THE GORGIAS OF PLATO.
THE

G O R G I A S

OF

P L A T O,

CHIEFLY ACCORDING TO STALLBAUM'S TEXT,

WITH

N O T E S,

BY

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PRESIDENT OF YALE COLLEGE.

Athenis diligentius legi Gorgiam: quo in libro in hoc maxime admirabar Platonem,
quod mihi in oratoribus irridendis ipse esse orator summus videbatur.

Cic. de Oratore, I. 11.

NEW EDITION, WITH ADDITIONS.

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THIS EDITION OF GORGIAS

IS INSCRIBED,

AS A MEMORIAL OF LONG FRIENDSHIP,

BY

THE EDITOR.
PREFACE.

1. The text of this edition principally follows Stallbaum’s, published at Gotha in 1840. After examining the various readings, as Ast has given them, the editor was led to make about forty changes in the text of Stallbaum’s first Gotha edition of 1828. On receiving, not very long since, the same critic’s second edition of 1840, mentioned above, the editor was pleased to find a large part of these alterations, and nearly all the more important ones, made by Stallbaum himself. A number of others have since been made, in reliance upon Stallbaum’s long study of Plato and ability; and the text now differs from his last revision chiefly in the following places.

496, A, reads ἀνθρώπους. — 497, A, gives καὶ ... νούθετεῖς to Callicles. Vid. not. — 500, B, brackets κατὰ τὸ σῶμα after μαγειρικῆν, which I have omitted. — 505, E, joins οὕτως to the next sentence. — 508, B, inserts ἀδίκως. — 514, C, I have bracketed ὑφ'. — 522, C, have given οὐτως. Vid. not. — 525, D, have omitted τοῦς before τοῦτον. — 527, C, Stallb. gives ἐν σοῖς λόγος. Vid. not.

In the text, like other editors of Plato, I have allowed οὐκοῦν, nonne igitur, to be thus accented, and, as I think, for good reasons. In the notes, I have followed what is, I believe, Hermann's practice, in treating a single Greek oxytoned word in an English sentence just as it would be treated in a Greek one. If, for example, ἄν occurs in the middle of a clause, it is not written ἄν.

2. I have had access to the following editions of Gorgias, which include all the modern ones of much value.
1. Routh's, Oxford, 1784. 2. Findeisen's, — an edition of indifferent judgment. Gotha and Amsterdam, 1796. 3. Heindorf's second, edited by Buttmann, Berlin, 1829, — excellent, especially for the Commentary. 4. Bekker's. 5. Stallbaum's Leipzig ed. These are concerned only with the text. Bekker's has some Scholia. 6. Coray's, Paris, 1825, together with Xenophon's Memorab. 7. Ast's, in his Plato. The bulky Commentary on Gorgias is in Vol. XI., Leipzig, 1832; valuable, but ill-arranged and tedious, and not always judicious. 8. Stallbaum's, in his Gotha ed. of Plato, 1828 and 1840. Both text and interpretation owe much to him, and he has collected most of what is useful in other editions.

From these editions, above all from the last, I have derived great assistance, which is often acknowledged and
often not. In a work like this, it would be plainly impos-
sible to trace everything up to its source, but nothing has
been adopted without examination; much, also, is original;
but I fear that, if any one should pass the severe judgment
upon the edition, that much of what is faulty is original, he
would not be very far out of the way.

Besides these editions, I have consulted several of those
works relating to Plato, to which an editor of his dialogues
would naturally think of turning for aid. Of this descrip-
tion are Ast's Lexicon Platonicum (the first three vols.),
which is of no great use after all, Ast's, Socher's, and the
first vol. of C. F. Hermann's Introduction to Plato, Schleier-
macher's and Cousin's translations, and Dobson's translation
of Schleiermacher's Prefaces.

3. An introduction is prefixed to the text of the dialogue,
with a view to give an explanation and critique of the argu-
ment. To this are added, in notes, rather literal transla-
tions of a few illustrative passages out of very many from
Plato's other writings, most of which I have read with ref-
erence to the present edition during its preparation. I had
intended to add an index, in which some things omitted in
the notes were to find their place, and had made some prog-
ress in it, but was tempted by the overpowering tediousness
of the task to lay it aside until too late.

4. I have said nothing, thus far, as to the propriety of
laying the Gorgias before American students of Greek,
rather than some other dialogue of the same great author.
To persons familiar with the Platonic dialogues, perhaps
nothing need be said on this point. Let me say, however,
that while many of the dialogues would not have suited my
design, on account of their abstruseness or their length, the
Gorgias deserved to be preferred to others equally finished in style, on account of its positive inculcation of truth and its high moral tone. Something better is to be found in it than the miserable doctrine of instruction, and the duty of the politician to obey the popular will.

Yale College, New Haven,
July, 1842.

A second edition of the Gorgias being called for, the editor has done what he could, amid the pressing cares of a new office, to render it, by the necessary changes and additions, less imperfect than the former. In doing this, he has received kind aid from several friends, and takes this opportunity of making his acknowledgments to Professor Crosby of Dartmouth College, Mr. Sophocles of Harvard University, Mr. Hadley of Yale College, and C. A. Bristed, Esq., of New York.

Yale College, June 1, 1848.
INTRODUCTION.

The times in Greece which just preceded the age of Socrates gave birth to a class of men denominated the Sophists. This title, which before was honorably applied to such as excelled in wisdom or ingenuity, was then chiefly confined to those who, with mercenary views, professed a vain and shallow kind of wisdom. Such is in substance Aristotle's definition of a Sophist. In the successive sketches of Plato's Sophistes, he is hit off as a mercenary hunter after rich young men; a dealer and huckster in intellectual wares, especially of his own production; a logomachist; one who, by his power of taking the opposite on all subjects, gets a reputation for wisdom; one who is employed about that which is false, or merely appearing, instead of the invariable objects of true science, and who conceals his ignorance of true science by artificial and crafty turns of words. This last characteristic is one which gives the relation of the Sophist to philosophy. He denied all objective truth, and stood only on the fluctuating, uncertain ground of subjective opinion. Hence, as to truth, he was an unbeliever. He could accommodate himself to one side or its opposite, contending for or against any point, as interest might dictate. Finding nothing in philosophy to employ himself with, he withdrew from the study of it to the arts of practical life, and aimed, by attract-
ing admiration and educating the young, to gain wealth and honor. Gratification or pleasure was the immediate object in his view, and he could have no higher; for to instruct in virtue would imply the existence of unalterable moral differences, which he denied. Or, if he professed to teach virtue and justice, it was only in accommodation to a vague opinion of those who employed him; and it was necessary for him to pervert these notions, in order to make his instructions consistent with the rule of gratification by which he was governed.

