The *Harvard Theological Review* has been partially endowed by a bequest of the late Miss Mildred Everett, "for the establishment and maintenance of an undenominational theological review, to be edited under the direction of the Faculty of the Divinity School of Harvard University. . . . I make this provision in order to carry out a plan suggested by my late father, the Rev. Charles Carroll Everett." During the continuance of *The New World*, Dr. Everett was on its editorial board, and many of his essays, now collected in the volume entitled *Essays, Theological and Literary*, appeared first in its pages. Sharing his belief in the value of such a theological review, and in devotion to his honored memory, the Faculty of the Harvard Divinity School, of which he was a member from 1869, and its Dean from 1878 until his death in 1900, has accepted the trust, and will strive to make the *Review* a worthy memorial of his comprehensive thought and catholic spirit.

The *Review* is edited by a committee of the Faculty of the Harvard Divinity School consisting of Professors William W. Fenn, Henry W. Foote and Frederic Palmer.
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THE PLACE OF COLERIDGE IN ENGLISH THEOLOGY

HERBERT L. STEWART

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John Stuart Mill once declared that Coleridge and Jeremy Bentham were the two creative minds in the English thought of their time.\(^1\) It was characteristic of Mill to take the impartial standpoint from which such dissimilar thinkers could be likened in originality and eminence. One fears that neither of them could have been equally dispassionate in judging the other, and it would be hard to say which would have felt the deeper resentment if he could have foreseen the company in which he was to be placed. The period to which they belong was not rich in speculative talent so far as England was concerned, and few will dispute the justice of Mill’s compliment to the two men who really left an enduring mark. It will be the purpose of this article to look at Coleridge in his special relation to the progress of theology, an aspect of his writings by which he would himself beyond all doubt have been most anxious to be appreciated. Julius Hare declared that by his work in this field he had shown himself “the true sovereign of modern English thought.”\(^2\) Kingsley at his moment of

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\(^1\) Dissertations, Vol. I, p. 393.

\(^2\) Cf. Life of Coleridge, by Dykes Campbell, p. 256.
deepest doubt on religious matters received *Aids to Reflection* with "utter delight." The leaders of the Cambridge Apostles—particularly Maurice and Sterling—could find no words to express their indebtedness but those which St. Paul judged fitting in Philemon towards himself, and acknowledged that they owed to Coleridge their very souls. But while all are agreed that his influence was significant, perhaps beyond that of any one else, upon the development of thinking at that time in the English Church, there are reasons which make his precise place somewhat difficult to specify.

Perhaps his enigmatic character is best evidenced by the variety of reproaches to which he has been subjected. The Evangelical, who thinks that all scepticism had its root in Germany, can never forgive the man who was a pioneer in introducing the Kantian *Religionsphilosophie*. Ever since Hegel has proved so dubious an ally for Christian theologians, those writers who have translated the language of dogma into the technical terms of Teutonic metaphysics have been looked upon with suspicion, and of these Coleridge was among the chief. The brilliant Oriel group at Oxford in the twenties of the last century detected in him a dangerous "mistiness," which had to be met by making doctrine clear-cut, lest heresy should take refuge in ambiguities. They felt called upon, like an early Church Council, not merely to hold the truth but to define it, and they had such men as Coleridge in view when they feared that divine philosophy might become procuress to the lords of hell. On the other hand our poet has been profusely vituperated on just the opposite ground. Carlyle accused him of having laid a speculative basis for the return to superstition. "He was thought to hold, he alone in England, the key

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4 Prefatory Memoir of John Sterling in Essays and Tales, by J. S., I, xiv.
5 Cf. Yeast, Chap. III, "He [the vicar] told me, hearing me quote Schiller, to beware of the Germans, for they were all pantheists at heart."
of German and other Transcendentalisms; knew the sublime secret of believing by 'the Reason' what 'the Understanding' had been obliged to fling out as incredible; and could still, after Hume and Voltaire had done their best and their worst with him, profess himself an orthodox Christian, and say and print to the Church of England, with its singular old rubrics and surplices at Allhallowtide, *Esto perpetua.*" Coleridge's apologetic work was summarized as an appeal to "transcendental life-preservers." When we remember the reverence which Carlyle had himself expressed in his paper on Novalis for just this distinction of Reason and Understanding, we cannot but smile at his change of front, and realize how the *odium theologicum* may appear in an unexpected quarter. The prophet of Cheyne Row, like the Rev. Francis Eden in Charles Reade's romance, liked people to think for themselves, and to end by thinking with him. Finally, Newman combined in a curious way both these criticisms on the philosopher-poet. He found him often heathen rather than Christian in his conclusions, yet the author of a regeneration in philosophy, which led his age nearer to Catholic truth. The present article will attempt to bring together the chief passages by which Coleridge's position on matters of faith may be defined; and while it is hopeless to estimate just what his influence was, we may judge what it ought to have been for those who understood him.

I

He flourished in a period marked, so far as England was concerned, by extreme theological stagnation. The last great debate had been on deism, and Coleridge was just emerging from boyhood when Burke was able to boast that the deistic writers had been gathered

6 Life of Sterling, Chap. VIII.  
7 Never Too Late to Mend.  
8 Apologia, p. 93.
to the vault of all the Capulets, appealing for corroboration of his statement to the London book-sellers. The time when pamphlet had followed pamphlet, when theologian and anti-theologian had stood—as Mark Pattison wittily put it—*et cantare pares et respondere parati*, was far in the distance. It was held, not without reason, that the orthodox champions had been dialectically victorious; that Berkeley, Butler, and Bentley had far outgeneralled poor Tindal and Chubb and Collins. The inference was indeed somewhat rashly drawn that the discomfiture of these heretics meant the final abolition of their heresy. But for the time the intellectual triumph of the Church was complete. It was possible to write on Butler's *Analogy*, "This is the sword that slew deism." Especially after the French Revolution few Englishmen would call themselves freethinkers, lest they might be classed with Hébert and Fouquier Tinville. Even the so-called "pious deists" were afraid of being reminded that Robespierre had made an unctuous oration on *Être Suprême*. The rampant unbelief of Dr. Johnson's time had to hide its head, and the only respectable opinion to promulgate was that the questions of religion were at length *res iudicatae*. James Anthony Froude, looking back upon this period, spoke of it as exhibiting ecclesiastical healthiness, when problems of faith were no longer discussed, when Christianity had so wrought itself into men's natures that it was no more in need of being debated than the movements of the planets or the changes of the seasons. Contrasting it with the stormy Tractarianism which was so soon to follow, he deplored the change which led men no longer to use the sun of the religious firmament as a light to their steps, but to begin looking at the sun till their eyes were dazzled. No controversial sermons investi-

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9 Reflections.
10 Essays and Reviews, p. 296.
11 Letters on the Oxford Counter-Reformation, in Short Studies, IV.
gated once a week whether the Evangelists had been guilty of perjury. No more books appeared like Sherlock's *Trial of the Witnesses*. The social prestige of the Establishment was jealously guarded as a guarantee of order. For the convulsion in France had cemented the alliance of morality with religion for the English mind, and, like Mr. Thwackum in *Tom Jones*, when men spoke of religion they meant the Christian religion, and by the Christian religion they meant the Protestant religion, and by the Protestant religion they meant the religion of the Church of England.

One must not indeed forget that this was the period of Paley, and that the *Bridgewater Treatises*, whose ingenious learning he did so much to inspire, were almost in sight. Far less than justice is now done to those somewhat hard and unemotional reasoners who gave to the first generation of the last century the Argument from Design. But Paley with all his gifts was the inheritor of a bad tradition. The spirit of forensic debate still lingered; the subtle archdeacon was as much a pugilist of the faith as any knight of chivalry, and it is perhaps the thought of him which makes us appreciate Sir William Hamilton's odd term "theological prowess." The times of deism had been rationalistic not more in respect of the assaults to which Christianity had been subjected than in respect of the defenses which had been offered on its behalf. One side was concerned with the destruction, the other with the support of an external religious authority; the day when men were to speak of a testimony within, of a "Spirit bearing witness with our spirits" was not yet. The whole effort of apologetic was to rise to the height of a great *argument*, to buttress the Christian mysteries with "evidence," so to state a case authenticated by miracle and backed

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by prophecy that a man must either own himself convinced or bear the reproach of being a dunce. The appeal of religion was deliberately intellectualized, so that it might be equally impressive to the faithful and the faithless. But though hard knocks might thus be given to unbelief, though men might even be coerced into a sullen acquiescence, the positive result was as disappointing as it deserved to be. Coleridge anticipated the tedium and the revolt with which our age looks back on such a conflict. And the extravagances of misapplied subtlety into which the discussions on Design were apt to run seem to us today almost incredible. Perhaps the most absurd came from Germany. In 1761 Süßmilch—quoted so profusely by Malthus—had published a work called Göttliche Ordnung in which he bade us meditate upon the Divine foresight by which the growth of trees had been stopped lest they should inconvenience mankind by pushing their branches into the sky! And if any one found an intellectual stumbling-block in the immense stretch of life which was ascribed to the antediluvians, Süßmilch had to point out that the earth was then almost empty, that the enormous families of a single parent provided a quick method by which it might be filled up, and that, as population grew, the Divine watchfulness was shown in the progressive curtailment of that span of days by which the contrary danger threatened to be incurred! The services of such an analogy to the social message which Malthus had to preach are obvious; its religious value is not so clear. But one sees something like it in that extraordinary support to drooping faith which Paley drew from the adjustments of the human throat. It appears that a delicate mechanism there secures this result, that the eater though constantly on the point of being suffocated during a meal almost always saves himself in time. In a city feast, for example, what
deglutition, what anhelation! Yet...not two guests are choked in a century.”¹³ Newman scarcely caricatures such reasoners when he said that they kept presenting an arithmetical alternative, “Three chances to one for revelation, and only two chances against it.”¹⁴ A great deal in the *Bridgewater Treatises*, about the hand, about digestion, about the stars, was of the same order of thought.

One of the more melancholy effects of this intellectualist temper was seen strangely enough in a field where intellect was professedly despised, and where the pride of reason was held a heinous iniquity. The notion that God was perpetually interfering with mechanical nature for purposes which a superficial human scrutiny could assign, showed itself in the confident detecting of particular providences, and in the assurance with which the ill fortune of individuals was traced to personal sins which the preacher or the religious writer could name. The Saints of the Desert did not move in a more vivid environment of angels and devils than did some Evangelicals and very especially the Methodists of a hundred years ago. No regard whatever seems to have been paid to that Scripture which warned against a hasty reprobation of those on whom the Tower of Siloam fell, or those whose blood Pilate mingled with the sacrifices. The habitual illustrations of a Methodist magazine were from the fearful fate by which A. B. or C. D. had been overtaken on his way from a dance or a card-party. The keeping of the Sabbath was seldom enforced without some such fearsome tale as that of a man, known to the district, who had reaped his corn on the day of worship, but of whom a lightning flash had made a solemn example as he closed his barn door.¹⁵ The appalling belief of the twelfth century

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¹³ Natural Theology, Chap. X.  
¹⁴ Tracts for the Times, No. 85.  
¹⁵ Cf. Sydney Smith’s article “Methodism” in the Edinburgh Review, where a multitude of illustrations is collected.
that a man might so offend the Most High as to have his deathbed beset by the tempting voices of fiends, lest devout thoughts should have a chance to cheat the judgment through a belated repentance, hardly went beyond that doctrine of a judicial hardening of heart by which the pious only three generations ago did such dishonor to the Father of mankind. This was the dark theological side of that Dissent which won such deserved gratitude by the practical enthusiasms of a Clarkson, a Wilberforce, or an Elizabeth Fry, and such deserved admiration by the glowing eloquence of a Robert Hall. Truly the disregard of speculative thinking on religion and the diversion of trained minds to other pursuits had a less wholesome outcome than Froude has told us.

"Chapel folk be more hand-in-glove with them above than we," says one of Mr. Hardy's Anglican villagers. It was plainly true of Dissent in the time of Coleridge. Side by side with this claim of intimacy in the Divine counsels went the usual confident interpretation of the predictive parts of Scripture, and the usual certitude that judgments were there foreshadowed upon those whom the interpreter disapproved. In a measure this was true of the Evangelical party within the Establishment. Like Joseph in Wuthering Heights, they ransacked the Bible to rake the promises to themselves and fling the curses on their neighbors. The sermons of Dr. Cumming were unfortunately typical of no small section among the nonconformists, and though they are themselves forgotten, the terrific critique by George Eliot in the Westminster Review preserves the author to a merciless immortality. The Pope was the Man of Sin. Cardinal Wiseman was the unclean spirit. The French were the frogs of the Apocalypse. The beast out of the abyss, the scorpions whose sting was in their tails, the lying prophet, and the horn that had eyes, were all

16 Far from the Madding Crowd, Chap. XLII.
dogmatically identified with contemporary persons. If, wrote George Eliot, an Evangelical preacher wished to have the avenues to his church as crowded as the passages to the opera, "let him rival Moore's Almanac in the prediction of political events, tickling the ears of his hearers who are but moderately spiritual by showing how the Holy Spirit has dictated problems and charades for their benefit." Cumming indeed was scarcely beginning to be known at the date of Coleridge's death, but he is an admirable example of that tone in the exegesis of the prophets against which the Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit was a far-seeing, but for him at least an ineffectual protest. Nor were the soothsayers apparently at all abashed by the circumstance that their successive predictions had been from age to age in close harmony with the political passions of the time, growing with their growth and disappearing with their disappearance.

In two widely different quarters, however, a token had shown itself of better things in British theology. One was the little group of historically minded clergymen at Oxford, of whom Whately was chief, and whose work was to be developed by Thirlwall and Arnold. The other was a secluded Scottish manse, where Erskine of Linlathen was exposing himself to the persecution by which ideas beyond the age are uniformly heralded. It was perhaps Niebuhr's rewriting of Roman history which suggested to Whately, as it undoubtedly did to Arnold, that the historical documents of the Old and New Testaments could only be understood by reconstructing the environment in which they first appeared. In 1825 Thirlwall had accompanied his translation of Schleiermacher's Essay on St. Luke with a preface in which the impossibility of verbal inspiration was, almost for the first time, expounded with competence to the

17 Evangelical Teaching: Dr. Cumming; in George Eliot's Essays.
English mind. Three years later Whately issued his work *On the Difficulty of St. Paul's Writings*, where the same point was driven home. The timorous feared that the destructive side of all this would be more potent than the attempts at rebuilding. Certainly so far as Thirlwall was concerned, though he became afterwards a bishop, one may doubt whether inspiration of any sort was ever seriously considered by that accomplished scholar. But in Erskine's *Remarks on the Internal Evidence for Revealed Religion*, published as early as 1820, we have the germ of the great rejuvenescence. It was by Erskine and Coleridge combined that the new ideas in Biblical Criticism, which might so easily have taken—and for so many actually did take—a purely negative direction, were fertilized and Christianized.

But on the whole Froude is undoubtedly right when he speaks of the period just before Tractarianism as disclaiming theology altogether. His sanguine inference that people were averse to discussions on dogma because faith was so completely established is, however, one upon which a lurid light is cast by contemporary literature, and by the literature of a few years afterwards in which that society has been portrayed. When men repudiate the obligation to think, in order that they may more energetically practise, the sluggards in intellect turn out as a rule to be sluggards also in duty. The average clergyman was a squire in holy orders. He brought with him into the Church those qualities, both good and bad, which belonged to squiredom; on the one hand polite manners, sportsmanship, hospitality, interest of a condescending sort in the “lower and middling classes”; on the other hand mental torpor, insular narrowness, complete ignorance—as Carlyle would have said—as to “what o’clock it was in the thought of Europe.” Trollope speaks of the reproach that the Establishment was affording “easy couches to worn-
out clerical voluptuaries.”

Cobbett declared that from the pen of his own leisure hours he had addressed more sermons to the poor than their appointed guides had given them in half a century, though the Church drew so great a part of her revenues from the salt of the laboring man. The earnest side of Wesleyanism, if it was no longer denounced in the strain of Parson Trulliber for menacing the ecclesiastical temporalities, had to bear many an elegant rebuke from writers like Sydney Smith for the sin of “enthusiasm.” That zeal, which was supposed to be allowed a period of remission because of a blessed agreement about the objects of faith, when it forsook theological studies was turned into any path rather than the application of truth to the needs of life. The scholarship which was withdrawn from elucidating dogma, became absorbed in the annotating of classical texts. Disraeli was not quite a fanatic for holiness, but it was he who wrote as follows: “A priest is scarcely deemed in our days a fit successor to the authors of the Gospels, if he be not the editor of a Greek play; and he who follows St. Paul must now at least have been private tutor of some young nobleman who has taken a good degree.”

Not even the Tractarians themselves in their denunciation of ecclesiastical worldliness could have improved upon the mordant satire addressed by Fakreddeen to the Lady of Bethany: “The English are neither Jews nor Christians, but follow a sort of religion of their own, which is made every year by their bishops, one of whom they have sent to Jerusalem, in what they call a parliament, a college of muftis.”

It is needless to say that these features, ecclesiastical and religious, of the England of a hundred years ago marked only a part of the State Church, and that an

18 Barchester Towers, Chap. XLIII. 19 Rural Rides, I, 42.
20 Coningsby, VII, iii. Cf. Archdeacon Grantly in Barchester Towers, “Even the Greek play bishops were better than this.”
21 Tancred, III, v.
impartial picture would have to set other qualities in relief. But the abuses were sufficiently prevalent to attract a great deal of reproach, and I have selected those which the work of Coleridge was intended to correct.

II

On the speculative side he entered an earnest protest against anti-rationalism on the one hand and ultra-rationalism on the other. He mediated between the two, not, like so many mediators, by suggesting a wretched compromise in which what is good in each extreme has been sacrificed to a hollow agreement. He indicated a real synthesis in which both were conserved, and the outcome of his influence was to give English theology a direction which it has never since lost.

We have seen that the problem of the eighteenth century had been how to deal with the mysterious element in revelation. The deists had said that genuine religious truth is wholly discoverable by the intelligence of man, and that all beyond this is Aberglaube. Their opponents had replied that not everything in religion is consonant with intelligence, that there is a body of dogma which even contradicts reason, and yet must be accepted, for it has come to us on the authority of Him whose supernatural person was attested by miracle. For Coleridge both these views contained a truth and both contained a falsehood. The Church apologists were wrong when they said that the irrational might have such external credentials that criticism must be silenced. The deists were wrong in that they confounded Reason with reasoning, supposed that the true can always be "understood" by the human mind, or that to "understand" a statement is a pre-requisite of believing it. The solution lay in distinguishing Reason from Understanding as faculties different in
kind. The latter was applicable to things of sense, the former to the supra-sensible.

This antithesis was clearly borrowed from Kant. But Coleridge professed to have found it in other quarters as well. Reason was the *siccum lumen* of Bacon. It was the “intuitive” faculty which together with the “discursive”—according to Milton’s Raphael—constituted the double mode of action of the soul. It was that “pure intelligence” of which John Smith the Platonist had said that we are not identical with it, though we partake of it; we have it *κατὰ μὲθὲν* and not *κατὰ ὄφην*. It was what St. Paul himself had in view when he contrasted the spiritual mind with the carnal mind. Coleridge suggests here a simple analogy drawn from the two ways in which a truth of geometry may come to be received. One may find by actual measurement that all the triangles he has ever drawn have two sides together greater than the third. Or one may prove from a single diagram that this relation among the sides *must always* be valid. In the former case Understanding has been exercised, in the latter case Reason. The difference is between empirical evidence which deals with data of sense and rational inference which uses sense merely as a help to conclusions about a supra-sensible concept. For the abstract lines and figures of geometry may be conceived, but cannot be perceived. Plainly Kant’s use of the word “Understanding,” however suggestive Coleridge may have found it, is here widely departed from.

Now—so runs the argument—that which is dealt with in the moral and spiritual sphere is always, like the geometrical point or line, an object of the trans-experiential kind. Mere tabulations of observed sequence or co-existence will give only empirical rules, such as might

23 Paradise Lost, Bk. V.
24 Aids to Reflection, p. 192.
be got in geometry by drawing figure after figure and taking actual measurements. Such treatment of the rules of conduct will reduce morality to a scheme of prudence, and the Greek sophists had so reduced it in the days of Plato. They had confounded a principle with the particular acts in which the principle manifests itself or by which it may be illustrated, and for those who know the difference between a law of necessity and a statement of uniformity they had been landed in ethical scepticism. So true is it that “by celestial observations alone can even terrestrial charts be constructed scientifically.”

Hence arose Coleridge’s impatience with the theistic proofs, and with all pretended demonstrations from facts of “experience” to a reality beyond experience. For the experience relied upon either involved, to begin with, an assumption outside itself, or else it could never conduct us thither by cause and effect reasoning. Suppose one aims to prove a Supreme Being, to reason “from Nature up to Nature’s God.” God then becomes simply a link in the chain of causation, similar in kind to the other links if the argument is to have real continuity.

For there must be no stealthy μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος. Thus for religious purposes you demonstrate either too much or too little; too little if you reach a mere finite Mechanician, too much if the Causa Sui et Mundi becomes a mere name for the natural order itself. There was indeed a certain sense in which the idea of God was implicit in every act of thought, the same sense in which infinite space was presupposed in all geometrical figures. But the nature of such underlying ground was left open. One could no more assume that the origin of all intelligence must be intelligent than that the source of organized life must be organized, or that the source of motion

26 The Friend, II, iii. 27 Ibid. 28 Aids to Reflection, p. 135 seq.
must itself move. And Coleridge found it hard by this line of thought to reconcile the basal ground of all being with the attribute of personality. For how could the Infinite be personal? For a long time his head was with Spinoza, though his heart was with St. Paul and St. John. Yet the disasters of pure intellect, proving and disproving the same thing in succession, had at least the negative value of showing the intellect’s incompetence in the realm of ultimates. The constant reappearance of religious conviction despite all theoretical discouragements was a hint that the real evidence was not purely intellectual, but was somehow bound up with states of will. And it was in Will that Kant had rightly found the Reason as distinct from the Understanding.

Our poet had no doubt indeed that intelligence was confirmatory of faith. He would have been completely sympathetic towards that exquisite simile of Wordsworth in which the intimations of God in nature are compared to those sonorous cadences which a child may hear in the “convolutions of a smooth-lipped shell,” betokening

“mysterious union with its native sea,”

and bringing to him

“authentic tidings of invisible things.”

Very much the same idea is expressed in his own poem The Æolian Harp:

“And what if all of animated nature
Be but organic harps diversely framed
That tremble into thought, as o’er them sweeps
Plastic and vast, one intellectual breeze,
At once the Soul of each and God of All!”

29 Biog. Lit., Chap. X. Was Coleridge here thinking of Shelley’s lines (Revolt of Islam, VIII):

“What is that Power? Ye mock yourselves and give
A human heart to what ye cannot know;
As if the cause of life could think and live.”

30 Loc. cit.

31 Loc. cit.

32 Excursion, Bk. IV.
But Coleridge's ultimate basis of conviction remained moral, and no one is more free from that naïve anthropomorphism which would fashion the Eternal after the likeness of human intellect. He never speaks, after the intellectualist habit, of "God geometrizing," as Milton, for example, in a strangely crude passage has depicted the creation of the world with a pair of gigantic compasses for perfect precision in drawing the celestial circles. He gives a much needed warning against the theological use of notions drawn from human jurisprudence. And we owe to him one of the earliest known anticipations of Ritschl's doctrine that religious truth is not speculative, but given in judgments of value. Coleridge would have agreed with Newman's preference for such arguments upon immortality as did not appeal with equal force to Dives and to Lazarus. Mathematical axioms he declared differ from moral axioms in that the former no man can deny while the latter no good man would deny. It was a fortunate inconsequence of our nature which thus called upon "the heart to rectify the errors of the understanding." For a belief that was intellectually coercive would be spiritually ineffectual, and the assent that was compelled would lack the moral value of a venture of faith. Our author boldly challenges the whole position of Paley, and invokes the support of Scripture itself when he asks whether miracles alone can work any true conviction in the human mind. "There are spiritual truths which must derive their evidence from within, which whoever rejects 'neither will he believe though a man were to rise from the dead' to confirm them.... What then can we think of a theological theory, which adopting a scheme of prudential legality, common to it with 'the sty of Epicurus' as far at least

33 Paradise Lost, VII.  
34 Aids to Reflection, 99.  
35 Cf. Grammar of Assent, Chap. VIII.  
36 Biog. Lit., Chap. X.  
37 Loc. cit.
as the springs of action are concerned, makes its whole religion consist in the belief of miracles?" 38

At the same time, Coleridge was very far indeed from either an unreflective intuitionism or a blind submissiveness to religious authority. He reminds the philosophers of "common sense" that while reason is to be reconciled to those judgments of the plain man about which they speak, it is no less needful that the judgments of the plain man shall be elevated into reason. 39 Indeed it is by his polemic against the anti-rationalists that Coleridge is best known. He held the knowledge of God to be no last conclusion of a syllogism, but this was just because He was the presupposition of all syllogizing. That which was assumed in every process of proof could not be directly given in any. But the same intuitive Moral Reason which ultimately constituted our guarantee of God's existence, must be the touchstone by which all alleged positive revelations of His character were to be judged. Coleridge was as certain as Plato of his τίτουθεωλογίας, and he quotes with thorough approval that quaint passage from Henry More, the Cambridge Platonist, in which God is depicted as a sovereign who bows to the authority of his own courts of law. The King's Bench, said More, is in the reason, Equity in the conscience, the Common Pleas in the understanding, and the Exchequer in the prudence. To these tribunals God refers even His own causes, so that the ultimate standard is no arbitrary will, but the very Spirit of Truth. A sign or a miracle is at best but an interlining of the great statute-book, and we are not only excused but even prohibited from "receiving as the king's mandates aught that is not stamped with the Great Seal of the conscience and counter-signed by the reason. 40 Fanciful, per-

38 The Friend, II, ii.
39 Biog. Lit., Chap. XII. Cf. Sir W. Hamilton's famous analogy between common sense and the common law, as both requiring judicious interpretation (Notes on Reid).
40 Aids to Reflection, 108.
haps, and very easily caricatured. Mansel would have been merciless to it. We should have had from him a paragraph of glowing rhetoric, pointing out that the anthropomorphism against which old Xenophanes protested had shown itself in a yet more absurd dress, and warning us not to conceive the rule of the Eternal after the likeness of our limited monarchies, or to impose upon the council chamber of heaven the pedantry of British constitutionalism. "In His Moral Attributes, no less than in the rest of His Infinite Being, God's judgments are unsearchable and His ways past finding out." But it is More and Coleridge who speak here for the modern mind. When Frederick Maurice attacked Mansel with a vehemence which only his moral passion could excuse, it was Coleridge's teaching that inspired him. And, curiously enough, the writer against whom that passage of *Aids to Reflection* was directed, was separated from Mansel wide as the poles in all but this, that they alike erected the notion of a capricious Divine Will to which human wills, under threat of perdition, were required to conform. The so-called "theological utilitarianism" of Paley had differed from the secular utilitarianism of Bentham only in that it included among its sanctions the foreseen pleasures and pains of a future life. The *ultima ratio* between God and man was the power of God to send man to hell, and under that penalty it behooved us to shape our moral ideas after the scriptural revelation. If the autonomous right of conscience is now a theological commonplace in the Reformed Churches, the credit for preaching it in England is due in no small degree to Coleridge.

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41 Bampton Lectures, Lect. VII.

Coleridge's insistence that the moral reason is no mere complicated calculating of pleasures, and that this *intuitive* quality in conscience is the true ground of philosophic theism, shows remarkable prevision of a great debate that still rages. Cf. his very suggestive point that wherever genuine morality has given way to a scheme of ethics founded on utility its place is soon challenged by the spirit of honor. Yet honor is but "the shadow or ghost of virtue deceased" (*The Friend*, II, ii).
But perhaps his clearest and most definite service in this field was performed in his doctrine of Holy Scripture, both in his mordant criticism of verbal inspiration, and in his most sagacious hints of that sense in which the uniqueness of the sacred writings may be securely affirmed. There is a wealth of thought in the *Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit*—thought which was long lost upon a religious world still unfit to assimilate it, and afterwards regained with far less than the due meed of gratitude to the subtle mind that had been so far ahead of its time. Coleridge on Inspiration was like bread cast on the waters and found after many days.

The "generality of our popular divines," he has told us, maintained the view that all parts of the Bible were equally inerrant, because equally dictated by the Supreme Being to a mechanical amanuensis. We may well believe him; for after two generations it was still heresy to suggest a different conception, and Bishop Colenso was made a martyr for free thought about the arithmetic of *Numbers*. The difficulties which Coleridge had to urge are the now familiar points of intelligent Biblical Criticism. They are such as these43: the *prima facie* differences in style and feeling from book to book—so natural if one assumes the active individuality of each writer, so inexplicable if one thinks of a single Author, to whom the human agents were like so many puppets to a ventriloquist; the *petitio principii* involved in "proving" inspiration from the statements of Scripture itself; the problem of defining how far the infallible guarantee extends—only to the Septuagint, or the New Testament? or to the Vulgate? or to the English translation?; the lineal descent of the received view from the Rabbinical worship of the Books of Moses and the exclusive claim of ἑορτευσία for these; the impossibility that infallible truth can be conveyed in our so fallible language; the perpetual miracle involved in safeguarding each

43 *Confessions, Letter II.*
version; the discrepancies on matter of detail which were bound to occur when several historians narrated the same event, and which the "harmonists" explained away only by such forced hypotheses as suggested collusion; the extreme unlikelihood that to men so far apart as the authors of the Pentateuch and the authors of the Gospels the same maturity of teaching would be communicated; the desperate compulsion by which the literalists were bound to shackle all growing knowledge with ancient precedents, as when "Sir Matthew Hale sent a crazy old woman to the gallows in honour of the Witch of Endor." But the overwhelming reason for seeking a more elastic doctrine was a moral reason. Only by supposing development was it possible to view the history of Israel as, in any sense at all, divinely guided. Coleridge quotes with horror the position of a divine who said that if Scripture applauded Jael for her treatment of Sisera this was good proof that Jael's morality was all that could be desired! He lays down the great principle that the Bible is to be looked upon as the Word of God because it is true and holy, not as true and holy because it is somehow antecedently known to be the Word of God. And he challenges the verbalists, as a crucial instance, to apply their view to the Book of Job, where if anywhere the free action of human minds upon a great spiritual problem is simply presented. Yet preachers did not scruple to take a text from the cynicism of Bildad the Shuhite, and unfold its meaning as the very voice of the Most High!

Writers like Whately and Thirlwall had already shaken the old orthodoxy in the same way. But Coleridge's contribution was far more positive, far more constructive, than theirs. He faced and answered the question: How much that is of religious value will be lost by abandoning this notion of inerrancy? Did men demand an infallible standard, saying with Chilling-

44 Confessions, Letter IV.
worth that the Bible and the Bible alone is the religion of Protestants, and fearing that to give up papal authority without a new authority as a substitute was to relapse into anarchic subjectivism? Bossuet, he reminds us, had clearly shown that the sects of Protestantism were far indeed from being unified by this external rule, so that if unity were the interest that literalism was to guarantee it must be acknowledged a failure.

Was there then no genuine sense at all in which the inspiration of Scripture is unique? Coleridge answers that it has proved itself such, and continues to prove itself, by the unexampled fitness of the truth it makes known to our human nature and needs. It is only when read without the presupposition of being exceptional that its exceptional character becomes realized, and that experimentally. "Whatever finds me bears witness for itself that it has proceeded from a Holy Spirit." By this attestation all history proclaimed that other books were to this one but as subordinate spiritual luminaries, that it alone shines by its own light, the ultimate manifestation of the Sun of Righteousness. It is to this thinker that we owe that most pregnant distinction which was to fill so great a place in later thought, the distinction between saying that Scripture is the word of God and that Scripture contains the word of God. Only on this basis could a truly historical and hence a credible view of the process of revelation be grounded.

III

For Coleridge then the objects of faith are neither demonstrable by the theoretic intellect nor revealed by an authoritative oracle with miraculous guarantees of inerrancy. "The sciential reason," he said, "stands neutral." It does not, for example, make coercive the

45 Confessions, Letter I.  
46 Biog. Lit., Chap. X.
belief in a moral providence, but neither does it refute such a belief. It even becomes an effective ally by undermining with equal destructiveness the dogmatisms of denial. There is no theoretic consideration against the idea of God, "except its own sublimity."^47 But our real ground of vital conviction is not in the intellect; it is in "the law of conscience." We accept the Christian scheme because of its consonance with that spiritual attitude towards life which mankind in its highest development has reached. One might perhaps illustrate Coleridge's point by the remark of Leibnitz, that first truths are virtually though not literally innate, for the mind is predisposed to receive them, as the veins of a block of marble prefigure the coming statue. Just as intelligence is prepared by its very constitution for knowledge, so conscience is pre-adapted for Christian faith. In each case the latent and the tacit had to be made explicit and articulate.

To exhibit this in detail Coleridge defines carefully the characteristics of the spiritual principle in man as these disclose themselves to introspection, rejecting three hypotheses as not less inadequate to the facts of analysis than hostile to the claims of religion.^48 There is the materialism of Hobbes, which would make moral distinctions illusory and the quest for moral satisfaction meaningless. There is the optimism of Shaftesbury, which regards human nature as essentially good and the natural conscience as self-sufficing—a doctrine in which those of our race who know themselves most profoundly see least reason to trust, and which would plainly exclude as superfluous all supernatural aid. And there is the Calvinistic dogma of total corruption, by which the very existence of an upward impulse in mankind is made impossible; but if there is anything which moral history makes certain it is that such impulse

^47 Loc. cit.  
^48 Aids to Reflection, p. 92.
exists, and if there is any assumption which would turn
religion into magic it is to suppose that the race could
be redeemed without it. We cannot doubt either that
we have aspirations of a spiritual kind, or that these
aspirations are deeply perverted by what St. Paul called
the "law in our members." If the soul is a mere aspect
of the physical organization, morality is abolished. If
the will is not radically diseased, it requires no healing
from a higher power. If our degradation is absolute,
the nisus after better things is gone, and, even though a
miracle should in chosen cases restore it, the restoration
would be an act of Divine caprice, the justice of God
would disappear in the single attribute of power, and
reverence would become a mere trembling before One
who arbitrarily picked out a few for bliss and a multi-
tude for misery. Against all three positions Coleridge
affirms as Catholic truth, corroborated by Reason,
that there is a distinctly spiritual principle in man,
much distorted yet not essentially destroyed, capable
of cooperating with the Supreme Power towards its
own re-establishment as the guiding force of life.

Hence the fundamental and the wholly rational char-
acter of the Article on Original Sin. Not the belief in
an omnipotent Creator of all things visible and invisible
can be called the basis of Christianity; this belonged no
less to Judaism, like the belief in the Moral Law, and —
if we include the apocalyptic period of the Jewish faith
— even the belief in a Resurrection and a Judgment.
The specific elements in the Christian creed are such as
assert salvation through an Incarnate Redeemer, repent-
ance and faith as the means by which it is secured, the
reception of a new principle of life, progressive grace
through the Spirit, deliverance from the power of sin
through the cooperative working of man’s best nature
and divine help. But at the root of all lies a true con-
ception of the “natural” state of the soul.
Coleridge regards it as a mere caricature of the Catholic position to make it imply by Original Sin that man is born wholly disposed towards evil. For this would be fatal to the man’s moral character as a free agent, and reduce him simply to the status of a thing. It is idle, he insists, to urge that we are “without excuse” because there always remains an abstract possibility to each person of rendering perfect obedience. Suppose a creature were blindfolded, and required to walk two or three leagues with traps set on all sides of him; it would be theoretically possible that he might thread his way with success. But if he failed to do so, would it be fair to call him responsible for his own calamities? “On what principle of equity were the unoffending sentenced to be born with so fearful a disproportion of their powers to their duties? Why were they subjected to a law, the fulfilment of which was all but impossible, yet the penalty of the failure so tremendous?” The thought is exactly that which Milton attributes to the father of the race:

“Did I request Thee, Maker, from my clay
To mould me man? . . .
As my will
Concurr’d not to my being, it were but right
And equal to reduce me to my dust;
Desirous to resign and render back
All I received; unable to perform
Thy terms too hard, by which I was to hold
The good I sought not.”

Or again one is reminded of the lines of Omar Khayyám:

“Oh Thou, who didst with pitfall and with gin
Beset the Road I was to wander in,
Thou wilt not with Predestin’d Evil round
Enmesh, and then impute my Fail to Sin.”

49 The point is precisely the same as in the Lutheran controversy with Eck, where it has always seemed to the present writer that the Roman disputant was right.
It is a good example of Coleridge's claim for the right of conscience to pronounce upon dogma.

From this standpoint two positions are insisted upon: (1) that the roots of religion are universally present, and (2) that religion is never "natural" in the sense in which "natural" is contrasted with "revealed." Man as such, man in that respect which makes him to differ from the lower animals, is conscious of responsibility, of obligation, of good and evil as an intrinsic antithesis which cannot be dissolved into a difference of extrinsic consequences. Some one may, indeed, deny that such witness is given by his own consciousness; if so, it is not possible to refute him, but it is proper to disbelieve him. The hypochondriac may "find" in himself glass legs, but this does not alter the objective state of the case, and there is a common spiritual nature, just as there is a common physical arrangement. The moral consciousness is no mere eccentricity or peculiar privilege of a few. It is "the light that lighteneth every man who cometh into the world." And the objects of universal faith—God and a future state—are objects which our moral nature has found most congenial to its own aspirations to accept. Intellect cannot disprove them, conscience imperatively requires them. But to follow the deists, and to call this process "natural" is to forget that it comes from just that activity in man which is beyond "nature," beyond the "faculty that judges according to sense." It is an immediate intuition, and the instinct of the mystics about it was so far right. When the Fourth Gospel says that the Logos was made flesh and dwelt among us, when Heracleitus speaks of man's ordering his life by the λόγος within and sinning just in so far as he sets up a "private" judgment of his own, both are testifying that only by sharing God's image can God be known. "Evidences of Christianity! I am weary of the word. Make a man feel the want of it, rouse him, if you can, to the self-
knowledge of his need of it, and you may safely trust it to its own evidence.” That which is the beginning of all argument cannot itself be argued to, just as the consciousness that “I am” is groundless only because it is the ground of all other certainty whatever.\textsuperscript{50}

IV

We shall not pursue Coleridge’s theological thought into further detail. Enough has been said to provide a basis for estimating his general import in the spiritual development of his age. One feature we should perhaps discount, for it may easily lead us to be more than just to his value as a thinker. The subtle seductions of the stylist were wonderfully at his command. He had the immense advantage of that poetic gift so rarely bestowed upon a theologian, and yet when present so effective in commending ideas upon the deep things of life. Poetry and religion have so many points at which they overlap, that imaginative splendor is apt to be mistaken for speculative insight. Shelley, for example, was no philosopher, although many an unforgettable verse on matters philosophic might suggest that he was. And Coleridge could seldom write more than a few pages together without some brilliance of fancy, some piercing comparison, some callida iunctura in the magic of words, that may or may not be accompanied with profoundness of thought, but in either case plausibly conveys to us that the author has seen very far. His biographer very happily remarks of him that when he had overcome the trials of his youth he was like another great poet not only in having his feet set on a rock and his goings established, but in discovering that a new song had been put in his mouth. It is not his verse alone that has poetic quality. In the \textit{Biographia Litteraria}, the

\textsuperscript{50} Biog. Lit., Chap. XII.
Aids, the Confessions, even the almost forgotten pages of The Friend, the same art is there, and while we delight in it we have to be on our guard against it. In judging him we must here ignore for the moment whatever belongs to the form, and think only of the significance of the matter.

He deserves immense credit for two things, first for his valiant though largely fruitless attempt to make Anglican theology philosophical, and second for his anticipation of the course which religious philosophy was to take in the period that was opening.

In 1852, twenty years after our poet’s death, Sir William Hamilton observed of English divines that their ineffectual character was the result of a lack of philosophical training. They had not recognized the real field upon which the battle between faith and unbelief must be fought out. Hamilton feared that the incoming tide of certain foreign heresies would be but feebly met by a Church which had not thus prepared herself for resistance, blaming especially the universities—which had dropped the philosophical element from their discipline—for “this singular and dangerous disarmature.”

It was the characteristic weakness then as still of the Anglican Establishment, and it was just this weakness which Coleridge had striven with might and main to remedy. He had his effect on such men as Maurice, and his admirers may claim that but for him the ignorance of moving speculation would have been more widespread, that by his work, for example, a select few were made aware of the vast import of German thought. His was an isolated voice calling aloud for that recognition of dogmatics as a science which the Church of England to her incalculable loss has still so slightly yielded. Probably Scottish divines have profited far more by the impulse which he gave. Moreover, it is not too much to say that Coleridge had

51 Discussions, p. 790.
the eye of a seer for the new direction which apologetic in the nineteenth century must take. The insistence upon internal rather than external evidence, the abandonment of cold rationalistic "proofs," the discernment that man's moral nature rather than his logical dexterity is the key to the position—in a word all that transformed statement of the appeal for the faith which deals in "values" rather than in "facts," found in him one of its first and most lucid exponents. It would be hard indeed after generations of later discussion to surpass his reconstructed doctrine of the authority of Scripture, so admirably balanced between servile submission on the one hand and lawless individualism on the other. And, unlike so many theorists whose own theories frighten them in the concrete application, he showed real courage in following out in detail the principles that he had once laid down.

It is perhaps a poor question to raise, and yet not without an interest of its own, how far Coleridge stands related to the various schools of our own time by which he has been either claimed or denounced. Very obviously and naturally he is quoted as a forerunner of the Broad Church. With by no means so clear evidence he has been called a herald of Tractarianism. The Anglo-Catholics said in their extreme way that he was more pagan than Christian. In the next twenty years it was by men whom they would have thought more pagan than Christian that his memory was cherished and his writings were pondered. Yet there must have been some substantial ground alike for Newman's tribute and for Carlyle's reproach.

We cannot make much of the point that the disparagement of understanding and the reinstatement of mystery gave a basis to those who looked upon free thought as sin, and who emphasized the mystic character of priest and sacrifice. Did not Carlyle himself speak incessantly
against the "rushlights of closet logic," \(^{52}\) against those who "dwell on the thin rind of the conscious," \(^{53}\) against the vain effort to escape from the primitive attitude of wonder? Did he not proclaim the principle of natural supernaturalism — an idea very near that of Coleridge — and thus remind us how the most bitter divisions are not between men who are in polar opposition but between men who are almost yet not altogether agreed? It is a far cry from the view that all Being is wrapped in mystery to the claim that a sacerdotal order holds the exclusive key by which these mysteries can be spiritually approached. If any one doubts the gulf between the author of *Aids to Reflection* and the authors of the *Tracts*, let him place side by side the chapter on Baptism in the former and Pusey's account of the same sacrament in the latter. Moreover, is there not just as much recognition of mystery, just as much restraint of intellect, in the *Pilgrim's Progress* or *Wesley’s Journal* as Pusey himself could have desired?

The real kinship of Coleridge with the men of the Oxford Movement belongs to a very different side of his teaching, and what I take this to have been I shall indicate in a very few words. The *Tracts* were in the first instance a protest against regarding the Church as a mere public department, an "institution" amenable in every respect to State control, with officers who were sanctified civil servants, and whose future equally with that of the universities, the municipalities, and corporate bodies in general was to be decided by the House of Commons. They were aimed not so much against Evangelicalism, or even against theological Liberalism, as against Erastianism. For the Reform Government had made it clear that the Church was to be handled as just another citadel of "privilege." The bishops had been warned to set their house in order. And it was not only

\(^{52}\) Cf. Sartor, *passim*.  
\(^{53}\) Essay on Diderot.
revenues that were threatened. The Church had her doctrine of apostolic succession and of the terms which make orders valid or invalid. Yet, by a diplomatic bargain concluded at the Foreign Office between Lord John Russell and the Prussian ambassador it was decided that a Protestant bishop of Jerusalem should be nominated alternately by the Anglican and the Lutheran communions. Two pliable prelates were indeed consulted and agreed, but the Church as a whole was not considered. "It was one of the blows that broke me," wrote Newman. The "Jerusalem Abomination," as the Anglo-Catholics called it, became the symbol of a statecraft which was to make the Church a tool of secular arrangements, and we who have seen nominations made to Sees by a premier who was sometimes a nonconformist and sometimes of no creed that can be specified—exercising his spiritual choice according to the political proclivities of each candidate—can understand the predictions of Keble's famous sermon on "National Apostasy." Even one who, like the present writer, sympathizes little with the doctrine of the Tracts, may agree whole-heartedly with the claim of spiritual independence which underlay them. It is by the monstrous denial of this claim that the assailants of Tractarianism so weaken their real case. And it was by Coleridge more perhaps than by any one else that the claim was clearly laid down.

For it was he, as one of his most discerning appreciators has told us, who asserted the view of the Church as "in its spiritual character first and foremost and above all things essentially a religious society of divine institution, not dependent on the creation or will of man or on the privileges or honours which man might think fit to bestow on it." In short, he put life into the nominal creed. He believed in an organized and visible community which

54 Dean Church, The Oxford Movement, p. 148.
had been founded by Christ and to which the perpetual inspiration of His Spirit was assured. He taught that Chillingworth was wrong in setting up a written book as the sole standard, that such Bibliolatry was little better than Romanism, that the promise of "guidance into all truth" was a promise with genuine and not negligible meaning. The Tractarians applied what he had said, with delight. Whether a Lutheran bishop should be recognized at Jerusalem was a point on which there might be difference of conviction, but at least it was not a matter for the judgment of Lord John Russell and Baron Bunsen, each with a single eye to diplomatic conveniences! Perhaps this opens up the whole problem of Church Establishment. Certainly the settlement of it is not yet in sight. But when the stupid observer wonders at the immense vitality in our day of the High Church, at the incredibilities which that section can believe and at the indiscreetness with which it can say, "Better disendowed and free than subsidized and bound," let him recall that in every age there has been power in a clearly articulated faith, and weakness in calculating compromise. Coleridge bade the Church believe in herself, take her creed about herself seriously, stand for her divine commission without those tactics which Disraeli so caustically called "bowing before Parliamentary Committees." And of this rejuvenated enthusiasm the Oxford Movement, with all its blundering, has reaped the merited reward.
THE SINAITIC AND VATICAN MANUSCRIPTS
AND THE COPIES SENT BY EUSEBIUS TO
CONSTANTINE

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Eusebius in his Life of Constantine, chapters xxxvi f.,
gives an account of the MSS. of the Scriptures prepared
in Cæsarea at the command of the Emperor for the use
of the churches in Constantinople, owing to the remark-
able increase in the number of Christians after the con-
version of the court. His account ends with a sentence
which according to Schwartz, whose opinion seems
obviously correct, is unfortunately incomplete. ταῦτα μὲν
οὕν βασίλειος διεκλήθητο αὐτίκα ὁ ἐργὸν ἐπηκολοῦθε τῷ λόγῳ, ἐν πολυτελῶς
ἡσυχίμενοι τεῖχεσιν τρισάν καὶ τετρασάν διαπεμψάντων ἡμῶν. . .

It is of course well known that the meaning of τρισάν
καὶ τετρασάν is doubtful. It has usually been taken, following Valesius, to mean "in gatherings of three and four sheets," but two alternative suggestions have been made. It has been held that it means "written in three and four columns to the page," like the Sinaitic and Vatican MSS., and this view has been sometimes extended in order to identify these MSS. as of Cæsarean manu-
facture. It has also been maintained that it means send-
ing them "by threes and fours."

The obvious difficulty about all these interpretations
is that no evidence has been produced in their favor from
the similar use of the words in passages where the meaning
is clear. The interpretation "copies of three and four
columns" is grammatically sound, but there appeared to
be no good evidence for this technical use of the words.
On grounds of general probability the view that the
meaning is "sending them by threes and fours" is the
most attractive, but on grounds of strict interpretation it is the weakest. There is no evidence that τρισά can denote “three at a time,” and a further difficulty becomes plain if an attempt be made to translate “sending them three and four at a time.” I suggest the normal Greek for this would be something like τριά καὶ ἕκαστος διαπεμψτων. It seems clear that the substantive implied by τρισά and τετρασά is ἀντίγραφα (copies), and the meaning is that they sent the τρισά καὶ τετρασά ἀντίγραφα in elaborately ornamented τεύχεων. Τεύχος means a volume, and the τρισά καὶ τετρασά ἀντίγραφα were made up into these costly volumes. If it had meant that each complete copy of the Scriptures was in three or four volumes the adjectives would have agreed with τεύχεων.

But these considerations are negative and do not explain the phrase. It is therefore interesting to note that the new text of the Historia Ecclesiastica in the Berlin edition of Eusebius indirectly throws fresh light on the point, and is, I think, decisive in favor of the interpretation that τρισά καὶ τετρασά means “copies written in three and four columns.”

After describing the Hexapla of Origen in the Historia Ecclesiastica (VI 16, 4) Eusebius says, according to the older editions, ταύτας δὲ ἀπάσας ἐπὶ ταύτων συναγάγων διελόν τε πρὸς κῶλον καὶ ἀντιπαραθέσις ἀλλήλαις μετὰ καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς Ἑβραίων σημειώσεως, τὰ τῶν λεγομένων Εξαπλών ἡμῖν ἀντίγραφα καταλέλαβεν, ἵδιος τὴν Ἀκίλλου καὶ Συμμάχου καὶ Θεοδοσίων ἐκδόσει ἄμα τῇ τῶν ἐβδομήκοντα ἐν τοῖς Τετραπλῶις ἐπισκευάσας. That is, Origen made an editio minor containing only Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion, and the Septuagint, and this was the “Tetrapla” as distinct from the “Hexapla.” But in the new edition E. E. Schwartz reads τετρασάοις instead of τετραπλῶις. There can be no doubt that he is right, though I do not see why he prints Τετρασάοις with a capital letter—it seems an unconscious copying of the custom of the older editions. Τετρασάοις is the reading of TERBD(M) while τετραπλῶις is
found only in A and Suidas, and is clearly condemned by transcriptional probability as an emendation intended to balance τῶν Ἐξαπλῶν. Nor can the meaning be doubted; it must be "in the copies arranged in four columns," one for each of the four versions, just as the Hexapla was arranged in six columns, or in more when the additional MSS. were quoted.

This evidence ought, I think, to settle the interpretation of τρισσά καὶ τετρασσά. Does it imply also that the Codex Vaticanus and the Codex Siniaticus, which are the only known MSS. of exactly this type, are two of those sent by Eusebius to Constantine? It is obviously shown that they belong to the same class, and is valuable evidence for their date. But the case for their origin in Egypt rather than Cæsarea is too strong to be put on one side.

This case is partly palæographical, partly textual. The Codex Siniaticus contains a curious spelling of the word κράβαττος as κραβακτος, which is also found in the papyri. Similarly the Codex Siniaticus spells Ἰσραηλεῖτης as Ἰοδραηλεῖτης, and the Codex Vaticanus spells it Ἰοτραηλεῖτης. These forms have often been regarded as Latin; they may be so, but in this case they represent a Latinism which, on the evidence of papyri, affected Egypt and no other known Greek district, though our knowledge is limited here and may be defective. Moreover the character of the script, especially as regards a curious way of writing Omega, is found in the papyri of the same date. This evidence is slight, but it is all that palæography gives, and is typical of the difficulty of fixing the date or provenance of Greek MSS.—so much greater than is found in dealing with Latin ones.

This palæographical evidence is confirmed by textual facts. The text of the Psalms in the Codex Siniaticus is extraordinarily like that in the early Coptic version found in the Pistis Sophia. The order of the chapters into which the Pauline Epistles is divided in the Codex
Vaticanus, as though they formed a single book, has a dislocation which shows that the archetype placed Hebrews immediately after Galatians. This resembles the order in the Sahidic version of the Festal Letter of Athanasius for the year 367, which puts Hebrews between Corinthians and Galatians, and is usually thought to represent an old Egyptian order. Moreover, the actual order of the Epistles in both codices is the same as that in the Greek text, probably the original, of the Festal Letter, placing Hebrews between Colossians and I Timothy.

Against these arguments, which point to Egypt, are the facts that the Codex Siniaticus was corrected about two hundred years after it was written, or perhaps even later, at Cæsarea, and that it contains a chapter-numeration in the Acts which is closely related to that of Euthalius, whose work was also revised by a certain Evagrius in Cæsarea. But books are not necessarily written in the places where they were afterwards corrected, and we do not know anything certain about Euthalius. He seems to have dedicated his critical studies to Athanasius, possibly of Alexandria, but we have no real knowledge. Under these circumstances it is probably true to say that the argument for a Cæsarean origin of the two MSS. is much weaker than that in favor of Egypt.

It is possible to argue that the interpretation of τρισά καὶ τετρασά implied by Eusebius reinforces the case for Cæsarea; but I do not think that it really does more than show that in the time of Eusebius calligraphic fashion, which we may be sure obtained in Alexandria as well as in Cæsarea, demanded manuscripts written in three or four columns. In other words, this note tends to support those who date the two manuscripts early rather than late in the fourth century, but throws no fresh light on their provenance.
THE CATHOLIC CAREER OF ALFRED LOISY

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It takes perhaps some boldness of assertion to maintain that the life-story of an author relatively unknown—at least to the English-reading world—deserves to rank with those acknowledged masterpieces of religious autobiography, the *Apologia pro Vita Sua* of John Henry Newman, and the *Souvenirs d'Enfance et de Jeunesse* of Ernest Renan. Renan and Newman were born leaders of men, each drawing after himself a train of zealous disciples, and followed by an admiring public. Both were consummate artists in words, knowing full well how to make the most of the dramatic and human element that chance or their own choice had woven into their careers. Each produced a long row of eloquent volumes, and their writings not only enjoyed the widest vogue in their own day but are among the works of the nineteenth century whose significance is still far from being exhausted. Each was a convert—the one into Roman Catholicism, the other out of it—and so their self-revelations appeal to the psychological interest of such a process, when the subject of it is a man of genius, and no less to the historical interest attaching to any conspicuous individual whose career has become interwoven with the Church of Rome. The *Choses Passées* ¹ of Professor Alfred Loisy assuredly did not originate in any conscious imitation of these two famous writers, although both were conspicuous among

¹ *Choses Passées*, Paris, Émile Nourry, 1913.
his formative influences. But his book belongs in the same class with theirs, and in its distinction of style, its dramatic and human appeal, and its psychological and historical interest, as I shall try in this article to show, falls no whit behind. It is my confident belief, at least, that *Choses Passees* bids fair to become in its turn a classic to be placed beside the *Apologia* and the *Souvenirs* on the shelf of the student of religion, as a document of outstanding significance for the intellectual and religious evolution of the last quarter-century.

Since 1908, M. Loisy has occupied the chair of the history of religions in the *Collège de France*, made vacant by the death of the lamented Jean Réville. In March of that year, on the ground of his obstinate persistence in "modernist" opinions, Loisy was visited with excommunication in its extreme form by the authorities of the Roman Church, in whose unstinted service he had thus far spent his life. The most competent critic of the Bible and of Christian origins yet produced by that Church in any land, he has been as prolific an author as either Renan or Newman. With already twenty volumes to his credit—three of them monumental achievements of exegetical science running close to a thousand pages each—he is still at sixty in full career, except in so far as the war has necessarily interfered with his productiveness. His bi-monthly *Revue d'Histoire et de Littérature religieuses* has not been issued, for reasons that one can easily conjecture, since the fatal August of 1914. The first overwhelming wave of German invasion reached almost to his summer home at Ceffonds, near Montier-en-Der, Haute Marne, and the present line of trenches runs not many miles away. The past,

1 "... Pendant mes études de critique biblique, en 1881-1893, ... mon auteur de prédilection fut Renan, que je ne prenais d'ailleurs pour un oracle; mais c'est surtout avec lui et contre lui que je pensais; de 1894 à 1900, c'est avec Newman, passablement élargi, que je pense contre les théologiens protestants." *Revue d'Histoire et de Littérature religieuses*, Nov.–Dec. 1913, p. 570.
however, is secure. Neglecting, therefore, his recent work in the general history of religions and in the pagan and Christian mysteries, which presages important results to come, we turn—following his own account of the things that are behind—to his career up to the age of fifty-one in the Roman Catholic Church.

I

Alfred Firmin Loisy was born at Ambrières, in the upper reaches of the Marne valley, on February 28, 1857, of peasant stock which had been on the land and had swarmed into several of the neighboring hamlets for something like two hundred years. Too frail of body to become a tiller of the soil, from an early age he gave evidence of a rare intellectual endowment. When taken to school at the age of four and a half, the timid and sickly child sat for two days mute before the teacher who was trying to instruct him in the alphabet; on the third day, without being asked, he recited all the letters, not wishing, as he says, to pronounce the names of those strange signs until he knew them perfectly. The incident is typical of his whole later career,—of his marvelous capacity for assimilating languages, ancient and modern, and provinces of learning, one after another; and equally of his sturdy independence and self-respecting pride. In it all, the child was father of the man. His appropriation of Catholic scholasticism and the traditional dogma was so complete as to leave nothing to be desired. But his conclusions, when finally announced, came straight from his own intelligence and conscience. Authority never awed him. A friendly superior, unable to persuade him into the usual smooth and politic ways, characterized his spirit in later years as "perpendicular." 3

3 Choses Passées, p. 137. Suppleness of character, he tells us, never was the dominant trait of his ancestors. Ibid. p. 2.
was not always strictly so, as we shall have occasion to see, the cause may be looked for in the peculiar training he received, and in the deep love he continued to cherish for the Church of his baptism until she rejected him with anathemas.

The Catholic Church hardly has herself to blame for having furnished the future heresiarch with the weapons that he was gradually to turn against her system of dogma. The young Loisy received the usual education, wholly in Church schools, of a French boy destined for the priesthood. From the hands of the village curé he passed to the ecclesiastical collège (i.e. high school) at St. Dizier, where he formed a resolve to serve the Church in her sacred ministry. Before he had quite reached eighteen, he entered the diocesan seminary at Châlons-sur-Marne. His theological course was of a perfectly orthodox mediocrity. His description of his, generally incompetent, teachers, while not unkind, is to the full as diverting as the account of the not much more illustrious masters of the seminary at Issy-sur-Seine, in whose high-walled garden, now invaded by the roar of suburban Paris, the youthful Renan drew in such stimulating draughts of the quiet and still air of delightful studies. The two bright spots in the four years' course were, first, a year in philosophy under the Abbé Ludot, a lifelong friend who, because of modernizing tendencies, was transferred at the end of Loisy's first year to the obscurity of a village curacy, where he remained until his death in 1905; and, secondly, the acquisition of Hebrew, with help from a fellow-student at the outset, and the reading of the Hebrew Bible, in conjunction with the Septuagint, in the spare time of his last three years. In this concrete study of texts, the future critic found his métier, and the amassing of positive linguistic and exegetical knowledge brought a solace of mind which

his prescribed courses had denied him. The effect on
his growing intelligence of the empty abstractions and
futile dialectics of the Thomist system of education,
fastened on Catholic seminaries by the decree of Leo
XIII, was desolating. Of the time given to the study of
Christian doctrine, after the scholastic method, he speaks
as "four years of intellectual and moral torture." Even
the private research that he found time to bestow
on the writings of the great Aquinas not only brought no
relief, but rather deepened his doubts. Thus at twenty-
one, having disregarded the sound advice of his high-
school principal, to take his baccalaureate in arts before
embarking on the ecclesiastical career, he left Châlons
having for mental furnishing only the narrowly traditional
teaching of this provincial seminary, corroded by a
secret scepticism that he was wholly unable to suppress,
and relieved by his independent acquisition of a
knowledge of the Bible in its original tongues.

He was, naturally enough, marked by the head of
the seminary, M. Roussel, for a professorship, and, with
this in view, was presented to the Bishop of Châlons, M.
Meignan — whom we are to meet again in an interesting
connection — for appointment to the just-established
(1878) Catholic Institute of Paris, to take an advanced
course in theology. This is the sort of good turn that
the Catholic Church is capable of doing for her more
brilliant sons. In Loisy's case the outcome was un-
looked-for. He had undergone a severe inner struggle
as to the soundness of his Catholic faith prior to ordina-
tion to the sub-diaconate, when the obligation of celib-
bacy had to be assumed, and after a few months of hard
study in Paris his always uncertain health gave way.
Repairing, after a short rest, to his old haunts at Châlons,

5 Choses Passées, p. 29. That some improvement has been made in teaching
the Thomist system, may be seen by consulting A Manual of Modern Scholastic
Philosophy, by Cardinal Mercier and Professors of the Higher Institute of Philosophy,
Louvain; Eng. tr., 2 vols., London, Kegan Paul; St. Louis, B. Herder, 1916.
he was there ordained deacon and, on June 29, 1879, priest. Two years in the country, in charge of small parishes, did much to restore his strength, and in May, 1881, at his urgent request, seconded by that of his professors in Paris, he was reassigned to the Catholic Institute. So began a more significant stage in what he himself calls "my laborious Odyssey"—the stage of a dozen strenuous years that was to end in a serious check to his career, and in his first tragic disappointment with human nature.

The leading spirit in the Catholic Institute was the Abbé Louis Duchesne, well-known as a historian of the early Church and in later years a member of the French Academy. To him Loisy attached himself, and he held a guiding hand over his remarkable pupil until 1889, when a serious breach occurred between them. While engaged in his brief parochial duties, Loisy had kept on with his studies to such effect that within two months after the return to Paris he was granted the baccalaureate in theology. The next fall, owing to illness of the professor of Scriptural interpretation—the diocese of Paris not being prolific in Hebrew scholars—he was made, at the age of twenty-four, instructor in Hebrew at the Catholic Institute. To extend his knowledge, he took courses in Hebrew under Renan at the Collège de France and in Assyriology under Arthur Amiaud—he was his only pupil—at the École pratique des Hautes Études. Then, as was inevitable, perspectives of which he had hitherto not dreamed began to open. Renan's informal but searching discussion of the Old Testament text made havoc of whatever was left of his early faith in Biblical infallibility and literal inspiration. The young abbé, who sat taking notes in his corner—and had progressed to the point of laughing

6 Choses Passées, p. 27.
with the rest when a tall ecclesiastic suddenly left, slamming the door behind him, on hearing Renan say that Jeremiah might have had something to do with the composition of Deuteronomy— at first secretly hoped to use the master’s arguments some day to refute him. But the cloak of Elijah fell, as of old, on the shoulders of Elisha. A copy of Tischendorf’s New Testament, lent him by Duchesne for a summer vacation’s reading, was a revelation not only of the endless variations in the manuscripts but also of the serious inconsistencies in the narratives themselves. He saw these with a characteristically French trenchancy and incapacity for self-deception; and thenceforth belief in the Virgin Birth and in the Resurrection rested in his mind on the sandiest of foundations. Even the unsuspecting M. Vigouroux, professor of Scriptural interpretation at St. Sulpice— where nothing had been forgotten and nothing learned since Renan passed through its portals thirty-six years before— contributed his full share to the disillusionment. The cautiously apologetic tone of his lectures utterly failed to meet at least one student’s keen curiosity and clear perception of the state of the evidence; while an ill-advised course in Biblical rationalism, in which he reviewed the history of critical exegesis, only made matters worse, the professor’s attempted refutations of critical results merely bringing out in more glaring fashion the discord between the Biblical data and the propositions that Catholic theology professes to derive from them. “I must say,” testifies Loisy, “that his instruction and his books did more to turn me away from orthodox opinions in this matter than all the rationalists put together, Renan included.”

So much for half-measures, and for conventional apologetics, when an eager and penetrating mind is in question!

The inner state of the young instructor was by this time even more perplexed than when he had tried at Châlons to squeeze spiritual nutriment out of the barren logomachy of Thomas Aquinas. With the prevalent Catholic teaching he was deeply disenchanted. Formerly, his religious feeling had been intense and at times ecstatic. Now it had almost entirely lapsed. He saw clearly the flat impossibility of reconciling the position toward which he was tending with the accepted Catholic doctrine. “I had not brought to the seminary (Châlons) the shadow of an idea contrary to the teaching of the Church.”

But, he now writes in his diary, “The Church is at the present hour an obstacle to the intellectual development of humanity.” A Latin thesis prepared in 1883–84 for the doctorate in theology opened the eyes of the rector of the Catholic Institute, M. d’Hulst, to the total abandonment of the traditional dogmatics on the part of his most promising scholar. Such radical views on inspiration, in the Bible and in the Apostolic Fathers to Tertullian, Loisy was told, it would never do to print; they would only be grazing-ground for the Congregation of the Index. The ideas are obvious enough, but they were not then and are not now Catholic doctrine:

“That the inspiration of the Scriptures, having to do with existing writings, subject to analysis, was a belief to be controlled by the study of the books in question; that the psychology of the inspired authors was visibly the same as that of all men who write; that whatever inspiration might add of the divine, changed not at all the nature of the writings to which it pertained, and did not transform a pseudonymous book, like The Wisdom of Solomon, into an authentic work of Solomon; that, if the revelation was contained in the Bible, and without error, as declared by the Vatican Council, it was under a relative form, proportioned to the time and to the environment in which the books had appeared, as well as to the general outlook of that time and environment; that the insuffi-

10 Choses Passées, p. 34.  11 Ibid. p. 68.  12 Ibid. p. 71.
ciency of the Scriptures as a rule of faith resulted from their very nature, and that the magistracy of the Church had for its object the adaptation of ancient doctrine to ever-new needs, in disengaging the essential truth from its superannuated expression; that authors like Irenaeus and Tertullian had anticipated this when they had opposed to the extravagant exegesis of the Gnostics not the letter of the Bible, interpreted by common sense, but the ecclesiastical rule of faith, imposed on the Bible as the rule for its interpretation."

Implied in these conclusions—so arresting, when we consider the environment in which they were matured—is the frankly revolutionary idea of the complete relativity of all doctrinal construction, whether derived from the Bible or formulated by the Church—an idea so incompatible with any vestige of finality or authority in doctrine that comparatively few minds are yet prepared to admit it in its fullness. Loisy says that he nowhere met this idea in his reading. It was not likely that he would meet it there, though hints dropped by Renan may well have helped to form it. Rather, it came to him one night by a kind of sudden illumination. The completely rounded thought was the result of vital fermentation which had long been going on in his mind.

The inner conflict of his Catholic career—which was to last for twenty-four years longer—consisted, on the one hand, in his heroic effort to win a standing-ground in Roman Catholic teaching for this principle of the complete relativity of ecclesiastical doctrine to the time and conditions of its origin, with the necessary corollaries of a development of doctrine through all the past, and its further progress through all the future; and, on the other hand, in the repeated and at length definitive refusal by the Pope and his advisers to abandon one jot or tittle of the rigid absolutism of the mediæval structure of dogma. To this the Roman Catholic

13 Choses Passées, pp. 72 f.
14 Ibid. p. 75.
Church, since the opening of the new century, seems to have irretrievably committed itself, largely by way of explicit repudiation of Loisy’s conclusions as a critic and a historian of Christianity. The encyclical *Pascendi* of Pius X, and the anti-Modernist oath by which it was followed to ensure its more complete effectiveness, have fastened this scholastic system on the Catholic Church with paralyzing results so far as concerns the normal progress of thought. This is the key to the apparently easy repulse of the Modernist movement. The victory was of that Pyrrhic kind which the Church won, with equal ease and self-delusiveness, over Galileo. The parallel occurs more than once to Loisy himself.\(^15\) The phenomena of doctrinal growth and change, throughout the Bible and the history of the Church, are undeniable. The historical method has become as axiomatic to minds trained in the modern viewpoint as the scientific reasoning based on the Copernican astronomy. It is interesting to speculate on how long the Roman organization can hold back the inevitable admission that the Thomist philosophy, in all its principal assumptions and deductions, is as dead and useless as the Ptolemaic theory of the heavens, with its cycles and epicycles.\(^16\) While this conflict emerges in sharpest outline from conditions that have developed within the Roman Catholic Church since the assertion of Infallibility in 1870, it is also present in slightly different form in the more backward sections of Protestantism, where it will long trouble the spirits of both progressives and conservatives. The profit to be drawn from a study of the Catholic career of Alfred Loisy is so great because there the issue is joined with a clarity and a completeness not elsewhere surpassed if anywhere equaled.

\(^{15}\) *Choses Passées*, pp. 109, 127.

\(^{16}\) Rudolf Eucken, *Die Philosophie des Thomas von Aquino und die Kultur der Neuzeit*, passim.
II

In the crisis of doubt which followed the rejection of his thesis on inspiration and which remained more or less acute for several years, Loisy kept unremittingly at work, carrying his studies far beyond the demands of his instructorship. He made it a duty, he tells us, to read through the whole Bible in the original tongues in the course of every year.\textsuperscript{17} Thus his ultimate mastery over it was arduously won. Beginning in 1886, he conducted a seminar in Assyriology at the Catholic Institute. His second-year instruction in Hebrew developed into a course in exegesis, to prepare for which he studied the works of Reuss and the best German commentators. Resolved as he was to avoid any closed system, and determined to know all the facts, it was not long before he had to face squarely the question whether he could continue teaching as a priest of the Roman Church, whose fundamental claim—that of the supernatural character of revelation—he now realized was untenable. His reasons for not seceding forthwith are significant.\textsuperscript{18} The most conclusive was that in the depth of his soul, notwithstanding all he had suffered, he remained profoundly attached to the spirit of Catholicism. Then, as he tried to persuade himself, his doubts were speculative rather than material. Even where they touched essential beliefs, could not these be retained in some symbolic sense, as having a value not readily to be acquired by new constructions? If the hope for an intellectual rebirth among the French clergy—which had been the official reason for the founding of the Catholic Institute—was no longer his, might

\textsuperscript{17} Choses Passées, p. 77.

\textsuperscript{18} "À vingt ans, je m'étais donné sans réserve à l'Église, et si sincèrement donné que, même après avoir constaté que plus d'une erreur s'était glissée dans le contrat, je n'ai pas cru devoir reprendre ma parole avant qu'on me la rendit." Loisy, À Propos d'Histoire des Religions, 1911, p. 148.
he not live peaceably in the service of the Church, a modest scholar, confining himself to the minutiae of philology and avoiding the perilous paths of theology and apologetics? This seems to have been for a time his heart's desire; but circumstances and his own ir-repressible candor made such a program in the end impossible.

His sympathy for his students, whom he would gladly have spared such sufferings as he himself had undergone, furnished the motive for doing what he could to bridge the yawning chasm between Catholic tradition and the modern mind. The attempt he was making, and was to persist in until the Roman authorities took stringent measures to disown him, was in line with a notion of Duchesne's, that the fields of history and of theology could be permanently held apart, without disturbing each other. To this essentially futile endeavor Loisy was to consecrate his remaining years in the Catholic fold. It could not succeed, because, in his professions of loyalty to the Catholic principle, he steadily meant one thing while the official Church meant another. The situation, as we have already seen and as he now admits, rested on a fatal equivocation.

In 1890 he was made assistant to M. Vigouroux in Biblical introduction, the larger part of the work falling to his share, while the title, for reasons of policy, went to the older and "safer" man. In the same year he received his doctorate, not without making a solemn public profession of faith, part of which—a promise to teach the Bible only according to the unanimous consensus of the Fathers—nearly stuck in his throat. Soon after, his first book appeared, drawn from the material of his lectures, a History of the Old Testament Canon (1890),


20 Choses Passées, p. 90. Cf. below, pp. 60 ff. 21 Ibid. p. 106.
followed the next year by a *History of the New Testament Canon* (1891). In these works, the dogmatic method was quietly ignored and the historical and critical definitely adopted. His general plan of campaign as an innovator was to attack the less exposed parts of his subject first, in the expectation that a gradual liberalizing of opinion would make it safe to pass on to more debatable topics. In the genial closing years of the pontificate of Leo XIII, such a hope seemed for a time not wholly vain, and was shared by many besides himself. But it was destined to a rude disenchantment.

From 1892, Loisy began the regular publication of his lectures in a little periodical, which had some two hundred subscribers, called *Enseignement biblique*. This soon brought him into difficulty, and eventually led to his summary expulsion from the Catholic Institute. His works on the Canon, already referred to, had awakened the first of a long series of newspaper polemics; and an article on Proverbs, denying the Solomonic authorship and assigning a post-exilic date to the collection, gave occasion for a denunciation at Rome—by his titular head, M. Vigouroux, we are led to infer. There was, on the part of the older man, a touch of professional jealousy as well as of doctrinal suspicion, which a little spice of malice in Loisy’s narrative allows to show through. A general taint of heresy began to attach to the young professor’s fast-growing reputation. Two articles on the Babylonian myths of the creation and deluge, as related to the Genesis stories, led to his courses being forbidden to the students of St. Sulpice by the superior, M. Icard, a strict traditionalist. The same measure of protection from the infiltration of novelties had been taken some years before against certain temerities of Duchesne in the history of the early Church. The latter’s prestige, however, as a member of the *Institut de France*,

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22 Joseph Schnitzer, *Der katholische Modernismus*, pp. 22 ff.
23 *Choses Passées*, p. 107.
and his strong backing from the laity, as well as a probable dread of his biting invective, had saved his standing in the Catholic Institute. Neither by nature nor by circumstances was Loisy so well protected. Reserved in manner, delicate in health, and so absorbed in his work as to be practically a recluse, he had in his favor when assailed only the solid scientific merit of his results—not the most potent recommendation in circles where mundane opinion and ecclesiastical policy had a determining voice over mere considerations of historical and critical accuracy.

"Some day it will be matter for astonishment—at least so I should hope," he writes, "that a Catholic university professor was adjudged a dangerous character for having said, in the year of grace 1892, that the narratives of the first chapters of Genesis are not to be taken as literal history, and that the pretended agreement of the Bible with natural science is a rather poor joke." 21

Loisy was not chiefly to blame for his break with his superiors coming when it did. There had been a lack of accord between the two allied institutions—the Catholic Institute, committed to a mild and circumspect, but in so far genuine, Liberalism, and St. Sulpice, the bulwark of Ultramontanism, upheld by the aged and reactionary Cardinal Richard, archbishop of Paris. On the death of Renan in 1892, M. d'Hulst published in the Correspondant an article in which he made the invidious suggestion that if St. Sulpice years before had given Renan the kind of enlightenment now to be obtained, for example, at the Catholic Institute, his great powers need never have been lost to the Church. The well-meaning but imperfectly trained rector of the Catholic Institute appears to have felt vaguely that the time had come for doing something toward bringing the mind of

21 Choses Passées, p. 110. Cf. Houtin, La Question Biblique chez les Catholiques de France au XIXe Siècle, and La Question Biblique au XXe Siècle.
Catholicism more into touch with the living thought of the age. He began, that is, to be haunted by the same dream that had long been in the mind of his young professor of Biblical introduction. It was not to him, however, that the latter turned for help in the impasse toward which he felt himself drifting, but to his former patron at Châlons, Mgr. Meignan, then archbishop of Tours and on the point of being made a cardinal. To him Loisy wrote, appealing for a public token of approval and support. The wise old man—a fine type of the higher French clergy, with no less goodness of heart than keenness of mind—knew better than to commit himself on paper in so delicate a matter; but he invited his former protégé, whom he seems to have sincerely liked, to an interview, which was held on a late October morning in 1892, at an old Paris inn in the Latin Quarter. A remarkable conversation it was. The archbishop, who smoked cigarettes as he talked, was almost, if not quite, as conversant with the state of critical learning as his companion. On that score, they frankly stood together. But when it came to publishing critical results, the would-be cardinal bluntly declared that the tolerance of the Jesuits set rigid limits to what Catholic scholars could safely avow, and their power and vindictiveness were to be feared. He instanced the example of the Oratorian, Richard Simon, crushed by Bossuet, saying, “Our theologians are ferocious; they put us on the Index for nothing.” A free criticism, he held, never had existed and never could exist in the Roman Catholic Church, and he warned Loisy that even those who thought in their hearts as he did would not uphold him in a crisis. All this was shown in the sequel to be true. They must be advocates, sincere advocates, he urged repeatedly, of tradition. Nothing else would serve. 

26 Choses Passées, pp. 114 ff.
From the point of view of worldly policy, this was sound advice; and if Loisy had been the time-server that most of his liberal friends and colleagues showed themselves to be—anxious above all for preferment and the rewards of an ecclesiastical career—he would have gone back to his textual criticism and Assyriology, leaving others to burn their fingers on more dangerous topics. Writing, years afterwards, to one of his associates who had gained some of the kingdoms of this world—becoming at last, by an unfaltering compliance with the papal tactics of repression, rector of the Catholic Institute in Paris—he sketched the lines on which his own life might have moved serenely to the end:

“If I had been willing to imprison myself in Orientalism, I should still be teaching Hebrew and Assyriology under you; as rector of the Catholic Institute, you would sing my praises in your annual reports to the assembly of bishops; I should be cited as an example of the harmony between science and faith, precisely because I had occupied myself only with science and had never spoken of faith. I should probably be an honorary canon of Notre Dame. And that is how I missed being happy in this world!” 27

That was not to be the kind of obscure, untroubled happiness appointed for Alfred Loisy. It was, however, no false step on his own part, but over-eagerness of the superficial and at bottom timorous M. d’Hulst to be a leader of Catholic thought that brought on the catastrophe. Flattered by the acclaim that had greeted his article on Renan, and sincerely concerned to protect his professor of Biblical introduction, the rector launched a second article in the Correspondant, this time on a more perilous theme—the Biblical question. It was the production of a tactician, not of a scholar. Under the caption of the école large, which he was pleased to contrast with the traditional and the mediating schools—the last being the position he assumed for himself—

27 Loisy, Quelques Lettres, p. 221.
the Rector outlined what was taken at Rome and elsewhere to be an authoritative statement of Loisy's principles. The école large, as a matter of fact, never existed, except as a diplomatic fiction. The writer had no grasp of exact scientific method and was incapable of comprehending Loisy's guiding conception of the complete historical relativity of doctrine. The plump admission, in behalf of the mythical école large, of errors in the Bible shocked the Ultramontane theologians, while the counter-claim that, notwithstanding acknowledged mistakes in science and history, the école large held the Bible to be inerrant in faith and morals, offered no adequate compensation. The sensation was great. After a show of resistance, M. d'Hulst, thoroughly alarmed for his own future and that of the Institute, bent before the storm. A visit to Rome convinced him that no headway was to be made on the line he had chosen, and he was persuaded that his young professor—whom he had meanwhile done nothing to disentangle from the compromising connection in which he had placed him—would better be relieved of his chair of Biblical introduction. This was accordingly done, and Loisy submitted to go back to his Hebrew and Assyriology, on the condition that his scientific results in exegesis should continue to be published. The compromise was not destined to last long.28

In the closing lecture of his course, in June, Loisy felt himself entitled, in self-justification, to define his actual position on the Biblical question and on inspiration. His lecture, when published in his review the following November (1893), a fortnight before the annual meeting of the episcopal protectors of the Catholic Institute, created a scandal. The permanent ac-

28 If less than full justice is here done, following Loisy's own narration, to the excellent M. d'Hulst, reference may be made to his official biography, Vie de Mgr. d'Hulst, 2 vols., Paris, 1914, by Mgr. Alfred Baudrillart, Rector of the Catholic Institute in Paris, the recipient of the letter cited above, p. 51.
quisitions of an unfettered criticism were summed up in five propositions. The first denied the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch. The second controverted the historical accuracy of the opening chapters of Genesis. The third declared that the Biblical books should be subject to the same processes of interpretation as other writings. The fourth established a real progress of doctrine, in all its branches, within the Bible itself. The fifth asserted that, as regards natural science, the Scriptures do not rise above the opinions of the time in which the various books were composed. These elementary statements of critical certainties seemed to the traditionally-minded Cardinal Richard to be damnable heresies of the most pernicious kind. He had never encountered the like. He lost no time in bringing the case before the assembly of bishops in November, and they voted, with only four protesting voices, to dismiss Loisy from the post where he had labored so abundantly, though not without serious searchings of conscience, for twelve fruitful, if troubled, years. It was a heavy blow. He naturally felt himself to be on the point of exclusion from the Church, and long afterwards he seems to have wished that the authorities might have signified to him then that his tendencies were those of a lay scholar, and given him back the freedom he had pledged to the Church that could only spurn his talents.29

III

Man proposes, but God more wisely disposes. The next stage in the career of this much-buffeted Ulysses was an unlooked-for haven of rest, where for five pregnant years he found external peace, a not uncongenial task, and abundant incitement to continue the researches into Biblical and Christian origins, for which the work

already done had laid so solid and durable a foundation. Cardinal Richard, who was not unkindly disposed toward him personally—although their total dissimilarity of outlook made their few interviews very distressing to Loisy—appointed him, in September, 1894, chaplain to a convent of Dominican nuns at Neuilly. His task there was to give daily instruction in the catechism to young girls of secondary grade. Nothing could have seemed more innocuous, and so the Cardinal doubtless felicitated himself. But nothing could have been more nicely calculated to set the future “Modernist” forward on his way. He had an ample margin of free time for his chosen studies, which he employed to the fullest advantage. His whole mind was now concentrated on the problem of adapting the teachings of Catholicism to contemporary thought.

In 1893, he had made the acquaintance of Baron Friedrich von Hügel, and at his suggestion had taken up the study of Newman, especially the Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine. Those were significant years in the world of Protestant theology. Not long before, Harnack had published his great History of Dogma. In 1894, appeared Wellhausen’s History of Israel and Judah, while the year 1897 was marked by the publication of Auguste Sabatier’s Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion, Heinrich Holtzmann’s New Testament Theology, and Albert Réville’s Jesus of Nazareth. These great works Loisy also studied and meditated, while as a reviewer for the Revue Critique he was in the habit of receiving current publications on the history and philosophy of religion, the history of dogma and church history. His activity as a reviewer has always been phenomenal. In 1896, he established, with the aid of friends, the Revue d’Histoire et de Littérature religieuses, which continued with a short break until August, 1914. While at Neuilly, he was laying the
foundation for the elaborate commentaries on the Fourth
Gospel and the Synoptics, which appeared in 1903 and
1908 respectively. But his most absorbing task in this
safe retreat was the writing of a long historical and
philosophical apology for Catholicism, in contrast with
the Protestant masterpieces just named, and largely in
obedience to the impulse to demonstrate to himself that
he could still remain a Catholic. Personally unable to
accept literally any single article of the creed—unless
it were that Jesus was crucified under Pontius Pilate—
he was yet sincerely devoted to the Catholic Church,
which he believed might have a future as glorious as
her past, if she could only learn to use the language of
living men. A deep distress was afflicting the inner life
of the Church and it was not only in relation to Biblical
questions that there was need of rejuvenation. Prepar-
ing his daily lessons in the catechism for his young
hearers with these preoccupations in mind, Loisy de-
voted himself to the composition of a book in which he
unfolded his conception of a reformed Catholicism. From
this large work, in twelve chapters, of which he
gives a most suggestive outline in *Choses Passées*, were
drawn parts of the famous "little orange-colored books,"
to the first of which we shall soon come in describing
his decisive conflict with the Papacy.

A severe illness, which carried him within a hand-
 breadth of death itself, led in the fall of 1899 to his resig-
nation of the appointment at Neuilly. As his strength
came back, he continued the publication—part of the
time over pseudonyms, to throw inquisitors off the
track—of articles dealing with such themes as the origin
of the New Testament, Catholic opinions on the Penta-
teuch, and the papal brief of September, 1899, on the
studies of the French clergy. An exceptionally frank
discussion of Biblical questions at the congress of Catholic

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30 *Choses Passées*, p. 170.
scholars in Freiburg, in 1897, in which Loisy's friend Baron von Hügel took a leading part, had quickened his hopes, notwithstanding the discouragement that had resulted from the encyclical *Providentissimus Deus* in 1893. His endeavor was to claim a place for free and fearless criticism within the Catholic system, largely as a means of meeting Protestant contentions, which he felt—as he sought to demonstrate in *L'Évangile et L'Église*—to be fallacious. If his dismissal from the Catholic Institute might be considered merely a stroke of policy, the authorities showed themselves to be on the alert by an official censure which he now received. The first of a series of articles in the *Revue du clergé français*, on the religion of Israel, was disapproved, and the continuation of the series forbidden, by Cardinal Richard, proving how little the hierarchy was yet prepared for any advance in this direction. Loisy now felt, even more than when he had been expelled from the Catholic Institute, that he was being singled out as a heretic and as a spreader of heresy. In order not to sacrifice his independence, he declined to be longer the recipient of a small pension, which had been granted him during his illness from a fund for infirm priests.

At this juncture, as later at a more important moment, help came to him unexpectedly from the lay element in French society. Through M. Paul Desjardins, with friendly aid from M. Albert Réville, he was appointed lecturer in the section of the science of religion at the *École pratique des Hautes Études*, and assistant in the preparation of the *Corpus inscriptionum semiticarum*, and in December, 1900, he began a series of public lectures on the Babylonian myths and the first chapters of Genesis. On the death of Auguste Sabatier in the spring of 1901, Loisy hoped to succeed him in the chair


Les Mythes Babyloniens et les premiers chapitres de la Genèse, 1901.
of early Christian literature, but the fact that he still wore the habit of a priest stood in the way. In the year 1901–02, his lectures were on the criticism of the Gospels, in 1902–03 on the Galilean, and in 1903–04 on the Jerusalem ministry, thus continuing the work that was to issue in *Les Évangiles Synoptiques*. Loisy believes that Cardinal Richard was from this time determined to suppress all overt utterance and publication on his part, but did not clearly see his way to do it. There was much consultation of the authorities behind the scenes though no action, and Loisy tried through Cardinal Mathieu to make his position understood in high Roman circles. He felt, beneath the régime of rigid repression, a growing intellectual anarchy among the Catholic clergy. Many besides himself were infected with the new ideas, some of them his own pupils, and his responsibility for these kindred spirits worked strongly to keep him within the Catholic fold, long after his own conviction and convenience would have impelled him to withdraw.

Two otherwise unconnected events came together to mark the end of the year 1902—Loisy's presentation as a candidate for the bishopric of Monaco by Prince Albert, who was out of favor with Rome, and whose three candidates were summarily rejected; and the publication of his most noted volume, *L'Évangile et l'Église*, the first of the “little orange-colored books,” together with a foretaste of his synoptic commentary in *Études Évangéliques*. The latter work was perhaps too technical in character to attract wide attention, but the former marked a date, not only in its author's personal career but in the progress of Catholic Modernism.

In form, a reply to Harnack's *Wesen des Christentums* (1900), of which a French translation appeared early in 1902 and received warm approval in Catholic as well as in Protestant circles, in fact *L'Évangile et l'Église* was a dis-
creet yet frank plea for the more progressive Catholicism of which its author felt called to stand forth as sponsor. The book has thus two aspects, of nearly equal significance. The more obvious is the orderly and explicit refutation of Professor Harnack. His "essence" appeared to Loisy to be that of Liberal Protestantism, rather than of Christianity as the scientific historian must conceive it; a dogmatic construction, therefore, resting on an inadequate understanding and an imperfect analysis of the Christian origins. As a living faith, carried on by actual men in the bosom of existing society, Christianity must needs have a body as well as a soul. It cannot be summed up in a formula so simple as, inward trust in the loving Father revealed by Jesus. Its essence, so far as the term can be made to apply, must be found in its total life, advancing with constant change and ever-new formulation down the centuries, while still loyal to the initial impulse given it by the Founder. "Why must we consider the essence of the tree as contained in a particle of the germ from which it sprang, and why may it not be as truly and more completely realized in the tree than in the seed?" he pertinently asks. "Professor Harnack," he adds, "does not conceive of Christianity as a germ that has developed, at first potentially and only later really a plant, identical with itself from the beginning of its evolution to the stage it has now reached, and from root to topmost branch; but as a ripe, or rather damaged, fruit, which must be peeled to reach the untainted kernel. And Professor Harnack peels so industriously that it is a question whether in the end he has anything left." 34 Attractive as Harnack's thesis is, and useful as has been on the whole its influence as an antidote to the older

Protestant dogmatics, still an open-minded reader can scarcely set his book and Loisy’s side by side without feeling that the latter proves himself to be the more penetrating critic of the Gospels and the sounder historian of early Christianity. He is successful in showing that the Roman Catholic Church as a doctrine, as a life, as an organization, and as a worship—widely as it has departed in externals and at times in spirit from the gospel of Jesus—has yet held true to the “notes,” as Newman would say, of primitive Christianity. It is an impressive demonstration, to which Protestant students would do well to pay more heed. This criticism of Liberal Protestantism—represented not only by Harnack, but also by Auguste Sabatier—as too subjective, abstract, and out of touch with historical religion, which has always been a communal rather than an individual affair, seemed to Loisy later to be the most valuable part of his work.

IV

When we consider *L’Évangile et l’Église* in its second aspect, as a plea for a new and progressive Catholicism, able and willing to admit to the full the results of a criticism of the Old and New Testaments as radical as Loisy’s, and prepared, moreover, to concede the complete relativity of its own doctrines to the times and circumstances of their origin, we are confronted by an irrepressible conflict which could hardly issue otherwise than in the excommunication of the intrepid scholar. “Admitting,” as he says, “that the tradition is sacred and immutable, any word derogatory to the tradition is reprehensible.” In Tyrrell’s terms, it was mediævalism pitted against modernism. Whatever Loisy might say in defense of Roman Catholicism as the legitimate product of a long historical evolution, by the end of the nineteenth century it had become in government
and in doctrine a rigid absolutism. The last faint stirrings of national independence, in Gallicanism, had been effectually suppressed, and Ultramontanism was everywhere triumphant. After the promulgation of papal infallibility in 1870, Döllinger and the Old Catholics were scarcely able to make a ripple in the general current of Catholic life, which flowed on as if unconscious of any inner conflict. The vigorous effort of Lord Acton in England to impart an intellectual stimulus to Catholicism, met with a discouraging response. "It is uncontestable," writes an authority, referring to the situation in France, "that Catholics, on the average, have not in the least assimilated the intellectual movement of the last four centuries, although a small élite of Catholics is at the forefront of the movement."

After the encyclical *Providentissimus Deus* (1893), on the study of Holy Scripture—which, Loisy tells us, did not expressly condemn the idea of a truly critical and historical exegesis because its existence was then not even suspected at Rome—he had taken the advice of a friend in the priesthood and written the Pope a letter of filial submission. Like his attitude in general during those earlier years, his letter was scarcely ingenuous in its attitude toward the Roman authority. This was perhaps inevitable, yet it brings out vividly the ineradicable weakness of the Modernist position. One cannot have his cake and eat it too. Loisy frankly stated his critical principles, but at the same time avowed his wish to remain an obedient son of the Church. So long as he held to this equivocation, he was neither happy nor free, nor had he even power to aid those who thought and suffered with him. Largely for their sakes he clung

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35 A Catholic professor, quoted by Weill, op. cit. p. 237. Schnitzer, op. cit., also gives much evidence, especially as regards German Catholicism.

36 Choses Passées, p. 153. Houtin is doubtless right in saying that the Encyclical was directed mainly against Loisy's position. Histoire du modernisme catholique p. 18.
to it until it was made no longer a tenable position within the pale of the Church.

"Called, four years ago, to occupy the chair of Biblical exegesis in the faculty of theology at Paris," thus he wrote to Leo XIII in 1893, "I have wished to pursue in my writings the accord between faith and science in the field of Scripture. . . . In questions of history, I have sought to resolve, by an attentive scrutiny of the means employed by the sacred writers and of the end which they had in view, the contradictions which seem to exist among them. It appeared to me necessary, in response to the needs of the present time, to make a prudent application of the critical method, so far as might be legitimate, to the study of Holy Scripture, and thus to meet the adversaries of the Bible with their own weapons."

After alluding to his dismissal from the Catholic Institute—which the Pope and his advisers had thought a trifle abrupt—he concludes:

"It is a severe trial for a priest whose life has long been devoted to Biblical studies to find himself thus held up to general reprobation as a disseminator of dangerous opinions, in advance of any judgment by the Apostolic See. But I now find much consolation in testifying to the Vicar of Jesus Christ, in all simplicity of soul, my most entire submission to the doctrine promulgated in the Encyclical on the Study of Holy Scripture. The objections which the enemies of the Church already raise against this admirable document have suggested the idea of a memorial, addressed in lowly homage to Your Holiness, to witness to my perfect submission to the instructions of the Holy See, to the good-will with which I have hitherto served the Church, and to my hope of further service in conformity to all the directions of the magnanimous Pontiff, Leo XIII."37

This over-unctuous epistle is probably best explained by the hope of the writer, shared with reason by many others, that Leo XIII was really on the side of progress. Appended to it was a longer statement in which, "with an audacity equalled only by my can-

37 Choses Passées, p. 390; the italics are mine.
"dor," as Loisy now declares, he more fully explained his critical procedure. The Pope read both documents and returned word by Cardinal Rampolla that, while appreciative of the expressions of fidelity to the Holy See, he advised the writer, "owing to circumstances and in his own interest," to apply his talents to another kind of studies. Loisy thus received the plainest of hints from the highest authority in the Church. It was his own responsibility if he did not choose to take it, but persisted in his reforming efforts until another pontiff, of a different calibre and more direct methods, came upon the scene.

