we did. He was doing his last bit of service to the cause to which he had dedicated his life—the independence and development of the Philippine Islands.

President Roosevelt was anxious to do what he could. We were all limited by the military situation. But what we could do—and what was done—was to assure the Filipino people that we would keep our promises to establish their independence and to protect it.

The gallant leader Quezon was denied by death the privilege of seeing the promise kept. But I can still see the flushed face of the small wiry man on that bed, with a wan, confident smile, as we told him of the foregoing message and how it was going to be broadcast to his people over the seas. We assured him that the Congress would do its part too.

The message had a lot to do with maintaining the splendid resistance and steadfastness of the Philippines until liberation finally came.

An indication of the regard which the President held for Manuel Quezon is contained in the following statement which the President made when Quezon died on August 1, 1944:

"The death of my old friend Manuel Quezon of the Philippine Commonwealth is profoundly shocking, although I knew, as did his many friends, that only a fierce determination had kept him alive these past several years.

"President Quezon died without seeing the cause of Philippine independence fully realized. Death came at a time when the Nation he loved, and for whose welfare he labored many years, is in the hands of the Japanese invader. He died, however, in full confidence that the eighteen million Filipinos of his homeland will be freed of foreign domination and that, with the pledged assistance of the United States, they will become a self-governed people.

"We will always remember President Quezon with admiration and affection. He will be remembered by his people with the respect and veneration that we in the United States have for the name of George Washington."
To the Congress:

There is now pending before the Congress legislation to permit the immigration of Chinese people into this country and to allow Chinese residents here to become American citizens. I regard this legislation as important in the cause of winning the war and of establishing a secure peace.

China is our ally. For many years she stood alone in the fight against aggression. Today we fight at her side. She has continued her gallant struggle against very great odds.

China has understood that the strategy of victory in this world war first required the concentration of the greater part of our strength upon the European front. She has understood that the amount of supplies we could make available to her has been limited by difficulties of transportation. She knows that substantial aid will be forthcoming as soon as possible—aid not only in the form of weapons and supplies, but also in carrying out plans already made for offensive, effective action. We and our allies will aim our forces at the heart of Japan—in ever-increasing strength until the common enemy is driven from China's soil.

But China's resistance does not depend alone on guns and planes and on attacks on land, on the sea, and from the air. It is based as much in the spirit of her people and her faith in her allies. We owe it to the Chinese to strengthen that faith. One step in this direction is to wipe from the statute books those anachronisms in our law which forbid the immigration of Chinese people into this country and which bar Chinese residents from American citizenship.

Nations, like individuals, make mistakes. We must be big
III. Repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Laws

enough to acknowledge our mistakes of the past and to correct them.

By the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Laws, we can correct a historic mistake and silence the distorted Japanese propaganda. The enactment of legislation now pending before the Congress would put Chinese immigrants on a parity with those from other countries. The Chinese quota would, therefore, be only about 100 immigrants a year. There can be no reasonable apprehension that any such number of immigrants will cause unemployment or provide competition in the search for jobs.

The extension of the privileges of citizenship to the relatively few Chinese residents in our country would operate as another meaningful display of friendship. It would be additional proof that we regard China not only as a partner in waging war but that we shall regard her as a partner in days of peace. While it would give the Chinese a preferred status over certain other Oriental people, their great contribution to the cause of decency and freedom entitles them to such preference.

I feel confident that the Congress is in full agreement that these measures — long overdue — should be taken to correct an injustice to our friends. Action by the Congress now will be an earnest of our purpose to apply the policy of the Good Neighbor to our relations with other peoples.

NOTE: Discriminatory legislation against the Chinese was long a black page in the record of the United States for tolerance and civil rights regardless of race, creed, or color. In the years between 1882 and 1913, laws had been enacted singling out the Chinese as a people to be excluded from admission to this country.

Whatever the original purposes of these laws were — whether a particularly odious form of racism or a misguided attempt to protect the domestic labor market — the anomaly of their existence in a democratic society was heavily underscored by the events of the war. China was, of course, an active ally of the United States in the war, and indeed had for many years stood alone against Japanese aggression. And Japan was astute to emphasize this injustice of the United States for its ally, China; the discrimination was a favorite, and not ineffective, theme of her propaganda directed toward China and against the United States.

Under the legislation proposed
by the President, and promptly passed by the Congress on December 17, 1943 (57 Stat. 600; see Item 136 and note, this volume), the laws dealing with the exclusion and naturalization of Chinese were repealed. The result was to place Chinese on the same basis as the immigrants from other countries; and they became subject to the regular quota computed under the Immigration Act. The new law also made Chinese eligible for United States citizenship through naturalization in the same manner as other aliens.

Thus, with a minimum of debate, a long-standing wrong— to a brave people and to our national conscience and to our traditional principles of tolerance— was finally righted by the President and the Congress.

112 (A Toast to the President of Haiti at a White House Dinner. October 14, 1943

This is a particularly happy evening for me, because it carries me back more than a quarter of a century. The President of Haiti is a very old personal friend of mine, and a good friend of most of the people who are here at the table tonight.

I said it carries me back a quarter of a century, because I had something to do with what I hope eventually will be recognized as having been of help to the Republic of Haiti. It goes back to when I myself sent marines to Haiti through a period of great unrest in that Republic. We made a promise then that some day Haiti would be independent, with its own Government, its own Republic.

It was a curious circumstance that many years later, in 1934, I came back to make a decision: I felt that the time had come for the complete independence of the Republic of Haiti; I felt that they could go their own way, with their own independent Government, and their own sovereignty.

I am very proud of what has happened during the last ten years. There were some "doubting Thomases," as President Les-cot knows. There were some people who said "No," it was too early. But I promised his predecessor in July of 1934 that the marines would be out by the end of August, and they were. And
since that time, one of the experiments of my life has been per-
manently successful, because in the last ten years of the Republic
of Haiti not a single American has been there with a gun. Haiti
has made good in every way. I regard the Nation's advance in
prosperity and in friendship during those ten years as something
that ought to be written up in the history books.

I keep talking, not just when the President comes here to visit
me, but on many other occasions, about the development of
Haiti. Those of you who have been there know it is one of the
most beautiful countries in the world. It has everything. It has
everything above the ground, and everything under the ground.
I was talking to the President about one section of Haiti that I
never personally visited, although I saw it from the top of some
mountains, a section in about the middle of the Republic that
is so high that you find there the most beautiful groves and
forests of pine trees, a country where in January or February
you find ice in the streams, and not very far away you get down
to a place where you can grow everything that grows. It is an
amazing place. I strongly recommend that whenever you get a
chance, if you haven't been there, that you go to Haiti.

I think it was a certain Queen of England who said that after
her death "Calais" would be found written on her heart. When
I die, I think that "Haiti" is going to be written on my heart,
because for all these years I have had the most intense interest
in the Republic of Haiti, and the development of its people in
a way that will never mean exploitation by any other Nation.
They ought to develop for themselves, and they have every op-
portunity in the world to do so. Under President Lescot and his
predecessor, very great strides have been made. It is becoming
a self-contained country, with divergent resources of all sorts
of things. We have been talking about economics already, and
the fact that Haiti has insufficient industries. And yet there are
dozens of articles down there which they can grow and produce
the raw materials for, and manufacture themselves. It is not
against our interest, because there are a great many things that
we can make that they can't make, and there are lots of things
that they can make that we can't make. That forms the basis of
trade.

At the present time, Haiti is engaged in the cultivation of a
new plant, cryptostegia, which turns out rubber. This year they
will be getting ten thousand tons of rubber in Haiti. I hope that
when I am out of the White House—I might get beaten on it
otherwise—that the Congress won't put the kind of tariff on rub-
er for American automobile tires just to keep some synthetic
plants going. That would mean that every man in the United
States who owned a car would have to pay 50 percent more for
his rubber. I believe in cheap tires, and more of them; and the
only way to get that is to use the tires that are made by nature,
whether it be rubber, or guayule, or cryptostegia.

In that way, and through the diversification of their crops, and
the diversification of their industries, the future of Haiti is very,
very bright.

We have to remember, as we sometimes forget it in this coun-
try, that Haiti is a great deal more than just another island in
the West Indies. Most of the islands in the West Indies have
relatively small populations. The Haitian part of the Island of
Santo Domingo contains nearly three million people—over two
hundred people per square mile. Because of this density of pop-
ulation they don't even raise enough food to sustain the entire
population.

One of the things that we want to help them on, in order to
be self-sustaining, is the growing of more of their own food sup-
plies. It will help them. And it will help us, for it may teach us
some day to make Puerto Rico self-sustaining. We have two mil-
lion people in Puerto Rico, and almost everything they eat is
bought on the outside. The money to buy their own food doesn't
go into their pockets, it goes into the pockets of China, and
Mexico, and the United States.

And so, in this new civilization that we are coming to, of
mutual aid and in a cooperative management between all the
113. Postwar Unit in Office of War Mobilization

Nations of the world, I think that not only can Haiti learn a lot from us, but we can learn a lot from Haiti.

It is a wonderful thing that during all these years we have had such good friends down there in the Government of Haiti—one more than my old friend, President Lescot, who used to be with us in Washington, and who has come back, and who we hope will come back many, many times again.

NOTE: For references to the withdrawal of the United States Marines from Haiti in 1934, see Items 59, 100, 127, and 128, and notes, pp. 184-186, 285-286, 341-343, and 343-344, 1934 volume.

113 Statement by the President on the Establishment of a Unit in the Office of War Mobilization to Deal with Postwar Problems. October 15, 1943

At my suggestion Justice Byrnes, Director of War Mobilization, yesterday met with heads of various agencies concerned with the problems of terminating or revising war contracts in light of the changing demands of our war strategy. The War and Navy Departments are now in the process of revising more than eight thousand contracts involving several billions of dollars.

It is planned to set up within the Office of War Mobilization a unit to deal with war and postwar adjustment problems and to develop unified programs and policies to be pursued by the various agencies of Government concerned. The unit will study and consider the whole range of problems which will ultimately arise out of the termination of war contracts, including the problems of reconversion and disposition of plants and property no longer required for war use.

The work has deliberately been placed within the Office of War Mobilization to insure that such reshaping of our war pro-
114. Argentine Suspension of Jewish Newspapers Condemned

Program as may be required will be carried through with a view to increasing the effectiveness of our war effort. While we must prepare for necessary postwar adjustments, this preparation must not interfere with the long and hard war programs which are still ahead of us.

NOTE: The President often said that we did not intend to repeat the mistakes of the first World War and delay our planning for the postwar economy until the day the shooting stopped. There was established in the Office of War Mobilization an "Advisory Unit for War and Post-War Adjustment Policies," headed by Bernard M. Baruch and John M. Hancock. In February, 1944, this unit published the monumental "Report on War and Postwar Adjustment Policies," popularly known as the Baruch-Hancock Report, which dealt with surplus property disposal, means of curtailing war production and resuming civilian production, the disposition of wartime controls, the human side of demobilization, and the termination of war contracts. (See note to Item 56, this volume, for a more extended discussion of the Baruch-Hancock Report and the other work of the Office of War Mobilization.)

114 (The President Condemns the Suspension of Jewish Newspapers by the Argentine Government. October 15, 1943

I have been informed that the Argentine Government has suspended the publication of Jewish newspapers, some of which have been in existence for many years.

While this matter is, of course, one which concerns primarily the Argentine Government and people, I cannot forbear to give expression to my own feeling of apprehension at the taking in this hemisphere of action obviously anti-Semitic in nature and of a character so closely identified with the most repugnant features of Nazi doctrine. I believe that this feeling is shared by the people of the United States and by the people of the other American Republics.

In this connection I recall that one of the resolutions adopted at the Eighth International Conference of American States at
Lima in 1938 set forth that "any persecution on account of racial or religious motives which makes it impossible for a group of human beings to live decently is contrary to the political and juridical system of America."

NOTE: A few hours after the President had issued the foregoing statement, the Jewish newspapers which had been suspended by the Argentine Government were permitted to resume publication.

115 (The Nine Hundred and Twenty-third Press Conference (Excerpts). October 19, 1943

(Revival of reoccupied territory — Food costs and production — Subsidies — Victory gardens — A little inflation like a little cocaine.)

THE PRESIDENT: There is one thing—I wish somebody would say something about it—I have been digging up some stuff on it because I have been very much interested in it, and that is what happens to land that is reoccupied.

I thought the best thing to do was to try to find out what has happened in North Africa. It has been under our occupation now for about eleven months, and what has happened there can, I think, be applied to most other lands that are reoccupied by us. The next thing will be the example of Sicily and southern Italy.

What happened in North Africa, as I saw last winter, was that they had been pretty nearly bled white. Nearly all of their wheat and their fruits during 1940, 1941, and 1942 had been seized and taken out of North Africa. There were no replacements of other materials from other sources. And the result was that it was a pretty sad North Africa that I saw when I got there. There wasn't enough to eat, and the production was increasingly going downhill.

Well, as a result of everybody's working together, we have had really remarkable success. Number one, with certain very minor exceptions such as peppermint tea, which they can't grow and which is the favorite drink of the Moors — off
the record, I don't advise you to try it—(laughter) North Africa is taking care of practically all of her own food needs.

And in addition to that, they are growing enough to make a very substantial contribution to the food of all of our troops there, and a large number of British troops, which is another case of lend-lease in reverse. . . .

We had to send them 8,000 tons of flour, 6,500 tons of wheat, 2,800 tons of potatoes, 1,800 tons of dried beans and peas, 1,000 tons of edible oil, and a few smaller amounts of cheese, dried eggs, margarine, rice, and vegetables. They were requested by General Eisenhower.

And they were needed for a lot of things, to obtain native labor sufficiently well-fed to work in the docks. We had some experiences where workers just dropped of exhaustion when they came to work for us, because they were so ill-fed. The same thing happened on the roads and railroads. Those supplies were needed to minimize the danger of famine and food riots that would require assignment of troops in order to keep order; to prevent the spread of disease that might menace the health of our troops; and to feed the large army that was then being mobilized by the French authorities and has, since then, distinguished itself in Tunis and Sicily and Corsica. Those original supplies were made available under lend-lease, but in view of their present financial position, the French have repaid us in dollars for these supplies.

Meanwhile, the agricultural experts sent over a lot of seeds, and things like that, in order to expand local agricultural production. These shipments, of very small amounts of tonnage, were carefully budgeted. They consisted of seeds, and a very small amount of agricultural machinery and equipment, certain spare parts, fuel oil, binder twine, bags, and fertilizers and sprays. They were all requested by General Eisenhower.

Some of them began to get over there way back in early spring, and arrived in time for the harvest in June and July. The remainder of it, especially the seeds, will arrive in time for fall planting this year, for harvest next year.
They will produce many times their own weight in foodstuffs. The total tonnage of all of these is 15,000 tons—a ship and a half. Food imports into North Africa have stopped entirely since the first of July. In other words, they are self-sustaining.

Many thousand tons of local fruits and vegetables and meats have been delivered to the British and American forces for local consumption, on a reverse lend-lease basis, and without payment. That means without our paying anything for them. In addition, the French are providing the Allied forces with 30,000 tons of North African flour for use in the Italian campaign, thus avoiding our having to send the flour direct from here, saving 3,000 miles of shipping. And agreements are now being negotiated to provide our forces with more than 60,000 tons of fruit and vegetable produce. Supplies are being furnished in reverse lend-lease, in partial return for the munitions with which we are equipping the French Army.

Beyond these immediate military objectives, the French authorities, working with the Combined Food Board, have begun to accumulate food supplies for use during and after the coming liberation of France. I can’t give you the exact date today. (Laughter) The success of that program will greatly reduce the shipping and future needs of France itself for American food.

And in the coming year 1944, these harvests in North Africa, aided by mounting agricultural help and a year of peaceful cultivation, should greatly ease the strain on the United States. And incidentally, in saying that, I mean that we won’t have to ship as many food products out of the United States as we would have otherwise. It works both ways. . . .

Q. Mr. President, with respect to this food experience in North Africa, have you reached the point where you are having any kind of experience in Sicily or southern Italy that you know about?
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The President: I haven't officially. I can only tell you what I have heard from various people coming back from there.

Sicily was bled white by the Germans, we all know that; and under the Fascist policy of government, the actual acreage successfully cultivated had gone way, way down in the last ten or fifteen years, especially the last two or three years. I think, as I remember it, that five-eighths of the total food and drink production of all Sicily was taken out of Sicily, so that the average farmer could only retain three-eighths of what he produced. At this time there seems to be a pretty general feeling on the part of the farmers of Sicily that they will be able to retain 100 percent of what they grow; that none of it will be taken away from them, and that what they do have in excess, they will be able to sell, instead of being robbed of it. . . .

Q. Mr. President, do you have anything to say about the food conference you had today?

The President: I don’t think so. I think the thing is that we are, I hope, gradually eliminating a whole lot of smoke and a lot of details, and coming down to brass tacks.

I am sending up a message to Congress on it, I think tomorrow or the next day, but the situation in a nutshell is that since July, since Marvin Jones came in, we have done on the whole a pretty good job, at comparatively low cost. The cost-of-living index is not as low as we hope it will be, but on the other hand it has come down somewhat. The cost of food we hope can go a little bit further; and the other costs of living, like rent and the other things, are holding their own and going down a little. And therefore, when all the intricacies of food, and bills, are cleared away to the essentials, I personally hope that on the first proposition they will let the present system continue. It has been pretty successful. There is no reason why we should try some other scheme. This one is working. And it doesn’t cost an awful lot, compared with the total cost of the war.

Now that all relates — put it the simplest way — to the cost
of food to the housewife, keeping it where it is, or perhaps a little bit lower. We have had three or four months of pretty successful operation. In other words, what I am thinking about in this first instance is the cost to the housewife between now and next July. We are all substantially agreed on a program for a great increase in the total production of crops.

I think the total production of this country is rather interesting. Take the 1935 to 1939 period—call that a hundred. Well, we thought we were doing pretty well in those years. And in 1942, in the calendar year, the total production rose to 125. It will probably surprise you when I say that in 1943 it will probably rise to 131, and not a good crop year. We either had drought, as in Oklahoma and that section, or we had floods as in Illinois and certain parts of the East.

The principal reason for the total gain in foodstuffs is the tremendous gain in cattle. Many of the agricultural crops are off a bit, but they are more than offset in—what shall I say?—the calories—isn't that the word that they use nowadays?—in cattle, hogs, and so forth—four-footed calories.

Well now, people get thinking in a foggy way, and come out and say, "No subsidies for anybody any more, beginning on the first of January." Those same people, some of them professional farmers, they have been getting subsidies ever since 1933, and even before that. We have given subsidies to agriculture for a great many years. Parity, and the effort to obtain it for agriculture, came along about 1933, and the Treasury has been spending many, many millions every year out of the Treasury and into the farmers' pockets. Of course that is a subsidy, subsidies which have always been demanded by the agricultural interests.

Then on the question of the gains of agriculture during the past year: In 1942, calendar year, the farmers of the country made about nine and a half billion dollars, and did a grand, cooperative job in raising all the extra food that they needed. They showed fine spirit. Give them all due
credit. And this year, which isn't quite finished, we think they will earn about twelve and a half billion dollars, which for one year is not bad at all. The average farmer is co-operating.

With the coming year, we have this new program for planting next spring and of raising the total acreage planted by a much larger increase over 1943 than 1943 was over 1942.

In that we are being greatly helped by something that I hope we can double next year, and that is the victory gardens. Well, they raised ten million tons of foodstuffs in the victory gardens. Well, that's an awful lot of foodstuffs. And we hope this year that we will double that to twenty million tons.

Of course, there are a lot of people who put in victory gardens this year who got hit by the drought or hit by the rain. Next year they will be much better agriculturists in running their victory gardens than they were this year. I would advise you to try it. And so we are going to start a campaign to get everybody, even with just a backyard, to put in some seeds, at any rate to double that amount from ten million tons to twenty million.

Well, those are some of the things we talked about this morning.

I told them a couple of stories. I told them that one of them had been asked, I think it was in a House committee hearing, "Well now, don't you think that a little inflation wouldn't be so bad?" And that the fellow who was asked that said, "Yes, I think a little inflation wouldn't hurt anybody."

So I told him the story about a friend of mine, who is a perfectly good citizen, quite strong-minded, had no vices.

Somebody went to him one day and said, "Did you ever try a little pill of cocaine?"

And he said, "No. I wouldn't touch cocaine, I might form a habit."

Well, this friend of his said, "Well, you know, it's the loveliest sensation in the world. It's perfectly grand. You just
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feel up in the skies. There isn’t anything as wonderful as the sensation that cocaine gives you.”

And he talked so enthusiastically that this fellow said, “All right, give me a pill.” And then he took it, and he felt just grand, just as his friend had said.

He came back the next day, and said, “That was the most wonderful sensation I have ever had. Slip me another.”

Well, within a week he was taking two, and at the end of a month he was a cocaine addict, a drug addict.

And I said to the men at the food conference, “You know, this inflation business is a little bit like that. You get a little inflation—you say you like a little inflation—and then you will want twice the amount, and then you will get the inflation habit.”

Well, that’s a pretty unanswerable argument, philosophically and economically. We know what has happened to the countries that have, unnecessarily, taken a little pill, just one little pill of inflation.

Q. Well, Mr. President, some of the Congressmen think you could get a subsidy habit, too.

THE PRESIDENT: We have had it for ten years and we are still alive. It doesn’t seem to have the effect of cocaine.

VOICES: Thank you, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Don’t take cocaine or inflation! *(Laughter)*

116 Presidential Statement Announcing the Refusal to Recognize the Philippine Puppet Government. October 22, 1943

On the fourteenth of this month a puppet Government was set up in the Philippine Islands with José P. Laurel, formerly a Justice of the Philippine Supreme Court, as “President.” Jorge Vargas, formerly a member of the Philippine Commonwealth Cabinet, and Benigno Aquino, also formerly a member of that Cabi-
Refusal to Recognize Philippine Puppet Government

net, were closely associated with Laurel in this movement. The first act of the new puppet regime was to sign a military alliance with Japan. The second act was a hypocritical appeal for American sympathy which was made in fraud and deceit and was designed to confuse and mislead the Filipino people.

I wish to make it clear that neither the former collaborationist "Philippine Executive Commission" nor the present "Philippine Republic" has the recognition or sympathy of the Government of the United States. No act of either body is now or ever will be considered lawful or binding by this Government.

The only Philippine Government is that established by the people of the Philippines under the authorization of the Congress of the United States—the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands. At my request, the principal executive officers of the Commonwealth were transferred in 1942 from Corregidor to Washington.

Further, it is our expressed policy that all the resources of the United States, both of men and materials, shall be employed to drive the treacherous, invading Japanese from the Philippine Islands, to restore as quickly as possible orderly and free democratic processes of government in the Islands, and to establish there a truly independent Philippine Nation.

Our sympathy goes out to those who remain loyal to the United States and the Commonwealth; to that great majority of the Filipino people who have not been deceived by the promises of the enemy and who look forward to the day when the scheming, perfidious Japanese shall have been driven from the Philippines. That day will come.

NOTE: See Item 146 and note, 1941 volume, Items 88 and 110 and notes, this volume, and Item 46 and note, 1944-1945 volume, for an account of the President's wartime statements on postwar independence for the Philippine Republic, and the political and economic rehabilitation of the Philippines.
117. President Denounces Draft-Dodging Charges

117 (The President Defends Federal Employees Against Charges of Dodging the Draft.

October 26, 1943

(The following message was sent to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives):

There has recently been much loose and harmful talk about the employees of the Federal Government. In an effort to discredit those in the public service, groundless charges are being made and irresponsible rumors circulated that the Federal Government is a haven for “draft dodgers” and “slackers.”

In simple justice to the many fine, public-spirited, and devoted persons in the Government employ, these unfair accusations must be emphatically denied.

Here are the true facts concerning the draft deferment of Government employees. I am sending them to you so that they may be made a part of the permanent record.

On July 31, 1943 (the latest date for which complete figures are available), there were in the Government service 2,825,904 full-time employees—men and women—in the continental United States—less than 9 percent of whom work in Washington. According to the latest available information, it is estimated that there were 154,500 additional civilian employees outside the continental United States, the greater part of whom were working for the War and Navy Departments or for the Panama Canal.

In addition, there were 145,808 part-time paid employees, such as consultants, specialists, and forest-fire fighters. And 251,663 persons were working without compensation or for one dollar a year, such as members of local ration and draft boards and industrial advisers. It has been the Government’s policy not to seek deferments for part-time or uncompensated employees or for dollar-a-year men. We can thus at the outset dispose of about 400,000 persons who under no circumstances can be regarded as “draft dodgers.”
117. President Denounces Draft-Dodging Charges

Of the 2,825,904 full-time, paid civilian employees in the United States, 1,952,700 men and women, or more than two-thirds, are employed by the War and Navy Departments. Let us consider first these civilian employees of the War and Navy Departments.

The greater part of them are engaged in war production in Government arsenals, ordnance plants, powder factories, and navy yards, or in essential work at Government depots, warehouses, proving grounds, air bases, naval training stations, and Government hospitals. They consist of engineers, draftsmen, mechanics, skilled artisans, procurement experts, scientists, specialists, and administrative personnel. They perform many difficult and important functions with regard to the far-flung supply, production, and other problems of the Army and Navy.

If the items of war material now being made in these Government-owned plants were produced, instead, in civilian-owned plants, the working men and women would be the very same civilians—and in the same number. And they would be deferred as essential war workers the same as other essential war workers are deferred.

Those who constantly bemoan the rapid growth of Government payrolls usually overlook the fact that it takes hundreds of thousands of men and women to produce guns and ammunition in Government arsenals and to construct and repair battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines in Government navy yards, the same as in privately owned and operated plants. One hundred percent of the battleships now in construction, 43 percent of the aircraft carriers, 10 percent of the cruisers, 8 percent of the destroyers, and about 31 percent of the submarines are being built in these Government yards. Our civilian workers make 86 percent of the Garand rifles built in this country. These are just a few examples.

The War and Navy Departments, like private manufacturers, must see to it that production is not disrupted by the drafting of their workers before systematic arrangements for their replacement are made. Accordingly, replacement schedules, similar to
President Denounces Draft-Dodging Charges

those used in private war plants and factories, have been prepared for most Army and Navy civilian workers. Deferments for such workers in these departments operate on the same basis as in private industry; viz., the deferment lasts for a limited period of time, during which new people—women or older men or younger boys—are trained to take the place of those who are inducted into the Army or Navy—except those who are indispensable and irreplaceable. These replacement schedules have to be approved by the Selective Service System before they become effective.

The vast majority of these 1,952,700 civilian employees of the War and Navy Departments consist of women, men below or over draft age, men who have been classified as physically unfit, and fathers. According to the records of Selective Service, less than 5 percent of all of the civilian employees in these departments—or about 84,000—have been deferred for occupational reasons. Men of draft age are constantly being released for military duty and are being replaced in accordance with replacement schedules. This record is much better than the occupational deferments in private industry.

Those civilians in the Army and Navy who have been deferred are preponderantly workers in the field outside of Washington. Thus, of the 36,672 departmental employees of the War Department in Washington, 364 are now deferred. Of the 19,000 departmental employees of the Navy in Washington, only 1,016 are now deferred. Those deferred are primarily engineers, draftsmen, naval architects, and other technical personnel.

If the “slackers” are not harbored by the War and Navy Departments, have they found their “haven” in the other Government departments and agencies?

No employee in the other Government departments and agencies is allowed to request his own deferment from his local draft board. No local draft board is allowed to defer any Government employee on occupational grounds unless the deferment has been requested by the employing agency and has received the approval of an independent Review Committee on Deferment.
of Government Employees consisting of three public officials and organized by Executive Order.

Deferment will be approved by this Review Committee only in the case of Government employees who occupy key positions, or who are engaged in highly specialized and essential work or who possess unique fitness and skill which are difficult to replace. The concept of a key position is narrowly limited to positions requiring an unusual degree of responsibility and specialized skill, and involving serious difficulty of replacement.