It would carry us far beyond our bounds, were we to attempt to exhibit at any length the causes to which this class of men owed their origin and their prominence. These causes lay partly in the unsatisfactory results to which the prevailing systems of Greek philosophy had arrived, and partly in the circumstances of the times. On the one hand, many of the philosophers either wholly denied the existence of truth within the reach of man, or so contracted its dimensions as to make it not worth pursuing. Hence arose scepticism, despair, and the fading away of a serious regard for truth, which were succeeded by frivolity and by the purpose to gain immediate selfish ends through pretensions to superior knowledge. On the other hand, the decay of religious belief which attends upon increasing civilization in heathen countries, and the disregard of political morality so prevalent in Greece, threw uncertainty into the opinions of men upon the most important subjects. Thus the same disease attacked the roots of philosophy, religion, and morals.

In the schools of the philosophers, the art of reasoning and its instrument had received by degrees some attention. Thus logic had been cultivated by the Eleatic sect, but was turned, in the hands of the Sophists, into an art of disputing, applied to puzzle the unpractised and display their
own dexterity. The right and elegant use of words was employed by other Sophists to procure for themselves admiration and pupils. Many of this class of men exhibited their knowledge in public by answering any question that might be proposed to them, or gave lectures prepared with great care; while in private they imparted such instructions to young men as would give them polish and ability in civil and political life. All of them took money for their instructions,—a practice not regarded as entirely honorable at that time in Greece.

The sophistical principles of the time were brought into closer connection with public affairs by means of the art of rhetoric, which arose at about the same era. Rhetoric began to be taught as a means of gaining a cause in the courts at Syracuse after the year 466, when a popular government, succeeding to the sway of Hiero's family, greatly multiplied judicial proceedings. An art like this was calculated to be popular in free states, and especially in Athens, where the judicial function of the people was the most important one; where the crowds of ignorant judges were easily deceived by sophistry; and where there was an uncommon fondness for displays of skill in the use of words.

The sophistical tendency, which we have represented as one in its origin, affected all branches of truth and every art which can be referred to scientific principles. In metaphysics it may be exemplified by the tenets of Protagoras, that all knowledge consists in sensation, and that whatever appears true to any man is true to him; and by the doctrine of Gorgias, that there is no truth which men can ascertain or communicate to one another. In morals and politics, it appeared in the opinions, that there is no natural justice, or that justice is the interest of the stronger; and that pleasure is the chief good. In the use of rhetoric, it showed its nature when Protagoras offered to teach how to prevail
by the worse argument (τὸν ἡπτόν λόγον κρείττω τοιείν), and
when Tisias and Gorgias said that the probable must be
held in higher esteem than the true.

The Sophists could not fail to disgust a man like Socra-
tes, who hated show and pretension, and who had a deep
veneration for truth. Hence he was sometimes brought into
collision with them, and in a degree his doctrines, as well
as those of Plato, were shaped by opposition to theirs. And
in accordance with this, Plato, especially in his first works,
represents Socrates arguing against some false opinion or
other maintained by a person imbued with this spirit.

One of the more prominent Sophists, with whom Soc-
rates was contemporary, was Gorgias, after whom this dia-
logue is named. Gorgias was a Sicilian Greek of Leontini,
a Chalcidian town, which lay some twenty miles to the north
of Syracuse, and suffered much from its nearness to that
powerful Doric state. The birth of Gorgias is assigned by
Foss* to the first year of the 71st Olympiad, or 496 B.C.
But there is good reason, I think, for putting it several
years later. For the art of rhetoric began to flourish at
Syracuse after 466 B.C., and Gorgias learned this art from
Tisias, a scholar of Corax, the first preceptor.† And with
this it accords, that Gorgias heard Empedocles in philos-
ophy, whose birth even Foss places no earlier than the 71st
Olympiad, while the ancients say that he flourished from
forty to sixty years afterward.

From this time we know nothing of Gorgias until he was

* De Gorgia Leontino Commentatio. Halle. 1828.
† This is asserted by the author of the Prolegomena to the Rhetoric of
Hermogenes (in Walz’s Collection, Vol. IV. p. 14). The passage is in-
serted by Spengel into his valuable book entitled Artium Scriptores. Stutt-
gardt. 1828. Foss denies it without authority, “tum propter alius testi-
monii inopiam, tum propter Tisias actatem.”
sixty years old or upwards. In the interval he may have taught rhetoric in Sicily, for Polus of Agrigentum appears at Athens as his disciple, and he probably stood high in his native state. In the second year of the 88th Olympiad, he came to Athens on the following occasion. "The Leon-tines (Diodor. 12. 53), who were emigrants from Chalcis, and of the same stock with the Athenians, were invaded by the people of Syracuse. As they were pressed by the war, and in danger of being reduced by the superior might of Syracuse, they sent ambassadors to Athens, begging the people to help them as speedily as possible, and rescue their state from its dangers. The principal ambassador among those who were sent was Gorgias, the orator, a man who excelled all his time in eloquence, and first invented the artifices of rhetoric* (τεχνας ῥητορικάς).—On his arrival at Athens he was introduced into the Assembly, and discoursed before the people concerning the alliance. The Athenians, who were fond of displays of genius and skill in the use of words, were struck with wonder by the novelty of his style, by his various antitheses, his clauses of equal length, his words of similar forms and endings, and the like artifices; which then, being new, met with favor, but now seem to be a waste of labor, and are ridiculous if repeated so often as to produce satiety. At last, having persuaded the Athenians to form an alliance with the Leontines, and gained admiration at Athens for his rhetorical art, he returned to his native town." The sensation which his rhetoric produced at Athens is spoken of by others also. The days on which he made his exhibitions were called festivals, and his discourses themselves torches.† "He won great praise," says