Mention was made earlier of the suppression by Cardinal Richard of the first of a series of articles on the religion of Israel. In the spring of 1901, Loisy was denounced before the Holy Inquisition, but he was still writing as a scholar for scholars and nothing came of it. _L’Évangile et l’Église_, which was his first appeal to a wider public, gave the signal for a storm of criticism and abuse in the Catholic press. Loisy intimates that personal enemies, who are perhaps to be sought among his former associates at the Catholic Institute, egged on his persecutors. He was made to appear as a deliberate troubler of the faith of simple Catholics. He hints at a persistent campaign of calumny, motivated by the bitter hatred of some one in a place of influence. Cardinal Richard at once took official action. On January 17, 1903, he issued an ordinance forbidding the reading of the book by the priests or faithful of his diocese, for the reason that it had appeared without the usual _imprimatur_, and was "of a nature gravely to disturb the faith of believers in the fundamental dogmas of the Catholic teaching." Like action was taken by the titular heads of a number of other French dioceses. Loisy deemed it prudent not to resist this prohibition,

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and held up the second edition of his book, already in the press.

"My intention," he writes, "was to go no farther in the way of concessions. Just as I had kept silent before the condemnation in 1900 of the articles of 'Firmin' [one of his pseudonyms], I meant to say nothing before the censure placed upon L'Évangile et l'Église. This was the best posture I could assume, and the most sincere, because within myself I had no real respect for the archiepiscopal sentence, and I could not make a 'submission' except by adding reserves that would render it unmeaning or equivocal." 41

Nevertheless, on hearing from his friend, Archbishop Mignot of Albi that Leo XIII expected his formal adherence to Cardinal Richard's decree, he wrote the Cardinal a letter in which occurs the following sentence:

"It goes without saying that I condemn and reprove all the errors that have been deduced from my book by those who place themselves, in interpreting it, at a point of view wholly different from that which I necessarily occupied in composing it."

The equivocation here leaps to the light, and naturally his subtle meaning was totally misconstrued. Loisy regrets having taken this step. In the hope of clearing himself, he wrote again, this time telling the Cardinal:

"I reserve, certainly, my personal opinion on all that has occurred in connection with this work of history in which it pleases some to hunt for errors in theology." 42

This is the last trace we can find of the dubious influence over him of Duchesne's sophistical dualism. At last comes the sincere note of personal revolt. It was time. The situation was inherently false, and needed clearing up. Between papal Rome and the unfettered reason no truce can be made, at least until Rome lays aside its pretense to sovereign infallibility and adopts a radically different conception of the seat of authority.

41 Choses Passées, p. 251. The difference in tone between this and the letter of ten years before, already quoted, is noteworthy.
42 Ibid. p. 254.
in religion. Of Loisy's initial good faith and entire loyalty in striving for a gradual lowering of the papal claims, there can be no question. But he was now at the parting of the ways. Either Rome must bend, or he must end his career as a priest of the Catholic Church.

Rome was not preparing to bend. As long as the politic and crafty Leo XIII had been at the helm, Cardinal Richard and others might rush to the Vatican and clamor eagerly for lightening the barque of Peter by throwing overboard the Jonah who was troubling its peace; still nothing was done. But in July, 1903, Leo XIII passed to his reward, and a month later Pius X reigned in his stead: The change was almost instantly felt. Now Cardinal Richard had his chance, and he hastened to use it. One of the last acts of the old Pope had been to refuse to sanction the placing of *Etudes Évangéliques* on the Index. The new Pope was told that the younger clergy were losing respect for tradition, and disdaining the scholastic system and the two great councils it had inspired, that of Trent and that of the Vatican, and that Loisy was largely to blame for this.43 Meanwhile, Loisy's own spirit was growing firmer and more resolute. His extended commentary on the Fourth Gospel was finished, and its printing had begun.

"In it," he says, "I formulate conclusions unheard of among Catholic exegetes — the unauthenticity of the book, which cannot be attributed to the apostle John; the symbolical and factitious character of the narratives, in accord with the theology of the discourses, which do not reflect the teaching of Jesus; and that the Fourth Gospel is a product of Christian faith, not a history of Christ himself." 44

At the same time, he decided to issue an explanation and defense of *L'Évangile et l'Église*, with replies to some of his critics. This was the second of the "little

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43 Choses Passées, p. 230.  
44 Ibid. p. 258.
orange-colored books”—*Autour d’un petit Livre* (1903). Following an extended introduction, the volume consists of seven letters, in part to friends by way of explanation, and in part to opponents by way of rebuttal. The subjects of the letters are—(1) the origin and object of the “little book” (*L’Évangile et l’Église*), (2) the Biblical question, (3) the criticism of the Gospels, and especially of John, (4) the divinity of Christ, (5) the foundation and authority of the Church, (6) the origin and authority of dogmas, and (7) the institution of sacraments. The recipients of these epistles are described in the book as first issued by title only—as, “To a Cardinal,” “To the Superior of a Seminary”—but in *Choses Passées* their names are given without reserve.

*Autour d’un petit Livre* only deepened the offense given to the Ultramontane circle by *L’Évangile et l’Église*. The first of these little books had been a defense of progressive Catholicism against Protestant subjectivism and individualism; the second was an impassioned defense of the author and his critical freedom against Catholic scholasticism and excess of traditionalism. It is a magnificent outburst of consciously righteous wrath against entrenched scholastic dulness and haughty obscurantism in the Church of his birthright. More incisive and brilliant, more solid and convincing polemical writing than these ringing chapters cannot be found, so far as I know, in the long record of theological “wars of the Lord.” They vibrate with personal emotion, showing not only the scholar, but also the man. Nowhere has Loisy better displayed the resources of his immense learning, the strength and firmness of his historical method, the trenchancy of his critical intelligence, and withal the play of his biting wit and lamen
tent humor. Nothing but the fact that mankind is solicitous for anything and everything except searching out the truth about its own gravest concerns, and that
the debate was in a region remote from the external passions of the moment, kept this from being a shot heard around the world. But the fortunate few who have had the intellectual, yes, the spiritual, joy of reading it, must feel that a new Erasmus is here, equal in culture and more than equal in courage to the gentle dreamer of Rotterdam. "After all, it does move!"—this is the challenge that he seems to hurl in the name of modern scholarship at the sealed doors of the Vatican. After all, modernism, progress, reliance on reason, is the spirit of the age in which we live. A Loisy may be excommunicated, as a Galileo was silenced; but that settles nothing. The world goes its way, and an institution—even if it be as ancient and august as the Roman Catholic Church—which refuses to move with it, is left behind. However, the old Church is wiser than any one pope or any single generation of her doctors, and the story of Catholic Modernism is not yet a closed book.

"L’Evangile et l’Eglise was written to show how the Catholic principle, in virtue of its inexhaustible fecundity, is able to adapt itself to every form of human progress. But the adaptation in the past has never been made without effort; it will be the same in the future." 45

That effort cannot be said to have more than begun; but unless Catholicism is to belie its past, its hour and Loisy's full justification will yet come.

V

What Loisy hoped and desired of the Roman Catholic Church was nothing excessive or unreasonable.

"There is a sort of latent incompatibility," he wrote in his sixth letter, "which speedily becomes conscious in a great many individuals, between the general knowledge of the world and man that is acquired today in the most ordinary education, and that which controls, or rather penetrates, the Catholic doctrine. Any substantial change in that doctrine could not be realized and is

45 Autour, p. xxxvi.
not required; what is demanded is above all a change in spirit and attitude toward the intellectual movement of our time."  

As a historian he realized that no sudden revolution in the formulas of the Church could take place. Inclined himself toward a theory of critical symbolism in religious belief, he seems to have been willing to leave the Church in possession of her traditional symbols, provided only a new and larger interpretation of the formulas might be permitted where they come into conflict with fact. But the official Church was not receptive to such counsel, and in giving it, Loisy was at last determined to suffer excommunication rather than sacrifice further his freedom of conscience as critic and as historian.

_Autour d'un petit Livre_ and _Le Quatrième Évangile_ had not been published a month when Cardinal Richard was in Rome, bent on securing their author's condemnation by the Holy Office. In December, 1903, five of his books—_La Religion d'Israel, Études Évangeliques, L'Évangile et l'Église, Autour d'un petit Livre_, and _Le Quatrième Évangile_—were placed on the Index of prohibited books. Loisy made up his mind to receive this decree with respect, and to tender his formal submission, as he had done after the censure of _L'Évangile et l'Église_. The essential statements in his reply to the notification by Mgr. Merry del Val, the Cardinal Secretary of State, are these:

"I receive with respect the judgment of the Sacred Congregations, and myself condemn in my own writings whatever in them

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46 _Choses Passées_, p. 209 f.
47 Ibid. p. 263. His approximation here to Auguste Sabatier is to be noted in view of his frank opposition to him as a historian of early Christianity, referred to above.
48 Ibid. p. 269. How long he could have been satisfied with so patent a compromise cannot be told. As an expedient, it appears to work well in the Anglican and some other churches; but the condition there is one of unstable equilibrium. Cf. Harnack's penetrating remarks in What is Christianity? Eng. tr., by T. B. Saunders, Williams and Norgate, 1901, p. 173.
is reprehensible. . . . I must nevertheless add that my adherence to the sentence of the Sacred Congregations is purely disciplinary in character. I reserve the right of my conscience, and do not wish to be understood, in bowing before the judgment rendered by the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office, as abandoning or retracting the opinions put forth in my quality as historian or as critical interpreter." 49

There was no chance of this language meeting with sympathy or understanding from the Roman curia. In reply, Merry del Val sent to Cardinal Richard a letter which Loisy describes as "extremely violent." It was read to him but never put into his hands. It demanded immediate retraction, without reserve, of the five condemned volumes and their contents on pain of a further proceeding of the Holy Office ad ulteriora. This of course was the expected threat of excommunication. A second letter to the Cardinal Secretary of State, couched in the same general terms as the first, only brought another insistent demand for an unqualified retraction. Loisy seems to have felt it his duty to stay in the Church as long as he could, or at least to do nothing himself to provoke the final rupture, 50 although he felt keenly the absurdity of being required to retract the entire contents of his books, as though all in them alike were untrue. Excommunication now appeared to be imminent. Loisy even prepared the letter that would be expected of him on the publication of the decree. He recognized that his place could only be outside of the Catholic Church as it was then inspired and directed. Suddenly, however, affairs took a new turn, and his expulsion was indefinitely postponed.

What happened was a sudden breakdown, under the intense and prolonged strain, of his physical and nervous forces. He came to shrink from the notoriety connected with excommunication, to dread lest it should turn him aside from his precious work of writing and teaching.

49 Choses Passées, p. 277. 50 Ibid. p. 284.
Already a curious and unwelcome throng was crowding the lecture-room at the École pratique des Hautes Études, where his exposition of the Synoptic Gospels was steadily progressing week by week. Also he dreaded the possible effect of his exclusion on the many who had followed, encouraged, sustained, or protected him in the Church. Above all, his soul was sadly weary of strife. It was, he suggests, a crisis of neurasthenia. He took an impulsive resolve: to let the excommunication come, and then after sentence was passed to write to the Pope, protesting the uprightness of his intentions, declaring that he could not honestly have refrained from making the reservations he did in his two letters to the Cardinal Secretary of State, and witnessing to his good-will for the pacification of spirits by abandoning the instruction he was giving in Paris. After that, His Holiness could judge whether or not to maintain the censure brought against him.

On the advice of two friends, a priest and a layman, he decided to change this plan in one important respect: to write to the Pope before, instead of waiting until after, the sentence of excommunication was decreed. This meant only to prolong the agony. But he was not in a condition to decide calmly. His letter to Pius X began with an appeal to the Pope’s goodness of heart. It expressed the writer’s wish to live and die in the communion of the Catholic Church, and not to contribute to the ruin of the faith in France. Asserting that it was not in his power to destroy in himself the results of his labors, he yet submitted as much as lay in his control to the judgment brought against his writings by the Congregation of the Index. As a token of his good-will and for the pacification of spirits, he was ready to abandon his teaching and suspend the scientific publications he had in preparation. Early in March,

51 Choses Passées, p. 307.  
52 Ibid. p. 290.  
53 Ibid. p. 292.
a rumor of his excommunication was printed in the newspapers, and Loisy believes the decree was actually prepared. Then came the most painful of all his encounters with Cardinal Richard. Through him the Pope sent word that the letter addressed to his heart had not proceeded from the heart. The promise to abandon teaching had been acceptable, but had been spoiled by the words, "It is not in my power to destroy in myself the results of my labors." The letter to the Cardinal ended:

"Assuredly, he is not asked to write no more, but to write in defense of the tradition, conformably to the words of St. Remy to Clovis: 'Adore what you once burned, and burn what you once adored.'"

At this, Loisy says, something gave way within him. He had yet other experiences to undergo to make him wish to be no longer a Catholic, but this heartless rejection by the Head of the Church was the decisive one. By a strange revulsion of feeling, however, after a tumultuous debate with the venerable Archbishop of Paris, on the same day Loisy sent him the following note:

"Monsignor —

I declare to Your Eminence that, in a spirit of obedience toward the Holy See, I condemn the errors which the Holy Office has condemned in my writings." 54

This was superfluous, if not actually misleading; and afterwards he would gladly have recalled it. He proceeded, however, to resign his chair at the École pratique des Hautes Études, and his place as assistant in the Corpus inscriptionum semiticarum, left Paris, and went to live in a small cottage loaned to him by his friend, the historian, Francis Thureau-Dangin, in the village of Garnay. There he hoped to end his days in peace. He had just passed his forty-seventh birthday,

54 Choses Passées, p. 299.
but he seemed to others and to himself an old and broken man.

The "laborious Odyssey" of his Catholic career was to last four years longer; yet not without compensations. The first of these years was occupied in the composition of the magisterial Introduction to his Évangiles Synoptiques. Nearly two years more were spent on the revision of the Commentary and the Introduction, while the fourth—from January, 1907, to January, 1908—was consumed in seeing the great work of eighteen hundred octavo pages through the press. All but the last few months of this quiet and fruitful interval were spent in what Loisy calls his "hermitage" at Garnay, the toil of writing and proof-reading being varied by care of his tiny garden and his few fowls. Some sections of the forthcoming commentary were published in the form of review-articles, and he continued his activity as a book-reviewer. It is evident that he had grounds for not feeling himself bound by his promise to the Pope to suspend his scientific publications. The Vatican, incensed by an article on John the Baptist's message to Jesus, retaliated by refusing to reissue a permission which had been granted him, owing to his infirm health, to say mass in his room. Thus on the first of November, 1906, he ceased after twenty-seven years to perform this daily service of the Catholic priesthood. During the same month he suffered from severe hemorrhages, and became so ill that he took measures to ensure the publication of Les Évangiles Synoptiques in the event of his death. In April, 1907, he removed from Garnay to live with his sister at Ceffonds, having received medical advice that he would be better for living less alone.

That was the period of the mighty struggle of Church and State in France, which ended—chiefly owing to the arrogant and unbending attitude of Pius X and
Merry del Val—in the abrogation of the Concordat and in complete disestablishment. Coincident with this, and as a further endeavor of the Vatican to "restore all things in Christ," came the campaign of increasing severity against Modernism. This part of Loisy's career can best be followed in the correspondence which he published in Quelques Lettres (1908), extracts from which are given in the later pages of Choses Passées. But we must hasten to the long-foreseen conclusion.

In July, 1907, appeared the expected syllabus of Modernist errors, the decree Lamentabili sane exitu, and in September the encyclical Pascendi dominici gregis, "against the errors of the Modernists." The only comment on these papal pronouncements calling for mention here is that which Loisy made to admiration in Simples Réflexions sur le Décret du Saint-Office, Lamentabili sane exitu, et sur l'Encyclique, Pascendi dominici gregis (1908). In the first half of this volume, he shows that practically all of the sixty-five condemned propositions of the syllabus were taken from his two books, L'Évangile et l'Église and Autour d'un petit Livre, in a large proportion of cases, however, distorted to suit the systematizing passion of his Roman censors. The second half is given up to a demonstration of the artificiality and injustice of the procedure of lumping together in one sweeping condemnation the extremely various and unconnected efforts of philosophy, theology, criticism, history, apologetics, and practical social reform which the official inquisitors saw fit to group together under the rubric of Modernism. Less interesting, because more scholastic in tone, and less personally impassioned, than Autour, Simples Réflexions is none the less a document of the first importance for the history of Modernism, and a damaging indictment of the false logic, critical and

66 The story is elaborately told, including the astonishing episode of the Dreyfus Affair, by A. Debidour, L'Église Catholique et l'État en France, 1870–1906, tome II; an able work, of strong anti-clerical bias.
historical incompetence, and essential superficiality of the reigning Catholic theologians of the beginning of the twentieth century.

The thread was now wearing painfully thin, and the sword of excommunication could not much longer hang over him. There were final vain efforts by Loisy's friends in the Church to persuade him to conform. The Pope even sent a last solemn warning—"in order, if possible, to save a soul." The sentence of excommunication (March 7, 1908) was published to the world two months after the appearance of *Les Évangiles Synoptiques*, the two events apparently not being connected, and without its victim being personally notified. It was after all a relief. A few months later, Loisy had the honor of election to a chair in the *Collège de France*, made sacred to him by his early master, Renan. His Catholic career was ended. But its influence upon the Church that so laboriously made him a heresiarch is still to be reckoned with, and can hardly fail of its ultimate, transforming effect.

56 Choses Passées, p. 364.  
57 Ibid. Avant-propos.
SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE ARAMAIC ACTS

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Professor C. C. Torrey's recent monograph on The Composition and Date of Acts has placed in the hands of New Testament scholars a new and fascinating instrument for exegesis. By his demonstration of a document in Aramaic, underlying Acts 1 1b–15 35 and translated by Luke with painful fidelity into Greek, he has opened up a whole new field for the criticism of the book of Acts. Things which no sober critic would have dared to suggest on the basis of the Greek text alone become not only possible or plausible but even certain on the basis of the Aramaic. A few results of a reading of these chapters in the light of the new theory are here presented.

I

The first turns merely on the meaning of a preposition. In Acts 1 2 the phrase διὰ πνεύματος ἀγίου has troubled every commentator. Shall it be construed with ἐνεπέλαμβανος? Then the opening words of the Aramaic Acts (adopting Professor Torrey's very plausible suggestion that the book began with the word דָּפַן, "after," where Luke put his own περὶ, "concerning") will read: "After all that Jesus did and taught, up to the day when, having given commandment through the Holy Spirit to the apostles whom he had chosen, he was taken up," etc. But then the question arises, in what sense this command was given "by means of the Holy Spirit." Not by communication of the Spirit, the Spirit acting as mes-
senger and medium, since this is not promised till afterward. Hence Meyer, who defends this view, falls back on the somewhat abstruse conception of the Spirit as the peculiar possession of Jesus and the ultimate motive power of all his activity, so that this act of commandment, like all the acts of Jesus, is done "through the Spirit." It is the best explanation possible on the premises, but it leaves the passage rather vague and pointless. No reason is apparent for stressing the inspiration of Jesus at this point, and the statement becomes a sort of pious interjection almost comparable to the scribal formulæ of later times. Moreover, the content of the command is left entirely undetermined. There is no expressed object for ἐνελάμενος, and conjectures have varied widely. Some have referred it to the baptismal command in Matt. 28. Calvin interpreted it of the preaching of the gospel as the Bezan interpolator had done long before him. Meyer, following Beza, again seeks safety in generality, and interprets thus: having given them (certain farewell) charges as persons are wont to do when leaving their friends, or also when leaving this world (ut facere solent, qui ab amicis, vel etiam ex hoc mundo discedunt, Beza). De Wette very properly connects it with the command in verse 4 = Luke 24:48f. Perhaps the connection is closer than he thought. All agree in rejecting the view of Grotius (mandavit, quae agere debereant per spiritum sanctum), as impossible with the present Greek text; but it shows the lengths to which interpreters have been driven.

The alternative is to refer the troublesome phrase διὰ πνεύματος ἁγίου to the verb ἔκλεισα, reading "up to the day when, having given commandment to the apostles whom he had chosen by the Holy Spirit, he was taken up." This is De Wette's conclusion, and he points to the list of the names of the apostles in verse 13, as also to the fact that their Spirit-induced, Spirit-
guided activity is the main theme of the whole book. This view requires an awkward hyperbaton, since the Greek order is ἐντειλάμενος τοῖς ἀποστόλοις διὰ πνεύματος ἁγίου οὐς ἐξέλξατο; but he considers that the position of the relative is even worse with the former interpretation than with this one! Otherwise he would construe the disputed phrase with ἐντειλάμενος. The word-order is indeed an outrage to one’s sense of Greek style. Professor Torrey’s note on the passage recognizes this difficulty, and supposes an effort on the part of the “cautious translator” to preserve an ambiguity existing in the Aramaic, where the words “through the Holy Spirit” “came at the end of the sentence, just before the verb (ἀνελήμφθη),” and in that position “might refer to either one of the two phrases, ‘giving commandment to the apostles’ and ‘whom he had chosen.’”¹ He says nothing as to the exegetical difficulties involved, but chooses the second alternative in his translation.²

The original Aramaic of the passage undoubtedly had the preposition ב for διὰ (so Torrey: נָשִּׁיָּר נָשִׁיָּר ב). To Luke, the translator, such a phrase could mean only one thing: “through the Holy Spirit.” That was one of the established formulæ of Christianity in his day, ranking along with διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, etc., and with a rather similar meaning. Seeing this Aramaic, he almost inevitably translated it into Greek as διὰ πνεύματος ἁγίου. And yet this need not have been the meaning in the mind of the Aramaic author. The preposition ב among its many uses has occasionally the sense of “in the case of, in the matter of, in respect to, concerning.” And how admirably the translation περὶ πνεύματος ἁγίου would fit the situation in this verse! It gives us at once the content of that otherwise mysterious command, and points unmistakably forward to the fuller statement in verses 4 f., which read: “While

¹ P. 23. ² P. 60. ³ P. 60.
eating with them, he charged them not to depart from Jerusalem, but to await the promise of the Father, which (said he) ye heard from me: John baptized with water, but ye shall be baptized with the Holy Spirit not many days hence.” The “day” in verse 2 is the day of the ascension, and is here briefly indicated by reference to its two chief occurrences: ἐντελάμενος περὶ πνεύματος ἁγίου and ἀνελήφθη. From Luke 24 (or its prototype) the Aramaic author seems to have constructed, by means of additions, omissions, and restatements, the story of a formal ascension, which he dated definitely forty days after the resurrection; and the chief outstanding event of that day was the promise of the Holy Spirit together with the specific directions to wait in Jerusalem for its coming. It is that which gave the story of the ascension its significance in the Aramaic book (Acts 1–15:35). The grand prelude to the whole is the spiritual baptism at Pentecost.⁴ And the introduction to the Pentecostal outpouring is the previous promise of it and the charge concerning it on the day of the ascension. It is with this day and the conversation which took place on it that the detailed narrative of the Acts begins (1:4 ff.).⁵ All that preceded is passed over; a mere reference to Jesus’ words and deeds before this day, and a brief parenthesis explaining how he had been appearing to them for forty days since his crucifixion and telling them various matters connected with the kingdom of God. Of this day, with which the author’s task begins and before which only the merest recapitulation is needed, no better description could be given than verse 2 in its amended form: “the day when, having issued instructions to his chosen disciples in regard to the Holy Spirit, he was taken up.”

⁴ See Case, Evolution of Early Christianity, p. 135, for a statement of the underlying symbolism of the Pentecostal narrative.

⁵ Torrey, p. 61, regards the καὶ before συναλίζομενος in 1:4 as representing a redundant Aramaic ។.
This makes a fitting introduction to the story of the ascension day, which is the introduction to the story of Pentecost, which is the prelude to the whole ecclesiastical history as conceived by this author. But the translator, mistaking ἡμέρα ἡ ἐνωρία for the customary Christian formula and translating it διὰ πνεύματος ἀγίου, was thrown completely astray, could not satisfactorily connect the phrase with either the participle or the verb, and registered his confusion by putting the words as far as possible from either. They are separated from ἐντειλάμενος by τοὺς ἀποστόλους and from ἐξελέξατο by οὐς. There could be no better proof that he really did not know what to do with them.

If this be a genuine instance of mistranslation in Acts 1:2, it furnishes further linguistic evidence of a most definite sort in support of Professor Torrey's argument⁶ that Luke began to make direct use of his source as far back as verse 1b.

A similar though not quite identical example of the same usage of the preposition διὰ is reflected in Acts 4:2: καὶ καταγγέλλειν ἐν τῷ Ἰησοῦ τὴν ἀνάστασιν τὴν ἐκ νεκρῶν, which the best commentators agree in rendering: "to proclaim the resurrection from the dead in the case of Jesus." Luke surely so understood it. If he had supposed it to mean "proclaim the resurrection of others, i.e., believers, from the dead through the instrumentality of Jesus," he would probably have written διὰ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ. Cf. Acts 13:38, where he has translated an expression of that sort by the words διὰ τοῦτον ὑμῖν ἀφεσιν ἀμαρτιῶν καταγγέλλειν. The interpretation of ἐν as "in the case of" in 4:2 is supported by such passages as 13:32: "We proclaim to you the good news that the promise which was made to the fathers God has fulfilled for the children by raising up Jesus"; 4:33: "And with great power the apostles bore testimony of the resurrec-
tion of the Lord Jesus”; and in fact by the whole series of passages in which the function of the apostles is that of witnessing to the Christian facts. Therefore in the original of Acts 4:2, “proclaim the resurrection of the dead as regards Jesus,” yields a parallel to הָרָוְ חַּיָּה in 1:2, “having given the apostles instructions in regard to the Holy Spirit.”

II

The second observation turns upon the meaning of a conjunction. Acts 15:14 reads: Συμεών ἐξηγήσατο καθὼς πρῶτον ὁ θεὸς ἐπεσκέφασεν λαβεῖν ἐξ ἑθνῶν λαόν τῷ ὄντως αὐτοῦ, which is usually rendered: “Simeon has rehearsed (or declared) how first God visited the Gentiles to take out of them a people for his name.” This makes of καθὼς an interrogative particle introducing an indirect question, which serves as the grammatical object of ἐξηγήσατο. No commentator, so far as I have been able to discover, notices the word, and no version shows a variant; but Thayer cites the instance with the usual rendering, and Liddell and Scott make a special entry of this passage in Acts as the only case—at least so far as their examples go—in which καθὼς = ὃς. And well they might, for linguistically it is all but an impossibility. Luke uses καθὼς frequently, doubtless as the equivalent of the Aramaic הָרָוְ. The very similarity in sound may have attracted him. But when he wishes to introduce an indirect question he knows Greek well enough to employ πῶς, as in 11:18: ἀπῆγαγεν δὲ ἡμῖν πῶς εἶδεν τὸν ἄγγελον. In fact two instances with πῶς occur after the verb διηγήσατο (9:27; 12:17),

Acts 15:8, 15 et seq. illustrate the common Aramaic usage to denote comparison. Acts 7:17 may well reflect the temporal use of הָרָוְ meaning “when”: καθὼς δὲ ἤγγιξεν ὁ χρόνος, κτλ. Acts 11:29 shows a specialized form of the comparative sense to denote “in proportion as, to the degree that”: τῶν δὲ μαθητῶν καθὼς εὑροεῖτο τίς ὥρισαν ἐκαστος, κτλ.
which is only another compound of the root verb used in 15 14, ἔγγυσατο. The prefixed ἐ cannot possibly account for the difference in the conjunction following. Nor does the Aramaic usage offer any simple solution. It is no more customary to use Ἰ skins with indirect questions in Aramaic than to use καθὼς in such a sense in Greek. Nevertheless, the Semitic use of ק and its compounds (e.g., יַֽיִשׁ in Hebrew) to denote comparison and correspondence is singularly loose and flexible, covering the whole range of ideas represented in English by “like, as, as if, according to, according as,” etc.; and I think that a careful exegesis of the passage in question may show a comparative sense in the word καθὼς which will do less violence to the context and yield a more interesting interpretation than the one now current.

Verse 3 has described the journey of Paul and Barnabas toward Jerusalem through Phoenicia and Samaria, “proclaiming the conversion of the Gentiles.” Ἐκδηγοῦμενοι is the word employed. Arriving at Jerusalem, they report (here ἀνθηγέλαν) the same glad facts at a public meeting of the church. Certain converted Pharisees protest, and the meeting adjourns without decision. Then follows the formal open conference (Acts 15 6 ff.), and after much debate Peter rises to speak.

“Men and brethren, you must understand that in ancient times God chose you, that the Gentiles might hear, by my mouth, the word of the gospel, and might believe.” In support of this liberal contention that his Gentile preaching was a part of the original plan of God, Peter now proceeds to relate facts: the Gentiles received the Holy Spirit (i.e., the gift of tongues, which was viewed as the Spirit’s chief outward manifestation), and so far as appearances went there was no distinction

8 Torrey’s explanation of ק בם as really a direct object, ק representing the Aramaic ק often used in such cases, is inevitable when once it has been suggested.
or difference in this respect between Gentiles and Jews. Why then load them down with the peculiar Jewish laws?

From Peter, one of the original twelve and a recognized leader in the Jerusalem Church, such testimony must have seemed overwhelming, though with some it may have left the mind crushed rather than convinced. At any rate silence ensued. Then Barnabas and Paul began relating what signs and wonders God had done among the Gentiles through them—all of course in support of Peter’s original thesis that the Gentile mission was God’s plan from the start. ἔξηγομένων is the word used of their reports.

James then rises to speak the final word. He passes over the reports of Barnabas and Paul, and goes back to the statements of Peter. “Simeon has made a report,” he says in effect (ἐξηγήσατο is Luke’s word), “which sounds as if his main contention were correct, viz., that at the very start (πρῶτον, emphatic by position) God looked ahead to take from among the Gentiles a people for his name,” i.e., a new “chosen people,” the Christians. “And with this view,” adds James, “the words of the prophets are in harmony,” and he proceeds to quote them.

This interpretation of καθως in 15:14 gives to the opening sentence of the speech of James a different emotional quality from that which it otherwise would have, though the essential content of the statement is hardly changed. The grammatical object of ἔξηγησατο is no longer the clause introduced by καθως, which would make a categorical assertion that Peter has proved his point. The object of the verb is left to be supplied, and includes such things as the ἐπιστροφὴν τῶν Θων which was the object of ἐκδηγομένων in verse 3, the σημεῖα καὶ τέρατα which was the object of ἔξηγομένων in verse 12, and in particular the impartial outpouring of the Holy Spirit.
which was the main element in Peter's own report (vss. 8 f.). This leaves καθώς with a loose and somewhat elliptical force of comparison, "as if," or more fully "in such a way as to imply that," and makes of the decision of James a rather hesitant, slightly grudging admission that the evidence points Peter's way. Such a force would be nothing unusual in Aramaic for the conjunction וּמָכָה (or וְשֵׁם in Hebrew), and I suspect that Luke caught this meaning and tried to reproduce it in Greek by the use of καθώς.

III

It is just possible that the underlying Aramaic may explain the stubborn textual problem of Acts 2:25. The last verses of chapter 11 have described the sending of Barnabas and Saul from Antioch with aid for the famine sufferers in Jerusalem. Apparently the author knew little or nothing concerning the details of that visit, and so filled in the gap as artistically as he could by describing in chapter 12 the persecuting activity and the death of Herod. Then comes at the end of that chapter the surprising remark: "Barnabas and Saul returned to Jerusalem, having fulfilled their ministration" (ὑπεστρέφαν εἰς Ἰερουσαλήμ, πληρώσαντες τήν διακονίαν). The reading εἰς Ἰερουσαλήμ, retained here by Westcott and Hort though with a marginal variant of εἰς for εἰς, is undoubtedly the lectio ardua which explains the unusual number of textual variations: εἰς Ἰερουσαλήμ, ἀπὸ Ἰερουσαλήμ, and even εἰς Ἀντιώχειαν. Any one of these would make a smoother text but could not account for the rise of the difficult but well attested εἰς Ἰερουσαλήμ. Hence Professor Lake, in his Earlier Epistles of St. Paul,9 is inclined to take the verse with this harder reading as a note of time, not referring to the return journey of Barnabas and Saul at all but to their journey Jerusalemward already alluded to in 11:27-30. Thus the passage becomes merely a warning

9 Pp. 317-319.
to the reader that this “famine visit” really took place after the death of Herod. But Professor Lake admits that “such a view is certainly harsh,” and he is finally undecided as between this and the assumption of a “primitive error.”

With the theory of an underlying Aramaic the field for critical conjecture is suddenly widened, and the notion of primitive corruption in the text takes on a new aspect. It may easily be but another term for mistranslation. Is it possible that in the original of this passage the phrase “to Jerusalem” was meant to be taken with “the ministration” as a virtual dative of advantage, and not as denoting the limit of motion at all? No one on the basis of the Greek text alone would suggest such a construction, but in the Aramaic it is at least conceivable. The most likely preposition would be ב, whose use in both these senses is too common to require references. The phrase לכו לירושלים coming at the end of the temporal clause would have precisely the ambiguity of this English: “They returned when they had finished their service to Jerusalem.” The insertion of a comma after “returned” gives the sentence one meaning, while another comma after “service” alters the sense completely. But this suggestion is not without difficulties of its own. To suppose that the present Greek text with εἰς arose from the wrong interpretation of such an original seems to argue an almost incredible stupidity or carelessness on the part of Luke as translator. For here, at least, he has by no means preserved an ambiguity existing in his source. On the contrary, if the lectio ardua correctly represents his Greek rendering, he has taken unmistakably the wrong meaning and has made this clear by the position in which he has placed the offending phrase. Εἰς Ἰερούσαλήμ, standing where it now does in Greek, can mean only one thing, the destination to which Barnabas and Saul returned. This is a hard thing to believe of Luke, and yet in view
of some of the other errors of which he has been convicted it is not wholly unthinkable. If by any chance the original preposition was ל instead of מ, the misunderstanding might be a little more natural. The first impression from ל might indeed be that of direction of motion, while at the same time the meaning “in behalf of, for the sake of” is by no means unexampled. Cf. the Aramaic of Ezra 6 17: מ, “sin-offering for all Israel.” If Luke reasoned over the passage at all, he may have thought of the messengers as going to various Christian communities outside of Jerusalem in their task of distributing relief, and as then returning to their base at Jerusalem before going off to Antioch. It is more likely, however, that he did not reason deeply over the passage, but simply translated with his eyes shut, so to speak, what he found—or thought he found—in his source. The man who retained the “forty days” of Acts 1 3 in spite of the time references in Luke 24, and who in the story of Paul’s conversion translated 9 7 verbatim only to correct it later in 22 9, might have rendered 12 25 with els ϊερονυσαλήμ because that seemed to be the statement, however strange and unaccountable, of the original. Psychologically this is no more difficult than Professor Lake’s suggestion that the verse is a warning as to chronology by an author who regarded the return journey of Barnabas and Saul as too obvious for mention. It is not a perfect solution of the famous textual puzzle, but it deserves to be numbered among the possibilities.

IV

Professor Torrey’s theory also supplies us for the first time with a rational explanation of the variations in the three accounts of Paul’s conversion, in Acts 9 1–19; 22 6–16; and 26 12–15. So far as I have observed, the
only treatment of Acts recent enough to benefit by the new theory is Professor Kent’s book on *The Work and Teachings of the Apostles*. But though he seems to accept the demonstration of an Aramaic source for the earlier chapters,⁹ he quite overlooks the bearing of this fact on the accounts of the conversion, contenting himself with the usual assertion that the one in chapter 26 is the oldest, that in 22 next, and that in 9 the latest of all.¹¹ No explanation of this singular literary phenomenon is even attempted.

The accounts have long been observed to disagree, the most glaring discrepancy being that between 9:7: “the men that journeyed with him stood speechless, hearing the voice, but beholding no man,” and 22:9: “they that were with me beheld the light, but heard not the voice of him that spoke to me.” This was bad enough, and yet there were other things that were even more damaging to Luke’s reputation as an historian. The account in chapter 9, which he seemed to have composed freely on his own initiative for its present place in the narrative, was observed to be much more highly legendary and romantic than those in chapters 22 and 26, which are introduced into speeches of Paul. In all the accounts there is the same light, followed by the same conversation between Jesus and Paul. But with Paul’s blindness chapter 9:8 begins to elaborate: he opened his eyes, but saw nothing, and he spent three days without sight and without food or drink—perhaps a conscious parallel to the experience of Jesus in the tomb (cf. Rom. 6:4; Col. 2:12). As for the Ananias incident, chapter 26 omits it entirely; 22:12 says simply: “One Ananias . . . came to me”; but 9:10–16 gives an elaborate description of a vision that prepared Ananias to go. Within this vision (9:12) there is a reference to Paul’s vision, and the conversation between Ananias and the Lord waxes extensive and rather argumentative.

¹⁰ P. 5. ¹¹ P. 75.
Finally Ananias goes and baptizes Paul and heals his blindness. "And straightway," we read, "there fell from his eyes as it were scales"! This is a lovely touch from the pen of some miracle-monger. It used to appear to be Luke's own.

On the new theory, however, Acts 9 1-19 is not Luke's own composition at all, but the translation of an account written by the man who reshaped the ascension narrative and depicted the Christian Pentecost. Whence this author derived the increments of marvel is not easy to determine. He may have invented them himself or have found them present already in some source written or oral. The story of Paul's conversion was doubtless common property, and popular report would not long allow it to lack embellishments. On the other hand, the Aramaic author himself was not bound by a prosaic regard for exactitude, but was perfectly capable of inventing circumstantial details. One remark in 9 17 sounds like his work. "The Lord," he makes Ananias say, "... has sent me that thou mayest receive thy sight, and be filled with the Holy Spirit." The writer of the Pentecostal narrative might well have added that.

Now Luke, having translated faithfully this highly colored narrative in chapter 9, comes in chapter 22 to a place where he can set the matter right. He does so on the basis of his own superior knowledge and personal acquaintance with Paul. For one thing he inserts the time of day at which the great event took place (περὶ μεσημβρίαν, 22 6; cf. 26 12, ἡμέρας μέσης), a point which was probably unknown to the Aramaic author. He corrects outright and most explicitly the statement of 9 7 regarding the bystanders, asserting that they saw the light, but did not hear the heavenly voice (22 9). This point is stressed again in 26 13, though the element of contradiction is not made so prominent: "I saw on the way a light from heaven, above the brightness of
the sun, shining round about me and them that journeyed with me. And when we were all fallen to the earth, I heard a voice," etc. It is perhaps hardly too much to suppose that this goes back to Paul himself; for the fact that his companions did not hear the voice, far from casting doubt on the authenticity of the occurrence, might to Paul’s mind be an actual confirmation of its special personal and private character. He remarks in Gal. 1:16: “It was God’s good pleasure . . . to reveal his son in me” (ἀποκαλύψαι τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ ἐν ἐμοί). A revelation which Paul alone could hear and understand might very naturally be described in these terms. The account in chapter 22 continues in a simple and straightforward manner. “And when I could not see for the glory of that light, being led by the hand of them that were with me I came into Damascus. And one Ananias, a devout man according to the law, well reported of by all the Jews that dwelt there, came unto me, and standing by me, said unto me, ‘Brother Saul, receive thy sight.’ And in that very hour I received my sight and could see him.” Ananias interprets the vision to Paul as a vision of the Messiah (“Righteous One,” 22:14) and urges immediate baptism. Later in Jerusalem in the temple while praying, Paul fell into a trance and again saw Jesus, and received his commission to the Gentiles at that time (22:17–21). In all this there is nothing incredible. It requires interpretation from the modern point of view, but there is nothing which, being properly interpreted, the modern historian need reject.

In chapter 26 Luke does not feel the need of being so explicit and detailed. He has already told the full story once in its proper form and set right the wrong impressions which might be derived from the account in his source. He therefore feels at liberty to omit the Ananias incident altogether, and to telescope the two visions of Jesus, the one on the Damascus road (Acts
22 6-11) and the other in the Jerusalem temple (22 17-21), into a single narrative. The commission to the Gentiles (26 16-18) is thus added on directly to the original words of Jesus in his first appearance. This is not serious. Gal. 1 16 would suggest that Paul himself often told the story so. But aside from this—from the ancient point of view harmless—syncopation no significant variation occurs between the two accounts which we owe directly to Luke. No detail is added in Acts 26 which is openly contradictory to Acts 22. To be sure, 26 14 says, "when we were all fallen to the earth"; 22 7, "and I fell to the ground." But there is no necessary contradiction here. In 22 7 part of the truth—the really significant part—is told; 26 14 tells more, but nothing incompatible. The same may be said of 26 14b, which adds the detail that Jesus used the Hebrew language, and said, "It is hard for thee to kick against the goads." This is an addition, but no necessary contradiction. As between chapter 22 and chapter 26 there is nothing even remotely resembling the contradiction of 9 7 by 22 2.

Professor Torrey's theory seems to furnish a perfect explanation of the peculiar facts in the three accounts of Paul's conversion: their present order, the superior historicity of the accounts in chapters 22 and 26, the superior fulness of that in chapter 22 over that in 26, and the sharp contradictions of the first account by the later ones. This result is an incidental confirmation of the theory itself, although the linguistic evidence alone has furnished all the proof that is needed. And the result for the historian and for the biographer of Paul is also important. We are thrown back, not upon the abbreviated account in chapter 26, but upon the fuller and more detailed account in 22 as the most reliable of all. It is the report not indeed of an eye-witness, but of a close friend and companion of Paul, and may be assumed to record the outward facts of the experience
accurately according to Paul’s own memory of them. This is as much as we have a right to expect or hope. The inward psychological facts, which are of so much concern to the modern student, did not interest Luke, and can only be deduced inferentially from the outward course of events. Even when Paul himself attempts an inward interpretation of his experience, as he may do in Rom. 7, the result is so involved with ancient mystical psychology and with Paul’s own subsequent reflections as to be of slight value from the modern point of view. It has, however, preserved one fact of crucial importance, namely, that Paul’s conversion was not only an intellectual change from disbelief to belief in Jesus’ Messiahship, but was also a moral emancipation from the power and sense of sin. From this moral aspect of his conversion were developed the deepest implications in Paul’s whole system of theology, but the fact seems to have passed completely over the heads of both of the authors of Acts.

V

A single note of possible disagreement may be added. It is not entirely clear from his discussion on pages 58, 61 ff., whether Professor Torrey means to reject entirely any theory of “doublets” or any tracing of sources whatsoever in the Aramaic Acts. “If,” he says, “the fact of translation is granted, it is not likely that any convincing theory of composition will ever be put forth.” In general this pessimism is well founded. The literary history of any ancient document is likely to be more complex than any convincing theory which we at this distance can construct. Nevertheless a purely literary criticism may at times achieve solid results. Most of the analyses of Acts, to be sure, have not been encouraging, and Torrey himself has with reason made merry over the theories of Wellhausen, Preuschen, Wendt, "P. 58."
Wendland, and Norden. But the work of Harnack seems to be in a different class. It shows a restraint, a soberness and good sense not always present in the others. His analysis had already led him to break the book in two at chapter 15 35, exactly where the new evidence adduced by Torrey divides it. This is a tribute to Harnack's perspicacity. It was based purely on literary evidence; the linguistic argument did not enter seriously into his calculations. But the division is unequivocally made and underlies the whole further progress of his discussion. And his conclusions show great caution. He believes that in the second half of the book there were no written sources used except the supposed "diary" in the we-sections. In the first half he picks out 6 1–8 4; 11 19–30; 12 25 (13 1)–15 35 as having belonged probably to a single written source, but expressly states that no one of the eleven arguments for this "affords a convincing proof of the written character of the source." He only asserts his impression that part at least, perhaps all, of this source was in writing. Over against this he puts 3 1–5 16; 8 5–40; 9 31–11 8; 12 1–23 as a Jerusalem-Cæsarean, Petro-Philippian source, but expressly says that he is not convinced that they need have formed a single written document which came bodily into the author's hands. He imagines rather that Philip, and perhaps Philip's prophesying daughters, were the living sources for this information. This is a virtual abandonment of any strictly literary theory of analysis. Although the investigations have been most exhaustive, these results are stated very modestly withal, and one feels the sort of difference between such conclusions and the other "critical analyses" of Acts which Professor Harnack himself feels between the miracles in Acts and the wild wonder-stories in the Apocrypha.

14 P. 232. 15 P. 245. 16 P. 246. 17 Pp. 241-244.
There are two points in the earlier half of Acts at which literary criticism would seem to be capable of results approaching certainty. The more pretentious efforts of Harnack issue, by his own confession, in little more than general probability, but the derivation of the ascension narrative from Luke 24 and the recognition of a doublet in Acts 4 and 5 17–42, produce a greater feeling of assurance. The theory of translation tends actually to support the former, while it has no apparent bearing either way upon the latter.

The detection of doublets in the two stories of imprisonment in Acts 4 and 5 17–42 turns not upon style at all, but upon content and arrangement. The resemblances are much closer than in any other supposed case in the book of Acts. Peter is involved both times. The priests and Sadducees are the prime movers (4 1; 5 17). The arrest occurs on one day (4 3, late in the afternoon; 5 18, not specifying the hour), and the next morning there is a formal hearing before the Sanhedrin (4 5; 5 21 ff.). After a time they are sent out while the Sanhedrin deliberates (4 15; 5 34). Both times they are severely threatened and let go (4 18, 21; 5 40). But if the resemblances in the events are significant, the differences in tone and attitude are almost more so. The first account (Acts 4) is simple, straightforward, and non-miraculous—except as it is connected with the supposed miracle of the lame man. The second account is heightened at every point. It is not Peter and John, but Peter and the apostles that suffer imprisonment. They do not spend the night in prison, but are released by an angel and are found by the astonished officer at daybreak preaching in the temple. The marvel of the shut doors and watching keepers is dwelt on with evident delight (5 23). At the words of Peter the officials are cut to the heart just as on the day of Pentecost, and think of slaying the offenders, whereas
in chapter 4 the officials are merely surprised at the boldness of Peter and John. The scene behind the closed doors of the council is described in full with the dramatic and demonstrably unhistorical appeal of Gamaliel, whereas 4 16 f. is most restrained on this point. The disciples in chapter 4 are merely threatened and charged, but in chapter 5 they are beaten and charged, and they go away with an exalted sense of martyrdom in a holy cause, "rejoicing that they were counted worthy to suffer dishonor for the Name" (5 41). In chapter 4 they go home and tell their friends all that has happened to them, but in 5 42 they flaunt their defiance in the face of the authorities: "Every day they ceased not to teach and preach Jesus as the Christ."

These facts have often been observed, and furnish strong indication that we are really dealing with a single incident. That they are in any way adversely affected by the theory of translation is not apparent. If it were a question of piece-work translation, one bit from one Aramaic document and another from another with editorial matter introduced by the Greek writer, the case would be different. But if the whole of Acts 1–15 35 has been taken over literally from a single Aramaic source, then all the arguments based on the structure and arrangement of material remain as they were before.

Professor Torrey himself has called attention\(^{18}\) to the series of close resemblances between Acts 1 1–11 and Luke 24 36–49: Jesus' earnest efforts to prove to his followers that he is still alive (Acts 1 3; Luke 24 26, 34, 39–40, 45 f.), his actual eating with them (συναληγόμενος, Acts 1 4; Luke 24 41–43, cf. also 30), the universal mission beginning from Jerusalem (Acts 1 8; Luke 24 47), the command to wait in the city for the Father's promise (Acts 1 4; Luke 24 49), the two men in white apparel—angels, according to Luke 24 23—who explain the true significance of events to the dazed disciples

\(^{18}\) P. 24.
(Acts 1 10, at the time of the ascension; Luke 24 4, at the tomb on the resurrection morning), and the geographical indications (Acts 1 12, "the mount called Olivet"; Luke 24 50, "over against Bethany," the road to which leads past the Mount of Olives). But along with these similarities there are discrepancies, of which the most glaring is the note of time. Acts 1 3 certainly sets the ascension at the close of a period of forty days of appearances, while an unbroken chain of time-references in Luke 24 1, 13, 21, 29, 33, 36 ff. seems to place the ascension on the evening of the resurrection day. However, the true text of Luke 24 51 does not describe a genuine ascension at all. The best texts omit καὶ ἀνεβήσατο εἰς τὸν οἶκον, as well as προσκυνήσαντες αὐτῷ, so that the passage reads: "And it came to pass while he blessed them, he parted from them. And they returned to Jerusalem with great joy; and were continually in the temple blessing God." That is simply a mystical parting at the end of a vision, exactly as had been the parting from the two disciples with whom he had gone in to take supper (Luke 24 30 f.). In the original text of Luke the latter of these partings is no more a formal ascension than the former, though it is given a setting which does suggest finality (cf. Luke 24 44, "These are my words which I spake unto you while I was yet with you"). The textual variations are to be ascribed to the tendency toward accommodation. But no harmonizer has successfully gotten rid of the "forty days," and no modern interpreter was able to explain that divergence so long as Luke was supposed to be the author of both Luke 24 and Acts 1.

The problem is enormously simplified by the new theory of translation. Since this applies as much to Luke 24 as to Acts 1, we need not suppose that the author of the Aramaic Acts read Luke’s gospel in Greek, but only that he knew the Aramaic source from which
Luke 24 was translated. Since Luke's habit as a translator was one of extreme faithfulness, we may compare the two passages with great confidence that in content, at least, they have suffered little change. It would appear that the author of Acts 1 1-11 has reduced the previous story considerably, has rearranged the order of some details, and has adapted the whole to the purposes of a new apologetic. This is really the most fundamental difference between the two narratives, out-ranking even such matters as the reference to the "forty days"—or rather comprehending and explaining them. The main purpose of the story as it appears in Luke 24 is to justify the belief in Jesus' Messiahship: he suffered and died, yet nevertheless he was the Christ in full accordace with the Old Testament prophecies (vss. 26 f., 44-46). That was practically the first great problem for Christian theology, to make the crucifixion not a bar to belief in Jesus' Messiahship but a veritable proof of it. Incidentally there is an effort to depict the resurrection as a very real thing, and to guard against the supposition that Jesus might be merely a ghostly spirit (vss. 36-43). The content of Christian preaching at this stage is also indicated: "Repentance unto remission of sins should be preached in his name to all the nations, beginning from Jerusalem" (vs. 47). This shows the religious goal, the remission of sins at the time of the great world-judgment. It gives point and purpose to what would otherwise be a mere historical witnessing to certain facts regarding the crucifixion and resurrection.

But by the time the Aramaic Acts were written new problems had arisen, and these narratives of a decade or two previous are seen in a different light. The thing which catches this author's attention, as he

19 So Torrey, Translations from the Aramaic Gospels, in the volume of Studies in the History of Religions dedicated to Professor Toy, p. 316: "It is obvious . . . that this whole chapter is translated."

20 "Late in the year 49, or early in the year 50," according to Torrey, p. 68.
scans them through, is not the attempted proof of Jesus' Messiahship from the scriptures, but the "promise of the Father," which he understands as the baptism of the Holy Spirit. The saying of John the Baptist also he interprets in the same way, and works it into the story at an appropriate point. What John originally said was undoubtedly: "I baptize you with water, but there comes a stronger than I, whose shoe-lace I am not worthy to untie; he shall baptize you with fire." Luke 3:16 shows already an expansion of the saying in the light of later developments: "I baptize you with water, but... he shall baptize you with the Holy Spirit and with fire." The author of the Aramaic Acts makes a further adaptation by leaving out the fire, and even goes so far as to put the saying into the mouth of the risen Jesus (Acts 1:4 ff.). Following this he introduces a brief but edifying colloquy (vss. 6 f.) designed to set at rest the troubling doubts regarding the time of the parousia. The coming kingdom had been long delayed. Many were anxious. Many had even fallen away. For the benefit of his own contemporaries therefore this author makes Jesus say, "It is not for you to know times or seasons, which the Father has set within his own authority." Verses 10 f. have the same intent: the two men in white say with the utmost assurance that Jesus shall return exactly as he now goes up into heaven.

But after all the real answer to the growing doubt is not by direct argument. It is rather by a substitution of interest. As I have suggested above, the main purpose of the ascension narrative is to prepare the way for the great events on Pentecost. Not only is the mystical parting of Luke 24:51 made into a formal ascension, but the conversation is made to turn primarily on the need of waiting in Jerusalem for the spiritual endowment. In Luke 24 there had been no mention of
the Holy Spirit. It is not likely that at that early stage the glossolalia, interpreted as a sign of the Spirit, had attained anything like its importance in the later church. It may have already made its appearance; the natural place to look for its spontaneous origin would be in the eager and excited groups looking for the end of the age. But it is doubtful if the "promise of the Father," for which the disciples are instructed to tarry in Jerusalem, is thought of in Luke 24:49 as the gift of the Spirit. The Holy Spirit is nowhere mentioned in this chapter, nor is there any reflection of the glossolalia unless it be found in the "enduement with power from on high" in this same verse. The likelihood is that the expected "promise of the Father" was really the kingdom itself, and that the earliest disciples felt that Jesus had charged them to wait in Jerusalem for his own parousia. We read in verses 52 f. that they went back to Jerusalem with great joy and were continually in the temple blessing God. Is it not likely that their joy was over the assurance that Jesus was alive and the kingdom was so near? What is meant by the "enduement of power from on high" (5:49) is not certain. It may simply be that eschatological "power" which in the Lord's prayer itself is connected with the kingdom and the glory. If it does refer to the baptism of the Spirit, observe how incidentally it comes in. It is far from being the focus of interest and attention that it is in Acts 1 and 2.

Two decades of waiting had made a profound difference in the attitude of the expectant community. The delay had by no means destroyed the eschatological hope, but it had somewhat dulled the edge of it. Remote interests weigh little with any kind of men, and perhaps least of all with the unlearned and ignorant; and already there is beginning within Christianity a shift from that other-worldly expectation to objects more immediately attainable. The glossolalia supplied just
that need. Those first days of waiting and longing for the great cataclysm must have been a season of intense excitement. The glossolalia might then indeed for the first time have broken out. If the Messianic parousia had also then taken place, the glossolalia, needless to remark, would have been passed by without further comment. But the end did not come. The days of excited expectation passed, and the great crisis with its terrors and its searching judgment did not materialize. One new thing, however, had materialized. The glossolalia had made its appearance. It seemed to be a special mark of divine interest. The persons affected felt that a divine power had seized hold of them and literally spoken through them. This was the beginning of that peculiar type of spiritual baptism which came to be regarded as the distinctive sign of God’s favor, that which marked God’s acceptance of the new converts and showed his continued interest in the old ones. Thus while the day of judgment still delayed to come, it was possible for the believer to find the immediate and present satisfaction of his religious needs in this gift of the Holy Spirit. The cultivation of the glossolalia, religiously interpreted as the gift of God, came to fill a large place in the life of the early Christian community. In Paul’s time the Christian water-baptism was not regarded as valid unless accompanied by this sign (cf. Acts 19 1-7), though there were followers of Jesus then in existence who had not so much as heard whether there was a Holy Spirit (5 2).

The author of the Aramaic Acts lived in this later age, and was an enthusiastic believer in the baptism of the Spirit with its accompanying glossolalia. He therefore interprets the “promise of the Father” and the “enduement with power from on high” in Luke 24 49 as referring to this manifestation, and supposes the gift of the Spirit to have been the first great event in ecclesias-
tical history. Its origin he regards as the virtual origin of the church, the time of God's definite indication that the conquering career of Christianity had begun. It is not necessary in this connection to discuss at length the symbolism of the Christian Pentecost and its manifest correspondences to the midrashic view of the Old Testament Pentecost as the time of the giving of the law. Professor Case in his "Evolution of Early Christianity" thus describes the parallelism: "The forty days of waiting by the disciples are the same as Moses' period of preparation in Sinai (Ex. 24 18); the thunder and lightning, with the voice of God coming from the midst of the fire, correspond to the roaring sound and tongues of flame in Acts (Ex. 20 18 ff.; Dt. 5 4 f.; 33 2 f.; Ps. 68 8); and the proclamation of the gospel in different languages repeats the midrashic representation of the manner in which the law was promulgated from Sinai, when seventy voices proclaimed it to as many different peoples, but all save Israel rejected." On such presuppositions as these was our author working when he rewrote the narrative of Luke 24 as a formal ascension and recast that day's conversation as a prelude to the Christian Pentecost. It may be observed in passing that John 20 19-23 presents another version of the affair, also based on Luke 24. This account says that on the evening of the day on which he rose from the dead Jesus met his disciples in a closed room and breathed on them, saying, "Receive ye the Holy Spirit" (John 20 22). From this multiplication of accounts regarding its origin we can judge the importance of the Spirit in this primitive religious life. They furnish a perfect background for the protests of Paul in 1 Cor. 12-14.

To turn to our literary problem, a particularly telltale bit of evidence is the reference in Acts 1 12 to the Mount of Olives. After the ascension we read: "Then re-

21 P. 135.
turned they to Jerusalem from the mount called Olivet.”

This is apparently the form given to the Lukan statement, “He led them out over against Bethany” (Luke 24:50), but it comes in peculiarly and unexpectedly. Συναλλαζόμενος in verse 4 certainly suggests that the conversation took place indoors; presumably the “upper room” of verse 13 was in the author’s mind. The question and answer of verses 6–8 seem to follow at once and quite naturally. Then in verse 9, “When he had said these things, as they were looking, he was taken up.” Nowhere between verse 4 and verse 11 is there any suggestion of a change of scene, but in verse 12 comes suddenly the statement that they returned from the mount called Olivet. The fact seems to be that the Aramaic author, in remodelling his narrative from Luke 24, has been guilty of an oversight, and betrays himself by neglecting to indicate the transition from Jerusalem to the scene of the supposed ascension.

On these two points, the literary relations between Luke 24 and Acts 1:1–11 and between Acts 4 and 5:17–42, something approaching certainty seems attainable. In pronouncing against theories of composition for Acts Professor Torrey may not have had such minor matters as these in mind. He may have been thinking of those elaborate reconstructions such as Professor Harnack has built up only to decide that they are too shaky for permanent habitations. But the demonstration of doublets in Acts 4 and 5 shows us plainly the nature of the sources which the Aramaic author had to employ, while the comparison of his ascension narrative with the last chapter of Luke gives us interesting though fragmentary glimpses into his very workshop.

22 Unless indeed οἱ μὲν οὓς συνελάβατες is meant to indicate a transition and should be translated: “They, having gone with him,” or, Aramaic tenses being vague, “as they were going with him.” But Torrey, p. 24, takes it as “those who were present.”
BOOK REVIEWS

THE RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND. King's Chapel Lectures.

This volume consists of fourteen lectures delivered on the Lowell Institute foundation in the winters of 1914–16. Four of the lectures, by Prof. John W. Platner of Andover Theological Seminary, are on the Congregationalists. The Unitarians and the Revolt against the Standing Order are described by Prof. W. W. Fenn, Dean of the Harvard Divinity School. The lecture on the Baptists is written by Dr. George E. Horr, President of the Newton Theological Institute. Prof. Rufus M. Jones of Haverford College speaks for the Quakers. Prof. George Hodges, Dean of the Episcopal Theological School, Cambridge, has two lectures on the Episcopalians, and Dr. William E. Huntington, formerly President of Boston University, two on the Methodists. The Universalists are represented by Dr. John C. Adams, pastor of the Universalist Church in Hartford, Conn., and the Swedenborgians by Prof. William L. Worcester, President of the New-Church Theological School, Cambridge. An important omission is explained in the Preface: "One deficiency the Committee sincerely regret. It appeared impossible to secure either for the lectures or for the book an historical narrative from a member of the Roman Catholic communion. The Committee feel that the book ought not to be issued without at least some word recognizing the contribution which that Church has made to the Religious History of New England." An omission, real though of less weight, is that of the picturesque if strenuous story of the Shakers.

The ecclesiastical history of New England is concerned with two groups of forces: the one, centripetal, that of Congregationalism or the Standing Order, as it was called; the other, centrifugal, the various revolts against it. Each of these latter had, as it believed, a distinctive gospel of its own, the preaching of which brought it into opposition to the established order, and in most cases to the other dissenters also. Even if a group of men, enthusiastic for a new variety of gospel, desired merely to utter themselves undisturbed, as Dr. Adams says was the case with the Universalists (p. 317),
they were unable to do so, because divergence from the established belief was accounted heresy; and though the attempt to improve heretics by burning had been given up, the endeavor to show them their wickedness by excommunication, social ostracism, and occasionally whipping, was still active. This put a premium on partisan loyalty, and gave every man an attitude as of going armed. For a couple of centuries whatever other aspect of Christianity the religion of New England lacked, it preeminently embodied the Church Militant. Rev. John Wilson, pastor of the First Church of Boston, who died in 1667, was especially commended by the author of certain Memorial Verses for his sturdy hatreds:

"Firm stood he 'gainst the Familist,
   And Antinomian spirit strong;
He never loved the Sep'ratist,
   Nor yet the Anabaptists' throng.
Neither the Tolerator's strain,
   Nor Quakers' spirit could he brook,
Nor bowed to the Morellian train,
   Nor children's right did overlook.
Nor did he slight our liberties
   In civil and in church concerns,
But precious were they in his eyes
   Who stood among their fixed friends."

It was characteristic, however, of New England Puritanism that under its hard shell it had a sweet kernel. The Memorialist continues:

"Gaius, our host, ah, now is gone!
   Can we e'er look for such another?
But yet there is a mansion
   Where we may all turn in together.
No moving inn but resting place,
   Where his blest soul is gathered;
Where good men going are apace
   Into the bosom of their head.
Ay, thither let us haste away.
   Sure heaven all the sweeter be
(If there we ever come to stay)
   For him, and other such as he."

The Standing Order had in fact the firmly established position suggested by its name. Church and State were not only joined; for a time they were one. By a law in 1631 none but Church-

members were entitled to the civil franchise, though all the inhabitants of a town were liable for the support of its minister. The principle of general taxation for the support of the ministry, though not always enforced, was not finally abandoned until 1833. This inequality bore especially hard upon two classes: those who were Congregationalists but not Church-members, and those who regarded the established ministry as no genuine ministry; because—in the opinion of the Quaker—its ministers were "hirelings," or—of the Baptist—because they baptized children, or—of the Episcopalian—because they had never been properly ordained. From within and from without, the Standing Order met opposition.

An even stronger opposition was aroused, however, by its doctrinal system, which was Calvinism. The absence in the colonial period of newspapers, magazines, works of fiction and art, the fewness of books of poetry, general literature, and science, the tremendous importance attached to the human soul and the narrow definition given to the soul, all combined to centre an absorbing interest in theology. Edwards, Hopkins, Emmons, of the earlier day, and Bushnell, Beecher, Brooks, of the later, showed that this system produced profound thinkers and inspiring preachers; while, at the other end of the intellectual scale, the doctrines of foreordination and the Divine decrees were discussed at the village store and with himself by the farmer jogging to mill.

The rigidity and severity of the Calvinism of the day are indicated by the revolts against it. These fall loosely into two groups: those of the seventeenth century, consisting chiefly of Quakers, Baptists, and Episcopalians, whose attacks centred on the polity of Congregationalism; and those of the half-century between 1770 and 1820, when opposition was primarily doctrinal. By this latter period the punishments for theological dissent had become social rather than material, and men who were brave enough to say aloud, "It isn't so," now found themselves not alone. Protests therefore became frequent: from the Free Will Baptists (1770), the Methodists (1772–90), the Universalists (1774), the "Christians" (1801), the Unitarians (1800–20), the Swedenborgians (1818).1 By the time these had made their attacks on New England Calvinism, so little of it was left that Calvin would not have recognized it. The spirit rent it sore, and came out of it, and it was as one dead, insomuch that many said, "It is dead."

There is always a tendency to measure the universe by the denominational foot-rule. This often accounts for the unfavorable

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1 These dates are not exact but only approximate.
opinions we are apt to have of our opponents. The Bay Colony had an unquestionable ground of complaint against Thomas Morton of Merrymount for giving his friends, the Indians, rum and muskets; but the fact that he observed Christmas and May Day and used the Book of Common Prayer seems hardly sufficient ground for charging him with setting up "a schoole of athism"; and there seems little other ground for the charge (p. 208). Wilbur Fiske was greatly exercised in mind because when he entered the ministry in 1818 "there was not a single literary institution of any note under Methodist patronage. He felt deeply the necessity of such means of training, both for the ministry and the laity, and gave himself to the cause of Christian education with great devotion and zeal" (p. 265). When one considers that at that time Harvard, Yale, Dartmouth, Brown, and Bowdoin Colleges were in existence, each having been founded for the training of young men in religion, it may be questioned whether the first adjective in the last clause should not rather be "Methodist."

The theological climate of the present day is widely different from that of a century and a half ago, and there is the temptation for each denomination which has fought its fight, and which finds its distinctive gospel now largely adopted by the thought of the time, to claim that it has been the agent to which the modifying change is due. While this claim is not directly made by any of the authors of this volume, several imply that they would be justified in making it. Their manner of refraining suggests Casca's description of Caesar's behavior when Antony offered him a crown: "As I told you, he put it by once; but, for all that, to my thinking, he would fain have had it. Then he offered it to him again; then he put it by again; but, to my thinking, he was very loth to lay his fingers off it." This tendency is deprecatingly referred to in describing the influence of the New Church:

"The opinions quoted above from James Freeman Clarke and Edward Everett Hale, that Swedenborg's thought has been spiritualizing both philosophy and religion; that Swedenborgianism has done the liberating work of the last century, and that the statements of Swedenborg's religious works have revolutionized theology, if they refer to effects consciously derived from Swedenborg, are doubtless exaggerations. If they include the unconscious influence of his writings, they are probably understatements of the truth" (p. 346).

Undoubtedly, the propagation by each denomination of its distinctive principles has tended to modify current thought; but to ascribe
the profound difference between us and our forefathers to any one of them is to mistake our surf-splashing for the rise of the tide. The change is owing rather to a myriad of agencies, most of them invisible, which go to make up what we call the spirit of the age. The Zeitgeist picks a thread from here and another from there, but both origins and effects are rarely traceable.

"So schaff' ich am sausenden Webstuhl der Zeit, 
Und wirke der Gottheit lebendiges Kleid."

There is, however, in these lectures very little blowing of the denominational trumpet. Its note may perhaps be heard in the glowing account of the accomplishment of the Baptists and of the Universalists. In case of the latter there is, moreover, a tone which suggests children with a grievance against others who refuse to play with them (pp. 303, 318); for the difficulty between the Universalists and Unitarians is, as Dr. Adams says, "more social than anything else" (p. 319).

With limited time, extended treatment of any subordinate point is of course impossible. Yet, in the interest of proportion, one may wish that a fuller consideration than the very brief mention of them had been given to the cases of Anne Hutchinson and Roger Williams and to the witchcraft episode. Again, both Professor Platner and Dean Hodges mention the remarkable words of Francis Higginson on leaving England in 1629:

"We will not say, as the Separatists were wont to say at their leaving of England, 'Farewell, Babylon! farewell, Rome!' but we will say, Farewell, dear England! farewell, the Church of God in England, and all the Christian friends there! We do not go to New England as Separatists from the Church of England, though we cannot but separate from the corruptions of it; but we go to practise the positive part of church reformation, and propagate the gospel in America" (pp. 11, 212).

Neither of the lecturers, however, explains why, after these ardent professions of loyalty to the Church of England, such a change took place that soon after the travelers landed at Salem they were so thoroughly Separatist that they could not tolerate Conant, Lyford, Oldham, and the brothers Brown, but joined with Endicott in informing these men that there was no convenient place in Salem or New England for the use of the Prayer Book, and that it and they must leave the country.

It is lacking in completeness, to say the least, to speak of the Quaker "martyrs," and to declare that it was to guard against "a
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religious peril” that the officials of the Massachusetts Bay Colony adopted “stringent methods of dealing with them”—to make this statement (p. 180) and to say nothing of the extraordinary conduct which gave rise to the stringent methods. The behavior of the Quakers was not only subversive of the principle of the Puritan State but was too often against common modesty, and was such as would not be tolerated in any city for a moment today. The long-suffering of the magistrates with these conscientious offenders against law and public decency should not be overlooked in drawing an indictment against Puritan harshness.

It is interesting to note the similarity of religious character and thought which widely different types of training have produced in the authors of this significant book. The distinctive message of each denomination has been filtering into the thought of the others, so that it is no longer to the Universalists that one must look for the news of a Divine love unsatisfied so long as a single soul is left unsaved; nor to the Baptist for the assertion of the preëminent importance in the service of God of conscious responsibility and mature choice; nor to the Episcopalian for an exhibition in appealing ritual of the corporate nature of religion. Each has now the flowers of which the others have sowed the seed, and each, not grudgingly but gladly, may say, with Samson, “If ye had not plowed with my heifer, ye had not found out my riddle.” As the patent of each on its special property has expired, denominational aggressiveness has been less called for, and greater opportunity has been given for a common type of Christian character. He who, in order to stand well with his fellows, was obliged in former times to shake his fist at all others, now is not ashamed to call them brethren. Out of the eater has come forth meat, and out of the strong has come forth sweetness. That division of labor, however, which is as necessary in the ecclesiastical world as in the economic will render it always desirable that one body shall press upon the world’s notice one aspect of religious truth and another another. Any union which should obscure this important function would be therefore a loss to the Christian Church, not a gain. But tone, atmosphere, spirit, is here, as elsewhere, the most important thing; and the similarity of character and thought among the leading representatives of different religious communions is a cheering indication that these are coming to hold the faith “in unity of spirit, in the bond of peace, and in righteousness of life.” To have the service to the community which each has fulfilled stated so clearly, so judiciously, so amicably, as in this interesting and valuable book, is a help to
interpreting the past and understanding the present and preparing the future.  

Frederic Palmer.

Harvard University.


The external facts of the life of Emerson have long been before the public, and the generation following his own has had time to sum up and assimilate his thought. Already he has seemed to be of those figures of the past to whom we may return to be reminded of the forces that stimulated our early growth, but from whom we no longer expect surprises. Only the access to fresh materials would seem to justify a new general treatment of his life and work; and such an access has been afforded by the publication of his Journals. These extensive diaries, kept by Emerson during the greater part of his life, have now been edited, and fill ten volumes. They might have been completed merely by a critical account of what they do to correct or supplement our previous knowledge of the man and his work. Professor Firkins has preferred to re-tell the whole story and re-estimate the whole body of Emerson’s writings as these now lie entire before us. The result more than justifies his decision.

The treatment is nothing if not systematic. Half the volume is biographical, and one could not ask for a more satisfactory presentation of the personality and environment of its subject. Professor Firkins is sufficiently detached from the atmosphere and tradition of New England to be able to deal with them in truer perspective than most writers on the Concord philosophers have been able to achieve. His attitude towards the man Emerson is sympathetic and admiring without being adulatory; and a lively sense of humor adds vivacity to his characterization of the minor worthies. The selection of biographical material is adequate for all the purposes of the student interested primarily in Emerson’s thought, and the handling of it is admirable.

The second part of the book consists of chapters on “The Harvest,” “Emerson as Prose Writer,” “Emerson as Poet,” and “Emerson’s Philosophy,” and closes with “Foreshadowings.” In the first of these the author undertakes to characterize one by one all the separate essays and lectures that constitute the Emersonian canon. This laborious task is accomplished with skill and versatility; but before the reader finishes the chapter his wonder at the author’s conscientious daring in assuming such a burden almost gets the better of his
admiration for the wit and resource which make it readable. The
discussion of "Emerson as Prose Writer" is subdivided into eighteen
sections, and some of these into minor heads—a method that will
offend some by its obviousness or its suggestion of the much abused
doctorate dissertation, but which makes it certain that we always
know where we are. The same kind of analysis is employed in the
treatment of the poetry and the philosophy, only it must be con-
fessed that the headings in the latter are at times even more enig-
matic than Emerson's own titles.

Professor Firkins is convinced that far too much has been made
of Emerson's lack of coherence and logical sequence, and it may
be that his schematic machinery will help to correct the prevalent
error. But in the endless subdivisions of the present work there is
perceptible also something of an Emersonian staccato, and the
gain in clearness and concentration is slightly discounted by a
lack of continuity. The biographer reminds one of his subject in
other respects. He has much of Emerson's power of concrete
illustration; he employs imagery with a freedom and vividness that
would make us suspect, if we did not know, that he is himself a poet;
and he not infrequently achieves an epigram that rivals his choicest
quotations. A few sentences will illustrate:

"There is no evidence that this transitoriness of the virtues was to Emerson
much more than an exciting possibility, fine hazard or stirring peril, adding
the charm of romantic vicissitude to the unguessed destinies of mankind.
For 'Circles,' with all its intrepidity, is not a revolutionary manifesto, nor
even a 'Marseillaise'; it is an attempt to gauge the depth of the universe
by the rapidity with which it engulfs institutions and beliefs. Emerson
was content with his view of the depths; his generalizations are devastat-
ing, but his illustrations are relatively mild. The truth is that the sense
that change is continuous quiets the eagerness for those particular changes
whose value rests largely on our trust in their finality. Radicalism is half
destroyed by the universalizing of its own principle."

The final chapter is in many respects the most interesting and
original. Here at last the author's high estimate of Emerson's
permanent importance is expressed whole-heartedly. The philos-
opher at present, he admits, has less than his due influence. "The
world adopts Emerson's sagacies, chants his verses, savors his
pungencies, and reveres his character. Meanwhile it ignores his
philosophy; he is at the same time honored and forsaken." But
he believes this will not always be so. In a succession of brilliant
paragraphs he points out the elements of Emerson's thought which
humanity is only preparing to receive, and concludes with the con-
viction that Emerson “is a revelation of capacity, an adjourned hope, an unassured but momentous foreshadowing.” In “Foreshadowings,” as in numbers of passages throughout the book, Professor Firkins is not merely giving an adequate and concentrated account of the first of American thinkers, he is himself making an important contribution to thought.

William A. Neilson.


Frank Spalding, as his friends called him, was born in 1865, and died (struck by an automobile) in 1914. He was Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church in Utah for ten years. Rev. Mr. Melish, who tells the story of his short life, is rector of the parish of the Holy Trinity, Brooklyn, and a leader among those who are thinking and working not only for social betterment but for social justice.

Spalding was a socialist. He set no mitigating adjective before the name, and knew no differences between his position and that of other men who think that way. He had the grace of unfailing and unflinching frankness, and declared his social gospel in all places. He preached it in Trinity Church, New York, in the Cathedral of St. John the Divine, before the General Convention, and in Westminster Abbey, when Mr. Asquith pronounced his sermon one of the most inspiring to which he had ever listened. “It was the passion of his life,” says his biographer. “He was an enthusiastic convert to the economic theories of Karl Marx, and he saw in socialism the instrument by which, under God, the terrible wrongs and inequalities which wreck the civilization of today were to be righted. He belonged to those religious pioneers of our day who see the larger interpretation of which Christianity is capable, and which it must receive if it is to become again the dominant factor in civilization.”

Here his biographer speaks not only for his hero but for himself, and is thereby enabled to enter into the situation with sympathetic understanding. It is interesting to read in the book how this straightforward and uncompromising socialism was preached for ten years by a bishop of the Episcopal Church, not only without serious criticism but with increasing admiration and affection for the preacher. It is a tribute not so much to the force of his reasoning as to the fineness of his manly character.

George Hodges.

Episcopal Theological School, Cambridge.
LETTERS OF JOHN WESLEY. Edited by GEORGE EAYRS, F.R.Hist.S.

We are indebted to the English Methodist historian, George Eayrs, for editing and publishing the first selection of Wesley’s representative letters. This becomes apparent when we consider the need of such a work. In the first place, Wesley’s position among the world’s greatest religious leaders stands unchallenged. Consequently anything emanating from him must be of interest not only to the theologian and historian but also to the average layman. The inimitable Journal of the St. John of England has long been regarded as an important source for its revelation of the character of the writer and of his times. Even more self-revealing are his letters. He wrote upon every conceivable subject. And, as few men before or since, he laid bare the innermost secrets of his heart. It is true, we have many of his letters printed in different collections and libraries, but they have not previously been collected and arranged in the manner of the present work. Therefore the editor has met an urgent need.

His task was by no means an easy one, but he is well fitted for the undertaking. He is a member of the United Methodist Church and for years has been a contributor to Methodist history. As joint-editor of the New History of Methodism and author of several books dealing with Methodist literature and history, he prepared himself for that work which entitles him to an honored place among historical writers.

The following features of the book deserve special mention: From the pen of Augustine Birrell we have a fascinating account of the great revivalist and his work. This is followed by a life-sketch in outline. Then Wesley is introduced to us as a letter-writer in an illuminating chapter by the editor. The student who is interested in chronological development will find a list where the letters are arranged according to date, the same list likewise designating the source of each letter. Besides, the book has a value all its own in giving us many new letters (70 in number), hitherto unpublished. For instance, of the 31 letters to Wride, 27 are new (pp. 185 ff.). Never before have so many letters (45 in number) of Wesley to his most intimate lay-friend, Blackwell, been brought together (pp. 294 ff.). Other letters, which previously had been presented only in part, are now given complete. And then the correspondence is grouped according to the main purpose or individual addressed, thus preserving a certain continuity which otherwise would be lack-
ing. Of importance second only to the letters themselves are the annotations and elucidations of the editor interspersed throughout the book. The charge so often made against technical works, that they mean nothing to the man not an expert, cannot hold in this case, for even the unversed reader will be able to find his way with the help of the editor’s guide-posts. Worthy of notice are, finally, several letters in facsimile, and especially the fine portrait of Wesley, which exhibits all the forcefulness and strength of his dominating personality.

This collection does not claim to contain all of Wesley’s letters. Hence its value is conditioned by the sense of proportion evinced by the editor in selecting the material at his disposal. Criticism is easy as regards an individual’s personal judgment. In this case, however, very little of an adverse nature is in place. For purposes of research, indeed, other works in addition to this must be consulted. We miss, however, a few letters which may well have been included, such as the one written to Lady Huntingdon, Sept. 14, 1772; the circular letter to the members of the United Societies, Oct. 18, 1776; and the letter to Miss Bishop, Oct. 18, 1778, which contains the following characteristic and discriminating remark of Wesley: “I find more profit in sermons on either good tempers or good works, than in what are vulgarly called Gospel sermons. That term has now become a mere cant word... Let but a pert, self-sufficient animal, that has neither sense nor grace, bawl out something about Christ, or his blood, or justification by faith, and his hearers cry out, ‘What a fine Gospel sermon’!” (Works, VII, p. 241 f., 3rd American Ed.).

Until we get Wesley’s correspondence in full, critically annotated, George Eayrs’s collection will take its place beside Curnock’s standard edition of the Journal as an additional source of the life of England’s St. Francis.

A. W. Nagler.

Garrett Biblical Institute, Evanston, Ill.


The psychology of religion, Professor Coe holds, “is properly nothing but an expanded chapter of general psychology.” The phrase well indicates the general character of his work. The book stands out among those of its field for its fidelity to empirical fact, for the consistency with which it maintains the point of view and
employs the methods of natural science, and — what follows from this — for its value as a contribution to general psychology.

The discussion of methodology is especially clear and adequate. The psychology of religion must be analytic, of course, and structural, for religious experiences, like all others, “have a mechanism.” But these experiences concern themselves increasingly, as we move upward in the scale of religions, with ends or values, with the realization of life; and the psychology of religion therefore should be predominantly functional. Professor Coe is not content, however, with current notions as to what the functional point of view in psychology may mean. In Chapter II, on “The Psychology of Mental Mechanisms and the Psychology of Persons,” with an appendix on “The Specific Nature of Mental Functions,” he investigates functionalism itself, showing the inadequacy of the merely biological point of view, with its formula of adjustment to environment and its ultimate reduction of functions to nutrition and reproduction. He presents a suggestive list of what he calls the “preferential functions” of “mind defining its own direction.” He conceives psychology to be, more than a structural analysis of states of consciousness or an objective description of behavior, “an empirical science of self-realizations, or, in short, of selves.” With respect to physical nature, “the business of mind is far less adjustment of ourselves to environment than adjustment of environment to ourselves.” In social relations, no person is “a merely given environmental fact; neither is simply accommodated to the other, but both are in process of becoming persons, even in the act of social adjustment. Accordingly that to which we adjust ourselves in our social functions has to be defined as an ideal toward which we coöperatively move.” Human functions are not merely complex cases of subhuman function; they are “just what they seem to be from a fully achieved human point of view.”

The chapters on the origin and development of religion in the race are compact, with little of concrete detail; yet one feels back of the generalizations here set forth the great body of anthropological material from which they have been derived. No definition of religion is attempted at the outset; it is described provisionally from the functional point of view as “the progressive discovery and reorganization of values.” Among early men religion is present because its functions are performed, rather than because any particular type of belief prevails. Such early religion comprehends every interest and value; it springs directly out of instinctive behavior; it grows peculiarly out of the social instincts that underlie
custom and group-organization; it is fundamentally anthropomorphic. It is in origin continuous with magic, though the two tend to grow apart, religion organizing life's values socially while magic seeks some particular value individually or at least independently of the larger social order. The idea of God is not in the beginning an intellectual hypothesis, the product of controlled thinking, but the spontaneous expression of the Einfühlung of intensely real experience. The differentiation of religions is primarily functional rather than structural; it is bound up with the differentiation of human activities, interests, and values.

The development of religion is pictured in bold lines in suggestive chapters on "Religion as Group Conduct," "Religion as Individual Conduct," and "Mental Traits of Religious Leaders." Three types of religious group are distinguished: (1) the religious crowd, in which coöperation is produced by the suggestion of mass movement, by suppression of inhibitions and disregard of individual variations; (2) the sacerdotal group, whose unity is that of fixed authority, priestly control, and the systematized suggestion of ritual, code, and education for conformity; (3) the deliberative group, in which individuals are stimulated to reflection and to the free expression of thought and desire, and where final unity results from the organization of a social will which does not suppress but expresses the discriminative wills of its members. Corresponding to these groups, three types of religious individuals are described: the impulsive, the regulated, and the self-emancipating. Religion has been too often regarded as essentially restraint of individual variation. At its best, it is democratic. It stimulates to self-expression and self-discovery, to purity of inner life, to freedom of conviction and of action. Roughly corresponding to these groups, again, are three types of religious leader: the shaman, the priest, and the prophet.

The heart of the book lies in Chapters XIII, XIV, and XV, on "The Religious Revaluation of Values," "Religion as Discovery," and "Religion as Social Immediacy." Professor Coe combats vigorously the notion that human nature remains always and everywhere the same. Human desires change; mental functions evolve; genuinely new wants are achieved; human nature can be reconstructed. It is in religion that this process of creative human evolution centers. Its law "is most acutely revealed in the religious revaluation of values that is characteristic of prophecy, the sense of sin, the attribution of ethical character to God, the hope of life after death, and faith in the possibility of a fully socialized society." In this process, men progressively discover reality. They not only find
themselves; they come to know and love aright other persons, human and divine.

In prayer, religion consciously expresses itself. Prayer is essentially conversation with God. At its best, it is "the culmination of the self-and-socius consciousness that makes us persons." "It starts as the assertion of any desire; it ends as the organization of one's own desires into a system of desires recognized as superior and then made one's own."

With respect to the future life the view is maintained that one cannot set a limit to the working of the "principle of personal-social integration that is no appendage of the physical conditions of life, but a user of these conditions for purposes of its own." It may yet "use death as a resource rather than submit to it as a defect of life."

Chapters on conversion, the subconscious, and mysticism are interposed at appropriate places. Conversion is viewed as a particular instance, more or less intense and abrupt in character, of that self-realization within a social medium which is characteristic of religion in general. The too ready use of the conception of the subconscious in explanation of certain religious experiences is subjected to a keen and constructive criticism. "Religious experience tends to focalize itself where individuality is most pronounced, not at its obscure outer edges; where self-control is at its maximum, not its minimum; where the issues are those of society as a deliberative (or potentially deliberative) body." The term "mysticism" is limited to that historical current which in Eastern religions seeks absorption into an absolute that is without predicates, and in Christianity has been bound up with Neoplatonic notions of God and the technique of the via negativa. So defined, mysticism is shown to be the diametrical opposite of social immediacy in religion.

This is, in short, the psychology of what most of us will recognize as our religion, or as the religion we could desire. Intended primarily as a handbook for beginners, the book is a notable contribution to the development of a comparatively new science — especially in its discussion and application of the functional point of view, in its modification and reinterpretation of the current "conservation of value" formula, and in the place that it gives to the ethical and the social, to freedom, initiative and originality, to democracy and human brotherhood, in religion.

Necessarily, the psychology of religion cannot tell the whole story. It deals only with religion's human, natural side. Professor Coe is more consistent than many in keeping strictly to the scientific
point of view. Yet we come to know that his God is real—no god-idea merely—and really to be known of men. Despite the somewhat negative trend of the chapters on conversion, the subconscious, and mysticism—which he uses more or less as foils for his main argument—this becomes clear in the chapters on religion as the discovery of reality and as social immediacy; in the occasional warning against a subjectivistic or solipsistic inference; and in the preface, where he sets forth, with just a shade of defiance, a list of his own attitudes with respect to religion and the psychology of religion. The reviewer confesses to a wish—for the sake of the "beginners" at least—that this part of the preface had been replaced by a chapter at the end of the book, dealing with the relation of the psychology of religion to its philosophy in the same clear-sighted way that the opening chapters deal with its relation to biology and general psychology.

There is a bibliography covering nineteen pages, of titles bearing directly upon the psychology of religion rather than upon its anthropology or theology. It is a significant evidence of the recent growth of the science that almost all have been published since the appearance of Starbuck's *Psychology of Religion* in 1899. A second, topical bibliography gives excellent guidance to the student.

**Yale University.**

**The Validity of the Religious Experience.** George A. Barrow, Ph.D. Sherman, French, & Co. 1917. Pp. xii, 247. $1.50.

Dr. Barrow's book has two features which call for especial appreciation. First, its independence; other writers are not quoted, or even alluded to. This is refreshing, for in most current philosophical or theological writing the author begins with an historical review which frequently exhausts his own energy and a reader's patience, and engages in so many side-skirmishes that the main drive of his argument misses its aim. But Dr. Barrow sets forth his own thought, and leaves to an instructed reader the business of relating it to that of others. To be sure, he has the exceptional advantage of working in a comparatively untiiled field, for with all the present prattle about "religious experience" there has been hitherto no serious attempt at analysis and discrimination. But it is highly creditable to Dr. Barrow that he has turned away from pious twaddle and undertaken a thorough-going investigation of noteworthy independence. Secondly, the book has the rare merit
of insisting upon exact definition. This used to be regarded as the vice of theology, and is sometimes contemptuously referred to as hair-splitting and logic-chopping; but recent writers have gone so far in the opposite direction that one frequently feels the need of a special glossary for every book, and sometimes for different chapters or even pages of the same book. In religious speech it is perhaps admissible to use words with reference to their emotional values, at the peril of sincerity, but in theological writing the intellectual content of terms should be of primary importance. This is plainly Dr. Barrow's conviction, and for it he deserves cordial commendation. Not that he has been uniformly successful in his laudable endeavor. Occasionally his definitions seem to be determined by the demands of the discussion and the objective of his argument, and at a few points there seems to be a slight but unconscious shifting in the use of terms; but occasional slips do not diminish our respect for his praiseworthy purpose.

In briefest outline, the argument of the book is that the religious experience is real because it is, or may become, focal in consciousness and datable in time, and also because it is not wholly under one's own control. The last-mentioned point suggests that the experience has a source beyond itself, and also beyond the individual in whom it occurs; and this is confirmed by the fact that regularly the experience is held to point to an "unknown factor," to the operation of which certain elements in the experience are attributed. Since the experience is real, this "unknown factor" must be real also, and accordingly must be competent to the experience in which it is represented and consistent therewith. Furthermore, the experience is active upon the will, hence between it and its source there is a relation best interpreted as an interaction of wills, personality acting upon personality. Consequently, the source of the religious experience is a personality, whose eternal and superhuman character is argued for.

The argument throughout is conducted upon the plane of conceptual logic, and detailed psychological analysis of the various types of religious experience is lacking. This, however, is in accordance with the author's declared purpose and deliberately accepted method, but the limitation suggests considerations which make against his conclusions. That the experience must have a cause (Dr. Barrow avoids the word) beyond itself may go with the saying, but that does not mean that it must have a source beyond the individual in whom it occurs. Certainly memory, association, and tradition make large contributions to every concrete bit of religious
experience, and these lie beyond the experience but not beyond the individual possessing it, and in some cases may prove quite sufficient for its explanation. Moreover, if Durkheim and his school are correct, the "unknown factor" affecting the experience may be the mores of the community in which the individual and his ancestors have lived. It is very doubtful whether Dr. Barrow's argument will stand without more careful consideration of such questions, the answers to which might affect also his argument for personality, which, indeed, is vulnerable at other points.

W. W. Fenn.


This great co-operative work goes rapidly forward. The present volume is a notable addition to those which have preceded, and will have for most of its readers a charm of novelty as well as of content. The names of the two scholars to whom the work was intrusted are sufficient warrant for its excellence. The volume is illustrated by forty-four plates, many of them beautifully reproduced in the original colors, which add much to the appearance and value of the book.

From the enormous mass of Indian Mythology, Professor Keith has made a rigorous and wise selection, "restricting the treatment to that mythology which stands in close connexion with religion and which conveys to us a conception of the manner in which the Indian pictured to himself the origin of the world and of life, the destiny of the universe and of the souls of man, the gods and evil spirits who supported or menaced his existence." Furthermore it was necessary to treat the subject chiefly according to the literary sources; this method is at the same time, broadly speaking, the historical as well, for in contrast to many of the mythologies known to us, the Indian today is rich and vigorous, so that an organic development can be traced through some thirty-five hundred years from the period of the Rigveda to the present moment. Therefore Keith treats in nine chapters successively the Rigveda; Gods of Sky, Air, and Earth, Demons, and Dead; the Mythology of the Brāhmaṇas; the Great Gods of the Epic; Minor Epic Deities and the Dead; Mythology of the Purāṇas; Buddhist Mythology in India and Thibet; Mythology of the Jains; Mythology of Modern Hindu-
ism. Into the wealth of material which these chapters contain, we may not here go.

Iranian Mythology shows many points of contact or similarity with the myths of the Aryan peoples of India, to whom the Persians are closely related ethnologically. The Vedic myths of the Aryans are therefore found in Iran, but they have often suffered great modifications under influences proceeding from the valleys of the Tigris and the Euphrates.

Professor Carnoy properly claims that his essay is the first attempt to present Iranian Mythology by itself; for although many scholars have handled Zoroastrianism and Iranian life, they have attempted no systematic treatment of the mythology. Professor Carnoy has been able to handle his theme more according to subject than his colleague Professor Keith could do. He accordingly treats in succession the Wars of Gods and Demons; Myths of Creation; Primeval Heroes; Legends of Yirna; Traditions of the Kings and Zoroaster; and the Life to Come.

Both scholars deserve credit for the skill with which they have handled their material, which is often superabundant and difficult. The uninitiate will find much to interest him in many parts of the volume, while the scholar will welcome the whole book as a valuable addition to works on mythologies.


Mr. Handcock's connections with the working staff of the British Museum and with the Palestine Exploration Fund have been no small help to him in the preparation of this work. He defines his object as being "to give some account of the arts, crafts, manners, and customs of the inhabitants of Palestine, from the earliest times down to the Roman period." He begins with the Stone Age, when the Trogloodytes of the Paleolithic period inhabited the caves of Lebanon—recently excavated in part by Père Zumoffen of Beirut and by the present reviewer and Dr. Charles Peabody of Harvard University—and the Trogloodytes of the Neolithic period dwelt in the caves at Gezer, explored by Professor Macalister; and Mr. Handcock has given us an interesting reconstruction of the life of that early day. These non-Semitic cave-dwellers disappeared before the incoming Semites about 2500-2000 B. C.