It is clear, therefore, that the standards of deferment of Government workers are much stricter than those governing deferments in private employment. A worker in private industry, unlike the Government employee, may request his own deferment, even though his employer does not see fit to do so. There is no agency in private industry comparable to this Review Committee of the Government which passes upon job classifications and carefully scrutinizes claims for deferment of workers. Nor, in private industry, is deferment limited to employees who hold key positions. Finally, the fact that the worker is engaged in any of the 2,000 occupations classified as essential by the War Manpower Commission may properly be considered by the local draft boards in the case of private workers; but, despite the fact that Government service has been classified as an essential activity, the local draft boards cannot defer a man in Government service, not on a replacement schedule, except in accordance with the foregoing rules. The Government, moreover, is handicapped by the fact that, due to budgetary limitations, it cannot always take on and train new employees to replace men who are about to be inducted.

I am informed that some local boards, on their own initiative, have granted occupational deferments to some Government employees without any prior request of the Government. Many of these deferments were obtained before the Executive Order establishing the Review Committee was issued. These deferments are now unauthorized. We are actively searching out such cases and when they are discovered, appropriate action is being taken.
The figures compiled by the Review Committee reflect the strictness of the Government's policy on occupational deferments.

The Post Office Department is the largest employer in the Government after the War and Navy Departments. It has 315,741 employees, of whom 307,817 are located outside of Washington. These are the men who deliver the mail and operate local post offices. No deferments have been sought by the postal authorities for any employees with the single exception of postal inspectors. These inspectors are engaged in highly skilled work requiring years of experience. They investigate postal frauds, check the accounts of the local postmasters, and do important work for the Army and Navy. Only 61 men—all of them postal inspectors—have received deferments. Twelve of these 61 are fathers. The number deferred is, therefore, less than 1/20 of 1 percent of the total Post Office personnel.

The Post Office certainly does not look like a "haven" for "draft dodgers."

Of the remaining Government employees nearly half are women. About 119,380 are men of draft age (exclusive of a few small agencies whose reports have not yet been submitted). Of these men, 25,537 are single, 26,195 are married without children, and 67,647 are married with children.

Let's turn first to the 25,537 single men. By August 15, 1943, 3,582 had been classified by Selective Service in Class I and were awaiting induction, ready to go into the armed forces; 11,667 had been placed in Class IV as physically unfit for military service, and 1,502 had been given a Class III classification by their boards because of dependency or hardship. No information was available as to the classification of some 2,743. The lack of information with respect to the classification of these employees is due, in part, to the failure of some individual employees to report promptly to the Government their induction or any change in their draft status, and to the delays involved in compiling figures received from the field. Occupational deferments had been received by only 6,043.

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I should like to analyze these 6,043 somewhat more in detail:
A. 1,077 of these are in the Department of Commerce;
190 in the Bureau of Standards are engaged in scientific
work of prime importance to the war;
139 in the Weather Bureau are meteorologists or weather
observers;
178 in the Coast and Geodetic Survey are engaged in expl-
oration and mapping of coastal defense waters;
554 in the Civil Aeronautics Administration operate the
network of Federal airways used almost exclusively
now by Army and Navy aircraft;
13 in the U. S. Patent Office are physicists, chemists,
and scientists, studying patents of potential value in
this mechanized war;
3 are Bureau Chiefs.
B. There are 1,225 single men in the Federal Bureau of In-
estigation who are in Class II. These agents investigate cases of
espionage, sabotage, and subversive activities, and perform other
duties so intimately related to the war that they might easily be
considered members of the armed forces.
C. Another 1,800 employed by various agencies and depart-
ments are overseas, many in actual combat zones. These consist
mainly of employees of the Coast and Geodetic Survey charting
North Pacific waters, civil aeronautical personnel engaged in air
traffic control and airways communications, radio monitor opera-
tors, operating railway workers, F.B.I. agents, operating and
maintenance employees of the Panama Canal, technicians, en-
geineers, pilots, members of the Foreign Diplomatic Service, and
representatives of foreign economic agencies.
D. Among the other deferred are 132 radio operators and
radio technicians in the Federal Communications Commission,
387 engineers and geologists in the Department of the Interior,
352 specialists in the Department of Agriculture engaged in the
inspection of food, the growing of guayule for rubber, in the pro-
tection of our national forests, or in the protection of our farms
against plant or animal disease, 60 inspectors protecting our bor-
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ders against illegal entry or smuggling; 60 scientists in the United States Public Health Service or the United States Food and Drug Administration; 278 scientists, engineers, and chemists in the employ of the Tennessee Valley Authority engaged in construction of flood control dams and the building and operation of power plants; and 84 in the Maritime Commission supervising our ship-construction program.

This accounts for 5,455 of the 6,043 deferred single men. The remaining deferred employees occupy key positions in the various departments and agencies.

If the normal experience of Selective Service holds true with this group, about 40 percent would be ineligible anyway for military service by reason of their physical condition.

Non-production Federal employees abroad, i.e., those not engaged in actual production of war materials or facilities, are now being individually examined by the Review Committee to make certain that only those physically unfit for military service or those possessing exceptional qualifications are granted continued deferment.

The same holds true of the 26,195 married men without children in the Government employ. Of these 26,195 men, 5,287 had been classified by Selective Service in Class I and were awaiting induction on August 15, 1943, 6,730 had been placed in Class IV as physically unfit for military service, and 5,635 had been given a Class III classification by their boards because of dependency or hardship. No information was available as to the classification of some 594.

The number deferred for occupational reasons — was 7,949. Like the single men, they are all engaged in work essential to the prosecution of the war and their cases have been carefully examined by the Review Committee. Here, too, about 40 percent would be found ineligible for military service by reason of their physical condition.

There are, besides, 2,003 uniformed personnel running the War Shipping Administration Training Organization and 14,050 cadets receiving training in the Training Organization schools.
for service in the merchant marine, who have also been deferred. These men are not really part of the civilian establishment of the Government.

The broad, over-all, unfounded charges of "draft dodgers" in Government service are particularly unfair to our Federal personnel. I am convinced that they are anxious to put on their country's uniform and that they have been kept, often against their will, in their present jobs. Their Government itself, and not the men as individuals, decided that they could be more useful to its war effort where they are.

This attempted discrediting of the public service is also unfair to the many who left the Government to enter the armed forces and who plan to return to their positions after the war. Unfortunately the statistics of those ex-employees of the Government now in the armed services are incomplete, but their very number would silence the mudslingers. As of January 1, 1943, there were 238,154 Federal employees in the armed services. The estimated number today is approximately double that amount— or about a half-million.

118 (Message to the Congress on Education of War Veterans. October 27, 1943

To the Congress:

On November 13, 1942, on signing the bill calling for the induction by Selective Service of young men eighteen and nineteen years old, I appointed a committee of educators, under the auspices of the War and Navy Departments, to study the problem of education of our service men and women after the war. The objective was to enable those young people, whose education had been interrupted, to resume their schooling, and to provide an opportunity for the education and technical training of other young men and women of ability, after their discharge from the armed services.
118. Education of War Veterans

This committee has sent me a preliminary report which I am herewith transmitting to the Congress for its consideration, and, I hope, for its early action.

We, at home, owe a special and continuing obligation to these men and women in the armed services.

During the war we have seen to it that they have received the best training and equipment, the best food, shelter, and medical attention, the best protection and care which planning, ingenuity, physical resources, and money could furnish in time of war. But after the war shall have been won, the best way that we can repay a portion of that debt is to see to it, by planning and by action now, that those men and women are demobilized into an economy which is sound and prosperous, with a minimum of unemployment and dislocation; and that, with the assistance of Government, they are given the opportunity to find a job for which they are fitted and trained, in a field which offers some reasonable assurance of well-being and continuous employment.

For many, what they desire most in the way of employment will require special training and further education. As a part of a general program for the benefit of the members of our armed services, I believe that the Nation is morally obligated to provide this training and education and the necessary financial assistance by which they can be secured. It is an obligation which should be recognized now; and legislation to that end should be enacted as soon as possible.

This is a good time not merely to be thinking about the subject, but actually to do something about it. Nothing will be more conducive to the maintenance of high morale in our troops than the knowledge that steps are being taken now to give them education and technical training when the fighting is over.

Every day that the war continues interrupts the schooling and training of more men and women, and deprives them of the education and skills which they would otherwise acquire for use in later life. Not only the individual welfare of our troops, but the welfare of the Nation itself, requires that we reverse this trend just as quickly as possible after the war.
Education of War Veterans

Vocational and educational opportunities for veterans should be of the widest range. There will be those of limited education who now appreciate, perhaps for the first time, the importance of general education, and who would welcome a year in school or college. There will be those who desire to learn a remunerative trade or to fit themselves more adequately for specialized work in agriculture or commerce. There will be others who want professional courses to prepare them for their life’s work.

Lack of money should not prevent any veteran of this war from equipping himself for the most useful employment for which his aptitudes and willingness qualify him. The money invested in this training and schooling program will reap rich dividends in higher productivity, more intelligent leadership, and greater human happiness.

We must replenish our supply of persons qualified to discharge the heavy responsibilities of the postwar world. We have taught our youth how to wage war; we must also teach them how to live useful and happy lives in freedom, justice, and decency.

Specifically, I agree with the recommendations made by the committee in this regard as follows:

1. The Federal Government should make it financially feasible for every man and woman who has served honorably for a minimum period in the armed forces since September 16, 1940, to spend a period up to one calendar year in a school, a college, a technical institution, or in actual training in industry, so that he can further his education, learn a trade, or acquire the necessary knowledge and skill for farming, commerce, manufacturing, or other pursuits.

2. In addition, the Federal Government should make it financially possible for a limited number of ex-service men and women selected for their special aptitudes, to carry on their general, technical, or professional education for a further period of one, two, or three years.

This assistance from Government should include not only cost of instruction but a certain amount of money for maintenance.

One incidental benefit of permitting discharged veterans to
Education of War Veterans

put in a year or more of schooling or training would be to simplify and cushion the return to civilian employment of service personnel. And I might call to your attention the fact that it costs less per year to keep a man at school or college or training on the job, than to maintain him on active military duty for a year.

While the Federal Government should provide the necessary funds and should have the responsibility of seeing that they are spent providently and under generally accepted standards, the control of the educational processes and the certification of trainees and students should reside in the States and localities.

I am sure that the Congress will agree with me that the report of this committee constitutes a helpful and constructive point of departure in the working out of a practical program for the meeting of this situation. Various recommendations are contained in the report concerning the administration of the plan. While there may be differences as to some of the details, I am confident that the Congress will find merit in the general objectives.

So far as disabled soldiers are concerned, the Congress is aware that, pursuant to existing statutes, the Veterans Administration is prepared to conduct a program of rehabilitation for veterans with service-connected disability. The program is designed to provide for the special needs of war-disabled veterans, and to furnish educational and training opportunities to help them take their places in civilian life. The program has already been initiated, and will be expanded as the war proceeds.

The new program of the Federal Security Agency will make provisions for veterans whose disabilities are not service-connected.

The Army and the Navy require a large number of workers skilled and experienced in various occupations and professions. Men who are filling these posts are acquiring valuable training and experience. A man who has become a mechanical draftsman, a cartographer, a meteorologist, a cook, or a baker may succeed in finding a similar post in civilian life. In a great many other occupations, such as those dealing with tank or tractor mainte-
nance and repair, or with radio operation and maintenance, men are acquiring basic skill and experience which will provide a solid foundation for learning a related civilian occupation.

In addition, the United States Armed Forces Institute, which is a joint operation of the Army and Navy, offers men and women in the armed services a chance to enroll in courses usually offered by colleges, high schools, technical and occupational schools, in which they can study in their off-duty time. The Institute prepares self-teaching textbooks which enable them to learn a subject entirely on their own initiative; or, if they prefer, they may join any one of hundreds of classes which have been or are being established in Army camps and posts and in Navy installations, and in Army and Navy hospitals, here in the United States and in places all over the world. Or if they wish, they can study by the correspondence method with the Institute or with one of its overseas branches the same as any student in a correspondence school.

Opportunities for vocational training and for systematic schooling within the armed services will be expanded and re-oriented during periods of demobilization and up to the moment of discharge.

Therefore, if the Congress adopts the general objective outlined herein, our men and women in the armed forces will be afforded opportunities for continuance of their education and vocational training—first, during the war; second, during the demobilization period; and third, for a year or more after their separation from the service.

While the successful conclusion of this great war is by no means within our sight, yet it may well be said that the time to prepare for peace is at the height of war.

NOTE: The President's message of October 27, 1943, was one of the important steps toward the enactment of the G. I. Bill of Rights, which provided certain educational and training benefits for veterans of the armed forces (see Item 45 and note, 1944-1945 volume, for the President's statement on signing the G. I. Bill of Rights).

Less than a year after Pearl Harbor, the President had begun to
formulate plans for a postwar educational and training program for service men and women. As indicated in the foregoing message, the President, on November 13, 1942, had appointed a committee of educators (known as the Armed Forces Committee on Post-War Educational Opportunities for Service Personnel) to study the problem and devise a program for postwar education and training of veterans. (See Item 122 and note, 1942 volume, for an account of the composition and early work of this committee.)

In its report, the Committee recommended that the armed forces assume the following responsibilities: (1) furnishing systematic guidance to direct service men and women to the educational opportunities open to them after discharge; (2) providing an objective record of educational experience in the service which could be used to gauge accurately the postwar educational opportunities for which these men and women were fitted; and (3) expediting the discharge of service personnel with feasible educational plans, and the discharge of teachers needed to carry out these plans.

Recognizing that a considerable number of service personnel would be unable to meet the financial drain of education after the war, the Committee recommended that the Government finance the payment of tuition and fees, plus an allowance to meet living expenses: $50 a month for maintenance of single persons, and $75 a month in the case of married men, with an allowance of $10 for each child.

President Roosevelt for many years had been interested in the problem of providing Federal aid for education to those localities with insufficient taxable property to support an adequate educational system of their own. A long history of resistance on the part of so-called "States-Righters" and others against any Federal aid made the problem a very difficult one. Opponents had successfully used the propaganda that the Federal Government would interfere with local educational standards and techniques, if it furnished any of the money. The new G. I. Bill provided the means to break down this resistance and this type of propaganda. It has now been shown that the Federal Government can help to provide education without interfering with local autonomy in education.

As a result of the widespread and successful use of Federal money for education by G. I.'s, it is no longer considered unnatural for the Federal Government to give aid for education. I feel sure that without the break in long tradition which came with the G. I. Bill of Rights, the idea of Federal aid to education would never have progressed this far.

(For a more detailed and comprehensive account of the provisions of the G. I. Bill of Rights, see
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Item 45 and note, 1944-1945 volume; for a discussion of additional legislation to aid veterans, see Item 126, this volume, and Items 18 and 75 and notes, 1944-1945 volume.)

119 (The Nine Hundred and Twenty-fourth Press Conference (Excerpts). October 29, 1943

(Food — Reverse lend-lease — Production of farm machinery — Moscow Conference a “happy ship” — Restatement of foreign policy and the process of international conferences — Russian cooperation to maintain peace.)

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, I have got a number of things. Steve will have for you a story for release at noon, not to be released before then.

(Reading): “Simultaneously with the announcement by the President and the Prime Minister of a rearrangement of the Combined Food Board whereby Claude R. Wickard, Secretary of Agriculture, has been named neutral Chairman, and Canada has been invited to appoint a member, the President signed an Executive Order strengthening the War Food Administration by designating the War Food Administrator, Marvin Jones, Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee and United States member of the Combined Food Board. The War Food Administrator and the Secretary of Agriculture will continue as members of the War Production Board.

“This represents an important step in the simplification of the food allocations process. And under the terms of the Order, the Food Advisory Committee and the Interagency Committee are abolished, and the War Food Administrator has created by administrative order a Food Requirements and Allocations Committee to pass on all domestic and foreign claims for food from United States sources.

“A strong food requirements and allocations mechanism in the War Food Administration will expedite food allocations. Under this arrangement the food requirements branch of the War Food Administration will present United States domestic claims for food and the newly created Office of Foreign Economic Administration will act as the claimant agency for food for foreign account. In this way, the machinery of food allocations will be similar to the Requirements Committee of the War Production Board that makes allocations on
the industrial side. The Food Requirements and Allocations Committee should prove to be a time-saver, in that there will be but one such committee on which claimants for food are represented. It will in this way simplify interagency relationships.

"Having the War Food Administrator as the United States member of the Combined Food Board will facilitate the work of that Board in dealing with international food problems. Inasmuch as his deputy has been named chairman of the Food Requirements and Allocations Committee, the War Food Administrator will be in a position to state the American point of view on the Combined Food Board, and any possibility of conflicting American points of view in food allocation matters will be eliminated."

And then the text of the Executive Order.

It all is working toward simplification, and Canada has been invited by the United States for the U. K. to become a full member of the Combined Food Board. It was set up, this combined Board, in June, 1942, in order to coordinate further in prosecuting the war effort, and so forth. I don't know that I need that —

MR. EARLY: (interposing) They have that, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: That I think you will get. It's all part and parcel, first, of the simplification process; and I hope that people also will keep it in mind in relation to the whole problem of food in this country, and throughout the world. You want to get rid of some — I don't want to say misunderstandings — but some lack of knowledge on the part of the general public of food throughout the world. I thought I could give you an illustration.

First of all, I think I will send up the Food Message on Monday to Congress. It's practically finished. And in connection with that Food Message there will be a good many figures. It's a tough thing to write about; but I think I will make it perfectly clear that on the whole, on the domestic side of things, the actual cost of food — well, you can't go behind statistics an awful lot — we all know that the cost of food in the last three months has gone up practically not at all, or very little — a very tiny percentage.
And that committee — the method that has been used since last July is a stabilization method. It has cost the country very, very little in actual cash, and it seems to be working pretty well toward the idea of stabilization.

At the same time, it all ties in with the general foreign picture, the winning of the war picture, things like, for instance, lend-lease. And I think I will bring out one fact — I don't know why it should not be talked about now, because you will have plenty to write about out of the message as a whole — just an interesting little item.

It's a thing called reverse lend-lease. We have been receiving from Australia enough beef and veal, practically, to feed all of our troops that are based on Australia. We are getting it through the lend-lease process, the reverse lend-lease process.

And the total amount of that beef and veal that we are receiving in reverse lend-lease is the same amount, roughly, that we are sending out of the United States to the European theater. It just about washes out. In other words, we are getting for our use as much as we are sending out for other people's use. Now that is an amazing statement. That is a real headline. In the long run that is something that the country doesn't know.

Of course, the Americans in the Southwest Pacific area are eating an awful lot. Instead of shipping American beef and veal out of here — a tremendously long voyage — we are feeding them in the Southwest area from Australia and New Zealand, and thereby saving an enormous amount on shipping, and getting this all from Australia and New Zealand on the reverse lend-lease basis. I didn't know it until this morning. I grabbed hold of it and said that's the thing that has been overlooked.

Q. May I ask a question, sir? Farm people have various ideas about the food thing. One thing which seems to stick in their minds is that the food program, which is going forward, is
lacking in farm machinery and material for farm machinery. I get the impression that they think it's lagging.

THE PRESIDENT: In a sense there is some truth in it. As you know, the allocations of steel for farm machinery that were made back last May and June, and some of them earlier than that, were very greatly increased. The companies that made farm machinery, who still had the machines to do it, were asked to make farm machinery up to full capacity. Well, during the past three months we have had quite a struggle with some of the people who were making farm machinery in the old days, because they didn’t want to go back to farm machinery. I guess they could make more money out of munitions. And we have had a bit of opposition from some companies—not all by any means—in reverting to the making of farm machinery. It was perhaps a better thing from their point of view to make parts for old machinery for other purposes.

Q. But you insist on carrying out the program?

THE PRESIDENT: Absolutely. Absolutely. And we have been pushing them and pushing them to carry out their part of the use of the steel and iron that has been turned over to them. They can get it. It is there.

And the only other thing is that I just want to say a word about this Moscow Conference. While documents and things like that are not ready for issue, the net result of the Conference has been a tremendous success, not only from what has been accomplished in the way of definite items of agreement, but also in the spirit of it.

When this thing started, there were a great many cynics who said, “Oh, they will all agree to disagree,” and, “There will be a lot of suspicion and they won’t get anywhere.” But the spirit of the whole Conference has been amazingly good. I think Mr. Hull deserves a great deal of credit for that spirit, and I think the Russians and the British deserve equal credit. It has been—what we called in the old days in the Navy—a “happy ship.” They have talked things out quietly. And the relationships between them individually have been about a hundred percent.
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And just as soon as the documents are signed and they start to come back, the whole thing will be of course given out, probably from that end.

Q. Can you tell us any more about the general nature of those documents?

The President: I think I had better not, because I don’t want to cross wires and state any generality here. It’s better to get the whole thing from the other side. But it is all working, of course, toward the objective, which is a unanimity in not merely the progress of the war but in the transition period, of a friendly agreement as to what can be done on many practical things, not necessarily all of them.

We can’t cross all the t’s and dot all the i’s in regard to all sorts of things. “What are you going to do about such and such a matter? What are you going to do about such and such a five-square kilometer area in the world?” Well, I call that a crossing of t’s and dotting of i’s.

This Conference has been engaged in considering the big things, the objectives.

Q. Mr. President, in a good many quarters of late, there has been expressed the feeling that in view of the developments some sort of redefinition or restatement in more explicit terms of this country’s foreign policy as a whole might be in order, particularly with reference to what those objectives at Moscow might be. I know that’s a large order, but is there anything that could be said at this Conference about it?

The President: Well, I suppose the easiest way to answer it is this, that when we went to this Conference all three Nations had a thing called an agenda, and in that agenda were many matters of general policy.

Well, if at this particular time, when our delegation went over there, had Mr. Hull been bound not merely to the general policy but certain more specific things, and the British had been bound to theirs, and the Russians had been bound to theirs, what would have been the use of a conference? You learn a lot in a conference, both sides.

The ultimate objectives, we all know pretty well what they
are. The first desideratum is peace in the world and the end of aggression. That is far and away the most important thing.

But the idea of a conference is to confer, get the other fellow's point of view. It is quite possible that you might get a good idea from somebody else outside of our own borders. It is quite possible that you might persuade the other fellow that some idea that you had was a pretty good idea. I think we have all lost sight of the fact that the main practical point at the present time is to sit around the table and see if we can't agree, and swap various kinds of language.

Now, in conferences, domestic or foreign, you draw up a document. Well, it's done by some draftsman, and they agree that it is pretty darn good language, and you get a general agreement on the language. And then you bring it into the whole conference, before all the conferees.

And somebody says, "Don't you think it would be better to put it this way, in the light of all the circumstances?"

And the others say, "Well, that's a good idea. Let's change those few words, here or there."

Or they say, "No. No, I don't think that is so good. Let's try a third method."

And finally you get a document which has been gone over with a good deal of care and agreement. You can't just go in and say didactically, "Take this language. We won't consider any other language."

Now I think the Senate, in talking about a foreign policy resolution, will come out by using some fairly general language. If they become too specific, it might have to be changed when the time came. The Senate hasn't had the other fellow's point of view.

So I am very much in favor of a Senate Resolution which will point out to the country in general terms that after this war, in order to avoid future wars in the world, that this country will cooperate with other Nations toward that end. That would be something. It would be a very fine thing.

Q. Mr. President, does the committee Resolution reported out
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by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee meet that specification?

THE PRESIDENT: That's the whole trouble. Now you put your finger right on it. How could I answer that question? You couldn't. I couldn't answer it. Now you are getting down to specific language. You and I could sit down, if we were the dictators of the world, and work out some language that you and I thought was 100 percent. And then Earl Godwin would come in and give us something that was better.

MR. GODWIN: Earl Godwin thinks that it does. (Laughter) Now, if it's just a matter of words, it's sort of silly to take up time —

THE PRESIDENT: (interposing) Well, I think the Senate has every right to talk about it just as long as they want.

Q. Exactly, sir, we shouldn't say anything else. But suppose the Senate had adopted the Resolution, which it may at any moment, and you may be over in Europe, will the United States or will the President of the United States feel bound by this kind of Resolution?

THE PRESIDENT: That's a difficult thing to say. I might not like it.

Q. Well, it's an expression of the Senate. It isn't the ratification of anything.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, if the general sentiment is all right, that's fine. I have told you what the general sentiment I think ought to be. This country wants to stop war. . . .

Q. The statement that the Conference has been a tremendous success would seem to imply that you are now confident of Russia's willingness to cooperate with us in maintaining peace?

THE PRESIDENT: I wouldn't put it that way. I always have been, personally. This confirms my belief.

Q. It has been confirmed — strengthened?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, yes. . . .

NOTE: See Item 121 and note, this volume, for the President's lengthy message to the Congress on the food situation. For the President's report to the Congress on reverse lend-lease, see Item 124, this volume.
Dear Mr. Davis:

I have your letter of October 28, informing me of the need for action to prevent further interruption of production in the coal mines. I am watching the situation carefully and shall not hesitate to take whatever steps may be necessary to see that the coal is mined.

We are short of coal to meet our war needs. We must have more coal. We can no more tolerate the letting down of coal production than we can tolerate letting down of the shipping of supplies to our fighting men.

I am not planning to take decisive action, however, until after the meeting of the Policy Committee of the miners next Monday. I am loath to believe that the miners, after careful consideration, will reject the proposal which the Board has indicated it would approve and which goes very far toward meeting the demands of the miners.

Certainly in wartime the miners will not take the position that they will sign no contract other than one dictated by their leaders. We are at war, and all of us must make sacrifices for our common good and common safety.

The Board has indicated that it will approve the Illinois contract with modifications which will give the miners for a 51-hour, portal-to-portal, 6-day week $54.00, which is $8.50 a week more than they are now receiving for 42 hours' actual work at their working places in the mines. It is about $2.50 less per week than they would receive under the Illinois contract as it was submitted. But we must recall that already $1.50 per week has been added to the rates prevailing under the old contract by reason of the adjustments previously allowed by the Board.

In making this proposal it seems to me that the Board has re-
solved every reasonable doubt with respect to the requirements of the stabilization program in favor of the miners' demands. Some may reasonably question whether the Board has not gone too far.

There is no basis for the assertion that the Board's proposals involve in any way a reduction in the basic rates that the miners are receiving. On the contrary, the assertion ignores the fact that the present basic rates are for production work at their working places, and make no allowance whatever for travel time as such. Under the Board's proposal the miners for the first time will receive pay for travel time, as such.

As a matter of fact, a 51-hour, portal-to-portal, 6-day week does not, conservatively estimated, average more than 46½ hours' productive work in the mines. For a 46½-hour, 6-day week of productive work, which is the equivalent of a 51-hour, portal-to-portal week, the miners would get under existing rates $52.25. Miners under the Board's proposal would get $54.00 for the same work. In addition they would get $1.50 special allowances previously granted. This certainly does not constitute a reduction of basic rates.

In order that there may be no misunderstanding among the miners, the Board should consider the wisdom of an announcement that it has no objection to the insertion of a clause in the contract that in no case shall a miner receive for a day's work less than he would have received for his productive work at the straight time hourly rate under the old contract.

I am confident that when the patriotic American miners realize the substantial increase in benefits the Board's proposal offers them they will not reject the opportunity given to them to secure a contract.

But if I am mistaken and the miners do not accept the Board's proposals, I shall take decisive action to see that coal is mined.

William H. Davis,
Chairman, National War Labor Board

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November 1, 1943

The Statement by the President:

For some time we have not been producing the coal which we need to fight the war. When we should be working to increase to the utmost the production of coal, production has stopped because of the failure of the miners to return to their work.

I have been obliged to direct the Secretary of the Interior to take immediate possession of the mines and to operate them for the Government.

Because I appreciate the desire of the miners to work under a contract, I have authorized the Secretary of the Interior to enter into collective bargaining contracts with representatives of the miners to govern the terms and conditions of employment during the period of Government operation. Such contracts will be made in accordance with the recent opinion of the National War Labor Board and will be subject to its approval in accordance with the provision of the War Labor Disputes Act.

As President of the United States and as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, I call upon every miner to return without a day's delay to the mines.

The grievances of the miners have been heard. They have been fairly dealt with. The Government offers the miners a fair contract. They have no right in wartime to refuse to work under it.

Coal must be mined. The enemy does not wait. The failure to mine coal at this critical moment is impeding the prosecution of the war and endangering the lives of our sons and brothers, the sons and brothers of the miners, on the battlefields.