* See Spengel, u. s., p. 81.
† This is said by the commentator on Hermog. u. s., p. 15, by Olympiodor. apud Routh, p. 562, and other late writers.
Socrates in Plato's Hippias Maj. (282, B), "by his speeches in the Assembly, and by his private displays of his eloquence. By the instructions he imparted to the young (συνών τοῖς νέοις) he gained a large amount of money, and carried it with him from Athens." If Plato, who is sometimes careless about precise facts and dates, may here be relied upon, he must have stayed long enough at Athens to act the part of a teacher before he went elsewhere. It is probable that, after discharging his mission, he soon returned to Greece, where the rest of his life seems to have been spent. Thessaly was his principal residence, and that he passed no very long time in Athens may be argued from the fact, that Isocrates, an Athenian, received his instructions in that country. There, also, he taught Meno, and Aristippus, one of the nobles of Larissa, and there, or in Boeotia, Proxenus, the comrade of Xenophon. The wealthy families of Thessaly had that rude taste which would make them fond of the glitter and ostentation of Gorgias, and were able to pay him well. He lived in splendor, affecting in his dress the same show and parade which marked his eloquence. (Ælian, Var. Hist. 12. 32.) Owing to his habits of temperance, he attained to a very great age, to six or eight years over a century, and acted the rhetorician to the last, by saying, according to Ælian (u. s. 2. 35), when invaded by a lethargic sleep, premonitory of his end,—"Sleep is now beginning to lay me in the hands of his brother." His works, in his capacity as a rhetorician, were,—1. One on the art, or on one branch of it, the art of speaking suitably to the occasion. 2. A number of orations, declamatory and laudatory. One of these was delivered at the Olympic festival, in which, like Isocrates afterwards, he tried to unite the Greeks against the Persians. Another was a funeral discourse in honor of Athenians slain in battle, a fragment of which, preserved by a Scholiast on Hermogenes,
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supplies us with the longest extant specimen of his style. These works exhibited a stately, uncommon, and poetical diction, together with frequent rhetorical figures, which must have been tedious and frigid in the extreme.* Two declamations still extant, bearing his name, are unlike his fragments in style, and ought probably to be regarded as spurious.

Gorgias was, as we have said, at bottom a Sophist,† but he avoided the title, which was not very popular, "and laughed at the Sophists, who professed to know how to make men better, confining himself to instructions concerning the art of speaking." (Plat. Meno, 95, C.) His literary labors in the more appropriate sphere of the Sophist were confined, so far as we know, to a work entitled περὶ φύσεως ἤ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, which may have been unknown to Plato, but is analyzed in a little treatise among the works of Aristotle. In this work, with such an ominous title, he attempted to prove, first, that nothing exists, then, if any thing exists, that it cannot be known, and, finally, that if known, it cannot be made known to others. Olympiodorus (in Routh's ed. of Gorgias, p. 567) says, that this work was written in the 84th Olympiad, that is, sixteen years or thereabouts before his embassy to Athens. For the sophis-

* The fragments, which are few, are collected by Foss, but not completely. Thus, Clem. Alex. Strom. 1. 11, § 51, cites some words of Gorgias, apparently from his Olympian oration. The following words are a good sample of the style of Gorgias, and show some just thought. They are cited by Foss from Plutarch. Гогифας τὴν τραγωδίαν ἑκατον ἡμας ἀπάτην ἤτοι ἢ ἢ ἀπατήσασα δικαιότητος τοῦ μὴ ἀπατήσασας καὶ εἰ ἀπατήσαντας σοφότητος τοῦ μὴ ἀπατήσαντος.

† And so the men of that time regarded those who displayed their talents after the manner of Gorgias. Thucyd. 3. 38, ἄλλοις ἵδον ἰδιωμάτων καὶ σοφιστῶν ἰδιαίτερως καθήμενοι. For the estimation in which the Sophists were held, comp. Protag. 316, seq.
tries out of which, with the help of the principles of the Eleatic Sect, he built up this triple wall against truth, I must refer to the treatise of Aristotle,* and to Ritter's history of philosophy.

Such was Gorgias. Of Polus, another speaker in the dialogue, little is known. He was a Sicilian of Agrigentum, a scholar of Gorgias in rhetoric, and perhaps of Empedocles in philosophy. He wrote, together with other works, a treatise, probably on rhetoric, to which Plato refers in the Gorgias. As we learn from the Phædrus and other sources, he gave great prominence to the figures of that artificial rhetoric of which his master was so fond; such as equality of periods and correspondence of adjoining words in sound; and taught the mode of using maxims and similes under separate heads, to which he gave pedantic names.

Callicles is an unknown Athenian, not a Sophist, as some have regarded him, but rather a contemner of the Sophists; although he carried out in practical life those principles which they laid down. He is a specimen of a considerable number of Athenians of his time, who, while they courted the people, despised it; who would have grasped at tyrannical power, without scruple as to the means; who looked down upon the pursuits of philosophy, when compared with the honors of political life; who had no faith in the distinction between right and wrong, and held pleasure to be the supreme good.

Besides these and Socrates, Chærephon bears a small part at the opening of the dialogue. He was an early friend and a follower of the philosopher, ardent in whatever he undertook, whose variance with his brother is mentioned in Xen. Memorab. 2. 3, and who obtained a response from

* It is edited by Foss, in his Commentatio before mentioned, and by Mullach (Berlin, 1845).
the Pythia commendatory of Socrates, according to the Apologies of Plato and Xenophon. He went into exile in the time of the thirty tyrants, and died soon afterwards, before his friend’s condemnation. He injured his health and complexion through his studies, and received the nicknames of νυκτηρέ, νυκτός παῖς (Aristoph. Birds, 1564, and Horarum frag.), for never coming abroad during the day, and of πύξινος θύρηνος, for his sallow hue (Eupolis Πολεον frag., Aristoph. Wasps, 1413), as well as other ridicule from the comic poets.* When, according to the Scholiast on Plato’s Apology, these reckless jesters proceeded further to call him a sycophant, a parasite, and a thief, we may put by the side of these aspersions the testimony of Xenophon, who classes him among those friends of Socrates who sought his company to improve themselves in household and civil relations, and who, at no time of their lives, either did, or were charged with doing, any wrong.

The persons of this dialogue are represented as having met in the year after the sea-fight at Arginusæ. Gorgias, being then on a visit at Athens, was lodging at the house of Callicles, and there, it is generally supposed, the dialogue was spoken. There is, however, good reason, I think, to accede to the opinion of Schleiermacher, who lays the scene in some public place, like the Lyceum, where the parties in several other dialogues convened.† At the opening of the

* In the proemium to Philostrat. Vitæ Sophist., another Charephon, as we are there expressly told, is brought into connection with Gorgias. He asked the Sophist a foolish question, Διὰ τί οἱ κύαμοι τὴν μὲν γατάγα φυσιφάσι τῇ δὲ τὸροι φυσιφασί; To which the other replied, Τεῦτο σοι καταλέξων εκνοτείν. Ἐγὼ δὲ ἐκτίνα πάλαι ὕδα ἔτη ἣν τοὺς νάρκηνας ἑτὶ τοὺς τωτούς φύ. I have seen the opinion somewhere expressed, that the story was first told of this Charephon, the declaration of Philostrat. notwithstanding.