The arrival of the Semites was marked by the introduction of the use of metal; but flint implements were used as late as the days of Saul. In the earliest Semitic times Palestinian civilization and
culture seem not to have been affected by foreign ideas; but by the
time of the Twelfth Dynasty we find Egyptian influence forming a
natural line of demarcation between the First and Second Semitic
periods. During the latter period the Semites of Palestine in their
arts and crafts were affected not only by the civilization of Egypt
but also by that of Crete, the Ἱπεραίων regions, and especially by that
of Cyprus. The Semites were markedly deficient in creative ability,
but they made up for their lack of originality by their capacity for
assimilation. In the Third Semitic period, which extended from
about the end of the fifteenth century to about 1,000 B.C., "Egyptian
and Ἱπεραίων influence are still discernible, but these influences were
rather reminiscent than direct. In the Fourth Semitic period,
which is more or less contemporaneous with the Israelite occupation,
this tendency becomes even more pronounced, but then fresh imports
from Cyprus restore the waning balance of foreign influence in
Palestinian culture. The Hellenistic period, which began about
550 B.C. and lasted down to Roman times, is characterized by the
influence of Greece and the Greek Islands."

Having thus briefly in his introductory chapter outlined the for-
eign influences operative during the different periods in Palestine’s
archaeological history, the author gives us a series of monographs on
the various arts and crafts as they were developed in these periods.
In eight chapters he discusses and illustrates by the aid of over a
hundred figures the Caves and Rock-cuttings; Architecture; Flint,
Bone, Ivory, and Stone; Metallurgy; Pottery; Terra-cotta; Burial
Customs; Worship and Places of Worship. It is all excellently
done; but one is somewhat surprised to find, in a study of the
Archaeology of the Holy Land, the author introducing his own highly
modern contempt for a belief in the future life, when he refers to
that belief in the present day as held only by the "unsophisticated." We
must forgive our author his bad taste and thank him for his work as a valuable addition to our shelf of books really useful to
Bible students.

MAX KELLNER.

A STUDY IN CHRISTOLOGY. HERBERT M. RELTON, D.D. Society for
Promoting Christian Knowledge. 1917. Pp. xxxvi, 278. $2.50.

Dr. Relton’s thesis is that the Christology formulated by Leontius
of Byzantium in the sixth century is not only the nearest approxima-
tion yet made to the solution of what is confessedly an insoluble
problem, but also is capable of restatement in such a way as to bring it into accord with modern psychology. In brief, the theory is that of the "enhypostatic union" of the two natures in Christ; an impersonal human nature finding its hypostasis in the Logos, which performs for the human body every function which would naturally have been performed by a human soul, and exists in such a relationship to the human body as a human soul would have done. This sounds like Apollinarianism, and the author concedes the resemblance, but escapes the imputation of heresy by calling attention to certain elements in the thought of Apollinaris which were insufficiently apprehended when his theory was condemned. The point is that the pre-existent Logos was humanity in its ideal perfection, so that only in its incarnation was humanity found perfect. To put it in more familiar terms: the Logos is the divine ideal of humanity; hence in its complete incarnation there is at once full divinity, because it is the perfect manifestation of a divine ideal and also full humanity, because it is a divine ideal of humanity, perfectly embodied. Thus the perfection both of the divinity and of the humanity of Jesus is assured, in harmony with the creed of Chalcedon, and the unity of the person is also maintained. Dr. Relton thinks that this view is in harmony with modern psychology; but it would have been better for his argument if this portion of it had been omitted, for his chief reliance is upon Maher, and his own acquaintance with the results and methods of modern psychology is amusingly antiquated.

There is likewise an entertaining inability to appreciate the present conditions of theological thinking. Consequently it would be futile to push inquiries with regard to the details of the theory. What, for instance, was the "human nature" which found its hypostasis in the Logos? Was it merely corporeal? Then in accordance with the ancient view which the author appears to accept, it is the body of man alone which is saved. Does it include the soul? How then can it be impersonal, since "personality is and must be central, and the whole complex of attributes and qualities briefly described as human nature can have no existence apart from and except in vital union and relationship with a unifying and focal Ego as its subject" (p. 224)? That is, impersonal human nature is not human nature at all. Thus, however, the problem is upon us again in full force and Nestorianism is near. When we are told that "the divine Logos prior to the Incarnation already possessed everything needful to enable him to lead a truly human life" (p. 226), we recall several other passages in which the union of both soul and body is declared
essential for man, and wonder whether the Logos can then have been perfectly human prior to his incarnation. Moreover, the relationship between the ordinary human soul and the Logos presents difficulties. To insist as the author does upon the affinity between the human soul and the Logos opens a way to a quite different course of thought, according to which Christ is actually what all men are potentially, and this would lead to the conclusion that he is man manifest in the spirit rather than God manifest in the flesh.

But such questions of detail would be unprofitable. It is a wise saying in Selden’s Table Talk, “The reason of a thing is not to be inquired after till you are sure the thing itself is so.” Dr. Relton accepts without question the conclusions of Nicea, and so faces a problem which he confesses ultimately insoluble. But a theory which gives rise to an insoluble problem arouses suspicion that the fault is with itself and not with the human mind. Only at the close of the book, and then most briefly, does the author deal with the facts which are supposed to make necessary the creeds of Nicea and Chalcedon. Here he accepts the Fourth Gospel as of equal value with the Synoptists, and deals with the latter in thoroughly uncritical fashion. He even supposes that Consistent Eschatology tends to Orthodoxy since it emphasizes Jesus’ thought of himself as the Messiah, without the faintest suspicion, apparently, that the content of that thought may be of such a character as to prove him in error. English-speaking Buddhists who transform Christian hymns into the praises of Buddha—“All hail the power of Buddha’s name,” for example—suggest that problems precisely similar to that with which Dr. Relton deals would arise with reference to other religious leaders in the world’s history, provided the traditions concerning them are accepted as are the Christian traditions. Of course, by presupposing Nicea and Chalcedon one may avoid this awkward predicament; but documents cannot be critically defended on the ground of conclusions derived from them uncritically accepted.

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THE MONOLOGUE OF BROWNING

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Hardly another poet in the whole course of English literature has met with such violent and continuous partisanship as Robert Browning. When Wordsworth put forth his epoch-making little volume of *Lyrical Ballads*, he too met derision, but it lasted only twenty years. By the time he reached middle age his position as a master was assured, and his limitations were well understood. Over Browning disputation has continued longer. Throughout his life and during the quarter-century since his death he has had ardent assailants and just as ardent defenders. Persons of standing declare the man a barbarian, who broke into the fair fields of verse with poetry cacophonous in sound, obscure in expression, and shocking in subject. On the other hand, there are those who regard Browning as half divine. He is a prophet, they say, and has so disclosed to them the significance of their personal lives that they cannot hear any criticism of him without a shiver. Sometimes Browning is set up in laudatory antagonism to Tennyson, or Tennyson in antagonism to Browning; and certainly these poets do differ fundamentally. But are their differences disparaging or supplemental? I believe I shall find the safest approach to my heated subject if,
without praise or blame, I coolly note some of the points of contrast between the two.

Tennyson is English for many generations; Browning is of compound nationality. Tennyson lived in England and found his subjects there; Browning lived long on the continent and gathered his subjects from everywhere except England. Tennyson is a university man; Browning had a miscellaneous education. Tennyson is acquainted with physical science; Browning only with literature, many literatures. Tennyson’s life is rooted in institutions; Browning cares little for them. Tennyson has a strong interest in the social and religious questions of his age; Browning only in the problem of self-development. Through many generations Tennyson was connected with the Established Church; Browning, his parents, and his wife were Congregationalists. Tennyson was an idealistic recluse; Browning a realistic man of the world. Tennyson’s figures are generalized; Browning’s particularized. Tennyson’s favorite time is that of the mediæval myth; Browning’s the later Renaissance. Tennyson aims at beauty, through approved and standard language; Browning at force and expressiveness. Tennyson chooses for subjects graceful and harmonious incidents; Browning unusual and startling ones. Tennyson is the conscious artist, ever correcting; Browning the spontaneous improvisatore. Tennyson has an exceptional mastery of poetic technique; Browning is rugged and bizarre. Tennyson has many of the traits of a refined and timid woman; Browning is all manliness and optimism. Tennyson was a dramatist at the end of his life; Browning at the beginning.

What amazing contrasts are here! Yet the two poets never conceived of themselves as rivals. On the contrary, Tennyson inscribed his Tiresias thus: "To my good friend, Robert Browning, whose genius and geniality will best appreciate what may be best, and make most
allowance for what is worst, this volume is affectionately
dedicated.” And Browning had earlier written in his
volume of Selections these careful words: “Dedicated to
Alfred Tennyson. In poetry—illustrious and consum-
mate. In friendship—noble and sincere.” It will not
then become us to take sides in the fictitious antagonism.
Rather, in considering Browning, we must lay aside
partisanship and endeavor—however contentious be
the ground—to inquire dispassionately what Browning
stands for. What is his type?

To determine this, let us for a moment turn back to the
Classicists, as their work culminated in Pope, and recall
how largely with them poetry was removed from ordinary
life, from the life at least of the individual. It was a
social affair. Its figures were cultivated men and women
who appear conversing with their kind. Literature
accordingly stood, as it were, somewhat apart from
ordinary existence, having its own laws, its own diction.
It was not called on to mirror my life or your life, or to
use the language of our homes. Of course as time went
on, and especially as the followers of Pope cheapened
his refined standards, there came a revolt, and individual
life was declared to be the important thing. When then
Wordsworth, as the leader of this Romantic Movement,
sets out to depict the actualities of experience, we should
expect him to bring before us men and women as we
find them on the street. But this he did not do. While
turning away from artificial human nature and studying
with penetrating veracity genuine persons, he was chiefly
interested in those central emotions which build up
homes and states, and rather oblivious to such moment-
tary changes as, going on in all of us, differentiate man
from man. Precisely to these Tennyson devotes himself
and thus gives to naturalistic verse a psychological depth
it had not previously known. But he studies moods
rather than persons. The single phases of humanity so
vividly set forth by him do not properly belong to John, Thomas, or Susan, but are universal, though temporary, aspects of any human being. The companions of Ulysses whom we meet in Lotus Land cannot be distinguished from one another. Edward Gray’s melancholy over Ellen Adair might as well have been that of Peter Robinson for Mary Brown. How characterless is Maud! “Dead perfection, no more.” The delightful Grandmother is so grandmotherly as to belong to no special race, time, or village. All these people are abstractions, representative of single traits, with as little blood in them as any figure of Ben Jonson’s or Dickens’. Novelists—Richardson, Fielding, Scott, Miss Austen—had long before made their readers acquainted with total human beings. But none such had yet appeared in poetry, unless in the pages of that half poet, half novelist, Crabbe. Neither Byron, Shelley, nor Keats knows anything of living men and women.

There is then something still to be done if poetry will listen to Wordsworth’s call and, abandoning conventions, deal with the realities of common life. Whoever can make us feel the complex and unstable unity of an individual person will introduce a new and highly important type into English poetry. This is the aim of Browning, and from it spring most of his peculiarities. Announcement of that aim is made in the preface to Sordello, where he writes: “My stress lay on the incidents in the development of a soul. Little else is worth study.” Accordingly Browning pays the least possible attention to outward nature. Only two or three of his poems set forth nature at all. There is De Gustibus, The Englishman in Italy, and Home Thoughts from Abroad. Is there another in which nature is the theme, or even where, as in Tennyson, nature forms a sympathetic background for human action? Browning’s figures need no background. They stand firmly on their own feet.
disposition then to turn to individual life and, without apology or attempt to justify the choice of subject by any lesson it might teach; simply to say, "The precious thing in all the world is the personal being. Whatever he does and says deserves attention"—this democratic individualism is what gives distinction to Browning, though it was also the special gospel of his age. Carlyle, Emerson, Arnold, John Stuart Mill, George Eliot, were all proclaiming it. Browning gives it appropriate form in poetry. The circumstances of his life shaped him admirably for the work.

That life is six years shorter than Tennyson's, beginning three years later and ending three years earlier; that is, it extends from 1812 to 1889. It divides itself into four periods, in close parallelism to those of Tennyson. Like his too they are entirely literary periods, not periods formed by outward events. The first we may call his Juvenile period, from his birth to 1828, a momentous date in Browning's life; for he then fell in with the poems of Shelley. The second is his period of Experiment, from 1828 to 1840 or 1842, the publication of the Bells and Pomegranates. Then comes his period of Mastery, when at last he has found himself, knows exactly what his work in the world is to be, and sets eagerly about it. This period runs from the Bells and Pomegranates to The Ring and the Book in 1870—or if we will be exact, 1869. The last is his period of Decline and Sophistry, from 1870 to 1889. Of this last I shall say little, except that, while it contains many bits of vigorous verse, his fame would, in my judgment, be more secure if all written after The Ring and the Book could be struck out. It is the early periods which require attention. If we would rightly measure Browning's subsequent stature, we must carefully observe his growth.

He was a city boy, born at Camberwell, a suburb of London. In cities he always made his home, using the
country merely for occasional refreshment. Tennyson spent three-quarters of his life in the country; by birth and education he is connected with the ruling class. Browning belongs with the average multitude. Probably his great-grandfather was a waiter at a country inn. His grandfather came to London, entered the service of the Bank of England, and rose rapidly to prominence and considerable wealth. From sharing in this wealth his second wife cut off the children of the first marriage. Browning's father was therefore obliged to care for himself and was unable to obtain a university education. He too became a clerk in the Bank of England, where by diligence he ultimately attained something more than a competence. Having always an eager desire for knowledge, he accumulated a library of six or seven thousand volumes and was able to use books in French, German, and Italian. He was a genial man, fond of drawing and writing stories, and had always a special fancy for whatever was curious and unusual.

I have called Browning a man of composite ancestry, and the fact affected, I believe, the interests of his whole life. His father was an Englishman, his mother a Scotch woman, her father a German merchant of Hamburg. His own father's mother was a Creole from the West Indies. Four nationalities contribute to the formation of this extraordinary man; and it has been surmised, though on slender evidence, that there was also Jewish blood in him. May not these diversities within himself have broadened his sympathies and fitted him more readily than would have been possible had he been thoroughly an Englishman, to comprehend and create the many strange creatures who move across his pages?

His education was similarly miscellaneous. The atmosphere of his home was literary, and his own early literary tastes were strong. But they were entirely unguided by the restraints and standards of a university
or even of continuous schooling. For only a few years at a time was he connected with any school. For less than a year when he was fifteen he attended a Greek class at London University. From that time his father's library was, as it had always really been, his chief source of intellectual nourishment. His constant reading of unusual books made him self-educated and a scholar. Music too he loved, and under the stimulating guidance of his friend, Eliza Flower, he became an adept in musical science. Strange that one of the harshest of modern poets should also be one of the most accomplished in music!

Early in life he showed a taste for poetry and began to write it. His father had been bred in the Classical tradition and looked with disfavor on Romanticism. His library was rich too in the Metaphysical poets. Quarles and Donne early became favorites of young Browning. By the time he was twelve years old he had written a little volume of verse, which he desired to publish under the title of *Incondita*. Thus early appears the taste for fantastic titles. The manuscript was submitted to the critical judgment of a London editor, Rev. W. G. Fox, who advised against its publication, and it was destroyed. But it brought him, besides a wise critic, two deeply valued friends introduced by Mr. Fox, the Misses Flower. Both wrote verse; Sarah, the younger, being the author of the hymn, "Nearer, my God, to thee," and the elder, Eliza, nine years older than Browning, continuing for a long time the object of his romantic devotion. Her he idealized in Pauline. When in boyhood he declared that he wished to devote his life to poetry, his indulgent parents did not gainsay him. He accordingly was prepared for no profession, but in his father's library took all literature for his province.

In 1828 something momentous happened. Browning came upon a copy of Shelley's *Queen Mab*, and persuaded
his mother to give him the rest of Shelley's poems on his next birthday. A new conception of poetry was now opened to him. Byron he had known before. But Shelley disclosed to him the full freedom of Romanticism, its mysticism, its magical music, its penetrating exploration of the human soul. Yet I cannot help thinking that he, like Tennyson, made a false start. Shelley's genius and his own were at the farthest possible remove. Tennyson, after gaining a certain fluency from Byron, withdrew promptly and unharmed to his own proper field. But Browning spent nearly ten years over the impossible task of writing pieces as shapeless as those of Shelley. He always felt gratitude for the one who first awoke him, but after 1840 abandoned him as a guide.

We all know the twofold character of Shelley. He is the inspired lyrist, panting forth a flood of rapture so divine as few poets of plaintive passion have equalled in any land. And then he is the creator of Queen Mab, Alastor, and the rest of that ungainly crew, who at inordinate length preach the theories of Godwin and the dreams of the French Revolution. The lyric Shelley, the seer, lay obviously beyond Browning's reach; but in the expository Shelley, the teacher, there was something which for a time strongly attracted him. In pursuit of it he wrote Pauline, Paracelsus, Sordello—all attempts, as he says in the preface to Sordello, to trace through successive stages the development of a soul. The long poem, with this sort of Pilgrim's Progress as its subject, was much in the fashion of the day. Shelley's Alastor gave it impetus among the intellectuals, Bailey's Festus among the populace. Wordsworth shaped it into a masterpiece in his Prelude. No wonder that Browning, who was to become a closer student of character than any previous poet, felt himself drawn to it at the beginning of his career. In 1833, three years after Tennyson's Poems Chiefly Lyrical appeared (and it will be remem-
bered that there was three years’ difference in the ages of the two poets), Browning put forth Pauline, following her in 1835 with Paracelsus, and in 1840 with Sordello. In each of these, by different methods, he attempted to trace the formation of a particular individual throughout the entire extent of his life; to see him aspiring, failing, groping, and ever moving from a small understanding of himself and the world to a large. All these books were published at the expense of members of Browning’s family, and all failed. Few copies were sold and little notice of them was taken. Here and there were readers intrepid enough to find their way through the literary jungle to merit. But they were naturally few.

Already, however, in 1837 the actor Macready thought he could detect underneath the intricacies of Browning’s early books a talent for portraying character. He asked Browning for a play, and Strafford was produced five nights at Covent Garden. It was expected to run three weeks. Browning and his hardened eulogists have always blamed the actors for its withdrawal; but a single reading should convince any one that the play itself made failure inevitable. Yet the attempt at play-writing formed an important second step in Browning’s advance toward individual portraiture.

The method first tried had been a serial one, stage succeeding stage in the development of a person. It had proved too theoretic, vague, and dilatory for a genius so forcibly concrete as Browning. A drama removes these objectionable features. A rounded individual is then at once thrown open to inspection, as he sets forth his own point of view in contrast with that of opposing characters. This would seem to be the very field in which Browning would shine. For half a dozen years he thought so, and spoke of himself as “Robert Browning, writer of plays.” Each year saw a new tragedy fall from his rapid pen. Occasionally, as in the first two acts of
Pippa Passes, something vivid and memorable was produced. But in general, Browning's plays lack distinction. Long speeches occur where swift action is needed. The plot is obviously managed, instead of unfolding itself, and the characters, though often strange, are unimpressive. Gradually it became plain, even to Browning himself, that he had not yet found his proper field.

In 1841 a new project was formed. Since managers refused his plays and the public his books, Browning's father arranged with Moxon to issue a play from time to time in pamphlet form. For the series Browning chose the repellent name of Bells and Pomegranates. Few copies selling, even at the tempting price of sixpence, Moxon suggested that some poems of a briefer sort be added; and accordingly in the third number, in 1842, appeared the beginning of that wonderful series of Dramatic Lyrics in which Browning at last found his sure mode of expression.

The form of these pieces is the monologue, the drama of a single speaker. So peculiarly suited to Browning is the scheme that we are apt to think it his invention. But it has been used in all periods of English poetry. Drayton's Heroical Epistles are monologues; so are Pope's Eloisa to Abelard and Cowper's Alexander Selkirk. Tennyson in St. Simeon Stylites employed it as early, and afterwards almost as frequently, as Browning himself; in Maud giving it greater variety than does Browning in James Lee's Wife. No, in the monologue Browning merely accepted a not uncommon form as an instrument for painting individual character more accurately than was possible in the sequent study of a single soul or the conversation of a contrasted group. As soon as Browning had created the Dramatic Lyric he abandoned play-writing altogether. The new method preserved all that was valuable both in it and its lumbering predecessor, attained the full individualism at which
Romanticism had long unsuccessfully aimed, introduced a new type into English poetry, and brought before its readers such a company of living men and women as it had not seen since Chaucer died.

For Browning added elements to the monologue which greatly increased its power and adapted it to his special work. They do not appear in all his pieces in equal degree. But about in proportion to their presence and prominence is the importance of the poem. As they become blurred, the monologue loses something of its quality. They are these: (1) His monologue is dramatic, addressed to a listener. (2) It is psychological, disclosing the speaker rather than what is spoken of. (3) It is comprehensive and sums up a complex and habitual character. I will explain briefly each of these points.

Browning's monologue at its best—as in *Andrea del Sarto, Fra Lippo Lippi, Clive, The Laboratory, In a Year*—is no mere soliloquy, a piece of introspective analysis, as most preceding monologues had been. His are veritable dramas, involving several persons, to only one of whom do we attend. The mind of him who speaks is everywhere in contact with another mind, which it seeks to bring over to its own point of view. It is as if we stood by a telephone and heard its user speak to a distant friend, and were left to guess at the situation by the fragmentary utterances of only one side. But it is dialogue still. An unseen interlocutor is there, and what we hear has constant reference to his thought. Undoubtedly there are shadings between such completed monologues and soliloquy. In *The Ring and the Book* most of the speakers seek to impress their own view of the case on definite persons. The Pope does not. He is alone and soliloquizes. But his is not like *Abt Vogler's* or *Johannes Agricola's*, mere soliloquy; for he addresses a plea for mercy or condemnation to God, the Church, public opinion, and argues it out with each.
The dramatic advantage of such monologue over the ordinary play lies in the concentration of interest. Where all else is subordinated to a single individual, we more readily identify ourselves with him than if he were but one of a group.

But if the monologue, unlike the soliloquy, has an objective reference to a supposed auditor and outward situation, our interest is not fixed on these. On the contrary, they are but a means for giving to the speaker an importance greater even than he has in the soliloquy, and far greater than in the narrative. They might be compared to a sounding-board, reflecting back in fuller tone the character of the speaker. In judging another, we judge ourselves. Our estimate of a person or event may be incorrect; but if given at an unguarded moment, it is stamped with the impress of him who makes it. This is the profound truth on which Browning’s monologue is based. In order to present a person, it is unnecessary to trace successive “incidents in the development of a soul,” to watch the man’s behavior in society, or to hear him soliloquize. There is a shorter and more illuminating way. A minute of a life as truly contains the character as fifty years. If we would know what a man is, we have only to throw a flash-light on him at a crisis-moment and watch his reaction. That is Browning’s new method. The serial scaffolding is torn down, the group dismissed, the narrative suppressed. Only the dramatic essence remains—a mind reacting on a defined person and situation. The first ten years of Browning’s authorship had been spent on the soliloquy, the narrative, and the play; and the first two of these were still to ravage his last twenty years. Even during his years of Mastery the narrative appears as late as 1845 in the beautiful Italian in England, the soliloquy in Christmas Eve of 1850, and something like a play in In a Balcony of 1853. But these forms are now sub-
ordinate. A shorter and more luminous method has been found.

It should be noticed too that while Browning’s flashlight is usually a brief affair, it illuminates not a single mood but a total complex individual. For this it is peculiarly fitted. Tennyson shows us in Sir Galahad only chivalric purity; but Browning’s Duke, displaying the picture of his last Duchess, is himself a full-length portrait. His dignity, courtesy, cruelty, interest in sculpture, in painting, unite, unconsciously and without exaggeration, to show this cross-section of a Renaissance aristocrat. As Browning’s aim too is not moral instruction but the dispassionate study of individual character, good and evil qualities are allowed to intertwine in the same perplexing fashion as in actual life.

Here then is a new and majestic type, and one of deep consequence for the depicting of humanity in English poetry. Of course Wordsworth, Tennyson, and Browning all alike deal with human nature. But Wordsworth deals with its fundamentals, Tennyson with its single moods, and only after long writing does individual man come to his own. With Browning the creation of character is its own abundant justification. When a poet can truly say, “Here they are, my fifty men and women,” we have no right to ask if they are such as will be socially valuable.

Nor must we be disturbed at certain unpleasing characteristics sure to mark the work of such a poet. Laying stress on the individual factor in life rather than the social, he will be disposed to care little for beauty, good taste, and conventional refinement, and will pick out subjects that are peculiar, erratic, even abnormal. In boyhood Browning cared for strange pets, bizarre stories, forced rhymes. They prepared him for his realistic work. His poems introduce us to people who are half insane—Porphyria’s Lover, Giraldus, Childe Roland—or to those
morally repulsive, like Fifine, Sludge, and Guido Franceschini. Yet when abnormal persons are shown to be living creatures, our hearts beat in sympathetic response. Nothing human is without interest. But it must be remembered that if these strange beings are to be transferred imaginatively to printed pages, they will use their own language. It would be bad art to offer them the standard language, such as is current among ladies and gentlemen. Not being ladies and gentlemen, they should use the language which accords with their special character. It will not do to be shocked at a diction unheard in poetry before.

On similar grounds some excuse may be found for Browning's notorious obscurities. They spring from fecundity, not feebleness. He can say anything he pleases, and say it with utmost precision. But what pleases him does not always please us. He is a man richly endowed, venturing into strange regions. His crowding thoughts often obtrude on one another, and if we fail to catch his point of view, we do not readily comprehend him. From usual modes of speech, as from usual characters, he is constitutionally averse. In a letter in my possession sent him from New Zealand, in 1846, by his friend Alfred Domett—the "Waring" of his poem—Domett writes: "As regards your books, I have one first and last request to make or advice to give you. Do for Heaven's sake try to be commonplace. Strain as much for it as weaker poets do against it. And always write for fools. Think of them as your audience, instead of the Sidneys and Marvells and Landors. Ask some one—the dullest, ploddingest, acquaintance you have—how he or she (if you can find a woman quite stupid enough) would have expressed your thought, and take his or her arrangement. Will you do this? I fear not. Yet I know that herein lies your truest course." Browning preserved the letter but rejected the advice. As an
improvisatore of singular genius, he could learn nothing
from criticism. The more the public grumbled, the more
firmly he set his teeth and walked his devious way. We
may regret that he could not, like Tennyson, draw aid
from his enemies. But genius has its limitations and
compulsions. He was not writing for others, but merely
to create children of his brain, writing for himself. All we
can ask of such a man is that he accept good-naturedly
the isolation involved in his work. Browning did not
do so, but from time to time bitterly complained that he
was not understood. So individual a writer, attempting
an altogether new line, should have been as indifferent
to public opinion as was Wordsworth. Browning was
resentful of disparagement and strangely tolerant of
organized adulation. Some social feeling is apt to linger
about the extremest individualist.

Yet while the creation of individual characters was
the special function of Browning, he was not always able
to carry it out dispassionately. He too was an individual,
possessed of beliefs, moral approvals, and a temperament
of his own. Through these he views the characters he
constructs, and by these they are liable to be distorted.
A great poet is distinguished from a poetic writer by the
very fact that he has acquired a fixed point of view from
which to survey all that comes before him. Nobody can
be impressive without a creed, gospel, or set of habitual
ideas with which he confronts the world. What we may
call the creed of Browning is, if I rightly understand it,
something like this:

To each man there is intrusted a unique character,
unlike all others, but incomplete, and with higher and
lower possibilities. Which of these possibilities shall
prevail is determined by the man’s own action at crisis-
moments, which in themselves are often small. Sin, for
Browning, is therefore, for the most part, injury to one’s
self rather than to society; and conventional sins are
little regarded. The world is for each of us a place of moral training and discipline, and has meaning only as material out of which a person may be formed. A world so constituted implies a God, whose existence cannot be independently proved but is involved in the whole framework of things. His presence is testified to by the Bible and by the consciousness of all men at their highest. This God is a being of power and knowledge, though still like ourselves. In ourselves we see that power and knowledge are merely instrumental to love, which is the highest manifestation of personality. Were God without love, we should be his superiors. Browning does not then conceive God as manifested in law, that is, in scientific fashion; but as the life-principle of love, in an individualistic way. Matter is but a lower form of spirit, and what look like circumstances are, in reality, only a reflex of the person. God lovingly imparts to us the germs of his own life. Consequently there is an immortality of activity open to each of us, whether in ever fresh existence or in a single continuous existence. But recognition will always be possible. Anything but optimism is stupid and cowardly.

Such in briefest outline is Browning’s creed, the body of ideas through which he interprets the world. A noble creed it is, with which in substance I heartily agree. Yet it is not the primary business of an artist to inculcate doctrine. Doctrine, of course, will underlie his work, just as it underlies all life. Our world is bound together by laws or principles, which no true representation of it can disregard. But they are mixed with things, and to detach them for separate statement destroys that concrete unity which it is the artist’s office to discover and present. We may say, if we like, that Hamlet teaches the dangers of delay, and Antony those of impulse. But the plays were not constructed for that purpose. Shakespeare sought merely to present an interesting section of
human life, and did it with such truth that we can draw from it a moral lesson, as we can from nature itself. The artist is primarily a seer, not a teacher. His characters and situations are no mere means to moral instruction as ends. They are themselves their own end.

Now notwithstanding Browning's extraordinary power of artistic creation, he will not always submit to its laws, but often puts into a poem matter which the subject does not demand. He has some theory to maintain, some lesson to impart, some clever thought has struck him, and he steps forward to offer his own ideas instead of leaving us to view the mind of an imagined character. No doubt it was difficult to be a dispassionate expositor. His beliefs were clear and urgent, and it is much more natural for the Englishman and American to turn to moralizing than to art. The art-sense is feeble among readers today. Then too strong influences were unhappily brought to bear, compelling Browning away from his unique office of character-creator to be the deliverer of a moral "message." Read the following passage from one of the letters of Miss Barrett to him just after he had discovered his new method and had begun to apply it in constructive work. On May 26, 1846, immediately preceding their marriage, she writes:

"But you—you have the superabundant mental life and individuality which admits of shifting a personality and speaking the truth still. That is the highest faculty, the strongest and rarest which exercises itself in art—we are all agreed there is none so great faculty as the dramatic. Several times you have hinted to me that I made you careless for the drama, and it has puzzled me to fancy how it could be, when I understand myself so clearly both the difficulty and the glory of dramatic art. Yet I am conscious of wishing you to take the other crown besides, and after having made your own creatures speak in clear human voices, to speak yourself
out of that personality which God made, and with the voice which He tuned into such power and sweetness of speech. I do not think that, with all that music in you, only your own personality should be dumb, nor that having thought so much and deeply on life and its ends, you should not teach what you have learnt in the direct and most impressive way, the mask thrown off, however moist with the breath. And it is not, I believe, by the dramatic medium that poets teach most impressively. I have seemed to observe that! It is too difficult for the common reader to analyze and to discern between the vivid and the earnest. Also he is apt to understand better always when he sees the lips move. Now here is yourself with your wonderful faculty!—it is wondered at and recognized on all sides where there are eyes to see—it is called wonderful and admirable! Yet with an inferior power you might have taken yourself closer to the hearts and lives of men, and made yourself dearer, though being less great. Therefore I do want you to do this with your surpassing power—it will be so easy to you to speak, and so noble when spoken.

"Not that I usen't to fancy I could see you and know you, in a reflex image, in your creations! I used, you remember. How these broken lights and forms look strange and unlike now to me when I stand by the complete idea! Yes, now I feel that no one can know you worthily by these poems. Only—I guessed a little. Now let us have your own voice speaking of yourself—if the voice may not hurt the speaker—which is my fear."

How exquisitely said, and how poisonous! Not only too was this poison given by her who was dearest, it came from the outside world as well. That Dr. Furnival who founded the Browning Societies writes thus, in eulogy of Browning's Essay on Shelley:

"The interest in this piece lay in the fact that Browning's utterances here are his, and not those of any one of
the so many imaginary persons behind whom he insists on so often hiding himself, and whose necks I for one should continually like to wring, whose bodies I would fain kick out of the way, in order to get face to face with the poet himself, and hear his own voice speaking his own thoughts, man to man and soul to soul. Straight speaking, straight hitting suit me best."

Yes, they always suit the prosaic Englishman best. In his mind the teacher is regularly set above the artist. In Browning's poetry both are present. It is strange that when in a neighboring art Browning had called attention to this distinction between naturalistic portraiture and endeavor after edification, and given strong preference to the former, he should so frequently in his own art have taken the lower course. In his poem of *Fra Lippo Lippi* we see the painter covering the walls of his cloister with pictures of unmistakable men and women. Then we hear the Prior's reproach:

"How? What's here?
Quite from the mark of painting! Bless us all!
Faces, arms, legs, and bodies, like the true
As much as pea and pea! It's devil's game.
Your business is not to catch men with show,
With honor to the perishable clay,
But lift them over it, ignore it all."

To which Fra Lippo replies:

"Say there's beauty with no soul at all
(I never saw it, put the case the same).
If you get simple beauty and naught else,
You get about the best thing God invents."

What a pity that Browning, abandoning naturalistic representation, for which he had as fine a genius as the Florentine monk, should so frequently have given way to sententious moralizings!
We hardly exaggerate when we say that there are two Brownings: one, the seer, who firmly and disinterestedly pursues his constructive art and, having observed all the subtleties of a character, is satisfied if he can present us a living being who announces no "lesson"; and then there is the teacher, who cannot escape from himself and is busy with inculcating his own special creed. It is no wonder that as time went on, this facile teacher, emancipated from the restraint of character-building, took on more and more the voice of Browning, became ever more wordy, and recorded more clumsily in rugged rhythms whatever random reflections came into his head. Browning had always loved argument and been amused to see what might be said in behalf of a bad cause. This tendency to sophistry grew upon him. We see it at its best in portions of The Ring and the Book; at its worst, in Fifine and in the Parleyings. In Browning's last period little sense of form remains. He often seems to write merely in order to let loose the miscellaneous workings of his mind. Only occasionally is it worth while to read what follows The Ring and the Book. After that time the teacher, the sophist, the random talker, are chiefly in evidence; the constructive artist has pretty completely disappeared. It may help some of my readers to trace for themselves the two tendencies in Browning if I group together a few illustrative poems. Much of his work admits no such clear classification. The same poem often contains material of different kinds. But if we select a group to show Browning's power as a constructive artist, it will include such as these: The Bishop Orders His Tomb, Andrea del Sarto, Childe Roland, The Flight of the Duchess, In a Gondola, James Lee's Wife, The Italian in England, Confessions, Hervé Riel, Life at a Villa, The Glove, My Last Duchess. All these poems move us by the imaginative accuracy with which the particular person or situation is presented.
A second group may show how oftentimes, though doctrine is evidently the object of the poem, it still embodies itself in concrete, personal form: _Fra Lippo Lippi, The Statue and the Bust, Caliban Upon Setebos, Saul, Cleon, The Strange Epistle of Karshish, A Grammariian's Funeral_. These are all intended to teach something, but they teach in a dramatic way.

And then we go over into the poems of preaching, directly announcing abstract truths. A little group of the strongest would be these: _Abt Vogler, One Word More, Old Pictures in Florence, Any Wife to any Husband, A Death in the Desert, Rabbi Ben Ezra_. The last may be regarded as Browning's reply to Omar Khayyám; _A Death in the Desert_, his reply to Straus. Such verse makes interesting reading; but the interest is a moral one. It has little to do with imaginative art.

In _The Ring and the Book_, written at the height of his powers and after long experimentation in other fields, Browning has left a complete epitome of his genius. The piece is of colossal proportions, original, terrific, and subtly imaginative beyond any poem of its century. In scope and majesty it takes no presumptuous place beside the glories of our earlier poetry, with _Troilus and Cressida, The Faery Queen, King Lear_, and _Samson Agonistes_. The Greeks had a way of choosing some hideous legend, "presenting Thebes or Pelops' line," and by its complete presentation in mellifluous language letting pity and fear effect their own purgation. That is what Browning has done. The squalid circumstance of a Roman murder trial more than two centuries gone by, he has made to live again as a thing of beauty and moral significance, acquainting us with the special temper of its distant time and with the baseness and exaltation which belong to humanity at all times. In these twenty thousand lines, put together during nine
years, there is room enough for all Browning's characteristics to find their place without damage to the total structure. Here are his argumentation, his searching psychology, his wide-ranging reading and observation, his interest in whatever is peculiar and out of the way, his profound religious sense, his tenderness, brutality and optimism, his love of mental adventure, occasionally too his mere loquacity. A strange mixture it is, wrought out in what I have called the completed form of his monologue, with appropriate attendant listeners, without soliloquy, narrative, or "message," and finding its sufficient end in a marvellous group of contrasted personalities.

The Ring and the Book too announces with startling clearness a fundamental principle of Browning's art to which I have hitherto paid too little attention. It is the principle of "the point of view," and with it his special type of poetry is inherently connected. We know how insistently personal that poetry is. Each man is unique; his nature, nurture, and circumstance differing in some respects from that of his neighbor. Accordingly the powers by which we apprehend truth will vary, and what is true for one of us will not be true for another. There is no standard set of powers by reference to which absolute truth may be known. Reality is always relative. Each of us brings with him a point of view, from which he cannot escape. The doctrine of the point of view accordingly underlies all that Browning writes. Something personal is always added to reality as a formative factor whenever we approach a fact. In The Ring and the Book what we call the same story is told by nine different people, and to the last we do not know—nor very much care—what the facts in themselves may really be. We only know how they look from these several points of view. The wise man then will fix his attention rather on the beholder than on the things alleged to be
beheld. "There's nothing either good or bad but thinking makes it so," Hamlet says. To comprehend a human soul, Browning has told us, is the one thing in the world deserving study. The great service of the poets lies in their teaching us to look at the world from other points of view than our own.

Now *The Ring and the Book* is a veritable school for this sort of instruction, and that its teachings may impress us the more, they are conveyed in triadic form. Three groups, with three contrasted members in each, report to us what they know, and therefore what they are. A ghastly murder occurred at Rome in 1679. Giuseppe Caponsacchi, a priest, ran away from Arezzo to Rome with Pompilia, the girl-wife of Guido Franceschini, a brutal and impoverished noble. Guido pursued the fugitives and subsequently killed Pompilia and her reputed parents, he himself being finally executed. Each of these three chief actors in the affair tells his story, no two alike. But the people of Rome are likewise interested, one part of them taking the wife's side, one the husband's; and besides these, those who, putting away all sentiment, see right on each side and pride themselves on judging all by pure intellect. Each one of this group not involved in the affair lets us learn how his mind has been affected. Then appears the legal group, the advocate of each party with the Pope, the judge of all. At the very last, and after Guido is condemned and is about to pass from his prison to the scaffold, he is allowed to speak once more, and then discloses a side of himself and his story unlike what was heard before.

Here then a story is told ten times without ever failing in interest. This is because by Browning's "new method" the event is transfused through personalities which it illuminates in every part. Where else outside Shakspere has individual experience been painted on such a scale? The long struggle of Romanticism, moving in
the direction of Browning's new type and new method, culminates in this masterpiece and shows itself capable of prodigious effects. No wonder the coming of something so huge created disturbance in the public mind. People must be either violently repelled or ardently attracted by this unflinching poet of the personal life. We may say that Tennyson and Browning summarize the imaginative life of their century. Browning shows the beginning of that Naturalism which henceforth, for good or ill, was to flood our poetry. Tennyson sings regretfully the shimmering charm, the ideal beauty, the refinement, the wistfulness, which were soon to pass away.
Neo-Realism, we shall all agree, has come to stay. Though the most recent of philosophical movements, it has already made an abiding impression on contemporary thought. Less noisy than Pragmatism, less fashionable than Bergson’s Intuitionism, it has yet quietly won over to its side a far larger number of the younger students of philosophy than one would suspect from the comparatively small amount of Neo-Realistic literature. What is even more striking, its criticisms of Idealism have had at least this effect, that many thinkers who are commonly labelled “Idealists” have hastened to dissociate themselves once more in the most explicit terms from that sort of Idealism of which the watchword is Berkeley’s esse est percipi. The so-called “Objective Idealists” have become noticeably more objective. To have compelled this re-alignment is in itself no small achievement to the credit of Neo-Realism.

By calling itself “new,” contemporary Realism rightly emphasizes its profound difference from the older type of Realism which was synonymous with Materialism. When the tide of reaction against the “speculative philosophy” of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel was at its height, and the age demanded a philosophy in harmony with the concepts and theories of physical science, then to be a Realist meant to analyze the universe exclusively in terms of “matter” and “force.”¹ The world was regarded as a large-scale mechanism, and minds, together

¹ Cf. Büchner’s Kraft und Stoff.
with all they stand for, as an insignificant and ineffective by-product ("epiphenomenon"), comparable to the noises or sparks of a machine. Philosophy was little more than physics exaggerated to metaphysical dimensions. Whatever facts in the universe cannot be dealt with by the methods and concepts of physics were depreciated, if not ignored. The modern Neo-Realist knows better than that. He is no longer preoccupied with the problem of matter and mind. He is no longer concerned to proclaim matter as the ultimate substance or to treat life and mind as accidental and irrelevant. He knows that "science is not all of truth, nor physical nature all of being."  

There is another important difference between the old Materialism and the new Realism. The former inevitably inclined towards a pessimistic philosophy of life. It depreciated moral effort on behalf of ideals on the ground of its being doomed to ultimate defeat. It depreciated religion as unscientific superstition and make-believe, intellectually false, morally mischievous. Morality was regarded as nothing but man's misguided attempt to stem the tide of nature, to assert his pigmy self against a hostile world, to impose moral ideals on natural forces wholly indifferent to good and ill. Religion could claim scientific warrant neither for the facts on which it pretended to be based, nor for its optimistic estimate of the significance of human values in the scheme of things. From all these prejudices, too, the Neo-Realists have shown themselves to be emancipated, whenever they have dealt with these problems at all. There is nothing in the position of modern Realism which precludes the attempt to provide an adequate "philosophy of life."

In fact, some of the spokesmen of Neo-Realism appear to claim that it is the only type of philosophy which can successfully make this attempt. It is put forward

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1 R. B. Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 108.
as the only genuine reconciler of science and religion, the theoretical and the practical interests of men. To achieve such a reconciliation has, not without justice, been regarded as one of the most persistent problems of philosophy. But in all previous solutions, so Professor R. B. Perry declares on behalf of Neo-Realism, philosophy has taken sides. It has either, as "naturalism," capitulated to the aggression of science, or it has, as "romanticism," made itself the champion of religion, even at the price of cherishing illusions. Neo-Realism alone, so we are told, combines disinterested respect for the facts of the world with loyalty to moral ideals. Compared with romantic illusions about the "perfection" of the universe, it is a "philosophy of disillusionment." But the disillusionment is wholesome, for the courageous acceptance of a hard truth is a source of power. Neo-Realism "removes illusions only in order to lay bare the confronting occasion and the available resources of action." The world is not perfect, but perfectible. To perfect it so far as in us lies is morality. To have confidence in its perfectibility and in the efficacy of human endeavour—this "hazard of faith" is religion. Realism is "opposed equally to an idealistic anticipation of the victory of spirit, and to a naturalistic confession of the impotence of spirit. In this sense all bold and forward living is realistic. It involves a sense for things as they are, an ideal of things as they should be, and a determination that, through enlightened action, things shall in time come to be what they should be." Thus Neo-Realism goes with science in its detached, dispassionate respect for facts, regardless of their present conformity to human wishes and ideals. It goes with morality in encouraging the effort to leave our world better than we found it. It goes with religion, at least if religion is adequately summed

5 R. B. Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 331.
4 Ibid.
6 Loc. cit., p. 347.
up in the belief "that what is indifferent will acquire value, and that what is bad will be made good." On this reconciliation of facts with values and ideals, of nature with spirit, Neo-Realism bases its claim to be the only philosophy which allows us to combine science and religion without sacrificing the one to the other.

In these ways, then, Neo-Realism is genuinely new as compared with the old Materialism. Of course, it has affinities, especially in its treatment of religion, with other modern movements. It shares the belief in the perfectibility of the world ("meliorism") with the Pragmatism of James, and the Instrumentalism of Dewey. In eliminating from religion all supernatural elements and identifying it with the hope of, and endeavour for, a more glorious future for mankind, it presents the same marriage of Naturalism and Philanthropy which was characteristic already of Comte and Mill and the "religion of humanity."

At any rate, it cannot be charged against modern Realism that, like Materialism, it is hostile to the claims of man's spiritual life. A Realist may be zealous for righteousness, for his philosophy may encourage activity on behalf of all good causes. Thus it is because Neo-Realism challenges Idealism, not merely on the technical ground of the esse est percipi principle, but on the ground of its philosophy of life and of religion, that it is worth while to examine critically what positive alternative Neo-Realism has to offer. How in detail does Neo-Realism interpret religion? To what facts of experience does it appeal in support of this interpretation? How does it define the relations to each other of knowledge and conduct, of theory and practice, of science, morality, religion and philosophy? It will but add doubly and trebly to the importance of our investigation that we shall ultimately find the whole issue to be turning on the problem of evil.

*Loc. cit., p. 344.*
The course of our argument thus demands, first, a brief survey of the main types and varieties of Neo-Realism with special reference to their bearing on religion (Section I). Thence we shall pass to an examination of the only available Neo-Realistic account of the difference between and relation to one another of the theoretical and practical attitudes in life, our main purpose being to determine, in the light of this distinction, how philosophy ought to interpret morality and religion (Section II). Lastly, we shall find ourselves involved in nothing less momentous than a discussion of the problem of evil (Section III). The melioristic thesis that there is no problem of evil except the practical one of how most efficiently to do away with evil, stands confronted by what seems the gratuitous paradox of the thesis that the world is perfect and that the evil in it is a necessary constituent of its perfection. We shall have to ask ourselves whether meliorism is really as plausible and reasonable, and its rival as unreasonable and self-contradictory, as either appears to be on first inspection. It may be we shall be driven to the conclusion that, for a deeper insight, the paradox of perfection disappears, whereas in meliorism contradictions come to light which make it untenable as an ultimate basis for a philosophy of life.

I.

To make a Neo-Realist, very little is needed; least of all any excursions into the realm of religion. Whether a thinker is to be classed as a Realist or not, depends solely on his attitude towards two somewhat technical problems. Has he renounced “epistemological dualism”? Has he, once and for all, forsworn the heresy of esse est percipi? If so, he is a Realist. The recipe for making Realists may thus be summed up by saying: Be an “epistemological monist” and affirm the “independ-
ence" of reality and knowledge. Both requirements are combined in Professor R. B. Perry's "cardinal principle of Neo-Realism," namely, "the independence of the immanent." 7

Let us translate these forbidding technicalities into simpler language. A familiar way of expressing the fact that somebody knows something is to say, he has an idea of it. Similarly, to be ignorant of a subject is to have no ideas of it. Thus knowledge would seem to consist of "ideas" which are "in" the mind of the knower and "of" the object which is known. But what is an idea? A moment's reflection shows that there is nothing to which we can apply the term unless it be what we have in mind, i.e., what we are conscious of, when we perceive and think. As Locke said, an idea is whatever object is before the mind when it thinks. Thus then of the things which I am now perceiving—pen, paper, table, books, etc., I shall have to say that they are ideas in my mind; so also are Neo-Realism, and the theory of knowledge, and all these topics with which my thoughts are occupied as I write these lines. But if so, what of the real world? What of the things themselves, "of" which I have ideas, that is, to which my ideas refer? These clearly must form a separate order of existences, distinct from the ideas in my, or in anybody else's, mind. Strange as this transformation of everybody's world into ideas in his mind referring to real objects "outside" may seem, are we not committed to it by saying that to know is to have ideas of objects? And where else can ideas exist except in minds? Ideas are mental and to be sharply distinguished from real objects which are non-mental. The familiar distinction of body and mind appears to reinforce this analysis of knowledge. And to clinch the matter, we may remind ourselves how commonly we speak of certain sorts of experiences, for example, dreams, as consisting of

7 Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 313.
“mere” ideas, that is, ideas to which no objects correspond in the outer world. How can we get on without the distinction between ideas which have objects corresponding to them and ideas which have none?

To argue thus is to be an epistemological dualist, that is, to construe knowledge as a relation between two factors, ideas in, and objects outside, the knowing mind. From the difficulties of this theory, which are too obvious and well-known to require recapitulation, our Neo-Realists have happily shaken themselves free. As sound “epistemological monists,” they insist that it is reality itself which we apprehend, not some substitute for, or representative of, it in the shape of an “idea.” The object, as Perry puts it, is “immanent” in knowledge. If we still choose to speak of “idea,” we ought to mean by the term the status of the object in its relation to the knowing mind. Thus, for example, my idea of the table is not a mental fact duplicating and referring to an extra-mental fact; it is the table itself considered as an object of apprehension for me, the table so far and so long as it figures in my field of consciousness. On this point all Neo-Realists appear to be agreed, however they may otherwise differ from each other. The English Realists (S. Alexander, B. Russell, and others), for example, have a very different theory of what a mind is from that of the Harvard group of American Realists (R. B. Perry and E. B. Holt). But when Russell declares that “the faculty of being acquainted with things other than itself is the main characteristic of a mind,” and that “acquaintance with objects essentially consists in a relation between the mind and something other than the mind; it is this that constitutes the mind’s power of knowing things”8—he eliminates ideas as the tertium quid standing between a mind and its objects as decisively as S. Alexander does when he analyzes all knowing into a relation of “together-

8 Problems of Philosophy, pp. 66, 7.
ness” or “compresence” between a mental act of apprehension and a non-mental thing. And in a different way the same “monistic” effect is achieved by Perry and Holt when they treat knowing as a “specific reaction of the central nervous system,” and knowledge as the peculiar complex of objects defined by this reaction and by it selected from the objective universe at large. Knowledge, in Holt’s striking phrase, is a “cross-section” of the universe. What a given mind knows and what it ignores, what is in that mind and what lies beyond it, depend simply on what the nervous system at a given moment specifically reacts to. Here again there is no room for “ideas.”

But this is not all. To eliminate “ideas” from the theory of knowledge is not the same thing as to overthrow the esse est percipi principle. For it might still be true that objects cannot exist except in relation to some mind which apprehends them, or some nervous system which reacts to them. Hence it is as essential a part of Neo-Realism to insist upon the “independence” of the object, as it is to insist upon its “immanence.” “Things may be, and are, directly experienced without owing either their being or their nature to that circumstance,” declares Perry. To be is one thing, to be experienced is another, says Holt; a thing must be before it can be experienced, hence its being cannot depend on its being experienced. In general, things may pass in and out of the relation to a mind or a nervous system, in virtue of which we say that they are known, without being thereby affected in existence or character. As an English Realist puts it: “We can no more think that in apprehending reality we do not apprehend it as it is apart

1 The Basis of Realism, Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. VI, passim.
10 Cf. R. B. Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, Chaps. XII, XIII; E. B. Holt, Concept of Consciousness, Chap. IX.
11 Loc. cit., p. 315.
from our knowledge of it, than we can think that existence depends upon our knowledge of it.”  

In the light of these quotations, we may claim to have made good the point that the minimum which is required to make a Realist is the affirmation of the “independence” of the object of knowledge and the denial of “representative ideas.”

Has all this any specific bearing on religion? Clearly not. So far we have found Neo-Realism to be narrowly preoccupied with a technical problem in the analysis of what it has taught us to call the “cognitive relation,” and the conclusions reached by it carry no obvious consequences for other fields of investigation. Indeed, the Realism of many Realists seems to begin and end here. Where it does so, it is only by guess-work that we can apply the Neo-Realistic conclusions to the problem of religion. Alexander, for example, would probably not object to saying that in religion we are “compresent” with God; and he does speak of the highest stage of knowledge as “seeing all things in God.” Russell’s theory of acquaintance would, if applied to religion, suggest the question whether, as a matter of fact, we are acquainted with God. And if the answer should be in the affirmative, and if we further remember that acquaintance can never be mistaken, the conclusion should satisfy even the most orthodox. But actually Russell’s discussions of religion do not follow this line at all. In fact, they have no point of contact whatever with his Realism in theory of knowledge. Instead, he is concerned with the status of morality and religion in a world of which he conceives the nature and future fate on the lines of scientific materialism. How on this basis he reaches the conclusion that ultimate extinction awaits the human race and the ideals for the realization of which it struggles, has been discussed in a previous article in these pages.

13 A. H. Prichard, Kant’s Theory of Knowledge, p. 119.

But there is, of course, no reason why Neo-Realism should remain thus narrowly epistemological, why it should not explore the wider vistas which beckon and tempt every philosopher to adventures in speculation. Hence it is not surprising that some of the most powerful thinkers among the Neo-Realists should have responded to the opportunity, and enlarged their vision to the dimensions of a metaphysical theory. Nor again is it surprising that through all their differences there should run a common strain, which we can describe only as a naturalistic or, more specifically, biological bias. When the history of philosophical thought at the beginning of the twentieth century comes to be written, the adoption of the biological standpoint will, we may safely predict, be recorded as one of the outstanding characteristics of that thought. Having analyzed the nature and function of mind in knowledge, the Realist is naturally ambitious to paint the picture of the universe and assign to mind its place within the cosmic scene. Alexander puts the point prettily. "The temper of realism," he writes, "is to de-anthropomorphize: to order man and mind to their proper place among the world of finite things; on the one hand to divest physical things of the colouring which they have received from the vanity and arrogance of mind; and on the other to assign them along with minds their due measure of self-existence."¹⁵ In a similar spirit, Perry accuses Idealism of being anthropomorphic and "bio-centric," and consequently unable "to survey the totality of things dispassionately," or "to treat them in a spirit of free and critical enquiry."¹⁶ Pronouncements such as these may seem to accord ill with the statement that Neo-Realism exhibits a biological bias. But it is precisely biology, and more generally the theory of evolution, which have led Neo-Realists to look upon life

and mind as phenomena in a context of varied other phenomena, as late-comers in the order of evolution, and as confronted on arrival by a determinate and pre-existing environment. It was an easy transition from the independent object of knowledge to the pre-existing environment. It was a fascinating task to seek a place for mind and knowledge within the detailed context and structure of this independent universe, once its independence had been established by epistemological analysis. The biological importance of the central nervous system could then be recognized, and it could be fitted into the pattern in its proper place. Mind and knowledge could be brought under the concept of "behaviour," and treated as identical with, or at least as dependent upon, specific responses of the organism to its environment. It was but a step further to ask how far increase of knowledge might extend man's control over his environment for the satisfaction of his needs, how far nature might prove plastic to the realization of his ideals and be made the tool of his progress. Not all Neo-Realists, however, are interested in this latter question. Indeed, we can at this point discern something like a parting of the ways. Our Realist metaphysicians divide themselves into two groups—the cosmologists and the moralists, as we may conveniently label them. The former are interested mainly in the diversified spectacle of the universe, which they are content to analyze and describe in detail. The latter are interested above all in "moral causality," in "the operation of moral agents on a pre-existing and independent environment." They seek knowledge which shall "illuminate things in order that action may be invented which shall make them good." 17 Cosmological Realism is represented by Alexander and Holt, though in widely different

17 These phrases and sentences are quoted from R. B. Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, Chap. XIV, A Realistic Philosophy of Life.
ways, Moral Realism by Perry. Alexander, so far, has given us little more than fragments and sketchy outlines of his universe. Roughly we can discern that he arranges its manifold constituents in an ascending order, which appears to be both an order of temporal evolution and an order of perfection. Each fresh step or level in this order is as real and "self-existent" as the rest, but each also introduces some new quality and is thus more perfect than its predecessors. The "secondary qualities" (colour, sound, etc.) are apparently regarded by Alexander as one such level of perfection; life is another, consciousness in animals and men a third. But man is not the apex of this hierarchy. Above man there are higher levels of more perfect beings, for example, angels, and we may fairly conjecture that the hierarchy somehow leads up to and terminates in God. Each level of existence, as Alexander quaintly says, "enjoys itself" and is "contemplated" by the more perfect beings above it. All this, however, is as yet tentative and shadowy, though no doubt it is being more fully developed in the Gifford Lectures which Alexander is now engaged in delivering at one of the Scotch Universities. It is a strange mingling of echoes from early Christian and Talmudic literature with highly modern psychology and biology. But though this Realism is without any explicit philosophy of religion, it is clearly in temper religious. Though its account of the levels of perfection in their relation to each other provides rather for man's contemplation by God, than for God's contemplation by man, yet it is eager to have us realize "both mind and things to be fragments not merely of something larger than their own salient momentary existences but of an infinite whole." In this sense it invites us to "see all things in God." ¹⁸

The other of our two cosmological Realists, Holt, is even more silent on religion. His universe is a “neutral mosaic”\(^\text{19}\) — “neutral” in the sense that the ultimate elements which analysis can distinguish within it, are neither mental nor material but logical. It too has an ascending order, embodying a kind of logical evolution from simple to complex. It is a universe “graded in a strict and inalienable order of complexities.” As his clue for a tentative sketch of this order, Holt has apparently used the system of the sciences. His universe begins with the simple entities of logic and mathematics. Soon after come the secondary qualities; then space (geometry); time, motion, mass (mechanics); matter (physics); the chemical elements; the “larger aggregates, such as clouds, rivers, and seas, mountains, plains, continents, and planets.” Thence, passing from the inorganic to the organic, we get plants and animals. To this level of complexity too belongs mind or consciousness. Last in the ontological series comes the level of values, to which correspond the normative sciences, for example, aesthetics and “ethics, including perhaps theology.”\(^\text{20}\) Clearly, this is a meagre result for the philosophy of religion, unless we are willing to squeeze what comfort we can out of the assurance that the beautiful, the real, the true, and the good, though the least fundamental in the ontological system, are “the very most important for us as human beings.”\(^\text{21}\)

The only type of Neo-Realism which is directly interested in religion and which attempts to offer a definite “philosophy of life” is the Moral Realism of R. B. Perry. Negatively this shows itself in its unsparing attacks on Idealism (or “Romanticism”) as a philosophy of religion which declares the world to be perfect and

\(^{19}\) The following account is based on certain passages of Chapter VIII, The Neutral Mosaic, in E. B. Holt’s Concept of Consciousness.

\(^{20}\) Loc. cit., p. 160.

\(^{21}\) Ibid.
the good to be fully realized here and now. Positively it shows itself in its plea for the cosmic efficacy of moral efforts, and in its demand for a religion, not of resignation and endurance, but of vigorous aggression upon evil and devoted labour in the cause of human progress. To the examination of this theory of religion we must now turn, considering first its general account of the relation of theory to practice (or "belief"), and secondly its plea for the perfectibility of the universe.

II.

Belief and theory, so we may summarize Perry's argument,\(^2\) are both forms of knowledge, and "knowledge furnishes the illumination and guidance of all conscious action." In order to do so, knowledge must of course be true. But merely to assert a theory, however true, is not enough. We must also adopt it as a matter of belief. Only then does it become a plan of life. Until theory takes on the form of belief, it "lacks that confidence and steadiness without which no consecutive endeavour is possible." Indeed, the difference between theory and belief cuts much deeper still. It is a moral difference. A different motive is involved, a different human good. In the attitude of theory, we care only about the attainment of truth. In the attitude of belief, we assume truth and look to efficiency of action. So again these attitudes differ in their social effects. "To belief, society owes its cohesiveness and stability; to theory, it owes its chance of betterment." But even this is not the last word. Theory, just because its end is truth, is in principle divorced from action. "The theoretical mood, even when a conclusion is reached, is a state of practical doubt." The conclusion need

\(^2\) All quotations in this section, unless otherwise stated, are taken from R. B. Perry's Present Philosophical Tendencies, Chaps. I and II. A first draft of Chapter I appeared in the Harvard Theological Review, Vol. III (1910).
not be, like a belief, assimilated into the agent’s life as, so to speak, its inspiration. Indeed, so Perry seems to hold, this divorce from action is a positive advantage for theory, because it secures “that immunity from direct social responsibility which is most conducive to clear seeing and straight thinking.” Ultimately this estimate of the place and function of theory in life rests on the view that essentially “to theorize is to doubt.” And even though doubting here seems to mean inquiring, investigating, researching as much as disbelieving, still it means playing among hypothetical alternatives, weighing inconclusive evidences, and therefore refusing to commit oneself. And, again, in the pursuit of truth, the theorist is entitled to concern himself with matters minute and remote from all practical interests. “The theoretical mind is not held to those standards of proportionateness which obtain in life.”

Even if we have followed Perry’s previous argument without a murmur of dissent, this last statement must surely give us pause. True, Perry speaks of this neglect of proportions as an “incident of theoretical analysis,” and mentions scientists, not philosophers, as practising it. Still, he fails to make clear that the one kind of theorist who, whatever details he may study incidentally, cannot afford to ignore the standards of proportionateness is the philosopher, especially when his aim is to formulate an adequate “philosophy of life.” In fact, the trouble is not that the philosopher is held to these standards, but that they are so hard to discover. Actual life so perplexingly and even cruelly confuses the standards, that it requires trained insight to discern them in the welter of first appearances. Again, though doubting, investigating, and the trying-out of hypotheses are instrumental to theorizing, yet essentially it consists, not in doubting but in contemplating. This is true not only because, after all, we do reach conclusions. It
is true chiefly because in philosophy, as we may say in
direct challenge to Perry's dictum, to theorize is to
apply to the interpretation of life the insight gained
from one's best, if rarest, experiences. In the dust of
the daily road we need the hill-top views. The philos-
opher, above every other kind of theorist, requires the
eye for the fundamental realities which only his deeper
experiences adequately reveal. This is, after all, the
spirit in which Perry himself philosophizes when he
urges upon our acceptance his view of man as striving
to transform the world by the realization of his ethical
ideals. There he does not "doubt." He communicates
his insight into life—or, to use William James's terms,
his "vision," his "mode of feeling the whole push of life." 23
This is, so we suggest, an example of the kind of think-
ing on which we ought to model our theory of what
"theory" is and does. A philosopher owes it to his
own enterprise to describe theory where he finds it at
its best. And that is not where it operates amidst the
necessary abstractions of science, but where, as in
philosophy, it seeks "to see life steadily and see it
whole."

It is but another way of putting this same point to say
that such a thing as Perry's "philosophy of life" carries
us at once beyond his own antithesis of "belief" and
"theory." That it does so, is all to the good. For, if
we may judge from the great thinkers, a Plato, a Spinoza,
a Kant, or a Hegel, the divorce of theory and belief is
not characteristic of philosophy at its best. Such phi-
losophy is too deeply rooted in the realities of experience
to cease "believing" (in Perry's sense) merely because it
reflects and investigates. The experiences which illu-
minate life and teach one to read its values aright carry,
so to speak, their own guarantee. There is nothing
hypothetical about them. Whatever stability and

23 A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 20, 1.
steadfastness we need in life we must draw from them. It is precisely the function of the kind of theory which we call philosophical, to seize upon these insights and make them available for the interpretation of our world. But thus understood, philosophy takes us once for all beyond the stage where man needs to “convert theoretical probabilities into subjective certainties and to believe more than he knows.”

Our concept of philosophy supplies us with a point of view from which to weigh what Perry has to say about the difference between religion and science, and the relation of philosophy to both. “Religion,” we read, “has to do with the general character of nature as a whole, or with whatever may lie beyond nature and still belong to the environment of life.” It is essentially “a plan of action,” “man’s hope or despair of salvation.” It springs from the need for “a final adaptation,” for coming to terms, as it were, once and for all with God, this being “the name for the over-ruling powers as sources of fortune.” Whether this description of religion in biological terms of environment and adaptation is adequate, we need not now stop to consider. For the moment we are interested only in its relation to science and philosophy. Science, we are told, is the pure embodiment of the theoretical motive, that is, of disinterested curiosity. Religion similarly is the pure embodiment of the practical motive, that is, the highly interested desire for a plan of action which shall secure the maximum of good fortune from the environment as a whole. But obviously “an enlightened and therefore effective religion” requires itself to be based on a thorough theoretical understanding of this environment, not in its proximate details but in its general and ultimate features. Not science but only philosophy can meet this requirement, for only philosophy deals theoretically with ultimates. Whence it follows that “as popular or applied science is related to
pure science, so religion is related to pure philosophy.” And again, “it is as important for religion to promote the development of a rigorously theoretical philosophy, as it is for engineering to promote the development of theoretical physics.” The qualification “rigorously theoretical” covers the demand that during the course of the inquiry the passions be repressed and the application of results to life ignored, lest hopes and fears beget illusions and dreams. “Religion is no exception to the rule that man conquers his environment and moulds it into good through forgetting his fears and renouncing his hopes, until he shall have disciplined himself to see coolly and steadily.” Now religion, as Perry says elsewhere, is the embodiment of man’s “optimistic bias.” Being “belief,” it is the spirit of hope and confidence which sustains him in energetic living, that hope of “salvation” which, for Perry, seems to coincide with “moulding the environment into good.” From all this we may conjecture for philosophy, as the theoretical basis of religion, a threefold task. On the one hand it must, in the critical and unprejudiced manner of science, examine the ultimate nature of the environment of human life as a mere matter of fact. On the other it must, with like disinterestedness, study what things are good or have value in virtue of the fact that human beings desire them. Presumably it must also rationalize these desires and their goods, i.e., organize them into a harmonious system, securing the maximum fulfilment of desire and the maximum realization of what is good. Lastly, philosophy will have to decide whether, the facts being what they are, the maximum fulfilment of interests, or at least a progress towards increasingly complete fulfilment, is possible. If so, we shall be justified in “believing,” that is, in labouring with zest and confidence for making the world an ever better and more satisfactory place for hu-

24 The Moral Economy, Chap. VI, p. 231.
man beings to live in. This is what Perry calls "the Baconian idea," the "axiom of modern civilization." "The good is to be won by the race and for the race; it lies in the future, and can result only from prolonged and collective endeavor; and the power to achieve it lies in the progressive knowledge and control of nature." 26 Science, so we may sum up his view in our own words, supplies the detailed knowledge of causes and effects, without which action would be impossible for lack of means. Philosophy investigates whether as a whole nature is favourable to the realization of human desires, that is, plastic to human action. Religion turns philosophy's verdict into belief and thus supplies the dynamic element. Its watchword, one feels, ought to be, Full steam ahead for efficiency and reform. Such is, as a matter of fact, the account of the theoretical content of religion, or "religious truth," which Perry offers in his Moral Economy. 28 Religious truth consists of ethical judgements concerning human interests ("what the believer has at stake"), and cosmological judgements concerning the environment at large, which in its bearing on the worshipper's interests is called "God."

On the whole theory a single comment will suffice at this stage of our argument. Perry's account of religion entirely ignores the mystical element in it. The biological language in which he has cast his description, only serves to throw this neglect into bolder relief. Hence his treatment cannot but strike as inadequate all who regard mystical experience as the intensest and purest form of religion. For such an utterance of religious experience as St. Paul's "Not I, but God that worketh in me," there is no room within Perry's formula. In discussing religion, it is inevitable that every

26 Present Philosophical Tendencies, pp. 4, 5.
thinker should reveal himself, that he should lay bare, as the basis of his argument, the type of experience through which he "feels his continuity with reality." For Perry this is clearly moral enthusiasm, the reformer's zeal for the bettering of his world through the realization of his ideals. This he offers as the essence of religion—what religion ought to be, what at its best it is. Though one feels tempted to say that he sacrifices religion to morality, yet such a zeal for progress in human welfare, for rendering service to the cause of reform, for fighting against evil in all its guises, is clearly something without which religion would be poor and ineffective. The question is whether, as it stands, this is equivalent to religion. The answer, it is hardly possible to doubt, must be No. Religion after all is an historical fact in the lives of men and, dogma apart, has found expression in utterance and conduct in so many forms that a comparative study not only reveals the main "varieties of religious experience," but enables us also to discriminate higher and lower forms—experiences, or lives, in which the distinctive and unique character of religion is more completely and adequately exhibited than in others. One might instance Christ or St. Paul or St. Francis. No combination of cosmology and ethics, welded together from a biological point of view, such as Perry offers, seizes the distinctive quality of religion as these "men of God" exhibit it. A philosophical theory of religion which fails to include, not merely one variety of religious experience among others but the most characteristic and revealing variety of all, namely, mysticism, offends against the canon of philosophical interpretation of experience which we laid down above.
III.

But the real trial of strength between these two ways of using experiences as material for philosophical theory, and thus extracting from them that wisdom which both is true as insight and imparts the right temper to conduct, is still to come. The issue so far has been whether religion, as a matter of experience, is identical with "moral enthusiasm," especially when this enthusiasm wears the biological air of an effort so to control and modify the environment that it becomes a better place for men to live in. As the alternative to this we have taken the view that religion, while involving morality as an element within itself, yet is as a whole a distinctive type of experience, of which the keynote is mysticism. The real touchstone of the adequacy of these two views, as we are now about to see, is the problem presented by the fact of evil.

To clear the ground for fruitful debate, let us put aside irrelevant topics and set down explicitly what is common ground for both sides. As irrelevant we shall regard the familiar dialectical puzzle how a perfect whole can consist of imperfect parts, or, to put the puzzle in theological language, how the existence of sin, error, and evil is consistent with the creation of the universe by God defined as all-wise, all-good, all-powerful. Let it be agreed that evil is neither an illusion nor yet something willed and planned as adding zest and spice to the perfection of the cosmic spectacle for a divine spectator. We will have no God enjoying from the stalls the tragedy of human sin and suffering enacted on the stage. Nor does experience support the suggestion that evil is as unsubstantial as a dream. Such interpretations pervert the judgement of perfection, the roots of which in our experience it will be our task to search out.
Again, let it be agreed that our world and our lives show a pattern of mingled good and ill, and that under these conditions there is as much need for the steadfastness of mind which endures suffering patiently and is not debauched by good fortune, as there is for the moral struggle to defeat evil and realize good. Doing one's best, the "full deliverance of one's self to the cause of goodness," as Perry finely puts it, is essential to happiness, by which we mean the sense that life is worth while. We shall make no attempt to call the universe "perfect" in any sense which makes morality meaningless.

Yet again, let it be agreed that we are not to make out a case for or against a surplus of pleasure over pain, nor to show every item of pain and wrong to be over-balanced or cancelled by some compensating joy or good. Least of all shall we pretend that evil is somehow good in disguise, or borrow the convenient philosophy of Pangloss in Voltaire's *Candide*: "Les malheurs particuliers font le bien général, de sort que plus il y a de malheurs particuliers, plus tout est bien."

All these issues being set aside, what issue remains? Where do we differ? The point of deep difference may be put in a nut-shell by placing side by side two sentences from Perry's *Moral Economy*: "If life is a real tragedy, it can be endured, and to enter into it will bring the deep satisfaction which every form of heroism affords." And, "The moment evil is conceived as the necessary but diminishing complement to partial success, the sting of it is gone. Evil as a temporary and accidental necessity is tolerable; but not so an evil which is absolutely necessary, and which must be construed with some hypothetical divine satisfaction." We have agreed above to put aside as irrelevant the appeal to a hypothetical divine satisfaction. We are to argue on the

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basis of human experience, taking it where it is at its best. Thus approached the question is whether the arduous and heroic life with the conditions, that is, the pain and the evil which evoke heroism, is worth while, enduringly and for its own sake, or whether morality is worth while only on the prospect of the final eradication of evil and therefore the abolition of morality itself. The issue is put misleadingly as a choice between "the practical optimism or meliorism which stakes its hope on the chance that the world may be made better," and "the contemplative or quietistic optimism, which consists in the faith that the world is best." The alternatives are not moral endeavour versus moral holiday, doing one's best versus doing nothing, fighting evil versus resignedly acquiescing in it. The only question worth asking and answering in this matter is, What kind of life, and under what conditions, is fundamentally most worth while as enabling us to make the most of ourselves—life in this actual world of ours with its suffering and evil, or life, as the meliorist's fancy paints it, in a world without either? If the decision is, as we hold it must be, in favour of the former alternative, then the meliorist is deluding us with his promise of a world which, in James's phrase, has been made to "forget the very place and name of evil." He is falsifying the very spirit of morality by his suggestion that only as a means to the realization of such a world is morality really worth while.

More abstractly the problem might be put in the form of the question, Is the value of evil purely negative, as of something to be once and for all eliminated, or is it so closely interwoven with the whole tissue of this double-edged life of ours that it is not only ineradicable as a matter of fact but positively valuable as the condition

30 Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 243.
31 Pragmatism, p. 297.
without which other values cannot be had? It should be clearly noted that in asking this question, we have left behind the level where desire and aversion, the things towards which and the things against which we are moved, are polar opposites. We are asked to survey life as a whole, with its values and their conditions. And “as a whole” means that we are not now to pick and choose, saying we would like to retain this and rather do without that. It means that once we understand the sources of all that is valuable, we shall find evil among these; and we shall find further that if evil were to be eliminated, utterly and in principle, the things which are good would not survive it. It is this reflection which underlies the “judgement of perfection” and leads in a sense to an acceptance of evil, and to a preference for the actual world with evil over an imaginary world without evil. Only let it be noted that this acceptance is not resignation nor a betrayal of morality. It rather begets loyalty to morality by dispelling the illusion that an evil-less, painless world is both possible and, from the profoundest point of view, desirable. Thus the “judgement of perfection” does not contradict or cancel morality, for it is made from a point of view which may be described in all seriousness as “beyond good and evil.”

It is not merely as an argumentum ad hominem, but as an illustration of the way in which the logic of experience will over-ride the prejudices of inadequate theory, that we shall quote a professed and eager meliorist in support of our contention. The meliorism of William James is part of the friendly philosophical polemic which he carried on against Royce’s defence of the perfection of the universe. That defence James labelled “tender-minded,” apparently under the impression that somehow a denial of the reality of evil was involved. But it would appear to require a “tougher”
courage to accept both evil and the fight against it as among the permanent "hazards and hardships" of finite life than to console oneself with the hope of a world in which there shall be neither. At any rate, James himself, on occasions, when he happily forgot his meliorism, showed himself possessed of this very courage, and made his choice of lives accordingly. There is the famous and oft-quoted passage describing his visit to the Assembly Grounds on Chautauqua Lake.32 He sets out eloquently the absence of disease, poverty, drunkenness, crime, and the realization of the meliorist's dream. "You have culture, you have kindness, you have cheapness, you have equality, you have the best of what mankind has fought and bled and striven for under the name of civilization for centuries. You have, in short, a foretaste of what society might be, were it all in the light, with no suffering and no dark corners." Yet after seven days of this "middle-class paradise, without a sin, without a victim, without a blot, without a tear," he bursts out, on emerging again into the dark and wicked world with "Ouf! what a relief! Now for something primordial and savage, even though it were as bad as an Armenian massacre, to set the balance straight again. . . . Let me take my chances again in the big outside worldly wilderness with all its sins and sufferings . . . all its moral style, expressiveness and picturesqueness—the element of precipitousness, of strength and strenuousness, intensity and danger."

In this utterance and in the experience which it records we have the very logic of the "judgement of perfection," the acknowledgment that this actual world of ours is the best world, in the sense that it is the kind of world in which it is most worth while to live. Beside it melioristic dreams fade into nothingness.

32 Talks to Teachers on Psychology and Life's Ideals, pp. 268 ff.—quoted and discussed by B. Bosanquet, The Value and Destiny of the Individual, pp. 332 ff.
Those for whom the "judgement of perfection" expresses the deepest insight into these matters, accept evil and the struggle against evil as permanent features of the universe, and they accept life in this universe on these terms as supremely worth while. They accept it, not with a gesture of despair or condemnation but, like James, confidently and even joyously, content to play a man's part and fulfil a man's destiny under the conditions of finite existence. They accept life, as the marriage-service has it, "for better, for worse." Is this optimism? Is this pessimism? Our classificatory pigeon-holes will not contain such an attitude. It is a recognition of value which carries us, as we said, "beyond good and evil." As the spirit of daily living it is religion. As reflective theory it is philosophy; and, paradoxically enough, though usually called "idealism," it is really the only philosophy which is realistic to the bitter end.
During the last quarter-century more investigation than ever before has been going on into the unconscious activities of the human mind, or, as the investigators have preferred to call it, the sub-conscious mind. This has led in psychology to the study of apparitions and the various forms of telepathy, and in religion to a revival of Quietism. Religious bodies as far from Quakerism as the Episcopal Church are holding retreats for meditation, silent prayer, "the practice of the presence of God." The exclusion of worldly thought is pointed to as the means for the opening of the soul to the incoming of the Divine; and some are following the Mystic Way through its steps of Purgation, Illumination, and Ecstasy to its goal of absorption into God in the Unitive Life.

This revived interest at the present time in Mysticism is not surprising. For in an age which is devoted to efficiency and moved largely by machinery, when thought is subordinated to action, and the quality most highly prized is power, there will always be those who turn away in sadness and disgust from the rush of effort and seek to find God by walking in the garden in the cool of the day; who adjust themselves to receiving, confident that from all sides the universe will pour its wealth into them if they do but furnish capacity for reception. They turn to those who in the midst of their strenuous
activities are distrustful of any attainment except through effort, and say,

“Think you, 'mid all this mighty sum
Of things for ever speaking,
That nothing of itself will come,
But we must still be seeking?”

It was when the might of paganism was asserting itself under Diocletian against Christianity that the Fayoum was filled by St. Anthony and his monks. Meister Eckart, Tauler, and Ruysbroeck lived in a world busy with petty wars and petty politics. And it was in 1624, shortly after the beginning of the Thirty Years' War, that Johann Scheffler, afterwards known as Angelus Silesius, was born in Silesia at Breslau or perhaps at Glatz. He is less known than his fourteenth-century predecessors, or even than his master, Jakob Boehme; but he is interesting for the completeness with which he represents the positions of Mysticism and for the daring with which he accepts the conclusions of its logic. Our busy age may well find a lesson in him. After reading his *Cherubinischer Wandersmann* one is inclined to say, as of *The Apocalypse*, “Seal not the sayings of the prophecy of this book, for the time is at hand.”

He was a Lutheran by birth and education, and took to studying medicine at Strassburg, Padua, Leyden, and Amsterdam, with strong interests also in theology and poetry. After taking his doctor's degree in philosophy and medicine at Padua he became, in 1649, court physician to the strongly Lutheran Duke Sylvius Nimrod at Oels in Württemberg. He remained here, however, only three years, and then returned to Breslau. He found the ecclesiastical atmosphere in both places uncongenial. The early glow of the Reformation had given place to the acrimonies and hair-splittings of Protestant scholasticism. The Lutheran was bitter against the Calvin-
ist and the Calvinist against the Lutheran and both against the Zwinglian, and the bitterness of all against one another was often greater than against their common enemy, Rome. Ever since the Psalmist hesitated to announce the message which had brought light to his soul through fear that it would offend the devout, and warned himself—"If I say, 'I will speak thus,' behold, I should offend against the generation of Thy children"—through all the ages, the bitterly pious ecclesiastic, narrowly zealous for his own type of orthodoxy, has been the strongest agency in turning men away from religion. And men of this type abounded, both at the Duke's court and in Silesia. Jakob Boehme, who died in the year Scheffler was born, had been browbeaten and silenced for five years by an aggressive clerical guardian of Protestant orthodoxy in Silesia; and a half-century later Duke Sylvius's court preacher fell foul of the court physician. Protestantism, as Scheffler met it, was unlovely. Its emphasis upon doctrine, its straining at the gnat of conformity while swallowing the camel of un-Christlikeness, its suspicion of good works, and the coldness with which it regarded that immediate union with God which its own son, Boehme, had claimed, all combined with the unattractiveness of those who were its representatives to turn Scheffler from it. There are people of whom we say, "They are good, but"—; and that "but" is like Pharaoh's lean kine, which devoured all the fat kine that were before them. So it was with those who to Scheffler stood for Protestantism; and on June 12, 1653, he abandoned it and entered the Roman Catholic Church. He had the zeal of the new convert; he would shake off the very dust of Protestantism from his feet. And so he adopted a new name. It had been his growing interest in Mysticism which had helped in bringing him into his new surroundings. He took, consequently, for a kind of godfather a Spanish
Mystic of the sixteenth century, Johannes de Angelis, and borrowing his name, called himself Johannes Angelus. But as there was a contemporary Protestant doctor of theology by that name, he could not risk the contamination of being confused with him, and he therefore appended the distinguishing adjective "Silesius," from the province of his birth, and he was known thereafter as Johannes Angelus Silesius.

He must previously have gained some distinction; for in less than a year after his conversion the Austrian Emperor, Frederick III, conferred on him the title of court physician. It was in this case only a title, the position carrying no duties and no income, but giving him the standing of a distinguished person and shielding him from the annoyances which his ecclesiastical change might involve. For seven years now he devoted himself to the study of dogmatics, and to perhaps composing, certainly publishing, his two chief poetical works. The first, appearing in 1657, had the title, Geistreiche Sinn- und Schlussreime. This title was changed in the second edition to Johannis Angeli Silesii Cherubinischer Wandersmann. Geistreiche Sinn- und Schlussreime zur göttlichen Beschaulichkeit anleitende. A second poem or collection of poems, which appeared almost at once, showing that it had been composed before the publication of the first, was headed Heilige Seelenlust, oder geistliche Hirtenlieder der in ihren Jesum verliebten Psyche; gesungen von Johann Angelo Silesio und von Herrn Georgio Josepho mit ausbündig schönen Melodien geziert.

In 1651 he entered the Franciscan Order and was consecrated priest. His prominence in the affairs of the Church in Breslau led some of his former Protestant associates to circulate scurrilous songs attacking him. He shortly afterwards replied in a pamphlet, in which he ascribed the recent victories of the Turks to a judgment of God for the secession of the Protestants from
the Church of Rome. The Lutheran theologians were naturally not inclined to this view, and several prominent among them replied; and so began an unedifying controversy, with all the polemic heat, the sharpness of tongue and personal vilification, which the time regarded as proper in discussion. It is always easier to set a dog barking than to stop him by the soundest arguments. In twelve years Scheffler published fifty-five blasts against the Protestants, bitter as aloes but without their wholesomeness. One can readily see how the arm of even so doughty a champion might by that time have grown weary, and why he gradually grew tired of making faces. Many of his Catholic friends too were not altogether pleased at having him as their representative. He was persuaded to retire from active conflict, and was allowed to choose the chief smooth stones out of the brook with which he had slain his Philistines and publish them under the title "Ecclesiologia, bestehend in 39 verschiedenen auserwählten Traktätlein." He had been a person of importance in the State as well as the Church; for in 1664 he had been appointed marshal and counselor to the prince-bishop of Breslau, a position which gave weight to the polemics in which he was engaged. But the slackening of his polemical ardor coincided with the death of his friend Sebastian, the prince-bishop, and in 1671 he resigned his offices and retired to the monastery of St. Matthias in Breslau. Here for six years he was occupied in editing his works and communing with his soul. He apparently never saw the opposition between the two, nor felt it strange that one whose ideal was expressed in the popular hymn,

"Ruhe ist das beste Gut
Das mann haben kann,"

should find his great interest and chief occupation in the hot activities of acrimonious polemics. Just after
the publication in 1677 of his *Ecclesiologia*, the arsenal of his munitions of war, he died. His conviction that to one spiritually minded the things of the flesh, including pain, are nothing —

"Mensch, bist du Gott getreu, und meinetz Ihn allein,
So wird die grösste Noth ein Paradies dir seyn" (I, 131)—

this conviction was put to the test by a severe and painful illness. To him, as to many another Christian, the process of being unclothed was one in which he groaned, earnestly desiring to be clothed upon. Yet while one hand remained entangled in earthly things, the other with its firm grip on heaven was ever lifting him upward.

I have spoken of his poetry as comprised in two volumes. He published a third in 1675 entitled *Johannis Angeli Silesii Beschreibung der vier letzten Dinge*. It is a vivid portrayal of death, the Judgment Day, the eternal pains of the damned, and the eternal joys of the saved, which he hoped would convert the impenitent. But, like most sulphurous whiffs of the atmosphere of hell, the flavor of brimstone repels one from the preacher rather than from the place, or else is discounted as unreal and passed by with derision, while the joys ascribed to heaven are pallid and unattractive to warm-blooded humanity. There is hardly any kinship between this attempt to get the accounts of the world ready for the Day of Judgment and the *Heilige Seelenlust* or the *Geistreiche Schlussreime*. The Cherubinischer Wandersmann did not travel into this grim country.

The *Heilige Seelenlust*, whose extended title I have already given, is a mild decoction of Solomon's *Song*. The love of the soul or Psyche for Jesus is set forth in the sensuous, sometimes sensual, terms of physical passion which have been not uncommon in minds where

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1 "Art thou but true to God, seeking no other gain,
Thou wilt find Paradise even in the sharpest pain."
ecstasy has followed meditation. Of the two hundred and five poems which the volume contains, most are to a modern reader simply dull. The expression of love and longing rarely rises above the commonplace. Of the five Books into which it is divided, the first three form an orderly whole. The Saviour is accompanied on his journey through life from his birth to his ascension, and the soul exults in union with him here and hereafter. The other two Books, published later and separately, contain poems on the spiritual life but unrelated to one another.

The *Heilige Seelenlust* is a mine in which the compilers of hymn-books have dug. Heinrich Müller's *Geistliche Seelenmusik*, which appeared in 1669, only two years after the publication of Scheffler's book, contained thirty-one hymns taken from it. In the course of the next half-century half a dozen hymn-books acknowledged their debt to it, and sometimes the debt was large; as in case of the *Freylinghausen Gesangbuch*, which included fifty-two out of Scheffler's two hundred and five pieces. The hymnologists of the Pietistic Movement found Scheffler's ardent commonplaces to their taste and borrowed them even more fully. In the more recent Evangelical hymn-books some still retain their place. Among these are

"Liebe, die du mich zum Bilde" (II, 338),
"Ich will dich lieben, meine Stärke" (I, 30),
"Mir nach spricht Christus unser Held" (V, 580),
"Ich danke dir für deinen Tod" (I, 190),
"Jesus ist der schönste Nahm" (I, 103).

Some have been translated into English, or rather paraphrased; the first of those above mentioned by Miss Winkworth, beginning

"O Love, who formedst me to wear
The image of Thy Godhead here";
and the second by John Wesley,
   "Thee will I love, my strength and tower."

Miss Winkworth has also translated
   "Morgenstern du finstren Nacht" (I, 80).
   "Morning Star, in darksome night."

Other translations are the following:
   "Komm Liebsten komm in deinen Garten" (III, 289).
   "Make my heart a garden fair" (Miss Cox).
   "Jesus ist die schönste Nahm" (I, 103).
   "Jesus is the highest name" (A. T. Russell).
   "Wo wiltu hin weils Abends ist" (II, 217),
   "Where wilt thou go? since night draws near" (A. Crull).

The hymns of Angelus Silesius have kept his name alive in Germany. But the world there and elsewhere has been discovering a weightier ground of remembrance in his first volume—Geistliche Sinn- und Schlussreime, or, as it is commonly called from the addition to the title in the second edition, the Cherubinischer Wandersmann. Man, so the title would indicate, is but a traveller here below, with no abiding place; but through union with God he acquires a super-earthly life and lasting peace, like that of the heaven-inhabiting cherubim. This union of opposites, the earthly and the heavenly, is the ground-tone running throughout the poem. Perhaps it should hardly be called a poem, since that implies more or less unity. The theme on which he is engaged is so great and manifold that endeavoring to reduce it to system would be like attempting to drive one of the beasts of The Revelation with seven heads and ten horns, with each head trying to go its own way. So he lets it
take its way, and gives us here a collection of aphorisms, chiefly couplets in Alexandrine verse, having relation to the general theme but little to one another. To attempt therefore to read many of them at a time is like riding in a jolting cart over a rough road, and is unwise. They are rather to be treated in the way our Puritan forefathers took the Bible, when they bit off a verse or two in the morning and chewed on them throughout the day. The mastication of Scheffler’s verses is not facilitated by beauty of style, for they are so condensed that they must dispense with amplifications and embellishments. To compare him with his immediate predecessors in English poetry: he has no kinship with the beauty-loving school of Spenser; he has much in common with the hard-thinking, close-knit phraseology of the school of Donne. Moreover he is not a master of technique; he is more intent upon matter than manner, and is often put to bald shifts to subdue his verse. He has his favorite tags which help him to conquer a refractory line—“Mensch, glaube mir,” “ich weiss,” “kann ich kühnlich sagen,” “für und für.” These often come in handy when he has said his say but is compelled by the exigence of his metre to fill out the required number of feet. Many of his verses are commonplace. Many are commonplace to us because they were revelations in his day. But there is in many of them a profundity of insight, a depth of feeling, a passion for God, and above all a daring in boldly claiming the conclusions which the logic of his theology carries, which make one who has known him unable to forget him. And occasionally he stumbling into beauty. There is in these couplets a kind of fragrant perfume, such as Isaac detected in his son’s garments: “The smell of my son is as the smell of a field which the Lord hath blessed.”

His fundamental position is that God is love. But love means sharing, sharing one’s best, sharing all one’s
best. And one’s best is ever himself. God therefore is for ever endeavoring to pour Himself into us, to give us all of Himself that we are capable of receiving.

“Gott gibt Niemand nichts; Er stehet allen frey,
Dass Er, wo du nur Ihn so willst, ganz deine sey” (I, 21).\(^2\)

“Gott liebet mich allein; nach mir ist Ihm so bange
Dass Er auch stirbt vor Angst, weil ich Ihm nicht anhange” (III, 37).\(^3\)

Such bountifulness on God’s part must result in endowing the soul with all the amplitude of God’s own nature.

“Ich bin so gross als Gott; Er ist als ich so klein.
Er kann nich über mich, ich unter Ihm nicht seyn” (I, 10).\(^4\)

This union with God results in the annihilation of time and place and makes eternity present.

“Nicht du bist in dem Ort; der Ort, der ist in dir.
Wirfst du hinaus, so steht die Ewigkeit schon hier” (I, 185).\(^5\)

“Zeit ist wie Ewigkeit und Ewigkeit wie Zeit,
So du nur selber nicht machst einen Unterscheid” (I, 47).\(^6\)

“Mensch, wo du deinen Geist schwingst über Ort und Zeit,
So kannst du jeden Blick seyn in der Ewigkeit” (I, 12).\(^7\)

\(^2\)“God thrusts Himself on none; He stands for all men free.
So that whate’er thou wilt, He may be unto thee.”

\(^3\)“God loves the special Me. Anxious for me He is;
So that He would expire of grief, were I not His.”

\(^4\)“God is small as I; I am as great as He,
He cannot above me, nor I beneath Him be.”

\(^5\)“Thou dwellest not in space, but space, it is in thee.
Cast it out, and already is eternity.”

\(^6\)“Eternity is as time, time as eternity.
If they are otherwise, the difference is in thee.”

\(^7\)“Lift up thy soul o’er time and space. The spirit’s power
Shall give thee even here eternity each hour.”
Both heaven and hell are annihilated.

"Wo in der Hölle nicht kann ohne Hölle leben,
   Der hat sich noch nicht ganz dem Höchsten übergeben" (I, 39).8

'Mensch, wird das Paradies in dir nicht erstlich seyn,
   So glaube mir gewiss, du kommest nimmer drein" (I, 295).9

The efficient agent of the Divine judgments is therefore transferred from without to within the soul.

"Der Himmel ist in dir und auch der Höllichen Qual.
   Was du erkiest und willst, das hast du überall" (I, 145).10

"Was klagst du über Gott?    Du selbst verdammest dich.
   Er möchte es ja nicht thun, das glaube sicherlich" (I, 137).11

This identification of the Divine judgments with the inner workings of the soul has become in the last half-century familiar to us. But it was by no means familiar to the men of Scheffler's day. The reign of law was then viewed as far more limited in range than since the great rise of scientific knowledge in the last century. To the thought of the men of the seventeenth century events not the direct result of human effort are from the arbitrary will and imposing hand of God. He reaches down from the skies and gives blessings here and punishments there. He takes this man to heaven and sends that one to hell, and there is no telling beforehand what will be the fate of either. Silesius himself in his Sinnliche Beschreibung revels in depicting heaven and hell as localities, and describing their pleasures and pains

8 "He who in hell — note this! — without hell cannot live,
   To his own Best himself as yet he does not give."
9 "If with thee Paradise exist not first within,
   Then, trust me well, thou ne'er wilt come therein."
10 "Heaven is in thee, and also in thee is hell's pain.
   Whate'er thou wilt, whate'er thou choosest, thou dost gain."
11 "But why complain of God, when it is thou alone
   Canst ever damn thyself?    He sentences no one."
as poured upon the soul from outside itself. This is the conventional method of religious speech. But into his contemporaries, trained to look thus to a future state for the assessment of moral values, Silesius drove a deeper thought when he proclaimed that the character of the soul not only determines its status but is its status.