The mines will be opened by the Government on Wednesday morning. Every miner will be expected to be at his post of duty, ready to work for his Government.

NOTE: (See Items 45, 46, 66, and 68 and notes, this volume, for the text of Presidential statements and orders and an account of Presidential intervention in the bituminous coal mines disputes of 1943, prior to the foregoing statement.)

The President's letter of October 29, printed above, was written in response to the following letter
from the Chairman of the National War Labor Board, dated October 28, 1943:

"Mr. President:

"The National War Labor Board regrets to inform you that strikes in the coal mines, which up to now have been localized principally in Alabama, are spreading throughout the Nation's coal fields. To date, the officers of the United Mine Workers of America have cooperated with the War Labor Board in a sincere endeavor to end the local stoppages, but without success. As of this writing, a total of approximately 45,000 mine workers are engaged in work stoppages in the coal fields of Alabama, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia and West Virginia.

"The National War Labor Board in a series of decisions, beginning with one on May 25, 1943, has ruled that the mine workers are not entitled to a general wage increase under the wartime wage stabilization program of the Government. The latest ruling of the Board was on October 26 when the Board, by a majority vote, disapproved the wage provision of a proposed contract for the Illinois District which proposed to pay the miners on a portal-to-portal basis. The majority of the Board found that the wages as proposed in the Illinois contract were in excess of what is permissible under the wage stabilization program.

"However, in its decision and opinion in that case, copies of which are attached, the Board made certain suggestions for a modification of the wage provision so that it would conform to the wage stabilization policies. You will note that the decision and opinion of the majority of the Board set forth the reasons for disapproving the proposed Illinois contract. Briefly, the contract, if adopted, would have resulted in the miners receiving more pay for productive time than is due them under their present contract, whereas the only increased compensation they are entitled to is that compensation for overtime after forty (40) hours which results when travel time is included as time of employment under the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

"The contract proposed for the Illinois area, as modified by the War Labor Board's suggestions to the parties, would result in an increase of at least ten (10) dollars in the average weekly earnings of mine workers resulting from an increase in production time and pay for portal-to-portal in accordance with the Fair Labor Standards Act. Under the Board's proposal, if the mines are operated on a full six-day-week basis, the average miner who works a full week would earn approximately sixty (60) dollars.

"When the Board handed down its decision on October 26 it notified the United Mine Workers of America that unless the spreading strikes in the coal fields ceased by today, October 28, and the men returned to work, the Board would report the situation to you.

"The issue is the same clear one which it has always been since the beginning of the coal controversy; namely, shall the wage stabilization policies of the Government be applied and enforced irrespective of the displeasure of any group toward these policies.

"Yours respectfully,

"WILLIAM H. DAVIS"

The foregoing exchange of letters between the President and the Chairman of the War Labor Board marked the seventh stormy month of intervention by the Board and the President in attempts to assure the uninterrupted mining of bituminous coal, which was so vital to the war effort. Although 1,700 bituminous coal mines had been turned
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back to the owners by October 12, 1943, the President, in the face of
the new wave of strikes, ordered
the Secretary of the Interior on
November 1, 1943, to take posses-
sion again of these 1,700 coal mines
and to negotiate a contract with
the miners governing the terms of
employment for the period of Gov-
ernment operation. The Secretary
of the Interior negotiated such an
agreement on November 3, the
Board approved the agreement on
November 5, and most of the min-
ers returned to work two days there-
after.

Following an agreement between
the operators and miners, on May
31, 1944, the Secretary of the In-
terior began to turn the bituminous
coal mines back to private control.
This process was completed by June
21, 1944.

121 (Message to the Congress on the Food
Program. November 1, 1943

To the Congress:

Food is as important as any other weapon in the successful
prosecution of the war. It will be equally important in rehabili-
tation and relief in the liberated areas, and in the shaping of
the peace that is to come.

THE OBJECTIVES OF OUR FOOD PROGRAM

The first major objective of our food program is to raise in the
most efficient manner enough food and the right kinds of foods
to meet our needs. That includes: first, the needs of our armed
forces; second, the needs of our civilians at home; and, third,
the amount required for our shipments abroad for the essential
needs of our fighting allies.

The second major objective is to see that the food for our
civilians at home is divided as fairly as possible among all of the
people in all sections of the country, and that it is obtainable at
reasonable prices.

I have not been content merely with a program for 1944
crops. I am thinking also about the balance of this year, and
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about the earlier months of 1944 before the crops are harvested. While the question of production for 1944 is an essential one, we must not lose sight of the necessity for keeping the prices of our present food supply at reasonable levels. We must see to it not only that the prices of food do not go up any further, but that the prices of those foods which have gotten out of line are actually reduced.

One of the great difficulties is that the steps necessary to attain these two major objectives sometimes become inconsistent with each other. For example, one of the inducements for increased production of food by farmers is to see that they get an adequate price for their products. Such a price is necessary in order to get production. However, if these prices are too high the result will be that by the time the food reaches the grocery store or butcher shop, the housewife will have to pay too high a price for it. This in turn may force a rise in wages and an increase in the prices which farmers have to pay for what they buy. On the other hand, if the butcher shop or grocery store gets an insufficient price from the consumer for meat or groceries, then the farmer in turn will get too low a price to encourage him to raise as much food as we need. In both of these cases, our production and price objectives are not likely to be achieved unless the Government assists with equalization payments or other aid.

The efforts of this Administration have consistently been directed at this double target of raising as much food as possible without placing too great a burden on the American housewife in her efforts to feed her family.

In the main our efforts have been successful. In the case of some foods, however, the objectives have not yet been attained. New measures are being taken in an effort to attain them.

FOOD PRODUCTION 1943

The increase of food production during this war has been far greater than the comparable increase in production during the last war. If, for example, we take the 1935-39 average as the base
of 100, the production in 1939 was 106, in 1942 it was 126, and in 1943 it will be 132. If we use the same base of 100, the production in 1914 was 81; in 1918 it was 90, and in 1919 it was also 90.

In other words, by the fourth year of this war—1942—our food production has increased more than twice as much as it did in the same period of the last war.

The 1942 crop was the largest in the history of the United States. But food production for the current year 1943, in spite of less favorable weather, will exceed the 1942 production.

Crops will be slightly lower this year than in 1942; but livestock will be so much higher than in 1942 that the total of all food is expected to exceed the 1942 record output by about 5 percent. This will mean that our total farm production—crops and livestock—will be more than 30 percent larger than the average annual production for the five years preceding the outbreak of the war in 1939.

Most of us do not realize how much food actually is being raised in 1943. Here are some illustrative figures:

- 55 billion quarts of milk, an increase of 14 percent over the 1935-1939 average
- 10 billion pounds of beef and veal (dressed weight), an increase of 27 percent
- 1 billion pounds of lamb and mutton (dressed weight), an increase of 13 percent
- 60 billion eggs (including non-farm), an increase of 50 percent
- 4 billion pounds of chicken (dressed weight), an increase of 63 percent
- 13 billion pounds of pork (dressed weight), an increase of 78 percent
- 3 billion pounds of lard, an increase of 73 percent
- 3 billion pounds of peanuts, an increase of 125 percent

This record was established in the face of three major handicaps: shortage of manpower, shortage of farm machinery, and shortage of fertilizer. This record production for 1943 is an amazing tribute to the patriotism, resourcefulness, and ability of the American farmer.
Message to Congress on Food Program

Much credit is also due to the patriotic men and women who spent so much time and energy in planting twenty million victory gardens in the United States, and helped to meet the food requirements. It is estimated that about eight million tons of food were produced in 1943 in these victory gardens.

The increase in our farm output since Pearl Harbor has been the largest of any similar period in history. It called for hard work, ingenuity, cooperation, and teamwork on the part of farmers, processors, and distributors, as well as all the State and Federal officials concerned with the food problem. They all deserve the thanks of the American people.

Due to the shortage of regular farm labor, heroic and successful efforts have been made to obtain help from the adult residents of villages and cities — both men and women, on a part-time as well as a full-time basis. High school boys and girls have also been enrolled to help in critical areas during the vacation period and after school hours. They too deserve our thanks.

The record for 1943, in getting additional farm help in places where it was needed, is very impressive. For example, during May, June, July, and August of this year, 900,000 workers registered for farm work; 48,500 workers were brought in this year from Mexico, 4,700 from the Bahamas, and 8,800 from Jamaica. This additional help was used on farms in shortage areas all over the United States. Altogether 1,750,000 placements on farms were made.

We have also made use of prisoners of war for the raising and harvesting of crops. Essential farm labor has been deferred from the draft. Where emergencies have developed, the Army has assigned soldiers to assist in saving crops that otherwise would be lost.

One of the great difficulties — the shortage of farm machinery and of spare parts — developed, of course, because of the imperative need for steel for the war program. There was only a fixed amount of steel available; and it had to be divided as efficiently as possible among the critical needs for war — ships, big guns and small weapons, tanks, new war factories and new additions to
war factories, railroad cars, and a number of other vital products. It was necessary to use our best judgment in determining just where we should use the available supply of steel.

The allotment of steel for farm machinery for use in 1944 has been increased by doubling the amount available for use this year. Furthermore, no limit has been placed on the production of repair parts.

This new farm equipment, however, while it will be available for the 1944 production, was not available for 1943. However, the farmers kept their own machinery in better order. They clubbed together in the making of repairs. They joined hands in the use of farm machinery by more than one farm family. The ingenious and resourceful farmers of America, by this cooperative use of machinery, were able to turn out this record crop of 1943.

DEMANDS ON OUR FOOD SUPPLY

Even with this all-time high food production for 1943 there were still shortages in certain parts of the country in our food supply. This was not due to lack of production but rather to the extraordinary demands for food—demands never before made in history.

The increased demands for food came from three principal sources. The largest increase in demand has come from our own civilians here at home. Many of our workers in war factories, in the mines, on the farms, and in other essential pursuits are eating more and better food than they ate before the war began. Many of them for the first time are approaching an adequate diet—so essential to the well-being of our people and to maximum war production. Even after making allowances for the rise in the cost of food since 1939, the average American family is not only spending more for food but eating more food than before the outbreak of the war. This has been one of the predominant factors in the greatly increased demand on our food supply.

The second increased demand for food has come from our nine million soldiers, sailors, and marines—who had and, of
course, always will have first call on all articles of food. These service men naturally consume much more food in the Army and Navy—and they are getting better food on the average—than they did in civilian life.

The third great demand was for our lend-lease shipments of food to our allies.

There has been a lot of loose talk about impending “meat famine” and “meat shortages” for the coming winter.

During the October-March period, this winter’s estimated total meat production, excluding poultry, will amount to 14.4 billion pounds, dressed weight, as compared with 12.5 billion pounds during the same period last year, and 11.4 billion pounds two years ago. As a matter of fact, this winter’s estimated meat production will be by far the largest on record.

Estimated poultry production during the October-March period this winter will amount to 2.3 billion pounds, as compared with 1.9 billion pounds last winter and 1.7 billion pounds two years ago. The production of poultry has increased about 60 percent since 1939.

During the next six months we will also produce an estimated 2.2 billion dozens of eggs, as compared with 2.1 billion dozens a year ago and 1.8 billion dozens two years ago. Egg production has increased about 40 percent since 1939.

Also, even though our animal numbers will be at an all-time high this winter, the 1943-44 total supply of feed grains will, except for last year, be the largest supply on record and approximately 20 percent above the 1937-41 average. On a per-animal basis, the feed supply will not be as large as in the last several years, but it will be about equal to the average of the ten years ending in 1932.

From the standpoint both of increased production and of price control, the food effort in this war is a far greater success than that of the first World War. Facts bear out this statement, but I suppose that facts are not going to deter those who want to create dissatisfaction or those who spread scares such as “food shortage” and “meat famine.”
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**FOOD PRODUCTION 1944**

Our food plans for the future are, of course, predicated on the assumption that we must not only continue our shipments overseas but actually increase them. The war is by no means won, and the global effort must be continued and accelerated. The requirements for our armed forces will be increased, not only because they will have a larger number of men and women than in 1943, but because more of them will be stationed in distant parts of the world.

The average soldier or sailor eats approximately five and one-quarter pounds of food per day—almost half as much again as the average civilian, who eats only three and three-quarters pounds per day. The greater the number of men in the armed forces the larger are the demands on our food supply.

In the last war we fed four million people in uniform—largely concentrated in the United States and in France. In this war by the end of 1943 we will have almost eleven million men in uniform, and they will be scattered in all parts of the world. At the beginning of this year our armed forces totaled about seven million; at the end of this year the estimated strength will be 50 percent higher. That is the reason why in 1942 approximately only 7½ percent of our food production was allotted to our armed forces whereas in 1943 the figure will be about 14 percent. As our Army grows, as more men are sent overseas, larger food reserves will have to be accumulated, and civilian belts will have to be tightened. Furthermore our armed forces require more of the so-called “protective” foods such as meat, fats and oils, milk and canned goods—foods which are, therefore, bound to run short for the increased civilian demands.

Our armed forces are now eating in each month 328 million pounds of meat, 34 million dozens of eggs, 28 million pounds of butter, 221 million pounds of potatoes—and staggering amounts of other foodstuffs. And the quality of this food is the best that we can give them.
Message to Congress on Food Program

The armed forces of our allies will also increase in 1944 and they will have to receive food assistance from us.

The amount of food going to lend-lease is gradually increasing. In 1941 it was 2 percent of our food production; in 1942, approximately 6 percent. This year because of increasing Russian shortages and other needs it will probably reach 10 percent. In 1941 and 1942 England was the largest recipient of lend-lease food, but owing to the German invasion of the Ukraine in 1942 more food has had to be sent since then to the Soviet Union. In fact Russia, in the first six months of 1943, received one-third of all our lend-lease food shipments.

All these war uses will require about one-fourth of our total food supply for the year beginning October 1, 1943, leaving about three-fourths for our civilian population. This three-fourths, however, because of our increased production will amount approximately to as much, per capita, as was used during the 1935-39 period.

I am sure that the American people realize that every pound of food which we send to our fighting allies is helping our own soldiers in their battles and is speeding the day when all our fighting men and women will come home.

The food that is sent to Russia is almost all for the use of the Russian Army.

Although British farmers, by strenuous efforts, have succeeded in increasing their production from 40 percent of Britain’s needs to 60 percent, she still has to rely upon imports in order to avoid starvation. American food provides only 10 percent of the entire British food supply—and yet it has been a great help in feeding Montgomery’s Army and the R.A.F. and in sustaining the millions of workers in vital British factories, shipyards, and mines. I think it is safe to say that England could not have continued in the war without the help she received in American and Canadian food.

When Russia was invaded, 40 percent of her usual food production was lost. Emergency food shipments were sent from Great Britain and the Middle East, but we also had to step up
our own shipments. I am sure that no one will disagree with
the wisdom — to say nothing of the need and obligation — of sus-
taining the gallant Russian fighters with American food.

The fact is that with all our shipments, civilian diets in Eng-
land and in Russia — particularly in Russia — are far below our
worst shortage periods. In fact, in Russia food for civilians has
been cut to the barest minimum.

Through lend-lease, the United States seeks to put a share
of its food resources to the most effective use against the enemy.
Conversely, through reverse lend-lease, the striking power of our
own armed forces abroad has been greatly augmented by sub-
stantial quantities of food provided by our allies. The United
Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand have provided the largest
amount of food, but we have also received food under reverse
lend-lease from other parts of the British Empire and are receiv-
ing increasing quantities of foodstuffs from the French in North
Africa.

Some illustrative figures may indicate the importance to our
war effort and to our national economy of the food which we
obtain from our allies as reverse lend-lease aid without payment.

Although we did not start receiving food under reverse lend-
lease from Australia and New Zealand until a year or more after
our lend-lease program started, the amounts received — in com-
parison to what we have lend-leased — are relatively large.

Thus, for example, through August of this year, the United
States has received from Australia and New Zealand more than
90 million pounds of beef and veal, compared to a total of 99
million pounds of beef and veal which the United States has
provided under outgoing lend-lease to all lend-lease countries
combined. In July and August, 1943, Australia and New Zea-
land supplied us roughly the same amount of beef and veal
under reverse lend-lease as we lend-leased to all countries.

We have received, from Australia and New Zealand alone, 55
percent of the amount of butter and 16 percent of the amount
of lamb and mutton which we have exported under lend-lease
to all countries.
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During the year 1943, the United Kingdom is providing under reverse lend-lease substantial quantities of many foodstuffs—such as flour, bread, potatoes, sugar, vegetables, coffee, and cocoa—in order to supplement the food our forces receive from the United States. The foodstuffs received from the United Kingdom under reverse lend-lease save valuable shipping space and include such commodities as fresh vegetables which cannot readily be shipped from the United States.

The United States is supplying much of the pork that England consumes. The delivery of beef to our Army from the Southern Dominions and the shipment of pork to England from the United States is a good example of sharing among the United Nations, on the basis of what each has to contribute to total war.

Most of the food for the American armed forces in the South and Southwest Pacific comes from the land and factories of that area. In order to provide for our troops, Australia and New Zealand have expanded their food production and processing facilities. Despite this, however, the large food requirements of our forces have caused shortages of many foods for the Australians and New Zealanders. Nevertheless, these two countries continue to supply our food requirements as reverse lend-lease without payment by us.

A certain small percentage of food will have to be used as the United Nations liberate presently occupied countries, until such time as the populations of these countries can have a chance to become self-supporting.

For example, a very small percentage of our food now goes to feed the liberated people of North Africa and Sicily and Italy. This includes only the bare necessities of life. Feeding people in this area is not only a military necessity, it provides strength for the hard work that has to be done by them in order to produce new supplies of food and other goods. Already the people of French Africa, with some assistance from us in expanding their agricultural production, have been able to produce a sufficiently good harvest in 1943 so that they can now even supply food to our forces there. This not only saves shipping but augments our
own food supply. The people of French Africa, without payment, and under reverse lend-lease arrangements, have also supplied the Allied forces with substantial quantities of flour for use in the Italian campaign. This, too, has helped our food, as well as our shipping situation.

Agreements have just been concluded to provide the United Nations with more than 100,000 tons of fruit and vegetables. The 1944 harvests in North Africa, aided by American agricultural supplies and a year of peaceful cultivation, should ease the strain on the food supply of the United States still further. In North Africa, we and the other United Nations have truly beaten our swords into ploughshares.

Food supplied to the liberated peoples also pays other dividends. It prevents epidemics. It is a potent psychological and morale weapon for those starving people whose countries are still overrun by the Axis. While starvation has been the weapon used by the Axis resulting in disease, misery, and death, the United Nations are using food as one of their most potent weapons to shorten the war and win a lasting peace.

The War Food Administration has accordingly raised its sights for 1944. A preliminary calculation calls for the planting of 380 million acres of crops, as compared with 364 million acres in 1943. That will be the largest farm planting in history and should result in the breaking of food production records for the eighth successive year.

The War Food Administration, with my approval, has requested the Congress to extend the life of the Commodity Credit Corporation and to furnish additional funds. I regard this as vital to the war food program. It will also enable us to carry out our pledge to the farmers, that we will assure them against a price collapse for the two years following the war.

Of course the goals set by the War Food Administration will be meaningless unless the farmers themselves are willing to adopt them as their own goals, and are able to fulfill them. Therefore, the War Food Administration is discussing the national needs with the State war board of each State, and with representative
farmer groups and leaders and public officials in each State interested in agriculture. In this way determination will be made by consultation with the farmers themselves and with Federal and State officials as to what parts of the national requirements can be contributed by each State.

The county war boards and local committees of farmers will also be consulted as to how the State quotas should be apportioned among the various counties of the respective States.

The State and local people will also be consulted about the extent of Government support prices and Government loans and Government purchases that will be necessary to attain the goals of production set. In other words, the farm program of production and prices for 1944 is going to be formulated finally, only after consultation with the farmers of the Nation and those who are interested in farming. Upon the basis of this collective judgment, the final goals for the year's production will be formulated well in advance of the production season, so that each farmer may know what to count upon.

In order to obtain the great production level of 1943, it was necessary to assure the farmers that their return would be sufficiently high to encourage them to plant and at the same time it was necessary to insure the consumer against prices for food which would be too high for him to purchase. This could be done only with the use of Government funds, and in order to bring about the proposed increased production for 1944 it will be necessary to use additional Government funds.

All of the restrictions on acreage which were imposed by the A.A.A. program in former years have been removed for 1944, as they were for 1943 with few exceptions. Only tobacco marketing quotas will be maintained — in order to encourage tobacco farmers to put more of their land into food products.

There are some people who, for political reasons, now maintain that these early acreage restrictions which were put into effect in 1933 and subsequent years are partially responsible for the present shortage. Of course the facts are otherwise. When these restrictions were imposed the farmers’ income had dwin-
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died away to practically nothing; they were unable to get decent prices for their crops because they raised so much more than people were able to buy, and also because the foreign market for their products had practically disappeared. As a result of this glut, this stifling excess of supply over demand, farm prices faded away to almost nothing; and it was necessary to restrict production by taking inferior land out of production in order to save agriculture from the complete bankruptcy which was threatening it in 1932.

The farmers themselves voted to do this, because of conditions which consumers well understood and appreciated, for they knew that that was the only road to salvation for agriculture and for the country as a whole.

Since the present war began, however, and the demand for food has outstripped the supply, these restrictions have been lifted and there are now no limitations on the production of food.

Another fact which is often overlooked by the critics of our acreage adjustment program is that more acres were put into soil-improving crops and legumes and that many conservation practices were instituted — such as terracing, cover cropping, and contour farming — which actually improved the soil so much that, although less acreage was in production, more food per acre was produced. In fact the great improvement in our soil which resulted from our agricultural programs has made possible the record food production of recent years.

In planting for 1944, we are determined not to repeat the blunder of the first World War — plowing, and planting crops without regard to the fitness of the land, and without regard to proper soil conservation. The “dust bowl” which was created by these practices has caused too much sorrow and suffering and financial loss in recent years to let us forget the lesson.

The increased production goals for 1944 involve not only an increase in the total food production but also shifting production from one kind of food to other kinds which are more necessary. The plan calls for the right amount of the right things in the right places — and the objective will be to stretch our food supply
as far as possible. Accordingly, the largest increases in production will be for those crops which furnish food for direct human consumption.

Plans are also under way to increase our food supply by the development and procurement of food abroad. I have already mentioned how our assistance in developing food production in North Africa has made and will make available food for our armed forces abroad under reverse lend-lease. Other sources of foreign food may be available to us. The functions of handling foreign food development are being centralized in the Foreign Economic Administration so that our food supply can be augmented in the most effective way.

SUPPORT PRICES AND EQUALIZATION PAYMENTS

In order to induce farmers to increase production to these new goals and at the same time keep the cost of food down, it will be necessary to increase the amount of Government funds which were used for these purposes in 1943.

Government funds have been used in various different ways in order to see that the farmer got a fair price for his product—a price high enough to encourage him to raise more crops—without raising the price to the consumer. All of these administrative methods of guaranteeing a minimum price to the farmer for his products—whether they take the form of non-recourse loans, or guaranteed prices, or subsidy payments, or actual purchase and resale—are generically called price supports, and are included in the price support programs. The purpose of the price support program is primarily to encourage the farmer to grow a crop with the assurance that, no matter what happens, he is going to get a certain definite return for it. If the price which the ultimate consumer pays as fixed by the price regulations is less than an amount which will pay the farmer this return, then the Government absorbs the loss and sees to it that the farmer gets what was guaranteed to him. The farmer also enjoys this guarantee when prices in the market fall below the support level.
If the price which the consumer has to pay as fixed by the price regulations is high enough to pay the farmer his support price, then of course there is no loss to the Government.

In certain commodities the War Food Administration knows in advance that it will have to bear part of the cost. Nevertheless, the charge will be a necessary part of the program to produce enough food, without having the consumer pay too much for it.

We cannot and should not expect the farmers of the Nation to increase their production all over the United States if they face the definite risk of loss by reason of such production. We do not expect industrial war plants to take such risks and there is no reason why the farmers should.

I am attaching herewith a statement of the commodities for which Commodity Credit Corporation support prices were in effect during 1943 (Schedule A). The Congress will notice that in some of the commodities such as cotton, corn, wheat, tobacco, and rice these support prices have been in effect for several years.

I am also attaching a statement showing the cost to the Government of this support price program for 1943 (Schedule B). The Congress will notice that production of only a fraction of the commodities required any outlay by the Government. In other words, in the majority of the products, the price which the consumer paid was high enough to cover the support price; whereas in a small percentage of the crops, the price which the consumer paid was not high enough to pay the farmer the price which was promised. For these items, the Commodity Credit program for 1943 cost the Government 350 million dollars. The administrative expenses of the Commodity Credit Corporation in carrying out the program were less than 3 percent.

This cost does not include the Reconstruction Finance Corporation program for reducing the prices of meat and butter, which will amount to an additional 450 million dollars per year.

I am sure that the Congress and the people feel that this expenditure of 800 million dollars per year is a moderate sum to pay in order to help accomplish the objectives which we have in mind—greater production and lower consumer prices—for a
whole year. In fact it is about equal to the cost to us of waging this war for three days.

We are only applying here the same principle which has proved so effective in the production of other war materials—such as copper, lead, zinc, aluminum, and others.

Every Nation now in the war has used some form of Government equalization payments in order to hold down the cost of living and at the same time to allow a fair return to the farmers. A good part of the great success of the stabilization program in both Canada and Britain is due to the effective use of Government funds in this way.

Although this program cannot hold the line without the enforcement of a firm price control and without an adequate tax and savings program to absorb excess purchasing power, nevertheless it is equally true that the firmest price control and the wisest fiscal policy cannot do the job themselves without the use of price supports.

When properly used they have three important advantages: First, they stimulate production of certain necessary and select crops. Second, by preventing price increases, they eliminate inflationary tendencies. Third, they encourage the distribution of food through normal legitimate channels instead of black market operators, who are willing to pay higher prices to farmers with the expectation of selling above ceiling prices.

When effectively used, this program not only performs this necessary function in stabilization of the cost of living, but it also results in great savings to the Government and to consumers. The expenditure of very small sums makes it possible to avoid pyramiding price increases all down the line—from the producer through the processors, wholesalers, jobbers, and retailers—the cost of which runs to extremely large amounts.

In the case of copper, for example, it has been estimated that every dollar paid by the Government to subsidize and increase production has saved the Government 28 dollars.

In the case of the coal and oil transportation subsidy, very moderate payments have avoided major increases in prices. If
there had been increases in the prices of these basic items, they would have increased the cost of producing practically every commodity manufactured on the east coast.

In the case of food, the money spent by the Government has not only assured us increased production, but, directly and indirectly, has saved the Government and consumers billions of dollars.

The agencies charged with responsibility for stabilizing the cost of living will, from time to time, place before the Congress the programs necessary to hold the line. These will require money. I strongly urge the Congress to give serious consideration to their requests. I am confident that the executive and legislative branches of the Government can pull in harness to get the job done.

**FARMERS' INCOME**

The administration of the food program has certainly resulted in a great benefit to farmers. Farm income last year reached an all-time peak — and this year it will be higher still. The increase in the prices that farmers pay for the commodities they buy, on the other hand, has been held to very much less than the increase in the prices they receive for their farm products.

In consequence, the net income of farm operators — income after all expenses — has risen to the highest level ever enjoyed by farmers. The average annual realized net income of the farm operators of the Nation during the five prewar years, 1935 to 1939, was $4,668,000,000. The realized net income for 1939 was $4,430,000,000. In 1942, it was $9,500,000,000. The estimate for 1943 is $12,475,000,000.

We cannot, however, look at the total income of farm operators by itself. We must also look at the income of the farmer in relation to the income of the rest of the country.

The average income per farmer since the outbreak of the war in 1939 has risen more than the average income of the other parts of the population. This was also true between 1910 and 1914.
which is the primary base period for parity calculation. In 1942, the increase in the average income per farmer over the parity base period was 38 percent greater than the increase in the average income of the other people in the country. In 1943, it was 50 percent greater.

In plain language, the farmer, this year, is not only better off in relation to others in the population than he was before the war broke out; he is better off than he was in the base period 1910 to 1914, and better off than he has been in any year since that time.

This is just and desirable.

All through the twenties, and through the early years of the thirties, per-capita farm incomes were far below fair levels. The Nation has profited from the fact that this injustice has been corrected.