† For some observations on the time and place of the dialogue, see Appendix, No. I.
work, Socrates and his friend find that they have reached the place where Gorgias and others were assembled, too late to witness his exhibitions of rhetorical skill. In the hope, however, of drawing from him his views concerning his art, they approach and begin the conversation. Gorgias being fatigued, the younger rhetorician, Polus, volunteers to take his place, and answer to the inquiries concerning the nature of rhetoric; but as it is soon apparent that he is unwilling or unable to observe a logical method, Socrates transfers the discourse to Gorgias, from whom he professes to think that more brevity and accuracy of definition may be expected. (447-449.) By a series of questions in his peculiar manner, he gathers from Gorgias that he is a rhetorician, and able to make others such; and that his art is employed about words as instruments of thought. Socrates asks whether the definition is not too general, since several arts called by other names are also employed about words. To this Gorgias replies, that other arts ask principally, "What is to be done?" and use words as a secondary thing; but that rhetoric inquires, "What is to be said?" (-450, B.) Socrates objects that there are other arts, such as those of calculation and astronomy, which mainly depend on words, and demands to what the words relate which rhetoric employs. The most important of human affairs, says Gorgias. (-451, B.) But what are the most important? asks Socrates; for other arts might make a similar claim. The good, replies Gorgias, to which rhetoric opens the way, is freedom for the orator and the power of controlling other men, and this it effects by the power of persuading public assemblies. By this power it brings every other art under its control. (-453.) Socrates still is not satisfied. For although Gorgias has defined rhetoric to be the art of persuasion, he inquires whether other arts, which have to do with words, do not aim at persuasion also. What, then, is
the province and the nature of rhetorical persuasion? Gorgias is brought to admit that its province is to persuade judicial and other popular assemblies concerning things right and wrong; and that it attains its end rather by plausible arguments than by proofs drawn from absolute truth. (-455.) But Socrates still finds it hard to comprehend what is the peculiar sphere of rhetoric. In all public deliberations, the artificer, the general, or other person acquainted with the point in question, can give the best counsel. Where, then, is the orator's place? In reply, Gorgias refers to matters of fact. It was the advice of the political leaders which led to the building of the Athenian walls and docks, and not that of the artificers. He himself had often persuaded sick persons to comply with the directions of physicians, who had exhausted their arguments in vain. There was no occasion when an orator was opposed to an artificer, without gaining an easy victory. Such was the power of rhetoric, but, like other arts, it might be abused by those who learned it. Yet that abuse was no good cause of complaint against the teacher. (-457, C.) Socrates, after offering an apology for his seemingly contentious spirit, now forces Gorgias to allow that the orator may be ignorant of the subject-matter of other arts; all his study being concerned with finding the means of appearing to "those who do not know to know more than those who do." This Gorgias regards as an advantage, since it furnishes the orator with power acquired by small pains.* Socrates, without stopping to examine into the extent of this advantage, inquires whether the case is the same with justice and injustice, good and evil, and the like; whether, without know-

* Philebus. 58, A. "I heard Gorgias say, on a variety of occasions, that the art of persuasion far surpassed all the other arts, since it brought all things under its sway, not by force, but by their own will."
ing what these are in themselves, the orator can gain a reputation for such knowledge; and whether, as a master in rhetoric, Gorgias would teach a scholar justice, who should come to him unacquainted with its nature. Gorgias has here to reply, either that there is no need of knowing anything about right and wrong in order to be an orator, and that, too, when he is perpetually employed upon questions involving right and wrong; or that he will teach his students their nature. He chooses the latter alternative, although the previous conversation shows that, to be consistent, he should have taken the former. Socrates now forces him to admit that he who knows justice is just. The rhetorician, then, under his training, must be a just man. But he had before said, that the art might be used for a good or a bad purpose,—to favor justice or injustice. Socrates brings forward this inconsistency as needing explanation, when this, the first part of the dialogue, is broken off by the impatience of Polus. (—461, B.)

There are two remarks which this portion of the discussion seems to demand. The first is, that, while it ends with an argumentum ad hominem, and with fastening upon Gorgias an inconsistency of no importance in itself to philosophical truth, it is not without its use. It shows how little the Sophists had reflected upon the nature of their arts, and how little they cared for truth or justice.* The

* Several passages of Phædrus, a work which treats of the worthlessness of rhetoric when not dependent on philosophy, may be adduced in illustration of what is here said. On 260, A, Phædrus tells Socrates that he hears the remark made, "that one who wishes to be an orator has no need to learn true justice, but only what may seem to be such to the multitude, who will exercise the office of jurors ; nor the truly good or beautiful, but only the seeming; for from these sources, and not from the truth, persuasion is derived." And, again, 272, D: "They say that there is no need of making so much of this, or of taking such a long, round-about
art itself, having in its own nature no reference to truth, but merely to the force of arguments upon the minds of others, and, at the same time, being employed in discussions concerning what is good and just, could in its best estate be as easily used against truth as in its behalf. But as it then was, it was based on sophistical principles and opposed to sound philosophy, its aim being something else than the greatest good. It was an art of acting on the ignorant, and of acting on them by pretending to knowledge. It must use such arguments as were suited to persuade the masses, who are not capable of taking the true philosophical view of things. What arguments could a person ignorant of justice use before an audience also ignorant, when the question related to justice, but such as almost necessarily mislead?

course to reach it. For the orator, who would be well versed in his art, (they maintain,) has no occasion to possess true views in regard to just or true actions, or in regard to men that are such either by nature or education. In fact, they assert that no one in the courts cares for the truth about these things, but only for that which is adapted to persuade. And this is the probable,” etc. Plato goes on to illustrate this by an example drawn from Tisias, one of the rhetoricians. If a brave man of weak body should have beaten and stripped of his garment a strong but cowardly man, and the case be brought before a court, neither ought to tell the truth; the coward ought to deny that the weak but courageous man was alone in beating him; while the other should ask, “how he, being so deficient in bodily strength, could have attempted it.” He then shows how weak, at its very foundation, that unphilosophical rhetoric is which is built on merely empiric rules; since he who knows what is true must know, also, what is like truth, and he who studies the classes of human minds with philosophy for his guide will know by what arguments each class of minds is most influenced. “But,” he adds, very nobly, “the virtuous man will not study this art of rhetoric for the sake of speaking and acting before men, but that he may be able to speak in a manner acceptable to the divinities, and to act so as to please them to the extent of his power.”