"Wie magst du was begehren? Du selber kannst allein
Der Himmel und die Erd' und tausend Engel seyn" (II, 149).\(^1\)

Not that he was the first to make this discovery, for it was but the development of the Johannine thought, "This is life eternal — to know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom Thou hast sent"; "This is damnation — that light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than light." It was but the consequence of the Pauline thought, in which Christ not only speaks to the soul, not only speaks in the soul, but is identical with the true condition of the soul itself. Silesius, however, was one of the first to proclaim in modern times that the soul is itself the agent in establishing automatically what had been regarded as externally imposed judgments of God.

In carrying out to its full range the conclusion which the logic of the situation authorizes, Angelus Silesius, like Isaiah, is very bold. If God gives Himself to man, then man, in so far, becomes God. Indeed, Silesius in his joyous flight is not always particular to put in the "in so far." He too will declare "I and my Father are one."

"Mensch, was du liebst, in das wirst du verwandelt werden;
Gott wirst du, liebst du Gott, und Erde, liebst du Erden"
(V, 200).\(^2\)

\(^1\) "Wherefore desirst thou aught? since thou thyself mayst even
Be earth and myriad angels and the very heaven."

\(^2\) "Whate'er thou lovest, Man, that too become thou must;
God, if thou lovest God; dust, if thou lovest dust."
“Ein grundgelassner Mensch ist ewig frey und Ein.
Kann auch ein Unterscheid an ihm und Gotte seyn?” (II, 141).14

“Wer ist als wär’ er nicht, und wär’ er nie geworden,
Der ist (o Seligkeit!) zu lauter Gotte worden” (I, 92).15

In the Preface to the Cherubinischer Wandersmann, however, he explains what he means by this oneness with God. It is not strange that he felt the necessity of explanation if such terms as “Vergöttung” and “Göttwerdung” were to pass the ecclesiastical censor. Even with his explanation it seems remarkable that the book received the “Approbatio” of the Jesuit judge and the “Imprimatur” of the Rector of the University of Vienna. Here is his bidding for orthodoxy:

“Inasmuch as the following rhymes contain many unusual paradoxes or contradictory expressions and many profound conclusions not familiar to every one in regard to the mystery of the Godhead — as, for example, union with God or with the Divine being, the Divine likeness, deification, becoming God, and the like — expressions to which, on account of the condensed style, one might easily ascribe a reprehensible sense or give an evil meaning, it is necessary to warn the reader in advance.

“It must be understood once for all that the author’s meaning is in no case that the human soul should or can lose its created character and become changed through deification into God or His uncreated being. For though God is almighty, this He cannot do — and if He could, He would not be God — to make a creature God by nature and essence. So Tauler says in his spiritual instructions: ‘Since the Most High cannot make us gods by nature, for this belongs to Him alone, He has made us gods by grace, so that we may have blessedness, joy, and one and the same kingdom with Him in everlasting love.’ He means by this that the favored holy soul may attain such close union with God and His Divine being as to be penetrated by it through and through, transformed, united with it and made one; so that when

14 “One who is freed from earth has wholeness, liberty.
How betwixt him and God can any difference be?”
15 “Who is as he were not, as he had never been,
Has become very God. O blessedness serene!”
men see it, they will see and recognize in it no other than God. It will be as it is in the life eternal, when the soul is wholly swallowed up by the brightness of the Divine majesty. It will indeed attain such complete likeness to God as to be through grace what God is by nature, and thus in a sense may rightly be called, as in these verses, a god in God."  

It was a reversal of the usual order of progress, according to which the heresy of one generation becomes the orthodoxy of the next, that such opinions could be approved by ecclesiastical authority in 1657, and in 1687 for holding the same opinions Molinos could be condemned to the dungeons of the Inquisition.

In setting forth the means by which this union with God is to be attained Silesius emphasizes strongly the central doctrine of Mysticism—dualism. The Divine and the human are different; more than that, they are mutually exclusive; the finite is the opposite of the infinite, so that the more of one the less of the other. The only way then by which they can come together is by one ceasing to be itself. As it is unthinkable that God can be the one to change and approach man, it must be on man's side that the approach is made. Man must empty himself of all that is characteristic of humanity; not only of positive sin but of all desire, will, endeavor, which in this view become sin. He must become nothing; and the more completely he succeeds in this self-annihilation, the more completely he becomes one with God. There was in the seventeenth century no study of comparative religion to point out to Silesius his kinship with Buddhism, and he had probably never heard of Plotinus. His spiritual ancestors were Meister Eckhart, Tauler, and most directly, as I have said, Boehme, though he does not care to mention him after his own conversion to Romanism. His was the world-old line of thought which dwells on the otherness of God, and

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16 Der Cherubinischer Wandersmann (ed. Sulzbach, 1829); Vorrede, pp. vi, vii.
which meets us today in the Roman Mass, in popular theories of the Atonement, and in the revivalist's song,

"O to be nothing, nothing!  
Only to lie at His feet,  
A broken and empty vessel  
For the Master's uses meet!"

Silesius is continually pressing home the need of this self-emptying and of thorough-goingness in it, and describing the blissful condition which results. For this he has many names — Abgeschiedenheit, Abgestorbenheit, Vernichtigkeit, Ledigkeit, Gelassenheit, Heiligkeit, Gleichheit, Seligkeit, Friede, Ruhe. When the process is complete and one has reached "gänzliche Verneinung des Willens," he has attained "Vergöttung."

"Die Heiligen sind darum mit Gottes Ruh umfangen  
Und haben Seligkeit, weil sie nach nichts verlangen" (I, 169).\(^{17}\)

"Mensch, so du etwas liebst, so liebst du nichts fürwahr.  
Gott ist nicht diess und das; drum lass das Etwas gar" (I, 44).\(^{18}\)

"Nicht bringt dich über dich, als die Vernichtigkeit.  
Wer mehr vernichtet ist, der hat mehr Göttlichkeit" (II, 140).\(^{19}\)

"Geh aus, so geht Gott ein; stirbt dir, so lebst du Gott;  
Sey nicht, so ist es Er; thu nichts, so g'schieht's Gebot"

(II, 136).\(^{20}\)

Logie again drives him. "Then if desire is evil, you must not desire even God." "True," replies he sturdily:

"Ein wahrer armer Mensch steht ganz auf nichts gericht.  
Gibt Gott ihm gleich sich selbst, ich weiss, er nimmt Ihn nicht"

(II, 148).\(^{21}\)

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\(^{17}\) "They who are held in God's sweet peace are blest in this -  
That they have no desire, therefore they dwell in bliss."

\(^{18}\) "Thou lovest not aright, lov'st thou aught here below.  
God is not This nor That; so let the Somethings go."

\(^{19}\) "Nought raises thee above thyself like nothingness.  
God is the more in thee as thou thyself art less."

\(^{20}\) "Go out, and God comes in; die, God thy soul will fill.  
Be not, and there is He; do nought, He has His will."

\(^{21}\) "One who is truly poor, no compromise can make.  
Should God give him Himself, even this he would not take."
Even Christ had to conform to this rigid law of willlessness:

“Auch Christus, wär in Ihm ein kleiner eigner Wille,  
Wie selig Er auch ist, Mensch! glaube mir, Er fiele” (V, 32).

Like every profound thinker, Silesius does not balk at the necessity of holding opposites. Consistency is not to be attained by an “either, or.” He may choose to hold both or neither. He is like a dog hunting. One who looks from a distance might think directness of aim was the last thing to be ascribed to him, as he turns here and there and forwards and backwards; yet all the time, though his path is crooked, his course is straight on the scent. So Silesius, though he has declared that the human will must be wholly dead, yet declares also that it is the will which preserves each in his condition:

“Der Will macht dich verlor’n, der Will macht dich gefunden,  
Der Will der macht dich frey, gefesselt und gebunden” (VI, 82).

“Gott kann schon ewiglich nicht die Verdammten finden,  
Weil sie stets durch ihr’n Will’n vor Ihm in Pfuhl verschwinden” (VI, 81).

It is not God’s decree but only the Devil’s own perverse will that keeps him a devil; and here Silesius is even more hopeful for the lord of hell than Robert Burns:

“Die Sonne muss ihr Licht all’n, die es woll’n, gewähren.  
Der Teufel wird erleucht, wollt’ er zu Gott sich kehren” (VI, 40).

22 “Christ himself, if he had an atom of self-will,  
However holy too, would not have been Christ still.”
23 “Thy will, it makes thee lost; thy will, it makes thee found;  
Thy will, it makes thee free, or fast in fetters bound.”
24 “God cannot find a wretch deep in the pool of hell  
Because it is his fixed will therein to dwell.”
25 “The sun, on all who turn to him, must brightly burn.  
The Devil’s face would shine, if he to God would turn.”
"Gott ist dem Belzebub nah wie dem Seraphin.
Es kehrt nur Belzebub den Rücken gegen Ihn"  (V, 72).26

Again, while he maintains that the finite must be absorbed in the infinite, he insists that this does not abolish personality. And here, in spite of startling expressions, he parts company from the thorough-going Mystic, who walks straight up to a void Nirvana. But what Silesius welcomes is not annihilation but absorption, when, in presence of the glorious Infinite, all other beings are drowned, like stars in day. Personality, he maintains, persists after death.

"Der Geist lebt in sich selbst. Gebricht ihm gleich das Licht,
(Wie ein Verdammter wird) so stirbet er doch nicht" (II, 160).27

"Ich glaube keinen Tod. Sterb' ich gleich alle Stunden,
So hab ich jedesmal ein besser Leben funden" (I, 80).28

"Ich sag, es stirbet nichts; nur dass ein ander Leben,
Auch selbst das peinliche, wird durch den Tod gegeben" (I, 36).29

Such union is so close that it becomes indissoluble; God Himself cannot tear it apart. The particular becomes as necessary to the universal as the universal to the particular. I am essential to God.

"Gott is mir Gott und Mensch; ich bin Ihm Mensch und' Gott.
Ich lösche seinen Durst, und Er hilft mir aus Noth" (I, 224).30

"Wer Gott vereinigt ist, den kann Er nicht verdammen;
Er stürze sich dann selbst mit ihm in Tod und Flammen" (I, 97).31

26 "God is both to the Fiend and to the Seraph near.
But the Fiend turns his back on God, and will not hear."
27 "Spirit must ever live. It may in darkness lie,
As do the damned; yet even then it cannot die."
28 "There is no death, I hold. Should I die every hour,
Yet every hour there is a better life in store."
29 "Nothing that is, can die. It is but life again
That follows death, even though a life of fiercest pain."
30 "I find in God a man; I find in man a God.
I slake His thirst, and He must needs help me, a clod."
31 "He who is joined to God can suffer no damnation;
For God Himself would perish in his conflagration."
"Ich weiss dass ohne mich Gott nicht ein Nun kann leben. Werd' ich zu nicht, Er muss von Noth den Geist aufgeben"
(I, 8).32

"Gott mag nicht ohne mich ein einzigs Würmlein machen. Erhalt Ich's nicht mit Ihm, so muss es stracks zukrachen"
(I, 96).33

This abolition of distinctions which takes place in man and in his relation to God, is the case with God also. He too, since He is infinite, can have neither passions nor parts; for these would constitute limitation. He is incomplext, of whom no affirmation can be made. The more He is known, the more He becomes unknowable.

"Mensch, Gott gedenket nichts. Ja, wär'n in Ihm gedanken, So könnt Er hin und her, welch's Ihm nicht zusteht, wanken"
(V, 173).34

"Wir beten: es gescheh, mein Herr und Gott, dein Wille; Und sieh, Er hat nicht Will'; Er ist ein ew'ge Stille" (I, 294).35

"Gott ist ein lauter Nichts; Ihn rührt kein Nun noch Hier. Je mehr du nach Ihm greifst, je mehr entwird Er dir" (I, 25).36

Silesius, however, is saved from the abyss of Quietism, the reducing of God to an unintelligible x, by his ebullient insistence upon the glories of God—His bountifulness, long-suffering, grace, love, will. These he persists in rejoicing in, regardless of the exigencies of thought which would forbid them. He is convinced that though the clouds of dialectic and the darkness of infinity are

32 "Apart from me, I know God cannot live a minute. Should I leave life, He too could not continue in it."
33 "God without me cannot create a worm. If I Hold not with Him, it and creation's self would die."
34 "God thinks not. Had He thoughts, they must go here and yonder. But it consists not with His changelessness to wander."
35 "Thy will be done, O Lord my God! we pray not well. He has no will, but in eternal calm must dwell."
36 "God is a simple Naught; He has nor Here nor Now. The more thou searchest Him, the less attainest thou."
round about God, yet righteousness and judgment are the habitation of His throne. This conviction the Cherubinischer Wandersmann carries with him in all his travels.

Like all the Mystics, Silesius holds that the knowledge of God comes not through the processes of the intellect but through intuitive perception; it is a vision, not a conclusion. He echoes the Apostle's declaration, "Knowledge puffeth up, but love upbuildeth."

"Viel wissen blähet auf. Dem Geb' ich Lob und Preis, Der den Gekreuzigten in seine Seele weiss" (V, 84).37

"Der nächste Weg zu Gott ist durch die Liebe Thür. Der Weg der Wissenschaft bringt dich gar langsam für" (V, 320).38

"Halt an, mein Augustin; eh' du wirst Gott ergründen, Wird man das ganze Meer in einem Grüblein finden" (IV, 22).39

Of the path which leads to the knowledge of God he says with Isaiah: "A highway shall be there, even a way, and it shall be called the Way of Holiness. The unclean shall not pass over it, but it shall be for others. The wayfaring men though fools shall not err there-in."

I have accused Scheffler of stumbling at times into felicity of expression or thought or even into beauty. Perhaps passages like these may justify the accusation:

"Stirb, ehe du noch stirbst, damit du nicht darfst sterben Wann du nun sterben sollst; sonst möchtest du verderben" (IV, 77).40

37 "Much knowledge puffs one up. Him rather I extol Who knows the Crucified abiding in his soul."
38 "The nearest way that leads to God is through love's gate. Who takes the way of knowledge, comes by far too late."
39 "Stay, Augustine; ere thou reducest God to rule, A man will find the whole of ocean in a pool."
40 "Die now before thou diest, that thou mayst not die When thou shalt die; else shalt thou die eternally."
"Ein Kind, das auf der Welt nur eine Stunde bleibt, 
Das wird so alt als man Mathusalem beschreibt" (II, 168).41

"In Gott ist alles Gott; ein einziges Würmelein 
Das ist in Gott so viel als tausend Gotte seyn" (II, 243).42

"Die Seele die nichts sucht als eins mit Gott zu seyn, 
Die lebt in steter Ruh', und hat doch steter Pein" (VI, 176).43

"Gott ist nicht alles nah. Die Jungfrau und das Kind, 
Die Zwei die sind's allein, die Gott's Gespielen sind" (I, 296).44

"Die Ros' ist ohn Warum; sie blühet, weil sie blühet. 
Sie acht't nicht ihrer selbst, fragt nicht, ob man sie siehet" (I, 289).45

"Mensch, suchst du Gott um Ruh', so ist dir noch nicht recht. 
Du suchest dich, nicht Ihn; bist noch nicht Kind, nur Knecht" (I, 58).46

"Du klagst, die Creatur'n die bringen dich in Pein; 
Wie? müssen sie doch mir ein Weg zu Gotte seyn" (II, 114).47

This last couplet proclaims Silesius no ascetic, and anticipates the exhortation of Browning's Rabbi Ben Ezra:

"All good things 
Are ours, nor soul helps flesh more now than flesh helps soul."

The Bible begins with a transcendent God, the world and all things therein made by a Creator outside it.

41 "A child who in the world lives but an hour, he 
Is old as e'er Methuselah was said to be."
42 "What is of God is God. A thousand Gods, I say, 
Might be; and yet a worm is God as much as they."
43 "The soul that only seeks oneness with God to attain 
Lives in perpetual peace, and has perpetual pain."
44 "Two there are close to God—not all to Him are near— 
The maiden and the child—these are God's playmates dear."
45 "The rose is without 'Why?' It blows because it blows. 
It cares not for itself, nor if seen even knows."
46 "Seest thou God for rest, thou hast thyself beguiled. 
Thou seek'st thyself, not God; a servant, not a child."
47 "The creatures, so laments thou, lead thy soul astray. 
Nay, let them rather be for thee to God a way."
The Bible ends—if the Fourth Gospel is the book latest in date—with an immanent God, one who mingleth Himself with the winds that blow as they list and with the words of our mouth and the meditation of our heart. These two streams of thought have engaged the attention not only of Christian thinkers but those of every place and time. How the two sides were to be combined was a problem which was especially urgent for the Christian Church in the second, third, and fourth centuries. How could the chasm between finite man and infinite God be crossed? how had it been crossed in the work of creation? how were spirit and matter related? how did evil enter the world, and what was evil? Almost all early thinkers were driven by these questions into some form of dualism. There were, they must believe, two Powers in conflict. Since spirit was the higher, matter was evil; it was the work of an inferior god. The material, the natural, was therefore to be fought against; the spiritual man could have nothing to do with it. Indeed, in so far as he was truly spiritual, he was already freed from and above it. This fundamental assumption of the essentially evil nature of matter is exactly contrary to that conclusion to which science now seems tending—that matter is a form of mind. Modern thought seems justifying us in saying that as God has only His own substance out of which to create, He is forever forming the world by an act of transubstantiation, and saying, “Take, eat; this is my body.” But Hebrew religion, in its moments of clearest insight, set itself against dualism. The creation, it declared, was not the work of an inferior deity or deities, but both worlds, those of spirit and matter, were called into being by one and the same infinite God. “In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth.” The Prophet of the Exile was so daring that he did not hesitate to declare Jahveh to be the author of evil itself:
“I form the light and create darkness; I make peace and create evil. I, the Lord, do all these things.”

Of course this problem laid its heaviest grasp upon the early Christians in relation to the person and work of Jesus Christ. Starting from the same ground — the essentially evil nature of matter — two opposite schools of thought arose. The one — that of Cerinthus — held that Jesus, as the true son of Joseph and Mary, was, like his fellow-men, tainted with sin, though more righteous than others. The divine Logos was at his baptism joined with him; and these two continued together in the human body of Jesus, until at his death he cast off his flesh and became pure spirit. Dualism was thus seated in the very person of Christ. The other school, that of the Docetists, denied altogether the fleshly, that is evil, nature of Jesus, and maintained that he was human in appearance only, having no real human nature but a wholly spiritual one. This too established a dualism in Christ, through the failure of the different elements in him to constitute a unity. Round this problem, thus insoluble — to keep Jesus in touch with humanity, to assert his freedom from the taint of sin, and to proclaim at the same time the essential distinction between human and divine, and the inherent evil of the human — over and about this the currents of thought flowed for centuries hopelessly. Ideas, speculations, fancies, from sources Christian, Jewish, Oriental, classical, magical, all combined in the many and strange systems which came to be known as Gnosticism. Dualism stamped itself deep even upon orthodox Christianity, and it came to be taken for granted that there was a necessary opposition between faith and reason, grace and nature, supernatural and natural, the priest and the man, the Church and the world.

Such opinions could not remain speculative only. They involved a denial of that which to the author of

48 Isa. 45 7.
the Johannine Epistles was life’s most precious possession — the conviction that Jesus was the authentic revelation of the infinite God. For this denial gave birth to a disbelief in any ultimate standard, which resulted in antinomianism and immorality, and to a disregard of the corporate nature of religion, which then became gross selfishness. One who can see Jesus Christ, and yet not welcome in him the ideal of God and man, can do so, in this author’s view, only by denying his own moral perceptions. And so he bursts out into the exclamation which is the central thought of all his Epistles, “Who is a liar but he that denieth that Jesus is the Christ!”

49

As religion has become more profound it has sternly demanded the unity of God. It will not allow many gods; there can be but one. But this just insistence upon monotheism has often failed to learn an important lesson from polytheism — the lesson of the value of complexity. To the polytheist the multifarious agencies of the world, though not all from the same source, are yet all divine. He sees “an earth crammed with heaven and every common bush afire with God.” The monotheist must draw a line between what he considers is proper to God and what is not; and the result is, on one side a God all of a kind, and on the other side a large part of the world without a God in it. Moreover, the more completely he raises God above the world, the more he removes Him from apprehension. Anything in Him which humanity could touch would be a derogation to His uniqueness, and He therefore becomes not only solitary but unknowable, the $x$ of a cosmic algebra. But monotheism may be saved from atheism by taking a hint from its sister polytheism and carrying it further. If the human mind demands both complexity and unity in God, then unity must itself be complex. And the moment the idea is apprehended, the mind exclaims in

49 1 John 2:22.
amazement at its own dulness, "Why, of course!" And then the instances come crowding in. Every government—so the modern world is perceiving—must include federated States; every complete family, both parents and children; every living body, nerves and muscles; every machine, wheels and shafts. Every union which is not such by cohesion only, must be organic, its parts finding the ground of their being in the whole and the whole present in every part. Then, says the mind, jumping from earth to heaven, the infinite must include the finite; then they are not diverse, the finite the opposite of the infinite. Then the finite belongs of necessity to the infinite, and the infinite must have it not out of kindness to the finite but in the interest of its own infinity. But if the finite is that which is limited, does not this establish limitation in the very bosom of the infinite? Yes, and because it is established there, it is no bar to infinity. For then infinity exhibits itself not as the unlimited but as the self-limited. The finite then becomes that which is limited from without itself and the infinite that which is limited from within itself; and at once the antagonisms of dualism and Angelus Silesius's paradox of the necessity of man to God disappear. God cannot exist without me any more than I can without God.

Dualism's method of uniting the human and the divine is quantitative. A certain amount of the human in one side of the scales displaces just so much of the divine on the other side. This is commercialism in a region in which commercialism is impossible. But the union between God and man must rather be qualitative. If we were to choose a word for the method, it would perhaps be "interpenetration." And in order to discover what that is we should turn to the instances of it by which we are surrounded. The thought of one mind flows into another not by displacing an equivalent bulk
there but by penetrating it, so that it becomes interwoven with the mind invaded while at the same time it belongs as fully as ever to the original owner. So the whole range of the personality of one passes into, fills, and becomes part of the personality of another.

“So close we dwelt, we hardly stood apart.
Before one spoke, subtly the other heard,
As hand serves hand without the need of word
In quick response, as pulse keeps touch with heart.”

To exhibit such union the best magnifying glass is marriage.

“For we have grown as part to part,
One filling out the other’s being;
Implying each, like blood and heart;
In each implied, like eyes and seeing.

“Such closest union has amazed
Our happy souls, its depths unfolding;
And through it, awe-struck, we have gazed,
God and His glory thus beholding.”

We find it expressed more accurately and profoundly in Shakespeare’s *Phænix and Turtle*:

“So they loved, as love in twain
Had the essence but in one;
Two distincts, division none;
Number there in love was slain.

“Property was thus appalled,
That the self was not the same;
Single nature’s double name
Neither two nor one was called.

“Reason, in itself confounded,
Saw division grow together;
To themselves yet either-neither,
Simple were so well compounded
"That it cried, 'How true a twain
Seemeth this concordant one!'
Love hath reason, reason none,
If what parts can so remain."

It was such a union that Jesus desired his disciples might have with him: "That they all may be one; as Thou, Father, art in me and I in Thee, that they also may be one in us. The glory which Thou gavest me I have given them, that they may be one, even as we are one; I in them and Thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one. All mine are Thine, and Thine are mine." 50

The line between different stages of being is everywhere difficult, sometimes impossible, to draw. Just where is this dividing line between the plant and the animal? between the animal and the human being? between a man and his friend? between the soul and God? Such lines are like the geographer’s parallels and meridians, which must be imagined for the convenience of the student but which have no real existence. Long before this abolition of distinctions in kind was pointed out St. Paul saw and rejoiced in its higher developments. "Ye are Christ's, and Christ is God's." It was to his mind the glory of the situation that there is a line running straight without break from every human soul through Christ to God. Man's humanity shades into the humanity of Jesus, and Jesus' humanity shades into his divinity, and his divinity shades into the divinity of the Godhead. This constitutes a bond between God and man, and gives each a need of and an essential hold on the other. The Bible

50 St. John 17:21 f. I cannot refrain from calling attention to the misuse of this passage, according to which Jesus is supposed to be setting forth the importance of corporate unity, as it is called, of having but one ecclesiastical institution. But the union he desired with his disciples was to be like that between him and his Father, which was certainly not institutional. His words here refer to a union the very opposite of that contemplated by those who use them as an authorization of their demand for church-uniformity.
is full of the thought that God needs man's aid in redeeming the world, a real need, the withholding of which will retard the redemptive process. Meroz is cursed because it came not to the help of the Lord against the mighty. And it was this interwovenness of God and man which formed the ground of Jesus' argument for immortality. It is sometimes regarded as a mere quibble that he should put forth the statement, "I am the God of Abraham and the God of Isaac and the God of Jacob," as proof that these persons were still living. But the argument is sound. If Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob were united to God while on earth, they came to form part of His being; and if once they became a part of Him, they must be ever a part, unless they have ceased to be such as in character they were. For God cannot change, and unless they did, they are still component and therefore living in Him; for God is not the God of the dead but of the living. Angelus Silesius likens the presence of God in all that is His to the presence of the number one in all the other numbers:

"Gleichwie die Einheit ist in einer jeden Zahl,  
So ist auch Gott der Ein’ in Dingen überall"  (V, 3).

And this insistence of the One in demanding its implications is the assurance of the permanence of the parts and therefore of personal immortality.

"This, this we know;  
For one must have its two,  
If two are one — foreseeing,  
Where thought can reach  
Each soul will carry each  
Stamped in its inmost being.

51 St. Matt. 22 32.
52 "As numbers great or small the number One imply,  
So too is God the One in all things low or high."
"For one means two, and two means four,
And four means fifty million more;
And fifty million stopped the sun
Because they missed one little one.

"God cannot rest in His eternal bliss
Without each atom which was ever His.
If thou in me and I in thee have grown
And both in God, then all we three are one."

Many of the followers of Mysticism have found peace in the great surrender it requires. When the tired mind gives up its problems, when the proud will bows itself, when the fierce passions cease their clamorous demands, then the soul feels itself lying without struggle and at rest in the arms of the infinite. Such a rest is indeed restful if it is temporary and partial. If it is thorough-going, it is death; for it is the annihilation of personality, and therefore a diminution of the glory of God. The Seer of the Apocalypse in his celestial vision once saw the voice of the place hushed; there was silence in heaven. But it was but for half an hour, and then the great chorus of praise and of judgment was resumed by angels and men. If the doctrine of the complex infinite is true, God’s glory consists not in the absence of other personalities but in their most numerous and fullest development. Each is not only an advertisement but an embodiment of Him. Let a man claim all knowledge as his right; let him sharpen his will till it is keen and firm; let him covet earnestly the best gifts; let him aim high—it cannot be too high. It is thus that he will be “for the Master’s uses meet,” rather than by being “a broken and empty vessel.” The barren lifelessness of Mysticism is not the peace of heaven.

Many of the most noted Mystics have freed themselves from the deadening effect of its negations, because to them

53 Rev. 8 2.
these were only parts of a higher affirmation, and it has been the glory of the affirmation in which they have rejoiced. To abstain from any assertion about God because of a narrow conception of personality is one thing; to abstain, blinded with seeing, because He is so gloriously beyond all description is another. To the higher Mystics therefore Mysticism has brought a wealth which persons of their temperament could probably have gained in no other way. Vistas open to them and far voices call. But the form of Mysticism which has leavened popular religious thought — and this leaven is extensive — is pernicious through the establishment of a false ideal — the suppression of personality as the means of approach to God. It is this which is largely responsible for that erroneous supposition of those who know religion but little, that it is feeble, joyless, measured by its abstinences, lacking in virility and power. Such a conception paralyzes effort; it does not hold up amplitude of life as the Christian's aim and right; it embalms a dead past. It refuses to follow the Psalmist when he declares, “I will walk before the Lord in the land of the living.” Such souls, though starting with a vision of the glories of God, through a mistaken response to it become narrower and feebler; like the rivers which instead of growing fuller and richer as they roll, become more and more shallow, until at last they are dried up and lost in barren wastes of sand.

I said that Silesius holds that knowledge of God comes not through the processes of the intellect but through intuitive perception. This is a fundamental position of the Mystics, so fundamental that to many it seems almost their sole distinguishing characteristic. The knowledge of God is to them not understanding but vision, and therefore certainty. Ask them how they are sure of that “therefore,” and they would perhaps ask in reply how you know that two and two are four. It is because it is;
and this conviction flashes upon them with a clearness and intensity which are their own assurance. Such evidence can of course be valid for themselves alone. The "Why?" which would be the bridge between them and others they cannot build. So though the sight of their confident faith may be impressive to a beholder, the grounds of it he must investigate for himself, for they cannot impart them. Yet this is not denying that these grounds may have validity for them. For the deepest intercourse between mind and mind is not limited by the senses but far transcends word or sight. The communications of the spirit are like the wind, of which "thou canst not tell whence it cometh nor whither it goeth." Samuel Butler says of excogitation: "Great thoughts are not to be caught in this way. They must present themselves for capture of their own free will, or be taken with a little coyness only." All the processes of life at their fullest must be unconscious; otherwise, like manners, they become vulgar. But it must be an unconsciousness which is positive, not negative; that is, which has passed through the stage of consciousness and which may, if need be, revert to it at any moment and feel its intellectual base. The skilled pianist in the midst of his sonata does not think of notes or fingers; but if a hitch occurs, he can stop and adjust the one to the other. Wealth is measured by the things one takes as matters of course. To the poor man having a dinner is a ground for congratulation; the rich man accepts it as part of the un-thought-about order of things. If one is apprehensive how this or that will affect his friend, the friendship has not reached its height. "He that feareth is not made perfect in love." Consciousness is a necessary step to the fullest development, but it is not itself the highest step.

Science is telling us today of a means of intercourse, of which, while she confesses her ignorance what it is, she

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54 God the Known and God the Unknown; Chap. IV, II.
yet seems to have confidence that it is. This power of second sight, thought-transference, telepathy, which gives the key to faith-healing and many other apparent miracles, when it comes to our fuller knowledge will undoubtedly explain much of that immediate intercourse between minds which now seems mysterious or often merely imaginary. But if it is possible for thought to pass from one mind to another by intuitive perception, there is surely no field fitter for its exercise than between the soul and God. Ask a soul so engaged, "How do you know that it is God at the other end of the telephone and not your own fancies merely?" and he would probably smile and turn away repeating his steadfast conviction, "I knew a man caught up to the third heaven, whether in the body I cannot tell or out of the body I cannot tell, God knoweth. But he heard unspeakable words, which it is not possible for man to utter." All we can say of these mystic states is that they may rightfully carry authority for those who have them; that they can have no authority for others; but that to grant their authority for any one is to overthrow the claim of the intellectual powers to be the sole ground of authority. The Mystic's claim to immediacy in the perception of truth may point the way to a larger world than that dominated by the rational understanding, a world whose ways of intercourse are as much swifter than the ordinary processes of thought as wireless telegraphy is swifter than footmessengers, a world in which St. John's sublime conjunction "for" is justified: "We shall be like Him, for we shall see Him as He is."

Spinoza was said to be a God-intoxicated man. Angelus Silesius was a man who panted to lose himself in God. But it must surely be that He who wills not that one of His little ones should perish, would not permit such suicide to be successful, but that one who thus aimed to
lose his life for God’s sake would find it. The epitaph which he wrote “On an Upright Man” may well be his own:

“Hier ist ein Mann gelegt, der stets im Durste lebte, 
Und nach Gerechtigkeit bey Tag und Nachte strebte, 
Und nie gesättigt ward. Nun ist ihm allbereit 
Sein Durst gestillt mit Gott der süßen Ewigkeit”  

(III, 49).

“Here lies a man who lived in thirst alway, 
Who strove for righteousness by night and day, 
And ne’er was satisfied. But, thirstless, he 
Now dwells with God in sweet eternity.”

Angelus Silesius sought God; and, as always, more abundantly than he had dreamed God met him. Like a river which, hemmed in on this side and on that, still struggles on, ever aiming at the sea; when before it reaches the shore, the great tide rushes up, meets it, enfolds it, and sweeps it into the mighty depths in which it finds the glad fulfilment of its aim.
The History of Dogmas in Israel.
Prof. David Neumark, Hebrew Union College, Cincinnati, Ohio.

This is the first volume of a history of dogmas in Judaism by one of the foremost Jewish scholars of the present day. A subsequent volume is to complete the history. As to how the history of a dogma should be presented there is of course room for difference of opinion. It is possible to trace the development of a particular doctrine or group of doctrines through a given period, or it is possible to give in more systematic form the teaching of the leaders of Jewish thought in their chronological order; and various combinations of both methods are possible. Dr. Neumark chooses the latter, which, outside of Biblical times, tends to concentrate attention on the particular teacher, and leaves a student uncertain how far the dogma which he represents is only an individual's opinion; but it has no doubt its special advantages, and the student who wishes to take his history in this form will find Dr. Neumark an excellently equipped and thoroughly sympathetic guide.

The study of Jewish dogmas was for a long time neglected. In the words of the late Dr. Schechter, the dogmas of Judaism "were either overlooked or explained away, so as to make them harmonize with the great dogma of dogmalessness" (Stud. in Jud. I, 148). It was Moses Mendelssohn's assertion (in his Jerusalem) that Judaism has no dogmas, which subsequently provoked considerable discussion. Abraham Geiger and Samuel Holdheim held that there are dogmas in Judaism but no creed as a condition of salvation, while some of their contemporaries were of the opinion that a definite formulation of principles is incompatible with Judaism. Despite the fact that many scholars have since treated this subject quite extensively, it remains to this day an unsettled point of debate.

Dr. Neumark bears the distinction of having produced the first exhaustive study of the subject that has ever been brought out, and as such it is notable. This book, which at the present time is recognized as a standard work abroad, is, I fear, owing to its being written in Modern Hebrew, not sufficiently known in this country. It will
therefore not be out of place to give here a brief outline of this invaluable work.

The method pursued by the author is highly commendable. In the introductory chapters he explains the technical use of the word יִשְׂרָאֵל in Jewish literature, which became the specific term for the fundamental principle of dogma in Rabbinic literature and in the works of the medieval Jewish philosophers. In proving that Judaism has dogmas, Professor Neumark asserts that their history must be divided into four periods: (1) The Period of the Books of the Covenant, i.e. from Moses to Ezra; (2) The Period of the Men of the Great Synagogue, i.e. from Ezra to the Close of the Canon; (3) The Period of the Mishnah; and (4) The Period of Literary Discussion, i.e. from the Close of the Mishnah to the Present Time. The present volume is devoted to the first two periods. Dr. Neumark then proceeds by dividing the Jewish dogmas into various classes. He finds in Judaism Essential and Historical dogmas. The first class consists of (a) The Existence of God, as eternal, spiritual, and unique; (b) Prophecy; (c) Man's Free Will; (d) Retribution. To these four dogmas, which were accepted in Judaism at a very early stage, are to be added two others: (e) The existence of Angels, as intermediary between God and the Universe—a dogma found in the first Book of the Covenant but rejected by the second and practically ignored in all the later authoritative documents in Judaism; (f) Creation, a dogma not found in the first two Books of the Covenant, being first indicated in the third Book of the Covenant. Professor Neumark therefore distinguishes this dogma by the particular designation Essential-Historical dogma. The historical dogmas are (a) Resurrection of the Dead; (b) The World-Hereafter, in the sense of spiritual retribution of the soul while being outside of the body; (c) The coming of the Messiah; (d) Torah from Heaven נְתוּרָה (פָאָה); and (e) Oral Tradition נְתוּרָה (פָאָה) שִׁבְעָלַת הַשָׁמֶשׁ.

It is gratifying to see that Dr. Neumark did not hesitate to adopt the results of modern Biblical criticism, building his own structure thereon. With the Bible critics he finds in the Pentateuch three covenants separated from each other in time and in doctrine. The first is that of Sinai, known as the Book of the Covenant; the second is the Deuteronomic covenant; and the third is that of Ezra, which combined the so-called Priestly Code with the Code of Holiness. What is novel in Dr. Neumark is the thought that these three covenants are not merely literary productions, which in the course of time became authoritative bodies in Judaism, and that each succeeding covenant was meant to invalidate its predecessor and take its
place, but rather that every code was a dogmatic document, and had its raison d'être in that it was meant to protest against certain objectionable beliefs which were sanctioned by the previously existing covenant and were taking a dangerous turn in the minds of the people. Thus the Deuteronomic covenant, being the work of the school of Jeremiah, was a protest against the belief in angels, sanctioned in the Sinaitic covenant but considered dangerous to the belief in the Unity of God by Jeremiah and his followers. The Ezra covenant was in the nature of a compromise between the school of Ezekiel, who believed in angels, and that of Jeremiah, who did not. The compromise was found in the new doctrine of creation. God created everything, the angels also. Before Jeremiah the prophets knew nothing of God as the creator of the Universe. They knew Him only as the moral force in the world, as the judge of human conduct. His unity was thus endangered by a belief in angels. With the dogma of creation introduced by Jeremiah the angel doctrine lost much of its sting, and yet Ezra, who came from the school of Jeremiah, was not in favor of angels, and there are only slight traces of it in the third covenant. All this is very ingenious indeed, and Dr. Neumark is admirably skilful in giving his theory plausibility and a measure of evidence, but it would be too much to say that one is convinced. In addition to these three Biblical covenants there are two post-Biblical documents of a dogmatic character consisting of (a) the form of prayers, benedictions, and public readings instituted by the Men of the Great Synagogue; and (b) the Mishnah. The first of these was meant to emphasize and make familiar the doctrines of the Biblical covenants, and served also as a receptacle for any new belief in the resurrection of the soul. The second document was the last authoritative one in Judaism, and owes its special form to the conditions of its authors' struggle with the new religion of Christianity. As the professors of the new religion had the Bible before them and in it they found support for Christianity, the Mishnah lays stress on tradition as a source of authority. The opposition of the Pauline school of Christianity to the ceremonial law was met by writing down a code developing the ceremonial law in all its details. Besides, it emphasized the theological dogmas in which Judaism differed from Christianity. Thus there is no mention of angels in the Mishnah, the Unity of God is emphasized, and stress is laid on freedom of the will and retribution. The literature after the Mishnah is merely expository and controversial.

It is interesting to note that Dr. Neumark, who is a member of the faculty of the Hebrew Union College—an institution for the
training of Reform rabbis—denies any dogmatic significance to the Rabbinic belief in the Election of Israel, which is so frequently exaggerated by the Reform movement in Judaism. It must be remembered, however, that though Maimonides did not include it in his Thirteen Articles of Faith, the notion of the Election of Israel always maintained in Jewish consciousness the character of almost an unformulated dogma (see Weiss, מימונד, III, 301; Kaufmann, JQR, II, 424; and Schechter, Aspects of Rabb. Theol., p. 57). Indeed Neumark himself mentions the fact that Judah Halevi regarded it almost as the most important yet unformulated dogma משמית העいけר והויתר קבר.

The religious significance of the Universalism of the Prophets of Judah and Israel is excellently treated by the author, who correctly asserts that the idea of universalism always formed an important link in the teachings of Judaism. It finds its expression in diverse ways in the literature of the Jews in all ages, but cannot be considered as absolutely essential to the teachings of Judaism. Dr. Neumark takes into consideration the chief incidents and turning points in the national history of the ancient Hebrews in their relation to the development of religious ideas, and the writings of the prophets naturally assume for him a new importance. They do not record a particular series of historical events; they embody the religious thoughts of successive generations.

In a very fine manner Dr. Neumark differentiates the philosophic conception of the world from the prophetic conception. The philosophic conception is based upon some outer senses, while the prophetic conception emanates from the soul to life. The ethical conception of the world is the natural result of this relation, and he justly asserts that as long as this ethical conception is not based upon a cosmological foundation, so long will it lack substantiality. It was this task that Judaism had to take up. Jeremiah was the first one to develop this cosmological view. He formulated the idea of an ethical God who is also the creator of the universe.

In the chapters devoted to the Immortality of the Soul and the question of Sheol, the author endeavors to explain the reason why the Old Testament has no reference to Immortality. He believes that the founders of Judaism surely had a certain definite conception of the Immortality of the Soul, since they seriously pondered on the significance of the soul and its place in the universe. It would be altogether wrong to assume that such men regarded the soul as a matter of passing nature. They believed that the soul of the individual is rooted within the soul of the multitude and that the immor-
tality of the soul of the individual is entirely connected with the eternity of the soul of the multitude. The idea of immortality must have been present in the minds of some of the founders of Judaism. The belief in a life after death was connected with the belief of Sheol, a belief which the Israelites commonly shared with the most primitive peoples. It is, however, certain that even in the Biblical age Sheol did not represent, for the Hebrew mind at least, all the possibilities of life after death. For some of the Psalmists Sheol was a state from which it is possible to be saved. The doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul gradually became an integral part of the Jewish Creed.

The concluding chapters of the volume deal at length with the problem of the Resurrection of the Body and its place in Jewish literature and liturgy. Interesting is Dr. Neumark's treatment of the controversy between the Pharisees and the Sadducees concerning the doctrine of Resurrection.

The book is in style and form a refreshing contrast to Dr. Neumark's other works. His point of view, spirit, and method of treatment are historical, showing throughout independence of judgment, and at many points he does not hesitate to depart from prevailing views. The book is the product of much labor on the part of the author and will repay careful study, and those who are interested in the subject will read it with pleasure and profit. -Dr. Neumark's work fills a long-felt want, and we only regret that owing to the present war the publication of the second volume is unavoidably delayed.

JOSHUA BLOCH.

LAKE CHARLES, LA.


Professor Barton's beautiful book, of 460 odd pages of matter, 111 plates, and 9 maps, was prepared at the request of the Board of Managers of the American Sunday School Union primarily to meet the needs of Sunday-school teachers and scholars. In any criticism of the book that fact must be kept in mind, for the method of presentation chosen was one calculated to avoid arousing the dogmatic prejudice which would almost inevitably follow the introduction of questions as to the historical value of some of the Old Testament material.

The book for the most part fulfils the purpose for which it was written, namely, to form such a collection of the material and so to
present it that "one may not only have the wealth of illustration for Biblical study that exploration has produced, but also that he may possess an outline of the history of exploration and of the countries sufficient to enable him to place each item in its proper perspective." It is today undoubtedly the best book available to put into the hands of ministers and Sunday-school workers, and even more serious students will rejoice in the possession of so complete an introduction to the archaeological matter bearing on the Bible.

In Part I the Bible Lands are considered. Egypt, Babylonia-Assyria, and the Hittites are taken up in turn, the land, the preservation of its antiquities, their recovery and decipherment, leading up in each case to an outline history of each of these peoples. Two chapters are devoted to Palestine, its exploration and archaeological history, while the cities of Palestine, its roads and agriculture, pottery, utensils and personal ornaments, and measures, weights, and money occupy five more. The high-places and temples and the tombs of the land are next taken up, and this part of the book ends with chapters on Jerusalem, the Decapolis, and Athens, Corinth, and the Churches of Asia. In Part II the external sources are given at considerable length, the order following that of the Biblical books which they illustrate.

From this outline of Dr. Barton's book its excellences at once appear, and also its one serious limitation. Although the archaeological material he deals with is largely literary-historical in character as distinguished from archaeological artifacts, Dr. Barton has not given a history of the ancient Orient in the light of archaeology and the Bible, but a series of monographs or prolegomena to such a history. The method adopted is topical at the expense of one strictly historical. It would have been an invaluable aid to the reader if all the data of archaeology and of the Bible here adduced had been assigned to their proper place chronologically, so that he could have been enabled to see at a glance all that is known about any given period of the history. Perhaps Professor Barton will give us such a book later on.

Max Kellner.

The two parts of this work which have been published, carrying us through the letter δ and representing one-third of the whole work, are sufficient to indicate the value and interest of the undertaking. It is not merely a lexicon or a dictionary, nor is it a concordance of New Testament words in the papyri. It is an alphabetically arranged series of "observations" on the N. T. from the non-literary Greek, and includes some grammatical and orthographic information as well as exegetical material. It is an expansion of such pioneer work as Deissmann's Bible Studies in matters of vocabulary, of Moulton's and Thackeray's unfinished grammars, and of such use of the papyri as has been employed in Milligan's commentary on Thessalonians and Robinson's on Ephesians.

In addition to the papyri the inscriptions and ostraka of the Hellenistic age, and such writers as Vettius Valens the astrologer, Epictetus, and even the evidence of Modern Greek are used as non-literary sources. Occasional new or neglected parallels from literary sources are also mentioned.

Neither the material nor the view-point of the work is wholly new. The series of articles published for several years in the Expositor by the same authors under the title "Lexical Notes from the Papyri" had already indicated the method and value of such study. It shows that the language of the New Testament was originally the language of the people and not either a Jewish Greek or a special "language of the Holy Ghost." It leaves few words to the somewhat imaginary category of "Biblical Greek." Further, it discloses or illustrates or confirms the special nuance of New Testament words, phrases, or idioms. It helps determine the literary standing of various words. Occasionally it gives us actually new meanings.

The form and method of the book are most commendable. It is singularly free from artificial standards. It is almost readable, though of course intended for reference. The parallels are well selected and are given fully enough for the purpose and dated. They are not exhaustive, but the frequency with which a word is used in the vernacular is usually indicated. As the long bibliography shows, the material here brought together is from a very large collection of expensive volumes to which few New Testament scholars have access either in public or private libraries. The large page and the
clear type are admirable. The only errors noticed are apparently merely defects in the plates.

The reviewer of such a volume must specially regret the death in March, 1917, of Professor Moulton, one of its editors. It is, however, a consolation to know that the whole work is well in hand and will be completed, the third part being already in press. Further discoveries and further study will prevent the volume from being final. The whole world would welcome such an independent working over of the same ground as the Observationes from the papyri for a new Wetstein which Heinrici and others planned at Leipzig in 1915. But the English work will long remain fundamental as a supplement to the regular lexicon.

HENRY J. CADBURY.


For the biographer of John Huss there exist few of the "problems" presented by the lives of most great leaders of men. The life of Huss was, in homely phrase, "all of a piece." A competent but not distinguished scholar, a preacher drawing men to him by a direct appeal to the simple and straightforward understanding of common folk, a theologian of no marked originality, but with a consistence and a persistence which his opponents felt as obstinacy, he did his work in the world with dignity and loyalty. When it came to the final test of purchasing his personal safety by the surrender of the loyalties he had so far maintained, he made his choice without wavering and sealed his decision by the supreme sacrifice of his life.

This judgment of Huss's personality is the keynote of Dr. Schaff's treatment of the man and his work before us. In the main it is a plain recital of the several stages of the Reformer's development and his varied activities. Based upon careful and long-continued research and made vivid by well-chosen allusions to personal visits to the scenes of action, the narrative carries us along easily and with a sense of completeness to the tragic close.

Problems there are, and these Dr. Schaff discusses in sufficient but not wearisome detail. The question of Huss's dependence upon his Bohemian predecessors, and especially upon the English Wycliffe, has been forced upon the student by the effort of Germans, notably J. Loserth, to minimize the Bohemian's originality, and the "deadly
parallel column” has been effectively used to prove his almost entire indebtedness to Wycliffe for his doctrinal divergences from the tradition of the Church. Dr. Schaff is inclined to go a little farther than we can follow him in accepting this view. He draws a rather sharp line between Huss’s moral teaching, which he thinks was his Bohemian heritage, and his constructive thought, which he ascribes mainly to Wycliffe. It is at least permissible to ask whether Huss’s thought was not his own, confirmed and strengthened by the more systematic and comprehensive presentation of the same ideas which he found in his English co-worker.

The problem of Huss’s relation to the Council of Constance is one rather of the European situation as a whole than of the Council and its victim alone. The Council itself was, in a very literal sense, on trial before the higher tribunal of Christian Europe. It was venturing upon a bolder programme than had ever been undertaken by any similar assembly — if indeed it can be compared with any earlier representation of the Church. Especially in its demands for thorough-going reforms it was exposing itself to the charge of a radical hostility to the existing church system. Above all things, therefore, it was necessary to establish the orthodoxy of the Council in matters of faith, and no better certificate of orthodoxy could be furnished than a unanimous and spectacular condemnation of heresy, witnessed by a brilliant auto-da-fé. Dr. Schaff does not, we think, quite sufficiently bring out this fundamental fact. He refers to the persistence of the leading reformers at Constance in their determination to crush their victim, but bases this rather upon their personal convictions than upon a predetermined attitude toward the problems of the Council itself.

His analysis of the vexed question of the imperial safe-conduct is eminently judicial. He marshals the evidence on both sides, and thus gives added force to the opinion that Sigismund, after his first flurry of indignation at what seemed an invasion of his right by the conciliar party, lost interest in Huss and sacrificed him to the greater advantage of his own good standing with the Council. The foul plea that faith need not be kept with heretics was merely a cover for the scandal of his broken word.

We commend this calm and thoughtful survey of the life and work of Huss to the student and the general reader alike as, on the whole, the best available treatment of its subject in English.

Ephraim Emerton.

Harvard University.
There are books the importance of which is not so much in their content as in the mere fact of their publication. The present volume belongs to such a class of books. Under the general title, *The Church and the New Times*, it contains ten chapters on various topics due to nine different writers, and an Introduction by Dr. Whittinghil, President of the Baptist Theological School of Rome. With few exceptions, the authors of the various chapters are former Italian Modernists, some of whom now belong to Protestantism, while others live outside any religious denomination. The attempt of the Italian Protestants to win to their cause the excommunicated Italian Modernists as a whole was a failure, not only because the content and the purpose of Modernism were not converging towards Protestantism either orthodox or liberal, but also on account of the peculiar conditions of Italian Protestantism, which makes no appeal to the Italian religious conscience. Dr. Whittinghil, however, succeeded in making friends with quite a number of them, especially through his monthly Review, *Bilychnis*, which is the only Italian religious review giving hospitality to the Modernist writers, who lack a periodical publication of their own.

The present book is the outcome of the spirit of collaboration which was created by the exchange of ideas established among the ordinary contributors to the same review, and it may be considered as the first open attempt to find a common ground for their religious thought and their religious activity as well. We cannot say, however, that it has been carried on very successfully, although we do not find in this book either any trace of the traditional Baptist theology or a constructive theology on a Modernist line. What we find is but a kind of diluted and elastic theological romanticism, together with an indictment of the Roman Catholic Church, reproducing the main points of accusation familiar to the old Protestant polemists.

Dr. Whittinghil says in his introduction that "the word 'Church,' as it is used in this volume, regards especially the Roman Catholic Church" (p. xxi); but as a matter of fact the criticism, which is in general directed against the Roman Catholic Church, can be as well applied, and it is frequently applied by the writers themselves, to the various Protestant Churches. For this part the book has
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a Modernist rather than a Protestant flavor; but other chapters, and especially those on the social question, on philosophy and theology and on morals, the compilation of which was handed to the Protestant contributors, display that kind of inconsistent eclecticism which is peculiar to the modern Italian Protestants.

The first chapter, under the title "Church and Churches" by G. Pioli, aims to be a comparison of the religious life as it is to be found in Roman Catholicism and in Protestantism, and is to the full advantage of the latter. The main charge brought against the Roman Church is its being a close field, while Protestantism is on the way towards a final religious unity which shall include even the non-Christian religions of the East. "The orthodoxies," he says, "will become the orthodoxy when they shall realize the relativity and symbolism of forms, rites, and canons; and the churches will not become the Church unless they lose themselves in order to find themselves" (p. 53). This phrase is in great favor with the preachers of today; but impressive as it is in its biblical clothing, it is none the less void of content unless it is taken as a total and complete rejection of the fundamental ideas necessarily connected with the kind of institutions that we call Churches. But then, why keep the name, if the thing itself is gone? To have falsified Christianity by putting new wine into old bottles, is a common charge against the Roman Church. Would not this be exactly the same process?

An equally wholesale condemnation of the whole system of the Churches is the conclusion of the second chapter on "Church and State," by the well-known writer, R. Murri. "The distinction between the two institutions," he says, "is substantially formal; but the form in this case is the content itself. Everything is religion and everything is politics; only the point of view is different, the momentum of the spirit which actuates itself" (p. 75). This whole chapter has a rather enigmatic form; but if these words have any meaning, they cannot be interpreted but as a flat denial of the right of all the Churches to be considered as personæ in the πόλις.

The third chapter on "The Church and the Social Question," by G. Meille, deals primarily with the economic side of the problem and makes also some astonishing revelations. It is said, for instance, that Pope Leo XIII betrayed the true interests of the working classes in his encyclicals on the social question, because "he understood that his adhesion to the doctrines with socialistic flavor of some Catholic bishops, would have alienated from him the sympathies of the European governments." And "that," he concludes,
“is a clear demonstration that to socialize the Roman Church, the first condition is to transform its organization, which is essentially political, into an organization essentially religious” (p. 86); as if Pope Leo was unaware that the fundamental principles of Socialism are antithetical to Catholic theology and cannot be reconciled to it, or as if although being fully aware of such an opposition he could overlook it and do as he pleased. No less sweeping is the final identification assumed by the author of “Church, Religion, and Social Service,” as if they were mere names of the same thing.

In the following chapter U. Janni rejects the solutions of the problem of religious knowledge offered by the intellectualistic as well as by the anti-intellectualistic philosophies. According to him, religious knowledge “finds its origin in the revealing act of the Holy Ghost, which brings Christ and with Christ God Himself to dwell in us. The mystic apprehension of the divine is given us by the reaction of the soul to this revealing act of the Holy Ghost” (pp. 129–130). This reaction is the work of the whole man, reason and will, working together and not as distinct energies. As for the object of this knowledge, it is “the idea that the absolute we are dependent upon is neither the absolute impersonal, nor the divine immanent in the soul, but the living personal God, who transcends the human soul and makes Himself felt in this very transcendency, although we do not understand how such a thing happens” (p. 132). The starting point here being a revelation of the Holy Ghost to individual souls, no wonder that in such a knowledge there is no room for the understanding. Credo ut intelligam. Is that Protestant or is it Modernist? We find also that the author is too optimistic in his idea of life in the early Church, when he invokes today that liberty of theological speculation “which was to be found in the Church of the early centuries.”

Less interesting is the chapter on “Church and Science” by M. Falchi, and the following two on “Church and Criticism” by M. Rossi and Qui Quondam. They give a rapid outline of the well-known struggle between positive science and theology and of the history of biblical criticism. The authors of those chapters do not fail to remark that if Catholicism was guilty against science, Protestantism was not wholly innocent; but in some historical details they exaggerate the Catholic guilt while they soften the guilt of the Protestants.

More interesting and as a whole well outlined is De Stefano’s chapter on “Church and Heresy,” although there is a kind of overestimation of the progressive function of heresy, and an under-
estimation of the real value of the coercive function of orthodoxy, which helps a great deal in eliminating all the trash inseparable from all heretical movements, while what is vital in them is really beyond the reach of the reactionary power. We are afraid that in his synthetical judgment the author looked at the matter more "sub specie aeternitatis" than with his usual historical accuracy.

The last chapter, by Rev. A. Taglialatela, deals with "Church and Morals." Here we have the usual indictment of Casuistry and Probabilism as representative of all Catholic ethics, and the no less usual quotation of some words of Harnack, who speaks of "the comprehensive ethical books of the Jesuits" as "monstra of abomination," etc.; words which are the locus communis of all the anti-Catholic polemics against confession and against the Jesuits. But if it was quite a blunder for Harnack to consider the Jesuit casuistry as the ethical code of Catholicism, there is no reason why his words must be reverently repeated like a biblical quotation by Rev. A. Taglialatela, who seems to know something about Casuistry. No less inexact is his assumption that the practice of confession leads necessarily the Catholic soul to lose the capacity of passing judgment upon itself. On the contrary, the practice of confession, as it is understood by the Church, is directed exactly to the development of such a capacity to its utmost efficiency. Confession calls for frequent and careful examinations of conscience, which are but informal auto-judgments; and after all, what else is the confession of his own guilt but a true judgment passed by the penitent upon himself?

In the same unfair spirit Rev. A. Taglialatela speaks of Catholic intolerance; and it is interesting to notice that his words provoked some unfavorable comments from other contributors to Bilychnis (Issues of August and September, 1917), especially that of Qui Quondam, who remarked that he misinterpreted a passage from Newman.¹

¹ While he does not deny that there are muddy waters even in Protestantism, he finds a radical difference in the fact that, after all, the Protestant churches possess the true Christ, whilst the Christ of the Catholics is but "an anaemic, spineless, byzantine Jesus," who inspires "a subtle sense of fear" (p. 303). Apart from the strange figure of a spineless Christ, who yet is capable of inspiring fear, it would not be unfair to ask Mr. Taglialatela of which Protestant Christ he speaks—of the Christ of the orthodox Protestant theology, or of the Jesus of the liberal theology? And which one of them is truly the Jesus of "the four evangelical biographies," to which he makes appeal? The charge of worshipping a boneless Christ was usually brought by Catholic polemists of yore against Protestantism, especially on account of the doctrine of salvation by faith alone. How comes it now to be turned against the Catholics themselves?
Such being the content of the book, we wonder why the editor did not think a fitter title for it would be "The Churches and the Old Times," instead of "The Church and the New Times." It is neither a Protestant nor a Modernist book, and it is not a consistent attempt at a constructive religious thought independent of both. It is essentially a polemical book. That is why it is a failure. That is why all the good that is in it will pass unnoticed and remain sterile. What the religious spirit of the new Italy needs now is wholly different and very far from the traditional style and language of the old anti-Catholic pamphlets. In this historical moment much more efficient would be the voice of a mystic speaking the simple language of love, than all the religious-philosophical pretensions couched in a semi-Hegelian and semi-Kantian language, which is everything but clear and anything but Italian.

GIORGIO F. LA PIANA.


India was the objective of the first deliberate outward movement from Europe after the Crusades, albeit the immediate result in the year 1492 was the discovery of America. Again, the first deliberately outreaching movement from the new world of the West was directed, past Europe, toward the same alluring land of the East. This time the motive was not geographical discovery nor political domination nor commercial trade, but a friendly religious interest. It was the foreign missionary movement, which was begun by a group of Williams College students in 1806 (only seventeen years after the adoption of the national Constitution). The first missionaries who went from the United States went to India, and landed in Calcutta. Driven away by the East India Co., they went elsewhere in India. Following that lead, American missionaries have spread into all the non-Christian countries, so that now they are more than twice as numerous as the representatives of the United States in the listed Diplomatic and Consular Service.

During the century which has elapsed since the first connection with India, the United States has acquired absolutely no political connection and relatively slight commercial connection with that distant country. But the religious interest has not diminished. The most scholarly book in any language on the subject of "The Religions of India" is by an American Professor of Sanskrit (E. W.
Hopkins of Yale University). The first (and till now, the only) scholarly volume dealing with "Modern Religious Movements in India" is the course of lectures (delivered by J. N. Farquhar) in the Hartford Theological Seminary.

Now comes another notable volume from that same New England hill-top college from whence came the very first Americans with an active outlook which reached to the religious life of aliens on the other side of the globe. It maintains the same high standards of scholarliness and of human interest; indeed, in no other single volume has there been accomplished so successfully a combination of the two view-points of the afore-mentioned books, namely, a historical survey of the religions of India, and a first-hand report of their recent developments.

Ten years ago Professor Pratt in his volume, The Psychology of Religious Belief, gave a clear and well-informed, though brief, interpretation of "Religious Belief in India" in the chapter under that title. Now, when this American Professor of philosophy during a year's leave of absence seeks the most interesting and profitable opportunity for further study and light in solving the profound problems of the psychology and philosophy of religion in which (as he explains in the Preface) he is especially interested, he betakes himself, not to solitude nor to huge libraries nor to scholars more learned in his specialty, but rather to living intercourse in the land of India, motherland of a larger number of organized living religions than have been produced in any other country in the world.

Besides Christianity (which has become the third largest religious group in India) the book deals with six other distinct religions, four of them indigenous and two imported. The largest amount of attention is appropriately devoted to the peculiar immemorial religion of India. Hinduism holds within its capacious, yet strictly nationalistic, embrace both polytheists and pantheists, both atheists and theists, both idolaters and spiritualists, and almost every kind of religious belief that has ever appeared in the history of religion. Even Christ is tolerantly offered an honorable place in the Hindu pantheon as one of the many incarnations of Vishnu, provided only that his followers will live peaceably with Hindus by observing the conventional rules of the caste system; that is the only point where there is any intolerance in Hinduism. In the decade reported in the last government census it grew at the rate of a million a year (i.e., 5.6 per cent), mounting to the vast total of 217,000,000; yet it did not increase as fast as the natural increase of the population of India as a whole (which was 7.1 per cent). Both theoretically
and actually membership in this religion has been reserved for the children of Hindu parents; and throughout its long history it has accepted only two individual non-Hindu proselytes, namely, Mrs. Annie Besant of theosophic fame, and an enthusiastic American convert, Miss Margaret E. Noble, who assumed the (quasi-Hindu) name “Sister Nivedita.” Yet Hinduism has recently been con-
ceived of, and presented, in an entirely new manner. Remarkably international is the latest advocacy of Hinduism, prompted by the agonies of the present war as the only way “to avert all wars in the future”—Harendranath Maitra’s Hinduism, the World-Ideal (1916, with an Introduction by G. K. Chesterton). And—not merely as an academic proposition, but actually —on the occasion of the full moon at the beginning of July, 1917, there was organized in Bombay The Hindu Missionary Society with an Apostles’ Union. Wonder-
ful indeed is the adaptive vitality of this the oldest living religion in the world today! The volume under review displays no little analytic and organizing skill in interpreting the profundities and the contradictory features of Hinduism. Thus the monism of phil-
osophic Hinduism is well reported in the chapter on “The One God,” and the polytheism of popular Hinduism in the chapter on “The Many Gods.”

Especially valuable and all but unique (except for Farquhar’s book) is the report, at once comprehensive, detailed, and sympatheti-
cally interpretative, of the various educational and reform move-
ments as well as of the more distinctly religious sects. Chapters either in whole or in part are devoted to the Brahmo Samaj (a definitely theistic sect), the Arya Samaj (a politically interested, reactionary Hinduism), the Radhasoamiis (who are interested in a curious combination of mystical quietism with a certain pseudo-
scientific theory of vibration), the Kabir Panth (a monotheistic, anti-caste movement), and Theosophy (that nondescript occultism with an educational programme, avowedly learned yet almost hope-
lessly obscurantist).

Besides Hinduism with its heterogeneous varieties there are treated the five other separate non-Christian religions in India, namely, Mu-
hammadanism (the second largest), Sikhism (offshoot and combina-
tion of the previous two), Jainism, and Buddhism (both of which originally were theoretically atheistic and practically reforming movements within Hinduism, but which subsequently have become independent and even quasi-theistic through the deification of their respective founders), and Zoroastrianism (which has the honor of
being the very first religion in the world to aim at universalism and
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actually to overpass national boundaries, but which now is as narrowly hereditary as any religion in the world).

With all of these the author has dealt in a notably successful manner, according to his plan of a historical and doctrinal as well as a contemporary and personal report. The book is manifestly the report of a traveller, alert and friendly, who has secured a far more intelligent and favorable acquaintance with India than has the average traveller. However, the sub-title is hardly adequate, inasmuch as the book is more manifestly the report of a diligent professional student and an enthusiastically admiring friend.

The book aims to be, and is indeed, judicial. The single serious criticism which might be passed upon it is that some of its estimates are over-charitable. If the author had had the opportunity for more intensive and extensive acquaintance with the life of the people of India along with the fine individuals whom he enterprisingly met during his few months in the land (whom he can truly, and should properly, report), he would probably be not less appreciative and hopeful, yet more judicious in some of his generalizations. For example, he considers (p. 288) that Jainism is "a very respectable system, and ranks well among the religions of India"; whereas another not less trustworthy student and friend of India (Professor Hopkins in his Religions of India, p. 297) concludes his account of Jainism with a very different estimate: "A religion in which the chief points insisted upon are that one should deny God, worship man, and nourish vermin, has indeed no right to exist, nor has it had as a system much influence upon the history of thought." And it was manifestly in a mood of rapture (such as that in which was indited the beautifully tender reminiscent last sentence of the Preface) that the author, in describing a weed-choked, all but disused temple containing an idol of Buddha, proceeded to interpret "the wild growth of fern up to his feet as though Nature too were eager to pay its reverence to him who was the Light of Asia." Here is clearly a case of a Professor in love with his subject.

However, the very fact of such extreme sympathy renders the more noteworthy and incisive the final conclusion which the author reaches. The elaborate exposition of systems and sub-systems culminates in the twentieth chapter (on "Christian Missions in India," which is perhaps the most worthful single chapter in the book) with this momentous judgment (p. 462): "Christianity has a message which the non-Christian world cannot do without. And the delivery of that message is the greatest debt which the West owes the East." Near the end of the closing chapter of the book
(which proposes and answers the question "What the West Might Learn") there is again expressed the same clear comparison and conviction (p. 475): "Doubtless the East has more to learn from us than we from the East. And certainly the best that it has to give we might have gained from our own Great Teacher, if we only would."

Thus while the book is not primarily missionary in its purport, it contains the most powerful missionary apologetic. It is a book which henceforth will be indispensable for the missionary to India as well as to the intelligent traveller and the general student of India and religion, for which classes it was chiefly intended. This learned and vivacious report of a keen observer, a careful student, and a warm friend will bring vividly again to the attention of the West a national situation than which there has been none more fascinating, accessible, elusive, rewarding, perilous, and magnificent in the history of India.

Robert E. Hume.

Union Theological Seminary.


The author of this book is well known to students of hymnody as the accomplished editor of the revised Presbyterian Hymnal of 1911, and as lecturer on Liturgies at Princeton Theological Seminary. Few men, either in England or America, are so well equipped to write a historical treatise on English hymnody as is Dr. Benson, and few have access to so extensive a collection of sources as he has built up for himself in his own collection of hymn-books. The volume which is here reviewed is by all odds the best available reference book covering the whole development of English hymnody, from the rise of psalmody about the middle of the sixteenth down to the opening years of the twentieth century. It does, indeed, stand quite by itself in its research into the sources of hymns, in its detailed outline of the historical development of the many branches of English hymnody, and in its breadth of treatment. Other studies covering the whole field have been far less thorough; or, if full and detailed, like the Introduction to the Historical Edition of Hymns Ancient and Modern, have been limited to a much narrower outlook. Dr. Benson has sought to cover the entire range of English hymnody, including within his view the hymns of such bodies as the Church of Latter Day Saints, as well as the outpourings of more conventional
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religious organizations in both England and America. He has estimated their value with fair and unbiased discrimination.

The scholarly study of hymnology is a very recent development in the English-speaking world. German scholars did good work during the first half of the nineteenth century in the fields of German and Latin hymnody; but David Sedgwick, a second-hand bookseller in London who died in 1879 at the age of sixty-three, was apparently the first Englishman to collect hymn-books, and as late as 1850 or 1860 the careless ignorance of even those who undertook to edit hymnals was amazing. Students of hymnody have failed to realize until recently that out of old psalm- and hymn-books, dry and unattractive though they seem, the dominant religious ideals of the past can often best be reconstructed, and that in them, in church proceedings, and in the memoirs of hymn-writers, the development of the general tendencies of a nation’s hymnody can alone be at all accurately traced. Dr. Benson has built his book out of these primary sources, and therefore speaks with a voice of authority much more commanding than that of most other writers on hymnody. The method is, indeed, the only sound basis for a scholarly reference-book such as this, but it must be said that it involves the sacrifice of some part of the human interest with which a good writer can invest the study of outstanding individual writers or groups of writers. The serious student will, however, be duly grateful for a volume which consists, not of guesses and gossip about hymns and their writers, but of trustworthy, first-hand information, skilfully used in tracing the development of English hymnody.

It is somewhat strange that we should have had to wait so long for such a work as this, for the English hymn has long offered an attractive field for research. Dr. Benson’s comprehensive book, so far from exhausting the field, serves rather to suggest still further opportunities for investigation. Until very recent years there has been a tendency to slight both the literary value and the religious significance of psalmody and hymnody. The average hymnal has been compared with such collections as The Golden Treasury, greatly to the former’s disadvantage. The critics have overlooked the fact that the basis of comparison was unsound. A hymnal is not a collection of poems to be read, but of songs to be sung by a company of people, and should be compared with collections of ballads, or of popular songs. Ballads have long been considered worthy of collection and study by scholars, but the psalms of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—commonly modelled on the ballad meters—and the succeeding hymnody of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, offer quite as rewarding a field of study. Hymnody is, in truth, a fruitful and engaging by-path of English literature, for if few hymns take high rank as poetry, a great many hymns do enrich and adorn the body of minor English verse. Indeed, it may safely be said that the English-speaking world could better dispense with all its other minor poets than with its hymn-writers.

The continued production of noble hymns by a church or a people is one of the surest signs of religious vitality. It indicates a fresh and living spirit which is outpouring itself in worship. That fact should give us good ground for hope in a renewal of the influence of religion in the English-speaking world. Dr. Benson, who carries his report down to 1914, points out some of the writers who have produced vigorous hymns in the last decade or two, hymns in which depth of thought and warmth of expression are combined with a far higher degree of literary skill and poetic instinct than was commonly the case in earlier days. He notes also the striking phenomenon of the great production of new hymn-books since 1900, both in England and America. Practically every denomination has revised, or is revising, its collection, and the new books almost uniformly mark a vast improvement over the old, in the quality and character of the hymns included and in catholicity of spirit. This phenomenon is, of course, simply the response of the churches to the spirit of the new day; their recognition that perhaps the truest expression of a people's deepest faith is to be found in the hymns they sing. It is a wholesome sign of spiritual growth when people find that the hymns of the fathers no longer fully express their own religious aspirations, and that they are moved to "sing unto the Lord a new song." The English Hymn will illuminate the path of the student and lover of hymns, and will make more easy the task of editors of future hymn-books. It has a carefully detailed table of contents and an ample index. There are a few misprints in the latter part of the book.

Henry Wilder Foote.
THE ANABAPTISTS AND MINOR SECTS IN THE REFORMATION

RUFUS M. JONES
Haverford College

Parallel with the main current of the Protestant Reformation there ran from the very beginning another powerful current which has always received far less consideration from historians than it deserves. Some have supposed it to be a mis-guided, if not a monstrous, undertaking. Others have considered it one more among the many "lost causes" about which history is more or less silent. Neither of these positions is, however, quite tenable. It was, like Bunker Hill in the American Revolution, "a battle lost but a cause won," since nearly everything which these minor reformers aimed at has since been achieved or is on the way to achievement.

The leaders of this parallel movement were ruthlessly martyred, their followers were exterminated, their books and tracts were suppressed, their aims were slanderously misinterpreted, their brave efforts were as rapidly as possible overwhelmed with oblivion; but strangely enough their ideas have triumphed. Their truths—though they themselves are dead—are marching on, like John Brown’s spirit. Their vision of what Christianity should be is much closer to the heart of our own religion today in England and America than is either the theology
of Luther or the dogmatic system of Calvin. There is no occasion to belittle the service of the great reformers, the reformers of folio size, like Luther, Calvin, and Zwingli. They did a monumental piece of work; they changed the course of history decidedly for the better, and they have been given, and rightly so, their place with the immortals. There is, nevertheless, much lumber, sheer dead wood, in their semi-mediaeval systems. They carried on many aspects of pre-Reformation Christianity which might profitably have been sloughed off, and they loaded human minds and hearts with some tragic burdens which might well have been spared. It is no doubt easier to see that fact today than it was to see it four hundred years ago, and we ought not to expect at the beginning of a period the critical insight which comes through the cumulative experience of the years.

These neglected reformers—of the quarto or octavo size perhaps—did see on the spot then that much of the wood in the new systems was already dead, that many of the tragic burdens which the reformers were loading on human shoulders were too heavy to be borne, and were in any case unnecessary. They wanted a "root and branch" reformation, a thorough-going reformation, a radical purification and reorganization. Though they belonged to the scholarly class, and came, almost without exception, from the universities, they were in deep sympathy with the people. They thought and spoke for toilers and peasants. They had entered into the meaning of the social struggle and had come under the burden of human suffering; they intensely felt the social wrongs of the world, and they came forth as the champions of the reformation which the common man needed and demanded. They failed in their day to carry through their programme, but it was in the main a noble aspiration, much of it was wisely conceived, historical
ANABAPTISTS AND MINOR SECTS

experience has confirmed many of the aims embodied in it, and it deserves patient and impartial, if not sympathetic, study.

One of the most interesting historical questions is that concerned with the spiritual pedigree of the movement, or more properly of the movements, for it was not ever, as we shall see, well unified into any single system. There must obviously have been some pre-Reformation preparation for it, since it burst forth almost simultaneously at many widely sundered places, in many lands, and it accumulated at once an immense popular volume and momentum. Wherever it appeared it took on, with all its particular variations, striking similarities, at least in its central purpose and its fundamental principles. The leaders plainly had a large stock of ideas and ideals in common. There must have been some background explanation. Unfortunately it is not possible yet to produce definite documentary evidence to prove beyond question that these new groups which formed at the beginning of the Reformation were the direct product of earlier groups of mystics, Waldenses, Wyeliftes, Hussites, Brothers of the Common Life, or Spiritual Franciscans. ¹ And yet it is an unmistakable fact that there did exist in unbroken succession, especially through the Rhine valley and in Switzerland, hidden groups of "heretics" and mystics. The puritan-minded Waldenses were never suppressed on the continent, as the Lollards never were in England. The writings of the mystics of the fourteenth, and especially the writings of the great Brother of the Common Life, Thomas à Kempis of the fifteenth century, were widely circulated and devotedly read. These books, as we now know, exercised

¹ Ludwig Keller was convinced that his researches established this point, but other scholars, including Dr. Ernst Troeltsch, do not endorse his claim. See especially Keller’s Ein Apostel der Wiedertaufer. Troeltsch’s great work, Die Sozialelehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen (Tübingen, 1912), is a very valuable contribution in this field, and I have carefully re-read the section of it bearing on my subject before writing this article.
a profound influence on Luther, and there is much to indicate that they exerted a still more profound influence upon the popular leaders with whom we are now concerned. The essential reason for thinking so is that the body of ideas in the new movement is uniformly so harmonious and consonant with the teaching and aspirations of these mystics and with the heretical groups which had already suggested the lines of reformation that were needed to restore real, that is, apostolic, Christianity.

Two events woke the quiet, long-suffering successors of the mystics and heretical groups from mere dumb hopes to eager, vivid expectation—the powerful teaching of the humanists and the dynamic message of Luther. It is impossible to miss or ignore the direct influence of the humanists upon the leaders of this common-man's reformation. It is most apparent in the new social and ethical emphasis. They one and all show a revolt from the old theology. It has lost both its interest and its reality for them. Something else more real and more appealing has come into the foreground of their consciousness. They have drawn much closer to the Jesus of the Gospel than had anybody else since St. Francis. They are more attracted to Him and to His wonderful words than to the elaborate metaphysical accounts of His being and nature. They turn eagerly to the positive teachings of this great Master of life as they find them revealed in the New Testament, which the humanists had helped them discover. They learned too from these same humanists how vastly different the Church of their time was from the Church in its pristine apostolic purity and power. Then came Luther's electrifying message of faith and freedom, shaking them entirely awake. They almost all refer to his quick and powerful word. They rose at once to meet it. They thought he was to lead them into a new epoch and be their champion in the work of building a new Church. The Liberty of a Christian Man and the
Babylonian Captivity of the Church, as they read them in 1520, seemed like a new revelation from God. They felt that the hour had struck and that the new heaven and the new earth were within hail.

Two pretty clearly marked tendencies appear in this general effort of the period to secure the type of reformation which the common man was striving for, though it must be recognized that the entire undertaking always remained throughout somewhat fluid, uncompact, and unorganized. The two typical tendencies were: (1) in the direction of what is historically denominated “Anabaptism”; and (2) a serious aim to work out a truly spiritual Christianity, winnowed of the accumulations of paganism, superstition, theology, and secularism. We may therefore loosely divide the leaders of the popular movement into “Anabaptists” and “Spiritual Reformers,” though the division is not a sharp one, and some leaders do not easily come under either label while others seem to come under both labels. The Anabaptists numerically bulk much larger than the second group, though in historical influence the former are not more important than the latter. The first group of Anabaptists to differentiate and to formulate and express its principles was the Swiss group in and about Zürich and St. Gall. The leaders were young scholars and priests whose hearts, “under the cross,” had been made one with the common people. They were genuine shepherds of the flock.

The most important men who led this movement were Conrad Grebel, Felix Manz, William Reublin, Simon Stumpff, and Ludwig Hetzer. They had all been powerfully affected by their reading and study of the Bible, now for the first time truly a book of the people. They began to preach to their flocks a fresh message drawn from the prophets and the Gospel. The popular response was immediate, and they found themselves, without intending it, the champions of a new cause. As Zwingli
moved forward to secure a reformation of the Swiss Churches, these men gladly joined him and were content to follow his leading. They soon discovered, however, that he was moving toward a reformation which was far too restrained and limited to suit their conception of what the times demanded. They engaged in public discussions with him, and found that he was voicing the reforming aims of the nobles and upper class but was unresponsive to the deep needs of the masses whom they represented. Gradually they felt compelled to deviate from the course which Zwingli was steering and to proclaim a more radical programme. They came across the writings of the "new prophets" of the people, Thomas Münzer and Carlstadt, and they deeply sympathized with the aspiration for a more inward religion which these men voiced, but they thoroughly disapproved of Münzer's support of popular insurrection and his passionate appeal for the oppressed to use the sword. They declined to employ the world's way to success and trusted wholly to the inherent power of ideas and to the invisible help of God. What they demanded as the most urgent need of the times was the complete reformation of the Church to make it fit the New Testament. They insisted first of all that the Church of Christ must be "a congregation of believers." Only those, they claimed, who have hearts of faith, spiritual insight, obedient wills, and real religious experience can compose a Christian Church. A mixed multitude of good and bad, of saints and sinners, cannot make a true Church. The historical compromise with the world, the scaling of the Christian standards down to the level of the nominal, secular membership, seemed to them to be the greatest source of the "apostasy" of the Church. They now proposed to wipe the slate clean, to make a new start, and to form a Church consisting only of Christians, only of the faithful. It seemed to them that the custom of baptizing
infants, who from the nature of the case could not exercise faith, was one fertile cause of the degeneracy. It stood in their eyes as the mark of apostasy from Apostolic Christianity, somewhat as circumcision stood out, for St. Paul in the Galatian controversy, as the peculiar mark of Judaistic legalism. If the Church were henceforth to be pure and Christian, then it must have no rites or practices which did not attach directly to personal faith, and it must have no members who had not positively experienced in their own souls a living faith. They had little primary interest in sacraments at best, since their main concern was for a strongly ethical and social Christianity, but they believed that the primitive Christians practised baptism as an outward sign of an inward experience and as a testimony of fellowship in a visible Church. They proposed therefore to restore baptism to this primitive, apostolic function. In 1525 Grebel baptized Blaurock, a devoted Christian man and one of the band of preachers who had accepted the radical attitude. Blaurock thereupon, "in deep fear of God," baptized many others, and a community of "brothers," as they liked to call themselves, began to grow and to differentiate from the main Zwinglian Reformation. These dissenters were given the nickname "Anabaptists," which means re-baptizers, and the name stuck to them and widened out to include almost all types of persons who dissented from the Roman and Reformed Churches. It became the opprobrious label for the entire effort of the common man for a reformation. The Swiss dissenters themselves refused to accept the name or to admit its implication. They declared that they were not "re-baptizers." The baptism which they had received as infants, they claimed, was no baptism at all, since baptism cannot take place without positive personal faith on the part of the recipient. Adult baptism taken in faith as a sign of fellowship in the pure church of Christ
was, in their view, the one and only baptism—not a "second baptism."

As their aims grew defined, the Anabaptists endeavored (1) to construct a Church entirely on the model of the New Testament, in every particular a copy of the apostolic pattern. (2) This was to be a visible Church, composed only of believers, a community of saints, winnowed and separated from the unbelieving and unspiritual. (3) This state of purity in the Church was to be preserved by a rigorous use of discipline. Those who fall below the Christian standard and become corrupt or contaminated by the world, or who compromise with the world, must be excluded by ban from membership in the Church, that is, there must be a continuous use of the winnowing fan. (4) The Church must be completely severed from all entangling alliance with the state. The Church and State have officially nothing in common. Membership in the former is a free act. There must be no kind of compulsion in spiritual matters. Through faith and experience the Church lives and grows and enlarges its fellowship. It influences the character of those who form the State, but its authority is indirect, not direct. In the sphere of religion the State has no authority; conscience in its relation with God is to be absolutely free and untram-merled. (5) All Christians have the same fundamental rights as the clergy have. There are no classes, no orders, no fixed distinctions. The only differences are differences of gift and function. (6) The movement tended, though more or less unconsciously, to treat the Gospel as "a new law," to be literally followed and obeyed, very much as was done in the earlier groups of Waldenses and Lollards. Under this influence most branches of the Anabaptists refused to take oaths, set themselves against war, and denied that a Christian is allowed under any circumstances to take human life. With this rigorous literalism they also joined a moral
strictness of life more extreme than that which marked any other section of the Reformation, even that of the Calvinistic churches. (7) They not only proclaimed freedom of conscience; they bore a powerful testimony to the august authority of conscience. They arrived at the conviction that conscience is an inner sanctuary or shechinah of God Himself, and here as nowhere else they believed the voice of the living God is heard. With this exalted sense of an inner connection with the divine, they suffered and died for what seemed to them eternal truth and everlasting righteousness, and in doing so they gave a new note of emphasis to the moral worth of conscience.

Two very powerful leaders, of German origin and education, soon threw in their lot with the Swiss dissenters and stood out at once as the prophets of the new movement, Baltazar Hübmaier, born near Augsburg in 1480, and Hans Denck, a Bavarian, born about 1495. Hübmaier was a Doctor of Theology, one of the best scholars of his time, a humanist, a mystic, a powerful preacher, a high-minded, pure-hearted, brave man, and finally, in 1528, a martyr. His watchword, used on the title-page of his little books, was "Truth is immortal," and he maintained, even in the face of death, that truth ultimately wins in any contest. He accepted in full measure Luther's claim that faith—the soul's attitude of trust and confidence in God—is the fundamental basis of Christianity; only he went farther with the principle than Luther did and carried it out more consistently. Nothing in the sphere of religion can be accomplished, he held, without insight, faith, obedience, effort, conformity of heart and will with God. Religion must be from first to last a spiritual affair. Rites, ceremonies, magical or sacerdotal performances, cannot alter the ethical and inherent facts of life. "God," he declared in his Apology, "will have none of our Baal-cries." With
this central position fixed, Hübmaier labored valiantly to secure a reformation of the Church consonant with the spiritual character of apostolic Christianity. "I believe and confess" he wrote, "a holy catholic Church, which is a communion of saints, a brotherhood of devout and believing men." Very large numbers were convinced by Hübmaier's preaching, and when his lips were sealed by the fagots in Vienna he had already carried his interpretation of religion into many lives both in Swiss and Austrian towns.

Denck belongs very definitely among the "Spiritual Reformers"; but he was for a time identified with the Anabaptists and he undoubtedly exerted a very strong influence upon the movement in its early stage, though as his insight deepened and his views matured, his interpretation of Christianity took a broader outlook and a more universal aspect than most Anabaptists were ready for. For more than a year — September, 1525, to October, 1526 — Denck was in Augsburg endeavoring to organize and direct the popular movement toward reform, striving to check fanatical tendencies, opposing literalists and extremists, and putting forth strenuous efforts to deepen and spiritualize the throngs of enthusiastic "seekers."

Before the Anabaptist leaders had any opportunity to clarify their aims or to formulate their principles, the world took fright at the potential dangers of the movement and began suppressing the prominent exponents of it and endeavoring to obliterate it utterly. The uprising of the German peasants in 1525, in the hope of securing for themselves a measure of economic and social justice, gave the ruling class and the nobles a vivid sense of what might happen if these submerged peoples awakened, found themselves, and became an organized and directed

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2 Hübmaier's Twelve Articles of Faith.
3 It is estimated that six thousand persons became Anabaptists in and around Nikolsburg where Hübmaier preached.
force. Luther threw all the power of his pen, voice, and personality against the cause of the peasants. He wrote: "Whoever can should knock down, strangle, and stab insurgents, privately or publicly, and think nothing so venomous, pernicious, and devilish as an insurgent." He declared that those who died fighting against the peasants were "true martyrs before God," and that those who perish on the peasant side are "everlasting hell-brands." The long-suffering peasants, driven to the limit of endurance by their intolerable condition and inspired by the hope which the dawning reformation gave them, made their assault against the immovable wall of German authority, and failed. Münzer, the spiritual champion of their aspirations, went to death with them.

The early Anabaptist leaders, most of whom owed much to the dynamic, if not wisely directed zeal of Münzer, disapproved of the appeal to force and set themselves against insurrection. The Zürich society of "brothers" wrote to Münzer in September, 1524, urging him not to resort to violence. They say: "The Gospel and its followers should not be guarded by the sword, neither shall they so guard themselves, as, by what we hear from the Brethren, ye assume and pretend to be right. Truly-believing Christians are sheep in the midst of wolves, sheep ready for the slaughter; they must be baptized in fear and in need, in tribulation and death, that they may be tried to the last, and enter the fatherland of eternal peace, not with carnal but with spiritual weapons. They use neither the sword nor war." In spite of this gentle attitude, which beyond question characterized the main current of the popular reformation, all existing authorities, both of Church and State, were seized with intense antipathy toward these spiritual

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4 Luther's tract, Wider die Mordischen und Reubischen Rotter der Bauern.
5 Letter written by Grebel to Münzer.
strivings of the common man, rose in might, and stamped it out in blood and fire. All the early leaders were either killed outright or so severely treated that death overtook them prematurely. The members of the group of "brothers" were dealt with as pests and outcasts, harried, imprisoned, banished, forced to live like beasts in dens and caves of the earth. It is impossible to tell what would have been the social and spiritual effect of this popular movement—which apparently, judging from its enthusiastic beginnings, would have swept in the common people of all countries—if it had been allowed to develop and realize its aims. Its first leaders were honest, sincere, unselfish men. They had no hostile intent. They sought no personal power or aggrandizement. They had no spirit of hate. They were fired with no class-animus. One of Denck's disciples, Hans Langenmantel, said: "The highest command of God is Love. Love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and thy neighbor as thyself." They denied that it is right to try to gain spiritual ends by violence and sword. They trusted everything to the immortal power of truth, to the transforming force of ideas. They meant to inaugurate a Church which would expand and become the Kingdom of God on earth. They found a Golgotha instead.

The fury of the persecution, the appalling method of answering their dumb aspirations, produced at once a new type of leader and drove many of the Anabaptists toward fanaticism. Melchior Hoffman of Strasburg and his disciples are a different type from those whom I have considered. Always inclined to literalism, the movement now focussed upon a fervid expectation of the fulfilment of millennial hopes. Hoffman became the prophet of an intense chiliasm, and even proclaimed that

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6 Even in the face of the terrific persecution that came down upon it as soon as it began, there were many thousands of Anabaptists in Middle Europe, and it has been estimated that thirty thousand were put to death in Holland alone.
the sword might be used to hasten the expected Kingdom of God. His Dutch disciples, Jan Matthys and Jan Bockelson, pushed the fanaticism of the radical wing to its wildest limit, and gave to the world by the spectacle of the Münster kingdom, a reason for the horror of Anabaptism and an excuse, after the fact, for its method of thorough extermination.7

A remnant of the original stock survived the double tragedy of persecution and fanaticism. The followers of Jacob Huter, a Tyrolese Anabaptist, who worked out a very interesting type of communistic society, succeeded in escaping from the annihilating persecutions of the Tyrol and migrated into Moravia. Eventually Huter was martyred. His last despairing cry is touching: "We know that it is not allowable to forbid the earth to us, for the earth is the Heavenly Father's." Huter's Communities were driven from place to place and reduced in numbers, but they were never wholly eradicated or suppressed. The Mennonites form another group of survivors. They owe their name and many of their characteristics to Menno Simon, born in West Friesland about 1496. He set himself to winnowing out the follies and fanaticisms of the Dutch Anabaptists, and he succeeded in organizing a strong branch of the movement, which has survived to the present time. He carried a puritan spirit into his group of followers, a determination to take the commands of Christ literally, and a tendency to form "a peculiar people," distinguished by dress, manners, separation from public affairs, and absence of ordained or salaried ministry. Sporadic individuals and even groups of Anabaptists escaped the violent Protestant and Catholic persecutions in most of the continental countries, and a large number, in one way or another, got into England. They merged with the

7 Hans Hut, a disciple of Münzer, also preached apocalyptic hopes, though, unlike Hoffman, he remained non-resistant.
Lollards, and in some cases managed to escape the fires of Smithfield. They helped to form the numerous groups of heretics and dissenters which swarmed during the freer time of the English Commonwealth. They formed also the early nucleus of the famous Baptist Societies out of which the Baptists sprang.

The other fundamental tendency, which I have called the aim at a "spiritual reformation," was even more viscous or fluid, less compact and unified, than was the Anabaptist movement. One reason for the lack of organization and solidification is to be found in the strong mystical aspect of this reforming movement. Its leaders were hostile to systems. They were in revolt against dogmas, and they were equally opposed to the tyranny of authoritative, State-controlled, ecclesiastical institutions. They wanted to escape alike from a Hellenized and a Romanized Christianity. They saw no way to solve the problem without a complete shift of emphasis from the outward to the inward. The visible Church had tightened itself around the human spirit until no free area or independent sphere of activity seemed left for man's soul in its own right. These minor prophets of the Reformation were primarily prophets of the soul, champions of the free spirit. They had no architectonic genius. They felt no interest in rearing either structures of logic or institutional structures. Like Copernicus, they proposed a new centre, and their new centre was man's soul. They were always thinking and writing about the Church; but it was from first to last an invisible Church about which they were concerned, not the visible and empirical one. It is in this point that they differ most from the Anabaptists, with whom they had close sympathy and often warm fellowship. The Anabaptists were eager to create a new visible Church, and they took the written word of Scripture as their charter for it. The "Spiritual Re-
formers" accepted neither of those positions. They found the ultimate basis of religion in the Word of God, the Light of God, revealed in the interior life of man, and they thought of the Church as a spiritual organism of illuminated and inwardly guided persons. They were deeply read in the books of the German and Flemish mystics—Eckhart, Tauler, Ruysbroeck, Theologia Germanica, the writings of "the Friends of God," and The Imitation of Christ, but they were almost as much influenced by the Humanists, especially by Erasmus. They shared his faith in human freedom, his strong emphasis on the ethical aspect of the true Christian life, his dislike of theological dogma, and his appreciation of the pure and simple "gospel." They are mystics, but they are distinctly a new type of mystics. Through their dislike for theology and metaphysics they allowed the speculative element, which is so large a feature of fourteenth-century mysticism, to fall away, and they consequently made the positive, affirmative way of relationship with God much more prominent than the via negativa of the earlier mystics. In short, they were more interested in direct experience than they were in logic.

So far as one can locate any "originator" of the movement—which, after all, stands out very much like Melchizedek, without historical "father or mother"—Thomas Münzer was the first person in the Reformation period to make the living Voice or Word of God in the soul the basis of religion. The interior Teacher seemed to him the source of truth and the guide of life. He was unfortunately a loosely organized individual, lacking in balance and capable of being stirred to fanaticism. But he planted his idea in the heart of Ludwig Hetzer, translator of the Hebrew Prophets, and Hans Denck, the humanist school-master of St. Sebald School in Nuremberg, and it came to resurrection-life and power in
sounder and saner men than himself. Denck, though he is often reckoned an Anabaptist, and though for a period he endeavored to shape the development of the Anabaptists in the direction of his own ideals, belongs more distinctly in this second group. Johann Büniderlin, born in Linz, a town of Upper Austria about 1495, Christian Entfelder, who first appears as pastor of a flock in Moravia in 1527, and Sebastian Franck, born at Donauwörth in Schwabia in 1499, are other early exponents of the spiritual ideals. Caspar Schwenckfeld, born at Liegnitz in Lower Silesia in 1489, was more distinctly interested than these other leaders in the formation of a visible society—those of "the middle way"—and he created a brotherhood that has survived to the present time; but his ideas and ideals were of the general type which characterize the aim at a "spiritual" reform. Sebastian Castellio, a French humanist and opponent of Calvin, born near Geneva in 1515, and Dirck Coornhert, a prominent Dutch scholar, born in Amsterdam in 1522, are two of the noblest interpreters of these spiritual ideals and aspirations.