It has been argued that the farm population has been receiving a decreased proportion of the national income. This is true. But it does not deny the fact that the average individual farmer is more prosperous today, as compared with the rest of the population, than he has been in thirty years. Any seeming contradiction is resolved by the fact that the non-farm population has increased during this thirty-year period by more than 50 percent, while the farm population has remained virtually unchanged.

While, therefore, the proportion of the national income going to the farm population as a whole has declined, the income per farmer has increased more than the per-capita income of the rest of the country.

The present program of management of farm prices — prices received and prices paid — has not injured the American farmer in the past. I am sure that it will not in the future.

In addition to these favorable prices and incomes, the farmer has been guaranteed Government support of the prices he receives for war crops, not only during the war, but for two years afterward — a guarantee against postwar disaster afforded to no other group. The farmer has been assured that the bottom will not fall out of his market — as it did after the last war. This
in their reading and in their radio-listening between informed
discussion and verbal thrusts in the dark.

I think you will realize that I have made a constant effort as
Commander in Chief to keep politics out of the fighting of this
war.

But I must confess that my foot slipped once. About ten days
before the last election day, one of our aircraft carriers was tor-
pedoed in the Southwest Pacific. She did not sink at once, but
it became clear that she could not make port. She was, therefore,
destroyed by our own forces. We in Washington did not know
whether the enemy was aware of her sinking—for there were no
Japanese ships near enough to see her go down. You will realize,
of course, that the actual knowledge of the loss of enemy ships
has a definite bearing on continuing naval operations for some
time after the event. We, for instance, know that we have sunk
a number of Japanese aircraft carriers and we know that we have
bombed or torpedoed others. We would give a king’s ransom to
know whether the latter were sunk or were saved, repaired, and
put back into commission.

However, when we got news of the sinking of this particular
ship, a great issue was being raised in the Congress and in the
public vehicles of information as to the suppression of news from
the fighting fronts. There was a division of opinion among re-
sponsible authorities.

Here came my mistake. I yielded to the clamor. I did so partly
in realization of the certainty that if the news of the sinking
were given out two or three weeks later it would be publicly
charged that the news had been suppressed by me until after
the election.

Then shortly thereafter protests came in from the Admirals
in command in the Southwest Pacific and at our great base in
Hawaii on the ground that, in all probability, the Japanese Navy
had no information of the sinking and that handing them the
information on a silver platter—although we were careful not to
reveal the name of the carrier—still gave to the Japanese a
military advantage which they would otherwise not have had.
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Address to Herald-Tribune Forum

This confession of mine illustrates to the people of this country the fact that in time of war the conduct of that war, with the aim of victory, comes absolutely first. They know that not one of their inalienable rights is taken away through the failure to disclose to them, for a reasonable length of time, facts that Hitler and Mussolini and Tojo would give their eye teeth to learn. Facts therefore become paramount—facts that cannot be told to the public at the time, as well as facts that can and should be told at all times.

The posters that tell you “Loose Talk Costs Lives” do not exaggerate. Loose talk delays victory. Loose talk is the damp that gets into powder. We prefer to keep our powder dry.

We have a gigantic job to do—all of us, together. Our battle lines today stretch from Kiska to Murmansk, from Tunisia to Guadalcanal. These lines will grow longer, as our forces advance.

Yes, we have had an uphill fight, and it will continue to be uphill, all the way. There can be no coasting to victory.

During the past two weeks we have had a great deal of good news and it would seem that the turning point of this war has at last been reached. But this is no time for exultation. There is no time now for anything but fighting and working to win.

A few days ago, as our Army advanced through North Africa, on the other side of the world our Navy was fighting what was one of the greatest battles of our history.

A very powerful Japanese force was moving at night toward our positions in the Solomon Islands. The spearhead of the force that we sent to intercept the enemy was under the command of Rear Admiral Daniel J. Callaghan. He was aboard the leading ship, the cruiser San Francisco.

The San Francisco sailed right into the enemy fleet—right through the whole enemy fleet—her guns blazing. She engaged and hit three enemy vessels, sinking one of them. At point-blank range, she engaged an enemy battleship—heavily her superior in size and fire power. She silenced this battleship’s big guns and so disabled her that she could be sunk by torpedoes from our destroyers and aircraft.
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It was the remainder of the food budget — the fresh fruits and vegetables — that did the real damage. Fresh fruits and vegetables rose 58 percent between September, 1942, and May, 1943, and accounted for over three-fifths of the increase in the entire cost of living during that period.

To put this somewhat differently, 90 percent of the cost of living had been largely stabilized. Ten percent of the cost of living had been permitted to get out of hand. That was the situation which confronted us last May.

The "easy" way out of this situation would have been to let wages rise above the base date level in the same degree that the cost of living had risen. That is what some did urge. That would have been a serious blunder. For if the line had been relaxed on the wage front, we may rest assured that the resulting pressure of costs would have forced prices and the cost of living up once more, thus calling for still another rise of wages. Just as the Stabilization Act is to the everlasting credit of the Congress, so the wholehearted support which responsible organized labor gave to the hold-the-line policy stands to the everlasting credit of labor in the United States. The responsible labor leadership saw that the easy way out was no way out at all, and they rejected it. Instead they threw their full energies into making effective the program to reduce the cost of living, the program to bring the cost of living back into balance with wages.

The "hold-the-line" Order was designed to undo the damage that had been done, and to prevent any further damage. The rise in the cost of living having resulted almost entirely from the increase in certain food prices, the program was quite properly designed to bring those food prices back to their September levels as far as possible.

Reductions in cabbage and lettuce resulted from squeezing the water out of the price structure by reducing excessive margins of distributors wherever they were found to exist.

The retail prices of meat and butter were reduced by 10 percent. In these instances, the prices received by farmers and distributors did not permit reduction without bringing returns to
unreasonably low levels. Accordingly, an equalization payment was paid by the Government to the processor to enable him to reduce the price of these products without loss to himself and without reducing the price he paid the farmer. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation undertook to make these payments to processors of meat and butter, so that retail costs of these foods might be held down while the producers received large enough returns to encourage output.

The public treasury has been using, as food production aids, other forms of payments under the Agricultural Adjustment Act and so-called Section 32 operations for supporting prices.

Additional or subsidy payments have been made to industry in order to secure wartime production of many essentials, including copper, zinc, aluminum, and other critical materials. We have paid premiums to speed up construction of ships and other war materials.

In consequence of these programs, the rise in the cost of living, which had proceeded without interruption from the early months of 1941, was brought to an abrupt halt. In June, 1943, the cost of living fell to 5.9 percent above the September, 1942, level, in July to 5.2 percent, and in August to 4.8 percent. It is true that in September, 1943, the cost of living rose by nearly ½ percent. It was not due to food but mainly to the cost of clothing.

There is now being put into effect a program, recently announced, to reduce the retail prices to consumers of other items: apples, onions, potatoes and sweet potatoes, peanut butter, lard, and vegetable shortening.

Furthermore, preparations are being made to establish ceilings at levels substantially below current retail prices on other winter vegetables.

A major part of these decreases will be made possible without the use of subsidies and by means of a reduction of margins and returns which are excessively high. In some cases, however, it will be necessary, in order to hold the retail price at reasonable levels, for the Government to absorb part of the cost of transportation,
to take a moderate loss on purchase operations, and to make direct payments.

In addition we intend to assure to the consumer that part of the savings in price to which he is entitled, and to prevent it from being dissipated by ceiling violations.

This program is intended substantially to effectuate the directive of the Congress. We are confronted, however, by acute pressures elsewhere, which threaten to break through the line. There are two situations which require immediate action. These are milk and bread — basic items in every family's diet. In the case of milk, increases in feed costs and other costs have brought the dairyman's returns down to a level far below that of producers of other farm commodities. Adequate production of this vitally important food is threatened. A program has just been announced by the War Food Administration to help meet the milk situation. This is discussed hereafter in connection with the problem of supplying feed to dairy farmers. A program to prevent an increase in the price of bread is now being developed.

In the four years following July, 1914, the advance in food prices was 67 percent as compared with a rise of 47 percent in the last four years. In the four years of the last war, the greatest rise in the costs of the average family occurred in prices for clothing and housefurnishings. Housefurnishings rose 82 percent, and clothing 90 percent. The General Maximum Price Regulation of May, 1942, prevented such an extreme increase in this war. From August, 1939, to September, 1943, the increases in clothing and housefurnishings were only one-third as much as in the same period of the last war.

Since August, 1939, the month before the war broke out in Europe, the total cost of living in the United States has increased not quite 26 percent, as compared with an advance of 53 percent in the same period in the last war.

**FEED FOR DAIRY CATTLE**

The price of grains used as feed for cattle has also advanced to a greater degree than the price of dairy products. Grain prices
have advanced more than 60 percent since 1941, while the price of dairy products has advanced only about 40 percent.

To those who recognize the importance of milk, butter, and cheese in maintaining a healthy, vigorous civilian population, this increased cost has given real concern about the supply of dairy products.

In order to enable dairy producers to obtain feed for their cattle without raising the price of their milk and other dairy products to the consumer, the War Food Administration has adopted a program of making payments to dairy farmers based on the increased cost of their purchased feed since September, 1942. The payments will be made directly to the dairy farmer, except in those cases where it may be desirable to make the payment to him through a cooperative association or other marketing agency.

While the program as announced is for a three-months' period, some form of equalization payment will probably be necessary as long as the margin between feed costs and dairy prices remains unfavorable.

In order to relieve the pressure on our feed supply, the War Food Administration has announced a reduction in the support price for hogs effective on October 1, 1944, and has removed certain slaughter quotas. The purpose of this is to encourage hog raisers to market their hogs earlier and at lighter weights.

In addition to this program, the War Food Administration is bringing in large quantities of grain from Canada for feeding purposes. This movement has been hampered by a series of transportation difficulties, including the late blocking of Buffalo Harbor with ice and the unusual fog during this summer on the Great Lakes.

In spite of these difficulties, there has been shipped from Canada to the United States during 1943 up to date approximately 125 million bushels of feed of all kinds. As much additional grain will be brought in as transportation facilities will permit.

Furthermore, every effort will be made to see that the supply of feeds is distributed equitably throughout the country, the War
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Food Administration taking such steps and absorbing such transportation costs as may be necessary to secure this objective.

RATIONING AND DISTRIBUTION

The greatest difficulty in the food program has been to bring about a fair and equitable distribution of the available food supplies. It is obvious that there is not enough to furnish all civilians with all the food they want. As I have said, this is the result, to a great extent, of the fact that so many civilians have so much more money to spend than there are civilian supplies of all kinds, including food, to go around.

There are some who advocate taking off all restrictions on food because of the vast food production which the American farmers have raised. But with the great excess of purchasing power now in the pockets of the American people, the supply would never last. We might have a feast for a few months, but then there would be a real shortage—not only for civilians at home but for our own fighting men and those of our allies.

I am confident that the civilian population of the United States is ready to give up certain eating habits and accept certain shortages. They know that they must, if the war is to be won. A sharp line will have to be drawn between the luxuries of life and the necessities of life. A shortage in sirloin steaks or in choice fruits does not mean that the war food program has failed.

In view of the fact that more food is wanted than actually exists, it is necessary to have regulations and rationing which are sometimes very burdensome. But they are the only way to insure that everybody gets a fair share irrespective of his economic or social or political standing.

Some of them are needed to hold back from commercial channels a portion of the supply which was produced during months of high production so that the civilian supply can be kept on a fairly even keel month in and month out. This is particularly true of perishable foods and vegetables where the supply conditions change sharply from season to season. For example,
last year there was a good crop of potatoes but the American people ate up the entire year's supply in ten months so that in the last two months there were few potatoes available in many parts of the country. This kind of situation must be avoided. We cannot afford to eat up a year's supply in ten months, and do without for the balance of the year. We must find a way to husband all of these supplies, spacing consumption evenly through the year. Fortunately we have an abundant supply of potatoes this year.

One of the difficulties has been the uneven geographical distribution of food supplies. Certain parts of the country have had abundance, while others have gone without. Part of this is caused by transportation difficulties; part is caused by the fact that excessive demand has made it profitable to sell within the area in which the crops are grown rather than to ship to other markets. This makes it necessary for the Government to develop programs to insure orderly geographic distribution of all important foods. National interest requires that every part of the country obtain a fair share.

More equal geographic distribution and a more even distribution through the year could be accomplished by the extension of rationing to some of the important foods which are not today rationed. However, for the perishable items, this would entail especially serious administrative difficulties. Therefore, it is planned that the Government itself either purchase or otherwise control certain foods, or absorb the transportation costs—in order to stretch consumption through the year, and to insure distribution that is fair to all parts of the country. Such operations would also go a long way toward stamping out black markets. These devices will be used selectively and only to the extent necessary to achieve the objective of year-round, orderly distribution.

Control and distribution by rationing has involved many difficult administrative problems, most of which have been solved by experience. No one would contend that mistakes were not made. Nevertheless there has been steady improvement. A recent
survey has shown that 93 percent of American housewives agree that a good job—a job fair to all—has been done.

Unfortunately the 7 percent who are not satisfied are more vocal than the 93 percent who are. Many reasons explain this.

Although civilians with their greatly increased purchasing power will not be able to purchase all the food for which they have the money, there will be a sufficient amount of good wholesome food for the people of the United States.

From a nutrition standpoint the civilian per-capita food supply during this year of 1943 will compare favorably with the average for the prewar period 1935 to 1939.

There have been inconveniences to the American dining table—even shortages of certain foods. But no American has gone hungry—in fact the American people as a whole are eating more now than they did before Pearl Harbor.

The American people realize that unless every farmer does his share to get full production and unless every civilian plays fair and does not seek to get more than his proper share of the limited supply, they may be depriving some of our soldiers or fighting allies of needed food to sustain them in their struggle.

ADMINISTRATION OF THE FOOD PROGRAM

There has been loose talk in some quarters about the need for a food "czar" to have full control of food—including not only production and distribution but prices, rationing, and transportation. The fact is that the production and allocation and distribution of food of all kinds are all now under the control of one man—the War Food Administrator.

The War Food Administration is the agency which allocates available supply of food to civilian, military, and lend-lease needs.

That part of the food supply which is allocated to civilians, insofar as rationing and ceiling prices are concerned, comes under the supervision of the Office of Price Administration. The Office of Price Administration does not ration food on its own initiative, but only on the recommendation of the War Food Adminis-
tration. In other words, the War Food Administration determines when the demand for food of a certain kind so exceeds the supply of that food that rationing is required. When such determination is made, the Office of Price Administration takes charge of the actual mechanics of rationing.

This is the most logical procedure, because it places the actual administration of rationing—the ration coupons, the ration boards, the ration regulations—in the same body of citizens that rations gasoline, fuel oil, shoes, and the other products, and it leaves the determination of the necessity for rationing food in the War Food Administration. There can be no reason, in logic or necessity, for setting up a new ration board in all the localities in the United States for each different product.

With respect to prices, it is true that the War Food Administration should be concerned with the fixing of price ceilings. It is. No price ceiling on agricultural commodities is fixed by the Office of Price Administration without the concurrence of the War Food Administration. In other words, the Office of Price Administration and the War Food Administration either agree on a price or any disagreement is settled by the Director of Economic Stabilization. In this way the Food Administrator has a great deal to say about the price of food—but not all. For the price of food should be kept in proper relationship to the prices of other commodities; and therefore it has been deemed advisable to put all price fixing and enforcement in one agency. There is no reason why the War Food Administration should have its own corps of price enforcement officials to duplicate the work of the other price enforcement officials in the Office of Price Administration.

With respect to transportation it would be impossible to give the War Food Administrator complete control over the transportation of food because every car used to transport food is a car which is also greatly in demand for the transportation of other war products. Obviously there must be an agency which apportions the transportation facilities among the various war needs and it would disrupt prosecution of the war and result in
chaos if the War Food Administrator were able to take a car needed for steel or weapons or chemicals or equipment and use it for food transportation.

The case is exactly the same for prices as for transportation. We cannot permit any part of the program, food or rubber, or any other, to have a free hand in bidding materials and manpower away from other equally essential parts of the war effort. If in transportation chaos would result, how shall we characterize the consequences on the price front where the relationships are even more complex and delicate than in transportation?

The fact is that the administration of food is now properly centered in one man and one agency, except only where such administration might encroach upon other war agencies which deal with such separate but relevant subjects as price control, transportation, etc.

There have been many complaints about the existence of black markets in food. It is an unfortunate fact that many persons who complain of black markets are themselves individually encouraging them by their patronage. Some black markets exist in all Nations which have rationing. The operators of these black markets are unpatriotic—and as they are caught, they will be punished. But we should all attach as much blame to those of our citizens who hurt their neighbors and their Nation by paying exorbitant prices in black markets. Vigorous efforts are being made by the appropriate Government agencies to stamp out black markets.

The objectives of our food program will, as in the past, be to grow and raise as much foodstuffs as is humanly possible.

We shall maintain our fighting men as the best fed in all the world.

We shall guarantee that every individual of our civilian population will have an ample and healthful diet. Everyone may be assured that there will be enough food to go around. No one needs fear that only a comparatively few people will be able to afford an adequate and varied diet.

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We shall assist in fulfilling the requirements of our fighting allies for food and shall also assist in assuring that the liberated peoples will be given sufficient food to regain their physical and economic strength.

Our farmers will receive a return over and above their costs of production that will compensate them decently and adequately for their long and arduous work. At the same time, the consumers of the Nation will be protected against rising costs which are properly chargeable to the war effort itself.

The price support program is proving reasonably successful on both fronts: increasing production and maintaining fair food prices for the consumer. I am convinced that to abandon our present policy would increase the cost of living, bring about demands for increased wages which would then be justifiable, and might well start a serious and dangerous cycle of inflation—without any net benefit to anyone.

Some people say "a little inflation will not hurt anyone." They are like the man who takes the first shot of opium for the sensation he thinks it will give him. He likes it, although he swears that he will not make it a habit. Soon he is taking two—and then more and more—and then he loses all control of himself.

Inflation is like that. A little leads to more. I am unalterably opposed to taking the first shot by Congressional, or by any other, action. The Nation cannot afford to acquire the habit. We have children to think of.

Those who are advocating an inflation course will have to be ready to accept responsibility for the results. We have so far been following a tried path, and are getting along fairly well. This is no time to start wandering into an untried field of uncontrolled and uncontrollable prices and wages.

With the same determination that has led our fighting men to conquer their military objectives, we at home shall reach the objectives of our food program. We will get the production that we have set as our goal. We will see that the supplies of food are distributed fairly and equitably and at stable prices that are fair to the consumer. To do this we shall have to draw upon that
basic characteristic of a democracy—a characteristic that has its roots in the American farm community. We shall draw on our teamwork, teamwork of the farmer, and the consumer, and the distributor, and the Government in both its legislative and executive branches.

The accomplishments of the past year have been great. We shall demonstrate to the Axis how the teamwork of a free people can make even those records fall. We shall demonstrate that freedom and teamwork make the people of a democracy the most efficient producers in the world—whether it be of battleships, tanks, planes, guns, or of the produce of the soil.

NOTE: During the period immediately prior to December 7, 1941, the Agricultural Division of the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense worked with the Department of Agriculture on agricultural and food problems (see note to Item 154, p. 699, 1940 volume). After the United States entered the war, and civilian military and foreign food requirements increased, it became necessary to strengthen the supervision of the Nation's food production and distribution. This was done by Executive Order No. 9280, which laid the foundations of the War Food Administration (see Item 133 and note, 1942 volume).

By Executive Order No. 9250, issued on October 3, 1942, pursuant to the Stabilization Act of 1942, the President had established the Office of Economic Stabilization (see Item 97 and note, 1942 volume). The powers of that office had been extended and strengthened through the "hold-the-line" Executive Order on prices and wages which the President issued April 8, 1943 (see Item 35 and note, this volume). The question of food subsidies as a component of the stabilization program had been discussed by the President in his press and radio conference of June 15, 1943 (see Item 69 and note, this volume). The issue was further discussed by the President in answering the letter of resignation of the War Food Administrator, Chester C. Davis, on June 28, 1943 (see Item 70 and note, this volume).

The foregoing 10,000-word message was one of the President's longest messages to the Congress. He directed me to gather the material and prepare the drafts of the message.

Ever since the early days of the war there had been recurrent outbursts of criticism against the Administration on the subject of food. It was of course the main consumer item, with which every citizen was vitally concerned. There were vari-
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ous complaints about shortages of food and feed, rising prices, rationing, and support prices and subsidies.

There were many discussions between the President and the various Government agencies concerned with the many aspects of raising, distributing, selling, and transporting food. It was finally decided that what was needed was a clear description to the American people of what was involved in the whole farm and food program — what our objectives were, how we were trying to increase the supply of food and at the same time to keep its price as low as possible, and how we were trying to make sure that no one class of citizens was given favored treatment over any other.

After I started to work collecting material at the request of the President, it became obvious that a discussion of the entire program would require more than the usual thirty minutes which the President had imposed as a maximum for a radio speech. Therefore, it was decided to prepare a full report and send it as a message rather than deliver it over the radio. As more and more material was gathered, the message became longer and longer. As various drafts were submitted to the President, he would follow his usual custom of looking at the number on the last page to see how long it was. Soon he began to "rib" me a good deal on its ever-growing length. It continued to grow until it became the longest message which the President ever sent to the Congress — over 10,000 words. It was decided that in view of the many criticisms and misunderstandings of the food program it was preferable to present to the Congress and to the people a complete, over-all picture of the past, present, and foreseeable future in respect to food.

In the message, the President elaborated on the fundamental principles and the specific details of his entire stabilization policy; he discussed particularly the relation of the food and stabilization programs. Our experience with food prices during the second World War furnished a happy contrast to the runaway inflation which occurred during and after the first World War, with its subsequent contribution to the agricultural depression of the 1920's. By a determined holding of the line on prices, the President not only protected the consumers of the country during the war but was able to keep wages in line, to insure adequate food production at fairly reasonable prices, and to fulfill the unprecedented requirements of the armed forces and foreign countries for food.
Three-Power Declaration on War Crimes

Statement Issued by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Premier Stalin Regarding Atrocities. November 1, 1943

The United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union have received from many quarters evidence of atrocities, massacres, and cold-blooded mass executions which are being perpetrated by Hitlerite forces in many of the countries they have overrun and from which they are now being steadily expelled. The brutalities of Hitlerite domination are no new thing and all peoples or territories in their grip have suffered from the worst form of Government by terror. What is new is that many of these territories are now being redeemed by the advancing armies of the liberating powers and that in their desperation, the recoiling Hitlerite Huns are redoubling their ruthless cruelties. This is now evidenced with particular clearness by monstrous crimes of the Hitlerites on the territory of the Soviet Union which is being liberated from Hitlerites, and on French and Italian territory.

Accordingly, the aforesaid three Allied Powers, speaking in the interests of the thirty-three United Nations, hereby solemnly declare and give full warning of their declaration as follows: At the time of granting of any armistice to any government which may be set up in Germany, those German officers and men and members of the Nazi Party who have been responsible for or have taken a consenting part in the above atrocities, massacres, and executions will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated countries and of the free governments which will be erected therein. Lists will be compiled in all possible detail from all these countries, having regard especially to invaded parts of the Soviet Union, to Poland and Czechoslovakia, to Yugoslavia and Greece including Crete and other islands, to Norway, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, and Italy.
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Thus, Germans who take part in wholesale shooting of Italian officers or in the execution of French, Dutch, Belgian, or Norwegian hostages or of Cretan peasants, or who have shared in slaughters inflicted on the people of Poland or in territories of the Soviet Union which are now being swept clear of the enemy, will know they will be brought back to the scene of their crimes and judged on the spot by the peoples whom they have outraged. Let those who have hitherto not imbrued their hands with innocent blood beware lest they join the ranks of the guilty, for most assuredly the three Allied Powers will pursue them to the uttermost ends of the earth and will deliver them to their accusers in order that justice may be done.

The above declaration is without prejudice to the case of major criminals, whose offenses have no particular geographical localization and who will be punished by joint decision of the Governments of the Allies.

NOTE: The foregoing statement was discussed at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers (see Item 119, this volume) and it was issued at the conclusion of the Conference. It was the strongest statement on war crimes with which the President associated his name (for other statements of the President in regard to war crimes, and the nature of the trial and punishment of war criminals, see Item 101 and note, 1941 volume; Items 83, 100, and notes, 1942 volume; and Item 24, 1944-1945 volume).
Gentlemen, on behalf of the host Nations, I welcome you to this historic conference.

Here in the White House seated about a table in the historic East Room are representatives of 44 Nations—United Nations and those associated with them.

The people of these 44 Nations include approximately 80 percent of the human race, now united by a common devotion to the cause of civilization and by a common determination to build for the future a world of decency and security, and above all peace.

Representatives of these 44 Nations—you gentlemen who represent them—have just signed an agreement creating the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration—commonly known as U.N.R.R.A.

This agency will help to put into practical effect some of the high purposes that were set forth in the declaration of the United Nations on January 1, 1942.

Coming after the Declarations of Moscow recently, this agreement shows that we mean business in this war in a political and humanitarian sense, just as surely as we mean business in a military sense. It is one more strong link joining the United Nations and their associates in facing problems of mutual need and mutual interest.

The agreement which we have all just signed is based on a preamble in which the United Nations declare that they are "... determined that immediately upon the liberation of any
area . . . the population thereof shall receive aid and relief from their sufferings, food, clothing and shelter, aid in the prevention of pestilence and in the recovery of the health of the people, and that preparation and arrangements shall be made for the return of prisoners and exiles to their homes and for assistance in the resumption of urgently needed agricultural and industrial production and the restoration of essential services.” That is the preambles of the agreement which has just been signed here today.

All of the United Nations agree to cooperate and share in the work of U.N.R.R.A.—each Nation according to its own individual resources—and to provide relief and help in rehabilitation for the victims of German and Japanese barbarism.

It is hard for us to grasp the magnitude of the needs in occupied countries.

The Germans and the Japanese have carried on their campaigns of plunder and destruction with one purpose in mind: that in the lands they occupy there shall be left only a generation of half-men—undernourished, crushed in body and spirit, without strength or incentive to hope—ready, in fact, to be enslaved and used as beasts of burden by the self-styled master races.

The occupied countries have been robbed of their foodstuffs and raw materials, and even of the agricultural and industrial machinery upon which their workers must depend for employment. The Germans have been planning systematically to make the other countries economic vassals, utterly dependent upon, and completely subservient to the Nazi tyrants.

Responsibility for alleviating the suffering and misery occasioned by this so-called New Order must be assumed not by any individual Nation but by all of the united and associated Nations acting together. No one country could—or should, for that matter—attempt to bear the burden of meeting the vast relief needs—either in money or in supplies.

The work confronting U.N.R.R.A. is immediate and urgent. As it now begins its operations, many of the most fertile food regions of the world are either under Axis domination, or have been stripped by the practice of the dictatorships to make them-
Estabishment of U.N.R.R.A.

selves self-sustaining on other peoples' lands. Additional regions will almost inevitably be blackened as the German and Japanese forces in their retreat scorch the earth behind them.

So, it will be the task of U.N.R.R.A. to operate in these areas of food shortages until the resumption of peaceful occupations enables the liberated peoples once more to assume the full burden of their own support. It will be for U.N.R.R.A., first to assure a fair distribution of available supplies among all of the liberated peoples, and second, to ward off death by starvation or exposure among these peoples.

It would be supreme irony for us to win a victory, and then to inherit world chaos simply because we were unprepared to meet what we know we shall have to meet. We know the human wants that will follow liberation. Many ruthlessly shattered cities and villages in Russia, China, and Italy provide horrible evidence of what the defeated retreating Germans and Japanese will leave behind.

It is not only humane and charitable for the United Nations to supply medicine and food and other necessities to the peoples freed from Axis control; it is a clear matter of enlightened self-interest — and of military strategic necessity. This was apparent to us even before the Germans were ousted from any of the territories under their control.

But we need not any longer speculate. We have had nearly a year of experience in French Africa — and later experience in Sicily and in Italy.

In French North Africa, the United Nations have given assistance in the form of seeds, agricultural supplies, and agricultural equipment, and have made it possible for the people there to increase their harvest.