Plato's opinion of advocates, which was none of the highest, may be found in Book XI. of the Laws, at the end.
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But in the second place, if the art taught or presupposed the teaching of justice, its scholars would be a very different sort of persons from what even Gorgias allows that they were. For he who has learned justice is just. This looks to us like sophistry on the part of Socrates himself, as if the knowledge and practice of virtue could not exist apart. But whatever of untruth there is in the proposition, it was not meant for sophistry; it is a part of the system of Socrates and Plato. In the view of Socrates, and in that of Plato at first, all virtue could be resolved into science; all vice into ignorance.* Nor was the reason voluntarily ignorant, but merely deceived by the conceit of knowledge, and false opinion. When this was removed, and knowledge took possession of the mind, there was no cause why he who knew should not act in conformity with his knowledge.

In the second part of the dialogue, Polus takes his master’s place. He begins by complaining that Socrates had unfairly involved Gorgias in inconsistency. Gorgias had said that he would teach justice to a scholar ignorant of it, only in accommodation to the prejudices of mankind, who regarded instruction upon that point as of high importance. A discussion now arises, in which Socrates explains in part his views of rhetoric. It is not an art, but a knack, or practical observation of rules aiming to produce pleasure. It belongs to a nature which is adroit, courageous, and skilled in mingling with mankind. It is reducible to flattery; like the arts of cookery, cosmetics, and sophistry, being mere routine or practice, not guided by the laws of absolute truth, and

* Comp. Aristot. Ethic. Eudem. 1. 5, ἱπποκάτως (Σωκράτης) ἔστι οὖν τὰς ἀρετὰς, ἥτις ἄμα συμβαίνει μηδὲν τινί δίκαιον καὶ μηδὲν δίκαιον. See, also, Xen. Memorab. 3. 9. 5. Plato appears at first to have entertained the same opinion, but afterwards made virtue to consist in this: that the faculties of the soul respectively perform their parts, and are all obedient to the reason.
aiming at gratification. The real arts relating to the soul and body are two, with a twofold division each; of which the one,—the political art, or that which conserves the public good,—when it seeks to secure that good, is called the legislative art, when to restore it, is called justice. To these two arts, two touching the body correspond: gymnastics, aiming to preserve bodily good or health, and medicine, to bring it back. To these four arts four arts of flattery answer, and, acting adroitly without settled principles, slip into their places. These are sophistry, answering to legislation, rhetoric to justice, cosmetics to gymnastics, and cookery to medicine. Aiming at pleasure, and not at the highest good, these false arts attract and deceive the ignorant and thoughtless. And, being incapable of exact limits from their want of a scientific basis, they run into one another. (−466.)

Polus is displeased at this brand of flattery put upon rhetoric, and asks if good orators are so regarded in the states where they live. Socr. "They are not regarded at all." Pol. "How not regarded? Have they not the greatest power in their countries?" To this Socrates replies by admitting that they do what seems good to them, but denies that they do what they wish. In explaining this, he shows that what men wish is not what they do, but that for the sake of which they do it. It is a good in prospect which moves to action. Unless, then, the great power which enables orators to dispose, as Polus says, of the lives and fortunes of others, is a good, it is not what they wish. And if to have great power is a good, orators cannot have it, seeing they use that which they call such as an evil. They may do, then, what seems good to them, without either really having great power, or doing what they wish. (−469.) Polus sneers at these views expressed by Socrates. "Just as though you would not choose the liberty of doing what seemed good to you in the state, and would feel no envy if you saw one killing
whom he liked, or stripping him of his goods, or binding him.” Socrates earnestly declares, that he regards such a one, if doing this unjustly, as most wretched, and to do wrong as the greatest of evils. Polus is surprised that he should think so, and affirms, that to be wronged is a greater evil than to wrong; and that the possession of supreme power in the state — which is won by the orator — is to be desired as enabling him to do what he thinks fit, — to wrong, if he pleases, and to keep others from wronging him. Upon this, Socrates makes his opponent own that uncontrolled power in the state, if it is a good, may also be an evil. It cannot, therefore, be a good in itself, and something beyond it must determine when it is good and when the contrary. This criterion is, that it shall be justly or unjustly exercised. (-470, C.) Polus responds in a superior tone to this, as going against the common sense of men, and appeals rhetorically to the prosperity of Archelaus, king of Macedon, which was begun by atrocious crimes. If you wish, says Socrates, to support yourself by examples and by testimony, you will have no want of them. But I shall not consider the matter settled until I force you, with whom I hold the argument, to acknowledge that the unjust man is unhappy, or you compel me to the contrary admission. (-472, D.)

The discussion during the rest of this part of the dialogue embraces two points, arising out of the proposition, that it is better to wrong than to be wronged: — 1. That the unjust man is, in every event, miserable; and, 2. That if he escapes punishment for his crimes, he is more miserable than if he suffers. And hence no man can prefer doing wrong to being wronged, which Polus says is the choice of all men.

1. Polus acknowledges that it is baser (αἰσχρόν, more ugly) to wrong, but denies that it is more evil (κακίον). This leads to an analysis of the ideas of the beautiful and the base (τὸ καλὸν, τὸ αἰσχρὸν), in which Socrates shows that
a thing is beautiful owing to its utility or pleasure, or both; and base, owing to its evil or pain. But to wrong—which has been owned to be baser than to be wronged—is not more painful; therefore it must be more evil. Neither Polus, then, nor any other man, as desirous of the highest good, can prefer the more evil and base to the less. (-476.)

2. Polus admits, that to be the object of justice (διδώνας δίκην) and to be justly punished for wrong-doing are the same; that a just punisher supposes one who suffers what is just, and that everything just is θαλόν as far as it is just. If, then, what is suffered is just, it is θαλόν, and if so, either useful or pleasant. But suffering for doing wrong is not pleasant; therefore, it is useful or good. This goodness consists in removing pravity of soul, which, of all kinds of badness, is the greatest. Justice, the medicine of the soul, effects this removal: hence, to escape from punishment is more miserable than to be punished. It is better to go unhealed of a disease, than not cured of this inward severer malady. And not to seek this cure from justice is like fearing the pain necessary for attaining to health. (-480.)

If these things are so, of what use is rhetoric? For if it place a man in a situation where he can wrong more easily than be wronged, it does him so much the more harm; and if he be enabled by it to escape the punishment of his misdeeds, again it does him so much the more harm. If it help him to punish an enemy, it benefits that enemy,—an object at which he is far from aiming. He cannot even defend himself against an enemy without doing the enemy this good.* (-481, C.)