They were all strongly individualistic, and they felt too little the importance of the help of a visible community. They had a naïve, uncritical, and unquestioning faith in inner divine guidance and personal revelation. "The Kingdom of God," Denck says, "is in you, and he who searches for it outside himself will never find it; for apart from God no one can either seek or find God, but he who seeks God already in truth has Him"; and again, "He who does not know God from God himself does not ever know Him." 8

Franck is a still more confident apostle of the inner way. Many, he says, know and teach only what they have picked up and gathered "without having experienced it in the deeps of themselves." Hearing people read

8 From Denck's two tracts, Was geredet sei, etc., and Vom Gesetz Gottes.
and talk about God is "all a dead thing." The real Christian "must go inside and have the experience for himself." 9

But in spite of the fact that they seem so individualistic and concerned with personal experience in their own souls, they are emphatically social in their sympathies. Like the Anabaptists, they are interested in the common man. They all alike make love, actual human love, the mark of fellowship with Christ. They show a fresh interest in man for his own sake. They all, with the exception of Schwenckfeld, deny the depravity of man and they refuse utterly to accept the dogma of "unfree will." They realize that human life is a frail and tragic affair, but it is, nevertheless, big with spiritual possibilities, and the most splendid fruit of life is love. "To hate everything that hinders love," is Denck's ideal of life. 10 Castellio declares that Christ's way always means love. "You [meaning Calvin] may return to Moses if you will, but for us others Christ has come." 11 Love, he constantly insists, is the supreme badge of any true Christianity; the traits of the beatitudes in a person's life are surer evidence that he belongs to Christ's family than is the fact that he holds orthodox opinions on obscure questions of belief. Franck has expressed as well as any of the group, the way they felt about the invisible Church: "The true Church is not a separate mass of people, not a particular sect to be pointed out with the finger, not confined to one time or place; it is rather a spiritual and invisible body of all the members of Christ, born of God, of one mind, spirit, and faith, but not gathered in any one external city or place. It is a Fellowship, seen with the spiritual eye and by the inner man. It is the assembly and communion of all truly God-fearing, good-hearted, new-born persons in all the world,

9 Franck's Paradoxa, Vorrede, sec. 13. and passim.
10 Vom Gesetz Gottes, p. 12. 11 Castellio's Contra Libellum Calvini.
bound together by the Holy Spirit in the peace of God and the bonds of love—a Communion outside of which there is no salvation, no Christ, no God, no comprehension of Scripture, no Holy Spirit, and no Gospel. I belong to this Fellowship. I believe in the Communion of saints, and I am in this Church, let me be where I may; and therefore I no longer look for Christ in 'lo heres' or 'lo theres.'”

This Church, which the Spirit is building through the ages and in all lands, is, once more, like the experience of the individual Christian, entirely an inward affair. “Love is the one mark and badge of Fellowship in it.”

No outward forms of any sort seem to him necessary for membership in this true Church. “External gifts and offices make no Christian; and just as little does the standing of the person, or locality, or time, or dress, or food, or anything external. The Kingdom of God is neither prince nor peasant, food nor drink, hat nor coat, here nor there, yesterday nor tomorrow, baptism nor circumcision, nor anything whatever that is external, but peace and joy in the Holy Spirit, unalloyed love out of a pure heart and good conscience and an unfeigned faith.”

The Kingdom of God, as they hold, is a kingdom of experience, and they want every feature and detail of the religious life to spring out of experience and to assist its enlargement. “As often,” Schwenckfeld writes, “as a new warrior comes to the heavenly army, as often as a poor sinner repents, the body of Christ becomes larger, the King more splendid, His kingdom stronger, His might more perfect.”

All these men have but the slenderest interest in sacraments. Sacraments have become for them what circumcision was for St. Paul when he wrote, “neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision, but

12 Paradoxa, Vorrede, sec. 8. 13 Ibid., sec. 9. 14 Ibid., sec. 45. 15 Schwenckfeld's Schriften II, p. 290.
a new creation." Schwenckfeld treats this matter more profoundly than any of the others. He meditated long and deeply upon the question, studying the New Testament both broadly and minutely, while at the same time he gave much thought to the fundamental nature of the religious life. He took Judas as his test case. He argued that if baptism and the supper were efficacious in themselves, then Judas, who received the supper from the Lord himself, would have been saved by it. If the bread and wine were changed into actual body and blood of Christ, then he must have eaten of Christ and partaken of His divine nature; but no corresponding change of spirit appears in him. He came out from the supper and immediately revealed an evil spirit. Schwenckfeld finds the key to Christ's teaching on spiritual life in the Johannine account of eating Christ's flesh and drinking His blood. This assimilation of Christ is for him not a figure, not a symbol, but a central fact. The risen and glorified Christ, the incorruptible life-giving substance of the God-Man, is the essential, necessary source of spiritual life for men. He must become the actual food of the soul. Not on rare occasions but continually, the true nature of Christ must be received and assimilated into the inner substance of our human spirits. No symbol can be a substitute for that actual experience: "God must Himself, apart from all external means, through Christ touch the soul, speak in it, work in it, if we are to experience salvation." 16 The Church which these "reformers" were endeavoring to create was thought of as a communion or fellowship of persons who were drawn together and united by their intimate spiritual relation with the living Christ. It was a Church after the Spirit, and not an imperial institution possessed of magical authority, employing mysterious sacraments, or holding a final deposit of infallible doctrine. It was to be an

14 Schwenckfeld's Schriften I, p. 768 b.
organism rather than an organization. "No outward unity or uniformity," Schwenckfeld wrote, "either in doctrine or ceremonies or rules or sacraments, can make a Christian Church; but inner unity of Spirit, of heart, soul, and conscience in Christ and in the knowledge of Him, a unity in love and faith, does make a Church of Christ." 17

Jacob Boehme, born in Silesia in 1575, more completely than any other single continental interpreter, gave a many-sided expression to the faith and aspiration of these spiritual leaders. 18 He is the culmination of the movement. There are many other strands of influence in Boehme, especially the theosophical and alchemic ideas derived from Agrippa, Paracelsus, and Weigel. This latter stock of inheritance proved a heavy weight to this great tragic, but surely divinely inspired, mystic. The barbarous terminology, the baffling symbolisms, and the literary limitations of this Silesian prophet, were always a tremendous handicap; but in spite of all the obstacles, difficulties, and hindrances a real heavenly vision and a living message break through and get revealed in Boehme's books. His most important permanent contribution to Christianity is to be found in his interpretation of what he calls the process of salvation as a way of life. Here he is unmistakably "a spiritual reformer." He will not put up with schemes or notions. He sets himself as strongly against the substitution of doctrines of salvation for an experienced process of salvation as Luther did against the substitution of works for faith. "Thou thyself," he says, "must go through Christ's whole journey and enter wholly into his process." 19 He opposes the Protestant tendency to make the Bible the basis of reformed religion — he calls that another form of "Babel-building," which does not reach all the way to

17 Schriften II, p. 785.
18 The influence of Schwenckfeld is most marked in Boehme.
19 True Repentance.
ANABAPTISTS AND MINOR SECTS

God. The written letter-word is no true substitute for the living Word of God in a man's soul. Theological "opinions" are only "mental idols." The "immortal seed of God" must come to birth in the soul, and Christ must live and operate within. Boehme once more, like his predecessors, is a builder of the invisible Church. He makes nothing of sacraments. He turns inward rather than outward. He separates religion wholly from State connection. He wants a Christianity of prophets instead of one of priests, and he calls men away from logical systems to personal experience.

The writings of nearly all these men reached England and were read by kindred spirits in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. John Everard is the first scholar of importance who shows a familiarity with the body of ideas and the type of Church set forth in the little books of the spiritual reformers on the continent. He was born in 1575, the year Boehme was born; he was a master of arts and doctor of divinity from Clare College, Cambridge. He was a student of the great mystics, and later in life — after he was fifty — he translated tracts by Sebastian Franck and Hans Denck and Castellio's edition of The Golden Book of German Divinitie. Everard's later sermons, printed in The Gospel Treasury Opened, give the same general interpretation of Christianity which his continental forerunners give. He was, before everything else, a good man. He was too a man of undoubted depth and power, and he shows both style and humor. Though so often imprisoned that King James I suggested that his name should be changed from Everard [Everout] to "Dr. Never-out," yet his influence was great, and he is almost certainly the first man in England to hold and teach in any impressive way the views of the spiritual reformers. He had important disciples and many successors. The most noted of the disciples was Giles Randall, another translator of spiritual
and mystical books. Francis Rous, Peter Sterry, John Saltmarsh, and William Dell are good examples of the kind of successors whom Everard had.

Meantime other developments were under way which carried the ideas of the spiritual reformers forward into the popular consciousness more extensively than did the books and sermons of these Cambridge and Oxford scholars. Groups of the common people formed into little societies, and worked out in practice, in quiet, out-of-the-way places, the ideals of these teachers. Attempts of this sort were often made in Germany, where they were generally soon suppressed. In Holland they were much more successful, and in that country, where a semi-freedom of conscience was allowed, small sects flourished. The most important of these independent sects were the societies of the Collegiants, who held the fundamental ideas of the spiritual reformers, with the added belief that the present existing Church is only an interim-church, and that God will soon send a new apostle, supernaturally endowed and equipped, to be the beginner, the founder, of the true Church of Christ. For this event they looked and waited, and thus were called "Seekers." They held that no one had the efficacious authority and power to administer sacraments or to be the bearer of an authoritative ministry-message. They therefore met in silence and waited for the Spirit to direct them. They looked after their own poor, watched carefully over the moral life—the "walk and conversation"—of their membership. They were socially minded and made love and fellowship the marks of their communion. They were opposed to oaths, and to the taking of human life, and in other ways they showed their connection with the common man's reformation in the sixteenth century. During the period of the English Commonwealth numerous groups of similar sects appeared in England. They had strong, substantial members, and their leaders—for
they had unordained leaders—were able men and excellent guides. Many other sects swarmed as the degree of freedom increased. There were groups of the Family of Love, who were followers of the mystic, Henry Nicholas, born in Westphalia in 1501. There were Ranters, who were pantheists and frequently were morally loose and antinomian. In the years between 1646 and 1661 all the writings of Jacob Boehme were translated into English, and now became a positive and powerful force, profoundly influencing such intellectual men as Sir Isaac Newton and John Milton,\(^\text{20}\) and forming the basic religious conceptions of many less noted persons. All these lines, including the groups of Anabaptists, converge and receive their consummate expression in the Society of Friends, which under the leadership of George Fox spread throughout the English counties between 1648 and 1691, the latter date being the year of George Fox’s death.

More important, however, than the formation of any religious organization was the silent propagation of truths and ideas which spread across the world as winged seeds fly abroad in the autumn. The contagion of thought from mind to mind, from person to person, without any visible organization, carried these ideals broadcast. They became winnowed of chaff as time sifted them, and they gained in weight and value as they lost their capricious and erratic aspects. They heightened as they received interpretation at the hands of wise and balanced thinkers, and gradually they won the standing which their discoverers could never succeed in giving them. Philosophical movements unconsciously coöperated toward a preparation of groups of people of ideals similar to those of the spiritual reformers. Social and political forces also became their allies. The religious and political experiments in the American colonies assisted greatly in shaping thought in the same direction, and the revolutions

\(^{20}\) See Bailey’s Milton and Jacob Boehme (New York, 1914).
carried through by the people in America and in France helped immensely to establish the principle of free conscience, separation of Church and State, the inalienable right of a man to be religious in his own way, while the unorganized but irresistible forces of literature in Europe and America, especially from Wordsworth's time onwards, worked silently and powerfully to emphasize inward religion — the religion of the Spirit — and to make dogma and ecclesiasticism less important. We find ourselves at last in a world wholly changed from that which the great reformers, the major reformers, endeavored to make. Their ideals are not our ideals. Their conception of the Church is largely dead or dying. We are, it must be admitted, not in the world of the spiritual reformers, but at the same time their ideals are much more nearly our ideals, their spirit is kindred with ours, and if they could become revenant, they would feel at home with us now and would join heartily in spiritual communion and fellowship in any of our live, active, forward-looking church-groups today.
The rise and fall of early free-thinking societies in America offers a picture of considerable interest. The background is that of eighteenth-century deism—with the neutral tints of unbelief; the high lights are furnished by the fires of the French Revolution, the shadows by the dark fires of reaction. Across this canvas march many figures—rationalists like Franklin and Washington, ardent innovators like Jefferson, and a host of lesser characters—Frenchmen like Genêt and his Jacobins, Anglo-Americans like Paine and Houston, plain Americans like Elihu Palmer, with his Principles of Nature, English reformers like Robert Owen and his sons with their liberalizing communism; and ever opposing this army of radicals, the conservative elements—heads of colleges, leaders of the bar, and, as particular defenders of the faith, the clergy of New England.1

1 The general histories of liberal thought fail to do justice to this subject. J. B. Bury, A History of Freedom of Thought, London, 1913, is an excellent short history, but offers only one pertinent reference, regarding political disabilities in Maryland. John Cairns, Unbelief in the 18th Century, Edinburg, 1881, has nothing on the United States. A. S. Farrar, A Critical History of Free Thought, New York, 1879, is extreme in its statements. For example, p. 199 refers to Paine's Age of Reason as "that infidel work by which his name has gained an unenviable notoriety... he gave expression in coarse Saxon words to thoughts which were passing through many hearts." J. M. Robertson, A Short History of Free Thought, 3d edition, London, 1915, contains a valuable chapter on "Early Free Thought in the United States" from Franklin and Paine and Jefferson, to Palmer, Houston, and Priestley. Too much confidence perhaps is here put in Moncure Conway's Life of Thomas Paine, New York, 1883. Fuller accounts of the beliefs of Franklin and Priestley may be found in my American Philosophy, The Early Schools, New York, 1907, pp. 229–263 and 396–406.

From the conservative American side Robert Baird's Religion in the United States of America, Edinburg, 1844, presents an overdrawn picture: "Infidelity," he says, "has descended to the lower ranks, the purlieus, where it finds its proper aliment, the ignorant and vicious" (op. cit. p. 650).
The first agitation against free-thinking societies was largely due to the implications of the word "infidelity," as carried down from our Revolution days:

"There stood the infidel of modern breed,  
Blest vegetation of infernal seed,  
Alike no Deist, and no Christian, he;  
But from all principle, all virtue free."  

So ran the doggerel description given by President Dwight of Yale College. He added that in New England the name "infidel" proverbially denotes an immoral character. Now as his clerical colleague, Jedidiah Morse, explained, the duty of the clergy was to warn their parishioners that a spirit of license and of French infidelity was abroad which could be repressed only by a strenuous and combined effort.

This advice had political implications. Thus a charge was made by the author of The Hamiltoniad, that every reasoner in the cause of the people was denounced by the royal Junto of New England as a Jacobin, an infidel, and a republican villain. He added that in New England the Tories are reviving the hackneyed theme that religion is in danger because Mr. Jefferson in his political capacity lets it alone. Now Jefferson, along with Tom Paine and Cooper, son-in-law of Joseph Priestley,  

2 Timothy Dwight, Triumph of Infidelity, p. 31, New Haven, 1778, dedicated to Voltaire.  
4 Henry Adams, History of the United States During the First Administration of Thomas Jefferson, p. 78, New York, 1890.  
6 Ibid., p. 42, note.  
7 Priestley, the English chemist, while in Northumberland, Pa., had published an addition to his Observation on the Increase of Infidelity, London, 1776. Despite its title this book was not illiberal. Written by the great Unitarian leader, it attacked "the corrupt system of Christianity" in Europe and added: "But happily, in this country, the Church has no alliance with the State, every person being allowed to worship God in whatever manner he pleases." Observations, Preface, pp. x, xi.
had been called one of the three doubting Thomases. But "the philosophical chief of Monticello" who had called the clergy "hierophants of superstition" was not the only one of the Revolutionary leaders suspected of laxity. Benjamin Franklin had been thought unsafe by George Whitefield in spite of his discreet reply to that evangelist, while apprehensions existed even as regards the father of his country. Replying to the solicitous inquiry of the church of Kingston concerning his eternal welfare, Washington, in a little-known letter, answered in a way that gave slight satisfaction to his interrogators but was at least a model reply as to one's private beliefs:

"Gentlemen:

I am happy in receiving this public mark of the esteem of the Minister, Elders, and Deacons of the Reformed Protestant Dutch Church of Kingston.

Convinced that our religious liberties were as essential as our civil, my endeavors have never been wanting to encourage and promote the one while I have been contending for the other—also I am highly flattered by finding that my efforts have met the approbation of so respectable a body.

In return for your kind concern for my temporal and eternal happiness, permit me to assure you that my wishes are reciprocal—and that you may be enabled to hand down your religion,

8 Seth Payson, Proofs of the Real Existence and Dangerous Tendency of Illuminism, p. 53; New Haven, 1802.

9 Jefferson indeed had gone so far as to declare that "it does no injury for my neighbor to say there are twenty gods or no god." Adams, op. cit., p. 180.

10 Franklin's letter of 6 June, 1753, to Whitefield is very non-committal: "The faith you mention has certainly its use in the world. . . . The worship of God is a duty. . . . Your great master thought much less of these outward appearances." Works (ed. Jared Sparks), 7,75-76, Philadelphia, 1840. The following letter, often quoted, is evidently not authentic. It is not given in Sparks, nor in the Bigelow, Ford, or Smyth editions. In 1764 Franklin is alleged to have written to Whitefield: "That Being, who gave me existence, and through almost three-score years has been continually showering his favours upon me; whose very chastisements have been blessings to me; can I doubt that he loves me? And if he loves me, can I doubt that he will go on to take care of me, not only here but hereafter? This to some may seem presumption; to me it appears the best-grounded hope; hope of the future built on experience and the past." Franklin, Works.
pure and undefiled, to a Posterity worthy of their ancestors, is
the fervent prayer of,

    Gentlemen,
    Your most obed. servant,
    Go. Washington.

Kingston
16th Novr. 1782."  

It has been observed by a sympathetic historian of free thought, that this habit of reticence or dissimulation among American public men was confirmed by the treatment meted out to Thomas Paine. It might be added that a complete billingsgate of bigotry could be compiled from the epithets applied to the author of the *Age of Reason*—atheist, blasphemer, deist, infidel; such terms by the reaction of resentment led subsequently to what clearly became a canonization of this apostle of free thought in the colonies. From the founding of the Theophilanthropical Society to the time of Lincoln’s early political career, from the Hall of Science in New York City to the log cabin on the Indiana frontier, Paine was tremendously admired and had an enormous number of followers. And the heterodoxy of political leaders was accentuated by the excitement due to the “French craze.” As one annalist expressed it, the establishment of American independence was not effected without the moral contamination always the result of protracted wars; licentiousness both in conduct and sentiment had followed the footsteps of liberty. More particularly, French infidelity was connected with French Jacobinism, and the tree of liberty, as well as the liberty cap, were considered by many as the outward and visible signs of the demoralization wrought by the coming of Genêt and his followers.

11 From a photographic copy of the letter restored to the above church by De Witt Roosa, 1887.
12 J. M. Robertson, A Short History of Free Thought, 1,322.
15 Dwight, Travels, 1,32.
There was now raised "the warwhoop of the pulpit" against the French Revolution as a deliberate attack upon the Church and the creeds. This attack was exposed in a flood of scarehead discourses. The series may be begun with the Reverend Joseph Lathrop's *A Sermon on the Dangers of the Times from Infidelity and Immorality, and Especially from a Lately Discovered Conspiracy against Religion and Government.* In these American States, narrates Lathrop, there has for many years and more especially since our late Revolution been a visible tendency to infidelity. The great accession of foreigners has had a most unfriendly effect on the religion of the country. Most of these are men of fortune, learning, and address, but of licentious principles and dissolute morals. France is filled with atheists. An awful conspiracy against religion has lately been detected by Mr. John Robinson of Edinburg. He shows that the principles of the Illuminati are such as these: there is no supreme independent being, no moral government of the universe, no future existence. Of these societies, Robinson says there are great numbers scattered over Europe, some in England, several in America. His statement is made as the societies stood in 1786. In what parts of America they are formed, he gives no intimation; we choose to believe not in the United States.17

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16 Springfield [Mass.], 1798.

Lathrop's complacent belief was to be speedily shaken. In the same year, on the day set apart for "Solemn Humiliation, Fasting, and Prayer," the Reverend Jedidiah Morse began his protracted assault upon the Jacobin societies, upon Volney's *Ruins*, and upon the French Grand Orient with its affiliated American branches. These sermons at that time furnished a veritable public sensation. People had grown tired of the old hell-fire doctrines and attacks like those of John Wesley upon deists as "heirs of damnation." But here was a subject of real excitement, and the religious leaders made the most of it. Robinson's rather dubious work was again used as the chief source of information. The abuse of our rulers and clergy, explains Morse, is due to a deep-laid and extensive plan, which has for many years been in operation in Europe. To this plan we may trace that torrent of irreligion which threatens to overwhelm the world. This plan is now unveiled in John Robinson's *Proofs of a Conspiracy Against all the Religions and Governments of Europe*. Here we are informed that a society which calls themselves the Illuminated has existed for more than twenty years past in Germany. Their principles are avowedly atheistical; they abjure Christianity, justify suicide, declare death an eternal sleep, advocate sensual pleasures, call patriotism and loyalty prejudices, decry against property and in favor of liberty and equality, decry marriage and advocate a promiscuous intercourse among the sexes. This society has secretly extended its branches through a great part of Europe and even into America.\(^{18}\) The aim of the society is to acquire the direction of education, of church manage-

\(^{18}\) Jedidiah Morse, *A Sermon delivered . . . May 1798 . . . the Day . . . for Solemn Humiliation, Fasting, and Prayer*, pp. 18–21, Boston, 1798. Cf. note, p. 21. Robinson says, "The order of Illuminati took its rise among the Free Masons, but is a vile and pestiferous scion grafted of the stock of simple Masonry." Morse adds, "Judging from the characters which compose the Masonic Fraternity in America, at the head of which stands the immortal Washington . . . this leaven has not found its way into our American lodges."
ment, of the professorial chair, and of the pulpit, to bring their opinions into fashion by every art and to spread them among young people by the help of young writers. They strive to get under their influence the reading and debating societies and reviewers, journalists or editors of newspapers and other periodical publications, the booksellers and postmasters. From their private papers, which have been discovered and are now published, it appears that as early as 1786 they had several societies in America. Doubtless the Age of Reason and other works of that unprincipled author, as they proceeded from the fountain-head of Illumination were sent to America expressly in aid of this demoralizing plan. Doubtless the affiliated Jacobin societies in this country were instituted to propagate here the principles of the illuminated mother club in France. 19

This is a formidable arraignment, but it is as yet based on surmises. Even Robinson’s postscript to the American edition of his Proofs 20 could offer no precise evidence as to the existence of local French societies except for a vague statement that America contained several lodges. 21 There was no proof positive of the existence of “Illuminated” Clubs in the country. The original Illuminati were started in 1776 in Germany, and as yet there was no direct intercourse between the two countries. But Robinson had assumed that the Bavarian Order of the Illuminati was the source of the French Societies of

19 Jedidiah Morse, A Sermon delivered ... May 1798, etc., pp. 22-24.
Cf. p. 30. “The Declaration and Constitution of the American Society of United Irishmen, published in Philadelphia (since the publication of the first edition of this discourse), is evidently planned after the model of the Illuminated Societies in Europe, and their Test that a social body be considered secret is proof that Illuminism is spreading its undermining and disorganizing influence in this country.”


Illuminées, so Morse naturally lumps together the Teutonic and Gallic organizations. The new infidelity threatening the land was manifestly not made in Germany. Nevertheless the Jacobin clubs, instituted by Genêt, were declared by Morse to be a formidable engine for the accomplishing of the designs of France to subjugate and govern this country. They started into existence by a kind of magic influence in all parts of the United States, from Georgia to New Hampshire, being linked together by correspondence, by constitutional ties, and by oaths after the manner of the Illuminati in Europe. These clubs have been the chief disseminators in this country of the demoralizing principles of the Illuminati and the distributors of those publications which are designed to bring into discredit and contempt the Christian religion. So the illuminated French Revolutionists sent over Volney "to sap the foundations of morality," and Thomas Paine to wound religion by the shafts of wit and ridicule. Paine's maxim was that "an army of principles will penetrate where an army of soldiers cannot." So a cargo of fifteen thousand copies of the Age of Reason was sent into the United States and disposed of by sale at a cheap rate or given away.22

For this frightful tale of pernicious propaganda Morse still gives no authority.23 Further gratuitous assumptions that French philosophers were in the plot may be best presented in Morse's own words: "Professor Robinson and the Abbe [sic] Barruel have given satisfactory proofs of a regular conspiracy against the Christian religion, of which Voltaire was at the head.... One method adopted by these anti-Christian con-

22 Jedidiah Morse, A Sermon preached at Charlestown, November 29, 1798, with an Appendix exhibiting proof of the early existence, progress, and deleterious effects of French intrigue and influence in the United States.

23 The tale of the free distribution of the Age of Reason was given by the New York Evening Post, July 12, 1803. Cf. Moncure D. Conway, Life of Thomas Paine, 3,330 note, New York, 1893. Other writers have repeated this but without going back to Morse.
spirators is to publish books calculated to discredit Christianity and ascribe them to deceased authors of reputation; such is the *System of Nature*, an insidious and blasphemous work, published under the name of M. Mirabaud, secretary to the French Academy. . . . Attempts have been made to circulate those poisons in Britain. Let Americans be on their guard.”

Voltaire was of course at this time a name to conjure with. As President Dwight of Yale succinctly put it, the followers of Voltaire were possessed of hatred to Christianity, contempt of the Bible, and hostility against their Maker. But the succeeding anecdote concerning the traveller Volney, friend of Jefferson and author of the *Ruins of Empires*, makes one doubt the trustworthiness of these discourses. So Morse continues: “M. Volney, a French philosophist, when in Boston in 1797, I am credibly told, expressed himself highly gratified at the progress of the principles, political and religious, of the French Revolution. . . . ‘England,’ said he, ‘will be revolutionized, Italy and the German States and all the enlightened parts of Europe, and then [he added, with the highest exultation] Christianity will be put in the background. Already has it received its mortal blow.’ . . . The gentlemen who heard this conversation are of the first respectability. One of them added that he ‘had been accustomed to hear similar sentiments from almost every Frenchman he had conversed with since the summer of 1792.’ . . . If we love our holy religion and our country,” concludes Morse, “let us shun the philosophy of Europe.”

Lacking direct evidence as to the great conspiracy, Morse fills up his discourse with these hearsay anec-

24 Jedidiah Morse, A Sermon preached at Charlestown, November 29, 1798, p. 20, note.
26 Jedidiah Morse, A Sermon preached at Charlestown, p. 21, note.
dotes. But in his fast-day sermon of 1799 he returns to the attack with better ammunition. The story is a long one, but highly interesting as showing how free-thinking had to contend against a virtual alliance between Church and State. In attacking Jefferson's friend, Volney, the New England pulpit had been charged with meddling in politics. But, it was replied, the clergy had a perfect right to do their part in saving the State. This will explain the tone of remonstrance which marks the opening of Morse's last and most important discourse:

"It must appear strange to a man who has impartially marked the career of abominations which the French government has pursued for several years past, that they should still find advocates among some Americans.... It has long been suspected that secret societies, under the influence and direction of France, holding principles subversive of our religion and government, existed somewhere in this country. This suspicion was cautiously suggested from this desk on the day of the last national fast.... I have now in my possession complete and indubitable proof that such societies do exist, and have for many years existed in the United States. I have, my brethren, an official, authenticated list of the names, ages, places of nativity, professions, etc., of the officers and members of a Society of Illuminati, consisting of one hundred members instituted in Virginia by the Grand Orient of France. This society has a deputy, whose name is on the list, who resides at the Mother Society in France, to communicate from thence all needful information and instruction. The date of their institution is 1786. The seal and motto of this society correspond with their detestable principles and designs. The members are chiefly emigrants from France and St. Domingo with the addition of a few Americans and some from almost all the nations of Europe.... There is evidence of the existence of a society of like nature and probably of more ancient date at New York, out of which have sprung fourteen others. The pernicious fruits of their insidious efforts are our unhappy political divisions, the increasing abuse of our wise and faithful rulers, the virulent opposition to some of the laws of our country, the Pennsylvania insurrection, the industrious circulation of corrupting books, and the consequent wonderful spread of infidelity, impiety, and immorality. The destruction of the clergy in all countries is evidently a part of the French system. What have the clergy of the United States done to provoke hostility?
They have 'preached politics,' being opposed to the hostile designs and insidious arts of the French government and to those atheistical, demoralizing, and detestable principles which their emissaries are endeavoring to disseminate in our country. To prevent this, it behoves us to watch the movements and detect and expose the machinations of their numerous emissaries among us. . . . I have received the following documents through the most respectable channel.27 . . . The best informed Free Masons among us who have seen the preceding documents, disclaim these societies. They have presumptuously assumed the forms of Masonry, but are not of the order of true and good Masons. They are impostors. . . . There are 1,700 of these Illuminati among us all bound together by oath. Nay, there is too much reason to fear that many thousands of Frenchmen who are scattered through the United States, particularly southward of New England, are combined and organized (with other foreigners and some disaffected and unprincipled Americans) in these societies. . . . The principles and objects of this society are in part deducible from their motto and their horrid seal.”28

This is the last of Morse's sensational disclosures. Its reference to the free-thinking societies of New York is one thing, the alleged connection between Illuminism and Masonry another. Both these subjects we shall take up later, since the former was an Anglo-American

27 Cf. A Sermon exhibiting, etc., p. 35, Copy of an Original Document (translation): "At the East of the Lodge of Portsmouth in Virginia, the 17th of the 5th month in the year of True Light 5798, the Respectable French Provincial Lodge, regularly appointed under the distinctive title of Wisdom, 2660 by the Grand Orient of France, to the very respectable French Lodge, the Union, No. 14 constituted by the Grand Orient of New York. . . . We congratulate you TT.: CC.: FF.: upon the new constitutions or Regulations which you have obtained from the Grand Orient of New York. . . . With these sentiments we have the favour to be P.: L.: N.: M.: Q.: V.: S.: C.

Your very affectionate FF.: 
By order of the very respectable 
Provincial Lodge of Wisdom.
GREU,
Secretary."

Morse adds to this translation a facsimile of what he refers to as a "horrid seal." This seal consists of such familiar symbols as the skull and crossbones, the sun and moon, and Masonic compasses. It is fortified by this Latin motto, "Amplius homines oculis quam auribus credunt."

28 Jedidiah Morse, A Sermon exhibiting the Present Dangers and Consequent Duties of the Citizens of the United States of America, delivered at Charlestown, April 25, 1799, the Day of the National Fast, pp. iii, 15-46. A second printing of this sermon was made at Hartford, 1799.
rather than a Gallic affair, while the latter is a complication due to the "Anti-Masonic storm" of the next generation. Meanwhile Morse's sermons furnished a nine days’ wonder. His reprinting in facsimile of the "horrid seal" with its skull and crossbones whetted the curiosity of the undergraduates who about this time were busied in their secret societies. 29 So we find the authorities at Harvard and Yale addressing words of warning to their charges. For example, the Reverend David Tappan, Hollis Professor of Divinity at Cambridge, delivers a discourse "occasioned by the approaching departure of the Senior class from the University." 30 Basing his remarks on Dr. Morse’s National Fast sermon,31 he cautions his hearers against the pretences to refined morality, to the most generous zeal for universal liberty and happiness, which have been made both by the Illuminati and by French politicians. Let the horrid practical fruits of such pretensions in the old world engrave on your hearts a perpetual caution against these innovating theories.

But it was Timothy Dwight, the "Pope of Connecticut," who was the chief academic defender of the faith. To the candidates for the baccalaureate in Yale College he addressed two discourses on The Nature and Danger

29 The History of Phi Beta Kappa is a curious case in point. Founded at Jefferson’s Alma Mater, the College of William and Mary, in 1776, a chapter was established at Yale in 1780 and at Harvard in 1781, and at Dartmouth in 1787, upon the joint action of the two former colleges. But as early as 1779, it was petitioned that the Harvard branch be conducted "in a less mysterious manner." This refers in part to letters in cipher passing between the Alpha Chapter of Virginia and the different branches. In the latter Anti-Masonic agitation, Jefferson’s name was brought in, and he was charged with having founded this society and having fostered in it pernicious principles. In 1831 Avery Allen published his treatise on Masonry, containing a Key to the Phi Beta Kappa which criticised the motto of the society as follows: "Philosophy has been the watchword of infidels in every age, and by its learned and enchanting sound many unwary youths have been led to reject the only sure guide to heaven." The same year the Harvard chapter voted that "no oath or form of secrecy shall be required of any member of the society." Cf. John M. McBride, "The Phi Beta Kappa Society," Sewanee Review, April, 1915.

30 Boston, 1798.

31 Jedidiah Morse, A Sermon preached at Charlestown, p. 21.
of Infidel Philosophy. Since the author apologizes for these discourses as "perhaps longer than the reader would have wished," we may simply say that Dwight's statements are somewhat contradictory. Charging the French Committee of Public Instruction with the present propaganda of free thought, he concludes as follows:

"As mere infidelity, it teaches nothing but to contest all principles and to adopt none. As scepticism, it has an ocean of doubt and agitation, in which there are no soundings, and to which there is no shore. As animalism and atheism, it completes the ravage and ruin of man, which in its preceding forms it had so successfully begun. It now holds out the rank Circean draught, and sends the deluded wretches who are allured to taste, to bristle and wallow with the swine, to play tricks with the monkey, to rage and rend with the tiger, and to putrefy into nothing with the herd of kindred brutes." 33

Dwight's work is historically of slight worth. The only thing of value in it is a postscript by the English editor impugning the credit to be given to Robinson's so-called Proofs. 34 The Scottish professor with his hearsay evidences is compared, in the language of Prior, to "the honest rook, who told a snipe, who told a steer." Nevertheless, in spite of certain doubts cast upon the Proofs of Robinson and his borrowings from Barruel, both these authorities were accepted as true by the general reader. A popular edition of extracts from their works was speedily published by Seth Payson under the title Proofs of the Real Existence and Dangerous Tendency of Illuminism. 35 This convenient handbook contained not only extracts from the most interesting passages of the two foreign authors, but "collateral proofs" of the statements of Morse. A Masonic friend of Payson's, for example, tells him that the Portsmouth branch is swelled by the arrival of the French fleet from St. Domingo. This lodge is not

33 Infidel Philosophy, p. 89.
34 Ibid., p. 99.
35 P. 199, Charlestown [Mass.], 1802.
in fellowship with the ancient order of Masons, but one of its members is a German.36

This is the most direct corroboration we have concerning Morse's statements regarding the Southern branch of Illuminism. It also furnishes a possible point of connection between America and Germany as the original home of the movement. But that connection is somewhat dubious. Robinson depends upon Barruel, but the latter's Memoirs were declared by a writer of the next generation as completely discredited, being written under the influence of an ardent imagination.37 These strictures of a compatriot are manifestly too severe. A more moderate opinion is given by an English reviewer to the effect that however extravagant may be the opinions of some leading men among the Illuminées, the average will of the party, the collective pursuit of the confederated lodges, appears rather to have had Socinianism and Republicanism than Atheism and Anarchy for its object.38

Slight attention was apparently paid to such a defence, for it availed little against the Abbé's dramatic presentation of the vast conspiracy. Act I presents the means of the conspirators: philosophizing mankind through the Encyclopædia, etc.—the extinction of Jesuits; the extinction of all the religious orders; Voltaire's colony at Clèves under Frederick the Great; academic honors; and inundations of anti-Christian writings. Act II connects the Gauls with the Germans; a deputation arrives from Weishaupt to the Free Masons of Paris; then comes the success of the Deputies, and finally the coalition of the conspiring sophists, Masons and

36 Proofs, p. 104.
Illuminées, generating the Jacobins.\textsuperscript{39} In the Third Act, the Grand Orient of Paris is presented as a reunion of all the lodges of the Kingdom, a sort of Masonic parliament with committees of the Administration of Paris, of the Provinces and of the Degrees. This grand empire over French Masonry issued its instructions to the lodges in Savoy and Switzerland, to those of Portsmouth in Virginia, of Fort Royal in Grenada, and, in short, to lodges in all the French colonies.\textsuperscript{40}

This is evidently the original statement regarding the first American Illuminated Lodge, a statement which Robinson repeated without verification, but Morse had the luck to verify in his famous facsimiles "with their emblems of carnage and death." There is, however, another curious reference to this country which shows a use of the imagination, if nothing else. In 1797, says Barruel, a secret association was formed called Amis des Noirs. This appellation was adopted only the better to conceal the grand object of their conspiracy under the specious pretext of humanity. While occupying all Europe with the question they had proposed on the slavery of negroes in America, they never lost sight of that revolution which they had so long meditated.\textsuperscript{41}

One ludicrous effect of the attack on the Illuminatati was that the accusers themselves were given that bad name. In an anonymous charge against the Federalists as the Royal faction, New England was called the home of religious bigotry and persecution. Begotten at the College of New Jersey, this odious society was reared in Connecticut and confirmed, on its maturity, at Dartmouth and Yale. Educated in these colleges, its progeny has gone forth to spread tyranny and oppression over all the States. They have seized on the institutions and methods of education, pillaged the Episcopal churches,

\textsuperscript{39} Barruel, Memoirs, IV, p. 209.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., Part II, pp. 212-213.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., Part II, p. 251.
secured land grants and money from State legislatures, waged war against other sects, sent missionaries to break up the peace between the settlers in Vermont and New York, anathematized the Church of Rome. Intolerance is ingrained in New Englanders. Remember the Blue Laws, many of which are yet in force.\textsuperscript{42}

This of course is pure fiction. The whole affair, however, furnished grist for the political mill. In a Fourth of July oration in 1798, President Dwight again attacked the order of the Illuminati as atheists and villains. Two years later charges of infidelity were brought against Jefferson in an anonymous pamphlet entitled \textit{The Voice of Warning to Christians on the Ensuing Election of a President of the United States}. In spite of this and similar pamphlets, the Southern leader knew how to take care of himself. His letters show how he met the missionary labors of “the pious young monks of Harvard and Yale.”\textsuperscript{43} Despite their endeavors his pet project, the University of Virginia, received the stamp of Gallic thought. Moreover his Alma Mater, William and Mary, still retained its liberal atmosphere, while the neighboring Transylvania University in Kentucky became the headquarters for local Jacobinism, and finally not only in Lexington but in Georgetown and Paris, Kentucky, there were formed societies affiliated with the Jacobin club of Philadelphia.\textsuperscript{44} And Ohio itself, although it was the old Connecticut Reserve, was charged with being a State


\textsuperscript{43} Cf. my American Philosophy, Chapter VI, Virginia and Jefferson, New York, 1907.

\textsuperscript{44} E. H. Gillet, History of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, 1,300, 420; 2,144, Philadelphia, 1864.
where infidelity walked "in brazen front." But this western extension of free-thinking societies more properly belongs to the later development in socialistic communities like that of Robert Owen, a development which was fostered by English rather than French influences. Meanwhile the "French craze" had died down, the "Terrible Republic" had been succeeded by a worse tyranny, and Napoleon, especially in his treatment of the free states like Switzerland, had disgusted the mass of Americans.

But a statement made in this connection, that the "rights of men" occupied public thoughts less and the price of cotton more, is hardly borne out by the facts. Politics remained of paramount interest in the American mind. This is shown by the history of the second group of free-thinking societies, which began by discussing metaphysics and ended with influencing legislation. With New York City as a centre and Thomas Paine as a founder, it was Theophilanthropy that had a varied and interesting career. At first the movement was harshly attacked, but the defence grew rapidly strong. The Franco-American free-thinking societies had been marked by extravagances and the silliness of secrecy. The Anglo-American, on the contrary, bore an air of practicability and were open to the public. The author of Common Sense was no fool, and his followers carried on his propaganda both by well-edited journals and by frank discussions in what were ingeniously called Halls of Science. In regard to this theophilanthropical movement we may begin with a hostile account. The Deists, says a leader of Princeton, have never been able to

45 Cf. The Correspondent, New York, 1827, for references to Ohio: 1,308 "Liberal opinions are gaining in the West"; 2,949 "An edition of 5000 copies of Paine’s Age of Reason is proposed to meet the demands in Western New York and Ohio."
establish and keep up any religious worship among themselves. David Williams of London, priest of nature, abandoned his project because it led to atheism. So did Frederick II, the deistical King of Prussia. Some feeble attempts of the same kind have been made in the United States, but they are unworthy of being particularly noticed. The most interesting experiment of this kind was that made by the Theophilanthropists in France during the period of the Revolution. After some trial had been made of atheism and irreligion, a society was formed upon the pure principles of natural religion. Their creed was simple, consisting of two great articles—the existence of God, and the immortality of the soul. Their moral system also embraced two great principles—the love of God, and the love of man—principles which were indicated by the name "Theophilanthropists." Their festivals were in honor of the following persons: Socrates, St. Vincent de Paul, J. J. Rousseau, and Washington—a strange conjunction of names truly.48

The correction of such an account as this may be found in the words of Thomas Paine, who declares that the precise history of the Theophilanthropists is that they do not call themselves disciples of such and such a man. They avail themselves of the wise precepts that have been transmitted by writers of all countries and in all ages.49 Now in attempting to form in New York a society for religious inquiry and also a society of Theophilanthropy, Paine's most sympathetic biographer claimed that the movement was too cosmopolitan to be contained in any local organization.50 This was in a measure true, but the whole story is to be found in con-

50 M. D. Conway, Life of Thomas Paine, 2,426.
nection with one of Paine's picturesque followers, Elihu Palmer, in whose magazine, *The New York Theophilanthropist*, some of the master's posthumous papers saw the light. Palmer was the author of *The Principles of Nature*, a rare volume reprinted by Richard Carlisle, the London publisher who had been imprisoned for the issuance of Thomas Paine's works. It contains a very lively account of the author by his friend, Colonel John Fellows, who with Paine was a charter-member of the first free-thinking society of New York. Palmer, who was born in Connecticut and graduated from Dartmouth, being early reproved for the liberality of his sentiments, abandoned Calvinism for Universalism. As his biographer puts it: The childish and impious presumption of supposing the Deity capable of requiring the murder of Jesus Christ, and of calling his son to atone for the trifling *faux pas* of a woman, committed some thousand years before, was too revolting for his honest and manly mind long to brook; and, having obtained the assent of a part of the elders of his congregation to that effect, he advertised in a public paper, the *Aurora*, that on the succeeding Sunday he would deliver a discourse against the divinity of Jesus Christ. This act of imprudence, it is added, drove Palmer even from the society whose main tenet was then hardly tolerated in the country. Turning to law, Palmer was obliged to abandon the undertaking because he had been left blind by an attack of yellow fever. But as the frontispiece of the *Principles* has it: "Though darkness drear obscured his visual ray, his mind unclouded felt no loss of day"—and he enlisted in "reason's cause." As a free-lance lecturer, Palmer now met with some success

51 M. D. Conway, *Writings of Thomas Paine*, 4,236, note.

52 Or *A Development of the Moral Causes of Happiness and Misery Among the Human Species*, 1804; London, 1823.

53 *Posthumous Pieces, Elihu Palmer... To Which are prefixed a Memoir of Mr. Palmer by his Friend Mr. John Fellows of New York*, p. 6; London, 1826.
in Augusta, Georgia, delivering discourses upon the broad basis of deism. Returning to New York in 1796, it was immediately proposed to him to deliver lectures. Thereupon a small society was formed in aid of his exertions; which assumed, without disguise, the name of The Deistical Society. This appellation was advocated by Mr. Palmer, although some others were in favor of that of The Theophilanthropist, as being less frightful to fanatics, not many of whom would understand the term. Although his lectures were generally pretty numerously attended, there were not many who were disposed to contribute for the support of the principles, and those for the most part were limited in means. It became necessary therefore for him to make occasional excursions to other populous towns to recruit his funds, which he frequently did, to Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Newburgh on the North River.

The Principles of the Deistical Society of the State of New York consists of the commonplaces of eighteenth-century deism—that the universe proclaims the existence of one supreme Deity, that the religion of nature is the only universal religion, that science and truth are the great objects for human energy. The animus of the document lies in its final admonition that every member admitted into this association shall deem it his duty, by every suitable method in his power, to promote the cause of nature and moral truth, in opposition to all schemes of superstition and fanaticism claiming divine origin. This admonition explains not only the later programme of the free-thinkers of New York, but the previous statements of Palmer concerning the earlier speculative movements. Such was his excellent defence of Illuminism when he said the Illuminati in Europe have been represented as a vicious combination of persons whose object was the destruction of all the governments
and religions of the world. If the enemies of philosophy, in that part of the globe, mean by governments the corrupt monarchies of the earth, and by religion, popular superstition, founded upon the idea of a supposed mysterious intercourse between beings of the earth and celestial powers, then they are right in this respect; for these are the governments and religions against which reason and philosophy ought to direct their energies; but if by government they mean a system of genuine republicanism, founded upon the equal rights of man, and by religion the idea of simple theism and the immortality of moral virtue, then their assertions are false, and their productions a calumny against reason and the rights of human nature.  

Promulgated in the same year as President Monroe’s doctrine against entangling political alliances, this was a kindred philosophical doctrine, in which nature was to be considered as free from the encroachment of outside agencies. In a word, this was nothing but logically developed deism, a scheme which implies that the laws governing the world are immutable and that the violations of these laws, or miraculous interference in the movements of nature, must be necessarily excluded from the grand system of universal existence. Here Palmer uses the very language of Paine, while in defending naturalism as against supernaturalism he clearly sees the opposition it will meet. It is this philosophy, he exclaims, that has developed the laws of the physical world and exhibited the principles on which its systematic order depends; it is this philosophy that has unfolded the moral energies of human nature, which has become an object of calumny in the estimation of a cruel and persecuting superstition.

57 Ibid., p. 198.  
59 Palmer, Principles, p. 113.
Among the advocates of this naturalism Palmer numbers not only the familiar Gallic thinkers from Condorcet to Volney, but Godwin, author of Political Justice, and Joel Barlow, the translator of Volney's Ruins. Barlow, as a diplomat in foreign parts, had no connection with the Theophilanthropists at home, but he was in thorough sympathy with their principles. Consequently he defended the memory of Thomas Paine, and in his Advice to the Privileged Orders presents his view of the established church as "darkening the consciousness of men in order to oppress them." He, nevertheless, takes pains to add that in the United States of America, there is, strictly speaking, no such thing as a church, and yet in no country are the people more religious. All sorts of religious opinions are entertained there, and yet no heresy among them all. All modes of worship are practised, and yet there are no schisms. Men frequently change their creed and their worship, and yet there is no apostasy. They have ministers of religion, but no priests. In short, religion is there a personal and not a corporate concern.60

Barlow's contention is borne out by a letter of John Adams to Jefferson in which he speaks of having once addressed an army of fine young fellows from Anabaptists to Atheists, from Moravians to Socinians. This referred to Adams' Philadelphia speech of 1798.61 Now Palmer in his attacks on the "American priesthood" was both beside the mark and also somewhat inconsistent. Five years before Adams and in Philadelphia itself, he had delivered an oration at Federal Point, which contains strictures upon the union of Church and State abroad, but expressly excepts such a condition of affairs at home. As a sample of Fourth of July oratory upon the subject of illuminism and free thought, Palmer's speech is in-

60 C. B. Todd, Life and Letters of Joel Barlow, pp. 89-90, New York, 1886.
61 Works, ed. C. F. Adams, 10,45, Boston, 1846.
structive. The age of reason and philosophy, he declares, has at length arrived and begins to illuminate the world. While the age of darkness, which spread itself over all nations, was faithfully preserved by the pious alliance of Church and State and humanity wept for the miseries of man, kingcraft and priestcraft, those mighty enemies to liberty and reason, were struck to death by the genius of 1776. Beware, ye American aristocrats! Your principles and efforts are leading you to a precipice. Civil and religious oppression will not gain much ground in the American world. If the cause of France should succeed, then farewell kings, aristocrats, and the long catalogue of clerical impositions. In justice, however, to the American clergy, it ought to be observed that in effecting our Revolution, many of them by their precepts and example afford great service. 62

Nevertheless there was a certain justification in the continuance of such attacks as were made by Palmer in radical journals like the Temple of Reason and in his own Prospect or View of the Moral World for the Year 1804. The latter work had for its frontispiece a symbolic picture of the Age of Reason and the Rights of Man garnished with a liberty cap. This symbol was psychological. It represented the smouldering resentment of the Columbian Illuminati against certain religious restrictions which had been but recently abolished. Prior to the Constitutional Convention of 1787, as McMaster says, the political rights of man were fenced about with restrictions which would now be thought unbearable. To be enfranchised in South Carolina, the free white man must believe in the existence of a God, in a future state of reward and punishment, and have a

62 Political Miscellany, passim, New York, 1793. In a note to p. 24, Palmer quotes from Morse, the Geographer, this curious passage: "The clergy in Connecticut have hitherto preserved a kind of aristocratical balance in the very democratical government of the State, which has happily operated as a check upon the overbearing spirit of Republicanism."
freehold of one hundred and fifty acres of land. No atheists, no free thinkers, no Jews, no Roman Catholics, no man, in short, who was not a believer in some form of the Protestant faith, could ever be a governor of New Jersey, New Hampshire, Connecticut, or Vermont. Any rich Christian might be the executive of Massachusetts or Maryland. Elsewhere he must be a Trinitarian and a believer in the inspiration of the Scriptures, or a Protestant and a believer in the divine authority of the Bible, or acknowledge one God, believe in heaven and in hell, and be ready to declare openly that every word in the Testament, both Old and New, was divinely inspired.63

While these political restrictions may have been removed, certain social prejudices still hung on. Thus Cooper's novel Precaution emphasizes as the chief requirement in the choice of a husband, his piety, and warns the heroine against admiring a deist however handsome he may be.64 And Harriet Martineau, in her Society in America speaks of the opprobrium directed upon such as those who embrace natural religion.65 To the free thinker, then, the spirit which engendered such narrowness must be crushed. It therefore became the express aim of the New York Society in their organ, The Theophilanthropist,66 to redeem mankind from the degrading fetters of hereditary superstition. The first charge was upon Calvin's Institutes "replete with its horrid doctrines and revolting views of the divine mind." How absurd, it is said, that such a system, whose never-ending and excruciating tortures are pronounced the doom of the wicked, should be called a consolatory system! Contrast now the Calvinist and the Theophilanthropist, the rigid sectarian and the lover of God and man, who believes in one supreme

64 T. R. Lounsbury, J. F. Cooper, pp. 25-26, Boston, 1893.
65 Society in America, 2,316, New York, 1837.
66 Ibid., pp. 1-5.
and incomprehensible Deity, the Creator and Conservator of the universe; who has for his duties benevolence and justice, and for his religion, the religion of nature, upon whose every leaf his creeds and duties are imprinted. 67

All this is but an echo of Paine’s Discourse at the Society of the Theophilanthropists, which declares that the existence of a God is the first dogma of the Theophilanthropist, and the universe his Bible. It is there that he reads of God; it is there that the proofs of His existence are to be sought and to be found. 68 As an organ the New York Theophilanthropist was not much of a success. 69 Its readers could not make out what it was all about. Articles defending the character of Thomas Paine were pertinent, but those explaining the morality of Mohammedanism were not. So there was room for a better presentation of free thought. This was fulfilled by The Correspondent, edited by the English radical, George Houston, who came over with the halo of persecution, having been imprisoned in Newgate for his translations of d’Holbach’s Ecce Homo. 70 The Correspondent announces itself as “A Strict Enquiry into the Origin of Religion.” Its prospectus claims that there is place for a paper which will fearlessly advocate the paramount importance of the laws of nature and the dignity of reason. As one subscriber immediately submits, while every denomination, every sect, and almost every distinct church have their presses, this advantage

67 The Theophilanthropist, containing Critical, Moral, Theological, and Literary Essays ... by a Society, New York, 1810.

68 Thomas Paine, Discourse at The Society of the Theophilanthropists, p. 27, Paris (1797).

69 Another ephemeral journal was The Temple of Reason, published by D. Driscoll, 1800–02, with articles by Paine and Palmer.

70 Cf. John M. Robertson, A Short History of Free Thought, 2,385, where The Correspondent is wrongly given as The Correspondence. Robertson also implies that The Minerva was an organ of free thought, whereas it announces itself as “A Literary, Entertaining, and Scientific Journal,” edited by George Houston, New York, 1824–25.
has hitherto been denied to the deists.\textsuperscript{71} This is corroborated by the journal’s first press notices. The National Advocate says that this is probably the first periodical work ever published in the United States that publicly avows and defends deism. The New York Times speaks of the new weekly paper as one in which the Bible is attacked, the Christian system blasphemed, and deism defended—Thomas Paine being the hero and reason the idol. Finally, the Albany Advocate proposes to carry on a constant and rigid warfare with The Correspondent, and like its esteemed contemporary would consign the liberal organ to the flames. But neither was the latter to be suppressed nor its by-product, the Philosophical Library. As the organ of the Free Press Association the journal starts reporting the Secretary’s lectures on “The Inconsistencies, Absurdities, and Contradictions of the Bible,” and ends with debates on such a question as “whether a revelation by a supreme being has ever been made to man.”\textsuperscript{72} Moreover its liberal library began with the publication of the Ecce Homo and followed with the theological writings of Paine, Palmer, Hume, Gibbon, and Volney. That both the propaganda and the publications had a wide spread is attested by a letter from a Philadelphia correspondent. Called an infidel and heretic, he read Volney’s Ruins; having found a copy of Paine, which the owner kept locked up, he bought it. Lending these volumes to his neighbors, they formed a club and soon possessed themselves of the Ecce Homo, of Palmer’s Principles, and of such works as Christianity Unveiled and The Spiritual Mustard Pot.\textsuperscript{73}

The Correspondent now becomes a veritable seed-bed for radical clubs. An account of these and their doings form an unwritten but significant chapter in American thought. According to the current numbers of this

\textsuperscript{71} The Correspondent, 1,3, 1827–29.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., 2,85; 5,13. \textsuperscript{73} Ibid., 3,219.
journal, there were these activities in the following States: in Delaware, the Wilmington Society investigates the truth or falsehood of the Bible; in Maryland, the Baltimore Association of Liberals stands for a free press, free library, and free discussion; in New Jersey, the Paterson Free Reading Society protests against our libraries containing so few scientific and philosophical works of established character, works consigned to the flames by fanaticism; in Ohio, the Cincinnati Society for Mutual Instruction in Natural Science languished at first, but was later stimulated by the establishment of the Western Tiller; in Pennsylvania is found a Philadelphia Society of Liberal Friends, and a Philosophical Society to discuss Paine’s Age of Reason and Volney’s Ruins; in Vermont, the Woodstock Free Reading Society annually celebrates Paine’s birthday; in New Hampshire, the Dover Free Press Association holds a similar celebration and signalizes it with a song written for the occasion, which ends as follows:

“What sovereignty is, and from whence its true birth,
Oh, PAINE! ’twas thy pen that defin’d,
And show’d that no right is divine on this earth
But the glorious ‘Rights of Mankind.’
When dark Superstition and Prejudice cease
To trammel the mind with their chain,
Amid an elysium of joy and of peace,
Blest man shall be grateful to PAINE.” 74

Such are the provincial efforts and effusions. The metropolis does more. As successors and heirs to the old Deistical Society, the New York Theophilanthropistical Society widely extends its activities. According to its official organ, between 1827 and 1829, it spreads not only over the city but over the State. Declaring its religion to be the religion of nature, it begins with a Paine celebration, defends the free-thinking of Franklin and Jeffer-
son, organizes a debating society on the Bowery, and in the upper part of the city inaugurates a society of free inquirers whose object is to paralyze the efforts of bigotry. Under the same auspices and outside of the metropolis, Albany holds a Paine celebration, Lockport starts a journal called *Priestcraft Exposed*, and Rochester one called *Plain Truth*. Naturally all this stirs up a series of attacks. One sample will serve for the rest. As to the Utica auxiliary of the infidel society in New York, says the *Western Recorder*, every decent man and every good citizen will look upon its doings as a public outrage; every man who belongs to it should be distinctly marked as a foe to his country, an enemy both to God and man.75

While the Free Press Association never achieved the formation of a proposed General Association of Liberals to spread its principles under one name, it managed to spread those opinions among sympathizers. These were found largely among the first group of socialists formed in the country under the leadership of the English radical philanthropist Robert Owen, the founder of the famous New Harmony community. But before we take up the cause of liberal principles in Ohio and its vicinity, a word is needful as to the winding up of *The Correspondent*. That organ of Theophilanthropy—as it inadvertently acknowledges in its last number—had been too exclusively devoted to theological discussions. But this was not the only reason for its demise. The tone of this journal, it must be confessed, was often cheap. Houston, in the words of an admirer, might have erected "the first Light House for Reason in the East," as Owen did in the West, but its beams did not penetrate polite society. He offended respectability when, for one thing, he attacked the strict observance of the Sabbath as unconstitutional, and in general was on a par with one of his

75 *The Correspondent*, 4,173.
exchanges, *The Herald of Heresy*. But it was from mixing in politics that he met with the most violent objections. To ridicule and agitate against Sabbath stage-coaches was one thing; to deride the laws of blasphemy enacted in New Hampshire was another. While the rural legislators, to punish any “curse or reproach” upon the canonical Scriptures, might seemingly contravene the Federal constitutional rights on freedom of religious belief, still the whole complicated question was one of States’ rights. So in 1829, *The Correspondent* went out of business with a last despairing wail regarding the secret propaganda which aimed to injure the printing establishment of George Houston.

Evidently this journal had done its work, for a more exciting political campaign for liberal rights had meanwhile arisen in the East, while in the West another “high priest of atheism and deism” had arisen in the person of Robert Owen. The New Harmony settlement in Ohio, like the Free Enquiry Society in New York, was immediately counted “an odium in polite society.” In Pittsburgh, as one of Houston’s correspondents recounted, no one would acknowledge to have any dealing with a settlement which contained no church and no Bible society. And Owen himself, to judge from the language he used in writing to the *Western Monthly Review*, did not mince matters in addressing “the deluded pious and the bigot.” Moreover in regard to his recent debate at Cincinnati with Alexander Campbell on the general subject “whether mankind can be trained to become more happy with or without religion,” Owen took the privative side against the superstitionists. He added that he had been dexterously misrepresented, by a “Kentucky manoeuvre.”

76 The Correspondent, 1,84; 2,78; 3,241.  
77 Ibid., 3,155.  
Robert Owen came to the country with two main tenets, one negative and one positive. The former was the familiar attack on priestcraft. He explains that he had been early satisfied that all religions had emanated from the same source and their varieties from the same false images of our early ancestors, in short, that all the religions of the world are so many geographical insanities.\(^{80}\) But the negative must be supplanted by the positive. So in place of an inscrutable supernaturalism Owen put a calculable naturalism. All my qualities, he argued, were forced on me by nature, and my language, religion, and habits by society; nature gave the qualities and society directed them.\(^{81}\)

We might call all this a violent leap from Puritanism to positivism. In other words, instead of Deity foreordaining, heredity and environment were to ordain. At any rate the new determinism must have astonished the natives; but Owen, like the "reasoning machine" which Coleridge called him, was still relentless in his logic. "Had you," he would say, "on my right hand, been brought up under the influence of such circumstances as are to be found at the foot of the Rocky Mountains, you would all have been Indians, save as to the color of your skins. Had you, on my left hand, been exposed from infancy to the circumstances which prevail in China, you would have been Chinese, except in form and figure."\(^{82}\)

Such were the working plans for Owen's Preliminary Society of New Harmony, where there should be no churches, no creeds, no religious worship, but in their stead moral lectures and such a system of public education as would foster in the young a love of justice, moral-


\(^{81}\) Podmore, ibid., 1,20.

\(^{82}\) J. B. McMaster, The Acquisition of the Political, Social, and Industrial Rights of Man in America, p. 91, Cleveland, 1903.
ity, and truth—an education which for the very young included dancing, singing, and military drill, and for the older in years, studies ranging from agriculture and botany to history and music.\textsuperscript{83}

The effect of such outright naturalism was seen in the case of Owen’s son, who declared: “I have no religion. . . . I have not accustomed myself to personifying a first cause; I embody no superhuman spirits, angelic or infernal.”\textsuperscript{84} These assertions were made in the Hall of Science, New York, and to a sympathetic circle of free inquirers. When similar sentiments were brought before the general public in the form of a challenge to the clergy of the United States, they elicited an unwarranted stir. In the notorious debate with the Reverend Alexander Campbell, who took up the challenge to meet Owen in a friendly discussion, the socialist brought forth five propositions which he was ready to defend. Assuming that all religions are founded on ignorance, he inferred that they are the only real bar to the formation of a society of virtue, of intelligence, of charity (in the most extended sense).\textsuperscript{85} The eight days of debate, which drew as many thousands of hearers, ended as such debates usually do. Mrs. Trollope, who was present, observed that neither the cleric nor the socialist appeared to answer the other, but to confine themselves to the utterances of what they had uppermost in their minds. When the discussion began, the one became too elaborately theological, and the other benighted in the mists of his own theories.\textsuperscript{86}

Owen explained that the object of the Cincinnati debate was not to discuss the truths or falsehood of the

\textsuperscript{83} Cf. McMaster, The Acquisition of the Political, Social, and Industrial Rights of Man in America, p. 93.
\textsuperscript{86} Mrs. Trollope, Domestic Manners of the Americans, 2,207, London, 1832.
Christian religion, but to ascertain the errors in all religions which prevent them from being efficacious in practice, and to bring out all that is really valuable in each, leaving out their errors, and thus to form from them collectively a religion wholly true and consistent, that it may become universal and be acted upon consistently by all.87 We are not concerned with Owen’s projected eclecticm, which harked back to the Jefferson Bible, and in a measure anticipated Comte’s Religion of Humanity. The ferment of free thought is our concern, but here unfortunately Owen checked an embryonic naturalism by his overheated statements. His kindliest biographer acknowledges that he looked upon religion as a kind of insanity,88 and his Book of the New Moral World bears this out. In this world, averred the radical, the priesthood must be abolished and all works of theology destroyed.89 Referring to Christian believers in a Christian country as “inmates in a lunatic asylum,” 90 Owen did anything but help his valuable social reformers. But his Declaration of Mental Independence capped the climax of his unpopularity among the conservatives. To the mind of the radical, society suffered under a trinity of evils—private property, orthodox religion, and the “marriages of the priesthood of the old immoral world.”91 Owen promulgated these doctrines on what was then the frontier, and at a time when manners were more or less free and easy.92 But Indiana was not yet Dakota, and the doctrine of divorce for incompatibility of temper had not yet reached the courts. As a local sheet interpreted it, Mr. Owen’s “fine theories” allowed persons to dissolve the matrimonial contract at pleasure.93 And

worse was to follow when the reformer's son and namesake subsequently issued his *Moral Physiology, or A Brief and Plain Treatise on the Population Question*. The treatise was not brief but plain, very plain, and one can imagine the air of astonished horror with which directions on birth control were received among the genteel classes, especially in the East where the traditions of prisms and prunes still obtained. A journal like *The March of Mind* might declare that Robert Owen's simple declaration of mental independence unshackled the minds of hundreds from the thraldom of superstition; but when his two sons and the "female republican," Frances Wright, removed to New York, they got into hot water. Miss Wright, said Robert Dale Owen, had radical views touching the independence of women, whether married or single. To this must be added her views on abolition as shown in her attempts to overcome the prejudices against negroes in her community at Nashoba, Tennessee. Finally, there were her pronounced opinions in favor of the dignity of labor, which came out when she and the two younger Owens formed the left wing of the Free Enquirers of New York. The older group of Enquirers, as *The Correspondent* put it, had taken a set against clerical impostors—"the Eastern Magi, with their black cockade." These efforts were largely literary, but now with the advent of the Western reformers, theory was succeeded by practice and the free-thinkers entered the political arena.

The year of the last number of *The Correspondent* was the year of the first year of *The Workingman's Advocate*, which declared in its prospectus that there was something "radically wrong" in the "existing state of society." In these social reforms we take interest only in so

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95 No. 1, October, 1829, quoted by J. B. McMaster, *The Acquisition of the Political, Social, and Industrial Rights of Man in America*, p. 101.
far as they were connected with mental independence. Thus the Advocate protested against such exclusive privileges as one part of the community having the means of education in college, while another was restricted to the common schools. Along with the Advocate there now sprang up a new crop of liberal journals; such were the New York Telescope, which scrutinized the encroachments of the clergy; the Rochester Spirit of the Age, which advocated an open Sunday; the Charleston Free Press, which announced "no sect, no creed, open to all." These journals were in general free-thinking, but their particular aim was political. We may only note that, because of this connection, the Workingmen's party had hard sledding in New York. Theirs was called the Fanny Wright ticket, the infidel ticket.

But the fight became even more complicated when the movement for social reform became involved with that peculiar movement, the Anti-Masonic agitation. This we are concerned with only as it serves to summarize the whole business of our early free-thinking societies. New York State politics from 1826-30 was stirred up by what was called the "Western excitement." This referred to the real abduction and alleged murder of one William Morgan at Fort Niagara. According to the report submitted to the State Senate, Morgan was an obscure representative among the thirty thousand Masons of the commonwealth. Attempting to publish a book exposing the secrets of his order, he was spirited away by the "new order of Jesuits"—the society of Free and Accepted Masons.96 According to the report of the Anti-Masonic convention, the committee of inquiry appointed by that body found, among other things, that the expositions of Masonic secrets were true, that Freemasonry originated early in the eighteenth century, and

96 James C. Odierne, Opinions on Speculative Masonry, Relative to its Origin, Nature and Tendency, pp. 190-198, Boston, 1830.
that its principles were inconsistent with the genius of American institutions.\textsuperscript{97} This report, although ridiculed by the Masonic organization itself, was substantiated by what one of the oppositors called “a host of new, learned, and scrutinizing enemies.”\textsuperscript{98} Their testimony was given in a set of \textit{Opinions on Speculative Masonry, Relative to its Origin, Nature, and Tendency}. These opinions, offered by the colleges, the bench, and the cloth, disclosed that history was repeating itself; that that which had happened in France was happening here. In a word, this meant that the old Masonry had been penetrated by Illuminism; that the original English convivial society of Free and Accepted Masons had been perverted by the intrusion of fanciful Gallic novelties. As to its origin, the critics concluded that the ancient order was not ancient. As Professor Leonard Woods remarked respecting the alleged high antiquity of Freemasonry, “If they assert that it existed in Solomon’s day, they might as well assert that Solomon made a balloon and frequently rode in it from Jerusalem to Tyre.”\textsuperscript{99} The venerable age of the institution is further rendered ridiculous by the fact that the Grand Lodge of England was instituted in 1717, and the first American lodge in 1733.\textsuperscript{100}

So much for the origin of the movement. As for its nature, similar unfavorable opinions were held. Though Washington joined the early Anglo-American branch, he came to suspect the Gallic varieties of the order. Remembering the machinations of Genêt and the activities of the candidates of the Jacobin societies in the land, the President’s Farewell Address contained a grave warning against secret societies.\textsuperscript{101} To its opponents then Free-

\textsuperscript{98} Odierne, p. 250.
\textsuperscript{99} Ibid., p. 123.
\textsuperscript{101} Odierne, p. 52.
masonry is fictitious in its origin and dubious in its nature. It is also pernicious in its tendency. Here the bill of attainder has many counts. It is anti-Christian because it appeals to Jew and pagan; it is blasphemous because it attempts a personification of the Great Jehovah; it is illegal because it swears to protect a companion "whether right or wrong"; it is seditious because the candidate for the third degree swears to keep the brothers' secrets . . . "murder and treason only excepted, and those at my own discretion." 102

Such were the charges brought by a host of seceders from the order. The old religious denunciations of the secret societies were now reinforced by political denunciations, and serve to explain the bitterness of the attacks on the part of the legal talent of the country. Thus the evil influence of Masonry, civil, social, and political, was portrayed by Charles Sumner in an address to the Suffolk Committee, while John Quincy Adams devoted a whole volume of letters tracing the institution of Masonry from its introduction into the Protestant colonies of North America to the admissions of the Rhode Island Legislative Committee. 103

But we will not meddle with politics except to note that because Masonry sought to influence "the bench of justice" it met with added opposition from "the sacred desk." The cloth now used an old weapon to meet the new menace. This is their syllogism: Free Masonry is connected with Illuminism; but Illuminism is infidel; therefore, "Masonry leads directly to infidelity." Such is the reasoning implied in Thacher's letters to a brother in the church. Now how can it be proved that Masonry and Illuminism are mutually coupled together? Thacher avails himself of the threadbare arguments of Robinson's Proofs. He also has some new evidence. A Massachu-

102 Odierne, passim.
103 Cf. Letters on the Masonic Institution, Boston, 1847.
setts friend informs him that he had heard indirectly through Dr. Timothy Dwight that the lodge of Portsmouth was "Illuminated"; and directly from a member of that lodge that it was affiliated with French Jacobinism. The writer also knew a young man who had become a gross infidel from joining a French society in one of the Middle States, this society teaching that "the Christian religion was all an imposition, and would soon be abolished.\textsuperscript{104}

From such information, Thacher is satisfied of the validity of the original proposition, that the tendency of Freemasonry is to infidelity, since it was exactly fitted for an engine of infidel philosophy, particularly as new-modelled and ornamented by the French. Finally, says the author, we cannot suppose that so large and fair a portion of the earth as America should be entirely free from the machinations of the Grand Orient of Paris. "There are certainly very many leading Masons of high standing in this country who are deists; and I have personally known several who were not ashamed to avow their atheism."\textsuperscript{105}

All this was written in 1829, the year in which the New York Correspondent ceased and the New Harmony Gazette, changed to the Free Enquirer, was turned into a political organ. We may therefore take the third decade of the century as marking the beginning of the end of free-thinking societies in America. Originally attacked because of their so-called atheistic tendencies, their secrecy was their final undoing. Their possible value as vehicles of rationalism had disappeared in foolish mummary. So from this time on, those who had liberal leanings joined organizations like Brook Farm and followed masters like the sweetly reasonable Emerson. Moreover, for those who preferred the Gallic type of

\textsuperscript{104} Letter of June 29, 1829, by Ethan Smith, Dissertation on the Prophecies, second edition, p. 176.

\textsuperscript{105} Odierne, p. 50.
rationalism, the philosophy of Victor Cousin offered a welcome addition to their intellectual diet. But it should be noticed that those who took up the New England Transcendentalism and the French Eclecticism were largely college-bred; for the masses, with a mere common-school education, there was no outlet for superabundant mental activity. Some took up with revivalism, as an emotional substitute for thought; but the radicals were left in the lurch. There were no more "Tom" Paines left and no "Bob" Ingersollss had as yet appeared on the horizon. Moreover, a civil war was to come and go before Herbert Spencer's agnosticism spread through the land. It was for such reasons then that Robert Owen's "Incomprehensible Power" gained no worshippers and that his "Rational Religion" fell flat. So, as Owen's son summarized the matter in the Forties, "While the Presidents of the United States were admittedly heterodox at the founding of the republic, now politicians are circumspect, and the orthodox clergy, lamenting the dangers of infidelity, are afraid to discuss both sides of the question; . . . they choose that heresy shall be put down without an argument, and are responsible for their insane revivals. Self-styled servants of God, they extend their society from the shores of the Atlantic to the Indian wigwams on the Missouri."

106 See my article "La philosophie française en Amérique" in the Revue Philosophique, November, 1917.
The approaching tercentenary of the founding of Plymouth incites, not to say compels, a review of the remarkable developments and departures from the doctrines of the fathers that have taken place in these three hundred years and calls for a conscientious consideration of what these changes ought to lead to in theological and ecclesiastical readjustments. It is a task which overawes as well as invites and one in which there is need of wide cooperation.

I

The chief concern of the founders of New England was not with doctrine but with church government. It was not to secure either freedom, except for their own uses, or tolerance as a principle, that they dared the perils and hardships of the deep and of the wilderness. Their aim, pursued with invincible singleness of mind, was to establish what they believed to be the only true and scriptural form of government of church and state — a coöperative theocracy. It is correct to call their commonwealth democratic only in the sense that it contained the seeds and sure previsions of democracy. That it was a great step forward in religious and social construction is universally conceded.

With the "Congregational Way," as these ecclesiastical pioneers later termed it, was closely linked a body of doctrine far more in accord with their conservative than
with their progressive principles. It was in brief that set forth by the Westminster Assembly, in whose doctrinal statements they shared fully with their brethren in England. This theology held sway over New England, though not without considerable individual dissent and with gradually loosening hold, until well into the nineteenth century and finally "collapsed" through pressure both from without and from within.

Few chapters in the history of religious thought are fuller of intensity and pathos than that of the supreme effort of Calvinism to maintain itself in this New World against the forces of religious and political progress and the increasing demand for a freer and larger faith. Calvinism found itself unable to meet the disintegrating and demoralizing influences incident to the heavy task of building up a civilization in a new and none too hospitable soil. It sufficed for elect souls initiating a new venture of faith, but it proved too barren and exacting for the wear and tear of every-day prolonged pioneering. Inevitably the severities and inconsistencies of the Westminster standards suffered modification and reduction. "Arminianism," which stood for looseness of all sorts, doctrinal, spiritual, moral, crept into New England in the eighteenth century — an admixture of rational protest against Calvinistic determinism and the other manifest extremes of doctrine and practice, and of sordid relapse into a lower stratum of faith and life. Against this incoming tide of "infidelity," threatening, so they believed, the very foundations of religion, Jonathan Edwards, Samuel Hopkins, and their comrades and successors of the "New Lights" set themselves with consuming zeal, and by sheer spiritual might turned back the tide, not only rescuing Calvinism but advancing its standard to new heights of shining victory. But they were heights impossible to maintain and "High Calvinism" soon had to ally itself with "Moderate Calvinism"
in order to resist the growing incursions of more progressive thought which had been gathering during and succeeding the Revolution and which were at length succeeded by the Unitarian movement.

II

It has been customary to regard Unitarianism as the natural development and culmination of liberal tendencies at work within the New England churches almost from the beginning, and many attempts have been made to spread the Unitarian mantle and even to attach the Unitarian name to all the more liberal New England preachers and theologians who protested against the narrower views prevalent in their time. Perhaps the best presentation of this claim is that of George Willis Cooke in his *Unitarianism in America*. The claim is an exceedingly questionable one, though it has helped to demonstrate how many of these protesters there were, and how reasonable and vigorous were their departures from Westminster theology. If we subject these protests, as recounted by Mr. Cooke, to examination, we find that they were along the following lines: (1) Declarations in favor of liberty of individual thought and judgment, such as that made by Samuel Willard, pastor of the Old South Church of Boston and author of *A Body of Divinity* (1726), who spoke against all “dominion over the consciences of men” and lamented the “woful neglect to know the mind of Christ.” (2) Recognition of the Divine revelation through nature and reason as consonant with that of Scripture, such as that so ably set forth by John Wise of Ipswich in his *Vindication of the Government of the New England Churches* (1717) and later by Ebenezer Gay of Hingham in his Dudleian lectures of 1759. (3) Insistence upon freedom of the will. Predestination and imputation naturally met with vigorous and repeated
denial. Every now and then a defender of freedom arose from the very midst of Calvinism to inveigh against its fatalism. Among such were Samuel West of New Bedford, Samuel Webster of Salisbury, Experience Mayhew, missionary to the Indians, and many others. The extent to which this departure from strict Calvinism had gone by the year 1806 is indicated in the famous compromise creed of Andover Seminary, which declared that "God's decrees perfectly consist with human liberty" — just how is not stated. (4) Declarations in favor of the Divine Unity as opposed to the crass, current tritheism. Among these "anti-trinitarians" were Jonathan Mayhew and Charles Chauncy of Boston, Thomas Barnard of Newburg, and William Bentley and John Prince of Salem. It has been customary to term these and their sympathizers "Arians" because they insisted upon the subordination of Christ to the Father. It would have been quite as exact to call them "Origenists" or even "Athanasians." The fact is, they had no thorough historic or theoretic knowledge of the doctrine of the Trinity. The sum of their anti-trinitarianism was a protest against the caricature of the doctrine then prevalent. (5) Affirmation of faith in the Divine Love and Fatherhood, which found no place in the Calvinism of the Westminster standards. This included a wider application of the Atonement (e.g. The Meritorious Price of our Redemption (1650) by William Pynchon of Springfield, a layman), and a more merciful fate for the non-elect. This liberalism went so far in several instances as to result in out-and-out Universalism, such as appears in Charles Chauncy's Salvation of All Men (1784) and Joseph Huntington's Calvinism Improved (1796).

These bold departures from the accepted doctrine were met by denunciation and attempted refutation; but the significant fact is that the remonstrants, as a rule, remained within the pale of the general fellowship and neither re-
garded themselves as schismatics nor were censured by any ecclesiastical action.¹ The fundamental reason for this lay in the very constitution and idea of New England Congregationalism, which held that the covenant, not the creed, is the constitutive principle of the individual church and that the pastor is answerable for his doctrinal views to his own church only. Although therefore from the first Calvinism was the accepted form of doctrine — the Cambridge Platform (1648) approving “for the substance thereof” the doctrine of the Westminster Confession² — it was the government of the church, “the parties of which are all of them exactly described in the Word of God,”³ departure from which was the most serious offence.

Moreover there is no evidence that these “inconsistent Calvinists” made any noticeable attempt to form a sect or party to antagonize their brethren. They simply gave free utterance to truth that came to them and submitted it to the Christian consciousness and reason of their hearers, their readers, and their associates. The fact, germane and honorable to the Congregational fellowship, is that there was a place for these independent minds, warm though it may have been — or perhaps, one should say cold — within the common body. They not only did not form a party; they did not even form a wing. They were the fearless spokesmen of new truth “breaking forth from God’s word.”

To class these early representatives of a freer and more progressive faith then as Unitarians is unwarranted. They were not Unitarians, for the simple reason that Unitarianism had not then come into existence.

Unitarianism arose as a coöperative, purposeful movement, with a definite existence and character of its own.

¹ The treatment of William Pynchon was a marked exception.
² See Williston Walker; Congregationalists (American Church History Series), p. 160.
³ Ibid. p. 162.
It originated when ministers and churches sought each other with the sense of a common consciousness and a common mission. It began when these associates commenced to say "we" and not "I."

By common consent the "magna charta" of American Unitarianism is Channing's Baltimore sermon of 1819. Throughout this sermon—though the term "Unitarian" does not appear—one of the most significant features is the constant recurrence of the term "we." "We" hold thus and thus. It is the symbol of the birth of a Unitarian consciousness. It marks the emergence of a new self-centred segregate. In a later utterance of Channing, Objections to Unitarian Christianity Considered, this consciousness, coupled with the frequent use of the term "Unitarians," was still more pronounced and aggressive. Thenceforth it developed rapidly and at length led to organization and propaganda. It would be assuming too much to say that this segregation was not provoked, perhaps compelled. All that I desire to point out is that this corporate consciousness and doctrinal consensus were essential to the very existence of Unitarianism as such and that prior to it there was no real "Unitarianism."

It is of no slight importance that it be kept in mind that original and pure American Congregationalism was not, as has been said, a system of doctrine but a way of government, and that it had room within it, as it developed, both for an expansion of its idea of the "Way" and also for independent, outspoken theological thought. It was the false and misguided, not the true, representatives of the New England churches who finally closed the door to doctrinal freedom and development. Had there been more of Christian liberality and grace and wisdom on both sides, there would have been room also for the movement which became Unitarianism within the general.

4 This was quite correctly though not quite amicably argued by the Unitarians. The claim provoked resentment, even denial, because converted into capital for controversy.
body. That, however, is past. Of more concern is it to trace the theological development of the two separating branches and to endeavor to see how they stand related to each other theologically at the present time.

III

The history of the bi-lineal theology after the great separation is full of interest and significance. Like two divergent streams from the same source the two dissen
tient theologies flowed on, now drawing apart, now approaching one another, never without mutual interaction and influence.

The Trinitarian branch moved farther and farther from its original source in the Westminster theology out into the warmth and freedom of a more expansive faith. It had long chafed within the narrow banks of Calvinism and had worn the channel wider and wider under the guise of "improvements." "The entire history of theology in New England," as Dr. Munger once remarked, "may be called an improvement."5 But improvements soon gave way to something more radical. It was not long after the rise of Unitarianism that the New England theology began, through the operation of its own inner life process, to break up. President Dwight published his Theology of softened Calvinism in 1818. Ten years later Nathaniel W. Taylor delivered his famous Concio ad Clerum in New Haven, in which he made the then revolutionary assertion that "sin is man's own act, consisting in a free choice of some object rather than God as his chief good." This was followed by the long and ardent controversy over Taylorism that shook the New England theology to its depths. Later came Charles G. Finney with his evangel of free choice of salvation based upon virtual repudiation of Calvinistic election. A more

5 Benjamin W. Bacon: Theodore Thornton Munger, p. 345.
deeply spiritual and pervasive solvent of the old doctrines was introduced by James Marsh of Vermont University in his epochal publication of Coleridge's *Aids to Reflection* (1840), opening as it did a new fountain of thought and life in the desert of conventional materialistic theology.

Yet the New England theology lingered on, not only in the backward pulpits of conservatism, but in such a centre of light and leading as Andover, where it produced its last brilliant exponent in Edwards A. Park. The new day of larger and freer things did not fully dawn until Horace Bushnell's fresh and emancipating thought had won its way to wide recognition. Then the new wine began to be poured into new wine-skins. The New England theology passed into abandonment and decadence. The transition was not made wholly without conflict and bitterness. Both the honored American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions and Andover Seminary were almost rent in twain by the effort to substitute a humane doctrine of the determination of human destiny and the wider mission of Christ for the old dogma of the eternal damnation of the heathen. But in each case the schism was healed and further separation avoided.

The "New Theology," as it has grown up within the Congregational fellowship under such thinkers as Horace Bushnell, Henry Ward Beecher, Theodore T. Munger, Egbert C. Smyth, Lyman Abbott, Newman Smyth, George A. Gordon, and others, while it has developed in close contact with the wider movement in the same direction, exhibits a peculiarly clear and comprehensive form of the "new" doctrines. These doctrines were inherent in original Christianity but obscured and inhibited under the reign of Calvinism. Restored and developed into a large and initial whole, they may be summarized thus: (1) Divine immanence, prominent in Greek theology
but obscured in Latin theology, ignored in Augustinianism and hence in Calvinism, which was the most pronounced Protestant form of Augustinianism; (2) the witness of the Christian consciousness or experience, as contrasted with the external authority of the written word; (3) continuous creation, as contrasted with static creation, regarding man as evolved physically from nature, though spiritually born from above; (4) salvation, social as well as individual; (5) Christ the centre of the Christian revelation, his incarnation interpreting and fulfilling all other incarnations and his suffering and death revealing the divine law of atonement.

So sharp is the contrast between these distinctive doctrines of yesterday and today and those of the theology that prevailed from the time of the founding of Massachusetts to the downfall of the New England theology, that it seems difficult to trace any continuity whatever between them. Yet there is a continuity. It consists (1) in a deep underlying substratum of common conviction, and (2) in an intellectual and spiritual devotion to religious truth as intense and unflagging as any the human mind has witnessed. Such continuous loyalty to truth forms a bond as strong as ever linked a spiritual succession. The fruit of it is no poor conformity, or uniformity, of intellectual belief, nor any passive development of one type of doctrine from another, but a heroic recognition of the imperative obligation of serious thought upon the problems of religion which survives in some degree even today among the sons of the Pilgrims and Puritans.

It is true that, as President Tucker has pointed out, speculation has given place to inquiry. Successors of the New England theologians hold back from the speculative daring of the fathers who, as Dr. Munger has said,

6 "No one, I am sure, can overlook the immense moral gain which has taken place through the transfer of thought in so large degree from speculation to sober inquiry." William J. Tucker; Idealism in Education; Public-mindedness, p. 314.
"waived nothing"; but neither their courage nor their love of truth has been wholly lost.

IV

When we turn to the history of Unitarian theology, we find here also not stagnation nor retrogression but agita-
tion, controversy, advance. Unitarian thought did not, could not, stop where Channing left it. It had its own course to run, its own problems to meet, its own findings to work out. Protest was its original mission, but it could not live upon protest.

One of the first of these issues was to determine its own conception of Christianity as a religion and of Christ as its founder. This was no light task. It called for constructive thought; and the early Unitarians were not strong in constructive thinking. Protest was far simpler and at first sorely needed. Channing was a genuine master of protest. Ethically sound and virile, intellectually clear and discerning, he exposed the fallacies and inconsistencies of orthodoxy with prophetic power and indignation, though not always with full justice. His protest against a degraded and degrading conception of humanity was not only sound but, as Dr. George A. Gordon has said, it was "a revival of the New Testament interpretation of human nature." His attack on the doctrine of the Trinity — directed against a "Trinitarianism" prevalent in his day but which had no more resemblance to original and genuine Trinitarianism than had the New England Primer to the Nicene Creed — was largely justified. As prophet and reformer Channing was unrivalled, in Christian character and devotion resplendent, but as theologian he was neither learned nor profound. Nor did early Unitarianism possess any outstanding constructive theologian.

7 Horace Bushnell, p. 88. 8 Ultimate Conceptions of Faith, p. 34.
The notable fact about early American Unitarianism is the radicalism of its protests and the conservatism of its products. As a protest against a narrow doctrine of man and a "deformed" tritheism it was, as Dr. Gordon contends, "wholesome, magnificent, providential." But as a positive constructive force it was slow in getting on its feet. It did not know what to do with miracles, and so accepted them. It did not know how to forge a new and better conception of Christianity, and so fell back on the old one. When it came to formulating a doctrinal account of itself, the American Unitarian Association in 1853 unanimously adopted a resolution declaring that "the Divine authority of the Gospel, as founded on a special and miraculous interposition of God, is the basis of the action of the Association." The instinctive loyalty of this declaration to the unique nature and mission of Christianity is commendable, but its perception of the true character of this mission is dull and commonplace enough. "A special and miraculous interposition" sounds like an echo from the wastes of Protestant scholasticism.

Across the barren desert of this theological impotence and lethargy rang the voice of a fresh and unfettered thinker, Theodore Parker. Here at length was an original and contributive mind; a giant, with a giant's strength — and weakness — rugged, human, forceful; too little balanced and reflective to be a great theologian, but bringing genuine opulence as well as candor to the Unitarian cause. At first the lately stoned prophets were for stoning this new prophet sprung from their own ranks, but—they thought better of it, and in due time built him a monument as to one of their chosen vessels. Parker's great sermon on The Transient and Permanent in Christianity (1841) — now regarded as the second of

9 The Christ of Today, p. 37.
the three chief documents of Unitarianism, though at the time greeted with condemnation and contumely — had a salutary influence upon Unitarianism. Though marred here and there, as Chadwick says, with a "purple patch of rhetoric," it is a noble setting forth of the essential elements of Christianity, rich in true thought and feeling. Its distinction between doctrine and the greater reality behind it had in it the promise of a new day. Yet its conception of Christ and of the relation of his person to his words is hazy and ill-defined and lacks the sense of his redeeming power. This latter deficiency is not singular, since sin and evil find little place in Parker's Weltanschauung.

Parker, with all his defects, was a great force, intellectual and religious, and with the larger-minded men of the fellowship, like Hedge, Clarke, and Bellows, saved Unitarian Christianity from lapsing into blank supernaturalism, on the one hand, and mere morality on the other. Above all, did he and they save Unitarianism from the dismal barrenness of a "mere man" conception of Him in whom "the godlike and the human met and embraced and a divine life was born." The incipient tendency to reduce Jesus to the dimensions and influence of "the man you may meet any day in the street" seems to have now completely vanished from Unitarianism.

A second issue which Unitarianism had to face was raised by its attitude toward other religions. Predisposed toward catholicity and sympathy with other faiths and stimulated by the studies of its own scholars in this field, Unitarianism more than once seemed in danger of substituting eclecticism for Christianity, of losing its own identity in its effort to touch hands with every alien religious aspiration, however distant or vagrant.

This inner and subtle peril was felt by the organizers of the National Unitarian Conference in 1865. For, after

11 The Transient and Permanent in Christianity.
much discussion, a clause was inserted in the conference platform stating that its members are “Disciples of the Lord Jesus Christ.” To offset this apparent illiberality and promote wider affiliations, the Free Religious Association was organized in Boston in 1867. The friction caused by these divergent points of view continued for many years. It entered into the controversy with the Western Unitarian Association, which was bent upon adopting into Unitarianism every form of righteousness and every impulse toward a higher life. Slowly, however, the Unitarian body as a whole came to the consciousness that to be coherent it must be Christian and that to be Christian it must keep in touch with Jesus Christ. This conviction found expression at the national conference at Saratoga in 1894 in the declaration commencing, “These churches accept the religion of Jesus,” etc., and later in the adoption of the clause “the leadership of Jesus” in the denominational Confession.

A third issue which the Unitarians had to meet, and one of peculiar difficulty, was the choice between theism and pantheism, or perhaps one should say between theism and monism. This issue was unconsciously thrust upon them by their greatest prophet and personality — with them yet not quite of them — Ralph Waldo Emerson. This is not to say that Emerson was himself a pantheist. He vibrated between pantheism and theism and only in his maturer thought came to equilibrium in theism. Much of his teaching, however, is so far pantheistic as to be both unchristian and unmoral. The famous Divinity School Address of 1838 — sometimes accounted the third great utterance of Unitarianism — full though it is of sweetness and light, is but a sorry version of the real substance of the Christian message. Underneath all the foolish disparagement with which it was assailed by Unitarians as well as by orthodox, lay the instinctive consciousness that this was neither true Christianity nor true Unitarianism.
No great seer and sage ever called for closer discrimination in the reception of his message than Emerson. While Unitarianism has been not a little misled by his vaguer and more naturalistic sentiments, it is upon the whole an evidence of its spiritual stability that it has not been more completely confused by its great prophet and deflected from vital ethics and theism. In the main it has stored his wheat and burned his chaff—or at least left it in the field for weaker minds to mistake for grain.

But what of Transcendentalism? Was not that a by-path into which Unitarianism strayed and from which it returned to the main road confused and exhausted? On the contrary, the Unitarian attachment to Transcendentalism—which was a movement far wider than its ranks—was on the whole an evidence of intellectual and spiritual sensitiveness. For Transcendentalism, when reduced to its essence, meant reliance upon moral and spiritual intuition as over against the crass materialism and rationalism of orthodoxy. It was a nineteenth-century rendering of the second chapter of First Corinthians. If it was not the "whole gospel," it was a needed philosophical *prolegomenon* of it. It stood for the truth that spiritual things must be spiritually discerned—though by no means as well able to coördinate this truth with the practical application of the gospel as was Paul. Here again, to be sure, there were transcendental lapses and lisplings on the part of weaker brethren, and sometimes on the part of stronger; but in the large, Transcendentalism laid hold of a genuine principle and helped to establish the self-evidencing nature of moral and spiritual truth.12

12 While Unitarianism, through the fear of dogmatic systemism, has been hesitant about launching theological systems, and thus has contributed less to the science of theology than it might otherwise have done, it has never lost interest in the intellectual apprehension of religion. The one outstanding text-book in theology produced by American Unitarianism, Professor C. C. Everett's posthumous *Theism and the Christian Faith*, is characterized by learning, philosophic judgment, and breadth, and, although of the Neo-Hegelian school modified by Schleiermacher, deliberately presents the theistic doctrine of God as well as the absoluteness of Christianity.
On the whole, the history of American Unitarian theology shows that it has escaped serious pitfalls, has assimilated the best and strongest and rejected the worst and weakest in the movements which have arisen within or about it, and has—like its kindred denomination—advanced steadily in its apprehension and interpretation of "pure Christianity."