After years of looting by the Germans, the people of French Africa are now able to supply virtually all of their own food needs. And that in just one year. Besides, they are meeting important needs of the Allied armed forces in French Africa, in Sicily, and Italy, and giving much of the civilian labor which assists our armed forces there in loading and unloading ships.
The assistance rendered to the liberated peoples of French Africa was a joint venture of Great Britain and the United States.

The next step, as in the case of other joint operations of the United Nations, is to handle the problems of supply for the liberated areas on a United Nations basis—rather than on the cooperation of only two Nations.

We have shown that while the war lasts, whenever we help the liberated peoples with essential supplies and services, we hasten the day of the defeat of the Axis powers.

When victory comes there can certainly be no secure peace until there is a return of law and order in the oppressed countries, until the peoples of these countries have been restored to a normal, healthy, and self-sustaining existence. This means that the more quickly and effectually we apply measures of relief and rehabilitation, the more quickly will our own boys overseas be able to come home.

We have acted together with the other United Nations in harnessing our raw materials, our production, and our other resources to defeat the common enemy. We have worked together with the United Nations in full agreement and action in the fighting on land, and on the sea and in the air. We are now about to take an additional step in the combined actions that are necessary to win the war and to build the foundation for a secure peace.

The sufferings of the little men and women who have been ground under the Axis heel can be relieved only if we utilize the production of all the world to balance the want of all the world. In U.N.R.R.A. we have devised a mechanism, based on the processes of true democracy, a mechanism that can go far toward accomplishment of such an objective in the days and months of desperate emergency that will follow the overthrow of the Axis.

As in most of the difficult and complex things in life, Nations will learn to work together only by actually working together. Why not? We Nations have common objectives. It is, therefore,
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with a lift of hope, that we look on the signing of this agreement by all of the United Nations as a means of joining them together still more firmly.

Such is the spirit and such is the positive action of the United Nations and their associates at the time when our military power is becoming predominant, when our enemies are being pushed back—all over the world.

In defeat or in victory, the United Nations have never deviated from adherence to the basic principles of freedom, tolerance, independence, and security.

Tomorrow at Atlantic City, the U.N.R.R.A. begins its first formal conference—and makes the first bold steps toward the practicable, workable realization of a thing called freedom from want. The forces of the United Nations are marching forward, and the peoples of the United Nations march with them.

So, my friends, on this historic occasion, I wish you all the success in the world.

NOTE: Throughout the war, the Axis followed the policy of draining off food and supplies from conquered countries, not only to meet their own needs at home, but also to weaken the civilian population of the occupied countries in an effort to break their will to resist. As the Allied forces advanced, the retreating Axis armies accentuated this policy in an attempt to slow down the Allied advances. As a result, millions of starving and destitute civilian war victims were desperately in need of assistance. The problems of war-torn Europe, Africa, and Asia were complicated further by the mass movement of displaced persons returning to their homes or fleeing from political persecution in search of freedom. Food, fuel, clothing, and medicine were urgently required for immediate relief; to achieve any long-range improvements, agriculture, industry, and transportation facilities had to be rehabilitated.

With the creation of the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations in December, 1942, less than a month after the North African invasion, the President began to attack this problem (see Item 128, 1942 volume, for the President’s press conference discussion of the new organization). The Office operated within the Department of State under the directorship of Herbert H. Lehman, President Roosevelt’s successor as Governor of New York. During the spring and summer of 1943, this organ-
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ization was particularly active in Tunisia, where food was distributed, camps for refugees were established, and health controls were created.

In June, 1943, the United States presented a draft agreement for an international organization to carry out the work of the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations. Various suggestions by other members of the United Nations were advanced and incorporated into the agreement, which was signed at the White House on November 9, 1943. Forty-four Nations signed the agreement in 1943; four additional Nations subsequently joined in support of U.N. R.R.A. to bring the total participating Nations to 48.

The preamble of the Agreement signed on November 9, 1943, declared that

"immediately upon the liberation of any area by the armed forces of the United Nations or as a consequence of retreat of the enemy the population thereof shall receive aid and relief from their sufferings, food, clothing and shelter, aid in the prevention of pestilence and in the recovery of the health of the people, and preparation and arrangements shall be made for the return of prisoners and exiles to their homes and for assistance in the resumption of urgently needed agricultural and industrial production and the restoration of essential services."

Other articles of the Agreement detailed the functions and purposes of the new organization and set forth the conditions of membership and the general outlines of the administrative organization. It was provided that each member Nation name one representative to the Council, the central governing body, which should appoint the Director General and convene not less than twice a year.

At the first U.N.R.R.A. Council session held in Atlantic City, N. J., Herbert H. Lehman was selected as the Director General. Mr. Lehman served from November, 1943, to March, 1946, when he was succeeded by Fiorello H. LaGuardia, former Mayor of New York. Mr. LaGuardia was followed by Major General Lowell W. Rooks, who took over the post of Director General on January 1, 1947, and served until the liquidation of U.N.R.R.A.

Between meetings of the Council, emergency policies were formulated by the Central Committee, composed of representatives of the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, China, France, Canada, Australia, Brazil, and Yugoslavia. Decisions of the Central Committee were made subject to review at subsequent meetings of the Council.

U.N.R.R.A.'s first emphasis was on the fulfillment of the most immediate needs for food, clothing, fuel, and medicines. Gradually, it became possible to give attention to pressing problems of longer-range rehabilitation. For example, early in 1946, U.N.R.R.A. sent large quantities of agricultural supplies,
such as seeds, fertilizers, insecticides, livestock, and basic farm tools and machinery. These supplies helped farmers in their spring plantings in order that the fall harvests would provide the liberated countries with stocks of food and seed for future plantings. In addition, U.N.R.R.A. supplied industrial rehabilitation supplies, such as spare parts and lubricants for machinery in the mines and in the factories producing relief goods; fuel; locomotives, rolling stock, trucks, and barges to aid inland transport; and raw materials such as wool and cotton.

In addition to shipping supplies, U.N.R.R.A. frequently sent technical personnel to assist officials in the devastated countries in restoring soil fertility and raising crop yields. Industrial rehabilitation experts aided in the maintenance of transport equipment and in the proper use of shop tools, appliances, and mechanical techniques.

In its operation, U.N.R.R.A. through its Council first set a minimum standard of what was needed. This standard was the same for all European countries; but the standard for Europe differed from that of the Far East because of the profound economic differences between the two regions. The next step was to make an estimate of the supplies which each country had available from its own resources, and the extent to which local supplies fell short of the established minimum standard. Committees of the Council then examined the foreign exchange resources of the liberated countries to determine whether they could procure essential imports without assistance. Finally, for those countries adjudged unable to pay, U.N.R.R.A. procured and delivered the needed supplies, which came from all over the world. The United States was U.N.R.R.A.'s largest supplier, but other member Governments contributed heavily. For example, South Africa supplied coal; India, peanut oil and jute; Australia and New Zealand, raw wool and foodstuffs; Brazil, livestock, food, and textiles; Cuba, sugar; the Dominican Republic, corn; Peru, beans and fish; Uruguay, blankets and cheese; and Iceland supplied fish.

After the war, all warring Nations had military surpluses on hand. Great quantities of food and clothing, medical supplies, and much-needed trucks and other transportation equipment were taken over by U.N.R.R.A. from these military surpluses.

Another source of U.N.R.R.A. supplies was the contribution of private individuals, both directly and through drives by charitable agencies. For example, enough clothing for an estimated 25,000,000 people was collected in a national drive in the United States early in 1945, with the cooperation of churches and fraternal and service organizations. Nation-wide clothing collections in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand netted about 17,000,000 pounds. Many
groups and individuals also contributed for the direct relief of specific countries. For example, 54 dairy cattle for the children of Greece were sent by the Falls Cities Cooperative Milk Producers Association of Louisville, Kentucky. Two boatloads of cattle were sent from the people of Mississippi to the people of Greece. And $75,000 worth of medical supplies for labor rest camps in Czechoslovakia were donated jointly by the C.I.O. and the A.F. of L.

U.N.R.R.A. assumed the responsibility of arranging for the shipment of supplies to the receiving countries, but once they were delivered at the port they passed into the hands of the Government of the receiving country. Although some of the supplies were given free to indigent people, the bulk were distributed through normal wholesale and retail channels, and sold to the people for local currency. The money thus collected from the sale of supplies was used to assist in defraying the cost of the U.N.R.R.A. missions, and for rehabilitation projects constructed by local labor and paid with local currency. This served the twofold purpose of stimulating economic recovery in the receiving country and saving money for U.N.R.R.A.

U.N.R.R.A. scrupulously followed the firm policy of not allowing any supplies and services to be used as weapons of political, racial, or religious discrimination. Controls and checks were also used in an attempt to prevent U.N.R.R.A. goods from going into black market channels. With the demand always far exceeding the supply in the war-shattered economies into which the goods were sent, it was perhaps inevitable that black marketeering in U.N.R.R.A. goods should spring up in some areas. This led some critics to the foolish conclusion that the entire program should be curtailed because it encouraged black markets. Fortunately, this inhumane and shortsighted counsel did not prevail and U.N.R.R.A. continued to relieve distress and rebuild sounder economies in the liberated countries.

One of its major tasks was assistance to and repatriation of displaced persons. In May, 1944, U.N.R.R.A. took over responsibility from the British military authorities for six camps in the Middle East, housing primarily Yugoslav and Greek displaced persons. Of the initial population of 40,000 displaced persons, 39,000 had been repatriated by January 1, 1947. In addition, U.N.R.R.A. repatriated large numbers of Greeks from Cyprus and other displaced persons from Ethiopia, Tanganyika, and the Belgian Congo.

By far the largest task of dealing with displaced persons was in Germany and Austria. In these countries, military authorities had the primary responsibility. Under an agreement concluded in November, 1944, between U.N.R.R.A. and Supreme Headquarters, Allied Ex-
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 Expeditory Force (S.H.A.E.F.), U.N.R.R.A. provided personnel to assist the military authorities in health, welfare, administration, and transport services for displaced persons in these areas.

 On July 6, 1944, the President issued Executive Order No. 9453, which, along with a simultaneous letter to Leo T. Crowley, outlined the responsibilities of the Foreign Economic Administration in connection with U.N.R.R.A.'s work. (See note to Item 112, 1944-1945 volume, for the text of the President's letter to Administrator Crowley; see Item 104 and note, this volume, for an account of the work of the Foreign Economic Administration.)

 During 1947, U.N.R.R.A. activities were gradually liquidated, and many of its functions were turned over to other international agencies. On January 1, 1947, the activities of the Health Division of U.N.R.R.A. became the responsibility of the Interim Commission of the World Health Organization and eventually passed to the permanent W.H.O. On February 26, 1947, arrangements were completed for the transfer of many of U.N.R.R.A.'s agricultural rehabilitation functions to the Food and Agriculture Organization. On June 30, 1947, U.N.R.R.A.'s responsibilities in the field of displaced persons passed to the International Refugee Organization. Other functions were taken over by the International Children's Emergency Fund.

 By the end of June, 1947, U.N. R.R.A. had completed its major operations. On that date, it had committed 98.6 percent of its total funds and had shipped nearly 95 percent of its total supply program. As of June 30, 1947, it had shipped a total of 23,495,978 gross long tons, having a total value of $2,768,373,000. Measured in dollar value, 44 percent of the total shipments were food supplies, 22 percent industrial rehabilitation equipment, 15 percent clothing, and 11 percent agricultural rehabilitation supplies.

 Repatriation of displaced persons was speeded up in the final stages of the operation under U.N.R.R.A. As a result, from V-E Day through June 30, 1947, a total of more than 7,000,000 displaced persons had been repatriated from Germany, Austria, Italy, and the Middle East, 6,000,000 of these leaving Germany alone. At the end of June, 1947, U.N.R.R.A. was providing maintenance assistance to over 642,000 people, most of whom were in assembly centers in Germany.

 Relief and rehabilitation of war-scarred Europe and the Far East did not cease with the liquidation of U.N.R.R.A., nor did the role of the United States in world recovery diminish after the transfer of many of U.N.R.R.A.'s functions to United Nations specialized agencies. Post-U.N.R.R.A. relief funds were voted by the Congress in March, 1947; special assistance was provided to Greece and Turkey; and an interim aid program for France, Italy, and
Austria was approved late in 1947. In 1948 the United States embarked on the long-range European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan) and Economic Cooperation Administration to carry forward the work originally started by U.N.R.R.A. (See Item 125 and note, this volume, for an account of the financing of U.N.R.R.A. and the United States contributions to it; see also Items 112 and 119 and notes, 1944-1945 volume, for additional items on the operation of U.N.R.R.A.)

124 (A Report to the Congress on Reverse Lend-Lease. November 11, 1943

To the Congress:

Since the enactment of the Lend-Lease Act in March of 1941, I have transmitted to the Congress eleven reports describing the lend-lease aid which has been furnished by the United States. These reports have also included information with respect to the types and quantities of reverse lend-lease aid provided to the United States by the various lend-lease countries.

While a complete account of the reverse lend-lease aid which we have received is not yet available, the statements recently received from the Governments of the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand and from our Army make it possible for me to report to you at this time regarding a part of the expenditures made by the British Commonwealth of Nations on reverse lend-lease aid to the United States.

The overwhelming benefit which the United States has received from its lend-lease program has, of course, been the pooling of resources and the combined effort of the United Nations against the Axis countries. Each of the United Nations has contributed.

There is, of course, no physical or financial standard of value by which we can measure the military contribution to the war on land or sea or in the air which has been made by our allies or ourselves. One thing is clear: By the help which our friends and allies have given us, and by the help which we have given them.
in the common cause, we have not only made progress in the war, but we have saved the lives of many of our own boys as well as those of our allies.

The master agreements entered into with Great Britain, the Soviet Union, China and other United Nations receiving lend-lease aid establish the principles which govern the lend-lease relationship. The other United Nations, under the master lend-lease agreements, have agreed to contribute to the defense of the United States by providing as reverse lend-lease aid all articles, services, facilities, or information which they can furnish.

Under these agreements, all lend-lease supplies, such as, for example, merchant ships or cargo planes, which are not used up in the war, can be required by the President to be returned at the end of the present emergency.

Article VII of the master agreements entered into with the United Nations receiving lend-lease aid provides that they will join with the United States in working toward some of the economic conditions which are a prerequisite to a secure peace.

The master lend-lease agreements do not determine the final settlement, but leave that for determination at some future date. As conditions have permitted, our allies have expanded the scope and nature of their reverse lend-lease aid.

During the past summer the United Kingdom agreed to extend reverse lend-lease aid to include not only goods, services, and information for our armed forces, but also raw materials, commodities, and foodstuffs hitherto purchased, for export, in the United Kingdom and the British colonies by or on behalf of United States Government agencies. Discussions on the administration and procedure for the handling of the contracts, transfers, and other details are now going forward.

This plan will make available to the United States, under reverse lend-lease and without payment, such materials and foodstuffs as rubber from Ceylon, Trinidad, British Guiana, and British Honduras, sisal and pyrethrum from British East Africa, asbestos and chrome from Southern Rhodesia, cocoa from British
West Africa, tea and coconut oil from Ceylon, and benzol and tar acids from the United Kingdom.

British shipping for these raw materials and foodstuffs from all parts of the British Commonwealth will also be made available under reverse lend-lease.

Discussions are also under way with the other Governments of the British Commonwealth looking toward a like arrangement for the provision of materials and foodstuffs as reverse lend-lease aid.

As of June 30, 1943, the British Commonwealth of Nations reported that expenditures of about $1,171,000,000 had been made for reverse lend-lease aid. The United Kingdom has expended about $871,000,000 of this amount; and Australia, New Zealand, and India have expended approximately $300,000,000.

Based upon estimates for the first six months of this year, expenditures by the British Commonwealth for reverse lend-lease aid to the United States are now at an annual rate of about $1,250,000,000. This does not take into account the anticipated exports of raw materials, commodities, and foodstuffs for the account of the United States.

The data necessary for even an incomplete accounting of the monetary expenditures by the British Commonwealth for reverse lend-lease assistance to the United States have been gathered in the face of difficulties. British aid is rendered to the armed forces of the United States all over the world. Usually it is under conditions very different from those surrounding lend-lease from the United States, which flows from a central source. Many supplies and services have been made available by the British to the United States armed forces in North Africa, Sicily, and elsewhere for which no report has yet been received.

The figures set forth in this report include expenditures made by the British Commonwealth for newly constructed barracks, military airports, hospitals, and other military facilities for our armed forces. They do not include such facilities made available to our armed forces where no out-of-pocket expenditures have been made for their construction since our entry into the war.
These British expenditures were from appropriated funds which required financing either through taxation or borrowing. They are comparable to the expenditures made by the United States from appropriations for lend-lease purposes, which include funds for capital installations in this country, such as munitions plants, shipyards, and other facilities.

It has not yet been determined how such lend-lease or reverse lend-lease expenditures will be entered or treated in the final settlement under the lend-lease agreements. They will, of course, be considered when the final settlement is made. The master agreement provides that in the final determination of the benefits to be provided to the United States, "full cognizance shall be taken of all property, services, information, facilities, or other benefits or considerations provided by the Government of the United Kingdom subsequent to March 11, 1941, and accepted or acknowledged by the President on behalf of the United States of America."

The Governments of the British Commonwealth have submitted their statement of expenditures for the reverse lend-lease aid covered in this report in pounds. To make these figures more intelligible to the American people, these expenditures have been translated into dollars at the official exchange rates. This may be misleading, because the rate of exchange used cannot, especially under war conditions, always reflect comparable values in terms of purchasing power, man-hours of work, or materials.

But in spite of the misconception which may result from translating the pound expenditure figures into dollars at the official rates of exchange, I think it is desirable to provide the Congress and the people of this country with the best available indication as to the expenditures made by the British Commonwealth for reverse lend-lease aid.

Exclusive of the expenditures for supplies transferred in colonial theaters of war, American forces have received aid through reverse lend-lease channels for which the United Kingdom made expenditures of $871,000,000 as of June 30, 1943, as follows:
124. Report to Congress on Reverse Lend-Lease

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goods and services</td>
<td>$331,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shipping</td>
<td>169,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airports, barracks, hospitals, other construction</td>
<td>371,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$871,000,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We are all familiar with the role which the Eighth Air Force has played, in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, in preparing the way for the invasion of Europe. It is not as widely known that the operation of reverse lend-lease has made contributions to the outstanding performance of our air forces based in the United Kingdom.

Under reverse lend-lease, the British have provided our bomber and fighter commands with many necessary items.

Specially heated winter flying clothing to protect bomber crews from the intense cold suffered at high altitudes was supplied by the British to our Air Forces. When certain United States fighter gunsights proved less effective than the sights employed by British fighters, the Royal Air Force provided a substantial number of British-type sights for immediate installation.

American bombers have been equipped by the British with photographic equipment effective in obtaining photographs of the target during the bomb run.

The British have also provided facilities for the development and production of a new type of protective body armor designed by our medical authorities.

A variety of other aid has also been provided for our Air Forces by the United Kingdom.

Mobile repair shops located throughout the United Kingdom recondition American bombers forced to make crash landings.

A one-man dinghy, developed by the British for parachute landings at sea, provides pilots of American planes with a one-man floating raft.

Specialized British radio equipment has been installed in American planes which has given greater safety to our bomber crews, and has improved the effectiveness of our bombing missions.
For purposes of recognition training, the Royal Air Force has delivered to the United States Air Forces more than 60,000 items of aircraft, warship, and armed vehicle recognition devices.

These are but a few instances of the aid which has been provided to our Air Forces under reverse lend-lease and without payment by us.

Although Great Britain depends upon imports for a large portion of her curtailed food supply, she is providing American forces with substantial amounts of foodstuffs as reverse lend-lease aid. These range from fresh vegetables, flour, and potatoes to corn-on-the-cob and soft drinks.

Australia, New Zealand, and India have also provided United States forces in those areas with substantial reverse lend-lease aid, including most of their food.

The Australian Government has officially estimated the expenditures for reverse lend-lease aid to the United States at £A60,792,000 as of June 30, 1943. As the official rate of exchange of a £A equals $3.23, this indicates a dollar value of about $196,000,000. This sum is divided into the following major categories:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stores and provisions</td>
<td>$39,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical equipment</td>
<td>7,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor transport</td>
<td>14,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft stores and equipment</td>
<td>16,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General stores</td>
<td>24,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation and communication</td>
<td>21,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shipping</td>
<td>7,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works, buildings, and hirings</td>
<td>66,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$196,000,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Australia and New Zealand have supplied American forces in the South and Southwest Pacific with the bulk of their foodstuff requirements on a ration scale comparable to the basic allowance of the American Army. This program includes fresh, dried, and canned products, and in some cases in the latter category requires amounts ranging up to 100 percent of total Australian production.

The following are the quantities of the principal types of food-
124. Report to Congress on Reverse Lend-Lease

stuffs the United States has received from Australia as reverse lend-lease through June 30, 1943:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Meat</td>
<td>61,480,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bread, biscuits, cereals</td>
<td>48,110,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes</td>
<td>29,762,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables and fruit</td>
<td>49,931,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canned foods</td>
<td>28,340,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency rations</td>
<td>2,231,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>11,782,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butter</td>
<td>6,628,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condensed milk</td>
<td>8,711,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fresh milk</td>
<td>11,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fresh eggs</td>
<td>22,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Pounds)

(Pints)

(Dozen)

Although clothing rationing has been introduced in Australia, the Government has undertaken an extensive clothing manufacturing program for the United States forces. This program includes millions of pairs of socks and hundreds of thousands of shirts, jackets, trousers, pullovers, under clothing, boots and shoes, and blankets.

Recreational needs of American soldiers have been met by an Australian program which calls for every type of game and accessory from boxing gloves to medicine balls—in all, more than 420,000 items of such equipment.

Numerous hospitals, including the newest and most modern in the country, have been made available to the United States Army for its exclusive use.

Official air, rail, and water passenger costs and freight, and cable and telegraph expenses of our troops are paid by the Commonwealth Government as reverse lend-lease aid.

A large number of small ships of various types has been turned over to American authorities, and Australian shipyards are now turning out landing barges and small vessels for the combat use of our forces.

On September 29, 1943, the Australian Minister of Finance introduced the Commonwealth Budget for the current fiscal year.
in the Australian Parliament. He estimated that Australia will spend approximately $323,000,000 for reverse lend-lease during the year July 1, 1943, to June 30, 1944.

New Zealand, no less than Australia and the United Kingdom, has supplied its share of reverse lend-lease aid. For the period ending June 30, 1943, the New Zealand Government has officially reported having expended $51,000,000 for reverse lend-lease aid to the United States, made up as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supplies, services and foodstuffs</td>
<td>$24,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camps</td>
<td>6,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospitals</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warehouses</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous building projects</td>
<td>7,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ship construction</td>
<td>6,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$51,000,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

New Zealand, with Australia, is the food basket of American forces stationed throughout the South Pacific area. In order better to provide for the needs of our troops in remote Pacific islands, New Zealand has greatly increased her capacity for the packing, canning, and dehydration of meats, vegetables, and dairy products.

Although its population is less than 1,700,000, this dominion has supplied the United States under reverse lend-lease and without charge with more than 170,000,000 pounds of foodstuffs during the year ending June 30, 1943, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>(Pounds)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fresh meat</td>
<td>49,650,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canned, smoked meat</td>
<td>21,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes</td>
<td>9,150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other vegetables</td>
<td>24,125,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fruit</td>
<td>10,825,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butter and cheese</td>
<td>12,550,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other dairy produce</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>7,100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flour and other cereals</td>
<td>13,725,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous supplies</td>
<td>11,475,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
New Zealand also supplies numerous articles of clothing, including shoes and textiles, to United States forces as reverse lend-lease aid. When American requirements were added to those of local forces, New Zealand found it necessary to ration the civilian supply of clothing to less than one full outfit per year.

American requirements under reverse lend-lease have also occasioned shortages in many other phases of New Zealand’s civilian life. Nevertheless, the Dominion continues greatly to expand the scope and volume of her reverse lend-lease to the United States, and during the present fiscal year about $65,000,000 has been budgeted for this purpose.

While no official report has yet been received from the Government of India, our Army reports total expenditures by India for reverse lend-lease aid of approximately $56,900,000, divided as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military stores, equipment</td>
<td>$5,421,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation and communication</td>
<td>3,161,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum products</td>
<td>13,127,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>31,413,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsistence</td>
<td>3,778,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$56,900,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We have received aviation gasoline, motor gasoline and lubricating oil, and lesser amounts of other petroleum products from the Indian Government for use by American forces. A part of the motor fuel has been used in a number of trucks and passenger cars given our troops without payment as reverse lend-lease aid. In addition, United States Army groups have been afforded postal, telegraph, and telephone facilities, water and electric power, furnishings for buildings, and items of clothing, including mosquito- and gas-proof outfits.

Canada has received no lend-lease aid from the United States. She has paid cash for the supplies obtained in this country. It may be noted, however, that Canada has already made a billion dollars’ worth of aid available without payment to the United Kingdom and is now engaged in making available another bil-
lion dollars' worth of aid to the United Kingdom, Russia, China, and the other United Nations on a mutual-aid program similar to our lend-lease program.

This statement of the expenditures made by the British Commonwealth of Nations for reverse lend-lease aid furnished to the United States, and of the expansion of this program so as to include exports of materials and foodstuffs for the account of United States agencies from the United Kingdom and the British colonies, emphasizes the contribution which the British Commonwealth has made "to the defense of the United States" while taking its place on the battle fronts.

It is an indication of the extent to which the British have been able to pool their resources with ours so that the needed weapon may be in the hands of that soldier — whatever may be his nationality — who can at the proper moment use it most effectively to defeat our common enemies.

**NOTE:** Under the provisions of the Lend-Lease Act approved by the President on March 11, 1941 (55 Stat. 31), the President was required from time to time, but not less frequently than once every ninety days, to transmit to the Congress a report of operations under the Act, insofar as the public interest permitted disclosure of such information. (See Item 52 and note, 1941 volume, for the President's message of June 10, 1941, transmitting the first report to the Congress on lend-lease operations; for other accounts of the functions and accomplishments of lend-lease, see Item 152 and note, pp. 663-678, 1940 volume; Items 15, 17, 28, 37, 76, 82, 96, 105, 111, 123, and notes, 1941 volume; Item 31, 1942 volume; Items 30, 98, 119, this volume; and Items 120 and 121, 1944-1945 volume.)

Except for the foregoing report, all of the Presidential reports to the Congress had discussed only the lend-lease which had been furnished to foreign Nations. The foregoing message contained a report on the aid by reverse lend-lease which foreign Nations had provided for the United States. Although all other Presidential messages to the Congress transmitted detailed reports on lend-lease transactions, in the case of reverse lend-lease the entire report was embodied in the President's message itself.

Reverse lend-lease was received without payment by the United States. It was granted largely in the form of goods, services, and installations for American forces abroad. For a detailed account of the value and nature of what was supplied to the United States
through reverse lend-lease, see the table included in the note to Item 105, 1941 volume.

The reverse lend-lease program began almost immediately after December 7, 1941. The first such reverse lend-lease was the shipment by the United Kingdom of barrage balloons to the United States to aid in our home air defenses. Happily, the occasion did not arise for the United States to make use of these barrage balloons, but their speedy receipt was a symbol of the alertness of Great Britain to reciprocate, when she could, for the aid which we had extended her during her critical hours.

By far the greatest amount of reverse lend-lease aid was made available by the British Empire. Great Britain herself made available to the United States close to five billion dollars' worth of reverse lend-lease aid. Australia, New Zealand, India, and the Union of South Africa brought this total up to approximately $6,750,000,000 in goods and services for the United States and American personnel overseas.

As of September 30, 1946, the cumulative amount of reverse lend-lease aid received by the United States from foreign countries was $7,819,322,000. Next to the expenditures by Great Britain and the British Empire, the largest amounts of reverse lend-lease were received from France, French Africa, and Belgium, which contributed a total of somewhat over a billion dollars' worth of goods and services. Over 99 percent of reverse lend-lease aid was contributed by the British Empire, France, French Africa, and Belgium.