The end reached in this second division of the Gorgias is to set forth in a clear light that a pretended art, like the rhetoric of Gorgias and Polus, which has the gratification

* See Buttmann’s view, in the note on 480, E.
of others, as well as one's own, in view, fails, by running against the law of right, to attain to anything good or useful, defeats its own objects, and falls into inconsistency with itself. It will not be doubted by the reader, that the moral tone of this discussion is worthy of the highest praise, and the conclusion most gratifying, considering it is formed by a heathen. But there are several places in the stream of the argument where we may fancy that we see shallows, or touch upon the ground. In the first place, we may question the accuracy of the comparison of the legislative art and justice with the self-styled arts of sophistry and rhetoric. What is the truth of the distinction, and what sphere must we suppose that Plato assigns to rhetoric? In reply, it must be owned, I think, that Plato fluctuates a little,* owing to his analogy between rhetoric and medicine, on the one hand, and between rhetoric and justice, on the other. If we press the resemblance to medicine, rhetoric must be confined to the reparation of injustice, and restoration of the public health. If we follow the parallel with justice, rhetoric must embrace within its limits every case where the question of conformity to the rule of right is involved; the rule of true right being laid down at the outset by the legislative art, and that of seeming right or gratification, in the place of justice, by sophistry. In this part of the dialogue, the narrower notion of rhetoric, determined by comparing it with medicine, seems to prevail in Plato's mind: the art has to do with the courts. And in this Plato was fully justified by the practice of writers on this art, who all, as Aristotle affirms (Rhet. 1. 1. 10), said nothing about the popular assembly, and confined their rules of art to the judicial

* Comp. Aristides (2. 377, Dindorf.), τοιε μεν γι, φησι, τωντων ιστην, ἡ μακάρις, μέτωξ καὶ σοφίτης, τοιε δ' αὐ τιν σοφιστικὴν κοινεῖν ιδιαὶ τῆς ἕπαρισκῆς καὶ διαφέρειν. See 517, A, note.
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(περὶ τοῦ δικύζεσθαι πάντες πειρώντας τεχνολογεῖν). But in the latter division of this work, Plato treats the orator and the political man as the same, which accords with the analogy between rhetoric and justice. This is the truer view of the subject, for otherwise the assembly of the people, where there lay open a wide field for false art, must be unoccupied.* We must recollect that Plato himself speaks of the boundaries of rhetoric as uncertain; and, also, that he is not opposing the bare "art of inventing and arranging arguments," but a sophistical art opposed to truth.†

In the second place, we may doubt whether the analysis of the beautiful into the pleasant and the good, that is, the useful, and of the opposite to the beautiful into the painful and the harmful, is correctly made out, and, consequently, whether the principles of the latter part of the discourse be-

* With more justice still, Socrates, in Phædr. 261, A, regards it "as the art of bending men's minds by words without respect to the occasion, not only in courts and other public assemblies, but also in private meetings; being the same in nature, whether small or great affairs are in question." To which, in reply, Phædrus says, that the rules of art are used in speaking and writing when suits at law are brought, and in speaking when addresses are made to the Assembly; but that he has not heard of a wider application of rhetorical precepts.

† Whately's definition. Aristotle's is, δύναμις ποιεῖ ξικαστῷ τοῦ Θεωρητοῦ τό εἰς ἐνεχώμενο πειθαν. It is worthy of remark how Aristotle alludes to this dialogue without naming it. He begins with saying, that rhetoric is ἀντιστροφος τῇ διαλεκτικῇ. In speaking of its abuse, he says, "It tries to put on the garb (ὑποδύται) of the political art"; and, soon afterwards, ἰστὶ γὰρ μὲν τὶ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς. Comp. 464, B, C.—This conduct of rhetoricians is ascribed to ignorance, or vanity, or other human reasons (1. 2. 7); and doubtless he joined with Plato in condemning the sophistical rhetoric of the preceding age. (Comp. 1. 1. 3.) But when he says that the judge himself ought to know whether a thing is just or not, and not learn it from the parties, whose only duty is to discuss the fact, he must be regarded not only as opposing Plato's views (454, B), but as condemning the Athenian and every other system where the judges were ignorant.

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between Socrates and Polus, true as we feel them to be, are not built upon the sand. If I am not deceived, Plato does not here intend to enter into a close dialectical exposition of what is meant by τὸ καλόν, the beautiful. But, still, his definition is exact enough for the argument and the purposes of the dialogue. The attempts of others to analyze this idea prove this. Whether the term beautiful is or is not applied on account of pleasure derived from contemplating the object so called, or on account of the perception of a certain fitness, implying a relation of the parts to the whole, and of the whole to some good or pleasant end; — whatever we may decide to be the primary and essential characteristic of beautiful objects, it is sufficient, I think, for the argument to say, that pleasure or utility, or both, invariably attend on objects so called, and the author was not required to stop and subject this idea to a closer examination. It is also to be remarked, that the good and the useful are treated here as identical.* Upon this point we need only say, that it is assumed that whatever is good tends to promote the perfection or well-being of the person; in other words, is useful in reaching a good end.

Again, it may be thought that the last argument, concerning the good or utility of punishment, renders it necessary that punishment should reform the offender, whereas Plato, in this work and elsewhere, speaks of incorrigible criminals.†

* Comp. Repub. 2. 379, B. "Is not God truly good, and ought he not to be spoken of as such? Certainly. But nothing good is harmful. Is it? I think not. Can what is not harmful, then, do harm? By no means. Does that which does no harm do any evil (κακός τι)? No, no more this than the other. But whatever does no evil can be the cause of no evil. Is it so? Assuredly. But what? is the good useful (ἀξίωμα)? Yes. Is it, then, the cause of well-being (ίστοργία)? Yes." Etc.