V

In the light of this conclusion we may go on to attempt to estimate the present theological situation as relates to the two branches of original New England Congregationalism on the eve of its tercentenary. What have the two fellowships in common? What have they of a distinctive and separative character? And how can they draw closer together for a common task in these urgent days that call for the greatest possible Christian unity?

In the first place, it must be evident that each fellowship has much to repent of in its treatment of the other, the Trinitarians of bitterness and scorn in their attitude toward Unitarians, the Unitarians of intemperance and injustice in their denunciations of Trinitarians. There have been acts too as well as words that were neither charitable nor Christian, such as the exclusion of Unitarians from Congregational pulpits on the one side, and on the other the appropriation of church property on the basis of a claim which was legal rather than equitable. The injustice of this latter action has been recently magnanimously admitted by a well-known Unitarian who adds his tribute to "the splendid loyalty to conscience which inspired the conservatives to depart from an organization which they deemed hostile to the Christian faith." Is it not time that we of

the Trinitarian lineage acknowledged that the charge of "robbery" preferred against the Unitarians was also unjust? The old bitterness and jealousy have now happily at length passed away, though not a little of prejudice and suspicion lingers — far less in New England, significantly, especially about Boston, than in parts of the country where less of the whole matter is known.

Endeavors toward mutual understanding and good will, both courageous and Christian, have frequently been made — notable among them those of Horace Bushnell, Cyrus Bartol, T. T. Munger, James Freeman Clarke, George A. Gordon, and Starr King. The latter's "memorable" sermon — *Spiritual Christianity* — is one of the strongest, most scholarly, and most eloquent of irenic sermons, and is as timely today as when it was delivered.

Probably the volume that has done most to interpret the opposing parties to each other is James Freeman Clarke's *Truths and Errors of Orthodoxy*, which appeared in 1866. Clarke, in the judgment of the writer, was the ablest theologian as well as one of the finest characters American Unitarianism has produced, and this book is one of the most penetrative and discriminating contributions to American theology. Its extensive circulation has given it a wide and beneficial influence, and the name of its author deserves honor and gratitude from these kindred bodies and from all lovers of truth and fairness.

The doctrinal issues between the two fellowships are now to a large degree obsolete, for the simple reason that the whole theological situation has changed. We are in another theological era. Old things are passed away, all is new — viewpoint, task, outlook. That does not mean the denial of continuity but the confirmation of it. It would be impossible, for instance, to revive the controversy over the doctrine of the Trinity as it once raged.
The assertion has often been made and is quite warranted, that neither side in the contest fully understood the doctrine, either historically or philosophically. This is well illustrated by a statement of Dr. Andrew P. Peabody, who was far better acquainted with the history of doctrine than most of his contemporaries, that “the Nicene creed is expressly anti-trinitarian, making Christ a derived and thus of necessity a subordinate being”\(^\text{14}\)—as if derivation, or at least differentiation in unity, were not essential to the very essence of the doctrine of the Trinity, except as the New England tritheism had perverted it. How significant was it of the change of attitude, or of atmosphere, when Dr. Hedge declared, “We cannot be too thankful that the Athanasian view prevailed against the Arian which recognizes no divinity in man”\(^\text{15}\).

With respect to the nature and destiny of man, Congregationalism has come far closer in its later development to Channing’s reverent and noble appraisal of human worth at its best, though it has carried into it also a perception of the darker side of human nature such as neither Channing nor his successors grasped but which history, especially of late, has amply confirmed.

In its doctrine of Christ, Unitarianism has been as vacillating and vague as Congregationalism has been dogmatic and conventional. Both are coming to see in him far more than either originally saw.

VI

The two fellowships are undoubtedly drawing nearer together as they move forward, in common with the whole body of Christians, into a larger conception of Christianity and its cardinal truths. Yet the statement

\(^\text{14}\) Unitarianism: Its Origin and History, p. 156. (Italics mine.)

\(^\text{15}\) Reason in Religion, p. 238; quoted by Charles A. Allen, in Unitarianism of Today, p. 11.
of Dean Fenn that the "two bodies have arrived, each in its own way, at substantially similar theological conclusions on the points once at issue," is open to question. In spite of very large agreements, there are still substantial differences which it is no gain to overlook. Perhaps the most deeply rooted divergence concerns human nature, or in other words the doctrine of sin. Here, it seems to most Congregationalists, the Unitarians have always been and still are inclined to a superficial optimism which is untrue to reality. The article, for instance, in the Unitarian Confession affirming belief in "the Progress of Mankind onward and upward forever," while provoking no positive dissent, seems to the sterner Puritan lineage essentially misleading because of what it fails to recognize — namely, the great struggle and cost of progress and the need of divine succor which it involves. Progress is a great, a divine truth, but it is not so near to the heart of Christianity as redemption, and divorced from redemption progress is but a roseate naturalistic self-deception.

Retaining a deep sense of the need of redemption, most Congregationalists cannot satisfy themselves with merely affirming "the leadership of Jesus." That leadership they gladly acknowledge and they see that it involves, if carried through, the transformation of the whole structure of society from bottom to top — social, educational, international. But they seek and find in Jesus Christ also a necessary dynamic, an impelling power, enabling men to do the things which they know they ought to do under his leadership but which they fail to do for lack of strength and impulse until they find in him "the power of God unto salvation." Perhaps it may be chargeable to a survival of something of the old inclination to rest back upon a Higher Power which characterizes Calvinism, but at all events the more

conservative branch of the lineage of the Pilgrims retains more of a sense of dependence upon God and is inclined to put quite as much stress upon the second part of that ringing exclamation of Paul, "I can do all things through Christ which strengtheneth me," as upon the first. Moreover they find in the long-abused doctrine of atonement a recognition of the place which sacrificial, vicarious — though not substitutionary — suffering has in human redemption which their Unitarian brethren do not seem as yet fully to recognize.

In the conception of God too there is a difference of shading, if not of substance. If, as Dean Fenn states, the Unitarians have gone over to a "Calvinism of immanence," the Trinitarians, while sharing to the full the doctrine of immanence, have endeavored to retain also the doctrine of transcendence, believing both to be essential to Divine Fatherhood.

VII

With these theological divergences — in spite of so much in common — still remaining, can the two fellowships come closer together? How can two walk together unless they are agreed? Clearly they cannot unless they have enough of agreement to undergird their differences. On the other hand, if they were absolutely agreed in every particular and point of view, of what stimulus were walking together? What is the case with these two disparted companies of disciples? Have they enough in common and enough that is original and distinctive to make a closer comradeship contributive to the common good? Certainly they have, along with their divergences, a great deal in common doctrinally. Yet there is a far more fundamental unity than that of doctrinal consent, essential to genuine sympathy and fellowship,

and that is experiential unity. Have these two bodies a common and uniting Christian experience?

There is a very prevalent impression among "Evangelical" bodies that Unitarians are lacking in spiritual life, that though they may abound in prayer and good works, they have not so much as heard that there is a Holy Ghost, that their religion is almost wholly moral and intellectual and very little experimental and communicative. Perhaps there has been some ground for this assumption. Unitarianism has clearly been characterized by a certain aloofness, a self-consciousness, at times painful to others, if not to itself. Unitarianism is, of all Christian bodies, the most analytical and introspective. It is almost pathetic to note how many attempts Unitarians have made to define themselves. The effort began with Channing and has been continued by President Eliot, Professor Emerton, Charles W. Wendte, Charles G. Ames, M. J. Savage, E. A. Horton, S. M. Crothers, S. A. Eliot, Howard N. Brown, William L. Sullivan, and, one might almost add, all other Unitarians. Such excessive self-examination is not edifying. It reminds one of the extreme morbidness, in individual experience, of a John Bunyan or a David Brainerd; only unfortunately there is very little of denominational penitence and self-reproach in it. It is in its way almost as bad as "such boastings" as the Congregationalists use, "or lesser breeds without the law," and makes one wonder if we are not all, after all, "miserable sinners."

Yet it is not this which has been complained of in the Unitarians so much as their frigidity. Did not Emerson himself call Unitarianism an "ice chest"? And yet in the utterances of representative American Unitarians—as Charles A. Allen has so conclusively shown in his Unitarianism of Today—preference has often been given to the religion of the heart over that of the head. "It
was of the very essence of the liberal movement,” declares John W. Chadwick, “to emphasize the ethical and spiritual.” “It is of less moment,” asserted Hedge, “that the intellect should form a perfect conception than that the heart should have perfect conviction.” “Religion is not a theory for the understanding, but a life to the soul,” wrote J. H. Allen. And one of the latest and best interpreters of Unitarianism, Professor Christie, holds that “the first and fundamental characteristic of Unitarianism is that it is an undogmatic church” and that religious union begins “whenever two souls recognize in one another a direct, real, and inward contact with the divine life.” It may be objected that these are individual utterances and do not reflect the temper of the body as a whole. However that may be, the tendency of Unitarianism today is certainly in the direction of greater warmth and outgo of spiritual life. The recent interest in mysticism and the preaching mission attest this. Who would have dreamed ten years ago of a Unitarian revival? Nor are these mere sporadic efforts to make the wheels go round, but evidences of a genuine spiritual renascence throughout the Unitarian body.

It is neither right nor Christian to let outgrown issues determine present attitudes. Theology must be justified of her children. If there is to be continued, upon the part of the “Evangelical” churches, a policy of withholding fellowship from Unitarianism upon theological ground, it must be made clear that it is based upon actual theological disharmonies sufficient to warrant so unbrotherly an attitude.

Yet this paper is not intended for the purpose of raising an issue but of surveying a great theological movement dating from the very beginnings of New England. I

have dealt with it in only one of its denominational aspects. A larger treatment would require consideration of other denominational theological relationships.

As one looks back upon the movement of American theology since 1620 it can hardly be without a sense of gratitude for the progress that has been made, not only in truth but in charity. There is reason for thankfulness, not only that the old controversies have died out, but that the very spirit of controversy, which was the animus of separation, has fallen into desuetude. Looking back from this distance it seems strange that controversial theology ever had such vogue, that the idea and practice of polemics could ever have assumed so large a place in minds so sweet and strong. The whole method of attack and defence is alien to the spirit of Christianity, a corollary perhaps of the obsolete philosophy of war as a method of settling differences.

Great indeed is the cause for gratitude that we of this generation have come—through little virtue or achievement of our own—out of the atmosphere of controversy into one of friendliness, in which we can not only work together but reason together concerning the great things of the kingdom. Along this open road, leading on to larger truth and deeper unity, we of the Pilgrim lineage may walk in generous fellowship with one another and with all our fellow Christians, assured that in so doing we shall lose nothing of the high purpose and true spirit of the fathers.
Through the pages of its *Mittheilungen*, of which 55 numbers appeared prior to 1915, the German Orient Society has kept its members informed concerning the excavations which since 1899 it has been conducting in the East. The more technical details have from time to time appeared in the *Wissenschaftliche Veröffentlichungen* issued by the Society. That Assyria and Babylon have been a field of special attractiveness seems natural for a Society the inception and direction of which have been in large measure the work of the eminent Assyriologist Friedrich Delitzsch. It is due to his enthusiasm that the Society has secured such large financial support that it could project and execute plans on a scale and with a degree of thoroughness not seen before in the Babylonian-Assyrian territory. The friendly relations between the German and Turkish governments have likewise greatly eased the path of the explorer.

The two sites which have received most attention have been Babylon and the Assyrian capital, Asshur. The work at Babylon lacks of course the interest that belongs to the excavations of the French at Khorsabad and Tel-loh or of the English at Nineveh and Calah, but this is no fault of the explorer. The literary and art remains of Babylon were for the most part less well preserved than those of the other sites named.

But Babylon has an interest, apart from its ruins, peculiarly its own. It is the site of the Tower of Babel, the home of the power which destroyed the Jewish State,
the scene of Daniel’s triumph and of Belshazzar’s feast, and it occupies a large space in the utterances of Hebrew prophets. Greek and Roman writers describe at length its greatness and splendor in the period just prior to its sudden fall, and especially its palaces, temples, fortifications, bridges, quays, and hanging gardens, built by Nebuchadnezzar. The native records which we have from this monarch never weary in dealing with these subjects. Impressed on clay cylinders and tablets from many of the ruins of Babylonia, and carved on stone slabs at Babylon and even on the steep sides of the mountains of Lebanon, these records give us much information about the city at the time of its greatest power and magnificence. Cyrus has informed us with what joy the Babylonians welcomed his victorious entry into the city. With its change of masters Babylon became one of the capitals of the Persian empire, but it declined greatly during the Persian period. Alexander had the intention to make it the capital of his new world-empire, and actually began preparations for its rebuilding, but sudden death put an end to his brilliant dream.

Through all the centuries of decay the ancient name has been preserved on the spot. It is now attached to the most northerly of the three mounds on which the larger buildings of the city stood. This mound, Babil by name, contains the remains of one of the palaces built by Nebuchadnezzar. Amran, the most southerly mound, is the site of Marduk’s temple Esagil, the most famous temple of Babylon. Between Babil and Amran is the mound called by the natives Kasr, wherein lie the remains of the chief palace of Nebuchadnezzar. These three mounds are all on the eastern side of the Euphrates. But the course of that stream has suffered many shifts, and it appears at one period to have run to the east of the Kasr. If this be the case, it would, as pointed out by Robert Koldewey, director of the German excava-
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tions at Babylon, explain the statement of Greek historians that the two palaces of Nebuchadnezzar were on opposite sides of the river.

For several centuries the site of Babylon has been known to the western world. It has in modern times been repeatedly visited, and in the past century was the scene of a certain amount of superficial excavation. Various considerations have tended to discourage exploration at this spot. Among these are the vastness of the ruins, the ill success of the initial tests, and the comparative ease and success of exploration elsewhere. What Koldewey’s predecessors accomplished is accordingly relatively insignificant. No one of them was in a position to lay plans commensurate with the largeness of the undertaking. Even Koldewey, with the large resources of money and time at his command, has scarcely half completed the task. Certain large results have been achieved, but many smaller problems still await their solution by the spade. The excavations have been confined almost entirely to the mounds, wherein the ruins of the larger buildings lie. The lower levels, burying the streets and houses of the successive periods of the city, are still largely untouched by the excavator.

Koldewey’s book, which in the original bears the title *Das Wieder Erstehende Babylon*, appeared in 1913, and reports what was accomplished at Babylon between March, 1899, and May, 1912. In this period the work went on almost without interruption.

The book contains in its preface an epitomized diary of the work. The record of the excavations is given in 52 sections. This is followed by an appendix with extracts from the writings of Herodotus and other classical historians, a table of contents, and a list of the illustrations. The translation into English adds an index of

seven pages, a list of the publications of the Orient Society, and an important note concerning a cuneiform description of the great temple Esagil.

About one half of the book is devoted to the Kasr, the central mound, the site of Nebuchadnezzar's chief palace. This mound is about 600 metres north and south and about 500 east and west. Here were unearthed the palace, the Procession Street, and the temple of the goddess Ninmacht. In places only foundations remained, in other places portions of the massive walls were in position. Here as everywhere else in the ruins enormous damage has been done to the buildings by the modern natives, who dig out the bricks for present use, the building of houses, and making of dams.

The palace on the mound consisted of two parts, a southern and a northern. The enclosing wall of the southern half forms a trapezium, with sides measuring approximately 280, 320, 190, and 125 metres. Here stood once the palace of Nebuchadnezzar's father, which the son rebuilt, enlarged, and adorned. The main entrance seems to have been on the east, where a massive gateway leads into a court about 40 by 60 metres in size. Across this court is a passage into a second court about 40 by 35 metres, and beyond this a third about 50 by 60 metres near the centre of the great complex of buildings. On the south side of this third court are three doors leading into the largest and finest hall in the ruin, a room about 53 by 18 metres. Here were found richly colored tiles with elaborate ornamentation representing figures of columns, garlands, and animal forms. Koldewey thinks that this was Nebuchadnezzar's throne room. A recess or niche in the southern wall of the room may have been the spot where the royal throne stood. The rest of the southern half of the Kasr is occupied by a great number of passage-ways, halls, and chambers. The chambers were doubtless the sleeping apartments, offices,
and store-rooms of the palace. A massive group of vaults in the north-east corner of the enclosure is believed by Koldewey to be the substructions of the hanging gardens.

The northern half of the mound was excavated only in small part, but enough was done to show that it contains the large extension of the palace in this direction of which we learn in the records of Nebuchadnezzar.

Running north and south on the eastern side of the palace, and extending as far south as the temple of Esagil, is the most celebrated street of Babylon, the so-called Procession Street of Marduk, along which the chief god of Babylon was at times borne in stately procession. This street is paved with blocks of breccia, and the walls enclosing it on either side were decorated with enamelled tiles representing lions, bulls, and dragons. Near the corner identified with the hanging gardens the street passes through the most elaborate gateway of Babylon, the Ishtar gate, often mentioned in the records of Nebuchadnezzar. The massive pillars of this gateway are likewise decorated with similar figures. The dragons have the body of a beast covered with the scales of a serpent, the fore feet of a beast, the hind feet of a bird, and the head and tail of a serpent. Koldewey estimates that there were several hundred of these animal figures.

On the eastern side of the Procession Street and near the Ishtar gate lie the ruins of the temple of Ninmach, which may have served as the palace temple. In size it is about 50 by 30 metres, and it is not quite rectangular. The entrance is in the northern wall, and the adytum is near the opposite southern wall of the temple. In front of the outer door was a small altar built of brick. A vestibule, with a porter's room on the left, leads to a central court about 20 by 14 metres. Beneath the floor of the court is a well. On the south side of the court is a
room about 12 by 5 metres, with a smaller chamber or closet at one end. Passing through the larger chamber we enter another of the same size. This is the adytum. Facing the door is the platform on which the statue of the god had stood or sat. There had been three of these platforms, one above the other, necessitated by successive elevations of the floor. Two of these were still in place. Underneath the lowest was a brick receptacle containing a clay statuette in human form with a thin staff of gold in one hand. Grouped around the temple court are several chambers, also certain long corridors of uncertain use. A foundation record of Assurbanipal's found in the temple shows that this Assyrian king had restored the building while his brother was ruling at Babylon. From inscriptions of Nebuchadnezzar we know that he also built the temple anew.

In addition to the temple just described three other temples were excavated besides Esagil. All were more elaborate than the temple of Ninmach, but the arrangements of the interior were much the same. Others still await discovery, for we read in the inscriptions the names of several not yet found.

A reminder of the Persian period of Babylon is found in the ill-preserved remains of a Persian building which stood on one side of the Kasr mound. The identification is based on the architectural features of the building, which repeat those of the Persepoilitan palaces. It is confirmed by the discovery of fragments of stone with several letters in the Persian cuneiform script. Koldewey thinks that he recognizes in them part of the name of Darius.

Some 1700 metres north of the Kasr lies Babil, an imposing mound, the site of Nebuchadnezzar's second palace. Though the excavation was only partial, inscriptions found there leave no doubt as to the identification. The mound is nearly square, with approximately 500 metres
to the side. In the records of Nebuchadnezzar the name Babil ordinarily means the city, but sometimes the citadel or what is now the Kasr. This double use of the name is the source of some confusion in the interpretation of the inscriptions. Particularly has that been the case in regard to two great walls of Babylon, Imgur Bel and Nimitti Bel. The excavations have shown that these were walls in connection with Babil in the narrower sense—the Kasr palace—and not the more northerly mound now known as Babil. What led to the transfer of the name from one mound to the other we do not know.

About 3000 metres south of Babil is the large mound Amran, of irregular shape, the site of Marduk’s temple Esagil. This temple, for many centuries the most important building at Babylon, was an object of reverent care to Babylonian and Assyrian kings from the days of Hammurabi. With all the other buildings at Babylon it suffered destruction at the hands of Sennacherib in or about the year 689 B.C. Esarhaddon restored the city, and Assurbanipal devoted much attention to Esagil. During the reign of the latter the statue of Marduk, which had been taken by Sennacherib as a trophy to Assyria, was restored to its shrine in Esagil. But naturally no Assyrian ruler would give to Babylonian temples such care as would a native king residing in the city. We find accordingly that Nabopolassar devoted special attention to Esagil. But it was under his son Nebuchadnezzar that this temple saw its most glorious days. Hardly any of his numerous records fail to describe at length or briefly his works of restoration. They tell us much about the temple proper, the bricks of its walls, the cedar of its roofing, the gold and silver with which it was adorned. They tell of its four imposing gates and of its three shrines, one to Marduk, one to his spouse Zirpanit, and one to their son Nabu, all brilliantly em-
bellished. They describe Marduk’s elaborate procession-boat, in which the god was borne on certain festive occasions. They give long lists of the sacrifices and describe the Chamber of Destiny, in which annually in the new-year period the gods assembled around Marduk to declare the destinies for the year. They devote special attention to the temple-tower, on the top of which stood another shrine to Marduk.

But unfortunately these records and those of the succeeding kings do not furnish the data for a reconstruction of the plan of the temple. While telling of laying foundations as deep as the water-level, of building walls as firm as the mountain-rock, and of rearing the top of the tower mountain high, they give neither dimensions nor directions. The impression received from these descriptions is of large, massive, solid, and lofty structures, lavishly adorned. Perhaps naturally one thinks of the tower and the shrines as forming a group of buildings surrounded by a lofty wall entered through massive gateways. Nothing in the record tells us what was the form of the tower nor how the shrine at its top was reached, whether by stairway or by inclined plane, whether from within or without.

Herodotus, fortunately, answers some of our questions. True it is that he came after the decline of Babylon had set in, but it is not likely that the tower had undergone any radical change of form, and if it had, a correct tradition may well have survived. According to Herodotus the tower consisted of a series of eight stages or blocks, each smaller than the one below it, and the ascent was on the outside. The lowest stage was square in plan, each side measuring a stadium. The shrine at the top contained no image, but there was another temple lower down, that is, on the ground, with altars and a large golden image of the god. The temple precincts in this account formed a quadrangle, each side measuring two stadia.
Koldewey carried his excavations down to water-level at a depth of 23 metres below the surface, but what he found in the Amran coincides not at all with the tower and temple described by Herodotus. What the explorer identifies as Esagil is a structure in two parts, an eastern and a western. The western measures about 85 by 80 metres. The sides face the cardinal points, and each side near the middle has an entrance conducting into the large court in the central space. Six floors were recognized, representing six successive elevations of the floor-level. Two of these were from Nebuchadnezzar and two from the Assyrian king Assurbanipal. The uppermost floor was reached only after digging through 18½ metres of débris. The enclosing walls of the building were six metres thick. Three shrines were recognized, on the west, south, and north sides respectively, one of them being that of Marduk.

The eastern portion of this temple covers about 90 by 115 metres. Four gates and several smaller openings lead into the interior. The excavations were not carried far enough to determine the details of the plan of this building, but inscriptions of Esarhaddon and Assurbanipal found at the floor-level seem to leave no doubt that it is a part of the great temple of Esagil. So great is the accumulation of débris at this point that to reach the floor involved the removal of 30,000 cubic metres of rubbish.

One may well ask whether this great structure in two parts is really Esagil, as Koldewey holds, or only an annex to the great temple. The main reasons for the doubt are that it is not inside the great enclosure where the remains of the tower lie, and particularly that the Procession Street does not skirt its wall as it does in the case of the enclosure. Elsewhere in Assyria and Babylonia the tower, the so-called ziggurat, is in close proximity to the temple, and we get the impression from Nebu-
chadnezzar and from Herodotus that this was the case with Esagil also. If this criticism is correct, Koldewey did not find the central part of Esagil at all. What remains of it is still to be sought in the unexcavated portion of the great enclosure.

The southern limit of this enclosure lies about 100 metres north of the buildings just described. The enclosure is nearly rectangular, measuring about 400 by 450 metres, and the walls are very massive. There are twelve gates. Built against the walls on the inside are many chambers, in all probability storerrooms, apartments of temple-attendants, and, as Koldewey thinks, lodging-rooms for pilgrims.

A tower near the south-west corner of the enclosure, about 90 metres square, is held by the explorer to be Etemenanki, the celebrated tower of Esagil. This opinion is supported by several inscribed bricks of Assurbanipal and Nebuchadnezzar from the ruin relating to the reconstruction of Etemenanki. Leading up to this tower and perpendicular to its southern line is a steep stairway, from which Koldewey concludes that this was the only method of ascent, and that the current view is erroneous. This view, based on Herodotus, represents the ascent as made by passing around the tower in rising from one stage to the next higher. This view is supported by what the French explorers found in excavating the city of Sargon in the ruins of Khorsabad. Here was a tower altogether like what Herodotus describes at Babylon. Koldewey thinks that there was no such tower found at Khorsabad but that the French explorers, misled by Herodotus, saw what was in reality not in the ruins at all. But is not such an opinion an excess of scepticism? To justify his doubt it was necessary for Koldewey to question also the accuracy of a report of George Smith that he had seen in Paris a cuneiform tablet describing Marduk’s temple at Baby-
Ion and agreeing essentially with Herodotus as to the form of the tower. A note appended to the translation of Koldewey's book calls attention to the fact that this tablet, long lost to sight, has reappeared, and has been made the subject of an elaborate study by two competent French scholars. This study seems to show that Koldewey is in the wrong in his strictures on George Smith, the French explorers, and Herodotus. Indeed, notwithstanding all the excavation carried on in this enclosure, but little new information has been gained regarding Esagil and Etemenanki, and it is much to be feared that these buildings have suffered so greatly that no degree of excavation will ever be able to add much to our knowledge. Some of the dimensions given by Herodotus are doubtless exaggerations, but there seems to be no reason to doubt the general accuracy of his descriptions.

Marduk's Procession Street, coming from the Kasr in the north, skirts the great enclosure on the east and on the south, and crossed the Euphrates on a bridge near the south-west corner of the enclosure. Though the river has shifted its course, a depression in the ground shows where it formerly ran, and seven of the brick piers by which the bridge was supported were excavated. The piers are 21 metres long and 9 metres in width, and the seven cover a space 123 metres long. Along the ancient river bank running north and south from the end of the bridge are the remains of a wall erected by Nabunaid, the last native king of Babylon.

Some 500 metres east of the Kasr lies an extensive mound composed entirely of the débris of burned bricks. This débris seems to have come from the ruins of Etemenanki at the time when Alexander caused the site to be cleared away with the intention of rebuilding the tower. In this mound were excavated the remains of an extensive Greek theatre. The seats, which numbered about 30
rows, have a semicircular form with an extreme diameter of about 66 metres. Though very badly damaged, enough of the theatre remained to make possible a restoration of its plan. According to a Greek inscription in four lines, perfectly preserved except at the ends of the lines, this theatre was erected or restored by a certain Dioskouri(des). The original construction may well belong to the time of the occupation of the city by Alexander.

In the triangle formed by lines connecting the Kasr, Esagil, and the Greek theatre, lies a section of the ruins now known as Merkes. Here were excavated some of the streets and private houses coming from various periods of the history of the city. In the surface-layers, the first two or three metres, were found the sparse remains of houses of the Parthian period. The next four metres are from Greek, Persian, and late Babylonian times. The narrow streets run north and south, east and west. The houses are thickly crowded together, have massive walls made of sun-dried bricks, and good brick floors. Wells are frequent. One of the larger of the houses, apparently from the time of Nebuchadnezzar, contains 24 chambers grouped around two courts. It is somewhat irregular in shape, about 40 by 40 metres, and consists of two halves. The arrangement of the rooms suggests that part of the house was used as a dwelling and part for business purposes.

At a lower level, in the period 1400-1300 B.C. as appeared from dated tablets found at this level, the houses were less crowded. One metre below water-level were reached the ruins of the city of Hammurabi (about 2100 B.C.) and his successors. The houses have walls of sun-dried bricks resting on foundations of burned bricks. They are closely crowded together and less massive than those of the time of Nebuchadnezzar. The Babylon of a still earlier period lies now entirely under water, owing to the gradual rise of the river bed, the surface of the ter-
rain, and the water-level. The space in which these houses were excavated was in ancient times slightly higher than the general level of the city, with the result that in the lower sections the remains are buried still deeper below the water-level.

A section of the city wall on the north-east side was investigated. The wall is double, an inner and an outer, that is, with a space between filled in with earth. The inner wall, of sun-dried bricks, is about seven metres thick, with towers at frequent intervals; the outer, of burned bricks, about eight metres thick; and the intervening space about 12 metres. The whole wall has thus a thickness of about 27 metres. The original height could not be determined. Outside and close to the wall was the moat wall, three and a half metres thick. The moat itself had not been examined, nor had any of the city gates been found when Koldewey's book was written.

The ruins described by Koldewey lie all on the east side of the river. Assuming the correctness of the statement of Herodotus that the city lay on both sides of the river, Koldewey estimates that the circumference was about 18,000 metres. This is somewhat more than a fourth of that given by Ktesias and somewhat less than a fourth of the figure named by Herodotus. Finding no evidence of remains of walls enclosing a vastly larger area, Koldewey concludes that the statement of the ancient authors is an exaggeration.

While the chief attention of the explorers was devoted to the examination of the great buildings of Babylon, especially palaces and temples, it was their good fortune to discover a multitude of small objects, such as cuneiform tablets, statuettes and figurines, pottery, etc.

Thanks to these excavations we can now form a better picture than ever before of the city which so profoundly influenced the history of the world and so deeply impressed the imagination of ancient writers. But though much
has been done, much still remains to be done, not only in the depressions where the houses of the people lay, but also in the great mounds, not one of which has been fully explored.

Koldewey's book is entertainingly written, and is profusely illustrated with plans, sketches, and half-tone reproductions. Seven of the half-tones are reproduced in color, and give a fine impression of the brilliancy of the ancient decoration. The book is full of details, but is not overloaded with them. For the student of history or the Bible it is a work of the deepest interest and importance.

A word remains to be said about the translation. On the whole this is well done. In several instances errors of the original are corrected without comment, as "eastern" for "western" (p. xii, n. 36, and p. 214), "south-east" for "south-west" (p. 2, line 16), and "76" for "46" (p. 32, line 7). On the other hand "Nebuchadnezzar" for "Nabopolassar" (p. xvi, n. 144, and p. 232) seems to be a slip of the translator. The name is correctly given on p. 225, line 9. Inasmuch as Professor Gütterbock of the Orient Society read the translation in proof, one suspects that some of the divergences from the German may be due to his hand. This would seem to be the case at least in the suppression of acknowledgment of indebtedness to him (p. vi of the German edition). In many cases the translation adds to or takes from the emphasis of the original, as "a number" (p. 6, line 4) for "many" (viele), and "many" (p. 164, line 18) for "several" (mehrere). Some of the translations are only approximations, as "strengthened our decision" (p. vi, line 10) for "helped to reach the decision" (trugen mit zu dem Entschlusse bei); "strip" (p. viii, line 4) for "corner" (Ecke); "only" (p. 3, line 12) for "scarcely" (kaum); "unfinished state" (p. 1, line 3) for "insignificance, small amount of" (Geringfügigkeit). Occasionally
the translation misrepresents the original, as p. 5, last sentence: “We shall later turn more in detail from the testimony of the ancient writers to the evidence of the ruins themselves.” Read: “We shall later return more in detail to (the subject of) the relation of the ancient writers to the ruins themselves.” On p. 5, line 15, for “There are other overwhelming considerations which we shall investigate later,” read “Other considerations are decisive; we shall try to present them further along.” On p. 5, line 16, for “even in circumference,” read “already in circumference as we have now established it.” On p. 5, line 19, for “which in other respects rivalled Babylon,” read “which certainly approaches Babylon” (i.e., in size).

While these lists of infelicities of rendering might be much enlarged, not many cases have been noted in which the sense is seriously affected. Both translator and publisher have rendered valuable service in promptly making this important publication accessible in an English dress.
THE UNITY OF THE ARAMAIC ACTS

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The most interesting contribution to New Testament criticism in recent times has come from a scholar in another field. Professor Torrey, a student of Semitics and particularly of the Aramaic, the language of the common people in Palestine before and after the Christian era, has propounded a new theory regarding the Book of Acts.¹ Chapters 1 16 — 15 35 are thought by him to have comprised an Aramaic book written about 49 or 50 A.D., which Luke later procured in Palestine and translated as faithfully as he was able, at the same time adding the remaining chapters himself in Greek on the basis of his own knowledge and investigation. The two parts of the book are accordingly designated I and II Acts, respectively. The evidence for the hypothesis is primarily linguistic. A striking series of Aramaismos and of mistranslations which can be plausibly corrected on the basis of the Aramaic, is found in I Acts, while in II Acts the reflections of Aramaic idiom are rare and instances of mistranslation are wholly lacking. The literature of the subject is not yet large, but a careful résumé and discussion of the new theory has appeared from the pen of Professor Foakes-Jackson.² Since he questions the validity of Professor Torrey’s more important deductions — conclusions whose correctness had been accepted almost

¹ C. C. Torrey, The Composition and Date of Acts, Harvard Theological Studies, No. 1 (1917).
without qualification by the present writer—a further consideration of their claims to credence may be permissible.

The epoch-making consequences of the theory Professor Foakes-Jackson sees clearly and states with generous frankness. To be sure, the term "orthodox" could be applied quite as appropriately to "our previous ideas of the date not only of Acts, but of the written synoptic tradition," as it can to the view newly promulgated, namely, "that Acts was completed by A.D. 64." But of course even these "previous ideas" have not been an undisputed orthodoxy, nor has the recent inclination to date Acts, and by implication most or all of the synoptics, after the year 70, always prevailed. There was an earlier stage of New Testament criticism which confidently placed these books in the second century. Later a dating between 75 and 85 became customary, and it is probably this which Professor Foakes-Jackson is somewhat loth to give up. But even before the Aramaic theory was promulgated, Professor Harnack, who formerly put Acts after 70 A.D., had come to the opinion that it was written before the Jewish war and soon after Paul's imprisonment. Professor Torrey's pronouncement in favor of a date as early as 64 A.D. seems thus but the culmination of a prevailing tendency in criticism to place this book progressively earlier in the Christian development. For New Testament criticism, we should do well to remember, furnishes almost as instructive a field for the tracing of historical tendency in the guise of successively asserted and rejected "orthodoxies" as does the collection of documents with which that criticism deals.

Professor Foakes-Jackson, while readily and gratefully accepting the demonstration of Aramaic sources for

3 In an article entitled "Some Observations on the Aramaic Acts," Harvard Theological Review, January, 1918, pp. 74–99. This was written before, though published after, the appearance of Professor Foakes-Jackson's treatment.
certain portions of Acts 1–15 35, is extremely doubtful that there was one continuous Aramaic document underlying these chapters. The question is one of prime importance. Naturally not every sentence or paragraph betrays the fact of translation by reflecting Aramaic idiom. Now Professor Foakes-Jackson shows an inclination to clear away all such indications from chapters 13–15, and more or less succeeds in doing so except for the sermon at Pisidian Antioch, “of which an Aramaic report may have been preserved,” and the account of the Apostolic Council, “which may have been in Aramaic.” These facts, he feels, militate against a belief in “the absolute unity of the Aramaic document.”

It will be admitted that over against this theory of a patchwork of sources, some in Aramaic and some presumably in Greek, the original theory of Professor Torrey regarding I Acts has one great advantage, that of simplicity; and other things being equal, the simpler theory has the better claim to credence. The decision hinges ultimately on two main problems: (1) the degree of literary and artistic unity discoverable in the section 1–15 35, and (2) the psychological conceivability of such a process of slavishly literal and yet none too accurate translation as is here postulated on the part of Luke, the companion of Paul. In the circumstances these general questions may really be more important than that minute investigation “into questions of sources” which Professor Foakes-Jackson suggests as necessary “before conceding the homogeneity of the Aramaic document.”

No one will deny the necessity of studying minutiae in the search for sources, and yet the fact remains that detailed reconstructions are seldom convincing in their details. Only the larger facts of literary relationship and influence, such as can be deduced from the broad general indications of the material in question, can usually be recovered satisfactorily.
The point of view and purpose of the Aramaic document as a whole have been admirably stated by Professor Torrey himself,\(^4\) and yet it is possible that the argument for unity may be put a little more strongly even than he has made it. Assuming for purposes of investigation that his theory is correct, we seem to find running through the work two principal motifs: (1) the spiritual baptism with its accompanying glossolalia, and (2) the question of Gentile admissibility. In a previous discussion concerning the origin of the ascension narrative\(^5\) an attempt was made to indicate something of the significance of the baptism of the Holy Spirit in the second great stage of early Christianity. The Pentecostal outpouring is described in Acts with all the pomp and circumstance of which the Aramaic author is capable. The narrative

\(^4\) "A man of Judea, presumably of Jerusalem, undertook to set forth the main facts touching the growth of the Christian church from the little band of Jews left behind by Jesus to the large and rapidly growing body, chiefly Gentile, whose branches were in all parts of the world. He was a man of catholic spirit and excellent literary ability. He wrote in Aramaic, and with great loyalty to the Holy City and the Twelve Apostles, and yet at the same time with genuine enthusiasm for the mission to the Gentiles and its foremost representatives, especially Paul. His chief interest was in the universal mission of Christianity. He was secondarily interested to show what the far-seeing among the Jewish Christians of his time must generally have acknowledged—that although the new faith was first developed, of necessity, among the Jews, yet being rejected by the main body of them it passed out of their hands. From the very beginning of his account, he had in mind as its central feature the wonderful transition from Jewish sect to world-religion. From the outset he purposed to show how Antioch became the first great Gentile centre of Christianity; his pride in Antioch was of course hardly equal to his pride in Jerusalem, but was very real nevertheless. It is a skilful arrangement of his material by which he makes it all lead up, in successive steps, to the first great triumphs of the new faith on foreign soil, and to the true climax in chapter 15."—Pp. 64 f.

"There is good reason to believe that in 15 35 we have the original conclusion of Luke's Aramaic source. This is the natural place for the Judean document to come to an end, for the story of the first distinct period of the Christian church in Jerusalem has been written. Peter has initiated the work among the Gentiles. Paul and Barnabas have gained their first great successes as foreign missionaries. The Mother Church has sent out its circular letter, voicing its own supreme authority and at the same time making Gentile Christianity permanently free from the regulations of Judaism. The verses 15 30–35 are admirably suited to bring the book to a close. The Gentiles, represented by the foremost Gentile Christian city, Antioch, receive their charter of freedom with joy; Judas and Silas return to Jerusalem; Paul and Barnabas remain in Antioch, 'teaching and preaching, with many others, the word of the Lord.'"—P. 64.

\(^5\) In the Harvard Theological Review, January, 1918, pp. 77, 94–99.
of the ascension serves as a prelude to it. The choosing of Matthias is but another necessary preliminary, bringing the college of apostles up again to the full sacred number of twelve. Finally on the day of Pentecost, the anniversary according to the rabbis of the giving of the law, comes the miraculous gift of the Spirit with visible tongues of fire and the noise as of a mighty wind. The inspired utterances are intelligible to sojourners in Jerusalem from twelve representative regions of the known world, beginning beyond the eastern confines of the Roman empire and culminating in Rome itself, thus symbolizing at the very start the universal mission of the new religion. Peter is able at once to explain the true inward significance of the occurrence: it has been virtually the first act of the risen and exalted Jesus to claim from God, his Father, the previously promised Spirit and to pour it out on his disciples waiting below. “This Jesus did God raise up, whereof we all are witnesses. Being therefore by the right hand of God exalted, and having received of the Father the promise of the Holy Spirit, he has poured it forth, as ye see and hear.” In fact, Peter sees through the whole matter from the very start, taking no time apparently for reflection or to await developments. And he is ready with the practical application. At the close of his sermon he assures his hearers that if they repent and are baptized they also shall receive this same gift of the Holy Spirit.

All this is manifestly enough artificial, an imaginary reconstruction of an early period from the standpoint of a later one. The interesting aspect of the matter for the present purpose is this, that it is all so self-consistent on its own premises, so patently designed for a definite

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6 Professor Harnack is surely right in suggesting the rejection of the references to “Judea” in verse 9 and to the “Cretans and Arabians” in verse 11, thus leaving an even twelve, again the sacred number.

7 Acts 2 32 f.
apologetical and homiletical purpose. Whatever earlier records he may have used—and an opinion has been expressed elsewhere regarding two cases which throw light on the problem of sources— it is clear that this author has controlled his sources, and not been controlled by them; he has skilfully adapted his material to his own ends. For some reason or other he has conceived of the spiritual baptism as a thing of paramount importance in the Christian movement, and has set it forth with all possible prominence and emphasis in the forefront of his history.

At the other end of the document stands the famous Jerusalem Council, at which the question of Gentile admissibility was settled favorably to the party of progress. That it was a genuine triumph, and not a mere compromise, seems clear from the critical investigation of the text of the Apostolic Decree. If, as seems most probable, the three-clause text was the original, then the decision was wholly in favor of Paul and the liberal party, and the requirements still enjoined upon the Gentiles were not a mixture of the ceremonial and the moral, but simply an injunction to avoid the three deadly sins, idolatry, fornication, and murder. This interpretation alone makes the letter (Acts 15:23-29) in which the decree is embodied, self-consistent; for verse 24 very explicitly repudiates the doctrine of the self-appointed teachers from Judaea, who had tried to impose circumcision (verse 1), and by implication the whole Jewish law (cf. verse 5), upon the Antiochean Christians. Such explicit repudiation of the legalists hardly comports with a final decision which only established a compromise. The deliberate judgment of James

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8 Harvard Theological Review, January, 1918, pp. 89 ff.
10 See Lake, Earlier Epistles of St. Paul, pp. 48 ff., who rejects πυκτῶν as a gloss.
(verse 19) is expressed in terms which point in the same direction: "Wherefore my judgment is, that we trouble not those who from among the Gentiles turn to God." This sounds less like a compromise than a complete abandonment of the legalistic position with respect to Gentile Christians.

If such a view of the report of the Apostolic Council be correct, one of Professor Foakes-Jackson's objections to the Torreyan theory is greatly weakened, if not wholly met. He says: "Dr. Torrey points out . . . the impossibility of the Council of Jerusalem in Acts 15 having been so described by a companion of Paul's. But does not Dr. Torrey ignore the difficulty of accounting for a close friend of Paul's having incorporated into his narrative so damaging a statement as that relating to the proceedings of the Apostles and the promulgation of the letter to the churches of Syria and Cilicia?" If, however, the result of the Council was a complete triumph, at least temporarily, for the Pauline party, the force of this objection is largely broken. Of course this is not the whole of the question. It ramifies interminably, involving ultimately such large problems as the date and destination of Galatians. Into these issues it is impossible to enter here. Suffice it to say that to a "South-Galatian" who is willing to date that epistle before the Apostolic Council, who identifies the "interview" of Galatians 2 with the "famine visit" of Acts 11:30 and 12:25, and who accepts the three-clause text of the Apostolic Decree, there are no very serious difficulties in the way of supposing either that a companion of Paul wrote the fifteenth chapter of Acts or that such a person incorporated it into his book—in always remembering that a friend and com-

11 P. 338. However, if I read aright, Professor Torrey at the beginning of his second chapter is not so much giving his own judgment on the varying Christology and style of the different parts of Acts and the incompatibility of Acts 15 with Galatians 2, as simply reviewing the reasons, cogent and otherwise, which have led to the so prevalent opinion that II Acts is composite.
panion of Paul need by no means have been Paul’s mere echo.  

The report of the Apostolic Council, which ended in a sweeping triumph for the liberal view, is the climax of the Aramaic book. It was, to be sure, a temporary triumph, as such victories are rather wont to be. The opposition was momentarily crushed, overwhelmed by the authority of Peter and the mass of evidence presented by Barnabas and Paul; but as we well know, it was by no means completely destroyed. Now our Aramaic author was not a trained historian, capable of foreseeing that opposition thus crushed would inevitably break out again in other and perhaps violent forms. Rather he was persuaded that a solid and lasting victory had been won for those principles of universalism and anti-legalism in which he so earnestly believed. And in the first flush of his enthusiasm — presumably before the opposition had assumed its later and more sinister forms — he wrote his book as a celebration and justification of the splendid triumph. The air of fresh enthusiasm which pervades

12 A note may be intruded at this point regarding another objection raised by Professor Foakes-Jackson in the same paragraph (p. 339)—"the problem of reconciling Acts 28 17 ad fn. with all that is elsewhere known of Paul’s attitude toward the Jewish leaders. How could a disciple of Paul who knew of the Epistle to the Romans, make the Jewish elders of Rome ignorant not only of his existence but of that of the Christian sect?" There is a certain exegesis of the passage, however, which relieves it of these supposed implications. In 28 17–20 Paul is apparently anxious lest his Jewish accusers at Jerusalem should already have sent to the Jews at Rome a prejudicial statement regarding his character and past conduct. He is anxious to anticipate such a report if it has not already come, or to meet and answer it if it has. But the Jewish leaders assure him (verse 21) that no such report has come either by letter or by messenger, and they express their desire to hear his teachings; "for as concerning this sect, it is known to us that everywhere it is spoken against" (verse 22). Does this indeed imply ignorance of the existence of the Christian sect, or quite the reverse? Does it not in the plainest possible terms imply considerable hearsay knowledge concerning the sect, mostly of a prejudicial character; and does not their desire to hear Paul’s doctrines even suggest that perhaps they knew of him already by reputation as a leader in the new movement and so able to give them authoritative information? At any rate verse 21 need not mean at all that they had never heard of Paul, but only that no adverse report concerning him had preceded him from Judea: "We neither received letters from Judea concerning thee, nor did any of the brethren come hither and report or speak any harm of thee." In any case, Paul’s tactful and earnest effort to conciliate the Roman Jews and win their confidence, before turning to the Gentiles, seems quite in accord with his usual custom elsewhere.
the book suggests that it was written soon after the Council of 49 A.D., and is if anything a stronger consideration than the argument based on the references to Silas in Acts 15 33 and 40.\footnote{So Torrey, p. 68, who finds it very significant that the Aramaic author "did not know that Silas had started on a new missionary journey in company with Paul. A man of his interests and information could not have remained for many months in ignorance of this most important turn of events." Hence a date late in the year 49, or early in the year 50.} The two considerations reinforce each other; but the matter of the movements of Silas impressed me at first, before I had caught the spirit of the book as a whole and could judge of its tendencies, as a rather slender argument for the date assigned.

These then are the two \textit{motifs} of the Aramaic book. The Pentecostal narrative stands as an imposing prelude, recounting the original gift of the Holy Spirit. The Apostolic Council stands as a dramatic finale, irrevocably committing Christianity to its universal mission. Nor are these two leading ideas confined to the beginning and the end, respectively. On the contrary, they dominate the whole work. The doctrine of spiritual baptism, so impressively illustrated on Pentecost, recurs at frequent intervals thereafter, notably in Acts 4 31 (which is in its outward manifestation almost a second Pentecost), 5 32 (almost a second Pentecostal sermon), 8 15 ff. (Simon tries to purchase the gift), 9 17 (the Spirit promised to Paul), 10 38 (God anointed \textit{Jesus} with the Holy Spirit and with power), 10 44 ff. (the case of Cornelius; cf. 11 4-18), 15 8 (Peter’s speech at the Council). Likewise the other great theme of the book, the universal destiny of Christianity, is indicated in a long series of premonitions, notably 1 8 ("witnesses . . . unto the uttermost part of the earth"), 2 9 f. (the geographical list of sojourners), 2 39 ("the promise . . . to all that are afar off"), 3 25 ("In thy seed shall all the families of the earth be blessed"), 6 14 (Stephen accused of predicting the abolition of the law), 8 4 ff. (Samaria receives the
word), 10 9-16, 28, 34 (the vision of Peter and his visit to Cornelius), 11 18 (“Then to the Gentiles also hath God granted repentance”), 11 20 (missionary work among the Greeks), 13 39, 46 (“Lo, we turn to the Gentiles”), 14 27 (“opened a door of faith unto the Gentiles”), before the final acceptance of the principle in chapter 15. Moreover — and this is the highly significant feature — the two ideas which thus run through the whole book are causally interconnected in the author’s mind. The glossolalia is decked out in its festal Pentecostal garb and accorded such peculiar prominence, precisely because of its bearing on the Gentile controversy. At the Apostolic Council it is Peter’s testimony that turns the scale (cf. Acts 15 14), and Peter’s argument is based solidly on his experience in this matter of the Spirit. He feels sure that God from ancient times intended to admit the Gentiles to salvation, and the experimental proof is this, that under Peter’s preaching the Gentiles had received the Holy Spirit, glossolalia and all, exactly as had the Jews. That had been the line of Peter’s defence against the criticisms of his Jerusalem compatriots at an earlier time: that the Spirit made no racial distinctions (Acts 11 12). This had forced his critics to the logically inevitable conclusion, “Then to the Gentiles also hath God granted repentance unto life” (verse 18). The test case had been that of Cornelius and his household, who had actually received the Holy Spirit and spoken with tongues before being so much as baptized (Acts 10 44-48). The importance of that case was fully recognized. There is no reason to doubt the essential fact, but it is dressed up with an elaboration of visions and legends — and incidentally of repetitions — which is paralleled only in the Pentecostal narrative and in that other incident of profound importance to the liberal cause, namely, the conversion of Paul. The fact that these three earlier points of critical significance in the history — Pentecost, Paul’s con-
version, and the case of Cornelius—are so thickly en-
crusted with legend, while the story of the Apostolic
Council is so straightforward and matter-of-fact, furnishes
another reason for dating the Aramaic book soon after the
last-named event. The Aramaic author may well have been present. At any rate, there had not been time for legendary accretions to gather.

The literary and artistic unity of the Aramaic docu-
ment is thus seen to be very great. It is a closely knit
work showing the characteristic contour which we have
been trained to expect in the best products of the dra-
matic art. Its two leading *motifs*, brought into special
prominence, the one at the beginning and the other at
the end of the narrative, are found on close scrutiny to run through the whole and to be conjoined logically and causally at the point of climactic interest just a little beyond the middle. So far as this problem is concerned, the case stands well with the theory of a unified docu-
ment.

The other problem is more difficult, though the answer,
such as it is, can be given in briefer space. Is it conceiv-
able that Luke, or any other person, should have taken a
document of this sort and translated it literally word for
word, not intentionally altering it at a single point, and
should then have gone on to complete the narrative and indirectly to correct some of the misstatements when occasion presented? The supposition is not an easy one, and yet who shall set logical limits to the things of which the human mind is capable? Certainly no modern scholar would treat a document in such a peculiar way; and yet that is no reason why Luke, an enthusiastic early Christian, a believer in miracles and all the rest, should not have done so. Perhaps there are even certain reasons why he should have done precisely this thing. In the first place, recall the artistic unity of the document with which he was dealing, and imagine what a powerful
and fascinating effect it must have had upon his mind, he being himself a member of the liberal party. In comparison with the brilliance of its great main thesis any minor errors of detail must have seemed trivial in the extreme, and to have stopped here and there to make corrections in so truly inspired a work would have bordered on sacrilege. I doubt if it was necessary to hesitate at the word "sacred" as a description of Luke’s feeling for so powerful and edifying a book.

Another aspect of the psychological objection is brought up by Professor Foakes-Jackson in the following words: “That Luke translated this [document] with meticulous accuracy, adding nothing of importance of his own and adapting nothing to prove those points which he desired to establish, is, judging by his use of Mark and Q, to me at least incredible.” At first sight this point seems weighty. In both cases Luke had before him a completed document to serve as his fundamental basis: Mark for his gospel and the Aramaic book for Acts. Unquestionably he used Mark as the framework for his first composition, omitting useless or undesirable portions, occasionally rearranging the order, and interlarding the work plentifully with material from other sources—probably from several others. Then why not also in Acts? And yet after all the two cases are hardly similar. For one thing, Mark was no such skilfully constructed piece of writing as was the Aramaic history. Also, the rich “logian” material now in Luke’s Gospel had to be inserted somewhere inside of the Markan framework if it was to be included at all; whereas the material which Luke had to contribute to the book of Acts belonged almost exclusively to the period after the Apostolic Council. Hence the temptation to disturb the closely woven

14 So Foakes-Jackson, p. 352: “To Luke it was so important — I had almost said so sacred — that he did not presume to alter a word when he made his literal translation.”

15 Ibid. p. 360.
texture of the Aramaic history was minimized. There was another factor working in the same direction. The Gospel of Mark, when employed by Luke, had required a good deal in the way of adaptation, for it was a record from a much earlier time and contained many things ill-suited to this later age. But in the case of the Aramaic document this work of adaptation had already been done. It was much nearer to Luke in point of time, and he was apparently in full accord with its fundamental "tendencies." In this case, therefore, no changes "to prove those points which he desired to establish" would appear to have been necessary. Thus there remain only certain minor errors of detail that would naturally seem to Luke to call for correction. Some such corrections he made quietly at appropriate points in his own section of the work; for example, the matter of the movements of Silas, and the facts regarding the conversion of Paul. Some other errors, such as the reference to the "forty days," he neglected altogether. To have altered that passage in order to bring it into harmony with the close of his own Gospel would have impaired the symbolism of the entire opening section of Acts, and Luke's scientific impulses were surely not strong enough for such heroic measures as that. The living unity of the document itself—plus the never-to-be-forgotten factor of human inertia—sufficed to protect it at that point.

When all is said and done, the fact remains that the psychology of Luke as translator and author, respectively, of the two parts of Acts is somewhat difficult; but the difficulties are nowhere nearly so great as on the older supposition that the author of the Third Gospel had in Acts composed freely a second work and adapted its sources to suit his own theories. On that supposition the "forty days," the conversion narratives, and the statements about Silas were absolutely insoluble puzzles.
And to seek escape from these troubles by denying the identity of authorship of Luke and Acts was to fly in the face of all the evidence, both external and stylistic, bearing on that problem. Thus, while the psychology of Luke is still a thing to be explained and accounted for, the case on the whole is very much improved. On the other hand, the literary unity of the rediscovered Aramaic document seems unmistakable and waiting only to be recognized and appreciated. When to the great mass of linguistic evidence are added this literary evidence and a greatly simplified psychology, the argument for the new theory of Acts appears very strong indeed.
To render original sources accessible is to confer an obligation not only upon scholars but upon all intelligent readers. Such a service, in widely different fields, the authors of these two books claim to have rendered. Mr. Horsch says in his Preface: "Menno Simons is perhaps today the most neglected of the prominent leaders in the history of the Christian Church. Neither in the English nor the German language is a book on his life and teachings available." This is perhaps overstating the fact. For his writings are published in English and in German by the Mennonite Publishing Co. at Elkhart, Ind.; and on the supposed tercentenary in 1861 of Simons's death, Gedankenblätter, a selection in German from his writings, was published at Dantzig under the editorship of J. Mannhardt. Among the books in Dutch is Menno Simons, eene Levensschetze (1892); and on one important department of the subject is Daniel J. Cassel's History of the Mennonites from the Time of their Emigration to America (1888).

Menno Simons was born, probably in 1496, in Friesland. His second name signifies merely that he was the son of Simon, and his followers therefore properly take their designation from his Christian name. For twelve years he was a priest of the Church; but on hearing of the execution in 1530 of Sikke Frerichs for having been baptized when an adult, he came to the conclusion from studying the Scriptures that there was no ground in them for infant baptism. Here, as so often, a martyr was a good advertisement. Menno had before this been interested in Luther's books, and now strode on beyond Luther. "Neither Luther nor Zwingli questioned the validity of Roman Catholic sacraments and ordination. If infant baptism was unscriptural and invalid, the Lutheran and Zwinglian reformation was clearly inadequate. . . . A regeneration or renewing of the Church along New Testament lines was in order. The restoration of scriptural baptism was in fact the most funda-
mental requirement for a true New Testament Church” (Horsch, p. 23). Adult baptism emphasized individualism, and carried with it therefore the independence of each congregation of believers and a sharp separation from the unbaptized, the great majority, of “the world.” To many of the world’s favorite customs the Mennonites were opposed—to oaths trivial or legal, to war, and they were the first to protest against slavery. They opposed a State Church, and therefore hated both the Roman Catholic and the Lutheran Churches. Basing themselves upon the Scriptures, they practised foot-washing; while in the seventeenth century a body of them in Switzerland came to the conclusion that the use of buttons and of the razor might imperil salvation. They took pains to prevent themselves from being confused with John of Leyden’s Münsterites, but by the indiscriminating they were identified with them and were slaughtered accordingly. In the latter part of the sixteenth century they touched England through Amsterdam, where Thomas Helwys joined them with his congregation of Brownists; though afterwards he and his friends left them and called themselves Baptists. The separation in the modern world of Church and State, the assertion of the liberty of conscience and of the continuity of revelation, are mainly due not to orthodox Protestantism but to the heretical sects, of which the Anabaptists, including the Mennonites, were the chief. In 1683 the Mennonites bought 8,000 acres of land from William Penn, and founded Germantown. Their chief home is now in the United States, where they report 80,000 members out of a world-membership of 250,000. Their original tenets in regard to discipline, bearing arms, and civil office are now abolished. In addition to an interesting historical sketch of Menno, Mr. Horsch gives 76 pages of extracts from his works illustrative of his system of doctrine, a complete list of his published works and letters, and a dozen pages of bibliography.

Miss Sears claims, not like Mr. Horsch priority in presentation of subject, but originality of matter. “Hesitatingly at first but with increasing confidence, I was permitted to pore over cherished records of the past and worn-out journals and touching books of verses. These are kept in hidden cupboards where the curious cannot find them” (p. xii). Her book gives a history of the Shaker Movement based on hitherto unpublished records of the Shakers in Harvard, Mass., and contains valuable extracts from those records.

The Shakers, whose name for themselves is “The United Society of Believers in Christ’s Second Appearing,” originated in France at

1 Cf. Troeltsch’s Protestantism and Progress; tr. by W. Montgomery, pp. 104, 122.
the close of the seventeenth century, when Jean Cavalier established the society known as the Camisards. They proclaimed the near approach of God's kingdom on earth and the necessity therefore of repentance and amendment. The contemplation of these mighty subjects produced in them tremblings, faintings, paroxysms, clairvoyance, prophesying, gifts of tongues, healing—all the manifestations which have always attended absorption in the Divine. Established religion treated these claimants to direct inspiration as was the custom, and as it had treated the Mennonites: it proceeded to send them to the stake and the wheel. Then Cavalier escaped to England, where by 1705 he had three or four hundred "prophets" stirring the country with the warning that the acceptable year of the Lord was at hand. Lack of organization, however, retarded the Movement, till it was taken up by two Quakers, James Wardley and his wife, who in 1747 founded in Manchester a Society of 30 persons. These agreed in the conviction that the Christ-spirit "would again appear on this earth, but this time it would be in the personality of a woman. Their argument was that God, being eternal spirit, must combine in Himself all the positive or masculine qualities of Power, Justice, Truth, Knowledge, and Might, and the negative or feminine qualities of Mercy, Loving-kindness, and Forgiveness as well, and that as He had revealed His Spirit through Man, so He must also reveal it through Woman, in order to complete the full revelation of His Divine Nature. With this expectation firmly established, they eagerly awaited its fulfilment; and they believed they found the fulfilment complete in the person of Ann Lee, who united herself to the Society in 1758" (p. 8).

After experiencing the usual persecutions, they migrated to America in 1774 and established themselves at Watervliet near Albany, N.Y. They combined religious fervor and "manifestations" with excellence in farming, and these qualities aroused both hostility and admiring adhesion. After half a dozen years they felt a missionary call toward New England, for Mother Ann had seen in England a vision of faces in the east turned to her in expectation. So a delegation set out to locate the promised land, and finally fixed it in Harvard, Mass. Here, from 1781 to the death of Mother Ann in 1784, was the classic period of Shakerism. They rejected marriage, baptism, and the Lord's Supper. They practised a strict discipline, renunciation of "the world," manual work for all, communism of property, government by appointed Elders. Their worship consisted in marching and singing, which developed into jumping, dancing, whirling, falling prostrate, speaking with
“tongues.” “Others,” said an intelligent visitor from “the world,” "will be shooing and hissing evil spirits out of the house; all in different tunes, groaning, jumping, laughing, talking and stuttering, shooing, and hissing, that makes a perfect bedlam” (p. 60). These exercises were not confined to their meeting-house. “At dawn, at midday, in the twilight, at the moon-rise, a traveller on the country roads around Harvard would see women and men, sometimes in groups according to sex, sometimes a single figure, whirling past him, dancing with rhythmic shaking of heads, arms, and hands. Fear and superstition gripped the hearts of the beholders, and they were wont to flee precipitately” (p. 61). It was the importation into modern Protestantism of the methods of Oriental dervishes. Before auto-suggestion, hypnotism, thought- and power-transference were understood, those who possessed these abilities considered them as proofs that they were directly inspired by God, and others either believed with reverence or regarded these manifestations as of the devil. Hard-headed New England took, in the main, the latter view, and, as the stake and the wheel had become illegal, had to content itself with arrests, mobs, whippings, and banishment.

Mother Ann Lee had, like Mrs. Eddy, ruled her Church with a strong hand. After her death Elder James Whitaker kept the Society together for three years, when Elder Joseph Meacham, upon whom Mother Ann had entailed the succession, became its head. He and Eldress Lucy Wright gathered the Church again in Harvard in 1791. In this, its second period, its organization became closer and its peculiar characteristics were modified. A shuffling march became its usual ritual, though the older members could not restrain themselves at times from leaping and dancing. The hostility against the Shakers diminished as their extravagances declined and their farm-produce increased. The genuineness of their piety and the excellence of their apple-sauce came to be recognized and brought them kindly toleration. But celibacy, which prevented growth from within, the tendency in the world away from “herb-doctoring” towards a more scientific medical theory, the development of farming on a large scale by machinery, the growth of millenarian views elsewhere, all combined to steer the Society into a back-water, and modern life passed it by, leaving still about a thousand Shakers in small settlements now scattered through the United States.

In studying the Shaker Movement one is impressed, as in the case of so many of the smaller religious sects, with the poverty of intellectual outlook from which it sprang. Yet it must be remembered that when it arose, Biblical Criticism had not begun to replace the
theory of verbal inspiration with the idea of progressive revelation. In treating the words of the Bible as literal, infallible, and ultimate, the Shakers did only what almost all the other Christians of their time were doing. But what they drew from their study of the Bible—the characteristic tenet of the nearness of Christ's Second Advent—was taken up in the first third of the nineteenth century by the more energetic hands of William Miller; and among the 50,000 who in 1843 stood in their white robes ready to ascend at the Lord's appearing, there were doubtless many who, if they had lived a generation earlier, would have been attracted by Shakerism.

Among the valuable features of Miss Sears's book are the vivid descriptions of the mobs which attacked the Shakers, the music and words of many of the Shaker hymns, together with ample data of the farm-produce and especially of the herb-department. For a fuller view of what the Shakers say of themselves, the book needs to be supplemented by such works as Testimonies to the Precepts of Mother Ann Lee, Collected from Living Witnesses; Shakerism, its Meaning and Message, by Anna White and Leila S. Taylor; and especially Shaker Sermons, Containing the Substance of Shaker Theology, by Bishop Henry L. Eads.

Frederic Palmer.

Harvard University.


To call, with Gooch, "Denifle's eight hundred pages hurled at the memory of the Reformer among the most repulsive books in historical literature," is not a bit too strong. That the author's feelings were so immensely enlisted would not matter if the man only had a spark of the candor and real desire to be fair that distinguishes the work of scholars like Pastor and Acton. But Denifle's mind was so warped by hatred that, while preternaturally sharp-sighted in detecting the slightest faults of Luther or the most trivial errors of modern Protestant scholars, he was, to the larger aspects of his subject, portentously blind. Luther and Lutherdom is a learned and elaborate libel.

Let us take a single example of its famous "method." The Dominican asserts that Luther set aside all prohibitions of consanguineous marriages, even that of parent and child and of brother and sister (p. 324). Any other scholar, in making so startling a charge, would
examine the evidence carefully. In proportion to the vast improbability that the Reformer should here have gone counter not only to all Christian sentiment but to that of the whole world, savage as well as civilized, the historian should have demanded copious proof and have sifted it judicially. One would expect that in a point like this a great stir would have been made and much would be forthcoming. But Denifle bases his assertion on a single word. When Spalatin drew up a table of forbidden degrees for the use of the Saxon Visitors, he wrote: "Bruder und Schwester mugen sich nicht verehelichen; so mag einer auch seines Bruders oder Schwester Tochter oder Enkel nicht nehmen." In revising the list Luther wrote opposite this section "Toldt," which Denifle interprets to mean that he repealed the whole law (Enders: Luthers Briefwechsel, vi, 186). The intrinsic improbability of this interpretation is so enormous, unsupported as it is by a single other passage in all the Reformer's voluminous works, that, even if the document in question stood alone, the careful searcher for truth would be forced to conclude that, whatever "todt" meant, it could not mean this. But the document does not stand alone. With it Luther sent a letter (De Wette: Luthers Briefe, iii, 260), in which the real meaning of the word is clearly shown to be merely "strike out," and the reason is distinctly given, namely that it is better on such points to allow the Visitors to give oral instruction when necessary. In the same letter and paragraph Luther discusses the marriage of uncle and niece, which on Biblical precedent he allows, but he says not one word on the marriage of kinsmen in the first and second degrees, proof positive that he never even so much as contemplated the possibility of it.

Of course Denifle's work is not all as worthless as this. His wide reading in scholastic and patristic literature served to elucidate some of Luther's ideas and to point out the failings of his recent editors and biographers. But though the scholar can still learn something from this work, yet its value has greatly decreased since it was first published fourteen years ago. Luther's commentary on Romans, known to Denifle in manuscript, has since been published in model form, and the researches of Scheel and Ficker and A. V. Müller and Grisar and many other scholars have left the learned Dominican far in the rear.

The worst that can usually be said of the present translation is that it is extremely inelegant, and the proof poorly read ("Eues" for "Cues," p. xlvii, "Raumburg" for "Naumburg," p. 143). The inelegance is due in part to the desire to be literal, as when Volz
renders, "Aurifaber omitted this passage, likely as smutty" (p. 105). In some cases, however, the sense of the original is totally missed. Where Denifle wrote: "Man müsse meinem Werke gegenüber den Standpunkt Niedriger hängen, einnehmen: Luther und der Protestantismus werde durch dasselbe nicht berührt," Volz translates: "My work is to be offset by the viewpoint of Niedriger — assume that Luther and Protestantism are not touched by it" (p. viii). "Niedriger," of course, is not a proper name, but a common noun meaning "obscure people."

Preserved Smith.

Poughkeepsie, N.Y.


Those, and they are many, for whom the name of Newman is still one to conjure with, will notice with surprise the meticulous caution with which the censorship of the Church has been brought to bear upon these Letters. The author was the greatest Catholic divine in a century of reaction. He did not suffer fools, even in high places, gladly; but his differences with the Rome of Pius IX were with its temper and methods, not with its teaching. Folly, carried beyond a certain point, became, he thought, a moral fault. Acton, who read him more accurately than any of his contemporaries, and from the wider European rather than from the provincial English standpoint, makes no question of his Ultramontanism; on which his elevation to the Cardinalate by Leo XIII, one of the most Roman, though one of the wisest, of Pontiffs, set the final seal. Yet the permission of three several Censors, one of them an Archbishop, is required before this selection from his letters between 1839 and 1845 can be published. And the censorship, it should be remembered, is negative, not positive; that is, it does not express approval. What it says is "Nihil Obstat"; there is no sufficient reason to refuse permission for the book to be printed. Such precaution does not inspire confidence. We do not know how far we have the real Newman; all that we can be sure of is that we have Newman as the ecclesiastical authorities wish him to appear. It is possible that in the letters of the years covered by the present collection there is little to which they could take exception. But there are periods in his life of which this could certainly not be said. His papers and correspondence, for example, between 1860 and 1876 would be of
the greatest possible interest to the historian of the Church of the
nineteenth century. But unless, by some happy indiscretion, these
documents are published without being submitted to the
censor, the chances of their appearance are small.

Whether or no the result is due to the care with which they have
been selected, edited, and censored, the letters contained in this
substantial volume are — what is rarely the case with Newman’s
writings — frankly dull. They describe a succession of small storms
in a small tea-cup: Tract XC; the Jerusalem bishopric; the varying
fortunes of the Oxford Movement; all treated from a narrow sect-
tarian point of view and with a curious want of urbanity and temper.
Dr. Arnold of Rugby was the bête noir of the party — the question,
“But is he a Christian?” will be remembered (Apologia, Chap. I);
and on his death we find the following comment in a letter to Keble
in the present collection:

“If it is right to speculate on such serious matters, there is something
quite of comfort to be gathered from his removal from this scene of action,
at the time it took place; as if so good a man should not be suffered to
commit himself cominus against truths which he so little understood”
(p. 321).

On the appointment of Dr. Alexander to the bishopric of Jerusalem
he writes to J. R. Hope:

“Your account of the Jerusalem matter is fearful; the more I think of it
the more I am dismayed. . . . I feel so strongly about it that when once
I begin to publish my ‘Protest’, I think I shall introduce it as a preface or
appendix to every book and every edition of a book I print. If people
are driving me, quite against all my feelings, out of the Church of England,
they shall know that they are doing so. Is there no means of impeaching
or indicting someone or other? Lawyers can throw anything into form.
Should Bishop Alexander commit any irregularity out in Palestine, might
not one bring him into Court in England?” (p. 144).

And Hope addresses Gladstone on the same subject:

“Had Prussia come to us humbled and penitent, complaining that separa-
tion from the Catholic Church was too heavy any longer to be borne . . .
then none more gladly than I would have prayed that, as far as higher duties
would allow, she should become one with us. But as it is, she comes
jauntily, by a Royal Envoy, with a Royal Liturgy in her hand, and a new and
comprehensive theory of religion on her lips, to propose joint endowment
of Bishoprics, alternate nominations, mixed confessions of faith . . . and a
Political Protectorate soldered together by a divine institution. . . . And,
 alas that it should be so! she has found among our Bishops men ready to
grant, without a pause or a doubt, all that she desired” (p. 158).
What a view! What a world! What a mentality! Can we wonder at Bunsen's judgment of the Movement—that it was "Popery without authority, Protestantism without liberty, Catholicism without universality, and Evangelism without spirituality"? or at Arnold's verdict on its action, for example, in the Hampden controversy?—"There was in that something more than theoretical opinion; there was downright evil acting; and the more I consider it, the more my sense of its evil grows" (Life of Arnold, p. 424).

To the present generation Newman is an enigma. That he was the leader of a reaction is certain. Catholicism owes him much. He restored its poetry; like the pious sons of Noah, he "went backward," and threw a veil over its shame. But in his later years Lucanus an Apulus, anceps. There were those to whom he seemed to have a foot in each camp. He was supposed to have an answer to every doubt and a solution for every difficulty. "If John Henry Newman can be a Catholic, surely you can," is an argumentum ad hominem by which many a waverer has been silenced; if belief can be vicarious, it could be so (it was thought) here. But if he possessed the powers attributed to him, he kept them in scrinio pectoris. His reserve was impenetrable; they did not appear. Jowett's comment on the Apologia was (1) that it was "not the work of a saint"—the great man was intolerant of opposition; and (2) that it discussed at great length the question whether the writer should, or should not, become a Roman Catholic—"not, I think, a matter of any great importance," the Master added. The remark showed less than his usual perspicacity; for both to the Catholic Church and to the Church of England Newman's secession was an event of the first consequence. It set the former in a false perspective; for he was a great magician—his spells could make shadows real and the worse the better reason; and it hypnotized the latter into the disastrous policy of substituting the denominational for the national idea. "Anglicanism," as the word is now understood, is the creation of the Oxford Movement; and it looks "to the hole of the pit whence it was digged."

The period of these Letters is that in which Newman was accustoming himself to the idea of secession. He was a master of introspection and self-portraiture; the process of auto-suggestion is vividly described. But the interest of the book is historical, not actual; the climate has changed. People still become Roman Catholics from a variety of motives—political, aesthetic, temperamental; and two generations ago more serious reasons led more serious persons to take that step. But surely no one ever took it, then or now, on such
grounds as those given by Newman; that is, on the strength of a supposed analogy between the relation of the Church of England to modern Catholicism and that of the Monophysites of the fourth century to Rome; Luther corresponding to Eutyches, the English bishop to Flavian, and Leo the Great, the most imperial of Roman Pontiffs, to the fatuous Gregory XVI. The unreality of the outlook is absolute. However great their negative sincerity, the position of those who take it is fantastic and unreal. These extravagances of the Tract party have left their mark more deeply than superficial observers think upon the Church of England. Their results are seen in its thinning congregations, its declining observance, its increasing failure to keep in touch with the national mind and life. When religion takes them into a backwater, people pass it by.

Newman was "stiff in opinion." Anglicanism he despised, Protestantism he detested, Liberalism he hated and feared. His ideal Church was that of the Fathers of the fourth century. "Be, my soul, with the Saints! and shall I lift up my hand against them?" "The much-enduring Athanasius and the majestic Leo," these were his heroes. "Anathema to a whole tribe of Cranmers, Ridleys, Latimers, and Jewels! perish the names of Bramhall, Ussher, Taylor, Stillingfleet, and Barrow, from the face of the earth, ere I should do aught but fall at their feet in love and worship, whose image was continually before my eyes, and whose musical words were ever in my ear and on my tongue!" His difficulties in later life came to a great extent from a certain esprit frondeur; he did not work easily with, or under, other men. But he saw no Catholicism outside Rome; and he was too thoroughly drawn to Catholicism, both by temperament and from dread of the scepticism which, for him, was the alternative, to hesitate. Acutely as he suffered under the deplorable Pontificate of Pius IX and at the hands of his odious entourage, it is impossible to think that his regrets were more than velleities; or that, whatever he may have said or written under extreme nervous tension, he ever seriously contemplated retracing his steps. Nor can we wish that he had done so. If the Roman furrow was not his, the English was still less so; like another eminent and ambiguous personality of our generation (Lord Rosebery) he must plough his own. Such figures are the disappointment of their own, and an enigma to later, time. They are full of promise, well equipped, brilliant, the favorites of fortune. "Ye did run well; who did hinder you?" Yet the dull, the vulgar, the mean, outstrip them. These have, it seems, a robustness of fibre in which those are lacking; and now, as of old, the sorrowful but inexorable sentence is passed upon
the children of the kingdom, "the publicans and the harlots"—a lesser breed, a lower race—"go into the kingdom of God before you."

ALFRED FAWKES.

RUGBY, ENGLAND.


Professor Peabody sets out with asking some questions which have at present more than usual importance: "What are the special obstacles which American civilization offers to religious progress? What are the traits of the American character on which teachers of religion may most confidently depend?" The Papers which constitute the book, "occasional for the most part in their origin and fragmentary in their form," are offered not as an answer to these and kindred questions, but as "exploratory excursions" into the field. This modest description is more than justified. The book has more unity than is here claimed. It is permeated throughout by Professor Peabody's experienced insight, sound judgment, clearness and grace of style, and his loving appreciation of the person and work of Jesus Christ. An illuminative instance of this is his treatment of the interview of Jesus with the Roman centurion (p. 112), and of the light it casts on the nature and worth of discipline, so much needed in American life. His analysis of the American character is discriminating and just (p. 93 f.); especially in his insistence on two foci for it—commercialism and idealism—rather than either of these as a centre, as many superficial observers have reported.

The book accomplishes its aim. It is not a treatise on Americanism, education, or religion; but it flashes interpretative light on all three, and adds another to the valuable series in which Professor Peabody has shown the union of piety and intelligence.

FREDERIC PALMER.


Mr. Laski's book will, we venture to predict, command two classes of readers; for it is a contribution not only to political thought but also to the history of events of wide interest. Written with the object of discussing the theory of the State, it contains really valuable
description of the Disruption in Scotland, of the Oxford Movement, and of the establishment of the Roman hierarchy in England. For the author, following in the steps of the late Professor Maitland and his disciple, Dr. Figgis, whose theological outlook differs widely from his master's, recognizes that the Christian Church was one of the greatest nurseries of political theory. The modern conception of the State is, in fact, the outcome of the mediaeval idea of the Church. And more than this, the problems of the State have in our own time been first brought into the light of day in the form of ecclesiastical questions imperatively demanding solution. The principles maintained so strenuously by Guelf and Ghibelline in Italy respectively, the dreams of Dante, the views of Marsilius of Padua, cast their shadows on modern history; and the voices of Gregory VII and Boniface VIII find their echoes not only in the Church but in the State of today.

Perhaps it is to be regretted that Mr. Laski has reprinted a lecture he delivered as an introduction to his thesis. It has all the merits and the faults of its original purpose. That is to say, it was evidently a most interesting lecture, and for this very reason has a certain lack of the literary style which adorns the rest of the volume. If, therefore, the reader should hastily judge by the opening remarks that the book is not likely to interest him and is disposed to lay it aside, he will be a serious loser, as there is hardly a page which will not repay careful perusal.

The chapter on the Sovereignty of the State is, however, in our judgment the least satisfactory, because it deals rather with abstractions than realities. With Mr. Laski's general contention we cordially agree, that a dangerous fallacy is contained in the dictum, "Everywhere the One comes before the Many. All Manyness has its origin in the Oneness and to Oneness it returns. Therefore all order consists in the subordination of Plurality to Unity." At the same time there are occasions when the State has the right imperatively to demand a unity which it has no time to secure by persuasion. Undoubtedly, when the individual is able to say, "I shall fight for England because I genuinely accept the rightness of its cause, not because when the call comes I must unheedingly, and, therefore unintelligently, obey it," "the State," again to quote Mr. Laski's words, "will be stronger which binds its members by the strength of a moral purpose validated" — whatever may be the exact meaning of the last words.

But such a state is no more than an abstraction; whereas the countries to which all of us belong are actualities, and when their very
existence is threatened, whether they are republics like the United States, or constitutional or centralized monarchies like England or Germany, the State has not time to exercise a reasonable persuasion but must call upon every individual to act, and if, when so called on, he wishes to pause and examine the rights and wrongs of the case before he obeys, he does so at his own personal risk. There are times when the State must commandeer the individual or perish; and when they occur, one becomes somewhat impatient of theoretical rights and disquisitions on the proper ideals of the actions of a citizen.

When, however, we come to the past viewed in the cold light of history, we are able to judge more impartially the value of Mr. Laski’s conclusions. Religion is the one force which really contests the claim of the State to absolute obedience; and there are times in which the issue is a straight one — when the individual has to choose between obeying God or man, the latter being represented by the State armed with visible power to coerce in case of disobedience. At times, of course, as at present in the case of those who have a conscientious objection to war, the individual is concerned; but Mr. Laski prefers to discuss the issue when religion is represented by the Church. Now the State, however high its claims, can never be a societas perfecta in the same sense as the Church. Even should it claim to exist by divine right, its ultimate end is human convenience, and as such it is liable to be modified or even destroyed. But that which deals with man’s eternal welfare cannot submit to be tested by the same measure. It is an expression of the divine will and its claims are imperative. Hence from time to time the mutable State is bound to come in conflict with the unchangeable Church.

The first example of this is the famous Disruption in Scotland in 1843. When that country accepted the Reformation, it by no means rejected the Church. The Presbyterian government then set up was considered not as a compromise but as a new societas perfecta substituted for the old. The question arose in its acute form on the question of patronage as opposed to the choice of the congregation; and in the chapter devoted to it we have a masterly survey of the arguments for and against the claim of the Scottish Church for absolute independence of the State in things spiritual. The result is well known. Dr. Chalmers and his friends refused to submit to the judgment of the temporal courts, and, having counted the cost, nobly paid the penalty. They left the General Assembly, resigned their positions and emoluments, and, after facing the very real danger of utter poverty, founded the Free Church of Scotland. No one
can deny that such a defiance of the State was legitimate and in the same spirit as that shown by the early Christians towards the Roman Empire — obedience to all lawful commands of the State and resistance for conscience' sake combined with a readiness to pay the utmost penalty, without unmanly whines to be saved from it by a sympathetic public.

The Tractarians in the Oxford Movement were animated by a similar spirit. Macaulay had complained that the Disruptionists of the North had not sufficiently imbibed Whig principles; but this could not be urged against the average Churchman of the South. Superior in social prestige and wealth, the priests in high places in England were as a rule less conscious of the independence of their spiritual position than the presbyters of Scotland. They were, in fact, more ready to pay the price for their privileges by acknowledging the Whig doctrine that the function of the Church is to act the part of the servant of the State. As a reward they were treated with a contempt which culminated in the legislation which, in the case of the Irish bishoprics, ignored the last claims of ecclesiastical liberty to control the Church. Against this came the indignant protest of Keble, which kindled the latent Catholicism of the English clergy; with the result of the secession to Rome by Newman and his more enthusiastic admirers. The sequel is found in Mr. Laski's fourth chapter on "The Political Theory of the Catholic Revival," the main theme of which is the opposition of Lord John Russell, in whom the Whiggery of the Revolution was incarnate, to the Roman Catholic hierarchy set up in England under Cardinal Wiseman. This raised the whole question of the dual obligation of every Roman Catholic to obey the Pope and the King, and some of the best intellects of the time were engaged in the discussion. Of course the issue was the total discomfiture of Russell; nor have English Roman Catholics proved in any way inferior in loyalty to the mass of their countrymen.

In his last chapter Mr. Laski discusses the political theories of Le Maistre, the ultra Catholic, and Bismarck, the Protestant absolutist, and shows where they come to a certain agreement. From the survey of his wide field the author concludes in praise of federalism. "We begin to see the State as akin to the mediaeval Empire, which was above all a community of communities." The analogy is not altogether happy, because the Empire was never a fact except on the rare occasions when it was centralized, nor was it a soil in which the tree of liberty was able to take deep roots. It is, however, with pleasure that we quote Mr. Laski's opening words: "This volume is
the first of a series of studies in which I hope to discuss the various aspects of the theory of the State.” He has great problems before him, many of which are in the womb of the future. For centuries the Church has asserted its independence on purely ecclesiastical grounds—patronage in Scotland, ritual in England, the rights of the Pope in Rome. Will it ever stand for great and fundamental principles of righteousness? If it does, all previous strifes between Church and State, from Gregory VII to Pius X, will be dwarfed into insignificance. What about the other great communities—trade-unions and the like? But these things are on the knees of the gods; and we can leave the discussion of them with some confidence to Mr. Laski’s future labors.

F. J. Foakes-Jackson.

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It would be strange indeed if the distinguished author of A History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century had not, in the course of his sympathetic study of the thoughts of others, been led to philosophical conclusions of his own. And it is only natural that one who has proved himself equally at home in the sciences, in philosophy, in sociology, and in theology, should focus his own reflections more particularly upon the problem of the relation of science and religion—a problem of which one may fairly say that, in one form or another, it has exercised every considerable modern thinker from the time of Descartes to the present day. Every one who is conscious of the debt we all owe to Dr. Merz for his History must welcome his contribution to the solution of this central problem of modern civilization. Dr. Merz's essay is written in simple, clear language, and distinguished by a serenity of outlook which bespeaks mastery of his subject and years of mature reflection. His manner of approach to the problem is, I think, unusual in discussions of this sort, and the effect is distinctly original. Dr. Merz describes his point of view as “psychological” and “introspective.” It is very closely akin to what Avenarius calls the standpoint of “pure experience.” Dr. Merz himself connects it, on the one hand, with Descartes' Cogito ergo sum, with Hume, and with the British Empiricists generally, and, on the other hand, with James's “stream of consciousness,” that is, with the concept of primitive experience as a changing, flowing mass or continuum of sensations,
feelings, desires. The "firmament of the soul" is Dr. Merz's own picturesque name for it. Thus the problem formulates itself for Dr. Merz as tracing religion and science respectively to their roots in this "primordial" experience, which is also "primordial reality." The Positivist estimate of religion as antiquated superstition, destined to be supplanted by science, is hereby excluded at the very start. Religion has, so to speak, a metaphysical value. It is one of the ways in which we experience the real. It is a revelation of the real as well grounded as that of science, and less abstract, for it takes us back to the fundamental unity or "Together" of things, for which we need a "synoptic" apprehension. Thus Dr. Merz's method is to exhibit the abstractness of the scientific view of the world, and thereby to make room for attention to those sides of experience which science ignores but in which religion is rooted.

The great illusion (the term is not Dr. Merz's, but it represents, I think, the spirit of his argument) of science is the cosmic smallness and insignificance of experience. A man's experience, chaotic, fragmentary, a thing of fleeting shreds and patches, is even more transitory and unimportant than his own physical existence. Further, a man is only one among countless other units. His race is only one among animal species, and these constitute but a small and evanescent portion of terrestrial phenomena. Our earth itself is only a speck in a crowd of innumerable other worlds. Measured by the vast cosmic scale, human experience surely is but the tiniest and least important of by-products.

But take the "introspective" point of view and your metaphysical scale of values is promptly reversed. Then you realize that the "stream of consciousness" or the "firmament of the soul" contains, "as a very small portion only, those elementary sensations of sight, touch, and sound, out of which common sense builds up the external world, and science, with a still greater restriction of fundamental data, its edifice of methodical thought, its picture or model of the universe." The question is, which of those two points of view, the introspective or the scientific, gives us the "fuller amount of reality." "Each contains the other within its circumference, and is itself contained in the circumference of the other."

The choice, for Dr. Merz, is determined by the recognition that science, precisely because it abstracts, selects and analyzes, loses what their "synoptic" point of view enables artist and philosopher to retain and appreciate, namely, a sense of the whole or the All. This sense is the root of religion, especially in the form of the "feeling of absolute dependence" upon a "spiritual reality," the "pressure"
of which upon us we feel throughout the whole of our experience. Dr. Merz tries to show in a very interesting way how, just as the first "things" we learn to distinguish in the outer world are "persons," so this all-embracing reality must be conceived as personal, though freed from the limitations of finite persons. It manifests itself in us and through us, though never falling as a whole within the field of any single human mind.

Dr. Merz does not discuss specific religious doctrines. With the clash between scientific truths concerning human life and the dogmas of the virgin-birth, the resurrection, the ascension, he does not attempt to deal. His problem might be put in language adapted from Kant: How is religion possible? All who are interested in this problem will find his essay very suggestive, and will rise from their study of it with feelings of respect and appreciation.

R. F. ALFRED HOERNLÉ.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.


In publishing this volume Professor Creelman has met a need which teachers of the Old Testament have long felt. We have a number of excellent Introductions to the Old Testament, varying all the way from such a brief handbook as that by G. F. Moore to Driver's standard work. In addition to these two those by McFadyen, Cornill, Kautzsch, Bennett, and Gray may especially be mentioned. But admirable as are these books, and leaving little to be desired in the way of exactness of scholarship, clearness of statement, and soundness and maturity of judgment, they do not meet the needs of the student who is looking for a detailed account of the chronological development of Old Testament literature and for a fair and impartial presentation of the divergent views still current in this field. These needs are met by Professor Creelman's new book.

The method followed by the author is to divide Old Testament history into a number of periods, and then discuss the historical sources for each of these periods and the literature belonging to it. The discussion of each period falls into two parts. First, there is a general introduction to the history and literature of the period, and then there is a detailed chronological outline of the Biblical material relating to it. In the first period, extending down to and including the conquest of Palestine, the structure and sources of the Hexa-
teuch are discussed, after which the Biblical material is analyzed and the question of its historicity dealt with in such a way as to give the student a clear grasp both of the contents of the Hexateuch and its probable historical value. In a similar way the history and literature of the period of the Judges, the United Kingdom, the Divided Kingdom, the Exile, and the Persian and Greek periods are treated. This method necessarily involves more or less of repetition. The historical writings, for instance, are considered both in connection with the period with which they deal and the period from which they emanated. The uncertainty also concerning the date of the Psalms and Proverbs makes it necessary to consider these books in several different periods. But this repetition is no drawback from the pedagogical point of view. It rather enhances the value of the work as a text-book.

The position of the authors is in the main that represented by Hastings' Dictionary of the Bible. It is moderately conservative without being dogmatic in its conclusions. Divergent views are freely recorded, and the reader is furnished with extensive references to current English Old Testament literature. No claim to originality is made. The authors' purpose is "to incorporate and make available the results of the best modern scholarship in such form as, it is hoped, will be helpful to intelligent Old Testament study," and in this aim they have admirably succeeded. The book is a painstaking, thorough, and reliable work, the outcome of many years of labor and experience. In its method of treatment and to some extent in its contents it is a valuable supplement to the other Old Testament Introductions, and as a student's manual it has distinct advantages of its own.

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ALBERT C. KNUDSON.


In the great collection of photographic copies of manuscripts relating to Central America, given to the Peabody Museum by Mr. Charles P. Bowditch, is an account of the missionary Avendaño's journey to Peten in northern Guatemala, at the end of the seventeenth century. Taking this unpublished journal (which had been translated by Mr. Bowditch and Señor Rivera) as a foundation, the author has added data derived from an unpublished account by Cano (in
the possession of the University of Pennsylvania) and other sources, and written an account of the progress of the Spanish conquest of Yucatan and the adjacent region from its beginning in 1517 to the complete subjection of the Itzas of Peten in 1696. A vocabulary of the Itza dialect, a list of the early maps of Yucatan, and a bibliography are given in appendices.

A brief introductory chapter presents an outline of the pre-Columbian history of the Maya people, of whom the Itzas were a branch. In this Mr. Means follows Morley's chronology. The story of the conquest itself begins with Cortez's famous overland expedition to Honduras in 1524, in which Europeans for the first time penetrated to Peten. Little came of this early contact, however, and for years the attention of the Spaniards was concentrated on northern Yucatan. About the beginning of the seventeenth century interest was again awakened in the Itza country, and the first missionaries penetrated to Peten. After a brief period of apparent success for their efforts, the Itzas revolted and apostatized, and nearly eighty years then passed before the final subjection of this warlike group.

The account of Avenaño deals with the period just prior to this final pacification, and his two entradas are given at considerable length. The first attempt of the intrepid missionary failed, but on the second he succeeded in reaching Peten, only to be obliged to flee for his life on account of the treachery of the people. After terrible privations, during which he almost perished of starvation, he at last returned to Merida in safety. Ursua, the governor of Yucatan, then determined to put an end to the unbearable situation, and led a well-equipped force to Peten, where he decisively defeated the Itzas.

Such in outline is the story told by Mr. Means, largely in the words of eye-witnesses. His work seems to have been carefully done, but the use of the term "race" in speaking of the Itzas and Mayas as "two separate races," is inexcusable; and the suggestion of plagiarism on the part of Villagutierre put forward in the Introduction seems to rest on rather slender evidence. In correlating the various accounts of the conquest and presenting the whole story in connected form, Mr. Means has done Maya students a real service. Yet, after all, the chief value of his paper lies in making accessible the hitherto unpublished journals of Avenaño.

ROBERT DIXON.
THE HINDU YOGA–SYSTEM

CHARLES ROCKWELL LANMAN

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Frederic Palmer’s account of Angelus Silesius, published in the April number of this Review, portrays admirably the struggles of a German mystic of some three hundred years ago, to attain the unattainable, to give utterance to the unutterable. Three and twenty hundred years ago, the like struggles were making part of the spiritual history of distant India. Perhaps Dr. Palmer’s essay may lend a certain timeliness to an endeavor to interest Occidental readers in those sombre followers of the Mystic Way, who — time out of mind — have held retreat for meditation in the solemn stillness of the forests “lapped by the storied Hydaspes.”

Our histories of philosophy are wont to begin with Thales of Miletus. But oh, how brief seems all recorded human history, when some geologist tells us the story of the earth’s crust, or the astronomer overwhelms us with that of the spiral nebulae! Lilliputian indeed is the difference — whether in time or in place — between Thales and Yājnavalkya, between Miletus and the Ganges. The informing fact remains, that these ultimate questions — answerable only in the language of the great antinomies — do and always will come up,
as far to the West and as far to the East as the blades of grass do spring.

Whom space nor time nor nothing else can bound,
Who hast nor form (save spirit mere) nor end,
Whom naught can fathom but Thy thought profound,—
To Thee, Light, Peace Ineffable, I bend.

Thus Bhartri-hari, calling unto God. It is He—of whom they say “Not, not.”

And if timeliness there be, the attempt is none the less timely, because of the work, recently published by the Harvard Press, and written by my friend and colleague and former pupil, James Haughton Woods (now serving at the Sorbonne as exchange-professor from Harvard), and entitled The Yoga-system of Patanjali. It is fitting that the work should be introduced, not only to Indianists, but also and especially to students of the history of psychology and philosophy and religion, by The Harvard Theological Review.

The volume, as appears from its title-page, comprises three distinct literary works, translated from Sanskrit into English, namely: the Mnemonic Rules, called Yoga-sūtras, of Patanjali; the Comment, called Yoga-bhāshya, attributed to Veda-vyāsa; and the Explanation, called Tattva-vāïçārādi, of Vāchaspati Miçra. It is here in place to point out some of the reasons why these works are worthy of study and some of the ways in which that study may prove interesting and fruitful. But first a word as to what the three works are.