125 (A Message to the Congress Recommending Appropriations for the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

November 15, 1943

To the Congress:

I am happy to inform the Congress that on November 9, 1943, representatives of 43 Nations and peoples joined with our own Government in signing the accompanying U.N.R.R.A. Agreement, setting up an International Relief and Rehabilitation Administration to give first aid in the liberated areas. This Agreement provides only the framework. The implementation is left to the constitutional lawmaking body of the member states.
125. *Appropriations for U.N.R.R.A.*

The task of the organization will be to assist in furnishing the medicine, food, clothing, and other basic necessities and essential services which are required to restore the strength of the liberated peoples. They have been deliberately stripped by the enemy in order to support the Axis war machine. More than that, the Axis leaders have boasted that as they withdraw, they will leave only devastation—what they have not stolen, they will destroy. As our American soldiers fight their way up the Italian boot, they are discovering at firsthand that the barbarism of the Nazis is equal to their boasts. Their only rivals in this respect are the Japanese.

U.N.R.R.A. will be able to make only a beginning in the vast task of aiding the victims of war. The greatest part of the job will have to be done by the liberated peoples themselves. What U.N.R.R.A. can do is to help the liberated peoples to help themselves, so that they may have the strength to undertake the task of rebuilding their destroyed homes, their ruined factories, and their plundered farms.

The length of the war may be materially shortened if, as we free each occupied area, the people are enlisted in support of the United Nations’ armies.

Already, for example, a new French Army has been created and, as we strike toward Berlin, increasing numbers in Sicily and Italy are falling in step beside the soldiers of the United Nations. Others construct roads and military installations required for our military operations. Millions more are waiting for the moment when they, too, can strike a blow against the enemy.

They do not want charity. They seek the strength to fight, and to do their part in securing the peace. Aid to the liberated peoples during the war is thus a matter of military necessity as well as of humanity.

U.N.R.R.A. will not, of course, be expected to solve the long-range problems of reconstruction. Other machinery and other measures will be necessary for this purpose. What U.N.R.R.A. can do is to lay the necessary foundation for these later tasks of reconstruction.
The devastation and disorganization caused by the Nazi and Japanese war machines is so great that this world disaster can be met only by the united action of the 44 United Nations and associated Nations. Accordingly, under the agreement establishing U.N.R.R.A., it is proposed that each Nation will contribute in accordance with its ability. Each will determine for itself the amount and character of the contribution which it can make.

A small fraction of the national income of the contributing member states will, it is hoped, be sufficient to meet the needs. Some of the liberated Nations may be able to make payment for the supplies and services rendered. But only by bringing to bear the resources of all the United Nations will we be able to relieve a substantial part of the suffering of the millions who will need help.

The nature and the amount of the contribution to be made by the United States will, in accordance with the terms of the U.N.R.R.A. Agreement, be determined by the Congress of the United States under its constitutional procedure.

At this time I recommend to the Congress the enactment of a bill authorizing the appropriation of funds as Congress may from time to time determine to permit the participation by the United States in the work of U.N.R.R.A. I am not now recommending the appropriation of a specific sum. At a later date after the conclusion of the Atlantic City meeting, I shall send to you a further recommendation, informing you of the result of the meeting and requesting the appropriation of specific funds.

NOTE: The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration was established by an agreement signed by 44 Nations at the White House on November 9, 1943 (see Item 123 and note, this volume, for the President’s address on the signing of the agreement, and an account of the organization and operation of U.N.R.R.A.).

The U.N.R.R.A. Council, the central policy-making body of the organization, evolved a financial plan for contributions by member Nations at the first Council meeting at Atlantic City, N. J., which began November 11, 1943. The Council recommended that each uninvaded country contribute to U.N.R.R.A. an amount equal to 1 percent of the amount determined by the member Government to have
been its national income for the year ending nearest June 30, 1943.

In response to the President's request in the foregoing message, the Congress enacted the U.N.R.R.A. Joint Resolution, approved March 28, 1944 (58 Stat. 122), and the U.N.R.R.A. Participation Appropriation Act, approved June 30, 1944 (58 Stat. 627). The Joint Resolution authorized the appropriation by the Congress of $1,350,000,000; it also incorporated the text of the U.N.R.R.A. agreement. The U.N.R.R.A. Participation Appropriation Act appropriated $450,000,000 as part of the authorized contribution of the United States; provision was also made for the transfer of an additional $350,000,000 under the Lend-Lease Act and other acts if the Joint Chiefs of Staff certified that the state of the war permitted such transfer with the approval of the Administrator of the Foreign Economic Administration.

Under these and subsequent appropriation acts, the United States made available a total of $2,700,000,000 to U.N.R.R.A. This sum amounted to 73.1 percent of the contributions to U.N.R.R.A. authorized by all member Governments through June 30, 1947 (the date when the major U.N.R.R.A. activities were terminated). In accordance with the financial plan outlined at the first Council meeting at Atlantic City, approximately 90 percent of the United States contribution was made in the form of non-convertible funds (expendable only in the United States), with approximately 10 percent in convertible funds which could be used in foreign exchange.

(For other items concerning U.N.R.R.A., see Item 123, this volume, and Items 112 and 119, 1944-1945 volume.)

126 [A Message to the Congress on Providing for the Return of Service Personnel to Civilian Life. November 23, 1943

To the Congress:

All of us are concentrating now on the one primary objective of winning this war. But even as we devote our energy and resources to that purpose, we cannot neglect to plan for things to come after victory is won.

The problem of reconverting wartime America to a peacetime basis is one for which we are now laying plans to be submitted to the Congress for action. As I said last July:
126. Return of Service Personnel to Civilian Life

"The returning soldier and sailor and marine are a part of the problem of demobilizing the rest of the millions of Americans who have been working and living in a war economy since 1941. . . But the members of the armed forces have been compelled to make greater economic sacrifice and every other kind of sacrifice than the rest of us, and they are entitled to definite action to help take care of their special problems."

At that time I outlined what seemed to me to be a minimum of action to which the members of our armed forces are entitled over and above that taken for other citizens.

What our service men and women want, more than anything else, is the assurance of satisfactory employment upon their return to civil life. The first task after the war is to provide employment for them and for our demobilized war workers.

There were skeptics who said that our wartime production goals would never be attained. There will also be skeptics who will question our ability to make the necessary plans to meet the problems of unemployment and want after the war. But, I am confident that if industry and labor and Government tackle the problems of economic readjustment after the war with the same unity of purpose and with the same ingenuity, resourcefulness, and boldness that they have employed to such advantage in wartime production, they can solve them.

We must not lower our sights to prewar levels. The goal after the war should be the maximum utilization of our human and material resources. This is the way to rout the forces of insecurity and unemployment at home, as completely as we shall have defeated the forces of tyranny and oppression on the fields of battle.

There are, however, certain measures which merit the immediate attention of the Congress to round out the program already commenced for the special protection of the members of the armed forces.

The Congress has already enacted a generous program of benefits for service men and for the widows and dependents of those killed in action.

For example:
(1) Under the National Service Life Insurance Act, life insurance at low premium rates is now available to members of the armed forces in amounts not less than $1,000 and not more than $10,000 per person. A total of nearly $90,000,000,000 of insurance has already been applied for.

(2) In addition, provision has been made, under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Relief Act, for the guarantee by the Government of the payment of premiums on commercial policies held by members of the armed forces while in service. Premiums on insurance totaling $135,582,000 have been guaranteed, as a result of 56,276 applications by service men for such relief.

(3) The Congress has also enacted legislation making provision for the hospitalization and medical care of all veterans of the present war, and for the vocational rehabilitation and training of those suffering from disability incurred in, or aggravated by, military service, when such disability results in a vocational handicap preventing reemployment. Similar provision has been made for the rehabilitation of disabled persons in civil life, who, with proper training, can be equipped to play a useful part in the war effort at home. Men who are rejected for military service because of physical or mental defects, or who are discharged from the armed forces because of a disability existing at the time of induction, are thus eligible for such rehabilitation services and training as may be necessary and feasible in order to fit them for useful and gainful employment.

(4) By recent legislation, our present service men and women have been assured the same pension benefits for death or disability incurred in the line of duty while in active military service as are provided for the veterans of prior wars. The pension rates for the family of those killed in this war were recently increased by the Congress.

The Veterans Administration will, from time to time, request the consideration by the Congress of various amendments of existing laws which will facilitate administration, and which will correct any defects in our present statutory scheme which experience may disclose. I am confident that the Congress, in line with
the historic policy of this Government toward its ill, injured, and disabled service men and women, will provide generous appropriations to the Veterans Administration with which to carry out these laws.

(5) Numerous other measures have been adopted for the protection of our service men such as the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act suspending the enforcement of certain obligations against members of the armed forces, the creation of reemployment rights under the Selective Service Act, and the provision for emergency maternity care to the wives and infants of enlisted men.

However, I believe that we must go much further.

We must make provision now to help our returning service men and women bridge the gap from war to peace activity. When the war is over, our men and women in the armed forces will be eager to rejoin their families, get a job, or continue their education, and to pick up the threads of their former lives. They will return at a time when industry will be in the throes of reconversion. Our plans for demobilization of soldiers and sailors must be consistent with our plans for the reconversion of industry and for the creation of employment opportunities for both service men and war workers. Already the armed forces have returned many thousands of service men and women to civil life.

The following further steps seem desirable now:

(1) To help service men and women tide over the difficult period of readjustment from military to civilian life, mustering-out pay will be needed. It will relieve them of anxiety while they seek private employment or make their personal plans for the future. I therefore recommend to the Congress that it enact legislation and provide funds for the payment of a uniform, reasonable mustering-out pay to all members of the armed forces upon their honorable discharge or transfer to inactive duty. This pay should not be in a lump sum but on a monthly installment basis.

(2) We must anticipate, however, that some members of the armed forces may not be able to obtain employment within a reasonable time after their return to civil life. For them, unem-
Employment allowances should be provided until they can reasonably be absorbed by private industry.

Members of the armed services are not now adequately covered by existing unemployment insurance laws of the States. It is estimated that approximately one-half of them will have no unemployment insurance protection at all when they leave military service. Benefits payable to those who are covered by State law are unequal, and will vary greatly among the States because of the wide differences in the provisions of the State laws. The protection in many cases will be inadequate. It is plainly a Federal responsibility to provide for the payment of adequate and equitable allowances to those service men and women who are unable to find employment after their demobilization.

For these reasons, I recommend to the Congress that a uniform system of allowances for unemployed service men and women be established.

I believe that there should be a fixed and uniform rate of benefit for a fixed period of time for all members of the armed forces who, after leaving the service, are unable to find suitable work. In order to qualify for an unemployment allowance each person should be obliged to register with the United States Employment Service, and, following the usual practice in unemployment insurance, must be willing to accept available and suitable employment, or to engage in a training course to prepare him for such employment. The protection under this system should be continued for an adequate length of time following the period for which mustering-out payment is made.

At present, persons serving in the merchant marine are not insured under State unemployment insurance laws, primarily because the very nature of their employment carries them beyond the confines of any particular State. I believe that the most effective way of protecting maritime workers against postwar unemployment is to enact without delay a Federal maritime unemployment insurance act. There has been in effect since 1938 a railroad unemployment insurance act, and a similar act for maritime workers is long overdue. Marine workers are, however, in-
Return of Service Personnel to Civilian Life

Assured under the existing Federal old-age and survivors' insurance law.

(3) Members of the armed forces are not receiving credit under the Federal old-age and survivors' insurance law for their period of military service. Credit under the law can be obtained only while a person is engaged in certain specific types of employment. Service in the armed forces is not included in these types. Since the size of the insurance benefits depends upon the total number of years in which credits are obtained, the exclusion of military service will operate to decrease the old-age retirement benefits which will eventually be payable to service men and women. Furthermore, a large number of persons whose dependents were protected by the survivors' insurance benefits at the time they entered the armed forces are losing entirely those insurance rights while they are in service.

I therefore recommend that the Congress enact legislation to make it possible for members of the armed forces to obtain credit under the Federal old-age and survivors' insurance law during their period of military service. The burden of this extension of old-age and survivors' insurance to members of the armed forces should be carried by the Federal Government, and the Federal contributions should be uniform for all members of the armed forces irrespective of their rank.

I have already communicated with the Congress requesting the enactment of legislation to provide educational and training opportunities for the members of the armed forces who desire to pursue their studies after their discharge.

The Congress will agree, I am sure, that, this time, we must have plans and legislation ready for our returning veterans instead of waiting until the last moment. It will give notice to our armed forces that the people back home do not propose to let them down.

NOTE: The three major recommendations made in the foregoing message of the President were carried out by the Congress in three separate enactments. Under the Mustering-Out Payment Act of 1944 (58 Stat. 10), approved by the President on February 3, 1944, pay-
ments were made to members of the armed forces on their separation, graduated according to the nature of their service. Under the G. I. Bill of Rights (see Item 45 and note, 1944-1945 volume) unemployment allowances were provided in accordance with the President's recommendations. On August 10, 1946, President Truman approved an act (60 Stat. 978) which extended social security benefits to cover survivorship cases involving members of the armed forces.

127 The President Vetoes a Bill Designating December 7 as Armed Services Honor Day.

December 1, 1943

To the Senate:

I return herewith, without my approval, Senate Joint Resolution 59, authorizing the President of the United States of America to proclaim Armed Services Honor Day for the recognition and appreciation of the patriotic devotion to duty of all members of all branches of the armed military and naval forces of the United States of America.

The measure designates December 7, 1943, as Armed Services Honor Day and authorizes and requests the President to issue a proclamation commending the observance of that day in honor of all men and women who have served or are now serving in any and all branches of the military and naval armed services of the United States. The measure further requests the Governors of every State to invoke the people's cooperation and urges local governmental units to make plans and hold appropriate ceremonies for proper observation of the occasion in every community.

I consider the commemoration of the day fixed in the measure to be singularly inappropriate. December 7, two years ago, is a day that is remembered in this country as one of infamy on the part of a treacherous enemy. The day itself requires no reminder, and its anniversary should rather serve to cause all the people of
the Nation to increase their efforts contributing to the successful prosecution of the war.

Furthermore, it seems to me premature to establish at this time a day to be set aside to honor and commemorate all who have served in the armed forces of the United States during the course of the present war. I think that a more suitable date can be selected for this purpose, and that future events will ordain the proper date for such a commemoration.

For the foregoing reasons, I am constrained to withhold approval of this Resolution. This Joint Resolution was presented to me on November 25, 1943.

NOTE: The attempt to designate December 7 as “Armed Services Honor Day” was one of a long series of well-meaning efforts to commemorate the events which had occurred at Pearl Harbor to bring the United States into the war. Many individuals, in keeping with the slogans of Spanish-American War days, suggested “Remember Pearl Harbor” and similar reminders of December 7. Someone even wrote a popular song with that title.

In his address to the Congress on December 8, 1941, the President had characterized December 7, 1941, as “a date which will live in infamy” (see Item 125, 1941 volume), and he had no reason to change his opinion during the course of the war. The President recognized that the war was being fought over issues which lay far deeper than Pearl Harbor. Furthermore, Pearl Harbor seemed hardly appropriate as a day this Nation might proudly commemorate. Therefore, the President successfully discouraged all attempts to set this day aside as one worth remembering.

As the last sentence of the foregoing veto message, the President wrote: “This joint resolution was presented to me on November 25, 1943.” Fortunately, this unusual language in a veto message was not particularly noticed by anyone in the Congress, nor did it receive comment in the press. There was a special reason why the President used this wording. At the time, the President was attending the Teheran Conference (see Items 128, 137, 138, and notes, this volume). With the Congress in session, he was concerned with the constitutional provision that bills passed by the Congress would become law if not returned within ten days after receipt of the bill by the President.

Normally, the ten days began to run from the time the bill was delivered to the White House by the Congressional messenger. This would not allow much leeway for airplane delivery to Teheran from
Washington, and bad weather or mechanical difficulties might prevent delivery within the ten-day limit. The President talked with me about this problem before his departure, and we decided that we would take the position that the President under a broad interpretation of the Constitution would have ten days after the bill had been presented to him in person wherever he happened to be. Therefore, the White House clerk prepared a new type of receipt for bills, this new receipt reading "Received at White House (date) for forwarding to the President." At the President's direction, I conferred with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of Representatives to forestall any indiscreet inquiries about this new form of receipt.

The foregoing veto message accompanied one of the two bills which the President vetoed while he was absent at the Teheran Conference. It so happened that we were able to return the vetoed bills with the messages to the Congress within the ten-day period. Accordingly, no questions were raised, and it never became necessary to put our theory to the test.

128 Joint Communiqué on the Cairo Conference. December 1, 1943

President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and Prime Minister Churchill, together with their respective military and diplomatic advisers, have completed a conference in North Africa.

The following general statement was issued:

"The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations against Japan. The Three Great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their brutal enemies by sea, land, and air. This pressure is already rising.

"The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has
stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and The Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid Three Great Powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.

"With these objects in view the Three Allies, in harmony with those of the United Nations at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan."

**NOTE:** The foregoing item was the official announcement of the first Cairo Conference.

On November 13, 1943, the President, with Harry Hopkins, Generals Marshall and Arnold, and Admirals Leahy and King, as well as other military and naval officers, sailed from Hampton Roads, Virginia, on the battleship *Iowa*. Seven days later, the ship reached Oran, where the President was met by General Eisenhower. He flew to Tunis on the *Sacred Cow*, and then, after a tour of the battlefields, the President proceeded to Cairo. There followed four days of conferences with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, in which Prime Minister Churchill participated. The conferences ended on November 27, 1943, and the foregoing announcement was released on December 1, 1943.

Meanwhile, prior to its release, the President had flown to Teheran, arriving on November 28, 1943, for the conferences with Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill. On December 1, 1943, the Teheran Conference ended although the Teheran Declaration (Item 129, this volume) was not released until December 6, 1943.

On December 2, the President went to Camp Amirabad, where American troops of the Persian Gulf Command were stationed. He spoke informally to these troops (Item 130, this volume), and, on the same day, he and his party flew back to Cairo. From December 4 to December 6, the President conferred with President Inonu of Turkey. Prime Minister Churchill participated in some of these conferences, and a communiqué was issued on December 7 (Item 132, this volume). At the close of the conferences, the President flew back to Tunis and then to Malta (Item 133, this volume).

For a vivid and superb account of the President's trip and these conferences, see Robert E. Sherwood's *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, pp. 766-804.
129. The Teheran Conference

129 The Anglo-American-Russian Declaration of Teheran. December 1, 1943

Declaration of the Three Powers:

We, the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, and the Premier of the Soviet Union, have met these four days past, in this, the Capital of our ally, Iran, and have shaped and confirmed our common policy.

We express our determination that our Nations shall work together in war and in the peace that will follow.

As to war — our military staffs have joined in our round-table discussions, and we have concerted our plans for the destruction of the German forces. We have reached complete agreement as to the scope and timing of the operations to be undertaken from the east, west, and south.

The common understanding which we have here reached guarantees that victory will be ours.

And as to peace — we are sure that our concord will win an enduring peace. We recognize fully the supreme responsibility resting upon us and all the United Nations to make a peace which will command the good will of the overwhelming mass of the peoples of the world and banish the scourge and terror of war for many generations.

With our diplomatic advisers we have surveyed the problems of the future. We shall seek the cooperation and active participation of all Nations, large and small, whose peoples in heart and mind are dedicated, as are our own peoples, to the elimination of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance. We will welcome them, as they may choose to come, into a world family of democratic Nations.

No power on earth can prevent our destroying the German armies by land, their U-boats by sea, and their war plants from the air.

Our attack will be relentless and increasing.

Emerging from these cordial conferences we look with con-
129. The Teheran Conference

fidence to the day when all peoples of the world may live free lives, untouched by tyranny, and according to their varying desires and their own consciences.

We came here with hope and determination. We leave here, friends in fact, in spirit, and in purpose.

Signed: ROOSEVELT, CHURCHILL, AND STALIN.
Signed at Teheran, December 1, 1943.

NOTE: Ever since the Nazi attack on Russia in 1941, the President had been attempting to include Stalin in the international conferences which took place at frequent intervals with Prime Minister Churchill and the British staffs. The system of government which Stalin represented was detested by freedom-loving peoples everywhere, but the military fact remained that after 1941 Russia was helping the Allied cause by weakening Germany. Under these circumstances, it became expedient to formulate joint strategic plans designed to eliminate Germany and Japan from the war as quickly as possible. Looking at these conferences through hindsight, many people fail to recapture the grim wartime situation: American forces were fighting and dying on world-wide fronts, every ounce of Russian strength was being used to help defeat the Nazis, and probably saved the lives of many American fighting men.

Against the background of the conferences with the Russians at Teheran and Yalta must also be placed the question of the opening of the second front. The sharp initial successes of the German armies against the Russians in 1941 and 1942 involved huge losses in Russian manpower which ran into the millions, before a drop of American blood was shed in large scale operations in Europe. Plans were laid to launch a limited cross-channel assault in the fall of 1942; but the acute British setbacks in Libya and the fall of Tobruk, coupled with American shortages in landing craft and escort vessels and lack of trained troops, led to the postponement of cross-channel operations until 1944. This postponement caused some acrimonious discussions with Russian leaders, who were insisting on an invasion of western Europe in 1942. It is against this background — and the fact that Russian aid in the Far East seemed essential for victory against Japan — that the conferences of Teheran and Yalta must be approached.

In the spring of 1942, at the time of the Casablanca Conference, in May 1943, and again at the time of the first Quebec Conference in August 1943, the President unsuccessfully tried to get Stalin's consent to meet with Churchill and himself. In October 1943, Secretary of State
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Hull in his trip to Moscow for the meeting of Foreign Ministers (see Item 119, this volume) concluded arrangements for the Teheran Conference, the first conference during the war in which Stalin consented to participate.

Following the first Cairo meeting with Chiang Kai-shek and Churchill, the President flew to Teheran, arriving there on Saturday, November 27. Stalin called on the President on the following day, and the two men alone with their interpreters conversed for 45 minutes on subjects ranging from military operations on the Russian front to French political affairs, the merchant fleets of America and Britain, the future operations in the Far East, and the problems of the British in India. Following this, Churchill and the staffs of the three Nations arrived for the first plenary session.

At the first formal Teheran session, the President opened the meeting and presided throughout—despite the fact that a special circular oaken table, ten feet in diameter, had been constructed for the occasion by local carpenters in order that none of the three chiefs of state would have precedence by sitting at the "head" of the table. After the exchange of initial pleasantries, the President reviewed the American point of view toward the war against Japan, and followed with brief comments on the European theater of war. The U. S. record of the Conference as quoted in Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 778-779 notes that the President said "that the United States was more directly affected by the war in the Pacific and that the United States forces were bearing the chief burden in that area with, of course, help from Australian and British forces; the greater part of the U. S. naval establishment was in the Pacific and over a million men were being maintained there. He pointed out as evidence of the immense distances in the Pacific that one supply ship operating from the United States could make only three round trips a year. The allied strategy in the Pacific was based on the doctrine of attrition which was proving successful. We were sinking more Japanese tonnage than the Japanese were able to replace. He said that the allies were moving forward through the southern islands and now through the islands to the east of Japan. On the north little more could be done due to the distance between the Aleutian and Kurile Islands. On the west our one great objective was to keep China in the war, and for that purpose an expedition was in preparation to attack through North Burma and from Yunnan Province. In this operation Anglo-British forces would operate in North Burma and Chinese forces from Yunnan. The entire operation would be under the command of Lord Louis Mountbatten. In addition, amphibious operations were planned south of Burma to attack
plained that the situation on the German front precluded Russia from entering the war against Japan but gave assurance that Russia would eventually do so. A good deal of discussion revolved around all three leaders stressing the primary importance of the cross-channel invasion of France, supplemented by the invasion of southern France. Churchill during the first session, and in fact the entire conference, stressed the desirability of persuading Turkey to enter the war, a possibility which Stalin said he was convinced was unlikely.

The President was host at dinner on the evening of the first day of the Teheran Conference, furnishing opportunity for additional exchange of views. In response to the President's suggestion, Stalin agreed that free navigation in both directions through the approaches to the Baltic Sea would be desirable after the war. Stalin disagreed, however, with the President's previously announced doctrine of "unconditional surrender" to be applied to Germany. Stalin claimed that German capitulation might be hastened through the statement of terms short of unconditional surrender. The President consistently refused to change his mind on the formula for surrender which he first enunciated at the joint press conference with Churchill at Casablanca (see Item 6 and note, this volume).

Following Anglo-American-Russian military staff talks on the
morning of November 29, the President and Stalin had another 45-minute talk prior to a plenary session. The first part of the conversation involved Russian assistance in the war against Japan. The President also asked for the use of Russian bases in the shuttle-bombing of Germany, a request which was later granted. When the President ascertained that Stalin would be receptive to a discussion of future international organization, the President proposed three main bodies for such an organization: an Assembly composed of all Nations, an Executive Committee of ten to deal with nonmilitary questions, and an enforcing agency to consist of Russia, Great Britain, China and the United States. Stalin expressed some doubt whether the small Nations would support such an enforcing agency, and he minimized the postwar power of China and her right to enforce peace in Europe.

The Second Plenary Session commenced at 3:30 p.m. on November 29, and was devoted almost entirely to a discussion of the cross-channel Operation OVERLORD and the means to carry it to success. Once again Churchill stressed the desirability of additional operations in the areas of the Balkans, without receiving much support. Robert E. Sherwood, in describing the role and behavior of the three principals in the conference, states in his Roosevelt and Hopkins: "One cannot read these deliberately dry and guarded accounts without the feeling that here were Titans determining the future course of an entire planet. This was indeed the Big Three. Churchill employed all the debater's arts, the brilliant locutions and circumlocutions, of which he was a master, and Stalin wielded his bludgeon with relentless indifference to all the dodges and feints of his practiced adversary; while Roosevelt sat in the middle, by common consent the moderator, arbitrator and final authority. His contributions to the conversations were infrequent and sometimes annoyingly irrelevant, but it appears time and again—at Teheran and at Yalta—that it was he who spoke the last word."

On repeated occasions during the Teheran Conference, Stalin attempted to pin the President down as to which general would be placed in command of Operation OVERLORD. Although the President felt at the time of the Conference that this command would probably go to General Marshall, he refused to make a definite commitment to Stalin at the time.

A brief plenary session was held on November 30, in the course of which Churchill noted the need which Russia had for warm water ports. The President then mentioned that Russia might possibly have access to the port of Dairen in Manchuria—a suggestion which many observers erroneously conclude was first made at Yalta rather than Teheran.

At dinner on the evening of No
November 30, a number of toasts and tributes were exchanged among the three leaders, including a statement by Stalin that without American production the war would have been lost. The President, in appraising the results of the Teheran Conference at this dinner, stated that the Conference increased the hopes for a better world in which the ordinary citizen might engage in peaceful toil and enjoy the fruits of his labors.

On December 1, the final day of the Conference, there was a lengthy discussion on the proposed meeting with President Inonu of Turkey. In the afternoon, the President, Stalin and Molotov met privately and the President attempted to acquaint the Russian leaders with some of the facts of life concerning American politics and the operation of public opinion in a democracy. The President pointed out that the opinions of millions of Americans of Polish, Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian origin had to be respected, to which Stalin later recommended that "propaganda work" be done among these peoples.

In the final plenary session, the conferees agreed on division of the Italian fleet and an agreement was also reached on the frontiers of Poland, although the President did not participate in the Polish agreement. Finally, some inconclusive discussions were held on how Germany should be dismembered after the war. The President presented a plan for five autonomous states, of Prussia (reduced in size); Hanover and Northwest; Saxony and Leipzig area; Hesse-Darmstadt, Hesse-Kassel and the area south of the Rhine; Bavaria, Baden and Wurttemberg. Under this plan, the Kiel Canal and Hamburg, the Ruhr and the Saar were to be placed under United Nations control. Churchill presented as an alternative that the southern states of Germany should be made part of a Danubian Confederation, to which Stalin strongly objected for fear Germany would dominate such a confederation. Because Stalin was not enthusiastic about either proposal, the discussion about the future of Germany reached no meeting of the minds.