† On the design and efficacy of punishments in society, a number of
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If to suffer δίκαια = to suffer καλά = to suffer ὠφέλιμα or ἀγαθά, can the criminal help being profited? and does not passages from the Laws give us Plato's views. One is found in Book XI. 934, A. "Not suffering for the sake of his crime, — for what he has done can never be undone, — but in order that for the future he and they who see him suffering justice (δίκαιονίμενον) may either altogether hate wrong-doing, or, at least, that a considerable part of so great an evil may cease." Another occurs in Book IX. 854, D. "For, perhaps, if he suffer this penalty, he may become better, by being rendered more sober-minded (σωφρονίσθης). For no penalty which is inflicted by law is inflicted for evil (γινεσθαι Ἰτι κακῷ), but has, for the most part, one of two effects: it improves him who is punished, or, at least, checks the growth of his depravity." He then goes on to speak of incurable offenders doing good as examples. On page 862, E, after remarking on the excellence of legal expedients by which transgressors shall be made "to hate wrong, and to love or not hate the nature of right," he continues thus: — "When a lawgiver finds men incurable, he will provide some law and penalty for them, being assured that, for such persons themselves, it is not the better part to live, and that, by withdrawing from life, they will confer a twofold benefit on others: they will serve as an example to others to deter from evil, and will rid the state of bad inhabitants. Thus [that is, on these principles], in the case of such persons must the lawgiver establish death as the penalty for crimes, and in no other way."

In Book V. 728, C, he speaks of becoming like the wicked, and being separated from the good, as the greatest penalties for wrong-doing. "Though this is not penalty (δίκη), — since justice and penalty are always beautiful, — but vengeance, which is suffering attendant on iniquity. And as well he who has suffered this vengeance is miserable, as he who avoids suffering it; the one, because there is no cure for him; the other, because he is lost, that many may be saved." In these passages, the end of punishment is to cure and deter, or, at least, such is its result. And with these may be compared such places as Repub. 1. 335, where it is said, that a just man cannot harm even an enemy and a bad man. It is true that the notion of harm is confined there to making such a man worse, but the reasoning appears to include pain if unproductive of good. Cousin, in his Preface to Gorgias, contends very brilliantly, and in some degree justly, that the right to punish in society is derived, not from the good effects of
the argument look like a dead algebraic formula, more than like living moral truth? This difficulty must attend the argument at the first view of it. Nor can it be removed, unless we allow δίκαια and καλά to be what they are, not only in themselves, but also in the apprehension of the sufferer, while ὁφελέμα is simply objective. The argument now becomes tenable. Punishment can be a good to none who do not receive it as just; nor can it, in the arrangements of this world, fail of being more or less of a good to him who feelingly owns that it is rightly inflicted. But there may be some who do not own this, and they are the incorrigible.

Polus being reduced to silence, Callicles steps forth as the third champion of the arts of show. He begins with doubting whether Socrates is in earnest in maintaining these principles, which would throw human life and conduct off from their old foundations. To this Socrates answers, that he follows wherever philosophy shows the way, just as implicitly as Callicles obeys the popular will, and that, before he can change his tone, he must hear her strike a different key. In reply, Callicles says that it was not philosophical reasoning, but trick, by which Polus was beaten. He had made the incautious admission, that to do wrong is baser (αιχείον) than to be wronged. It is so, indeed, by law, but not by nature. This ambiguity it is between the naturally

punishment upon the criminal or others, but from the duty of punishing, which is based on the instinctive feeling of desert of evil for doing wrong. He adds, “This theory is, without doubt, only indicated in Plato, but it occurs in a number of places, briefly but positively expressed.” I could wish that the learned translator had proved this assertion, which his familiar acquaintance with Plato must have rendered easy. Doubtless Plato could not get rid of the conviction written on the heart, that the sinner ought to suffer, or of the tendency to view suffering as a debt owed to justice. But did not Plato try to go further back than this conviction, and search into reason of the right which it admits?
and the legally beautiful or right which enables crafty reasoners to gain their points. When Polus spoke of that which is legally base, Socrates shuffled the natural into its room. But by nature nothing is baser which is not more harmful. The natural feelings of men, which, when injured, instantly rise against the aggressor, show, that to be wronged is no property of a man. The legal definitions of base and wrong deeds are introduced by the many and the weak, in order to keep the strong in check. But herein law is opposed to nature, which teaches that the better ought to have more* than the worse, and the more powerful

* πλοιοκτίου. πλοιοκτία is substantially selfishness, to which cause in a very striking passage Plato ascribes all the wrong actions of men. Leges, V. 731, D: πλοιοκτίου δι μικροτον, etc. "The greatest of all evils is inherent in the souls of the mass of men, for which they excuse themselves and seek no deliverance from it. This is what the vulgar saying implies, that every man by nature loves himself, and that it is right so to do. But in truth the cause of all errors in every case is to be ascribed to too great self-love. For the lover becomes blind in regard to the object beloved, so that he judges wrongly of the beautiful, the good, and the just, thinking that he ought to honor what pertains to himself before the truth. The man who will be truly great ought not to love himself or his own things, but what is just and right, whether pertaining to his own actions or another man's. From this fault it comes, that all think their own ignorance wisdom. Whence, though we know next to nothing, we think we know everything; and, being unwilling to intrust to others that which we are not well skilled to do, we are forced to make mistakes in doing it. Therefore ought every man to avoid undue self-love, and to seek out some one better than himself, allowing no shame to prevent his taking such a course."

In another fine passage of the same work (IX. 875, B), the necessity of law is partly ascribed to the selfishness of man. δευτερον δι, etc. "In the second place, should any one in theory properly comprehend that this is so [that is, that the political art ought to care for the community more than for the individual, and that it is for the interests of both to have the community, rather than the individual, well arranged], and then rule a state with irresponsible and autocratical power, yet can he not adhere to this persuasion,
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than the less powerful. The "good old plan, that they should get who have the power," is the law of nature — ay, and of right — in animals and man, as they show whenever they can seize the occasion. All this is very evident to the man of the world. But philosophy makes a man blind to these truths of common sense, and, if pursued beyond the requirements of education, is the ruin of a man. It unfitts him for civil and political life; it is unbecoming for a full-grown man, who should be practical and mix with his fellows; it makes one slink away to a corner with two or three disciples; and, if attacked by foes in the courts, he cannot help himself, but falls into their hands, as defenceless prey, to be slain at their pleasure. (-486, D.)

In this brilliant passage we see described the contempt felt by the vulgar politician for the true philosopher, and the sympathy of such a man with false and sophistical principles. He aims at pleasure rather than good, and the Sophists give their maxims for the prudential attainment of the same end. There is a plain allusion, also, to the behavior of Socrates at his trial, and to the charges against Socrates and Plato, — especially the latter, — of neglecting the service of the state. The ground which Callicles takes is evidently the only one which can be taken against Socrates,*

and through life keep the interests of the community foremost in the state, and his private interests subordinate; but his mortal nature will ever drive him into selfishness and the pursuit of his own ends (πλεονεξίαν καὶ ἰδιαπέφαγια), since it blindly shuns pain and seeks pleasure. Thus it will give a higher place to pleasure and pain than to the more just and good; and, by producing darkness in itself, will at length plunge the man himself and the state into all sorts of evils."