The third, or the Explanation, is of course a commentary on the second, or the Comment. And the Comment is in a way a commentary on the Rules; but it is much more than that, as will appear when we consider what the Rules themselves are. Professor Woods has done well in rendering the Sanskrit word for sūtras by ‘mnemonic rules,’ for that phrase emphasizes the fact that they are primarily, not something that will
give you a clear idea of the Yoga-system, but rather "something to be learned by heart," a set of mental pegs on which to hang, in very close and orderly sequence, the principles and precepts of a thoroughly elaborated system,—which system, however, you must know from other sources than the rules themselves, namely, from the teachers of your "school."

While therefore it is important to understand that the Comment is a posterius to the Rules and that the Rules are a prius to the Comment, it is yet more important to understand that the Rules themselves are a posterius to an elaborated system, of which prior system however no exposition in literary form contemporaneous with that prior system has come down to us in Sanskrit; and that the Comment or Bhāṣyā, the reinvestiture of the skeleton of the Rules with the flesh and blood of comprehensible details, is accordingly the oldest systematic exposition of Yoga doctrine in Sanskrit that we possess.

Onesikritos, the companion of Alexander the Great, is the first notable foreigner to give us an account of the Yogins of India.¹ Himself a disciple of Diogenes the Cynic, we need not wonder that Alexander selected him as the man most fit to talk with the Hindu ascetic sages and to inquire about their teachings. His report of that memorable interview of 326 B.C. has been preserved for us by Strabo in his Geography (xv.63). Despite the difficulty of conversing through interpreters, Onesikritos was in fact remarkably successful in getting

¹ Possibly Demokritos of Abdera visited them, perhaps a century earlier. According to Clement of Alexandria (Stromata, 1.xv.69), Demokritos maintained that none of his contemporaries had seen more countries and made the acquaintance of more men distinguished in every kind of science than himself. Among those men, Aelian includes the sages of India (τοὺς σοφιστὰς τῶν Ἠρώων: Varia historia, iv.20); and Diogenes Laertius reports a similar tradition (τοὺς γνωσοφισταῖς ἔαει τινς συμμικταί αὐτῶν καὶ Ἡρώων: i.35). Such a tradition is not to be set aside too lightly, when we consider the views of Demokritos concerning peace of mind (ἐθνομα: ix.45) as the best fruit of philosophy, and the many references thereto in the fragments of his ethical treatises. Had these last been preserved, it is possible that we might have found in them distinctly recognizable traces of Indian teaching.
at some of the very fundamentals of Indian belief. The drift of the talk, he said, came to this, that that is the best doctrine, which rids the spirit not only of grief but also of joy; and again, that that dwelling-place is the best, for which the scantiest equipment or outfit is needed.\(^2\)

Of these two points, one is of prime significance for the spiritual side of Yoga, just as the other is so for its practical aspects. The one suggests the ‘undisturbed calm’ (citta-prasāda) of Patanjali, the ‘mindfulness made perfect through balance’ (upekkhā-sati-parisuddhi) of Buddhaghosa; and the other is a concrete instance of the doctrine\(^3\) of emancipation from the slavery to things. This latter is a part of the fundamental morality (specifically, neither Brahmanical nor Jainistic nor Buddhist) which is an essential preliminary for any system of ascetic religious training, and is accordingly taught again and again, now with a touch of gentle humor, now sternly, and always cogently, by Brahmans and Jains and Buddhists alike.

Contemporary with Onesikritos, but destined (unlike him) never to be forgotten in India, was Kāūtilya, “the Hindu Bismarck,” as Jacobi calls him, imperial chancellor of Chandragupta or Σανδρόκοττος. His treatise on Statesmanship\(^4\) is, as Jacobi shows, our most trust-

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\(^2\) Strabo xv.65: τὰ γοῦν λεξίθεντα εἰς τούτ’ ἐκὴ συντελεῖν ὡς ἀλγὸς ἀριστος δὲ ηδονὴν καὶ λύπην ψυχῆς ἀφαιρῆσαι. ... καὶ γὰρ οἰκλαν ἄριστην εἶναι ἡτὶς ἁν ἐπισκευὴς ἑκαχιστῆς ἕδεται.

\(^3\) This is beautifully set forth by Buddhaghosa in his great treatise on Buddhism, The Way of Salvation or Visuddhi-magga. See book 1, sections 105–112, especially 106, in volume 49 of the Proceedings of the American Academy, p. 159. Of all names in the history of Buddhist Scholasticism, Buddhaghosa’s is the most illustrious. He is not less renowned in the East than is his contemporary, Saint Augustin, in the West, and for the same reasons,—sanctity of life, wide learning, and great literary achievement. An edition of the Pali text of this treatise was undertaken by my beloved and unforgotten friend and pupil, the late Henry Clarke Warren. It is my hope to complete his unfinished work, and to issue the text with an English version.

\(^4\) The recently edited Arthagāstra, published at Mysore, 1909. See the articles by Hillebrandt, Hertel, Jacobi, and Jolly, and especially the three articles by Jacobi, Berliner Akademie, 1911 and 1912. He calls it “eine historische Quelle allerersten Ranges” (1911, p. 834: cf. p. 937, and 1912, p. 834).
worthy source of knowledge for the ancient Hindu state, not only because its date (about 300 B.C.) is certain, but also because it was written by the very man who had the principal part in the foundation and administration of the great and growing empire of the Mauryan Dynasty. Kāuṭiliya says that Sāṅkhya and Yoga and Lokāyata were the three philosophic systems current in his day. Unfortunately, he does not tell us whether there were expositions thereof in literary form. In the centuries (perhaps six or more) between Kāuṭiliya and Patanjali, the Yoga-system did probably undergo many modifications in detail; but it is a fact of prime importance that so great an authority as Kāuṭiliya recognizes it as a system, and as one of the three most worthy of mention among those current in his day.

The elements of Yoga, as Hopkins observes, are indefinitely antique. The rigorous austerities, the control of the senses, especially as against the temptations of carnal lust,—these are the achievements of holy men which made even the gods to tremble on their thrones. And they are described in the Mahā-bhārata and other narrative works, often with amusingly grotesque exaggeration, but in such an incidental and matter-of-fact way that we cannot doubt that from very early times Yoga-practices were common and wide-spread in India and that the belief in their potency was altogether genuine.

Yoga is accordingly one of the most ancient and striking products of the Hindu mind and character. It is therefore a little strange that, while the labors of Deussen and Garbe and others have done very much to open up the Vedānta and Sāṅkhya systems to the Occident, the

5 Berliner Akademie, 1911, p. 954. 6a Ibidem, p. 733.

history of Yoga as a body of practices and as a religio-philosophic system is yet to be written. For the history of Yoga-practice, nothing could be more illuminating and fruitful than to carry further such investigations as those of Hopkins, just cited. For the history of Yoga as a system, the most immediate requirement is evidently an Occidental translation of the Comment or Yoga-bhāṣṭya. It is greatly to the credit of Professor Woods that he realized this need and addressed himself with so much energy to the task of supplying it, the more so when that task involved journeys once and again not only to the great teachers of Europe (Deussen and Jacobi), but also to those of India.

Rājendra-lāla Mitra, in the preface to his Yoga aphorisms of Patanjali (1883: p. xc), says: "I had hopes of reading the work with the assistance of a professional Yogī; but I have been disappointed. I could find no Pandit in Bengal who had made Yoga the special subject of his study, and the only person I met at Benares who could help me was most exorbitant in his demands. He cared not for the world and its wealth, and the only condition under which he would teach me was strict pupilage under Hindu rules — living in his hut and ever following his footsteps — to which I could not submit.” That was five and thirty years ago. A real command of both Sanskrit and English by the same person is a combination rare enough. Still rarer, the combination of those two elements with a knowledge of one of the great vernaculars of India, such as R. Mitra had. Rarest of all, this triple combination plus the chance (which a foreigner is not likely to get) for a thorough acquaintance with the actual procedure and habit of mind of a genuine Yogin of high character. What fruit might that now perhaps almost impossible combination have borne!

7 This, with all due deference to Garbe and his excellent chapters on Yoga in the Grundriss der Indoarischen Philologie (1896).
If no Occidental may hope for any such chances of practical acquaintance with Yoga, it is at least needful that the written treatise which serves as the basis of book-study should be informed by the noblest spirit and loftiest purpose. That the Comment or Bhāshya meets these requirements, none of us, however much or little we sympathize with the Hindu point of view, will, I think, deny. “Find me, and turn thy back on heaven,” says Brahma, in Emerson’s familiar verses. And so the author of the Comment, in treating (at ii.42) of the supremest happiness, says that the pleasures of love in this world and the great pleasures of heaven are not worth the sixteenth part of that supremest happiness that comes from the dwindling of lusts.

And again, in like spirit, he speaks at iii.51. First he quaintly describes how the gods tempt an advanced Yogin with the sensual pleasures of their transitory heaven: “Sir, will you sit here? Will you rest here? This pleasure might prove attractive. This maiden might prove attractive. This elixir wards off old age and death.” And so on. Then he suggests the Yogin’s answer to these enticements, and in so doing he rises to a pitch of sustained and noble eloquence:

Baked on the pitiless coals of the round-of-rebirths, wandering about in the blinding gloom of birth and death,—hardly have I found the lamp that dispels the darkness of the moral defilements, the lamp of Yoga,—when, lo, these lust-born gusts of the things of sense do threaten to put it out! How then could it be that I who have seen its light, tricked by the mirage of the things of sense, should throw myself like fuel into that same fire of the round-of-rebirths as it flares up again? Fare ye well, [things of sense,] like unto dreams are ye! to be pitied are they that crave you, things of sense, [fare well!]

8 It is certain that the Gheranda-sanhitā, more or less widely known in the Occident, does not meet them. My former pupil, Professor S. K. Belvarkar of Poona, India, assures me that it is condemned by those whose learning and character he respects. The like is true of Haṭhayoga-pradīpikā and numerous similar works.

9 Quoting from the Mahā-bhārata, xii.174.46, a stanza of significance and dignity.
Perhaps enough (or more) has already been said to make clear the historical importance and the moral dignity of the Yoga-bhāshya. Its importance was long ago pointed out by others in other connections: so by Kern in his History of Buddhism, by Jacobi in his Ursprung des Buddhismus aus dem Sāṅkhya-Yoga, and by Senart in his Bouddhisme et Yoga; but the appearance of the present translation justifies us in emphasizing the dignity and importance of the original, the more so as it is hoped that this translation of Dr. Woods and the publication of Buddhaghosa’s treatise on Buddhism will prove to be a powerful stimulus and aid to the comparative study of these two great systems.

Thus, to instance some of the more striking and well-known coincidences between the Bhāshya and Buddhism, we may begin with the Four Eminent Truths. The most significant achievement of modern medicine is the finding out of the cause of disease. This is the indispensable foundation for the whole structure of preventive medicine. It was precisely this problem in the world of the spirit to which Buddha addressed himself, the etiology of human misery. His solution he publicly announced in his first sermon, the gist of which was destined to become known to untold millions, the sermon of the Deer-park at Benares or sermon about the Four Truths. These concern suffering, its cause, its surcease, and the way thereto, and they coincide with the four cardinal topics of Hindu medical science, disease, the cause of disease, health, and remedies. Now these Four Truths

11 Göttinger Nachrichten, 1896.
12 Revue de l’histoire des religions, 1900.
14 This coincidence the Hindu medical writers did not fail to observe: so Vāgbhaṭa in the stanza introductory to the Aṣṭāṅga-hṛdaya.
are set forth by the author of the Bhāshya at ii.15, and not without explicit reference to the fact that this Yoga-system has four divisions coincident with those of the system of medicine. It may be added that a part of the Rule to which this is the Comment, reads: To the discriminating, all is nothing but pain, duḥkham eva sarvam vivekinaḥ; and that this again is one of the three fundamental axioms of Buddhism.\(^{15}\) All is transitory, All is pain, All is without substantive reality.

Again, the Bhāshya enumerates (at i.20), quite as a matter-of-course, the five means to the higher concentration, namely faith and energy and mindfulness and concentration and insight (çraddhā-vīrya-smṛti-samādhiprajñā). These are the same five elements of Yoga mastered and taught by the famous Yoga-doctors, Āḷāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta, and coincide literally with those given in the Buddhist texts, namely in the Discourse of the Noble Quest or Ariya-pariyesanasutta, Majjhima-nikāya, vol. 1, p. 164. Here Buddha tells how he, before his Enlightenment, went to these teachers, found that he himself had mastered saddhā, vīrya, sati, samādhi, and paññā no less truly than they, and admitted that these things were good as far as they went, but that they brought you only to the third or fourth of the Four Formless Realms, that is, that they did not bring you far enough. The discussion of the proper balance of these five moral faculties constitutes a most interesting section of the fourth book of the Visuddhi-magga.

Again, among the Forty Businesses or kammaṭṭhānas, that play so prominent a rôle in the Visuddhi-magga, are the Four Exalted States or brahma-vihāras, namely friendliness and compassion and joy and indifference

(mettā, karunā, muditā, upekkhā). The whole of book ix is devoted to them. They all lead up to the first three trances, and the cultivation of upekkhā leads even to the fourth trance or highest of the ordinary trances. Now all these four states, under the corresponding names of mātṛī, karunā, muditā, and upeksā, are prescribed by the Rule and the Bhāshya at i.33, and as a means for calming the mind-stuff.

Or again, to cite a case of partial correspondence and partial diversity, we may mention the kleças or innate defects of human nature or moral defilements or (as Dr. Woods calls them) the hindrances. These are enumerated by the Bhāshya, at ii.3, as ignorance, the feeling-of-personality, lust, ill-will, and the will-to-live (avidyā, asmitā, rāga, dveṣa, abhiniveṣa). But Buddhaghosa, in book xxii, has a list of ten, containing most of these five, and also, for example, sloth or languor (thīna, styāna), which last by the Bhāshya, at i.30, is put among the nine obstacles or antarāyas. We hope that the Bhāshya and the Visuddhi-magga may prove mutually illuminating, by reason not only of their coincidences but also of their differences.

Minor coincidences, in matters of diction, as between the Bhāshya and the Buddhist texts, deserve careful notice from any who chance to study these sources at the same time. Confident as we may be concerning the influence of the Yoga system upon Buddha,—the interplay of influences as between the Bhāshya and the Buddhist texts may well have been chiefly in the opposite direction. Thus the use of the Sanskrit word adhvānam in the sense of 'time' (so at iv.12) is, unless I err, wholly foreign to Brahmanical Sanskrit texts, and is a downright taking over of its Pāli equivalent addhānam in its secondary but common meaning of 'time.' Similarly the use of -nimna with -prāghbhāra (at iv.26) seems to me not rightly Sanskrit at all, but rather a conscious adapta-
tion of the familiar Pāli combination -ninna, -poṇa, -pabbhāra.

Indeed, one is sometimes tempted to surmise that the diction of the author of the Bhāshya was influenced by downright reminiscences of Nikāya texts. Thus at ii.39 and iv.25 are given the questionings or doubts as to personal identity through various past and future births: “Who was I? Or who shall we become?” and so forth: ko ’ham āsam? katham aham āsam? . . . ke vā bhaviṣyāmaḥ? katham vā bhaviṣyāmaḥ? These are substantially the questions cited at length by Buddhaghosa (in book xix) from the Majjhima-nikāya (vol. 1, p. 8).

The reflections of the Yogin “on whom insight has dawned” are put by the author of the Bhāshya (at i.16) in a way which — at once brief and yet ample — is marked by noble dignity. They describe the winning of the supreme goal: “Won is that which was to be won. Ended are the moral defilements which had to be ended. Cut is the close-jointed succession of existences-in-the-world, which — so long as it was not cut asunder — involved death after birth and birth after death.” Prāptaṁ prāpaṇīyam. Kṣīnāḥ kṣetavyāḥ klecāḥ. Chinnaḥ cūṣṭaparvā bhava-saṁkramo, yasyāvicchedāj janītvā mṛiyate mṛtvā ca jāyate.

In like manner the consummation of the holy life, salvation or the setting free, is described in the Dīgha-nikāya, vol. 1, p. 84: “In him, when set free, there arises the knowledge that he is set free. He knows: Ended is rebirth. Lived has been the holy life. Done has been what was to be done. There is no more returning here.” Vimuttasmiṁ ‘vimuttam’ iti īśanam hoti. ‘Khiṇā jāti. Vusitam brahmacariyam. Kataṁ karaniyam. Nāparam itthattāya’ ti pająñāti.

The whole spiritual situation in both cases is similar; and that the substantial coincidences of the two descrip-
tions may be nothing more than the natural outcome of that similarity we will not deny. But the examples that have been mentioned (a few out of many) make it clear that a systematic study of the Bhāshaṇa in the light of the Buddhist texts is well worth the while.

The comparison of Yoga and Buddhism is not the only study which I hope this work of Professor Woods will powerfully stimulate. I hope it will direct the attention of scholars to a severely critical examination of the supernormal powers which, as Buddhist and Yoga texts alike maintain, are among the fruits of the cultivation of profound concentration or samādhi.

In order to make my meaning clear, let me instance (with added references to the text of the Bhāshaṇa) some of these powers: Such are clairvoyance and clairaudience (ii.43); knowledge of the future (iii.16) and of one's previous births (iii.18); thought-reading (iii.19); power to become invisible (iii.21); the cessation of hunger and thirst (iii.30); the power of hypnotic suggestion (iii.38: "your mind-stuff enters the body of another," cittasya para-çarīrāveçah); the power to walk upon water or a spider's thread or sunbeams or to pass through the air (iii.42); the power by reason of which "the fire, hot as it is, burns you not" (iii.45); and so on. Such powers are systematically treated by Buddhaghosa in books xii and xiii, and are constantly mentioned with quiet gravity by the story-tellers, as if no one were expected to have any difficulty in believing them. Is it not worth while, in the light of modern knowledge, to try to draw a line between that which has some real basis in fact and that which has none? To this question William James, by word and by deed, answered with an emphatic Yes.

The more obvious manifestations of Yoga-practice, such as the standing upon one leg or the holding of one
arm aloft and other austerities, did not fail to strike the Greeks (Strabo xv.61), just as, at all times, the sensational has struck the casual observer. The noblest and most spiritual achievements of the Yogin present no features of interest for the gazer or for the tourist-photographer. On the other hand, the rewards — whether of gratified vanity or of reputation or of gifts — for the successful performance of marvellous or apparently super-normal acts, are and always have been a temptation to abuse Yoga-practices with venal and fraudulent purpose. The ample admixture of deception and trick and miracle-mongering has tended to make men of science averse to any serious consideration of the whole subject. But fraud, even if preponderant, will not excuse us from the due investigation of the residuum of well-attested fact, not even if that residuum be small. The reason why well-attested cases of the apparently miraculous are relatively few is a legitimate one: to persons most likely to make the highest and noblest attainments by the practice of Yoga, the so-called "magical powers" are after all an incidental by-product. And accordingly, Buddhaghosa relegates the discussion of the supernormal powers to those books (xii and xiii) which form a mere appendix to his treatment (books iii to xi) of Concentration or Samādhi. To seek these powers as an end, or to make a display of them to satisfy the curiosity of the vulgar, is wholly unworthy, and indeed most strictly forbidden. In the gospel-narrative of the temptation, when the Devil says, "If thou be the Son of God, cast thyself down from hence," the answer of Jesus is an uncompromising rebuke. And in like spirit, the Mahā-

16 Or, to speak in terms of the twentieth century, the "cameral" or "snapshot" observer. The National Geographic Society of Washington devoted most of its Magazine for December, 1913, to the "Religious penances and punishments self-inflicted by the Holy Men of India." The paper is illustrated with seventy pictures. The sensational aspects of Yoga-practice have been treated in easily accessible works. Such are John C. Oman's The Mystics, Ascetics, and Saints of India, London, 1903; Richard Schmidt's Fakire und Fakirtum, Berlin, 1908.
bhārata threatens with "a hell from which there is no release" the Yogins who are thus guilty.\textsuperscript{17}

Thought-reading is a power very often ascribed to Buddha or to a saint, who thereby intuitively discerns the evil intentions of another and so thwarts them. In many of these cases the use of good judgment or of a knowledge of human nature may explain the successful thought-reading; while in others some influence much more subtile may be in play. The cases as a class are not easy to sift. On the other hand, the activity of the subliminal consciousness is most clearly referred to in the Explanation to the Bhāshya at i.24: "Chāitra thinks intently, 'Tomorrow I must get up just at day-break,' and then after having slept, he gets up at that very time because of the subliminal impression resulting from that intent thinking." This power of awaking from sound slumber at a predetermined hour is abundantly attested by common experience, and also, for example, by J. M. Bramwell in his Hypnotism, page 387 (cf. p. 115). And doubtless the power to "emerge from trance" or "rise out of trance" (one of the five "masteries" of Buddhaghosa at book iv, section 103, the vuṭṭhāṇa-vasi) is a power of a kindred nature. If the Bhāshya's promise, "fire burns him not" (at iii.45: see above) refers to insensibility to the pain of a burn, the power therein implied may stand in relation to the facts of anaesthesia and analgesia as recited by Bramwell at pages 360–361. Compare also his Index, under "Analgesia, in hypnosis, and post-hypnotic."

Perhaps the most marvellous of all these "supernormal" attainments is the power of suffering one's body to be buried for a long time and of resuming one's normal activities on release from the grave. Well-attested cases are indeed rare, but such in fact there are, and none is better attested or more wonderful than that of Haridāś.

\textsuperscript{17} At xii.197.7, cited by Hopkins, Yoga-technique, JAOS. xxii.344.
This man had himself buried alive for six weeks at Lahore at the Court of Runjeet Singh in 1837. Thorough-going precautions were taken against fraud, and the account of the matter is from the pen of Sir Claude Martin Wade, who was an actual eye-witness of the disinterment. The account was first printed by James Braid, in a tiny book,\(^1\) since become famous, entitled “Observations on trance or human hybernation,” Edinburgh, 1850. The very title of Braid’s sober and judicial treatise intimates that he sees nothing miraculous in this performance, but regards it rather as analogous to the hibernation common in many animals and as something that could be and was induced by natural, albeit most elaborate and painstaking, means. The case at any rate warns us against too ready incredulity concerning Hindu marvels that seem at first blush to pass the bounds of the possible.

To show the interest of studying Yoga in the light of the discoveries of modern psychology, I know of no better example than the story of Ruchi and Vipula. This is indubitably a case of hypnosis and effective suggestion to the hypnotized subject to refrain from yielding to a strong temptation to do a sinful act. If we knew nothing about the psychological facts involved, we Occidentals should certainly not recognize the true significance of the narrative, especially as its technical features are presented in a terminology which the facts alone can elucidate. Thus the gaining power over another’s will by hypnotizing is called “entering the body of another” “as wind enters an empty space”—phrases of hopeless obscurity until we know in detail the nature of the facts intended. The story is given in the Mahā-bhārata (at

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\(^1\) Braid was a surgeon of Manchester, England. The copy of his book that lay before me when I wrote this, was a gift “To the President of Harvard College with the author’s compliments” in 1852. The little volume has since been transferred to the “Treasure Room.” The account was reprinted by Garbe in The Monist for July, 1900, Chicago. See also Garbe in Westermann’s Monatshefte for September, 1900; or W. Preyer’s Der Hypnotismus, Berlin, 1882 (p. 46, translated from Braid); or Richard Schmidt, Fakire, p. 88.
xiii.40, 41), and it is to Hopkins that we owe the service of showing its meaning to Western scholars. The story itself is in brief as follows.

The sage Deva-çarman had a wife of great beauty named Ruchi. Even the gods were enamored of her, and in particular god Indra, whose illicit amours are notorious. Well aware of Indra’s designs, the sage, before going away to perform a sacrifice, summons his pupil Vipula and bids him protect Ruchi and her virtue and especially as against the lustful Indra. Vipula, himself a man of the utmost integrity and virtue and self-control, agrees to do the bidding of his teacher, and asks him in what form Indra may be expected to appear. “In any one of many forms,” answers Deva-çarman. “Indra may come wearing a diadem or a clout, as a Brahman or as an outcaste, as a parrot or as a lion, as an old man or as a young man, or indeed in the form of the wind-god. Therefore,” he continues, “watch over her with diligence.” And so he departs.

Vipula sagely reflects that, if the tempter can come in the form of the wind, a fence for the hermitage or a door for Ruchi’s cottage would be of no avail. He resolves to protect her virtue “by the power of Yoga.”20 “I will enter her body by Yoga and in it I will abide, sunk in the deepest concentration (samāhita). If I keep myself free from the slightest trace of passion, I shall incur no guilt.” Accordingly, he sits down by her, who is seated, and gazes steadily with his eyes into her eyes, and so that her gaze meets his, and fills her mind with longing for what is right, so that she is averse especially to any adul-

19 In his paper on Yoga-technique, already cited, Journal of the Am. Oriental Society, xxii.359. Compare his excellent comments upon the technical features of the story.

20 In such a story as this, the phraseology of the original Sanskrit (at Mahā-bhārata xiii.40) is of moment. My phrases are accordingly intended to be correct reproductions. Note especially those enclosed within marks of quotation, and see stanzas 50–52 and 56–59 of the original, as numbered in the Bombay edition of 1888.
terous word or deed. 21 "Vipula entered her body as the wind enters space, and remained there motionless, invisible. Then, making rigid the body of his teacher's wife, he stayed there devoted to guarding her, and she was not aware of him."

Indra, thinking "This is my chance," comes now to the hermitage in the form of a man, young and very handsome, sees the body of Vipula seated and with staring eyes and motionless as a picture, and sees Ruchi also in all her loveliness. She, on seeing him and his superb beauty, wanted to rise and welcome him and ask him who he was. But under the influence of Vipula, she could not move a muscle. Indra makes known to her himself and his passion and the need of prompt assent. Vipula recognizes her danger from her looks, redoubles the force of his hypnotic suggestion, "and bound with Yoga-bonds all her faculties," so that, although, in reply to Indra's "Come, come," she wanted to say "Yes,"—the words that actually escaped her were "Sir, what business hast thou to come here?" She was, the story adds, not without grave embarrassment at the incivility of her answer, "spoken under the control of another." Indra now perceives "with his supernormal eye" that Vipula is "in Ruchi's body like an image in a mirror," and that his case is therefore hopeless, and trembles lest Vipula curse him. Vipula "quits the body of Ruchi" (that is, terminates the hypnosis), and, with unstinted rebukes to the crestfallen Indra, tells him to take himself off. — Deva-çarman returns and Vipula presents to him his wife unspoiled.

The facts relating to hypnotism were unknown to the Occident at the beginning of the last century. In 1841 James Braid independently discovered and observed and described many of the phenomena here concerned.

21 Such is, I take it, the significance of lakṣaṇam lakṣaṇenaíva, vadanaí vadanaena ca, at stanza 58.
Even the word *hypnotism*, as may be seen from Murray’s Dictionary, is only about seventy-five years old, having been introduced with *hypnotize*, etc., into the English language by Braid himself in 1842. But in spite of the extreme modernity of the Occidental knowledge of the facts, and of the terminology in which they are recorded, there is already a large and rapidly growing literature upon the subject, and the elaborate treatise of John Milne Bramwell entitled “Hypnotism, its history, practice, and theory” (London, 1906) gives a bibliography of books and articles running into the hundreds. Nevertheless, the systematic treatises, those of Moll and Bramwell at least, do not even attempt to carry the history of hypnotism back beyond the times of Braid, Esdaile, Elliotson, and Mesmer — a statement which I make, not by way of carping, but rather by way of calling attention to an opportunity. Unless I err, the whole subject is commonly regarded in the Occident as very modern, a recent discovery, when in fact it has been well known and widely known in the Orient for over two thousand years.

The fruits of Yoga-practice are told, not only in systematic Sanskrit treatises on Yoga and in Buddhist books, but also incidentally, as I have said, in many epic or narrative texts. The exploitation of these texts by an Indianist who has already made a thorough study of modern psychology is sure to yield very striking results. In the second chapter of his work on hypnotism (page 109 of the new edition of A. E. Waite, London, 1899), Braid describes his technique for inducing hypnosis. What must our wonder be on finding that almost exactly fifteen centuries ago in the island of Ceylon there was written a book, Buddhaghosa’s *Visuddhi-magga*, a large part of which is concerned with this very subject. With Buddhaghosa indeed it is self-hypnotization, but the technique of it is substantially the same as that of Braid
in all its essential features: the willingness on the part of the subject to submit himself, the comfortable position, the steady and slightly strained gaze, the fixed attention, the gentle monotonous sensory stimulations.—That important discoveries should be made by a people, and be made again centuries later and quite independently by another people,—this is one of the most astonishing facts of human history.

Envoy.—The foregoing paragraphs were written several years ago, just after I had spent months in trying to live up to my doubtless wildly misconceived notions of editorial fidelity. To forestall the perhaps yet harsher criticism of less friendly judges, I had tried to find every findable fault with Dr. Woods’s Yoga-book before he sent it to the printer. Buddhaghosa wisely says that you must ever and always be on the lookout for the good points in others, not for their faults. Now that I come back to the book,—not as an editor, but rather as a human being,—I am simply amazed at the general impression which it makes upon me as the outcome of genuine enthusiasm and indomitable patience. All this and much more was needed to advance our scientific salients into the territory of the Hindu dialecticians. We may well imagine those jealous guardians of their sacred lore as saying to themselves of us, *ils ne passeront jamais!* But Dr. Woods’s intellectual emplacements (metaphors, like the sleeves of blouses, must be in the fashion) were good, and his preliminary bombardments have been effective. The infantry assaults of a second edition, or of fresh troops of Indianists, are now in order.

What I greatly missed in his work—as I told him at the time—was a chapter, in addition to the discussions of his Introduction, which should somehow make clear to the Occidental mind what the relation is between such hairsplitting dialectic and the practical aim of this philo-
sophical system, to wit, Salvation or Release. True, my position is exactly that of the young man who was asked whether he could play the violin, and who answered that he didn’t know, but that he could try. It is one thing to translate a text, or three texts, and it is quite another to interpret one of the great movements of the human mind to a generation of humanity transformed by the vicissitudes of two millennia and the inexorable forces of a physical and intellectual environment as different as the East is from the West—and this last the reader may take either as the familiar biblical commonplace or as a literal simile. The wise men of the East, it is said, think that we know how to make a living and that they know how to live. And it was an Oriental who said, I am come that they might have life, and that they might have it more abundantly. I should like to have Professor Woods tell us wherein, according to the Yoga-view, the fulness of life consisteth.

It may be that my question is so wrongly put that I shall be adjudged an incompetent critic. But at any rate, Dr. Woods has made a large step in advance towards proving that I am wrong, or else towards answering me aright; and in either case I thank him heartily. Meanwhile he has published in the Journal of our Oriental Society, volume 34, The Jewel’s Lustré or Maṇi-prabhā, and he has the Yoga-vārttika well in hand, if not practically ready for publication. Let us hope that he will not let the great power of such long-gathered momentum be dissipated by any avoidable delay.

The pervading gravity of tone of these Hindu philosophical discussions comports with their extreme difficulty, and is rarely relieved by a touch of humor,—unless it be when old Vāchaspati Miṣra deigns to add to his Explanation of something less hard than the rest, the amusingly laconic observation, “Easy” (su-gamam: so at ii.43, 44). As who should laugh at us up his sleeve,
if he had any sleeve, for not knowing that much ourselves! And worse than the comments — difficile per difficilius — are the super-comments. Most of them, after they have been done into the clearest English, are still as tough as whitleather. But Professor Woods's book has often reminded me of the symphony-concerts in the old Drapers' Hall or Gewandhaus of my student days at Leipzig, and the staring legend on the cornice above the fiddles and trombones and viols,

RES SEVERA EST VERUM GAUDIUM.

Dr. Woods has not chosen one of the "soft snaps" of the Indian antiquity. Its further difficulties need not dismay him. And our dearly loved French brothers with whom he is now so zealously working, are showing us the supremely great lesson, that the first thing needed for substantial victory is the loftiest moral courage. Long, long ago Plutarch put that lesson in an unmatched phrase which has often sustained me,

άρχη γάρ δυνώς τοῦ νικᾶν τὸ θαρρεῖν.
THE PAPACY AND THE MODERN STATE

ALFRED FAWKES

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More than a year ago, in a letter to the present writer, an eminent French savant, M. Alfred Loisy, contrasted the parts played by the Pope and the President of the United States respectively in the war. "Maintenant c'est Wilson qui devient pape, et qui fait la morale aux belligérants, en nous appuyant de son crédit politique, financier, militaire. Vive le pape Wilson!" The contrast was just. "Faire la morale aux belligérants"—this is what we expect a Pope to do. We have been disappointed; it is exactly what he has not done. On the other hand, the President is the one politician on either side who has risen to the level of a statesman, and has gained, not lost, in reputation during the last four years. It must be remembered that he came late into the firing line, and has therefore been less exposed than his European colleagues to the test of time under which so many of them have broken down. But more than any one man now in public life, he stands for the combination of Reason and Energy.

"Vis consili expers mole ruit sua;
Vim temperatam di quoque provehunt
In majus." 1

"Happily," says an English journalist, referring to certain political issues which need not be dwelt on here, "happily, there is America. We might have been the captain of the Western Alliance. She is." 2 On the field

1 Horace. Odes iii, 4.  
2 Nation. March 2, 1918.
of ethics, it is true. "The moral leadership in the war is not the least of the debts which we owe to the intervention of the United States." 3

Yet though the other disciple has "outrun" Peter—the modern state having taken over more than one function formerly discharged by the Papacy—the Note addressed by Benedict XV (August, 1917) to the Heads of the Belligerent Peoples is a notable document. Its effect on public opinion was small. But this public opinion was to a great extent manufactured; as sixteenth-century rulers tuned the pulpits, so twentieth-century party wire-pullers tune the press. The London "Press-Industry," which has become one of the worst features of English political life, started a campaign of denigration. The conductor waved his bâton, the instruments blared and brayed in unison; as far as its influence extends, and it extends widely, not a discordant note was heard. That this was so was not due either to hatred of Popery or to love of Protestantism. The "Press-Industry" is above either weakness, and can adapt itself on occasion to either creed. There are springs of action less respectable than bigotry. To large classes of the community the war is a very profitable investment; and, without crediting them with direct and conscious commercial motives, men do not readily destroy that by which they live. It is impossible to overlook the great and increasing mass of vested interests that has been created. Officials are multiplied, salaries liberal, profits swollen, prices high. "Five pund a week am I making syne the war," said a Scotch "body"; "and there's that auld deevil the Pope wanting peace."

Whatever else he may be or not be, the Pope is the first ecclesiastic in Christendom; and if in human things the actual falls short of the ideal, we need not

*Daily News, April 8, 1918.
assume that the official bias from which the Head of so
great a politico-ecclesiastical institution as the Roman
Catholic Church cannot, and probably would not if
he could, wholly free himself, is such as to make his
appeal for peace either perfunctory or insincere. It is
permissible to think that it was neither. The spirit in
which the Pope’s Easter Message (1918) to “the noble
British nation” is conceived is admirable; and per-
sonally, though his type is that of the official and his
genius administrative rather than inspired or creative,
Benedict XV is an able, an excellent, and a moderate
man. Shrewd, unemotional, silent, he is in every re-
spect unlike his immediate predecessor; he resembles
rather Leo XIII, though he has neither that Pope’s
arbitrary temper nor his large views. A statesman he
is not; and he has been described as un petit, un très petit
politicien. In the notorious von Gerlach case, he was
the dupe of a vulgar Mephistopheles—which he must
have resented bitterly. It is his misfortune that the
situation in which he finds himself calls for just those
qualities — insight, inspiration, leadership — that he does
not possess. In normal times he would have made
an excellent Pope; but the times are not normal. Con-
sensu omnium imperii capax, nisi imperasset will perhaps
be the verdict of history. He is characterized by a
certain flatness; he is neither inspired nor inspiring,
and in fact he does not inspire. What he sees he sees
clearly; his understanding is positive; he is under no illu-
sions as to what a modern Pope can and cannot do. This
is probably why he is slow to urge the religious motive
on evil-doers; were he to do so, he would be, he knows,
“speaking into the air.” The war has been an object-
lessen in the inefficacy of this motive. This has been so
even in the narrower sense of the word “religion.” The
sacrileges perpetrated by Catholic Austrians and Bava-
rians in Catholic churches and on Catholic priests and
religious persons of both sexes have been as atrocious as those committed by Protestant Prussians and unbaptized Turks. "The children of Israel have forsaken thy covenant, thrown down thine altars, and slain thy priests with the sword."

The Pope, however, is one thing; the Papacy another. The excuses that may be urged for Giacomo della Chiesa aggravate the case against the Roman See. To those who regard the Papacy as the corner-stone of religion, its "neutrality" in this great conflict between good and evil must, if they allow themselves to think, be an embarrassment. For "he that is not with me is against me." It was for "neutrality" that Meroz was cursed. Never was Authority and all that Authority implies — exhortation, denunciation, correction — more called for.

"Prophet of God, arise and take
With thee the words of wrath divine,
The scourge of heaven, to shake
O'er yon apostate shrine."

The motives alleged for non-intervention are those of human prudence. In the case of the Vice-Gerent of Deity they are not even colorable; nor, to do them justice, does the special pleading of Catholic apologists give the impression of any great enthusiasm or conviction on their part. Not so did the great Popes of the Middle Ages, the Gregories, the Innocents, conceive their office. They would have made short work with the man whose lawless ambition has let loose these horrors upon humanity — "to deliver such an one unto Satan for the destruction of the flesh." They believed in themselves; and this was why the world believed in them. The world will sit loose to an authority which is not sure of itself; it has no use for a Roi fainéant — a Teacher who cannot, or will not, or at least does not teach. That the patience, if not the faith, of Catholics has been tried
is beyond dispute. M. Denys Cochin's letter to the *Gaulois* (April 2) on the silence of the Vatican in the matter of the French hostages taken by the Germans is an example. "Hold not thy tongue, O God, keep not still silence; refrain not thyself, O God." Nor is dissatisfaction confined to Catholics. Those of us even who regard the Papacy rather from the standpoint of history than from that of theology are chilled. For the moral forces at the disposition of mankind are neither so many nor so strong that we can afford to see the disappearance of what was once one of their number with indifference,

"Men are we, and must grieve when even the Shade
Of that which once was great is passed away."

The ground of complaint is not that the Pope is personally indifferent either to the horrors of war or to the interests of peace; Benedict XV is neither; but that he has kept silence, even from good words, when, as Pope, speech was incumbent upon him; and that to all appearance he is blind to the moral issues involved in and raised by the war. He would probably answer the first objection by urging that nothing he could say would have the smallest effect; which is true, but which is an admission fatal to the very idea of the Papacy; and the second by reminding us that his conception of morality and of the good of mankind is not ours. This is so; and it is here that the crux of the situation lies.

The Pope, though the Head of the clerical profession—"in him we see the pretensions, the merits, the demerits of the clerical office in its most complete, perhaps in its most exaggerated, form"—is a Priest, not a Prophet. This is the secret both of his success in the past and of his failure in the present. There was a time when an Absolute Ruler—Priest or King—was a condition

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*Stanley. Christian Institutions, p. 220.*
of human progress. It passed. The Reign of Law followed. That of Spirit is yet to come. The Papacy is still in the first stage, and by a law of its being cannot get beyond it; the world is passing out of the second into the third. The Papacy, therefore, survives like a fossil remnant of earlier strata in a new geological formation; it shows us what the past of the race has been. And if, when we consider its long history, it seems to us that from the first its material side has been more prominent than its moral, we may remember the saying of the historian, that "the natural man is a born Catholic."² Esau is supplanted, not only because Jacob is a supplanter, but because he, Esau, lays himself open to being supplanted, and so becomes the trickster's easy prey. And here the Roman Church does but exhibit, writ large, features which she has in common with the other Churches. The interests of the institution which they represent bulk large before Churchmen. A regard, perhaps an excessive regard, for these interests "is the badge of all our tribe."

The policy of individual Popes varies. That of Gregory XVI was Austrian; that of Pius IX Legitimist; that of Leo XIII French; that of Pius X German. But the Pope is the titular Head of a great international polity which was before him and will be after him; which has its historical genius, temper, tendencies, and laws. Under the surface-waters this deeper stream runs in its own direction and with its own velocity. Chronic and acute as has been the strife between them—for the contention which should be the greater is eternal—the connection between the Holy Roman Church and the Holy Roman Empire is intimate. A common interest unites them. Both stand for Authority, and for the Force (in the last resort a material Force) which lies behind it; and Force, as Renan reminds us, "is not

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² Rudolf Sohm. Outline of Church History, p. 35.
an amiable thing.” Such as it is, however, it is the link between these two great institutions. It is an effectual one. They can neither part, nor live at peace together; they are an inseparable, if an ill-mated pair.

In its mediæval shape the Holy Roman Empire disappeared in the Napoleonic wars. But its spirit survives in the Central Powers. Austria is the nearest approach to a Catholic state now left in Europe; only its preponderance in the Near East stands between Rome and the *terra incognita* of Slav religion: while the third part of the population of the German Empire is Catholic; and the grouping of parties is such as to give the Catholic Centre a disproportionate influence in German politics; its vote turns the scale. These are assets which the Papacy will not easily relinquish; and this is why an anti-German Papacy is unthinkable. This has been the case increasingly since the Congress of Vienna. The Popes of the Holy Alliance were the instruments of the Hapsburgs. For a moment Pius IX broke loose: but in 1848 he learned his lesson, and never forgot it; the Vatican came to heel. The Pontificate of his successor was of the nature of an interlude. Leo XIII, who was in the line of the greater Popes, made France the keystone of his policy in the hope of making the Republic what the Monarchy had been, the eldest daughter of the Church. But this hope was doomed to disappointment; France, which bore with her the fortunes of civilization, was launched on larger seas. He did not, however, abandon it: “Nothing,” he emphatically assured the French ambassador 6 when he received him for the last time before his death, “nothing should make him break with France.” The consideration of the “ifs” of history is as attractive as it is unprofitable: had the policy of Leo been continued by his successor, what might not the result have been? On his death, however

6 The late M. Nisard.
(1903), the Vatican reverted to its traditional policy. Pius X owed his election to the Austrian veto; the Central Powers were determined to exclude the one man of ability in the Sacred College, the pro-French Cardinal Rampolla; and when the present Pontiff succeeded (1914), the abolition of the Concordat had made relations with France embarrassed, and the conservative forces in Italian politics, of which the Pope is the natural ally, were German at heart. It was not surprising that Benedict XV should have followed the line of least resistance. The incompetence of his predecessor had left the Papacy in a state of dilapidation; he had to rebuild. Had he been a master-builder—which he was not—the war might well have made his difficulties insuperable; for the Papacy is a political rather than a religious institution. It would be too much, no doubt, to say that it is indifferent to religion; it is not too much to say that it is political first and religious afterwards, that policy counts for more than religion in its designs. A genius might have dared and won, both greatly; but Benedict XV was not a genius; he "fought after the manner of men." For Rome, England is the great Protestant Power, France the great anti-clerical Power, Russia the great anti-Latin Power; Italy is anti-Papal; America is a sentina gentium from which, let European politics shape themselves as they will, dollars can always be drawn. Why should it love any of us? It is foolish to expect it; its aims and methods are other than ours. Like goes to like, not to unlike; the Papacy does and we do not "believe in gods in whose name men kill." Brieux's famous phrase expresses the situation with exactness. The German ideal is akin to the Papal, and can be dovetailed into it with little difficulty. The English, the Italian, the French, the American, cannot. "Between us and you there is a great gulf fixed."
This gulf is none the less real because it is, in a sense, intangible. For, as M. Emile Faguet has admirably expressed it:

"A religion is not only a collection of dogmas; it is a body of men animated by similar tendencies of conscience, will, and temper. For centuries the Catholic Church has not only been authoritative herself; she has also upheld authority as such, and other than her own. All power is of God; her own first and foremost; but also all those powers, whatever their origin, whose prescription guarantees their establishment—a establishment human indeed but approved by God. So that if it is asked, 'What sort of people are, or become, or are satisfied to remain, Catholics; or, being—so to speak—semi-Catholics, regard Catholicism with favour?' the answer is, 'All, or almost all those, whose disposition is authoritative; who are temperamentally, conservative, and opposed to innovation.' The result is that the Church is the rallying point of persons whose temperament is that of authority. The lover of novelty—the Liberal, the emancipator, above all the revolutionary—gravitate naturally towards liberal Protestantism or Free Thought, or, more frequently still, become unbelieving Catholics, who retain nothing of Catholicism but the name.

"To what then did Lamennais invite the Church? To the abandonment of her historical tradition, and to the sacrifice of the most numerous, the most persistent, the most devoted, and the most energetic of her following. No Church, no party, will for a moment entertain such an idea. A Church is tied by its past and to its adherents, because its past and its adherents make it what it is. I will not say that a Church would rather renounce its beliefs than its general spirit. But it is certain that, provided the discussion is discreet and indirect, it will more readily admit discussion of its particular tenets than of its general spirit. In the one case it can shut its eyes; in the other it is compelled to open them. The Church, mainly composed, as she is, of men of arbitrary and authoritative temper, may come to find herself everywhere a minority; but she will none the less everywhere uphold the powers that be, and desire her adherents to respect them, regardless of whether their form be monarchical or republican. For there is a consideration which weighs more than this with her; that is, the stability of the civil power, corresponding in general to the stability of the spiritual power; a stability good in itself, and in harmony with the desires,
the genius, and the character of the faithful who constitute the reserve force of the Church.”

It is probable that in the first instance Benedict XV believed in a speedy and decisive German victory. He was not alone in this belief; in the Italian army, among Italian conservatives, and in cosmopolitan Italian society, it was widely held. Now he is not sure of it. He would like to be. *Fiat justitia ruat coelum* is an idea beyond his horizon; and powerful influences of more than one order are at work to persuade him that his original anticipation will be realized. But he is too astute to be convinced that it is so. It is probable that he now thinks that the issue of the war will be inconclusive, neither side being able to inflict a definite defeat on its opponent, and that his policy is to keep a foot in each camp. It would perhaps be truer to say that he keeps a foot and a half in that of the Germans; the action of the Canadian hierarchy in the Bourassa controversy shows the direction in which the wind of Roman officialism blows. An enthusiast might risk all for right; a statesman might foresee the triumph of the larger idea and of liberty; but Popes are not enthusiasts, and priests neither love liberty nor move easily among ideas. It is to the credit of Benedict XV that he was a *persona ingrata* at the court of his predecessor. It is impossible to conceive him stooping to that level; he was of another world. But those who have been brought into contact with him describe him as a man rather of concrete than of abstract mind. He sees a number of particular facts more readily than a general principle, and approaches a subject rather from the particular than from the universal side. He avoids the *question de droit*; the positive, the *question de fait*—this is his element. He will not denounce the crimes of the pious Emperors; it would

be useless; and he has an eye to the future; the Hun is a bad enemy, and may still be a useful friend. It is not heroic, but a casuist could probably make a case for it; and the official mind is much of a muchness in all the Churches, which are seen at their worst in dealing with ideas, or with movements into which ideas enter—the clergy, the Royalist historian of the Civil Wars reminds us, taking "the worst measure of affairs and measures of all men that can read and write." Never has that wise saying been more strikingly verified than in our own time. "L'attitude du Vatican durant la présente guerre est principalement caractérisée par une foncière inintelligence de cette crise de l'humanité," says the distinguished French writer who has been already quoted. "Pour Benoit XV, c'est une guerre comme une autre, qu'il s'agirait de terminer par un compromis—en attendant de nouveaux conflits—et la démocratie ce pape comprend rien. Ses sympathies sont tous naturellement aux vieilles monarchies, qu'il croit encore beaucoup plus fortes qu'elles ne sont en réalité. Je pense qu'en reprenant la série des actes de Benoit XV il serait assez facile d'en montrer l'in-signifiance réelle et l'esprit suranné." 8

In a democratic country, such as France or America, Catholics are naturally unwilling to be placed in an attitude of opposition to the form of government which commends itself to the majority of the citizens. Leo XIII rallied French Catholics to the support of the Republic; "There," he said, pointing to the crucifix, "is the one corpse to which the church is tied." It was the greatest act of a great pontificate. There is no reason why a Catholic should not be a democrat—using the word in the European sense. The Church indeed is a monarchy, and tends more and more to become an absolute monarchy; but it does not follow

8 M. Alfred Loisy, Professeur au Collège de France.
that the state should be so; here it may go its own way. It was a Catholic poet who wrote the famous lines,

“For forms of government let fools contest. Whate’er is best administered is best’’;

and though those which immediately follow them —

“For modes of faith let graceless zealots fight; His can’t be wrong whose life is in the right”

embody a whole series of condemned propositions, the most rigorous censor could not refuse the Imprimatur to the former couplet. For Catholicism has no quarrel with Democracy as such — that is, with government by the community as a whole, as distinct from government either by a single ruler or by a privileged class. The political doctrine of St. Thomas is that of an English Whig of 1688. “As it is lawful to resist robbers, so it is lawful to resist evil rulers”; though, “if the tyranny be not excessive, it is more profitable to endure it for a time than by active resistance to incur graver dangers than those which arise from the tyranny in question.”

In the seventeenth century another line of thought appears. Some Catholic writers, with the Jesuits Suarez and Mariana, developed the theology of tyrannicide. Others argued either (after Hobbes) that the de facto existence of a government carried its legitimation with it, or (with the patriarchists) that monarchy had its origin in natural law, and that, once made, the delegation of sovereignty was irrecoverable; in which case the actual community had no more voice in the matter than children in the selection of their parents. Such authors,

10 “Sicut licet resistere latronibus, ita licet resistere malis principibus.” (Summa Theologiae, 2.2. q. 69 & 4.)
“Si non fuerit excessus tyrannidis, utilius est remissam tyrannidem tolerari ad tempus, quam contra tyrannum agendo multis implicari periculos quae sunt graviora ipso tyrannide.” (De Regimine Princ: VI, 1.)
however, were rather jurists than theologians, and their motives were frankly opportunist. At one time, for example, it was desired to justify the assassination of Protestant rulers; at another to revive the doctrine of the Deposing Power of the Popes; at a third to terrorize pietists into the support of the Bourbon and Hapsburg monarchies. As Pascal put it to the Jesuits, "Toutes vos démarches sont politiques." 11 But it is a true maxim of the canonists that such opinions are born—and die. 12 In practice common sense asserted itself. "Though they should deny it a hundred times, kings reign only by the suffrages of the people," writes a fourteenth-century French lawyer; 13 and our own John Selden—"A king is a thing men have made for their own selves, for quietness' sake." 14 The jus divinum of the Stuarts was a figment of the Reformation: "The Reformers did much advance the King's Supremacy, for they only cared to exclude the Pope." In our own time the words of Leo XIII are explicit: "No form of civil government is to be blamed in itself, not even that which gives the people a share, greater or less as the case may be, in the exercise of sovereignty; a function which at certain times and under certain conditions may be not only profitable to the citizens but even incumbent upon them." 15 The limitation "in itself" (per se) should, however, be noted. The Papacy has suffered too much from kings to be wedded to monarchy; but it is irreconcilably hostile to certain features, not indeed of Democracy as such, but of Democracy of the lay type, the only type now possible—to that emanci-

11 XVIIème Lettre Provinciale.
12 Communes opiniones nascuntur, et moriuntur.
13 Michel de Dormans, 1388.
14 Table-Talk LXX, LXXI.
15 "Nulla per se reprehenditur ex variis rei publicae formis . . . immo neque illud per se reprehenditur participem plus minusve esse populum rei publicae certis: quod ipsum certis in temporibus certisque legibus potest non solum ad utilitatem, sed etiam ad officium pertinere civium." (Encyclical Immortale Dei. 1885.)
pation of lay from clerical life and mind known loosely but with sufficient accuracy for practical purposes as Liberalism. In this connection the Bull of Pius IX, *Quanta Cura* (1864) with the annexed *Syllabus*, and the Decree *Lamentabili sane* with the Encyclical *Pascendi Dominici Gregis* of Pius X (1907), deserve careful study.\(^{16}\) The proposition that "the Roman Pontiff can and should reconcile himself, and come to terms, with Progress, with Liberalism, and with Modern Civilization," was condemned by the former Pope; while the latter denounces the opinions that "in temporal matters the Church should be subject to the State," and that "the government of the Church, in particular in matters of doctrine and discipline, should be brought into harmony with the modern conscience, *quaec tota ad democratiam vergit* — the whole tendency of which is in the direction of Democracy."

It is to Liberalism, however, rather than to Democracy that the Church is opposed. The alliance between Berlin and Rome is *ad hoc*, and would not stand the strain — to which it is improbable that it will be exposed — of a German victory. The Kulturkampf followed close upon Sedan. Perhaps the social order from which the Papacy has most to hope — it appears to be that which it desires to see established in Ireland — is a democracy of peasants segregated from European civilization and ruled by priests. Paraguay under the Jesuits, Ecuador under Garcia Moreno, or the Swiss Cantons of the Sonderbund are examples. The kings of the earth may, under certain circumstances, be the lesser of two evils; but the ideal of the priestly historian is a Theocracy; "The Lord your God was your King."\(^{17}\)

For — here is the thing itself — this Divine King rules

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\(^{16}\) These documents will be found in Denzinger's *Enchiridion*, Edition XI. Herder, 1911.

\(^{17}\) 1 Samuel 12:12.
through the hierarchy. "Each of the two swords, the spiritual and the material, is at the disposition of the Church; but the latter is employed for, the former by, her. The one is wielded by the hand of the priest, the other by that of kings and soldiers, but at the priest's will and bidding. For it must be that the one sword be subject to the other, and the temporal authority obey the spiritual rule." 18 Thus Boniface VIII.

But the extravagance of the claim was its refutation; the weapon broke in his hands.

"Veggio in Anagni entrar lo fior d'aliso
E nel vicario suo Christo esser catto." 19

The end of an age was in sight. For no modern State is moving, or can by any possibility move, on these lines. "Believe in the Pope?" said Dr. Arnold with his usual directness; "I would as soon believe in Jupiter!" Both belong to a world that has passed away. Such cults linger in an enfeebled form in back-waters, among those who for one reason or another lie outside the main current of life. The worship of the old gods survived among the country folks — (pagus, paganus, paganism); the peasant element is the strength of Catholicism today. On these levels both are genuine. Elsewhere they ring hollow. There was an element of make-belief in the neo-paganism of the Emperor Julian; there is a strain of unreality in the neo-Catholic apologetic of today. De Maistre, Brownson, Newman — it is brilliant fencing, but it is the fencing of the salle d'escrime, not of the battlefield; there is an absence of the real thing. The policy of the modern Papacy is one of shifts and

18 "Uterque est in potestate Ecclesie, spiritualis scilicet gladius et materialis; sed is quidem pro Ecclesia, ille vero ab Ecclesia, exercendus: ille sacerdotis, is manu regum et militum, sed ad nutum et patientiam sacerdotis. Oportet autem gladium esse sub gladio, et temporalem auctoritatem spirituali subjici potestati." (Bull Unam Sanctam, 1302.)

19 Purgatorio XX, 89.
expedients. Like Autolycus, it is "a snapper-up of unconsidered trifles." Bankruptcy is inevitable; but it can still fish in troubled waters, make small temporary profits, overreach an unwary opponent, put off the evil day. More than this it cannot do. It is frappé de caducité. It is only on the dial of Ahaz that the shadow went back.

It is difficult to argue from the teaching of a Church to the practice of its members. Religion is one of many motives which influence conduct, and it is not always the strongest motive; men are at once better and worse than their creeds. But Catholicism has in many respects a stronger hold on its adherents than Protestantism; its appeal to the senses and the imagination is more persistent, its machinery is more effective and better worked. The dream-democracy of the priests comes through the gate of ivory; though we would have them otherwise, "things are what they are." But the pressure which can be brought to bear upon individuals is great, and it is impossible to foresee when and where it will be overwhelming. During the Italian Risorgimento the Roman question sent English and Irish Catholics into the camp of Continental Absolutism; peasants from Connaught, who would have been Fenians in Ireland, enlisted among the Papal Zouaves. A generation later, when Gladstonian Home Rule was before the country, the Education controversy split the Irish vote in England; the Marriage question may have the same result in our own time. This makes the Catholic vote an incalculable quantity. It is peculiarly liable to be swayed by pietistic sentiment; it is irrational — open to the influence of clerical wire-pullers, of women, of the confessional. A hint, a whisper — and the trick is done. The picture given by the author of Jean Barois is

20 A. Loisy. Quelques Lettres, p. 73.
lifelike; it needs a strong swimmer to make head against the tide. There are, no doubt, Catholics who can do so, but they are exceptional. Nor is indifference a guarantee of immunity. The most indifferent have their religious moments—"Just when we are safest, there's a sunset-touch"; and those who identify piety with superstition are often superstition's easiest prey.

It is these petty, chance, and diminishing gains that confirm the Papacy in its policy of self-seeking; it "minds earthly things"; and self-seeking in religion spells disaster. Its best friends are those who, even at the cost of a rude awakening, would shake it out of its evil dream. The dramatic collapse of Russian Tsardom with its Empire and Church is, it may seem, a gain to the Vatican. Such gains have been before now fallacious. "Are you quite sure he is dead?" is the question put by an English cartoonist into the mouth of the Emperor of Austria, when his Over-lord bade him walk over the bearskin. There may yet be life in the Bear. And the Wise King would counsel the Pope against premature confidence:

"Rejoice not when thine enemy falleth
And let not thine heart be glad when he is overthrown,
Lest the Lord see it, and it displease him,
And he turn away his wrath from him." 24

An uncertain gain among a semi-civilized Eastern peasantry is dearly bought at the price of the alienation of the conscience and mind of Europe. "Ce que je constate est que dans le monde entier la France c'est le catholicisme," said M. Brunetière. Leo XIII bid for this great prize; Pius X threw it away; Benedict XV might have regained it, but has failed to do so. This is the tragedy,

22 Browning. Bishop Blougram's Apology. 23 Punch. March 27, 1918.
24 Proverbs 24, 17, 18.
it may well be the final tragedy, of his well-intentioned but ill-starred reign.

"Delicta majorum immeritus lues,
Romane, donec templam refeceris." 25

The Church, if she would repair her fallen fortunes, must worship at her first shrines.

The author of France, Mr. Bodley, whose knowledge of that country is perhaps unique and who has always displayed a very friendly feeling for the Roman Catholic Church, sums up the situation:

"The enemies of the Church in France, always indefatigable, had an ally in the Vatican. From the moment when the Austrian Cardinal at the Conclave of 1903 vetoed the election to the papacy of Rampolla, who represented a policy conciliatory to France, the Vatican has been considered, rightly or wrongly, an Austro-German agency. But for Rampolla’s defeat, it is probable that that admirable instrument, the Concordat, would not have been abrogated, the rupture of which has removed the last trace of Gallicanism from the French Episcopate. The policy of the new Pope, elected in the first weeks of the war, has, justly or unjustly, persuaded impartial spectators, who have no love for anti-clericalism, that the Vatican desires and works for the victory of Germany and Austria, and the abasement of France, of Italy, and of England. The position of the French bishops is one of painful difficulty. Of patriotism beyond reproach, they are compelled by their dependence on the Holy See to express their loyalty to it, a dilemma of which the anti-clericals are not slow to take advantage. The sacrifice of life and limb and health made by thousands of the younger clergy have had their effect counteracted by the allegation that the clergy is a body primarily owing allegiance to a power which in the European conflict is hostile to France." 26

It is probable that the destiny of the Papacy will work itself out rather by detrition than by catastrophe;


26 The quotation is made, by the author’s kind permission, from a forthcoming work, The Romance of the Battle Line in France, by Mr. J. E. C. Bodley, Corresponding Member of the Institute of France.
the end is not, and will not be, yet. No human institution lives so successfully on a false reputation; so effectively disguises its losses and placards its gains. But the balance sheet is decisive. The future of Latin religion is a problem; that of Latin Catholicism, in its historical shape, is not. The divergence of principle between the Papacy and the modern State places the future of the Papacy beyond question: it "must decrease."
St. John tells us that when Jesus was parting with his friends he comforted them with the assurance that, though for a little while they should not see him, the time would come when they should have a deeper understanding of his life.

It is twenty-five years since Phillips Brooks died, and as we think of what he was to those who knew him, how great our loss has been, let us hope that some such experience as John prophesied has been ours in our relation to our great friend. We can no longer see him as in the days when his great physical presence loomed above us, and his cordial welcome greeted us, and his wisdom filled us with a sense of the richness of life, or even as when in this pulpit he made our insignificance seem accidental and our possibilities the reality which God would glorify. But because he too has gone to the Father we may be able to have a clearer understanding of the spiritual significance of his life, as we think not alone of what he was to us but still more of what he "was worth to God."

In The Life of Stopford Brooke, a brilliant preacher contemporary with Brooks, in many ways most unlike him but physically his peer, there is a description of his presence so perfectly applicable to Brooks that I venture to quote it:

"His message never seemed a burden to him; it came forth unlaboured, a spontaneous utterance sustained with joy, with passion,

1 An address delivered in Trinity Church, Boston, on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the death of Phillips Brooks, January 23, 1918.
and with an affluence of fine and fitting words. His form and figure in the pulpit were a vision of the higher opportunities of man. To look at him was to be lifted up, kindled, reassured. He had the air of one born in a better world than this, and a cloud of glory from his birthplace seemed to follow him. Virtue went out from his presence, and though some were left cold and untouched, there were always many to whom the sight of his face, as he delivered his message, or administered the Holy Communion, was as the breath of a new life. His published sermons stand high in the literature of the pulpit, but no eloquence of the written word can convey the power of enforcement that lay in his personality. The influence struck deep while he was in the act of speaking, and when the sermon was over, the mind would linger on the image of the man, and unconsciously construct a greater sermon for itself." 

This is a description of power and beauty. The last line in particular reminds us, I think, of a test of genius. When we read the clever writers or listen to the words of men of more than ordinary gifts, how often is the effect depressing! We feel the distance that divides our ordinary minds from theirs. We feel the hopelessness of ever doing as well as they have done. That is a common experience which every reader knows. It is an experience that the clergy perhaps alone can appreciate in listening to a man whom they recognize as their superior. I remember well at the beginning of my ministry hearing two distinguished preachers, one a gifted minister of the Congregational Church in America, Dr. Richard S. Storrs, and another a brilliant ecclesiastic of the Anglican communion, Canon Liddon. I remember coming away from the hearing of both these men discouraged, feeling how impossible it would be ever to do the brilliant work they were doing. But I never listened to Brooks, and I doubt if any minister ever listened to him, without experiencing that exhilaration which "unconsciously constructs a greater sermon for itself." It was like reading Shakespeare. We felt

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for a moment that it was a mere accident that prevented us from saying what he was saying, from seeing what he saw; the reason being that the rod of genius causes the waters to gush forth from the rock, which without that touch could never have found issue; and as the stream comes forth, it mingles with the river of life and is thereby glorified.

As we consider the divine gift of the sublime physical presence of the man, we see that his life was sacramental, the physical was but the outward and visible sign of abounding spiritual vitality. In the beautiful poem embodied in the Book of Genesis, "Joseph," the poet says, "is a fruitful vine. His branches run over the wall." How true this was of the man of whom we are thinking today! Indeed, if we are limited, as we now are, to one word by which we may express the characteristic of Phillips Brooks, shall we not say it is the luxuriance of his nature, the abounding vitality of the man, the inexhaustible faith, the ever-widening love, and the eternal hope?

The first and most important manifestation of his abounding vitality was a luxuriant faith. His early religious life was nourished in the evangelical atmosphere, and personal faith in Jesus Christ was the root of his wonderful ministry. It began, no doubt, with the child's love and reverence for the Saviour who lived long ago; it passed into the youth's discipleship for a Master whom he reverenced and obeyed; but it grew into a mystic communion unmarred by fancies or self-consciousness. To him Jesus was an ever-present friend. The love that is usually divided between wife and children he gave to his Lord, who was "closer to him than breathing, nearer than hands and feet." There was the hiding of his power; and there, I suspect, lay the secret of that strange aloofness which no one penetrated. It admits of no analysis. It will be judged abnormal by the
positivist, and natural by those who have experienced even a moment of the communion of God through Christ.

But here was the wonder: This mysticism neither became morbid nor reacted into rationalism. This was, no doubt, due first to the practical demands of his ministry, and secondly to the fact that his intellectual nature was vigorous and ever growing. As a rule, two such elements are apt to be in conflict; and as a result the spiritual nature is troubled and one becomes the master and determines the direction of life. This was the experience of Newman, whose rationalism turned to scepticism and then scepticism in panic sought sanctuary at the altar. Or, as in the case of Froude and others of the mid-Victorian age, the rational overcame the mystic and scepticism became the habit of life. But with Brooks the mystic and the rational seemed to develop without conflict. What he said of Tennyson's poetry describes himself: "Thought is saturated in emotion;" and so his religious life was as serene and mellow as a day in June.

If those who knew him best found that there were chambers in his soul to which no one was admitted, they found also that his intellectual hospitality was unbounded. "A Broad Churchman," he once said, "is not one who holds certain opinions, but one who holds his opinions on a rational basis;" and with all such he delighted to commune. He certainly could give an answer if asked the reason of his faith. That reason led him far away from the dogmatic teaching of his youth. The evangelical theology in which he was trained was based on the Atonement, and the Atonement was popularly identified with the theory of the substitution of a sinless Victim for a guilty sinner and by that substitution God's wrath was turned away. It was almost certain that a youth in whose veins ran the blood of
Unitarians, who had been bred at Harvard when it was a denominational college, who read the sermons of Channing and had hosts of Unitarian friends, could not long rest satisfied with such a dogma, and he did not. But the wonder was that, having broken with that theology, he did not react and abandon the ministry of a Church whose Liturgy justifies men in holding such a theory of Divine righteousness. His evangelical brethren thought he must be a Unitarian, and some of his Unitarian friends could not see how he could be anything else.

It was because of his luxuriant faith. His branches ran over the wall, and their leaves were nourished by rain and sunshine that the plants of lesser growth could not obtain. He never pretended that he was in sympathy with many of the opinions embodied in the Liturgy and the Creeds, but he did believe that his faith could be expressed in those archaic forms. He believed that those forms had been created to preserve the faith and that they had done so, but he never thought of them as containing a growing faith. The branches of the growing Church’s life ought to run over the wall.

The mistake his puzzled critics made was in supposing that when he no longer assented to an opinion long identified with an Article of Faith, his faith had grown less, whereas it had expanded. The problem of the Creeds arises not from paucity of faith — very little is required for conformity — the problem arises when faith has grown great. “Keep the branches within the wall,” cries the timorous traditionalist. “Let the branches hang over the wall till they tear up the roots,” cries the radical. But this man of great faith had the roots of his life embedded in the past and drew nourishment from soil which the fastidious would not touch, while his branches were growing into and toward the light.
Let me try to make this clearer by an illustration drawn from an unpublished Good Friday address. Every student of theology knows what a part the word "satisfaction" played in the Calvinistic system, and how the conscience of the New England Churches at length rose up against all that it implied. No one was more in sympathy with the protest than Brooks. No one shrank more from all the horrid travesty of Calvary than he; yet, though the Incarnation had come to be the centre of his thinking, he never lost the message of the Atonement. On one occasion he spoke of Jesus Christ's death as a satisfaction to his Father—and instantly illumined the whole dreadful controversy by asking, "How can a son's death be a satisfaction to his father?" Then, no doubt with the memory of his brother's death in the Civil War in mind, he poured out his heart in praise of the son who gave his life for a great cause and the father's supreme satisfaction in knowing his son had died to free his brother-man. For God to have His will perfectly done on earth by a Son that shrank from no pain, not even death, trusting and loving his Father in his agony, surely with that, not the wrath but the love of God was satisfied. It was his luxuriant sympathy that enabled him to get at the heart of the truth and so find a ground on which good men might meet.

That sort of thing did not please the literalist, and sometimes he would speak of it with a pitying smile as "poetry," as if poetry were a common thing which any man might have who wished it, whereas logic was a rare gift which he and a few others possessed! And, on the other hand, there were those who took a less charitable view of a man who, they said, each week recited words which he did not believe, and either asserted plainly that he was dishonest or else saved his veracity at the expense of his intelligence. It seems
incredible to those who knew Brooks, knew his scrupulous accuracy, his uncompromising insistence that, a lie being a vile thing, a man should not touch it even to save his own life or his friend's, that any one could believe it possible that he could be capable of disingenuousness! Indeed, no one who knew him did suppose it. But it hurt him cruelly to have any one think it. Indeed, I believe he was never quite the same after the unworthy hesitation of his Church to crown his years of service with even such an inadequate acknowledgment as the episcopate. But men were puzzled then as they are now, and, while it is not possible at such a time to enter into a discussion of the ethics of subscription, it is possible to say, in a word, how Brooks looked on his allegiance to the formularies of his Church.

He loved the Church which he served with all the energy of his nature. He felt the serene beauty of its service, he knew its educating, purifying influence upon the devotional life, but he recognized its dangers. He once laughingly said he intended to move in General Convention that a rubric be prefaced to the Morning Prayer providing that “All the services in this book shall be used at the discretion of the minister.” None knew better than he that the discretion of ministers must be largely increased before the laity would submit themselves to their vagaries. He looked on the Prayer Book as a charter of liberty, freeing minister and congregation alike from the tyranny of the passing fashion in thought or act. But his love for his own Church did not blind him to the excellency of the many ways by which the spiritual life is nourished in other Churches. There was no element of condescension in his ministrations in other communions. “Where Christ is, there is the Church,” and “Where the spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty,” were the poles of his Christian fellowship. He once said, “When Bishop Meade ordained me, he
authorized me to exercise my ministry in the Episcopal Church; he did not make me a minister."

To his Church then he was indeed loyal, but he believed his first loyalty was to truth. He found the Liturgy and the Creeds already formulated, and he used them as tools for effective work. He found no difficulty in so doing. They did not exhaust his faith; they symbolized it. Much of the conventional opinion identified with them he utterly repudiated, although he could and did use them as sometimes unsatisfactory statements of his own opinions but never as contradictory to them. Had he felt they were that, he would have ceased using them. But he would not be judged by another man's conscience. He claimed the right, not "to stretch the Creeds," in the ecclesiastical slang of the day, but to interpret them according to his own private judgment guided by sound learning. He admitted that there were limits to that. He approved Stopford Brooke's leaving the Church of England, but he rejoiced that a man like Dean Stanley could continue to serve it. But the limit must be found by the individual minister. He was scornful of the suggestion that men would hold on to the ministry for its rewards while their consciences rebuked conformity. He was at one time tempted to leave the Episcopal Church, not because he was uneasy in its doctrines but because he feared it might abandon the Protestant position which ensures the freedom in which alone he believed any Church could minister to America. He had been for many years the liberal leader of the Church. He weathered the storms that centred round the dogma of Creation and the theory of the Atonement. He died just as the storm centre was shifting to the Incarnation and the Resurrection. But the principle would have held him had he lived till now, that any man who, with expanding knowledge and deepening faith declared that he could with clear conscience use the Prayer Book,
should be not "tolerated" but honored. He used to say: "How can any human being know the exact significance of the words of the Creeds to the men who first used them? If that be insisted on, we build on doubt. We may guess, but then we are in difficulties. What did they mean when they spoke of God? If a man were to ask me if I believe in God, I could not give a categorical answer, for I do not know what he means, possibly something that I repudiate; but if he let me say I believe in God, I will answer, though my God may seem to him unworthy of his worship." But he did believe there was spiritual value in the recitation of a creed, for the unity to which this act witnesses is a common faith in Infinite Power and Wisdom and Love, mediated by Christ, to whom in the Creed we express our loyalty.

Another manifestation of the abounding vitality of his spirit was seen in his sympathy. One of his friends, who ought to have known better, once said that he was interested in man but not in men. This opinion was, I think, widespread, and was due to the modesty of the man, who shrank from the flattery that shallow souls thought would please the popular preacher. To such he was not genial—he was grim! But if any soul needed him, he poured out the riches of heart and mind. Only one who has stayed in his house and seen the steady stream of men and women who came all day long with fears and doubts, with sins and sorrows, can know that, great as he was as a preacher, he was far greater as a pastor. One night he was to meet a friend at a large reception and they were to return together. He did not come, and at midnight his friend started for home and met him. He explained that as he was leaving his house, a messenger had come saying a poor negro in the hospital wished to see him. He went at once, and found a sorry creature who in despair had cut his throat and then, slowly dying, had sent for the only minister of whom
he had ever heard and was comforted and, I hope, saved. On another occasion he came in late at night, explaining that he had been at a wedding. When it was remarked that it was a late hour for a wedding, he said, "Oh, it was long ago, yesterday I think, but I went to the reception and enjoyed myself so much that the time slipped away." "What did you do?" "Well, it was a colored couple, and they asked me to their rooms on Cambridge Street, and I had a wonderful time—sat in a rocking-chair and ate ice-cream and sponge-cake and talked to a dear old woman!" We are reminded of Bacon's words, "The nobler a soul is, the more objects of compassion it hath." But the love of this man was greater than compassion. He is indeed hard-hearted who is devoid of pity, unwilling or unable to "weep with them that weep"—compassion is indeed the test of nobility; but to "rejoice with them that do rejoice" is a higher test. How the joyful love of his great heart went forth to all in their joy—the child with its new toy, the youth in the "hazard of new fortune," the bride with shining eyes gazing into the mystery of motherhood! But it went deeper than that; it was the motive of all his preaching, it gave momentum to all his utterance. No one left the church without hearing a declaration of his love. He loved souls. He was eager to reveal the soul to itself, that it might know the joy of its Lord. It was Christ in each, the hope of glory, to which he spoke; so that deeper than the superficial accidents of life, deeper than the intellectual problems, deeper than sorrow or sin, went the word of God, who is love filling each heart with strange joy as the Christ in each is born. That was why multitudes who never spoke to him loved him.

Of his friendships with men of like mind with himself I may not speak except to say this, that I do not suppose there ever was a great man who so respected the person-
ality of his friends. They forgot his greatness because there was the give and take of argument as between equals. If advice was asked, it was seldom given, but instead the problem would be drawn out by the Socratic method without its irony, in such a way that when it was brought to light the truth of the matter was seen. I think in all his dealings, especially with younger men, he dreaded imposing the authority of his character upon them. He called no man master. He would have been shocked to hear any man call him master. The character for which in the Church's history he had the greatest horror was not the inquisitor but the "spiritual director." I have often thought that it was remarkable that with all his friends, especially among the clergy, there was no imitation of mannerism. Every man who knew him became a better and a larger man as a result of that friendship, because he became more fully himself. If Brooks dreaded the imposition of his own authority lest the individuality of his friend be warped, still more did he dread any word, however deserved, that would discourage any soul. A friend once said of some one who, he believed, had done him wrong, "When I next see him, I shall tell him just what I think of him," and Brooks cried out, "Oh don't; he might believe it true." Every one laughed at the repartee, but his face was sad, for what he felt was the horror of discouraging a fellow-man.

But there was another side to his character. With his pity went scorn, not the scorn of the successful man for the failures, nor the scorn of the man of affairs for the inefficient, not even of the wise for fools, but the scorn of humility for pretence. When the current of a materialistic interpretation of the universe was running strong, he was not disturbed. He knew in Whom he had believed, and kept his mind clear from the confusion between truth and hypothesis. He was no more in-
fluenced by scientific than by theologic dogmatism. He looked with pity on the ministers who wildly applauded one of Joseph Cook's Monday morning refutations of infidelity, as a sign of fear. He read all the great writers who made the Victorian age as great in science as the Elizabethan had been in literature, but he spoke with scorn of "the fatuous self-confidence" of those who, lacking in the humility of Darwin and Pasteur, would complacently have heard Job's scornful question, "Where wast thou when God laid the foundations of the earth?"

When the pulpit was being turned into a rostrum for the discussion of the relation of science and religion, he ignored the controversy and comforted God's people, remembering the prophet's words, "How beautiful upon the mountains are the feet of him that bringeth good tidings, that saith unto Zion, Thy God reigneth."

I think it was this scorn of dogmatism which prejudiced him against the Higher Criticism, in which his younger friends were so deeply interested. Once when one of them complacently remarked that he had just finished Ewald's History of Israel, Brooks remarked, "Six volumes of dogmatics!"

But his scorn of dogmatism did not equal his disgust at pretentiousness. The Bishop who spoke of his clergy and his diocese, and, with entire ignorance of the Church's life before or since the Oxford Movement, spoke of the episcopate as the guardian of the Faith, he could not away with. He generally dismissed him from his mind with the characteristic, "Preposterous creature!"

Of the luxuriance of his imagination there is no need to speak at length. It explains, I think, the anomaly of his inconspicuous undergraduate life and his failure as a school-teacher. In the days at college he was laying the foundation of his scholarly life, sinking the roots deep into classic soil, and bathing the leaves of life in poetry, especially in Wordsworth and Browning, and,
above all, Tennyson. It was only when he dedicated his life to the service of Christ that he discovered how this rich imagination, which had been the shy companion of his soul, was now to become the glory of his mature life. In the first sermon, as in the last, the branches of the imagination ran over the wall, so that the wayfarer outside the garden of the Church could reach up and enjoy the fruit so joyously offered.

This, then, was the man: loving the Lord his God as he was revealed in the man Christ Jesus, with all his heart and mind and soul and strength; loving his neighbor as himself, with all the respect and pity and sympathy and affection that he was thankful to receive. With ever-growing knowledge his faith grew deeper and simpler. He was a great revealer of God.

He might have applied—I have no doubt he did apply—to himself the words he loved so well:

“Our little systems have their day,
They have their day and cease to be;
They are but broken lights of thee,
And thou, O Lord, art more than they.

We have but faith; we cannot know;
For knowledge is of things we see.
And yet we trust it comes from thee,
A beam in darkness; let it grow.

Let knowledge grow from more to more,
But more of reverence in us dwell;
That mind and soul, according well,
May make one music as before.”

None like him shall be seen, because, like every genius, he was primarily the interpreter of his time. The time has gone and he has gone, but God lives, and a new messenger will come to prepare the way of Christ. May the new prophet have his faith, his love, his abound-
ing hope, ever renewed and reinvigorated by communion with Jesus Christ—the one power in humanity which, amid all the changes and chances of this mortal life, is "the same yesterday, today, and forever." That was the faith of Phillips Brooks. That too is our faith, and from it grows our confidence as we gaze into the portentous future that "as God was with our fathers so will He be with us."
WESTERN PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY

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In regard to Western scholastic philosophy of the Middle Ages, every one repeats the laconic judgment, that it is “philosophy in the service, under the sway and direction, of Catholic theology.” It could be nothing else; and it seems that one has said everything after announcing this clear-cut formula. This current definition, susceptible of the most different meanings, is found on the first page of a recent book, published during the War, on the philosophy of the Middle Ages; and though the author gives a very mild interpretation of it, it is offered to the reader as an abridged thesis, in which one finds condensed all that is important to know on the subject. “Scholasticism is Philosophy placed at the service of already established ecclesiastical doctrine, or at least philosophy placed in such a dependence on this doctrine that it becomes an absolute Rule when both meet on common ground.”

Now this current definition of scholastic philosophy in the Middle Ages defines it very badly, because it is a mixture of the true and the false, of accuracy and of inaccuracy. It must be distrusted, like those equivocal maxims which John Stuart Mill calls “sophisms of simple


2 “Die scholastik ist die Philosophie im Dienste der bereits bestehenden Kirchenlehre oder wenigstens in einer solchen Unterordnung unter dieselbe diese auf gemeinsamen Gebiete als die absolute Norm gilt.” P. 196. It represents the first and the general judgment of Baumgartner.
inspection," which by force of repetition enjoy a kind of transeat or vogue in science without being questioned.

To destroy the ambiguity we must appeal to history, and replace philosophy and theology in the midst of the civilization whence they have evolved. For this we must consider what results they had attained by the middle of the twelfth century in the classification of the sciences — the chief problem — and how these results harmonize with the general mentality of the epoch. (I) We must give an account of the rational distinction which writers of the thirteenth century establish between philosophy and theology, and the way they apply this distinction in their studies. (II) We must consider that in the thirteenth century it is a religious civilization in which philosophy and theology are developed and of which they are both factors, and that because of this sociological character certain relations arise between the two sciences. (III) By the light of these teachings of history, some conclusions will emerge that will show what is acceptable and what unacceptable in the definition before us, and what are its insufficiencies. (IV) These are questions of primary importance and of general concern, which we shall try to treat briefly.

I. Results of Scientific Work in the Twelfth Century

The twelfth century witnessed the civilization of the Middle Ages established in its definitive form. The struggles of kings with feudalism, the coming of the commons, the swing of commerce, the formation of citizenship, the freedom of the serfs — so many facts attest that the balance is being established among social forces. A new art is springing to life — the art of romance — and intellectual culture, always behind other factors of civilization, makes a considerable advance.
One of the most fertile results of the scientific work accomplished in the many schools that then covered the West, and chiefly the soil of France — where, as all agree, mediæval civilization was born — is that a distinction of frontiers between the different sciences is created and notably philosophy is clearly established outside the liberal arts, which it leaves below, with theology above.

It has been long supposed, and people still write, that philosophy in the Middle Ages was confused with dialectics (one of the three branches of the Trivium, with grammar and rhetoric); that it was reduced to a handful of dry quarrels on the syllogism and on sophisms. Some dialectical acrobats who in the eleventh and twelfth centuries emptied it of all content of ideas and rendered it bloodless and barren ("exsanguis et sterilis," are John of Salisbury's words), have managed to give this thesis a seeming foundation. But the truth is quite otherwise. These "virtuosi," with their play on words and verbal discussions, were strongly combated; and men of worth — Anselm of Canterbury, Abelard, Thierry of Chartres, John of Salisbury, and others — not only practised dialectics or formal logic with sobriety and applied it in accordance with doctrine, but they placed philosophy by the side of and above the liberal arts and consequently above dialectics. Their writings touch the problems of metaphysics and psychology, which is matter quite different from formal dialectics.

While it hardly exists in the "glosses" of the Carolingian schools, philosophy rapidly progresses towards the end of the eleventh century, and in the middle of the twelfth century forms a considerable portion of ecclesiastical doctrine, which the following centuries were to make fruitful.

Now while philosophy has gained its position, the pro-pædeutic character of the liberal arts becomes evident: they serve as an initiation for higher studies. Men of the
twelfth century take them into consideration, and the first who occupy themselves with the classification of the sciences express themselves clearly on this subject. Speaking of the liberal arts, "Sunt tanquam septem viæ," says a codex of Bamberg; they are, so to speak, the seven ways that lead to the other sciences—physics (part of philosophy), theology, and the science of laws. Hugh of S. Victor, Dominic Gundissali, Robert Grosstête, speak in the same sense. Here is a fact that settles the matter.

At the end of the twelfth century, the iconography of the cathedrals, the sculptures, and the medallions in the glass windows, as well as the miniatures in manuscripts, confirm this thesis. The philosophy which inspired artists is sculptured apart from and by the side of the liberal arts; for instance, at Laon and at Sens, and much more the window at Auxerre placed above the choir. The copy, still preserved at Paris, of the Hortus Deliciarum by Herrad of Landsberg (the original at Strasburg was burnt during the bombardment) places philosophy in the centre of a rose with seven lobes disposed around it.

Just as the twelfth century clearly distinguishes the liberal arts from philosophy, so it established a complete separation between philosophy and theology. The establishment of this doctrine of scientific methodology is of the highest importance in the study in which we are engaged. The question of the existence of philosophy distinct from theology is, for philosophy, a matter of life or death, and we do not fear to say that it is definitely answered. But here also there are historical stages, and their study is fertile in teaching. The Middle Ages, in


the beginning, took up the Neoplatonic and Augustinian idea of the entire identification of philosophy with theology. Thus it is that J. Scotus Erigena wrote in the ninth century: "Quid est aliud de philosophia tractare nisi verae religionis, qua summa et principalis omnium rerum causa Deus et humiliter colitur et rationabiliter investigatur, regulas exponere." But at the end of the eleventh century, and especially after St. Anselm had solved the problem of the relation between faith and reason, the distinction between the two sciences is practically accepted; and it is easy to see that St. Anselm, for example, speaks sometimes as a philosopher, sometimes as a theologian. The twelfth century advances a step further, and the distinction between philosophy and theology becomes one of its characteristic declarations. A codex of Regensburg of the twelfth century clearly distinguishes philosophers, "humanæ videlicet sapientiæ amatores," from theologians, "divinae scripturæ doctores." I know well that besides these texts there are others in which philosophy is abused or misunderstood; that reactionary minds, narrow theologians or disdainful mystics, condemned profane knowledge as useless, or if they admitted philosophy, reduced it to the rank of a vassal and a serf of theology. In the eleventh century Otloh of St. Emmerau forbade the study of it to monks; they, he said, having renounced the world, must occupy themselves only with divine things. Peter Damien wrote of dialectics, that if sometimes (quando), by way of exception, it is allowed to occupy itself with theological matters and with mysteries of divine power (mysteria divinæ virtutis), it should renounce all spirit of independence, for that would be arrogance, and like a servant place itself at the service of its mistress, theology:

6 De divina prædestinatione, I, 1 (Patrol. lat. t. 122, 357-358).
Velut ancilla dominae quodam famulatus obsequio sub-

servire. 7

Here for the first time this famous phrase is used. It
is repeated in the twelfth century by a compact group of
so-called rigorist theologians — Peter of Blois, Stephen
of Tournai, Michael of Corbeil, and many others. The
lofty mystics of the convent of St. Victor at Paris —
Walter and Absalom of St. Victor — went so far as to
to say that philosophy is the devil’s art, and that theolo-
gians who used it were “the labyrinths” of France.

But one must not forget that these detractors of phi-
losophy were a minority, just as quibbling dialecticians
formed an exceptional category, and that already in the
eleventh and the twelfth century the best minds refused
the unhappy phrase of Damien. St. Anselm had dis-
avowed it. The Chartrains, John of Salisbury, Alan de
Lille, expressly oppose it, or show by their writings that
they reject it. Moreover, the speculative theologians
who appeared at the beginning of the twelfth century
and almost immediately formed three great schools —
Abelard, Gilbert de la Porrée, Hugh of St. Victor —
condemned these rigorous and timid writers, and the
apologetic which they created (of which we shall speak fur-
ther on) is the counterpoise to the tendencies of Damien.
Peter Lombard himself, in spite of his utilitarian and
practical point of view, rises up against such excessive
pretensions. The formula is condemned by the major-
ity of intellectual philosophers and theologians. Hence
those are very unjust to philosophers of the twelfth
century and the Middle Ages who follow the doctrines of
a minority against which the best openly rebel. To go to
the origin of the formula that philosophy is the slave
of theology is to do it justice.

These considerations were necessary to raise the philos-
ophy of the Middle Ages from that grave contempt which

7 De divina omnipotentia, c. 5 (Patr. lat. t. 14, c. 603).
weighed upon it too long on the ground that it had no raison d’être nor proper methods nor independence. To say that philosophy by the twelfth century had become clearly distinguished from the liberal arts on the one side and from theology on the other, is to recognize that its frontiers are clearly marked. Now this great and first step by way of organization had been made at the same time by the other sciences, which in different degrees were all raised to independence. This same development took place simultaneously in dogmatic theology, which progressed rapidly, as we have just said, and threw out branches in the great schools of Abelard, of Gilbert de la Porrée, of Hugh of St. Victor, of Peter Lombard. It appeared also in the liberal arts, of which one or another branch was more especially studied in one or another school; for example, grammar at Orléans, dialectics at Paris. It was shown, moreover, in the appearance of new branches, as medicine, Roman (civil) law, and canon law. The great disciplines of the mind with which the thirteenth century was to be nourished, assert their titles to independence and their respective values; just as the functions of the king, of the great vassals, of the bourgeois of the towns, of the rural populations, are declared clearly in the political and social régime.

II. The Rational Distinction between Philosophy and Theology

A great fact dominates the history of the speculative studies of philosophy and theology in the thirteenth century — the creation of a unique and international centre, the University of Paris; a phenomenon, moreover, which was in strict harmony with the civilization of this great epoch, thirsting after unity and internationalism, which had only one faith, one code of morals, one
aestheticism, and one unique and dominant conception of life.

The University of Paris, the first university of Europe, issued from the schools of the Cathedral of Nôtre Dame at the end of the twelfth century, like a flower from its stalk, by the natural grouping of masters and pupils whose number had multiplied by the incessant development of studies. Henceforth in France and, one may add, in the West, Paris monopolized the development of speculative studies—philosophy and theology—and destroyed the concurrent regional schools. Two Faculties or groups of masters interest us: that of the philosophers (or artists) and that of the theologians. The sharp separation of the "personnel" of artists or philosophers and of theologians, is one of the first signs that the distinction of the two disciplines was clearly maintained. The University of Paris only took up the methodological classifications of the twelfth century, just as one finds them in the treatises of Dominic Gundissali, of Hugh of St. Victor, of Robert Grosstête, and many others. The tree of knowledge is cut in the form of a pyramid, with the particular sciences at the base, philosophy at the centre, theology at the summit. We shall show elsewhere that all the university programmes are dominated by this grand ideal. But what is new in the present situation is the reflective and reasoned study of this respective independence between philosophy and theology.

This independence rests on the difference in the points of view (ratio formalis objecti) from which they regard the materials with which they are occupied (materia). The scholastic theory of science is dominated by that principle of intellectual methodology which a man like Henri Poincaré would revive. In every science it is necessary to distinguish the things (materia) with which it is occupied from the point of view (ratio formalis
objecti) from which it contemplates them; and this point of view, which is the special good of each science, is always an aspect which the mind takes by way of abstraction in respect to the material. Thus the point of view of anatomy is not that of physiology; for though the two sciences are both occupied with the same matter—the human body—the first is only interested in the description of the organs, the second in that of the functions. Whence it follows that for the scholastics the distinction between the two sciences rests only on the divergence of their points of view, and the fact that they are occupied with materials with which at the same time other sciences are occupied is without influence. Physiology and anatomy, according to this theory, are as distinct as astronomy and civil law; in spite of there being, in the first group, a community of matters studied (the human body) which does not exist in the second group (stars and human actions). With this in mind, we can understand the declaration with which Thomas Aquinas opens his two Summae on the raison d'être of theology outside the philosophical sciences (praeter philosophicas disciplinas) and its distinction from philosophy. “It is diversity in the point of view of knowledge (ratio cognoscibilis) which determines the diversity of sciences. The astronomer and the physicist establish the same conclusion, that the earth is round; but the astronomer uses mathematical arguments abstracted from matter, while the physicist, on the other hand, uses arguments drawn from the material condition of bodies. Nothing then prevents the same questions with which the philosophical sciences are occupied, so far as they are known by the light of natural reason, being studied at the same time by another science, in the measure that they are known by revelation. Thus theology, which is occupied with sacred doctrine, differs in kind from théodicée, which is part of philosophy.”

8 Summa theologica, 1a Pars, q. I, Art. 1.
A contemporary of St. Thomas, Henry of Ghent, also maintains, in the beginning of his *Summa Theologica*, this doctrine, accepted by all the intellectuals of the time: "Theology is a special science. Though theology is occupied with certain questions touched on by philosophy, theology and philosophy are none the less distinct sciences, for they differ in the aim pursued (sunt ad aliud), the processes (per aliud), the methods (secundum aliud). The philosopher consults only reason; the theologian begins by an act of faith, and his science is directed by a supernatural light. "Adhuc philosophus considerat quaecumque considerat, ut percepta et intellecta solo lumine naturalis rationis; theologus vero considerat singula ut primo credita lumine fidei, et secundo intellecta lumine altiori super lumen naturalis rationis infusa." 9

It is easy to show that such principles were fully applied in the thirteenth century. Philosophers reasoned on the origin of ideas, on human liberty, on change, on the finality of nature, on the relations between will and knowledge, with many other arguments of the rational order. One would seek in vain a religious veneer or a theological *arrière pensée* to the solutions given, were it only for the reason that many come from Aristotelianism. Theologians discuss the holy Trinity, Redemption, the supernatural end of man, etc., and invoke the Scriptures. When certain matters are common to the two orders of study, as the existence and the nature of God, the point of view under which the philosophers and the theologians discuss them differs. Their arguments meet, like the rays of light which set out from distinct foci and are received on the same screen; but they are no more confused than—in our comparison—the luminous sources are confused. This is why numerous philosophic systems could arise, remarkable explanations of the world

and of life, capable of being judged and set forth as one
sets forth and judges the philosophy of an Aristotle, of
a Plato, of a Descartes, or of a Kant.