On December 2, after spending the night at Camp Amirabad among American troops of the Persian Gulf Command, the President visited with and spoke to the troops prior to taking off for Cairo for his meeting with President Inonu (see Item 130, this volume; see Item 132 and note, this volume, for an account of the conference with Turkish officials).
Informal, Extemporaneous Remarks to the Personnel at Camp Amirabad, Teheran, Iran. December 2, 1943

Officers and men:

If you had said to me, or I had said to you three years ago, that we would meet in Iran today, we would have probably said that we were completely crazy.

I got here four days ago to meet with the Marshal of Soviet Russia and the Prime Minister of England, to try to do two things. The first was to lay military plans for cooperation among the three Nations, looking toward the winning of the war just as fast as we possibly can. And I think we have made progress toward that end.

The other purpose was to talk over world conditions after the war—to try to plan for a world for us and for our children when war would cease to be a necessity. We have made great progress in that, also.

But, of course, the first thing is to win the war, and I want to tell you that you—all of you—individually and collectively, are a part of that purpose. All of you who are here today, and all of you who are farther south in Iran, can remember always that you have taken a very necessary and very useful part in winning the war.

When I woke up this morning in this camp and looked out, I said to myself, “I am back in Arizona or New Mexico.” And then, suddenly, I realized how far away from home we are.

America is proud of you, proud of what you are doing in this distant place. I wish that great numbers of our people could see this work of getting the necessary equipment and supplies through to our ally, who has had very heavy losses, but who is licking the Nazi hordes.

And so I am on my way home. I wish I could take all of you with me. The people back home know what you are doing—
how well you are doing it. They, too, are proud of you. All I can say is, "May you get back home to our good America just as soon as you can. Good-by and good luck."

131 (Informal, Extemporaneous Remarks to a Group of Military Policemen at the President's Villa in Cairo, Egypt. December 6, 1943

Boys, I want to say "howdy" to you.

We are in a very strange land. I have already seen about three thousand of our boys in a more distant place than this — Teheran. Strictly speaking, to us — and I think to them too — it seems the end of the world. Here we are much nearer home, but even this seems too far from home. I think we all want to get back home. I know I do. I wish all of you could be going too, but we know you can't do it just yet.

My place here has been extremely well guarded, just as well as my place at Hyde Park. There is a place next door to my place up there where we have an M.P. school, and they look after us very well. On graduating, they are sent on to duty in distant parts of the world. When I get back home, I shall see them and tell them I saw you, and that you M.P.'s guarded me while I was in Cairo.

Most people back home, nearly all of them, are mighty proud of what our people are doing in every part of the world. They want the war over just as much as we do, and they want to make this the last one we will have to go through as long as we and our children live. That is our great objective — our great reasoning. This time when we clean out the enemy we are going to clean them out thoroughly, so that they can't start another war.

People back home, most of them, are working hard every day that goes by, doing better, doing more and more, producing the things that are necessary for us to win the war. I wish that I could get into this myself, play a more active part than is possible.
These conferences here, and up in Iran, have been very satisfactory—extremely so. Real accord has been reached. After all, the Russians, the British, the Chinese, and ourselves—collectively we represent and are fighting for nearly three-fourths of all the people in the world. That is something for us to realize. It means without doubt that even if we have to keep peace by force for a while, we are going to do it. But that does not mean that you are going to have to stay overseas all your lives.

It’s good to see you.

Thank you for all that you have done for me, and for the members of my staff.

NOTE: The President’s informal, extemporaneous remarks to soldiers at Teheran and at Cairo were not published at the time. In the foregoing remarks, the President said that “even if we have to keep peace by force for a while, we are going to do it.” Staff accompanying the President wanted to have this statement released when it was made, but the President said it was too important a statement to be released in such an off-hand way. He therefore gave instructions that a typewritten copy of this remark be forwarded to me, so that when he prepared his report to the people on the results of the Teheran Conference, that thought would get into the address—which it did (see Item 138, this volume).

132 Communiciqué on Meeting with the President of Turkey. December 7, 1943

Mr. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, M. Ismet Inonu, President of the Turkish Republic, and Mr. Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, met in Cairo on December 4, 5, and 6, 1943.

Mr. Anthony Eden, His Majesty’s principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, M. Numan Menemencioglu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, and Mr. Harry Hopkins took part in their deliberations.

Participation in this conference of the head of the Turkish state, in response to the cordial invitation addressed to him by
132. Meeting with President of Turkey

the United States, British, and Soviet Governments, bears striking testimony to the strength of the alliance which unites Great Britain and Turkey, and to the firm friendship existing between the Turkish people and the United States of America and the Soviet Union.

Presidents Roosevelt and Inonu and Prime Minister Churchill reviewed the general political situation and examined at length the policy to be followed, taking into account the joint and several interests of the three countries.

The study of all problems in a spirit of understanding and loyalty showed that the closest unity existed between the United States of America, Turkey, and Great Britain in their attitude to the world situation.

The conversations in Cairo have consequently been most useful and most fruitful for future relations between the four countries concerned.

The identity of interests and of views of the great American and British democracies with those of the Soviet Union, as also the traditional relations of friendship existing between these powers and Turkey, have been reaffirmed throughout the proceedings of the Cairo Conference.

NOTE: After the historic conference with Churchill and Stalin at Teheran (see Item 128 and note, this volume), the President proceeded to Cairo for a meeting with President Inonu of Turkey, and Churchill. It was a plan closest to Churchill's heart to bring Turkey into the war, and one which he pushed unremittingly, but the President was skeptical about whether this could be accomplished.

In the three days when conferences were held in Cairo, December 4-6, the President joined with Churchill, Inonu and the Turkish Foreign Minister in two meetings, and Churchill on his own attempted to convince the Turkish leaders that they should enter the war. The reluctance of Turkey was based on a fear that they were not strong enough to prevent destruction of their country in the event of attack.

In the midst of this second Cairo Conference, it became necessary for the President to inform Chiang Kai-shek that American and British support for the land offensive in North Burma (Operation TARZAN) and amphibious operations in the Bay of Bengal would have to be withdrawn. The President explained the situation in the follow-
ing excerpt from his note of December 5, 1943 sent to Chiang Kai-shek from Cairo, with the approval of Churchill: "Conference with Stalin involves us in combined grand operations on European continent in the late spring giving fair prospect of terminating war with Germany by end of summer of 1944. These operations impose so large a requirement of heavy landing craft as to make it impracticable to devote a sufficient number to the amphibious operation in Bay of Bengal simultaneously with launching of TARZAN to insure success of operation . . ."

After the Teheran and the second Cairo Conference the President flew to Tunis and conferred with General Eisenhower. The President then informed General Eisenhower of the decision which he had reached on December 5 at Cairo—
that Eisenhower was to be placed in command of the Allied invasion forces which would strike at France. Despite strong pressure that this post be given to General Marshall, and despite the President's initial feeling that Marshall was the man for the task and should be given the opportunity to cap his military career by leading Operation Overlord, General Eisenhower was ultimately selected. Aside from the fact that General Eisenhower had demonstrated his outstanding ability in both military strategy and in welding the British and American armies into a smooth-working team, General Marshall's position on the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff made him almost indispensable in Washington.

The President then flew with General Eisenhower to Malta (see Item 133 and note, this volume).

133 The President Pays Tribute to the Heroism of Malta. Remarks at Malta.
December 8, 1943

Lord Gort, officers and men, good people of Malta:

Nearly a year ago the Prime Minister and I were in Casablanca — shortly after the landings by British and American troops in North Africa — and at that time I told the Prime Minister some day we would control once more the whole of the Mediterranean and that I would go to Malta.

For many months I have wanted on behalf of the American people to pay some little tribute to this island and to all of its people — civil and military — who during these years have con-
tributed so much to democracy, not just here but all over the civilized world. And so, at last I have been able to come. At last I have been able to see something of your historic land. I wish I could stay but I have many things to do. May I tell you though that during these past three weeks the Prime Minister and I feel that we two have struck strong blows for the future of the human race.

And so, in this simple way, I am taking the opportunity to do what all the American people would like to join me in doing. I have here a little token—a scroll—a citation—from the President of the United States, speaking in behalf of all the people of the United States. And may I read it to you:

“In the name of the people of the United States of America, I salute the Island of Malta, its people and defenders, who, in the cause of freedom and justice and decency throughout the world, have rendered valorous service far above and beyond the call of duty.

“Under repeated fire from the skies, Malta stood alone, but unafraid in the center of the sea, one tiny bright flame in the darkness—a beacon of hope for the clearer days which have come.

“Malta’s bright story of human fortitude and courage will be read by posterity with wonder and with gratitude through all the ages.

“What was done in this Island maintains the highest traditions of gallant men and women who from the beginning of time have lived and died to preserve civilization for all mankind.

“Dated December 7, 1943. Signed FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.”

I have signed it at the bottom and I wrote on it not today but yesterday, December 7, because that was the second anniversary of the entry into the war of the American people. We will proceed until that war is won and more than that, we will stand shoulder to shoulder with the British Empire and our other allies in making it a victory worth while.

NOTE: Two or three days before the President left for the Teheran Conference he called in Bob Sherwood and me and said that on the way back he wanted, if possible, to stop at Malta and present a scroll to its inhabitants for their gallant part in the war in withstanding countless Axis air attacks.

Sherwood and I prepared the text which is set forth in the foregoing speech. Then the question
arose as to how to get it engraved appropriately without breaking the wartime secrecy of the proposed trip of the President. We called in Mr. Giegengack, the very competent and discreet gentleman who was then in charge of the Government Printing Office; and explained our problem to him. He undertook to get it done in a way which would maintain the secrecy of the forthcoming trip. The procedure he set up required more time than it would have taken in normal routine. As a result, the President could not take the scroll with him; it had to be sent after him. It was a most beautiful piece of scrollwork, and is now one of the treasured documents in Malta. The scroll was presented to Lord Gort, Governor General of Malta, in a ceremony at the Luca Airdrome. Lord Gort’s acceptance speech follows:

“Mr. President:

“We are very sensible of the greatness of this occasion and of the important place which the 7th of December, 1943, will occupy in our history and of the United Nations. It is a day which Malta will never forget and I can assure you, Sir, that this citation, presented in person by the President of the United States of America, has moved us very deeply. May I be permitted, on behalf of the armed forces of the Crown and peoples of Malta, to thank you, Mr. President, most respectfully, most sincerely, and most gratefully for the sentiments which inspired you to undertake this special journey.

“Malta is, perhaps not unjustifiably, proud that she has been able to play her part in the Mediterranean war, but the language in which the citation is couched and, if I may be permitted to say so, Mr. President, the moving phrases which you have so generously used in making this presentation impress upon us how highly you rate such services as our island fortress has been able to render to the cause of the United Nations.

“No one can be asked to do more in war than to fulfill his or her duty—no one can do less, and that you, Sir, and citizens of the United States of America should feel that the armed forces and people of these islands have not failed the United Nations is in itself a full reward.

“Mr. President, the memory of the great honor which you have conferred upon this fortress today will always be cherished by each one of us and I can assure you, Sir, that this citation will be a treasured and highly prized addition to the historic archives of Malta. But I also believe that the full purport of its message will not be realized unless generations as yet unborn are constantly reminded of the common sacrifices of the United States of America and the British Empire in this the Second World War. I, therefore, have it in mind, Mr. President, with your consent to reproduce the citation in bronze and to
place it in the Palace Square in Valletta where it will stand in all weathers as a permanent monument to a great and unique occasion."

The President after leaving Malta flew to Sicily, landing at Castelvetrano on the southwest corner of the island. The President reviewed troops which had five months before participated in the invasion of Sicily, and he then bestowed the Distinguished Service Cross on General Mark Clark and five other officers of the Fifth Army. The homeward bound journey was made on the U.S.S. Iowa (see Item 135, this volume) and the President arrived back in Washington December 17, 1943, after having been absent since November 11.

134 (Statement of the President on the Death of Marvin McIntyre. December 13, 1943

Another faithful servant is lost to the public service in the death of Marvin McIntyre. Despite the handicap of frail health in recent years which would have defeated a less valiant spirit he could not be persuaded by any consideration of self-interest to relax his devotion to the heavy and important duties and responsibilities which fell to him to discharge.

To me personally his death means the severing of a close friendship of a quarter of a century. We at the White House shall miss him. We shall remember him as a public servant whose whole career emphasized fidelity and integrity in the performance of the many tasks which made up his busy day. We shall remember also his never failing humor, his cheerful spirit, and his ever ready helpfulness throughout these years.

NOTE: In the last two years of his life, the President was saddened by the passing of several of his office staff who had come to be friends in every sense of the word. People like Marvin McIntyre, "Missy" Le Hand, and "Pa" Watson made magnificent contributions to Roosevelt and his work, which are difficult to appraise fully.

Marvin McIntyre was associated with the President for over a quarter of a century. While Roosevelt was Assistant Secretary of the Navy, McIntyre was in charge of press relations for the Navy Department. During the campaign of 1920, McIntyre handled publicity for Roosevelt's vice-presidential campaign. Although there was no official relationship between McIntyre and Roosevelt for several years...
after 1920, McIntyre did yeoman work during the 1932 campaign. In 1933 he became Assistant Secretary to the President in charge of appointments. After the death of Louis McHenry Howe in 1936, McIntyre was promoted to the post of one of the three Secretaries to the President.

McIntyre was particularly helpful to the President in his sound judgment as to whom the President should see and whom he should not. He had a wide circle of friends in Washington who kept him informed of a great deal of what was going on in official and semi-official circles which would never make the newspapers. He mixed in Washington society very extensively and was able to pick up much information about people and events which was valuable to the President. He was unswervingly loyal to the President and was one of those few men who would speak his mind frankly even though it was to say something unpleasant. In later years, he became quite ill and should have cut down on his work — but he refused to take his doctor’s advice which would undoubtedly have prolonged his life.

135 Informal, Extemporaneous Remarks of the President on Leaving the U.S.S. Iowa.

December 16, 1943

Captain McCrea, officers and men of the Iowa:

I had wanted to say a few words to you on the trip east, but I couldn’t do it properly because so many of you were mere, miserable pollywogs. Now, I understand that I can talk to you as the Chief Shellback of them all.

I have had a wonderful cruise on the Iowa, one I shall never forget. I think that all my staff have behaved themselves pretty well, with one or two lapses. When we came on board from that little French destroyer, I was horrified to note that Major General Watson and Mr. Hopkins came over the rail on all fours. However, landlubbers like that do have lapses. Outside of that, all the Army and Navy and civilians have been wonderfully taken care of, and I am impressed with two facts — the first is that you had a happy lot of visitors, fellow shipmates.

Second, from all I have seen and all I have heard, the Iowa is a “happy ship,” and having served with the Navy for many years,
I know — and you know — what that means. It is part and parcel of what we are trying to do, to make every ship happy and efficient.

One of the reasons I went abroad, as you know, was to try, by conversations with other Nations, to see that this war that we are all engaged in shall not happen again. We have an idea — all of us, I think — that hereafter we have got to eliminate from the human race Nations like Germany and Japan, eliminate them from the possibility of ruining the lives of a whole lot of other Nations. And in these talks in North Africa, Egypt, and Persia, with the Chinese, the Russians, Turks, and others, we made real progress.

Obviously, it will be necessary, when we win the war, to make the possibility of a future upsetting of our civilization an impossible thing. I don’t say forever. None of us can look that far ahead. But I do say as long as any Americans and others who are alive today are still alive. That objective is worth fighting for. It is a part of democracy which exists in most of the world.

In upper Teheran, where the Prime Minister, Marshal Stalin, and I met, in one sense it followed that as heads of Governments we were representing between two-thirds and three-quarters of the entire population of the world. We all had the same fundamental aims: stopping what has been going on in these past four years. And that is why I believe from the viewpoint of people — just plain people — this trip has been worth while.

We are all engaged in a common struggle. We are making real progress. Take what has happened in the past two years. From Pearl Harbor, from being on the defensive — very definitely so — two years ago, from being in the process of building things up to a greater strength a year ago, to where we are today, when we have the initiative in every part of the world. The other fellows may not be on the run backwards — yet. That will be the next stage, and then all of us in the service of the country will have a better chance to go home, even if we have to come home to very cold weather like this. I think after what you have seen of Bahia and Freetown and Dakar, that you will agree with me that in the
long run, year in and year out, this American climate is better than any other.

And now I have to leave you for the U.S.S. Potomac. When I came out on deck quite a while ago, and saw her about a half-mile away, I looked and decided how she had shrunk since I had been on the Iowa.

And so good-bye for a while. I hope that I will have another cruise on this ship. Meanwhile, good luck, and remember that I am with you in spirit, each and every one of you.

136 The President Approves the Bill to Repeal the Chinese Exclusion Laws.

December 17, 1943

It is with particular pride and pleasure that I have today signed the bill repealing the Chinese Exclusion Laws. The Chinese people, I am sure, will take pleasure in knowing that this represents a manifestation on the part of the American people of their affection and regard.

An unfortunate barrier between allies has been removed. The war effort in the Far East can now be carried on with a greater vigor and a larger understanding of our common purpose.

NOTE: On October 11, 1943, the President had sent a message to the Congress asking for legislation to allow the immigration of the Chinese into this country and to allow Chinese residents here to become American citizens (see Item 111 and note, this volume, for the text of this message, a discussion of the background and issues involved, and the nature of the resulting legislation).

The President issued the foregoing statement at the time he signed the resulting legislation (57 Stat. 600), which embodied the recommendations he had made in his message of October 11. The new legislation repealed the series of laws passed between 1882 and 1913 which prohibited Chinese immigration into the United States. It also made Chinese subject to the regular quotas established in the Immigration Act of 1924, and made Chinese residents eligible for naturalization as American citizens.
137. *Nine Hundred and Twenty-seventh Press Conference*

**137** (The Nine Hundred and Twenty-seventh Press Conference (Excerpts). December 17, 1943)

*(Success of Cairo and Teheran Conferences — Death of Marvin McIntyre — Impressions of Marshal Stalin — Security precautions on trip — General Patton — Toasts.)*

(Held on the day of the President's return from the Cairo and Teheran Conferences.)

THE PRESIDENT: I want to say in connection with the trip that I thing else, on these voyages. The Secret Service and the Army of view of the conduct of the war, but also for the discussions that I hope will have definite and very beneficial effects for the postwar period, based on the general thought that when we win the war we don't want to have another one as long as this generation is alive.

The only sad note was the news I got, on the way home, of Mac's [Marvin H. McIntyre] death, because I think all you older people realize what that means to me, as he and I had been together practically since the earliest days in the Navy Department, back as far as 1913.

I think we will all miss him very much.

I know I will.

As soon as I got here this morning, I talked with the legislative leaders in regard to possibly going up to tell the Congress about the trip, but there's quite an accumulation of things, and I don't want to make carefully prepared addresses in too large numbers. . . .

Q. Sir, could you tell us any of your personal impressions of Marshal Stalin?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the actual fact of meeting him lived up to my highest expectations. We had many excellent talks. And I was also extremely glad to meet the Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek. And on the whole, the mere fact of getting to know those two world leaders, I think, is going to make for excellent relations in the future.
Mr. President, would you care to tell us how those talks were conducted? Was it an easy matter?

The President: Through an interpreter, which of course is not as easy as if I spoke Russian and Chinese and they spoke English, but still we got on all right.

Q. Facile at all?

The President: Oh, yes.

Q. Back and forth?

The President: Oh my, yes. Yes, yes.

Q. Was it stodgy, or anything of that sort?

The President: Not stodgy at all, except the answer sometimes came before the translation was finished. (Laughter)

Q. Did you find Stalin—all we know about him is that picture with a handle-bar mustache, which evidently is out of date.

The President: Yes, that is rather out of date.

Q. What type would you call him? Is he dour?

The President: I would call him something like me—he is a realist.

Q. Yes, he seems to be.

The President: (laughing) Yes.

May Craig: Tell us about it.

The President: May, I don't write no social column. (Much laughter)

Q. Sir, does he share your view that there is hope of preventing another war in this generation?

The President: Very definitely, if the people who want that objective will back it up.

Rather interesting, up at Teheran with Mr. Stalin, the Prime Minister and I—the Chinese of course didn't go to Teheran—I saw them in Cairo—we figured out that the Governments and associated Nations that were on our side represented between two-thirds and three-quarters of the entire population of the world, which I thought was rather a significant fact. In other words, world opinion if it ever does count, will count in circumstances like that. . . .

Q. Mr. President, what did you call Mr. Stalin?
THE PRESIDENT: I told him it was a beautiful day.

Q. What did you call him? How did you address him?

THE PRESIDENT: Marshal. . . .

Q. Mr. President, is there anything you can tell us about the method of your travels?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think I can put it this way, mostly that when I—well, I couldn’t put it that way because it might disclose something else. *(Laughter)* I went to Teheran in a plane. You can’t go there by water.

Q. Did you go anywhere by water, sir?

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, now you are asking questions. That’s different.

Q. That’s what I get paid for. *(Laughter)*

THE PRESIDENT: Well, one thing that irks me just as much as anything else, on these voyages. The Secret Service and the Army and the Navy are on my neck all the time for what they call security reasons; and the reason is, when you leave a place and issue a statement, it is obvious you are going away. Well, I would give the thing out right away, if I had my choice, but some places it isn’t considered in the best interests of security, because then they would know that you were leaving, and throughout the whole distance, you are practically under the range of German planes. And it’s like shooting a duck sitting on the water for a German pursuit plane to go after a transport plane without any guns on it.

Well, for instance, I don’t put much stock in this, but when we got to Teheran I went to the American Legation, which is about a mile from the Russian compound—a high wall. And next door to them is the British Embassy.

And that night, late, I got word from Marshal Stalin that they had got word of a German plot.

Well, no use going into details. Everybody was more or less upset, Secret Service, and so forth. And he pleaded with me to go down to the Russian Embassy—they have two or three different buildings in the compound—and he offered to turn over one of them to me, and that would avoid either
his, or Mr. Churchill's, or my having to take trips through the streets, in order to see each other.

So the next morning I moved out, down to the Russian compound. I was extremely comfortable there, and it was just another wall from the British place, so that none of the three of us had to go out on the streets, for example.

But of course, in a place like Teheran there are hundreds of German spies, probably, around the place, and I suppose it would make a pretty good haul if they could get all three of us going through the streets. (Laughter) And of course, if your future plans are known, or if they can guess the time because of departure from one place, they can get German pursuit planes over the transport plane very easily. . . .

Q. Mr. President, is there anything you can tell us about General Patton?

THE PRESIDENT: No. I saw him in Sicily. I saw him, and General Clark and General Eisenhower went over with me. I think probably that you may, if you want to write a piece, stick in there the story of a former President [Lincoln] who had a good deal of trouble in finding a successful commander for the armies of the United States.

And one of them turned up one day, and he was very successful.

And some very good citizens went to the President and protested: "You can't keep him. He drinks."

"It must be a good brand of liquor," was the answer.

Q. Speaking of drinking, did you attend one of those dinners where they had forty-five toasts? (Laughter)

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I can tell you this. We had one banquet where we had dinner in the Russian style. Very good dinner, too. Russian style means a number of toasts, and I counted up to three hundred and sixty-five toasts. (Laughter) And we all went away sober. It's a remarkable thing what you can do, if you try. (More laughter)

Q. How, Mr. President? (Laughter)

THE PRESIDENT: When you go up to those places like Teheran,
138. Christmas Eve Fireside Chat on International Conferences

you learn! I made one glass of vodka that big—(indicating a two-inch width with his fingers) last for about twenty toasts—just about. (Laughter)

NOTE: See Item 134 and note, this volume, for the President's statement on the death of Marvin H. McIntyre. For accounts of the Cairo and Teheran Conferences, see Items 128, 129, 138, and notes, this volume.

138 ("Keep Us Strong in Our Faith That We Fight for a Better Day for Humankind"
— Christmas Eve Fireside Chat on Teheran and Cairo Conferences. December 24, 1943

My friends:

I have recently returned from extensive journeyings in the region of the Mediterranean and as far as the borders of Russia. I have conferred with the leaders of Britain and Russia and China on military matters of the present—especially on plans for stepping up our successful attack on our enemies as quickly as possible and from many different points of the compass.

On this Christmas Eve there are over 10,000,000 men in the armed forces of the United States alone. One year ago 1,700,000 were serving overseas. Today, this figure has been more than doubled to 3,800,000 on duty overseas. By next July 1 that number overseas will rise to over 5,000,000 men and women.

That this is truly a world war was demonstrated to me when arrangements were being made with our overseas broadcasting agencies for the time to speak today to our soldiers, sailors, marines, and merchant seamen in every part of the world. In fixing the time for this broadcast, we took into consideration that at this moment here in the United States, and in the Caribbean and on the northeast coast of South America, it is afternoon. In Alaska and in Hawaii and the mid-Pacific, it is still morning. In
Iceland, in Great Britain, in North Africa, in Italy and the Middle East, it is now evening.

In the Southwest Pacific, in Australia, in China and Burma and India, it is already Christmas Day. So we can correctly say that at this moment, in those Far Eastern parts where Americans are fighting, today is tomorrow.

But everywhere throughout the world — throughout this war that covers the world — there is a special spirit that has warmed our hearts since our earliest childhood — a spirit that brings us close to our homes, our families, our friends and neighbors — the Christmas spirit of "peace on earth, good will toward men." It is an unquenchable spirit.

During the past years of international gangsterism and brutal aggression in Europe and in Asia, our Christmas celebrations have been darkened with apprehension for the future. We have said, "Merry Christmas — Happy New Year," but we have known in our hearts that the clouds which have hung over our world have prevented us from saying it with full sincerity and conviction.

And even this year, we still have much to face in the way of further suffering, and sacrifice, and personal tragedy. Our men, who have been through the fierce battles in the Solomons, the Gilberts, Tunisia, and Italy know, from their own experience and knowledge of modern war, that many bigger and costlier battles are still to be fought.

But — on Christmas Eve this year — I can say to you that at last we may look forward into the future with real, substantial confidence that, however great the cost, "peace on earth, good will toward men" can be and will be realized and insured. This year I can say that. Last year I could not do more than express a hope. Today I express a certainty — though the cost may be high and the time may be long.

Within the past year — within the past few weeks — history has been made, and it is far better history for the whole human race than any that we have known, or even dared to hope for, in these tragic times through which we pass.
A great beginning was made in the Moscow Conference last October by Mr. Molotov, Mr. Eden, and our own Mr. Hull. There and then the way was paved for the later meetings.

At Cairo and Teheran we devoted ourselves not only to military matters; we devoted ourselves also to consideration of the future — to plans for the kind of world which alone can justify all the sacrifices of this war.

Of course, as you all know, Mr. Churchill and I have happily met many times before, and we know and understand each other very well. Indeed, Mr. Churchill has become known and beloved by many millions of Americans, and the heartfelt prayers of all of us have been with this great citizen of the world in his recent serious illness.

The Cairo and Teheran Conferences, however, gave me my first opportunity to meet the Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek, and Marshal Stalin — and to sit down at the table with these unconquerable men and talk with them face to face. We had planned to talk to each other across the table at Cairo and Teheran; but we soon found that we were all on the same side of the table. We came to the Conferences with faith in each other. But we needed the personal contact. And now we have supplemented faith with definite knowledge.

It was well worth traveling thousands of miles over land and sea to bring about this personal meeting, and to gain the heartening assurance that we are absolutely agreed with one another on all the major objectives — and on the military means of attaining them.

At Cairo, Prime Minister Churchill and I spent four days with the Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek. It was the first time that we had an opportunity to go over the complex situation in the Far East with him personally. We were able not only to settle upon definite military strategy, but also to discuss certain long-range principles which we believe can assure peace in the Far East for many generations to come.

Those principles are as simple as they are fundamental. They involve the restoration of stolen property to its rightful owners,
and the recognition of the rights of millions of people in the Far East to build up their own forms of self-government without molestation. Essential to all peace and security in the Pacific and in the rest of the world is the permanent elimination of the Empire of Japan as a potential force of aggression. Never again must our soldiers and sailors and marines — and other soldiers, sailors, and marines — be compelled to fight from island to island as they are fighting so gallantly and so successfully today.

Increasingly powerful forces are now hammering at the Japanese at many points over an enormous arc which curves down through the Pacific from the Aleutians to the jungles of Burma. Our own Army and Navy, our Air Forces, the Australians and New Zealanders, the Dutch, and the British land, air, and sea forces are all forming a band of steel which is slowly but surely closing in on Japan.