It is important to note that this distinction was uni-
versally recognized by men of the thirteenth and four-
teenth centuries; and a proof that the public itself
judged so is in the celebrated painting by Traini pre-
served in the Church of St. Catherine of Pisa, where the
great artist of the fourteenth century has symbolized in
drawing and in color all the intellectual movements of
the time. What interests us especially in this picture,
called the Triumph of St. Thomas, is the diversity of the
sources by which the master is inspired, as he sits upon
a golden throne in the centre of the composition, the
Summa Theologica open on his knees. From the top of
the picture Christ sends upon him rays of light, reflected
by six sacred personages—Moses, the Evangelists, St.
Paul—placed in a semicircle; then, further, by Plato
and Aristotle arranged on the two sides on the same
plan. Waves of brightness spread the doctrines over
the world, whilst Averroës, in the attitude of one con-
quered, lies at the Saint’s feet. This synthetic picture
is a striking résumé of intellectual speculation in the
thirteenth century, and gives the impression it made on
men like Traini, who was placed in a position enabling
him to see the master-lines. It teaches us that theology
and philosophy occupy different planes, but subordi-
nated like the personages who symbolize the one and the
other; it shows us that both are joined, and complete
each other in the work of a famous thinker whom
the contemporaries of Traini called “doctor eximius.”
Moreover, the writers of the Renaissance and the Reform,
so curt in treating of the Middle Ages, have clearly dis-
tinguished the scholastic theologians and the scholastic
philosophers, reserving rather for the latter the name of
scholastics: “Cum vero duplicem eorum differentiam
animadvertamus theologos alios, alios philosophos, quamquam illis hoc nomen potius tributum sit.” This judgment, which I borrow from the treatise De doctoribus scholasticis of Busse, 1676, is confirmed by Binder Tribbechovius, and by all those who belong to that curious category of detractors and insulters of scholasticism, on whom Rabelais and so many others have founded their sarcasms. These “distributers of injuries” are better advised than some of our contemporary historians, for whom the speculation of the Middle Ages is a chaos, a hodge-podge of philosophy and theology, and who make the history of mediaeval philosophy a department of the history of religions.

Not to understand the fundamental distinction between the order of nature and that of grace, between the rational conception of the world and the systematization of revealed dogmas, would be to misunderstand the speculative work of the Middle Ages, and to substitute arbitrary conceptions for the indisputable declarations of its greatest doctors.

III. The Religious Spirit of the Epoch

The freedom of philosophy from dependence on theology rests then on solid methodological grounds. But while philosophy and theology are objects of speculation, we must not forget that both are living things and a function of the civilization in which they appear, the effects of which they feel. Hence they are marked by a whole series of sociological characteristics, and one of these characteristics is that they are both touched, but one more than the other, by the religious spirit. 

10 Tribbechovius, De doctoribus scholasticis et corrupta per eos divinarum humanarumque rerum scientia. Giessen. 1665.

11 I am preparing a new book on the sociological character of the mediaeval philosophy. It will be a complement to my Histoire de la Philosophie Médiévale, of which subsequent to the English translation (Longmans, 1900) a fourth French (1912), a German (1913), and an Italian edition (1914) have been issued.
Could it be otherwise in an epoch in which Catholicism leaves its mark on all civilization? To judge of this impression it is not enough to turn to the Golden Legend, or the Apocryphal Gospels, which furnished food for the piety of the people. It is not enough to collect popular superstitions, the charges of satirists and preachers, the stories of Cæsar of Heisterbach. It is not enough to note the excesses caused by the veneration of relics, the conflicts between abbots and bishops, the bourgeois of the towns and the feudalists, whom material interests divided. These many oddities pale before the grand fact that the Catholic religion is the inspirer of the social state to the bottom of its structure, is the regulator of its morals, of its art, and of its thought. Statesmen the most individual — Philip Augustus or St. Louis in France, Simon de Montfort or Edward I in England, Frederick II or Rudolph of Habsburg in Germany, Ferdinand of Castile — all recognized the Catholic Church as the necessary foundation of the social state, even when their politics led them into conflict with the Papacy in order to shake off its patronage. The ardent faith which had aroused the Crusades sprang from the most diverse social strata — the new monastic associations of the Dominicans and Franciscans, who raise the level of belief and morality in the masses. Even the heretical movement that appeared in Languedoc, in Champagne, in Flanders, shows the vitality of the religious sentiment. In spite of the spirit of opposition to the Church, the century of Philip Augustus remains an epoch of Catholic faith.\(^{12}\) By its dogmas and its morality Christianity penetrates everything; it gives a supernatural sense to the life of individuals, families, and peoples, who are all in the way (in via) which leads to a happy fatherland (in Patriam). In the corporation, work is a holy thing, masters are equal, art is allied to handicraft, the insti-

\(^{12}\) Luchaire, Histoire de France, publiée par Lavisse, T. III, p. 318.
tution of the masterpiece guarantees the quality of the product. It is because one worked for God that the thirteenth century could cover, first the soil of France, then that of Germany, with gigantic cathedrals, chiselled like jewels.

There also shines out the intimate union between religion and beauty. The "Rationale divinorum officiorum" of Willemus Durandus, Bishop of Meude, shows in detail that the cathedrals are at once marvels of art and symbols of prayer. The church of Amiens, which was the most perfect of the great French monuments, is a striking demonstration of the aesthetic resources of the original scheme. That of Chartres no less brilliantly exhibits its iconographic resources. Each stone had its language. Covered with sculptures, it presents a complete religious programme. It is for the people the great book of sacred history, the catechism in images. Consider Amiens or Chartres, Paris or Laon. Everywhere is underlined the function of a temple destined for the masses; everywhere our looks converge towards the altar, which sums up the idea of sacrifice. The frescoes and the glass windows of Giotto breathe forth the perfume of religious life; the poems of St. Francis, singing nature, raise the soul towards God; and Dante wrote to Can Grande della Scala, tyrant of Verona, that he wished by means of his poems to snatch away the living from their state of wretchedness and put them in the way of eternal happiness. Art, under all its forms, shows the unfailing bonds between religion and beauty.

The religious spirit that penetrated everything was bound to be felt in the domain of science, and notably philosophy. We shall find this question, so complicated and so badly understood, under new aspects, in the precise relations of scholastic philosophy and the Catholic religion. In what consists the tie between philosophy and the religious medium? and how can one reconcile
it with that doctrinal independence which philosophers so fiercely claim?

Conciliation is easy for a group of ties which I shall call exterior to philosophical doctrine, and which therefore cannot affect it. They are not less suggestive of the mentality of the time, and one can, it seems to me, reduce them to three classes, which we must examine briefly.

1. The first class results from the social superiority of the theologians; and this points to the fact that philosophy is for the most part a preparation for theological studies. That theology holds the place of honor in the complete cycle of studies ought not to surprise us, when every study, whatever it was, was subservient to the clerical estate. The thirteenth century in that only continued the traditions of the previous Middle Ages. The University of Paris, issuing from the schools at Nôtre Dame, counted only clerics among its professors, and these professors had strict relations with the Chancellor of Nôtre Dame and with the Papacy. Many were themselves canons, either of Paris or of the provinces or from abroad. Not to mention the Franciscans or Dominicans, who were the most brilliant masters in the University, the translation of Greek and Arabic works, whose revelation to the West was momentous, was due to clerks of Toledo or monks of Greece and Sicily. In short, all the workers of the Renaissance in the thirteenth century are ecclesiastics.

It is natural that the masters in the Faculty of Theology (sacrae paginae) took precedence of all other masters, and notably of philosophers. In this, university discipline was only the reflection of social life. It is the intensity of Catholic life which makes us understand how these “artists” or these philosophers, after taking their degrees in the inferior faculty, desire in great numbers to undertake the study of theology. So much so, that the master-
ship of arts was a direct preparation for the grades of the Theological Faculty. So documents teach us: "Non est consenescendum in artibus sed a limine sunt salutandae." One does not grow philosophy; we must salute it at the threshold of knowledge and engage ourselves with theology. It is the intensity of this Catholic life which makes us understand how Robert of Sorbonne, founder of the famous college of that name, could, in the little treatise De conscientia, compare the Last Judgment to the examinations for the degrees of Paris, and pursue the comparison into a thousand details. In the supreme trial for the Doctorate, the judge will not be accessible to recommendations or presents, and all will pass according to the requirements of strict justice. It is, moreover, the intensity of religious life at that epoch which can explain certain controversies between theologians which subvert our modern ideas, like that on the subject of Christian perfection. While ordinary people are enthusiastic for religion simple and strong, the learned at Paris strove to know if the life of the regulars is nearer to perfection than that of seculars. Between 1255 and 1275 all doctors were obliged to declare themselves on this question. Certain secular masters treated it with an asperity and a passion which served as an outlet to their ill-humor against the Dominicans and Franciscans, whom they never forgave for having taken the three chairs in the Faculty of Theology. The religious themselves had similar discussions, and there is no more curious witness to this sort of jealousy than certain artistic works in the fourteenth century, as the Last Judgment of Fra Angelico, the Dominican, where we see some Friars Minor tumbling down to hell, while the Dominicans are received into Paradise.

If, for all these social and religious reasons, more credit, honor, and importance have been granted to theology and to religious discussions than to philosophy, the fact can
alter nothing regarding the position of philosophy, which remained what alone it can be — a synthetic study of the world by the sole data of reason.

2. The second class of ties results from the penetration of philosophy into speculative theology, and from its being constituted an apology for Christianity. The penetration affects theology alone, and philosophy not at all. Such was in fact this method, dear to the masters of Paris and called, currently but improperly by modern authors, the dialectic method in theology. We already know that speculative theology, to which the thirteenth century gave its brightest glory, is the coördination of Catholic dogma, and therefore its chief method is, and can only be, the authority of the sacred books. But by the side of this method, which is and remains the chief, theologians employed another accessory and secondary. In order to give dogmas an advantage over intelligence, they seek to show their well-founded reasonableness, as Jewish theologians had done in the days of Philo and Arabic theologians with the Koran. Abelard, Hugh of St. Victor, and Gilbert de la Porrée, in the twelfth century, founded this apologetic method, which attained greatest extension in the thirteenth. The same Thomas Aquinas, from whom we have learned to distinguish philosophy from theology, wrote on this subject, “If theology borrows from philosophy, it is not because it needs its help, but to place in a livelier light the truths it teaches.”

To apply philosophy to theology is what I call using apologetics. And as the application of mathematics to astronomy affects only astronomy, so the application of philosophy to theology affects theology. On this historical point, which I have long struggled to establish,

13 “Ad secundum dicendum quod hæc scientia accipere potest aliquid a philosophicis disciplinis, non quod ex necessitate eis indiget, sed ad majorem manifestationem eorum quæ in hac scientia traduntur.” (Ia, 1, a. 5.)
writers of the thirteenth century support me, for they distinguish the two theological methods of authority and reason, "autoritates et rationes."

It clearly results from this that the use of philosophy for theological ends arises by the side of pure philosophy, while this remains what it is. If one refers to the religious mentality of the thirteenth century, one understands how these applications of philosophy to dogma led away many minds, so that most philosophers became theologians, and mediaeval apologetics rose under the most varied forms. In a social state like that of the thirteenth century, where heresies themselves sprang from an excess of religious zeal and under color of purifying belief, no one dreamed of opposing dogma but explained it in all sorts of fashions. The wisest, following the traditions of Anselm and of the Victorines, posited a reserved domain, the domain of mystery, for the advantage of theology. St. Thomas does not allow philosophy to demonstrate mystery, and only authorizes it to establish that mystery contains nothing irrational. Duns Scotus goes further, and for fear of a conflict withdraws from the empire of reason every theological question. But others did not follow these wise lessons. Raymund Lulli, as formerly Abelard, wished to support all the contents of revelation by syllogisms; Roger Bacon confused philosophy with apologetics. Mediaeval rationalism, contrary to modern rationalism, which wishes to deny dogma in the name of reason, vindicates for reason the power of demonstrating dogma in every way.

Where does the profoundly religious spirit of mediaeval speculation shine out better than in these rash attempts? It was religious even to folly, for there is no other word to characterize a third attitude, that of the Latin Averroists, who troubled so deeply the University of Paris in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Not wishing to deny either the Catholic faith or the compact mass of
philosophical doctrines in flagrant contradiction with this faith, they proclaimed the astonishing device of a double truth: "What is true in philosophy," said they, "may be false in theology, and vice versa."

Whatever be these different attitudes and the religious care which inspired them, the result was this pedagogic consequence — that the theologian, to make his apologetic application, would take up a crowd of philosophical questions; and as no science more than philosophy is stamped with the impress of him who treats it, each theologian kept and developed his philosophic tone of mind. Then, moreover, he experienced again the attraction of philosophic problems, or he had to refresh the memory of his hearers — "propter imperitos," says Henry of Ghent — and in both cases he made deep and prolonged incursions into the ground reserved to philosophy; so that philosophical work was at the same time used in the Faculty of Arts and in the Faculty of Theology, with disinterested preoccupation in the first and with apologetic in the second. This is the simple explanation of that deductive phenomenon peculiar to the Middle Ages which has perplexed historians so much — the mixture of matters philosophical and theological in the Summa, the quodlibeta, the quaestiones disputatæ, in almost all mediæval works. To consider only the title of Summa Theologica given to their chief works by Alexander of Hales, St. Thomas, Henry of Ghent, one would think they were large books in which philosophy had no share. Let there be no deception. Real treatises of pure philosophy are in these vast compositions. It will be enough in the work of St. Thomas to cite questions 75 to 90 (Prima pars) and the beginning of the Prima Secundæ, which respectively form easily detachable treatises of psychology and ethics.

3. The religious mentality of the time created a third class of ties, existing, not between philosophy and the-
ology, but between the subjective intentions of philosophers and the end to which they subordinated all their studies, which is no other than that of attaining happiness. The eye of all was fixed on the future life. As Dante wrote the Divine Comedy "to snatch the living from the state of wretchedness and to lead them to the state of happiness," so also the intellectuals of the thirteenth century refer their researches, whatever they are — astronomy, mathematics, the science of observation, and philosophy also — to their personal striving for Christian happiness. There was here no difference between them and painters, sculptors, or architects, who also worked for the glory of God and their own salvation, or even princes and kings, who were all moved by the desire of avoiding hell and of meriting heaven, and who did not conceal this in their official acts. But these intentions stood apart from their moral consciousness, and changed in no respect either the politics of kings or the beauty of works of art or the value of philosophical systems. Scholastics would have applied to their case the famous distinction of "finis operis" (or the work itself) and "finis operantis" (or the intention with which it was done).

To sum up: Neither the social superiority of theologians nor the constitution of theological apologetics nor the religious intentions of men of study were obstacles to the independence of philosophy.

4. There is a last class of ties of which it remains to speak, which touches very nearly on philosophic doctrine itself — the prohibitive or negative subordination of philosophy to theology. Profoundly convinced that Catholic dogma is the expression of the infallible word of God; convinced, on the other hand, that the truth cannot overthrow the truth, without overthrowing the principle of contradiction and involving all certainty in this ruin, the scholastics drew this conclusion — that philo-
sophical doctrine is forbidden to contradict theological doctrine.

To understand the precise meaning of this prohibition we must note: (a) That it is based on the law of the solidarity of truth. Truth cannot contradict truth. Music, which depends on the application of mathematical principles, writes St. Thomas, cannot go against those principles, and is not disquieted about their foundation; that is not its affair. Supposing the fact of a revelation—and in the heart of the Middle Ages no one doubted it—the attitude of scholastics is logical. Henry of Ghent wrote very precisely: "If we admit (supposito) that theological doctrines are true, we cannot admit that other doctrines can contradict them." 14

(b) We must note further that it is a prohibition to contradict and not a command to demonstrate. Thus a statute of the Faculty of Arts of 1272 enjoins on artists not to "determinare contra finem," but does not tell them to "determinare pro fide." 15 No one applied this precept with greater broadness of view than Thomas Aquinas, and his famous doctrine on the eternity of the world furnishes a proof. The Bible teaches that God created the world in time. St. Thomas does not put the thesis that the world is eternal; that would be to contradict the dogma; but he goes so far as to say that its eternity would not be in opposition to its contingency, and thence that the idea of an eternal creature is not contradictory.

(c) It must be noted finally that this prohibition only touches philosophy on a restricted side of its teaching, for it holds only in regard to matters expounded at the

14 "Supposito quod hinc scientiae non subjacet nisi verum . . . supposito quod quaecumque vera sunt judicio et auctoritate hujus scientiae . . . his inquam suppositis, cum ex eis manifestum sit quod tam auctoritas hujus scientiae quam ratio . . . veritati innititur et verum vero contrarium esse non potest, absolute dicendum quod auctoritati hujus scripture ratio nullo modo potest esse contraria." S. Theol. X, 3, No. 4.

same time by philosophy and theology. The statement has no weight where the two domains are not in question.

Having pointed out the theory of the scholastics on the subordination of philosophy to theology, we may discuss its value, and see if a like prohibition, however limited, trammels philosophical liberty. The answer would be different according as one accepts Christianity or not, and according to the meaning one gives to revelation. It is not this question that interests us here but a historical problem, and that brings us back to the point whence we set out.

IV. PUT TO THE TEST

The preceding considerations allow us to appreciate at its just value the current definition which served as a beginning of this study, and which Dr. Baumgartner reproduces at the head of his new edition.

First, one can say of scholastic philosophy that it is a philosophy of religious inspiration, in this very general sense, that it was evolved in a social atmosphere of which religion was the inspiring sovereign; that under the influence of this mentality theological studies enjoyed a social consideration superior to that which was granted to philosophical studies; that the neighborhood of faculties—theology and philosophy—introduced this curious mania for mixing—but not confusing—in the same book, philosophical and theological questions; finally, that in the order of moral intentions philosophy was regarded by the intellectuals of the Middle Ages as a preliminary step towards happiness. But this religious inspiration affects all the other activities that make up the civilization of the thirteenth century—politics, art, morals, family, work. The religious inspiration is a sociological characteristic by the side of many others;
but precisely because this characteristic belongs to civilization, it belongs to all its factors and is not peculiar to philosophy, which is only one factor. Hence it is not sufficient for the definition or judgment of philosophy. One could as well think of understanding the oak by describing the chemical and geological nature of the soil where it grows together with the elm, the beech, and other forest trees. One can understand that historians who study expressly the civilization of the Middle Ages, like Mr. Henry O. Taylor in his remarkable work, *The Medieval Mind*, should criticise in the scholastic philosophy of the thirteenth century only its dominant preoccupation with salvation, which takes the lead of all subjects, and should think this its sufficing characteristic. But that works treating solely of the historical evolution of doctrines should be content with such a superficial judgment, seems to me inadmissible.

Besides the general criticism we have just made of this definition on the ground of insufficiency, some special criticisms come to mind as conclusions from the preceding study.

Scholasticism, they say, is “philosophy placed in the service of already established ecclesiastical doctrine.” No. To place philosophy in the service of theology is to use apologetic; and apologetic, which proposes to show the rational character of dogmas fixed beforehand, comes from scholastic theology and not from scholastic philosophy. To define, according to the energetic idea of Aristotle, is to say what a thing is. Baumgartner-Ueberweg defines scholastic philosophy saying what it is not.

Is scholasticism then philosophy placed in such a dependence as to follow theology by absolute rule? Their ground is common. Yes; but the question is whether this limitation is enough to constitute a complete definition, and one that we have a right to expect

16 The Mediaeval Mind, C. II, chapter 35.
in Dr. Baumgartner's work; and we answer in the negative. In the first place, because the limitation simply places boundaries or limits beyond which one cannot pass. It does not treat of what is beyond, or of a considerable number of philosophical doctrines in which theology is not interested, but in which Dr. Baumgartner's definition should be interested. To define is not only to trace the boundary where the territory stops, but it is to penetrate the territory itself.

We object further, because this limitation does not establish any doctrinal content, but simply forbids contradiction. It can only therefore establish a negative—that is to say, an imperfect—definition of philosophical doctrine, which is the thing itself to be defined. The strange thing is that Dr. Baumgartner does not deny this. He admits, in the notes or in some brief parts of his text, that scholastic philosophy extends to vast departments that do not enter the kingdom of theology. But he refuses to take account of them in his definition. Hence he excludes what is essential; he leaves out precisely what ought to be found there; he rests on a side-issue; he repeats barren formulas, and he perpetuates prejudices.

17 Even Mr. Henry O. Taylor recognizes that scholastic philosophers are devoted to the pursuit of knowledge for itself. Besides the joy of working for their salvation they have the joy of study. Men like Roger Bacon, Albertus Magnus, St. Thomas, could not have done what they did, says he, without the love of knowledge in their souls.
BOOK REVIEWS

BOOKS ON THE OLD TESTAMENT AND JEWISH THEOLOGY:


As long ago as 1892 the Jewish Publication Society of America took the initial steps towards an English translation of the Bible, assigning the several books to individual scholars in America and Great Britain, with the expectation of bringing these independent translations into unity through the labors of an editorial committee and by correspondence with the authors. Considerable progress was made in the work on this plan; but as time passed it became evident that the scheme was impracticable, and accordingly in 1908 a board of editors selected by the Jewish Publication Society and the Central Conference of American Rabbis was formed, by whom the work should be done in cooperation. Of this Editorial Board, Dr. Cyrus Adler was the chairman, and Professor Max L. Margolis editor-in-chief and secretary of the Board.

The results of their labors, extending over a period of nine years, are embodied in the volume before us; and the first obligation of the reviewer is to congratulate the editors upon the successful accomplishment of their task.

The translation properly follows the Masoretic text and the order of the books in the three parts of the Hebrew Bible. In only a few instances the Ketib is preferred to the prescribed marginal reading (Kere). The translators have availed themselves of the labors of their predecessors, both before and after the so-called Authorized Version of 1611. They have wisely adhered as closely as possible to the inimitable diction of that version, even when they differ from
its interpretation. In this respect they have been more conservative than the American revisers of 1885 and the editors of the so-called "Standard American Edition" of 1901. They have, of course, followed the unbroken tradition of the versions from the Septuagint on in substituting "the Lord" for the Tetragrammaton which the American revisers print "Jehovah." They have also recognized that in a version intended for popular use the multiplication of marginal notes, offering the unlearned reader his choice of variant readings in the text or versions and various renderings of Hebrew words between which the learned decline to decide, is out of place.

The names of the editors — Schechter, Kohler, Philipson, Schuman, Adler, Jacobs, Margolis — are assurance that the work has been done by as competent scholars as there are in America, and an examination of the translation which they have produced fully confirms the favorable expectation which the constitution of the Editorial Board creates. It may be affirmed without fear of contradiction that they have given English-reading peoples the best version of the Old Testament in existence, one distinctly superior to the revision of 1885 in either its British or American form. In the places — comparatively few in number, it must be said — in which the English versions have been dictated by traditional Christian interpretation, the reader will find the largest divergence from the renderings with which he is familiar; not because the editors have set up a Jewish interpretation against the Christian, but in general because they have more faithfully adhered to the meaning of the Hebrew text. A conspicuous example of this may be seen in Daniel 9:24-26, where the new translation alone renders the words of the original as anybody who knew Hebrew and had no apologetic end to serve would translate them off-hand. The Authorized Version here frankly — one might say, naïvely — embodies the Christian exegesis. The English revisers, at the most important point, followed the Hebrew in the text, but in the margin gave the reader the benefit of the translation they rejected; while the American revisers went back to the Authorized Version in their text.

It remains to say that the volume is excellently printed, in paragraphs, with an unobtrusive numeration of the verses. Not only in the poetical books but in the plainly measured oracles of the Prophets, the text is broken in lines in a way which makes its character apparent to the eye as well as to the ear.

It is to be hoped that this excellent version will find wide currency, not only among the Jewish readers for whom it is primarily intended, but among Christians also.
BOOK REVIEWS

The second volume mentioned above may be regarded as a companion to the new translation of the Bible issued by the Jewish Publication Society. It gives in compact and popular form an account of the Targums, the Septuagint and later Greek versions made by Jews, the Syriac and Latin Bibles, the Jewish translations in the Middle Ages, the translations of the Reformation Age and succeeding centuries, and modern translations by Jews and Christians, with concluding chapters on agencies for circulating the Bible and their work, and on the difficulties of translating the Bible.

No scholar is better fitted for such a task than Professor Margolis, who stands in the front rank of students of the ancient versions, particularly of the Greek translators. The book is a pleasure to the eye, and is illustrated with a number of facsimiles of manuscripts and printed texts, which, notwithstanding their reduced scale, are admirably clear. There is also a complete index. All in all, there is more trustworthy information about the versions of the Bible to be got from this work than from many larger and more pretentious volumes.

Professor Naville is a respected Egyptologist, who, without knowing the Semitic languages or anything about Semitic epigraphy more than can be learned from a desultory perusal of encyclopædias, has propounded a novel theory of the linguistic and palæographic history of the books of the Old Testament. If a Hebrew scholar, with an equivalent ignorance of the Egyptian language and Egyptian epigraphy and palæography, should propound a revolutionary history of the text of the Book of the Dead—for example, that it was brought by Abraham from Ur of the Chaldees in the "cuneiform" language and writing—Professor Naville would probably be among the first to remind him, "ne sutor ultra crepidam."

It would be a waste of time to reproduce here the theory which Naville confidently sets forth in these lectures, or to expose the blunders in the very elements into which he falls; but to Semitic scholars it may be recommended as an extremely entertaining book. It is to be regretted that a man of Naville's eminence in his own field should discredit himself by such a misadventure; and it is surprising that it should be put out among the scientific publications of the new British Academy.

President Kohler, of the Hebrew Union College in Cincinnati, was one of the editors of the Jewish Encyclopædia, and contributed to it the greater part of the theological articles. He also wrote an outline of Systematic Jewish Theology in the series, Grundriss der
Gesammtwissenschaft des Judentums (1910). The present volume is not a translation of the last-named work, but a treatment of the same subject in English on a somewhat different plan and scale. In the task which he set himself in these two volumes the author had no predecessors. Excellent studies exist in different parts of the field, chiefly from a historical point of view; but no attempt had hitherto been made, either on the conservative or progressive side, to cover the whole field systematically.

Dr. Kohler has long been recognized as one of the leaders of the progressive school in American Judaism, and it is from this point of view that he has written the volume before us. Conservative, or, as they would prefer to be called, orthodox, Jewish scholars, will probably regard the book in the same light in which a Catholic theologian looks on a treatise on systematic theology by a somewhat advanced Protestant. A presentation of Jewish theology from a liberal standpoint is as legitimate, however, as a corresponding presentation of Christianity. The reader must in either case keep the standpoint in mind.

The three main divisions of the subject are "God" (God as he makes himself known to Man; the Idea of God in Judaism; God in Relation to the World), "Man," and "Israel and the Kingdom of God." The historical development of Jewish doctrines receives full measure of attention; the author accepts the main results of modern criticism and makes free use of the investigations of Christian scholars. Christian readers, who it is to be feared are in the habit of thinking that the history of Jewish thought ended in the Talmud — if they do not make it end in New Testament times — will find the treatment of the mediaeval and modern developments especially profitable.

George Foot Moore.


This book is based upon lectures delivered in part before the Lowell Institute in Boston and in part at five colleges in the Middle West. In its ten chapters it covers a period of over a thousand years, and, as its title implies, it deals, not primarily with the material side of religious origins, cults, and mythology, but with the higher ranges of Greek thought, philosophical, ethical, and theological, and thus stands in a class with such books as Campbell's Religion in Greek
Literature rather than with Farnell's Cults of the Greek States or the work of writers like Miss Jane Harrison. Within such restrictions the work undoubtedly gains by the exclusion of much controversial material, yet one feels that for the general reader, with little access to the voluminous literature of the subject, a brief introductory chapter on origins (like that in Farnell's Higher Aspects of Greek Religion) might have been helpful.

While the lecture-form, which has been largely retained, has the disadvantage of at times making rather sharply drawn divisions of theme, it has the merit of allowing frequent and well-balanced summaries of the contributions made by Homer, Hesiod, the Orphics, Plato, and the rest, to the slowly advancing and gradually purified stream of religious thought and experience. Thus viewed, the whole course of Greek religion appears as a sort of preparatio evangelica, and the author well emphasizes the fact that the fundamental beliefs of early Christianity — revelation, faith, mystic union with the divine, and salvation — were presented to a Graeco-Roman world to which, partly through Greek religion and partly through Oriental cults established in the West, these ideas were already familiar and welcome. The final step was for the new religion to be embodied in the garb of Greek philosophical thought, and thus Christianity was not merely the death, but in a larger sense the consummation, of Greek paganism. In this aspect, more often treated in works on early Christianity than in those on Greek religion, Professor Moore's book should prove of great value to both clergymen and others interested in the Greek elements in Christianity. With no claims to originality — and unproved views would be obviously out of place in such a work — it strives to set forth, in clear, untechnical language and with a sound sense of proportion, the essential and well-established facts. The seventh chapter, on the victory of Greece and its religion over Rome, and the eighth, on the spread of Oriental cults in the western Roman empire, at first sight appear to interrupt the course of the narrative, but each is important in its contribution to the final result, and the latter is especially welcome as a description, by an expert in the field, of some of early Christianity's more important parallels and rivals. Indeed, were any fundamental criticism to be made of this sane and readable book, it might perhaps be the wish that it might even more clearly set forth by its title the importance in its plan of that Christianized Hellenism towards which Greek paganism is seen to move.

Arthur Stanley Pease.

The University of Illinois.
The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy. The Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of Aberdeen in the years 1912 and 1913. A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, LL.D., D.C.L. Oxford University Press. 1917. Pp. xvi, 417. 12s. 6d.

The author is profoundly convinced that the traditional idea of God must be modified if we are to deal satisfactorily with ancient problems as they present themselves to modern knowledge in the light of current philosophy. "The traditional idea, to a large extent an inheritance of philosophy from theology, may be not unfairly described as a fusion of the primitive monarchical ideal with Aristotle's conception of the Eternal Thinker" (p. 407). Perhaps the "fusion" might be described more accurately as Neo-Platonism; at any rate, it is the aloofness which the inherited idea ascribed to God, as respects both man and the world, which is the author's chief point of attack. Beginning with Hume and Kant he finds the defect of both in the separation which each practically acknowledged between the world of mind and the world of things. From this unfortunate diremption came the division between facts and values, science and religion, knowledge and faith. Human thought tried to stand, like the angel in the Apocalypse, with one foot on the solid ground of fact and the other on the shifting sea of subjective values. Escape from this way of thinking comes by substitution of biological for mechanical categories. Indeed, the word "organic" strikes the key-note of Pringle-Pattison's book. Because man is organic with nature, the world is what it appears to be, having fashioned the human senses and brain for its own just apprehension, or more accurately for its own self-expression. Hence he says rather poetically (but to him as to Dr. Everett, "Religion is poetry believed in"), "The intelligent being is, as it were, the organ through which the universe beholds and enjoys itself" (p. 111). Accordingly secondary qualities are not merely man's reactions to an unknown and unknowable world, they are nature's revelations in man. Likewise, values or "tertiary qualities" are not purely subjective but are resident in reality. So the two themes of the first series of lectures are immanence and continuity — the organic unity of man and the world.

In the second series, the same principle is applied to the relation between God and the world, including man, which also is defined as organic in an even deeper sense. Thus by the method of restatement, a solution is found for long-standing problems. Creation means the presence of the infinite in the finite; teleology, the discovery of rationality in the world-process both in details and as a
whole; time is an aspect of eternity, and so forth. Theologically, the Incarnation is the disclosure in human terms of the inmost nature of reality; hence God is to be conceived as striving and as possible.

One is loath to criticize, but two or three suggestions may be in order, bearing principally upon method. In the Preface, the author apologizes for referring so frequently to other authors, justifying his practice by saying, “This method of construction through criticism is the one which I have instinctively followed in everything I have written.” So indeed one’s own thought may develope, but it does not therefore follow that it is the best method of presentation. In fact, the book proves that it is not, for too often the thread of thought is lost in the maze of controversy. Again, it may be doubted whether the writer would not have done better to be more radical in his undertaking. That the traditional idea of God needs modification is indisputable, but perhaps it needs more than modification. What is deeply demanded nowadays is a fresh start from the world as we now know it, and an approach to the idea of God unhampered by traditional methods and prepossessions. One feels that at certain points elements of the traditional idea—perhaps one might more truly say, religious feelings associated with such elements—have unduly influenced the author’s thought. To take but a single instance, referring to “beings capable of spiritual response which enrich thereby the life from which they spring,” he adds, “Only for and in such beings does the Absolute take on the lineaments of God” (p. 295). But this Absolute, whence comes it? Surely from the speculative tradition rather than from our world as known. If the “Absolute” of tradition and of rhetoric were dispensed with altogether, perhaps then, in Emerson’s phrase, God would fire the heart with his presence.

Dr. Pringle-Pattison is an idealist according to his definition of idealism as “the interpretation of the world according to a scale of value, or, in Plato’s phrase, by the idea of the Good or the Best” (p. 181). Yet in his epistemology he goes far in the direction of Neo-realism, and in his insistent emphasis upon a differentiated unity and an irreducible individuality he is at one with Personal Idealism. Possibly the most valuable contribution of his book will prove to be its suggestion of a possible combination of various tendencies of contemporary thinking.

W. W. Fenn.

In this work we have an important addition to the constantly increasing literature which deals with the famous monument set up by the Nestorian Christians at Hsian-fu in Western China. There is no book on the subject which covers the same ground as the one before us, and any future students who occupy themselves with the great historical missions which penetrated to China perhaps as early as the sixth century, whose greatest memorial is the eighth-century inscription in question, will have to consult Professor Saeki, even though they may have to differ from many of his conclusions and to distrust some of his philological conjectures. For Professor Saeki has the advantage of being an Oriental scholar from the other end of the “Land Bridge” which runs across Asia. As a Japanese who knows the Chinese literature, he is able to show the place which the Hsian-fu monument occupies in Chinese tradition, and to furnish a number of incidental allusions to the history of the monument. Then he has been able to show from his intimate knowledge of the Buddhist and Taoist religions that the monument makes use of expressions borrowed from both of these quarters (as well as from the Chinese Classics), a process of sympathetic coloring which was quite proper in presenting a new religion where other forms of faith were already in possession of the field. The recognition of these already existing religious terms in the Chinese text of the inscription has enabled Professor Saeki to mark by quotation-signs such parts of the inscription as involve loans from Buddhist or Taoist ideas, and to give us the sense of a number of passages which would be otherwise obscure. Professor Saeki’s translation is thus the most valuable of all that have yet appeared, and must be consulted at every point.

In the introduction prefixed to the text and translation of the monument Professor Saeki was again in a position of advantage; for research in Central Asia as well as in China is giving us back a number of documents which relate to the propagation of Christianity in those regions, including the attendant Manichæism which followed or accompanied the Christian faith. Two documents stand out as of prime importance.

The first is a Chinese manuscript of the eighth or ninth century, which is now in the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris, which was discovered by Professor Pelliot in A.D. 1908. The second is the Chinkiang inscription of A.D. 1281, of which the contents, as well as
a number of notices of Christian men and Christian monasteries, are preserved in a Chinese book of the fourteenth century. These two documentary sources are of the first importance for determining the Chinese equivalents of the Syrian and Persian names which underlie them, and can thus be used in the decipherment of the great inscription.

Now let us give closer attention to the MS. mentioned above, and see how Professor Saeki has treated it. The MS. contains a Nestorian Hymn to the Trinity (Saeki says a Nestorian Baptismal Hymn to the Trinity). Then there is a list of saints who are revered by the Church, to all of whom Saeki prefixes the title of Catholicos. A list of revered books follows, thirty-five in number, which it is said were translated by Ching-Ching, who is shown to be the same as the chorepiscopus Adam, the Persian Christian who composed and set up the Hsian-fu inscription. It is also said that a number of other Nestorian books over and above the thirty-five rolls that are mentioned remain untranslated, making a total of 530 books. Those which were done into Chinese may be taken as the same as those which Adam translated in the Royal Library, as described on the great inscription.

It is now time to be on our guard against hasty conclusions. If the number of Nestorian books is anything like 530 (a point on which I do not see that Saeki commits himself), we can only say that there is no possibility of such a number of Nestorian works in the eighth century, and that the term “book” must be applied to small compositions (tracts, hymns, etc.) as well as to longer works. Thus we should not expect a single entry for the Old Testament or for the New.

Turning now to Professor Saeki’s interpretation of this MS., of which he has translated the greater part for us, we find that the Hymn of the Trinity is correctly described, but it is not a baptismal hymn; in fact, it is part of the regular Nestorian Ritual. We shall proceed to prove this later on by putting side by side with the Chinese Hymn a section of the Breviarium Chaldaicum. It will be remembered that the Service-Book in question has been re-edited by the authorities of the Roman Church, and we have to watch the text for insertions, omissions, and alterations. For example, the hymn in question is probably due to Theodore of Mopsuestia, but one must not expect to find the name of that saint on its title-page. The agreement between the Chinese manuscript and the Breviarium shows that the Nestorians had actually translated their ritual into

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1 I owe the reference to my colleague, Dr. Mingaria.
Chinese by the eighth century. They did not conduct their services in a tongue that the people did not understand. They used, moreover, a commendable freedom in their translations; to the Chinese they became as Chinese that they might gain Chinese.

At this point we are surprised to find that Professor Saeki has depressed the date of the Pelliot MS. to the fourteenth century, a mistake which leads him into a number of consequent errors in the identification of the books mentioned in the MS. Thus we find on p. 70 at the end of the list of books the following remark: "Fragmentary as these are, they are quite enough to convince any one of the fact that there was a strong body of Nestorians in China prior to the fourteenth century." Again on p. 75: "We cannot but see that the Nestorian stone belongs to the T'ang era (618-907 A.D.), while the newly discovered diptychs are of a later era—not earlier, in our opinion, than the fourteenth century."

It follows naturally from this judgment as to the date of the identification of many of the books must be hopelessly wrong. And they are wrong in two ways: (1) because they are books much posterior in date to the eighth century, and (2) because many of them are Jacobite or West Syrian books, and would not appear in a Nestorian propagandist library. For instance, Saeki's first identification is that of a book called Eternal-Enlightenment-Kingly-Pleasure. This is identified with the Lamp of the Sanctuary, a work of Bar Hebræus in the thirteenth century! It is much more probable that the name is a Chinese translation of "Gospel."

Next to this comes a work entitled The-Explaining-Origin-Reaching-The-Cause (or Root). Saeki identified this with De cause causarum, another work of the later Middle Ages. It is more likely that it describes the Book of Genesis. Other identifications of wrong books and impossible people might be noted.

Now let us come to the Breviarium:

**Chinese Text**

All the angels in the highest profoundly adore Thee.
The whole earth rejoices in universal peace and good will.
In the beginning man received the true Divine Nature from the Three Powers.
All the saints adore Thee, most Merciful God our Father.
All the Enlightened praise Thee!
All who seek truth take refuge in Thee.

**Syriac Text**

Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace, good hope to men.

We worship Thee, we praise Thee, we exalt Thee, O eternal Essence,
Looking up we receive the gracious light,
And are freed from evil spirits that we may seek the lost.
O true Eternal and Merciful Father!
O Glorious Son!
O Pure Spirit!
Triune God!
Thou rul'st over all the Kings of the earth.
Thou art the spiritual emperor among the world-honoured ones,
Dwelling in Divine Light of boundless effulgence.
Visible only (to the Saints).
For no mortal eyes have seen Thee,
Nor can any one describe Thy glorious Form,
For Thy holiness is beyond description.
Thy Divine Majesty is matchless.
Only Thou art changeless.
Thou art the root of all goodness,
And Thy goodness is boundless.

Now when I consider Thy grace and goodness
Which gladdens this country with the music (of the gospel),
O Messiah! Thou greatest and holiest of beings!
Who savest innumerable souls from the sorrows of life,
O Eternal King!
O Merciful Lamb of God.
Who greatly pitiest all suffering ones,
Who dreadest no Cross,
We pray Thee remove the heavy sins of men;
Let them recover their true original nature;
Let them attain the perfection of the Son of God,
Who stands on the right hand of the Father,
And whose throne is above that of the greatest Prophets.
We pray Thee that all who are on the Salvation Raft may be saved from fire.
Great Pilot, Thou art our merciful Father,
The Great Prophet of our Holy Lord,
Our great King,
Who art able to save all who have gone astray,
By Thy Wisdom.
Steadfastly we lift our eyes to Thee!
Revive us by Celestial favours (ashes, fertilizers, and sweet dew),
And nourish our root of goodness.
O Thou most Merciful and most holy Messiah!
Pity us, O Father, whose mercy is like the Ocean.
O Most merciful and meek Son (Holy One)
And pure (Holy) Spirit who is embodied in our Lord,
Beyond all thought.

The comparison of the texts is conclusive as to their interrelation. They proceed from a common original. This point being established, we can see more clearly how to identify the books that are mentioned in the Pelliot MS., for we have the starting-point found for us in the rituals, and the Breviarium Chaldaicum will serve us as a searchlight in making our identification, especially if we bear in mind that many of the books mentioned should be (as stated above) of small compass. We shall easily find a number of books of the Bible, and a number of sections of the Service-books.

Take away the intrusive Catholicos and replace it by the Syriac Mar or Saint, and the list is evidently headed by the four evangelists. At the other end of the Catalogue is a book called Wu-shana-sutra, i.e., the Hosanna section of the ritual. This is preceded by the service for the Cross, that is, probably the festival of the Invention of the Cross. Somewhat higher up we see the section for the Seven Sundays of Moses (so headed in the rituals), and these are followed by Seven Sundays of Elijah. In the same neighborhood there will be found a Sutra of the Revelation, which is the term which describes the Transfiguration in the East Syrian Ritual, and should here denote the order of the service for that particular festival.

If Pelliot is right, that we should read David for Mahadad, we have the Psalter among the books. This is preceded by the Heavenly-Treasure-Sutra, which is clearly the portion of the Service-book called the Gazza; it is too early for the book called the Cave of Treasures, and so on in other cases. Thus the Nestorian Rituals will give us the meaning of many of the Chinese titles.
We have said enough to indicate what we believe to be the right way of approaching the subject. It would take more space than a review can claim to discuss the names of the persons commemorated on the diptychs. Probably most of the suggestions offered by Saeki are unsound and the whole question requires re-examination. But, as we said at the beginning, the book is one of great value to Christian students of the East, and we are glad to have so fresh and intelligent a contribution from the Japanese-Chinese side.

RENDEL HARRIS.

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Professor Grandgent’s purpose in writing his book on Dante is clearly stated in its preface: “It has been my purpose to present my hero, not as an independent figure, but as the mouthpiece of a great period of the world’s history. I have attempted to trace a portrait of the Middle Ages with Dante’s features showing through. At length or in brief according to the degree in which they wore his likeness, various phases of medieval life have been first discust and then illustrated by copious citations from the mighty spokesman. Thus I have hoped to differentiate my study from the many volumes already devoted to the Florentine poet.”

At first sight some doubt may arise about the logical disposition of the thirteen chapters of this book, and it is only after careful consideration that the author’s method in analyzing the mediaeval life, with an advance from the general to the particular, becomes evident. A short biography of Dante is the real preface to the book. Then follows an outline of the most comprehensive mediaeval characteristic, its political and religious conceptions, theories, and institution, and especially the struggle between Church and State which is the convergent point of all mediaeval history.

Literature, art, and science are closely connected with this feature of mediaeval life, and their development is clearly outlined in the four following chapters: Mediaeval Song, Language and Poetry, Didactic Literature, and Mediaeval Learning. But the highest accomplishment of the mediaeval scientific mind is its theology (Chap. VIII); not only because theology is at the top of mediaeval specu-
lation, but primarily because it offers the only basis for a systematization of all the mediæval learning. It is in connection with theology that the Middle Ages developed their conception of the universe as a reality, and that side by side with a very fragmentary terrestrial geography they created also a super-terrestrial geography to which Dante gave in his poetry a more definite and plastic form. No less depending upon theology was the mediæval appreciation of the human activity in the world, although "ancient mythology had to be picked up with history, and the two were not always distinguished" (p. 226). But, after all, such a mythology went through a process of Christianization, in the same way that Aquinas had Christianized Aristotle's philosophy, and that the popular tradition had Christianized Virgil and other typical figures of the classical world.

Love for images and figures, for allegory, is the main characteristic of mediæval artistic expression. To the mediæval thinker, trained in considering all things visible as mere analogies of the unseen truth, to allegorize was to imitate exactly the divine method in nature. Allegory is in mediæval art what analogy is in mediæval philosophy. At this point, and in the light of these various elements of mediæval life, we are able to penetrate the psychology of the mediæval man.

The last chapter, in which is given a synthesis of the content of the Divine Comedy, is the epitome of the book, in the same way that Dante's biography at the beginning is its preface. The appeal to Dante's life, work, and thought is constantly made throughout the whole book to illustrate the various phases of the mediæval world, and it is mainly through Dante that we see its political and religious organization, its poetry, its theology, its knowledge of the cosmos and of human history. Dante himself is the highest representative of the mediæval temper. As a whole the book fulfils the promise of the author and satisfies the expectation of the reader.

As for the chapters dealing with mediæval poetry, Professor Grandgent is such a competent scholar in that field that it would be hard to contest any of his assumptions. I take, however, the liberty of calling his attention to a single point which seems to me to be of real importance. Although there is no doubt that the Sicilian school of poetry derived its main inspiration from the Provençal love-songs, yet, as Professor Grandgent remarks, it possesses some characteristics of its own: "Their verse is similar in most respects to the Provençal and yet different enough to suggest that it was copied in part from some intermediary, probably German, as well
as directly from the south Gallic songsters" (p. 129). As yet we have no evidence of any German element influencing that poetry. Would it not be simpler to think of local influences? This local influence may have come from two sides: either from Arabic poetry, or from the Byzantine syllabic poetry which was extensively used in the Church liturgy, and which is not so far away from the Sicilian school as is commonly thought.

As a matter of fact, the Church in southern Italy and Sicily was Greek for many centuries and opposed a strong resistance to the process of Latinization started by the Normans. In the last part of the twelfth century we find in Sicily a very remarkable writer of Greek homilies, the so-called Teophanes Cerameos, and one of his best Greek sermons was preached before King Roger in the dedication of the Cappella Palatina in Palermo. The "syllabic" religious poetry found here a very fertile ground. Sicily produced quite a number of hymnographers, the best of whom is perhaps Joseph the Hymnographer, author of hundreds of poems, some of which are to be found even today in the Greek liturgical books. Now it seems almost impossible that this religious syllabic poetry, which was so widely spread among the Sicilian Christians for so many centuries, did not exercise any influence on the popular songs which must have been not lacking among those populations. The fact is that the fragments we possess of this Byzantine syllabic poetry show here and there in its metrical forms and in the use of rhymes some analogies with the later poetry of the Sicilian school. One of the most striking of these is the form of the ottava, which is undoubtedly of Sicilian origin, and which is to be found almost exactly in some Byzantine fragments. Of course this is only a suggestion. I am fully aware that this problem is not easy to solve, but I think it is worthy of consideration.

The synthesis of mediaeval theology as presented in Dante's poem is outlined by Professor Grandgent in a few pages, and as a whole it is sufficiently exact. Of course Professor Grandgent does not profess to be a theologian, and it is quite natural that he should miss some points; especially, it seems to me, his exposition of Dante's scholastic doctrine of free will and sin overlooks the essential point of the system.

A remarkable feature of this book is a number of passages of Dante's poems rendered into English by the author. To translate Dante's terzine into English terzine with the same number of verses and the same system of rhymes, is by no means an easy task. Professor Grandgent, however, if we may judge from these passages, is
well equipped for this work. A good many of the terzines we find in this book not only convey exactly Dante's thought and not "dis-jecti membra poetæ," but also the original and peculiar shade of color of Dante's words. See, for instance, to quote only one passage, the translation of the last terzines of the Purgatorio (p. 204). Of course there are instances in which the translator remains far below the original and even modifies unduly Dante's images, but almost never do we find cases of real mistranslations. I wonder, however, why Professor Grandgent does not give in their Latin original those words which Dante himself gives in Latin, and which belong in most of the cases to the Church liturgy, like the "Asperges me" (p. 203), and the "Te lucis ante terminum" (p. 362).

The five lectures on the "Ladies of Dante's Lyrics" contain not only, carefully stated, the conclusions of modern literary criticism about the historical identification of the ladies mentioned in Dante's lyrics — Violetta, Matelda, Pietra, Beatrice, and Lisetta — but also a very remarkable psychological analysis of the nature and the character of Love as it was conceived by Dante and the poets of the "dolce stil nuovo." In this book also quite a number of Dante's lyrics are rendered into English, reproducing exactly the metrical systems of the originals. They confirm our impression of Professor Grandgent's ability as a translator of Dante, and make us hope that he will give us a complete new translation of the whole of Dante's poetical work, which will be by no means a useless addition to the many that we already possess.

GEORGE F. LA PIANA.


In studying any important movement in the world's development, after due attention and estimation have been given to the chief movers in it, our interest turns to those who were less prominent but whose importance was almost as great since they laid foundations and prepared the way for the chief actors. These John the Baptists are always appealing figures; and it is necessary to study them in order to perceive the movement as an orderly development and not an unrelated outbreak. There are many such forerunners in case of the Protestant Reformation. One whose acquaintance, it is safe to say, comparatively few in our time have made, is intro-
duced to us in these two valuable volumes—John Wessel Gansfort.

He was born at Groningen in North Holland about 1420. The name “Gansfort” (in Dutch “Goesevort”; anglicized into “Gansvoort”), while belonging to the family, was apparently little used by this member of it, who was known to his contemporaries as John Wessel. He was educated in the schools established by the Brethren of the Common Life at Groningen, and at Zwolle, some fifty miles distant. At the latter he met a man about forty years older than himself, who came to be known as Thomas à Kempis, and who was then engaged on his *Imitation of Christ*. An intimacy sprang up between them, which had definite results on each. The elder man urged the younger to enter the monastic life; but though he was at first inclined to this, he finally decided against it, and eventually became a strong opponent of monasticism. On the other hand, it is said that Wessel criticised certain parts of the *Imitation*, and that Thomas accepted the criticism and changed them; so that when the book appeared it contained, according to the biography published a generation after his death, “fewer traces of human superstition.”

From the school at Zwolle Wessel went to the University of Cologne, which was the home of dogmatic orthodoxy. Dissatisfaction with the lecture-room had the not infrequent result of driving an active, inquiring mind to the library, and perhaps accentuating in him the early-formed bent of asking every established habit and opinion in religion the inconvenient question, “Why?” At Cologne, though not in the University, he learned Greek and Hebrew, both of which languages were frowned upon by the ecclesiastical authorities, and in some cases elsewhere were prohibited. This made him a marked man; and constituted him a sufficient marvel to be known as “a three-language man.” Here also he became an ardent champion of Realism; and, when about thirty years old, he left Cologne for Paris in order to confute at their citadel the Nominalists in the controversy then raging. “As representing dissent against current opinion and usage, Nominalism became to some degree identified with the cause of intellectual liberty and with progress and reform in the Church. . . . It thus served as a bond of intellectual interest to those who in the fifteenth century and the next were impatient with current dogmatism and eager for reform in the administration of the Church” (I, 67, 68). But after reaching his new university at Paris he discovered that there was more to be said in favor of Nominalism than he had imagined, and
moreover that his natural disposition was towards the things for which it then stood. He therefore abandoned Realism and became and remained a Nominalist.

For some fifteen years Wessel continued in Paris as a licensed teacher, or privat docent. He was cut off from rising to academic distinction because he never took a doctor's degree. He was prevented from taking the road to advancement which lay open to many scholars—the Church—because he refused to be ordained priest. His interests were outside the State and the Court. He therefore never attained a prominent position in the world. And this was in accordance with his scholar's taste for study and quiet. He had taken a degree in medicine and practised in some cases. Professor Miller's statements as to his success are somewhat contradictory: "It is highly improbable that he came to eminence in the science of medicine" (p. 72); "Wessel's unusual skill in medicine is beyond question" (p. 85). Only once did he step into official position. In 1477 he was appointed Professor of Theology in the University of Heidelberg. But his advanced opinions were out of keeping with those of the rest of the Faculty, and he realized that by remaining there he would expose himself to arrest by the Inquisition. Several of his friends had lighted stakes or darkened dungeons; and although he wrote to a friend, "I do not fear anything that I may have to undergo for the purity of the faith, if only there be no calumny" (p. 238), yet he was aware that there would be calumny, that is, false accusations supported by unfair evidence and proceedings without regard to justice. He therefore resigned his chair within two years and retired to his native Groningen. Here and in the neighborhood he spent the remaining ten years of his life under the protection of his friend, the Bishop of Utrecht. He died in 1489.

Wessel impressed himself profoundly as a teacher upon his generation and the following. Among his pupils were Jacob Wimpheling, Rudolph Agricola, and John Reuchlin, all of whom were conduits for conveying the forces of the Renaissance into the Reformation. Wessel was notable for independence of mind. "He presented hackneyed subjects in an original and thought-provoking fashion. The boldness of his assertions, the startling character of his paradoxes, arrested the attention and stimulated the minds of his hearers." He had "clearness of statement and lucidity of explanation." "He possessed also a very winning manner in private and in public discourse" (pp. 116, 117). But it was the epoch-making character of his opinions which appealed most to minds athirst in the aridity of
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scholastic theology. He was one of the first to insist on the importance of the study of the Scriptures, and for this, of a knowledge of Hebrew and Greek. He held light that cardinal doctrine of the Middle Ages, that grace must be mediated through the Church, and regarded the Christian's relation to God as personal and direct, justification being through faith. For this reason he constantly disparaged the "means by which the medieval Church made reconciliation with God seem in large part something to be merited by good deeds or penitential suffering or to be obtained through the good offices of the Pope or a priest." This "cut the foundation from under the Church's penitential system, belittled the value of confession, endowment of masses, repetition of prayers, pilgrimages, celibacy, and asceticism in general. These 'good works,' which formed so conspicuous a part of the life of the medieval Church, had, he declared, nothing in them to merit salvation" (p. 133). The Catholic Church, he held, embraces all true followers of Jesus Christ in all parts of the world. The Scriptures are the final authority in faith and conduct. No prelate, not even the Pope, is to be obeyed if his commands do not accord with the teachings of the Scriptures. The Pope has no authority to impose penance. It is sin, not excommunication, that separates a soul from God. When a wise man differs from the Pope, one should stand by or agree with, not the Pope, but the wise man, who should by no means forsake his opinion to follow papal authority. Purgatory is not a place of material and penal suffering but a vestibule of Paradise, where increasing love for Christ matures the redeemed soul and advances it towards the full bliss of heaven.

After Wessel's death Rhodius of Utrecht, one of his pupils, brought some of his writings to Luther to ask his opinion as to their publication. Luther was surprised and delighted to find one who had not bowed the knee to Baal. "My joy and courage began to increase, and I had not the slightest doubt that I had been teaching the truth, since he, living at a different time, under another sky, in another land, and under such diverse circumstances, is so constantly in accord with me in all things, not only as to substance but in the use of almost the same words" (p. 232). To this happy agreement there was one exception—Wessel's doctrine of the Eucharist. To the publication of this Luther refused to give his approval, but sent it to Ecolampadius for his opinion. The latter approved it and handed it to Zwingli; with whom it became one of the chief influences in moulding the view of the Eucharist maintained by the Swiss Reformers.
The first volume, that by Professor Miller, gives the impression of having been written at different times and not being fully welded together; indeed, the author says, his studies in this field have been pursued during brief vacations. There are many repetitions and sometimes contradictory statements. Thus he says (p. 101) that it is thought the Bishop of Burgundy paid Wessel's board at the convent of Sta. Clara in the latter part of his life; but, on the other hand, "after he reached Paris there is no indication that he received assistance from any one" (p. 114). A biography should give at once the data as to the birth of its subject, that the reader may know where to place him. These Professor Miller does not give until page 42, though on page 19 he incidentally mentions the year in which Wessel was born. The second volume contains translations by Professor Scudder of Wessel's principal theological works. Students of the precursors of the Reformation are indebted to the author and the translator for presenting in so accessible and attractive a form the work of one of whom Luther said, "If I had read his works earlier, my enemies might think that Luther had absorbed everything from Wessel, his spirit is so in accord with mine."

Frederic Palmer.


Writing to a friend about reading a certain Life, Stopford Brooke asks, "Why do you read a book of that kind, and done by a relation too? One knows beforehand all that it will be, and that more than half will be of interest to the relative and none to the world." (I, 524). This, it must be confessed, is a somewhat arbitrary ruling, and if we were to follow it, we should lay aside this Life and Letters of Stopford Brooke. It is written by a "relation"—Dr. Jacks is a son-in-law; many of the letters are addressed to "relatives" and are of interest only to them. But there the parallel ends. Much of this Life is of interest "to the world." We could wish the correspondence had reached out to wider circles; but what there is gives to the picture an intimate touch, and the book as a whole presents us with the portrait of a man, magnetic, brilliant — somewhat Bohemian — the artist-preacher of London in the later decades of the nineteenth century.

Stopford Brooke was born in Ireland of Irish parents. There went to his make-up English, Scotch, and Welsh elements as well
as Irish—but the Irish predominated. He ever remained an Irishman in sympathies and prejudices. His first curacy was in London. This gave him a personal knowledge of the conditions in which the poor live, and helped to make him a socialist. It gave him a profound sympathy with the poor which found expression in nearly every sermon he preached. "There is no doubt that among the many causes which made him rebel against the existing economic system, this—the present lot of women—was the chief. When he spoke of the poor—and he hardly ever preached a sermon without speaking of them—it was poor women who had the chief place in his thoughts" (I, 280). All this had its origin in his experience as a curate.

But a curacy in London on a salary of £60 a year was not a position of affluence or influence, especially with an unsympathetic rector. Brooke surrendered his curacy. He married. This marriage brought him into touch with people of influence in the political, literary, and art world. He was appointed chaplain to the British Embassy at Berlin. It was in the days of the English Crown Princess, and he became a great favorite of that lady. She wanted him to be tutor to her son—the present Kaiser; and Dr. Jacks ventures a surmise as to whether it would have had any effect on the present-day happenings had the Kaiser been educated under English influences instead of German. The surmise is idle. Brooke failed to find that spiritual helpfulness among the Christian teachers of Germany he had expected, but he saw nothing of those characteristics which Germans have shown in recent times. His wife had truer intuitions. While in Berlin Mr. Brooke completed the Life of F. W. Robertson—the famous English preacher. We know the place it has taken in religious biography. It is a remarkable book to have been written by one so young and from a single sitting. Brooke met Robertson only once.

On his return to England Mr. Brooke spent some weary months "looking for a job." He had come under suspicion of being "unsafe"; bishops and rectors in the search for promising young men looked askance at him. Dean Stanley used his influence, but the Dean himself was suspect. Besides, the Broad Church party had not many "livings" at its disposal, and there was an impression that Brooke could buy himself a "living" if he would. That he did not care to do, but he took the lease of a chapel belonging to Lord Carnarvon in St. James' Square, London. It was a venture, and all his friends advised him against it; but it gave him what he wanted—a pulpit in London from which to preach his gospel. Financially
it was not a success. He did not lose by it, but he did not gain. "I get out of it," he writes, "about £50 a year; and it sometimes touches me with a kind of dark anger that after twelve years in the Church I should only be earning £50 a year" (I, 213)—and well it might. But he won for himself a name as a prophetic and impassioned preacher. It was in St. James' Chapel that he gave those literary-religious lectures he afterwards published under the title of Theology in the English Poets. These he delivered on Sunday afternoons. They were an innovation at the time and he was severely criticised and condemned. He has had many imitators since.

While he was at St. James' Chapel his wife died. Dr. Jacks does not tell us much about Mrs. Brooke, but he tells sufficient to show how close was the attachment between husband and wife. Brooke seemed to live in the sense of her presence, and she continued to have a profound influence on all his thinking.

Whether her death had anything to do with his final break with the Church is not shown; that break followed some years after. He had won for himself a recognized position as a preacher, and Queen Victoria had appointed him one of her chaplains. This was in a measure due to the Crown Princess of Germany. It was a great honor and secured him favor. Years afterwards he tells us in his diary that the Queen wanted to make him a canon of Westminster, but "when the Queen asked Disraeli to make me a canon of West-minster, he said, 'I could not appoint a man of his politics.' And when she afterwards tried Gladstone, he said, 'I could not appoint a man of his theological views.' I didn't care twopence about being a canon" (I, 309). Had Brooke been made a canon, we don't know what might have happened. Heretics have preached in Westminster Abbey and been elevated to the episcopate. But that was not to be his fortune; his disagreements were too radical. He had ceased to believe "that miracles were credible and that since the Anglican Church founded its whole scheme of doctrine on the miracle of the Incarnation, a disbelief in that miracle put him outside the doctrine of that Church." Besides, he not only "disagreed with its doctrine, he also disapproved of its very existence as an ecclesiastical body, and of the theory of its existence in relation to politics, to theology, and to religion." Moreover, he had "come to regard the Church, in 1880, rightly or wrongly, as on the side of the rich; and he himself stood definitely on the side of the poor" (I, 319).

These are sufficiently weighty reasons for separating himself from the Church. Pressure was brought to bear to induce him to remain
where he was; but he put it aside. He would have none of the sophistries of the Broad Church party. The yoke which lay lightly on its shoulders pressed heavily on his. His reason, his conscience, his whole nature demanded expression, and he stepped out of the Anglican Church a free man. There was no bitterness in his leaving, and none towards him on the part of the clergy. With one exception, they abstained from criticism, and Brooke after his secession never indulged in recrimination. No malice entered into the memories he cherished.

By this time he had left St. James’ Chapel, the lease having expired. Some friends had bought the lease of Bedford Chapel, Bloomsbury, and presented it to him. He therefore in a measure owned his church. He retained the Anglican form of service, changing it to suit his changed views, and compiled for himself a hymn-book, which is somewhat remarkable for its long hymns — Brooke believed in long hymns. His preaching now took on a greater freedom and a greater power. It was wider than ever in its scope. It possessed a spiritual fervor and artistic grace which were unique. His biographer points out that he was not a theologian nor was he a metaphysician. He was not even an ethical philosopher; his faith had more of a mystical than an ethical basis. He did not despise morality — far from it; but he founded his belief on union with God and all that comes therefrom. What theology he did preach was Christocentric. He laid emphasis on the human nature of Christ, but he exalted the meaning of Humanity. He came under the influence of Mazzini and his “Christology became a mode of interpreting the gospel in the terms of social ideals. It pointed less to the salvation of individual souls one by one and more to the creation of a new community founded on the brotherhood of men in Christ” (I, 310).

His preaching continued to be attractive. Some few friends left him when he severed his connection with the Anglican Church, but others took their place, and Bedford Chapel became the Mecca for many kindred spirits, and some that were not kindred. He won the sympathy of the Unitarians and many of them became frequent attenders at his Chapel. Dr. Martineau and his family were among the number. Yet there was a phase of Brooke’s preaching that did not appeal to that aged philosopher. While he was liberal in religion Dr. Martineau was conservative in politics, and it must have been a trial to his tolerance to have to listen to Brooke’s socialistic sermons. But Martineau was one of the most tolerant of men, and he looked upon this preaching as sowing the wild oats of youth.
“Ah, well,” he said, “you know Brooke is Brooke. But he'll learn wisdom as he grows older.” Brooke at the time was sixty years of age; Martineau was approaching ninety (II, 451).

On leaving the Church of England Brooke abstained from allying himself with any other sect. He was not attracted to Nonconformity; he seemed to share the feeling of Matthew Arnold that there was something Philistine about it. The logical step would have been to join the Unitarians, but Brooke was not logical. While holding to some of their views he kept aloof. The Unitarians understood this. As Dr. Jacks bears witness: “A multitude of congratulatory letters poured in upon him from Unitarian clergymen; but not one of them had the bad taste to welcome him into their denomination. As individuals they offered him the right hand of fellowship, and it was a fellowship that was rightly offered and gladly accepted, for otherwise he would have stood alone. He sometimes called himself a Unitarian, but not in the sense of being a member of that body, and he greatly disliked the name” (I, 820).

As to Brooke's ultimate faith his biographer himself suggests doubts. From vague hints given us in this Life we might almost imagine he became a pagan. Dr. Jacks refers to a peculiar habit he had when taking the water-treatment at Homburg. “He would contrive a myth and set his own life in the midst of it; or he would call up spirits from the vasty deep, and would laugh and play and converse with these brilliant creatures of his imagination as though they were his visible companions, as who can say they were not?” (II, 555). The biographer gives several extracts from his diaries — stories of how the water-sprites, the genii of the wells, made their appearance. They were all real to him. This was not once but at frequent times during a number of years.

What does it all mean? Was it a return to childishness? The answer seems simple: it was the Celtic nature, the Celtic imagination he had inherited from his forebears, finding expression in his old age. It was a phase in Brooke's development.

But what can we say of this other occurrence? In 1911 Brooke "made the acquaintance of Rabindranath Tagore, and the two men spent some time together. Strangely enough, he never would tell what passed in these interviews. . . . All that he would say was, 'I have had a wonderful time, a wonderful time!'" (II, 586).

We have no right to want to lift the veil which both he and his biographer have drawn over that interview; but the importance given it does suggest the question, What really happened? Did Brooke surrender his Christian faith and accept the pantheistic
philosophy of his Indian visitor? Dr. Jacks suggests that "Brooke's genius was much akin to the spirit of the East" (II, 585). Perhaps had age and vigor permitted he might have evolved some form of faith which harmonized the semi-paganism of Rabindranath Tagore with his own Christian belief. But we do not like to think he lost his way in a vague Tagorism. Fortunately we are relieved of that fear. In a letter written a few months before his death, speaking of the cruel war and its problems, he says, "I was glad I was able to make Jesus a reality to you. In the midst of all these horrors He is now the one reality to me. The world was cruel to Him, and He saw unlovingness at its height around Him, and yet He said God was love, and He could leave Peace as His last legacy to His people. I do not understand how He could say and do this — but I believe He was right, and cling to that" (II, 659). He died in the faith.

He was greatly distressed over the world-war. He had always held the Germans in respect. In the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 his sympathy was with the Prussians. That was the attitude of most of the English "Intellectuals" of that period. They did not know they were the dupes of a forged telegram. But in this war Brooke saw nothing favorable to Germany. Writing to his daughter he says: "What a dreadful business this is. It weighs on me day and night. It is a shameful crime to have started it, and I am afraid it has been deliberately planned and done by Germany. I hope not, but I am afraid it is true, and I am more sorry, if it be true, than I can say. But I cannot speak of it. I had hoped we could remain neutral, but we could not have done that without disgrace and ruin afterwards. But it was not without something like agony of mind that I felt we must go to war" (II, 655).

His own grandsons entered the war as active combatants, and a letter he writes to one of them, Lieutenant Lawrence Jacks, (at the front) is a confession and a rebuke: "If I were young, I should like to be with you, fighting for all that humanity needs in the future, but at eighty-three what can I do but feel with you and give what I can? . . . The pessimists about us are turning now to optimism since the French have made so brave and vigorous a resistance at Verdun. I am glad that these gentlemen are becoming saner. It is poor work and a poor spirit to be crying woe, woe, when all of you are doing so patiently and so splendidly" (II, 663). This was written nine days before his death.

Brooke never visited America. His only son, Stopford Wentworth Brooke, was minister for some years of the First Church in Boston. Brooke himself had often wished to come. In 1894 he ac-
cepted an invitation to give a course of lectures at the Lowell Institute on English Poetry—a subject in which he was a master; but he was taken ill just as he was about to leave home, and the trip had to be given up. It was a bitter disappointment to him. "Why didn't they ask me ten years sooner?" he said. He was interested in America. In connection with this great war he held the opinion that "the industrial system would go to pieces under the shock of civil war, and he expected that the beginning would be in America" (II, 652)—a view held by many socialists.

There is much more that is worthy of notice in this Life. Brooke was a man of many parts. He made for himself a prominent place in literature, and he could have done the same in art, his biographer assures us. He loved art, and he surrounded himself with its works. Pictures and books were his idols. Dr. Jacks has shown us this and has shown us many other things. He has succeeded in giving us a living picture of a living man. Instead of being a disadvantage to have been "done by a relative," it is a decided gain; and we close the book feeling that it is written by an artist and by a lover too.

ALBERT LAZENBY.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.


Some one has said that any number of facts independently stated are little better than gossip, but that even two facts shown in their relations are history. Evidently the relations in which facts may stand to one another are many and various. Broadly speaking, when history is concerned with literature, they may be divided into two classes—relations, like those of chronology, which when once established are indisputable; and relations, like those of schools or of influences, which must always remain more or less matters of opinion. At first glance the plan of the history whose first volume is now before us would appear to be of the former character; for we are promised that the second volume will concern "Early National Literature, Part II," and the third, "Later National Literature, 1850-1900." One would suppose, accordingly, that Book I,
which deals with "Colonial and Revolutionary Literature," would chronologically begin with the earliest literature produced in America and end with the period of the Revolution — extending at furthest to the adoption of the Constitution in 1788; and that Book II, which deals with "Early National Literature, Part I," would begin at this point and end at some other, definitely fixed, before 1850. A glance at the Table of Contents will correct this impression. To take only Book I, the first chapter, entitled Travellers and Explorers, is stated to cover the dates 1588–1763; the second, concerning Historians, runs from 1607 to 1788; the third discusses Puritan Divines from 1620 to 1720; the fifth, Philosophers and Divines from 1720 to 1789; the seventh, Colonial Newspapers and Magazines from 1704 to 1775; the eighth, American Political Writing from 1760 to 1789; and the ninth, the Beginnings of Verse from 1610 to 1808 — incidentally touching on such obviously affiliated writers as Mrs. Bradstreet and Freneau. Evidently, the plan of this book is in no severe sense chronological; it is based rather on what the fashion of our time is apt to call by the name, unpronounceable in English, of genres.

Here we come to a difficulty. What belongs in any given genre is clearly a matter of opinion. To go no further, it is not any too easy to draw a sharp line between newspapers and magazines on the one hand and political writing on the other; and a glance at the titles of chapters seven and eight will show these matters chronologically to overlap in this case by fifteen fairly animated years. Nothing but a dominating and authoritative central mind could quite disentangle such snarls as might easily get knotted here. Of such authoritative control, the first volume of The Cambridge History of American Literature shows no sign. Nothing could be less Rabelaisian than this morally blameless work, but hardly anything since Tristram Shandy has more faithfully observed the Theleman precept, "Fais ce que vouldras." Now when it comes to planning a history as a matter of opinion, a man of genius may sometimes be able to do so in accordance with this excellently democratic principle; but the task is probably beyond the power of any four collaborators who ever lived — for no two of the four, however lofty their gifts, would often wish to do the same thing. In that case, either somebody must do something against his will or everybody must do as he chooses. The latter alternative has apparently been preferred, with cordial kindness of feeling, by the four eminent American scholars who are jointly responsible for the work now before us.
For this they are nowise to blame. What they have courageously attempted is to direct the composition of a coöperative history, in which each chapter is independently written by a competent person with no detailed knowledge of what is to precede or to follow it in the printed volume. A number of such attempts have previously been made in English. To go no further, this was the effort of the late Mr. Justin Winsor in bringing to light the Memorial History of Boston, and the Narrative and Critical History of America. He was a man of dominant personality, and he chose good people to write his chapters; but no one has ever been heard to wax enthusiastic over the result of his labors. This was the effort, as well, of the late Lord Acton, when he planned *The Cambridge Modern History*. Lord Acton is said to have been the most thorough master of modern history in all Europe during his later years. He was by blood and by training almost equally English and German. He was at once a devout Roman Catholic and a conscientious Liberal. There was never more honest, more earnest, more energetic, or more accomplished and learned a man. Yet even the main plan of his volumes, which he never lived to see published, is often perplexing. The confusion which pervades their pages may perhaps be held due to his premature death. Competent as the committee was which took up his task, they could not but lack the dominant precision of his unique individuality. There is reason to think, however, that even if he had directed the work from beginning to end it could hardly have been much else than it is—a collection of monographs widely differing in merit and supplemented by variously complete and authoritative bibliographies. *The Cambridge History of English Literature*, which presently followed, under the supervision of a committee headed by the Master of Peterhouse, Sir Adolphus Ward, confirms the impression that where Winsor failed, and even Acton, no group of men can reasonably hope to succeed. Just imaginably, a coöperative history which should confine itself to incontestable relations of fact, such as chronology, might, if executed with German docility, be of value to others than its publishers. No coöperative history which strays into the regions of opinion can possibly result in anything but confusion worse confounded. One might as well try to square the circle.

Clearly, however, a succession of monographs, loosely related but supplemented by bibliographies, may have considerable merits or faults as a matter of detail. It may therefore be worth our while to examine the first Book, of which seven of the nine chapters have already been specified; if this justifies itself in detail, its inevitable
lack of unity and coherence may be forgiven. The first chapter, by Mr. Winship, devotes thirteen pages to a pleasantly cursory discussion of Travellers and Explorers from Sir Humphrey Gilbert to a Dr. Hamilton, who made a pleasure trip from Annapolis to Portsmouth in the year 1744. The seemingly careful bibliography covers fourteen pages. One lists twelve anonymous publications, said to be arranged chronologically from 1610 to 1741—but a stray one of 1622 lags on at the end; the remaining thirteen are arranged "alphabetically by the author's name." On the whole, the text and the bibliography seem conceivably disproportionate, and neither has anything to do with literature proper. The second chapter devotes seventeen pages to Historians, from Captain John Smith, who has already been touched on in the previous chapter, to Thomas Hutchinson. The last page and three-quarters are devoted to Hutchinson; but until the closing eleven lines nothing definite is said about his History. Then comes (p. 30) this masterpiece of expository criticism: "He was bitterly denounced by Otis and Samuel Adams, and he did not show an ability to appreciate them. He left untouched some important phases of Massachusetts history, and was indifferent to social and industrial changes. In spite of these faults, for which excuses can be made, he was the best American historian of his time. He treated narrative history in a philosophical manner and with simple and natural sentences whose charm endures to this day." Of the five-page bibliography appended to this chapter, a page and a half concern John Smith. Incidentally the incorrect account of Daniel Gookin on page 25 indicates that the admirable Life of Gookin by his descendant, Mr. Frederick Gookin—not mentioned in the bibliography—has escaped the notice of the diligent writer of the chapter. The third chapter, which is more solid, is an effort to summarize and interpret the Puritan Divines. It gives two of its twenty-six pages to Increase Mather, and one and a half to Cotton Mather, "whose passionately distorted career," it says, "remains so incomprehensible to us." There is no specific account of the Magnalia—which has been called "the prose epic of New England Puritanism." In revenge, the bibliography of Cotton Mather, mostly condensed from Sibley, enumerates four hundred and seventy-four published works, and ten manuscripts, but overlooks the remarkable Angel of Bethesda, in the library of the American Antiquarian Society—a manuscript-treatise on medicine, which, among other things, indicates dim foresight of bacteriology. The bibliography of Increase Mather covers eight and three-quarters pages. In all, the bibliography of the twenty-six-page chapter
extends to forty-two. Again, there seems to be somewhere a peculiar sense of proportion.

The fourth chapter is refreshingly different. It is a pleasantly discursive and interpretative essay on Jonathan Edwards by Mr. Paul Elmer More, who is quite unable not to write well. The trouble is that while Mr. More is a commentator of the first merit, he is not disposed to confine himself to the humdrum limits of a rigid historian. A paragraph of fact would have given his fifteen-page chapter what it lacks—a firm basis. The twelve-page bibliography appended by Mr. John J. Coes looks systematic and exhaustive. Everybody will agree in hoping that it is so.

The character of the fifth chapter, which devotes eighteen pages to Philosophers and Divines, and four to their bibliography, may be inferred from the statement (p. 72) that an "attack was especially directed against the middle of the five points of Calvinism," and the fact that—so far as the index and diligent search can prove—there is nothing in the whole book to indicate what the five points of Calvinism are, let alone their order. The sixth chapter, Professor Stuart Sherman's twenty-one-page discussion of Franklin, supplemented by a nine-and-a-half-page bibliography, is the first which gives a clear and systematic account of its subject; for once, one is reminded that the human mind is still capable of purpose, order, and proportion. But the bibliography neglects to indicate the unusual merit of Mr. John Bigelow's three-volume edition of the Autobiography, supplemented by admirably selected extracts from the Correspondence. The seventh chapter devotes thirteen very cursory pages to Newspapers and Magazines, and the two-and-a-half-page bibliography looks perfunctory. This is not the case, however, with the bibliography of equal length which Professor William Macdonald has appended to his orderly but not always definite eighth chapter, on Political Writing. He has really digested and selected his list of authorities; but he has neglected to tell us such details as when the men he discusses were born or what were the general outlines of their careers. The ninth and last chapter, which concerns the Beginnings of Verse, covers twenty-three and a half cursory pages, and incidentally finds no room for Phillis Wheatley. She appears, to be sure, in the ten-and-a-half-page bibliography, but why her volumes of 1773 should be classed under the Beginnings of Nationalism, only the Maker of the maker of the list can certainly know. This bibliography, by the way, shows an earnest passion for such subdivisions as will generally put anything where you would not expect to find it.
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We are forced to the regretful conclusion that whoever seeks information from the first book of The Cambridge History of American Literature will find little more satisfaction in its detail than in its general plan. To warrant this opinion we have been compelled to indicate at perhaps tedious length a few confirmatory facts; there are plenty more.

With the second Book included in this volume we can deal more summarily, for it presents no new features. There are nine chapters, covering one hundred and seventy-eight pages. One of these chapters devotes eighteen pages to the Early Drama, 1756–1860 — a dreary waste from which the sole lingering survival is the refrain:

"Home! Home! Sweet, sweet home!
Be it ever [ear. never] so humble,
There's no place like home."

To sustain this chapter there is a highly classified bibliography of seventeen pages. As to the general sequence of the chapters, they are so arranged that Henry Theodore Tuckerman is discussed before Irving, Irving — properly enough for once — before Bryant, Bryant before Willis, Willis before Fitz-Greene Halleck, all these before Brockden Brown and Cooper, and Herman Melville before Channing and Emerson. Only two of the chapters contribute anything in particular to the subjects which they discuss. Major George Haven Putnam, who personally remembers Irving, writes of him sympathetically and systematically, but is of opinion that his Washington is "great" (p. 259). Mr. Paul Elmer More writes fourteen interesting pages about Emerson, and provides a sixteen-page bibliography. His manner of treating his subject may be inferred from the sequence of the running titles which occur on every other page: "Emerson's Method," "Emerson's Later Life," "Emerson's Teachers," "Emerson's Spontaneity," and "Emerson's Dualism." His last words are: "The world had never before seen anything quite of this kind, and may not see its like again."

So far as the volume of which the text thus ends purports to be a history, that sentence might be held symbolically to summarize it. It closes with an eighteen-page index, confined to the names of individuals and to titles, the latter printed in italics. This index includes the name of Achilles, whose "sorrowful, chafed soul," we are told on page 268, "walked apart by the shore of the many-sounding sea." As topography, and so on, is beyond its scope, the index makes no reference for one thing to the colleges which were in many aspects the nurseries of literature in America from the beginning up
to the last quarter of the nineteenth century. One is irresistibly led to a suggestion. Any work dealing with literature may happily follow the old custom of placing a motto on its title-page. In case this plan should appeal to the editors of the coming volumes of *The Cambridge History of American Literature*, they may find words ready for their purpose in the second verse of the first chapter of the Book of Genesis:

"And the earth was without form, and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep."

BARRETT WENDELL.

**Harvard University.**


Since our last notice in this *Review* (July, 1914), three additional volumes have appeared, carrying the work down to the word “Phrygians,” and bringing it within a measurable distance of completion. The peculiarities of the editorial plan and the general character of the articles have been sufficiently described in our earlier notices. It remains to say that, contrary to what might have been expected in a work of so eminently international a character, the war seems to have had very little effect upon it. The editor is to be congratulated upon having achieved what even in times of peace is not easy to accomplish — keeping his distinguished contributors on from volume to volume. It is sincerely to be hoped that nothing may interfere with the speedy consummation of the undertaking, which, vast as it appeared in the programme, appears almost incredible in the accomplishment.

As in the former volumes, there are in these a good many composite articles; for example, at the beginning of volume VII, one on “Hymns”; in volume VIII, “Magic,” “Marriage,” “Missions”; in volume IX, “Music,” “Names,” “Nature,” “Philosophy.” Notable single articles are: “Jainism,” by Hermann Jacobi, “Karaites,” by Samuel Poznanski, “Indonesians,” by Kruijt, and “Melanesians,” by Codrington, to name but a few of many. As in the earlier volumes, philosophical subjects are given large room, and are treated generally from a Scotch standpoint. The long article, “Jesus Christ,” by W. Douglas Mackenzie, includes the whole history of Christology, down to the “present situation,” and deals with the subject from the point of view of the systematic
theologian upon a method which effectually excludes the historical problems.

There are again some strange omissions; for instance, there is no article on Imam and Imamites, and neither article nor cross-reference under Ismaili. It is hardly to be supposed that those who use this Encyclopedia will know enough, when they fail to find the latter in the proper place, to look for them under "Assassins" and "Carmatians." In general, a greater liberality in cross-references would add much to the usefulness of a work which, partly from the nature of the matter and partly from its peculiar arrangement, is very hard to find anything in. To make the wealth of its contents fully available, extensive indexes will be necessary, and indexes made with an intelligence which the professional index-maker cannot be expected to possess.

GEORGE FOOT MOORE.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.


Among those who have recently taken part in the work of presenting Christianity to the English Jews, two men, members of Jesus College, Cambridge, Dr. Lukyn Williams and Dr. Oesterley, have been honourably distinguished. They belong to very different wings of the English Church, but are in absolute agreement that the most important prerequisite for their work is a thorough acquaintance with Jewish modes of thought. Dr. Oesterley showed how genuine was his sympathy with Judaism when he produced in collaboration with Canon Box their Religion of the Synagogue; and Dr. Williams has in this respect followed in the steps of his younger friend in the present Lectures on The Hebrew-Christian Messiah.

The lectureship was founded by that typical eighteenth-century divine, William Warburton, Bishop of Gloucester, who was also Preacher to Lincoln's Inn. He is best known as the editor of Shakespeare, the friend and executor of Pope, and the author of The Divine Legation of Moses Demonstrated on the Principles of a Religious Deist, a marvel of perverse ingenuity in apologetic. In 1768 Warburton endowed the lectureship "to prove the truth of the Christian Religion from the completion of the prophecies of the Old and New Testaments which relate to the Christian Church, especially to the Apostacy of Papal Rome." "On the right determination of the
prophecies relating to Anti-Christ," he said, "one might rest the whole truth of the Christian religion." Dr. Williams by his choice of a subject has fulfilled the first purpose of the founder; but he has wisely left Benedict XV and Anti-Christ alone. The lectures are from a decidedly orthodox standpoint, and have the rare merit of being the work of a scholar, who does not parade his learning to disguise his own opinion or the weakness of his case. The writer possesses a first-hand knowledge of his subject and a rare acquaintance with rabbinic literature. He offers a study of St. Matthew as a Hebrew-Christian author by the light of the Jewish learning at his disposal. In this Dr. Williams raises a number of questions of interest, and his book is too fresh and original not to be open to criticism. He has done too well to deserve the poor compliment of indiscriminate and general approval.

It is assumed in the first lecture that the First Gospel was written after the fall of Jerusalem, and that it is an apologia from Pella for Christianity. It confessedly supplements the Marcan Gospel. This accounts for the substance of the document from the Genealogy to the Temptation. Dr. Williams treats each topic separately, the Virgin birth being dealt with in a fair and scholarly manner, though to some the reasons for accepting it are a priori rather than historical: "If we were to give it up now, we should be acting not only against the evidence of the New Testament . . . and not only against an article in the Creed which has always been held sacred, but also in such a way as to forward the denial of our Lord's divinity." Whether the words here printed in italics are a fair representation of the original intention of the Early Creed is questionable. Probably the clause appeared not to prove that Christ was divine, but rather that despite his divinity he was actually born. But the whole passage is redolent of the fallacy that the acceptance of a fact on the basis of the original historical evidence for it is to be determined a priori by the theological consequences; and this is fatal to all truly scientific criticism.

Another extract quoted from the account of the Temptation is open to serious objection: "Observe farther, that the bodily frame of the Messiah, and therefore, if we may trust physiologists, His whole personality, was at its weakest. He was to derive no advantage from mere physical well-being. The devil was given every advantage." Physiologically this may be true; but that such an idea could have been associated with the idea of the temptation in the days of the First Gospel is inconceivable. Fasting would surely be regarded as a means of strengthening, not of weakening, the spiritual
powers. This is the fundamental purpose of asceticism. It might even be said that Satan came to the Christ when he was physically weakest but spiritually strongest. Dr. Williams is really speaking as a modern man. That our Lord was made susceptible by his bodily weakness "to such sensuous sensations as his apparent removal in space to the temple's precincts," is to use the language of the rationalism of today, and not to express the ideas of his age of the Christ. It is more probable that, during the solitude of the long fast, which in itself is represented as a time of temptation,1 Jesus had abstracted his thoughts from the world, and that the feeling that he was hungry brought him back to the actuality of the world and the practical consideration of the work before him. The three typical temptations seem more explicable on this hypothesis.

The lecture on the Jewish sects displays wide reading and contains some interesting information; but it may be suggested that hardly sufficient justice has been done to the "liberalising" tendencies of Pharisaism, whose "tradition" strove to make the Law easier and not more difficult to the average Israelite, as compared with the rigid legalism of the Sadducees.

The treatment of the difficult subject of miracles in the third lecture is reasonable and scholarly. Dr. Williams shows that, judging by the later evidence of the Talmud, the Jews had an extensive knowledge of anatomy and diagnosis, and their physicians performed some of the more hazardous operations of modern surgery. Not all cures therefore were necessarily regarded as miraculous, though miracles were recognised. There is a discussion of the miracles wrought at Epidaurus as well as those of the Middle Ages which are attested by strictly contemporary evidence; and, while he dwells on miracles as attesting the Messiahship of Jesus, Dr. Williams does not hesitate to say: "It appears probable that God uses the human means of strong personality on the one hand, and, as we have already seen, humble reciprocity on the other, when He allows miracles to be performed among either Christians or heathen."

Enough has been said to show the merits of this book without ignoring the points where the writer lays himself open to criticism. There is a serious need of "orthodox" scholars like Dr. Williams. Not that he is in any sense a controversialist. He tells his readers what he knows and what he thinks. His reverence for his subject is as genuine as it is unobtrusive. If he edified his critical audience in Lincoln's Inn Chapel, it was by no conscious effort. He addressed

1 Matt. 4:1 and especially Mark 1:13.
them as a perfectly fair expert witness laying the case before them; and as such he deserves a respectful hearing by thinkers and scholars clerical and lay.

It only remains to give the subject of the other lectures. IV, The Messiah as Teacher—his originality; V, The Messiah as Teacher—the Permanence of the Jewish Law (The remarks on St. Paul are especially valuable, and so is the Appendix on "A Hebrew-Christian Church"); VI, The Ethical Demands of the Sermon on the Mount; VII, The Messiah—the Son of David; VIII, The Son of Man; IX, The Son of God; X, The Messiah and the Apocalyptists (There is an interesting Suggestion that the First Gospel is intended to correct the impression that the Second Coming was to be immediate); XI, The Messiah and the Cross; XII, The Messiah—the Victor. Special attention should be given to Dr. Williams's discussion of Professor Lake's view of the Resurrection, and of the work of the Society of Psychical Research.

F. J. FOAKES-JACKSON.

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

MEANS AND METHODS IN THE RELIGIOUS EDUCATION OF THE YOUNG, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE SUNDAY-SCHOOL. JOHN DAVIDSON. Longmans, Green, & Co. 1917.

This little book represents the sort of guidance that a Scottish educationist—for Dr. Davidson is, among other things, examiner in education in the University of Edinburgh—is prepared to give to Sunday-school teachers. The topics are the usual ones—the teacher's aim, the lesson-plan, story-telling, questioning, illustration, memory work, worship, and the treatment of the miracles and of the parables. The level of the whole may be sufficiently indicated by comparing the more fundamental parts of the book with the tendency of American educational thought concerning the same topics.

Holding that religion is a mode of life rather than of knowledge, and that it is bound up with the whole of life rather than being a thing apart, Dr. Davidson would test the technique of teaching chiefly by its effect upon action, worship included. Any reader who expects him, starting from this point, to go on to a reconstruction of the conventional technique of yesterday, however, will be disappointed. American educationists who take his view of the nature of religion and of the end of teaching hold almost, if not quite, unanimously that we learn to act by acting, and that yesterday's method of attempting to control the conduct of children by means of antecedent
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ideas about conduct is fundamentally deficient. But Dr. Davidson will be satisfied, it appears, with a Sunday-school lesson in which the teacher merely causes the mind of the pupil to work over, in accordance with the Herbartian Five Steps, a set of ideas about goodness — ideas unconnected as yet with any corresponding good act by the pupil. If Dr. Davidson adds anything at all to this conception of the technique of teaching, it is simply emphasis upon feeling as a preliminary to conduct. Inasmuch, however, as he would produce a habit of feeling by merely causing the pupil to run over mentally various instances of a given kind of conduct, it is fair to say that we have here no incorporation of action into the teaching-process itself.

The specimen lesson that Dr. Davidson gives in some detail is perfectly logical therefore — however astonishing it may be — when it makes the Fifth Step (Application) consist of the baldest moralizing. The lesson is "The Call of Samuel." The teacher is advised to point out and discuss ways in which the pupils "can render service to God." Let him point them, for example, to such children's organizations as the League of Mercy, The Band of Hope, the Guild of Courtesy, Boys' Brigade, Boy Scouts, etc. — organizations whose aim is not so much to learn about righteous acts as to do righteous acts. Let him urge that the boy or girl who unites with his fellows to help the poor, the weak, the unfortunate, the oppressed, is a true little knight of God, and may claim kinship with all the good and great in history who have served God in serving their fellowmen. He will remind them of the exquisitely encouraging words of Jesus Himself — God's ideal Knight: "And the King shall answer and say unto them, 'Verily, I say unto you,'" etc. It hardly seems necessary to show why this method of teaching is not only not likely to secure the desired action from pupils, but is likely even to disgust them with the thought of it.

GEORGE A. COE.

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.


This is an attempt to meet the needs of those many worshipping persons who desire freedom from the limitations both of individualism and of any of the historic liturgies. It is modelled upon the Prayer Book of the Protestant Episcopal Church; following the order of the latter in prescribing forms for Morning and Evening
Prayer, for Baptism, Marriage, and other ordinances of religion, and yet varying these by the elimination of expressions regarded as obsolete or misleading, and adding prayers which are apparently the composition of the compiler. It may be questioned whether such prayers do not lose the merits of both their ancestors. The voluntary prayer in church, with its expression in modern diction of immediate needs, may be inspiring when it is evidently the outpouring of the offerer; but when it is repeated Sunday after Sunday, its up-to-date features jar with the sense of timelessness which a fixed form gives. It is neither historic nor of the occasion, and therefore is likely to grate upon the liturgically trained spirit and to be like Saul's armor to one not liturgically trained.

Yet such a book is to be welcomed as an attempt to solve the problem of combining the needs of worship in the present with the devotional wealth of the past. It is an endeavor to preserve continuity in the service of the Church without wearing the clothes of our ancestors. The volume is handsomely bound in flexible leather with gilt edges.

FREDERIC PALMER.

The Papers of the American Society of Church History, Second Series, Vol. 5, contains three essays on conditions at the Reformation: The Reformers and Toleration, by the president, John A. Faulkner; Recent Sources of Information on the Anabaptists in the Netherlands, by Professor Henry E. Dosker; and Adam Pastor, Antitrinitarian Antipædobaptist, by Professor Albert H. Newman. It has also an article on the trial in 1440 of Gille de Rais, the original of the legend of Bluebeard, by Professor Arthur C. Howland; a paper on Recent English Church Historians, by Professor F. J. Foakes-Jackson; and a sketch of Early Theological Education West of the Alleghanies, by Professor Jesse Johnson.