On the mainland of Asia, under the Generalissimo's leadership, the Chinese ground and air forces augmented by American air forces are playing a vital part in starting the drive which will push the invaders into the sea.

Following out the military decisions at Cairo, General Marshall has just flown around the world and has had conferences with General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz — conferences which will spell plenty of bad news for the Japs in the not too far distant future.

I met in the Generalissimo a man of great vision, great courage, and a remarkably keen understanding of the problems of today and tomorrow. We discussed all the manifold military plans for striking at Japan with decisive force from many directions, and I believe I can say that he returned to Chungking with the positive assurance of total victory over our common enemy. Today we and the Republic of China are closer together than ever before in deep friendship and in unity of purpose.

After the Cairo Conference, Mr. Churchill and I went by airplane to Teheran. There we met with Marshal Stalin. We talked with complete frankness on every conceivable subject connected
with the winning of the war and the establishment of a durable peace after the war.

Within three days of intense and consistently amicable discussions, we agreed on every point concerned with the launching of a gigantic attack upon Germany.

The Russian Army will continue its stern offensives on Germany’s eastern front, the Allied armies in Italy and Africa will bring relentless pressure on Germany from the south, and now the encirclement will be complete as great American and British forces attack from other points of the compass.

The Commander selected to lead the combined attack from these other points is General Dwight D. Eisenhower. His performances in Africa, in Sicily, and in Italy have been brilliant. He knows by practical and successful experience the way to coordinate air, sea, and land power. All of these will be under his control. Lieutenant General Carl D. Spaatz will command the entire American strategic bombing force operating against Germany.

General Eisenhower gives up his command in the Mediterranean to a British officer whose name is being announced by Mr. Churchill. We now pledge that new Commander that our powerful ground, sea, and air forces in the vital Mediterranean area will stand by his side until every objective in that bitter theater is attained.

Both of these new Commanders will have American and British subordinate Commanders whose names will be announced in a few days.

During the last two days at Teheran, Marshal Stalin, Mr. Churchill, and I looked ahead to the days and months and years that will follow Germany’s defeat. We were united in determination that Germany must be stripped of her military might and be given no opportunity within the foreseeable future to regain that might.

The United Nations have no intention to enslave the German people. We wish them to have a normal chance to develop, in peace, as useful and respectable members of the European fam-
ily. But we most certainly emphasize that word "respectable"—
for we intend to rid them once and for all of Nazism and Prus-
sian militarism and the fantastic and disastrous notion that they
constitute the "master race."

We did discuss international relationships from the point of
view of big, broad objectives, rather than details. But on the basis
of what we did discuss, I can say even today that I do not think
any insoluble differences will arise among Russia, Great Britain,
and the United States.

In these conferences we were concerned with basic principles
— principles which involve the security and the welfare and the
standard of living of human beings in countries large and small.

To use an American and somewhat ungrammatical colloquial-
ism, I may say that I "got along fine" with Marshal Stalin. He is
a man who combines a tremendous, relentless determination
with a stalwart good humor. I believe he is truly representative
of the heart and soul of Russia; and I believe that we are going
to get along very well with him and the Russian people — very
well indeed.

Britain, Russia, China, and the United States and their allies
represent more than three-quarters of the total population of the
earth. As long as these four Nations with great military power
stick together in determination to keep the peace there will be
no possibility of an aggressor Nation arising to start another world
war.

But those four powers must be united with and cooperate with
all the freedom-loving peoples of Europe, and Asia, and Africa,
and the Americas. The rights of every Nation, large or small,
must be respected and guarded as jealously as are the rights of
every individual within our own Republic.

The doctrine that the strong shall dominate the weak is the
doctrine of our enemies — and we reject it.

But, at the same time, we are agreed that if force is necessary to
keep international peace, international force will be applied —
for as long as it may be necessary.

It has been our steady policy — and it is certainly a common-
sense policy—that the right of each Nation to freedom must be measured by the willingness of that Nation to fight for freedom. And today we salute our unseen allies in occupied countries—the underground resistance groups and the armies of liberation. They will provide potent forces against our enemies, when the day of the counter-invasion comes.

Through the development of science the world has become so much smaller that we have had to discard the geographical yardsticks of the past. For instance, through our early history the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans were believed to be walls of safety for the United States. Time and distance made it physically possible, for example, for us and for the other American Republics to obtain and maintain our independence against infinitely stronger powers. Until recently very few people, even military experts, thought that the day would ever come when we might have to defend our Pacific coast against Japanese threats of invasion.

At the outbreak of the first World War relatively few people thought that our ships and shipping would be menaced by German submarines on the high seas or that the German militarists would ever attempt to dominate any Nation outside of central Europe.

After the Armistice in 1918, we thought and hoped that the militaristic philosophy of Germany had been crushed; and being full of the milk of human kindness we spent the next twenty years disarming, while the Germans whined so pathetically that the other Nations permitted them—and even helped them—to rearm.

For too many years we lived on pious hopes that aggressor and warlike Nations would learn and understand and carry out the doctrine of purely voluntary peace.

The well-intentioned but ill-fated experiments of former years did not work. It is my hope that we will not try them again. No—that is putting it too weakly—it is my intention to do all that I humanly can as President and Commander in Chief to see to it that these tragic mistakes shall not be made again.
There have always been cheerful idiots in this country who believed that there would be no more war for us if everybody in America would only return into their homes and lock their front doors behind them. Assuming that their motives were of the highest, events have shown how unwilling they were to face the facts.

The overwhelming majority of all the people in the world want peace. Most of them are fighting for the attainment of peace—not just a truce, not just an armistice—but peace that is as strongly enforced and as durable as mortal man can make it. If we are willing to fight for peace now, is it not good logic that we should use force if necessary, in the future, to keep the peace?

I believe, and I think I can say, that the other three great Nations who are fighting so magnificently to gain peace are in complete agreement that we must be prepared to keep the peace by force. If the people of Germany and Japan are made to realize thoroughly that the world is not going to let them break out again, it is possible, and, I hope, probable, that they will abandon the philosophy of aggression—the belief that they can gain the whole world even at the risk of losing their own souls.

I shall have more to say about the Cairo and Teheran Conferences when I make my report to the Congress in about two weeks' time. And, on that occasion, I shall also have a great deal to say about certain conditions here at home.

But today I wish to say that in all my travels, at home and abroad, it is the sight of our soldiers and sailors and their magnificent achievements which have given me the greatest inspiration and the greatest encouragement for the future.

To the members of our armed forces, to their wives, mothers, and fathers, I want to affirm the great faith and confidence that we have in General Marshall and in Admiral King, who direct all of our armed might throughout the world. Upon them falls the great responsibility of planning the strategy of determining where and when we shall fight. Both of these men have already gained high places in American history, which will record many
evidences of their military genius that cannot be published today.

Some of our men overseas are now spending their third Christmas far from home. To them and to all others overseas or soon to go overseas, I can give assurance that it is the purpose of their Government to win this war and to bring them home at the earliest possible time.

We here in the United States had better be sure that when our soldiers and sailors do come home they will find an America in which they are given full opportunities for education, and rehabilitation, social security, and employment and business enterprise under the free American system—and that they will find a Government which, by their votes as American citizens, they have had a full share in electing.

The American people have had every reason to know that this is a tough and destructive war. On my trip abroad, I talked with many military men who had faced our enemies in the field. These hardheaded realists testify to the strength and skill and resourcefulness of the enemy generals and men whom we must beat before final victory is won. The war is now reaching the stage where we shall all have to look forward to large casualty lists—dead, wounded, and missing.

War entails just that. There is no easy road to victory. And the end is not yet in sight.

I have been back only for a week. It is fair that I should tell you my impression. I think I see a tendency in some of our people here to assume a quick ending of the war—that we have already gained the victory. And, perhaps as a result of this false reasoning, I think I discern an effort to resume or even encourage an outbreak of partisan thinking and talking. I hope I am wrong. For, surely, our first and most foremost tasks are all concerned with winning the war and winning a just peace that will last for generations.

The massive offensives which are in the making—both in Europe and the Far East—will require every ounce of energy and fortitude that we and our allies can summon on the fighting
fronts and in all the workshops at home. As I have said before, you cannot order up a great attack on a Monday and demand that it be delivered on Saturday.

Less than a month ago I flew in a big Army transport plane over the little town of Bethlehem, in Palestine.

Tonight, on Christmas Eve, all men and women everywhere who love Christmas are thinking of that ancient town and of the star of faith that shone there more than nineteen centuries ago.

American boys are fighting today in snow-covered mountains, in malarial jungles, on blazing deserts; they are fighting on the far stretches of the sea and above the clouds, and fighting for the thing for which they struggle. I think it is best symbolized by the message that came out of Bethlehem.

On behalf of the American people — your own people — I send this Christmas message to you who are in our armed forces:

In our hearts are prayers for you and for all your comrades in arms who fight to rid the world of evil.

We ask God’s blessing upon you — upon your fathers, mothers, wives and children — all your loved ones at home.

We ask that the comfort of God’s grace shall be granted to those who are sick and wounded, and to those who are prisoners of war in the hands of the enemy, waiting for the day when they will again be free.

And we ask that God receive and cherish those who have given their lives, and that He keep them in honor and in the grateful memory of their countrymen forever.

God bless all of you who fight our battles on this Christmas Eve.

God bless us all. Keep us strong in our faith that we fight for a better day for humankind — here and everywhere.

NOTE: Although Congressional leaders wanted the President to make his report in connection with Christmas Eve at Hyde Park. He foresaw the early possibility of an organization which would keep world peace, and he wanted to tie in that objective with
139. Seizure and Operation of the Railroads

the natural message of Christmas—Cairo and Teheran Conferences, see
peace on earth, good will toward
men.
For additional accounts of the

139 (Presidential Statement and Executive
Order on the Seizure and Operation of the
Railroads. Executive Order No. 9412.
December 27, 1943

The President's statement:

Railroad strikes by three Brotherhoods have been ordered for
next Thursday. I cannot wait until the last moment to take ac-
tion to see that the supplies to our fighting men are not inter-
rupted. I am accordingly obliged to take over at once temporary
possession and control of the railroads to insure their continued
operation. The Government will expect every railroad man to
continue at his post of duty. The major military offensives now
planned must not be delayed by the interruption of vital trans-
portation facilities. If any employees of the railroads now strike,
they will be striking against the Government of the United
States.

The Executive Order:

Whereas the continuous operation of transportation service in
the Nation is necessary for the movement of troops, materials
of war, necessary passenger traffic, and supplies and food for the
armed forces and the civilian population, and is otherwise es-
sential to the successful prosecution of the war; and

Whereas the continuous operation of some transportation sys-
tems is threatened by strikes called to commence on December
30, 1943;

Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me by
the Constitution and laws of the United States, including the Act of August 29, 1916, 39 Stat. 645, and as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, I hereby order:

1. Possession and control of all common carriers by railroad, express companies, terminal companies and associations, sleeping, parlor, and railroad-owned or controlled private car companies (all hereinafter referred to as carriers) located in the continental United States, together with any and all appurtenances and facilities used in connection therewith, are hereby taken and assumed, through the Secretary of War, as of seven o'clock p.m., on the twenty-seventh day of December, 1943. Carriers taken over under this Order shall not include, because not now deemed necessary, street electric passenger railways, including railways commonly called interurbans, or local public transit systems whether or not the same be owned or controlled by any of the systems of transportation taken hereunder; but if and when the Secretary finds it necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of this Order, he may, by subsequent order, take and assume possession, control, and operation of all or any part of any transportation system, including subways and tunnels, and any transportation system so taken shall be deemed a carrier for the purposes of this Order.

2. The Secretary of War is directed to manage and operate or arrange for the management and operation of the carriers taken under this Order in such manner as he deems necessary to assure to the fullest possible extent continuous and uninterrupted transportation service.

3. In carrying out this Order the Secretary may act through or with the aid of such public or private instrumentalities or persons as he may designate, and may delegate such of his authority as he may deem necessary or desirable, with power of successive redelegation. The Secretary may issue such general and special orders, rules, and regulations as may be necessary or appropriate for carrying out the purposes of this Order. All Federal agencies shall comply with the directives of the Secretary.
139. Seizure and Operation of the Railroads

hereunder and shall cooperate to the fullest extent of their authority with the Secretary in carrying out the purposes of this Order.

4. The Secretary shall permit the management of carriers taken under this Order to continue their respective managerial functions to the maximum degree possible consistent with the purposes of this Order. Except so far as the Secretary shall from time to time otherwise provide by appropriate order or regulation, the boards of directors, trustees, receivers, officers, and employees of such carriers shall continue the operation of the carriers, including the collection and disbursement of funds thereof, in the usual and ordinary course of the business of the carriers, in the names of their respective companies, and by means of any agencies, associations, or other instrumentalities now utilized by the carriers.

5. Except so far as the Secretary shall from time to time otherwise determine and provide by appropriate orders or regulations, existing contracts and agreements to which carriers taken hereunder are parties shall remain in full force and effect. Nothing in this Order shall have the effect of suspending or releasing any obligation owed to any carrier affected hereby, and all payments shall be made by the persons obligated to the carrier to which they are or may become due. Except as the Secretary may otherwise direct, dividends on stock and sinking fund, principal, interest and other distributions upon bonds, debentures, and other obligations may be paid in due course, and expenditures for other ordinary corporate purposes may be made.

6. The Secretary shall provide protection for all persons employed or seeking employment. The Secretary is authorized to prescribe the compensation to be received by such employees subject to any approval which may be required by applicable statutes, Executive Orders, and regulations relating to economic stabilization. To the extent deemed practical by him, he may maintain the working conditions which are specified in existing contracts between the carriers and their employees. He shall recognize the right of the workers to continue their membership
in labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing with the representatives of the owners of the carriers, subject to the provisions of applicable statutes and Executive Orders, as to matters pertaining to wages to be paid or conditions to prevail after termination of possession, control, and operation under this Order; and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of such collective bargaining or for other mutual aid or protection, provided that in his opinion such concerted activities do not interfere with the operation of the carriers.

7. Except as this Order otherwise provides and except as the Secretary otherwise directs, the operation of carriers hereunder shall be in conformity with the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, the Railway Labor Act, the Safety Appliance Acts, the Employers' Liability Acts, and other applicable Federal and State laws, Executive Orders, local ordinances, and rules and regulations issued pursuant to such laws, Executive Orders, and ordinances.

8. Except with the prior written consent of the Secretary, no receivership, reorganization, or similar proceeding affecting any carrier taken hereunder shall be instituted, and no attachment by mesne process, garnishment, execution, or otherwise shall be levied on or against any of the real or personal property or other assets of any such carrier, provided that nothing herein shall prevent or require approval by the Secretary of any action authorized or required by any interlocutory or final decree of any United States court in reorganization proceedings now pending under the Bankruptcy Act or in any equity receivership cases now pending.

9. From and after seven o'clock p.m. on the said twenty-seventh day of December, 1943, all properties taken under this Order shall be conclusively deemed to be within the possession and control of the United States without further act or notice.

10. Possession, control, and operation of any carrier or carriers, or parts thereof, taken under this Order shall be terminated by the Secretary as soon as he determines that such posses-
sion, control, and operation are no longer required to prevent interruption of transportation service.

NOTE: Only a few days after his return to the United States from the Cairo and Teheran Conferences, the President was confronted by the threat of a crippling railroad strike called for December 30, 1943, which would have seriously impaired the military offensives planned for 1944.

The President issued a call on December 18, 1943, for representatives of the railroads and operating brotherhoods to meet at the White House the following afternoon.

On December 19, at the White House, fifteen representatives of the railroads, five chiefs of the railroad brotherhoods, Director of the Office of War Mobilization James F. Byrnes, and Director of Economic Stabilization Fred M. Vinson met with the President from 2:30 to 5:30 P.M., after which all but the President retired to the Cabinet Room for additional conferences until 7:15 P.M. Following the sessions, Presidential Press Secretary Early reported:

"The President this afternoon received the committee representing the operating brotherhoods and the committee representing the carriers and for several hours there was a discussion of all phases of the controversy as to the demands of the operating employees for increased wages. After meeting with the President the conferees adjourned to the cabinet room where they discussed the problems at length but were unable to reach final agreement. Upon adjournment of the conference representatives of the brotherhoods communicated with the members of their several committees who are now in Chicago, calling upon them to come immediately to Washington. It was tentatively agreed that another conference will be held by representatives of the carriers and brotherhoods Tuesday morning. It was felt by the conferees that the meeting with the President had contributed greatly to a clearer understanding of the problems involved."

On December 20, and on succeeding days, the President met with Director of the O.W.M. Byrnes and the union leaders in other White House sessions in an attempt to bring agreement. On December 23, the following White House statement was issued:

"The President tonight directed the Attorney General to prepare the necessary documents for the taking over of the railroads by the United States Government. No date for such action has been fixed.

"At a conference called this afternoon by the President he told the representatives of the carriers and the brotherhoods that there had to be a prompt settlement of the controversy. He stated that action had become necessary, that the war could not wait—that he would not wait.

"He asked that he be advised whether all parties to the controversy would agree to his arbitration of the dispute and would agree to abide by his decision, which, of course, would have to be within the law of the land.

"Shortly after the conference ad-
journeyed, A. F. Whitney, representing the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen, advised the President that his organization was willing to have the President arbitrate and would abide by his decision.

"John J. Pelley, President of the Association of American Railroads, informed the President that the representatives of the carriers unanimously had agreed to his arbitration of the dispute and that they would abide by his decision.

"Alvanley Johnston, representing the Brotherhood of Engineers, notified the President that his organization would agree to arbitration by the President and would abide by his decision.

"However, D. B. Robertson, representing the Brotherhood of Locomotive Enginemen and Firemen; Thomas C. Cashen, president of the Switchmen's Union; and H. W. Fraser, president of the Order of Railway Conductors, all advised the President that they refused to agree to arbitration by him.

"Later in the afternoon the President met with the representatives of the non-operating employees. The President advised them of what had transpired during the last few days in his various conferences with the operating brotherhoods. The same proposals for arbitration which he had made to the operating brotherhoods were repeated.

"The representatives of the non-operatives made it clear they had not declined the President's offer to arbitrate their disputes with the carriers. However, they presented to the President a new proposal for settlement of their disputes.

"At the request of the President, Justice Byrnes (James F. Byrnes, War Mobilization Director) will tomorrow submit this proposal to the carriers and to Judge Fred Vinson, Stabilization Director, for their consideration. The President again made clear to the representatives of the employees that any settlement must be in accordance with the stabilization program."

Meanwhile, the fifteen non-operating unions had announced they would join the strike scheduled to start on December 30. In view of their acceptance of the President's offer to arbitrate, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen announced on December 24 that they were calling off their part in the strike. At 5 P.M. on December 27, the fifteen nonoperating unions fell in line, and announced they were canceling their strike notices and would accept the President's arbitration. Nevertheless, with the strike orders of three brotherhoods still in force, it was necessary for the President to act in order to keep the railroads operating. Less than nine and a half hours before the strike was to have become effective on December 30, these three brotherhoods canceled their strike call.

The transition from private to governmental control of the Nation's railroads was smoothly accomplished because of meticulous advance planning. The War Department in collaboration with representatives of the railroad industry had worked out a plan approved by the President several days before the foregoing order was issued. The actual operation was placed under the Chief of Transportation of the Army Service Forces, with representatives of railroad employees
and the railroad industry, the Association of American Railroads, and the American Short Line Railroad Association acting in an advisory capacity. The presidents of seven large railroads were commissioned as colonels in the Army, and each made a regional director in the field organization which was established. The Army took no direct hand in the operation and management of the railroads, nor did it interfere in normal relations between the railroads and other governmental agencies like the Office of Defense Transportation and Interstate Commerce Commission.

The President’s arbitration award in respect to the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen and Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers was made effective December 29, 1943. On January 14, 1944, an agreement was reached with the other three operating brotherhoods, paralleling the earlier arbitration award. With respect to the fifteen nonoperating unions, a settlement was reached on January 17, 1944, after the President had established a Special Emergency Board to consider the issues.

“As this settlement brings to an end the wage controversy between the Carriers and their employees,” wrote the President to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson on January 18, 1944, “I hope as soon as you have satisfied yourself that the provisions of the Executive Order have been complied with, that you will promptly return the railroads to the owners.”

As of midnight on January 18, 1944, the Government relinquished control of the railroads.

140 (The Nine Hundred and Twenty-ninth Press Conference (Excerpts).
December 28, 1943

(Dr. New Deal and Dr. Win-the-War — Review of New Deal legislation — Need for expanded economy after the war — New program for new needs.)

MR. DONALDSON: All in. . . .

Q. Mr. President, after our last meeting with you, it appears that someone stayed behind and received word that you no longer like the term “New Deal.” Would you care to express any opinion to the rest of us?

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, I supposed somebody would ask that. I will
have to be terribly careful in the future how I talk to people after these press conferences. However, what he reported was accurate reporting, and—well, I hesitated for a bit as to whether I would say anything. It all comes down, really, to a rather puerile and political side of things. I think that the two go very well together—puerile and political.

However, of course lots of people have to be told how to spell "cat," even people with a normally good education. And so I got thinking the thing over, and I jotted down some things that a lot of people who can't spell "cat" had forgotten entirely.

And of course, the net of it is this—how did the New Deal come into existence? It was because there was an awfully sick patient called the United States of America, and it was suffering from a grave internal disorder—awfully sick—all kinds of things had happened to this patient, all internal things. And they sent for the doctor. And it was a long, long process—took several years before those ills, in that particular illness of ten years ago, were remedied. But after a while they were remedied. And on all those ills of 1933, things had to be done to cure the patient internally. And it was done; it took a number of years.

And there were certain specific remedies that the old doctor gave the patient, and I jotted down a few of those remedies. The people who are peddling all this talk about "New Deal" today, they are not telling about why the patient had to have remedies. I am inclined to think that the country ought to have it brought back to their memories, and I think the country ought to be asked too, as to whether all these rather inexperienced critics shouldn't be asked directly just which of the remedies should be taken away from the patient, if you should come down with a similar illness in the future. It's all right now—it's all right internally now—if they just leave him alone.

But since then, two years ago, the patient had a very bad accident—not an internal trouble. Two years ago, on the
seven of December, he was in a pretty bad smashup—broke his hip, broke his leg in two or three places, broke a wrist and an arm, and some ribs; and they didn’t think he would live, for a while. And then he began to “come to”; and he has been in charge of a partner of the old doctor. Old Dr. New Deal didn’t know “nothing” about legs and arms. He knew a great deal about internal medicine, but nothing about surgery. So he got his partner, who was an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Win-the-War, to take care of this fellow who had been in this bad accident. And the result is that the patient is back on his feet. He has given up his crutches. He isn’t wholly well yet, and he won’t be until he wins the war.

And I think that is almost as simple, that little allegory, as learning again how to spell “cat.”

The remedies that the old Dr. New Deal used were for internal troubles. He saved the banks of the United States and set up a sound banking system. We don’t need to change the law now, although obviously there are some people who don’t like saving the banks who would like to change the whole system, so that banks would have the great privilege under American freedom of going “bust” any time they wanted to again.

Well, at the same time, one of the old remedies was Federal deposit insurance, to guarantee bank deposits; and yet I suppose there must be some people, because they make so much smoke, who would like to go back to the old system and let any bank, at will, go and lose all its depositors’ money with no redress.

In those days, another remedy was saving homes from foreclosure, through the H.O.L.C.; saving farms from foreclosure by the Farm Credit Administration. I suppose some people today would like to repeal all that and go back to the conditions of 1932, when the people out West mobbed a Federal Judge because he was trying to carry out the existing law of the land in foreclosing a farm; rescuing agriculture from
disaster—which it was pretty close to—by the Triple A [Agricultural Adjustment Administration] and Soil Conservation; establishing truth in the sale of securities and protecting stock investors through the S.E.C. And yet I happen to know that there is an undercover drive going on in this country today to repeal the S.E.C., and "let's sell blue-sky securities to the widows and orphans and everybody else in this country." A lot of people would like to do that, take off all the rules and let old Mr. Skin skin the public again.

Well, we have got slum clearance—decent housing; and there hasn't been enough done on slum clearance. I don't think that people who go into slums in this country would advocate stopping that, or curtailing the program, although of course a small percentage of real-estate men would like to have slums back again, because they pay money.

Reduction of farm tenancy.

Well, your old doctor, in the old days, old Doctor New Deal, he put in old-age insurance, he put in unemployment insurance. I don't think the country would want to give up old-age insurance or unemployment insurance, although there are a lot of people in the country who would like to keep us from having it.

We are taking care of a great many crippled and blind people, giving a great deal of maternity help, through the Federal aid system. Well, some people want to abolish it all.

And the public works program, to provide work, to build thousands of permanent improvements—incidentally, giving work to the unemployed, both the P.W.A. and W.P.A.

Federal funds, through F.E.R.A., to starving people.

The principle of a minimum wage and maximum hours.

Civilian Conservation Corps.

Reforestation.

The N.Y.A., for thousands of literally underprivileged young people.

Abolishing child labor. It was not thought to be constitutional in the old days, but it turned out to be.
Reciprocal trade agreements, which of course do have a tremendous effect on internal diseases.

Stimulation of private home building through the F.H.A.

The protection of consumers from extortionate rates by utilities. The breaking up of utility monopolies, through Sam Rayburn’s law.

The resettlement of farmers from marginal lands that ought not to be cultivated; regional physical developments, such as T.V.A.; getting electricity out to the farmers through the R.E.A.; flood control; and water conservation; drought control — remember the years we went through that! — and drought relief; crop insurance, and the ever normal granary; and assistance to farm cooperatives. Well, conservation of natural resources.

Well, my list just totaled up to thirty, and I probably left out half of them. But at the present time, obviously, the principal emphasis, the overwhelming first emphasis should be on winning the war. In other words, we are suffering from that bad accident, not from an internal disease.

And when victory comes, the program of the past, of course, has got to be carried on, in my judgment, with what is going on in other countries — postwar program — because it will pay. We can’t go into an economic isolationism, any more than it would pay to go into a military isolationism.

This is not just a question of dollars and cents, although some people think it is. It is a question of the long range, which ties in human beings with dollars, to the benefit of the dollars and the benefit of the human beings as a part of this postwar program, which of course hasn’t been settled on at all, except in generalities.

But, as I said about the meeting in Teheran and the meeting in Cairo, we are still in the generality stage, not in the detail stage, because we are talking about principles. Later on we will come down to the detail stage, and we can take up anything at all and discuss it then. We don’t want to confuse people by talking about it now.
But it seems pretty clear that we must plan for, and help
to bring about, an expanded economy which will result in
more security, in more employment, in more education, in more health, in better housing for all of
our citizens, so that the conditions of 1932 and the beginning
of 1933 won't come back again.

Now, have those words been sufficiently simple and under-
stood for you to write a story about?

Q. Does that all add up to a fourth-term declaration? (Laughter)

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, now, we are not talking about things like
that now. You are getting picayune. That's a grand word to
use—another word beginning with a p—picayune. I know
you won't mind my saying that, but I have to say something
like that.

Q. I don't mean to be picayune, but I am not clear about this
parable. The New Deal, I thought, was dynamic, and I don't
know whether you mean that you had to leave off to win the
war and then will take up again the social program, or
whether you think the patient is cured?

THE PRESIDENT: I will explain it this way. I will ask you a ques-
tion.

In 1865, after the Civil War, there was a definite pro-
gram arranged for and carried through under the leader-
ship of the Congressman from Pennsylvania, Thaddeus
Stevens, who was the leader of the Republican Party at that
time. That was the policy. It lasted for nearly ten years, a
policy of repression and punishment of the whole of the
South. That was the policy of the United States. Well, they
didn't like it at all—the country didn't. And finally, after
ten years, they threw it out.

Now, do you think that twenty-five years later, in 1890,
that we should have gone back to the same old policy? I
don't. The country didn't go back to it.

You have a program to meet the needs of the country. The
1933 program that started to go into effect that year took a
great many years. If you remember what I said, it was a pro-
program to meet the problems of 1933. Now, in time, there will have to be a new program, whoever runs the Government. We are not talking in terms of 1933's program. We have done nearly all of that, but that doesn't avoid or make impossible or unneedful another program, when the time comes. When the time comes.
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