* The philosopher Archelaus, who was, perhaps, an Athenian and a scholar of Anaxagoras, taught (although he may not have meant by his words what the Sophists taught) τὸ δίκαιον ἑαυτὶ καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν οὗ φύσι ἄλλῳ ἀναλαμβάνειν. This principle is admirably ridiculed in the Clouds, 1421, seq. Pla-
but it is equally the foundation of an attack against all morality. If the idea of right is admitted, it must be supreme; and pleasure, if opposed to it, must bow before it. The only escape is to show that pleasure is never inconsistent with the right and the good. But right, as fixed by law, restrains the individual, and is therefore inconsistent with self-gratification. Hence the advocate for pleasure must yield, unless he can show that natural right— which is really such—is another thing from what the opinions of men, expressed in their laws, call such, and that it authorizes selfish indulgence. But if this be natural right, it contains no moral element, implies no relation of one man to others, and sanctions obedience to every desire which looks towards pleasure.

Socrates first answers with exquisite irony to the maxim of Callicles, that the better ought, by natural right, to have more than the worse. If his opponent means, as he admits that he does, by the better (βελτίων), the superior and stronger, then, since the many are stronger than the one, as is shown by their enforcing their laws, they have a natural right to make laws for the one. Now they say, in their laws, that to wrong is baser than to be wronged; and hence, according to Callicles, it must naturally be so. (-489, B.)

2. Callicles now shifts his ground, and makes the better the more intelligent. If so, replies Socrates, and if the more intelligent ought to have more than another of that to which his intelligence relates, then, in a mixed collection of men, a physician ought to have more food and drink than others, while yet the greater portion thus assigned to

to refers to it in a striking passage, Leges, X. 890. The discussion with Thrasymachus, in the first part of the Republic, attacks a kindred principle, and may be read here to advantage. Hobbes went to the length of any of the ancient Sophists on this point. See Mr. Hallam's Critique, Hist. of Lit., Vol. III. 365–382, especially the close of the chapter.
him may do him extreme harm. In short, there is no end to the absurdities which will follow from the principle, that intelligence should move in an orbit around desire and not around good. (−491, B.) 3. Callicles forsakes this definition, and the better now become the more intelligent and courageous in politics,—such as are capable of governing.* Socrates here changes his point of attack, and takes a position nearer to the enemy’s inner works. For whatever definition Callicles gives, to have more than others (πλεονεκτεῖν), or self-gratification, is the centre of the system, and must be laid bare in all its deformity. Do you mean, says he, by governing, governing one’s self? At this the man of the world sneers, and pronounces a man’s well-being to consist in having as large desires as possible, with the courage and intelligence to fulfil them. These qualities the many do not possess, whence, to hide their weakness, they praise self-restraint and blame incontinence. But it was not so from the beginning; the great and mighty of old acted by another rule; they regarded justice and self-restraint as base and evil, and got all they could from their enemies for themselves and their friends. Good and pleasure are the same. (−492, C.)

Socrates answers this in two ways. He first tries, by selecting some examples of low bodily pleasures, to awaken Callicles to the consciousness of the amazing baseness and evil which may attend a life of enjoyment.† The illustrations which form the long prologue of this part show that a most important topic is begun. (−495, B.) In the second place, he searches for some tests of the nature of pleasure,

* This may be regarded as the notion of the ἀγαθός, the optimates, which was somewhat in vogue at the time, only a little altered.
† Comp. Philebus (an important dialogue, in which the nature of the good and the pleasant is closely examined), 46, A, B.
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which shall show that it differs from good. To do this, he makes Callicles allow that courage, science, and pleasure are not the same; and that ἐν πράττεν and κακῶς πράττεν are opposites, so that one cannot be in both states at once, any more than he can be well and ill at once. The same may be said of weakness and strength, of swiftness and slowness, of good and bad, of happiness and misery. But pleasure and pain can coexist in the same person at the same time; as, for instance, thirst, a pain, exists, until drinking, which is pleasant, slakes it.* Thus pleasure wants an essential characteristic of good, and pain of evil. (−497, E.) Another test follows, grounded on the admission of Callicles, that the manly and intelligent are good. A foolish boy or man may be glad, and so may a wise one.† In war a coward is as glad, if not more so, when the enemy goes away, than the man of courage. Then the coward is as good as the courageous man, or even better, and yet bad by the concession of Callicles. (−499, B.) In other words, if good is relative to desire, as such, then its absolute nature ceases, it is in a perpetual flux, and alters with every change of desire or character.‡

Callicles now admits that some pleasures are evil and some good. He thus overthrows his argument, for if pleas-

* Comp. Cic. de Fin. 2. 3. 9.
† Comp. Philebus, 55, B: “And, besides, to be compelled to say that a man who feels grief is bad when he feels it, though he be the best of all men, and that one who is glad, the more he is so, at the time when he is so, is the more virtuous.”
‡ In a fine passage, Leges, II. 663, Plato teaches that the good and bad judge of pleasure subjectively, or relatively to their own character. He then inquires whose judgment is to be received, as accordant with the truth, and answers, that of the good. Neither the lawgiver, then, should ever separate the pleasant from the right, the good, and the beautiful, nor any one else engaged in educating the young.

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ure is in itself a good, evil cannot be affirmed of it. Socrates seizes upon the acknowledgment, and carries him back to a point debated in the first part of the dialogue,—that the good being the end of all actions, the pleasant must be sought for its sake, and not *vice versa*. (-500, A.) Now to know what pleasures are good and what evil needs an artist,—a man who has studied the invariable absolute principles of true good and right;—whilst the knowledge how to gratify, acquired by observation, and resting on no unchanging truth, has nothing of the nature of true art, and to apply that knowledge calls simply for an exercise of memory.

If this be so, we have a standard by which we may try the pursuits of men; and, according to this standard, must condemn the music which is in vogue at the public contests, dithyrambic poetry, and even tragedy itself, with all its lofty pretensions. But how is it with rhetoric and the orators or statesmen? Do they neglect their own or the public interests? Do they seek to benefit or gratify the community? To this Callicles responds, that the question admits of a double answer; the orators of the present day seek to please the people, and follow their will, but he thinks that Miltiades, Themistocles, Cimon, and Pericles were good men, and aimed at the highest public good. (-503, D.) This Socrates denies, and, to make the matter clearer, goes at some length into the motives which should influence the good orator,—the true political artist. As the physician has health in view, so has he the health of the community, which consists in justice and temperance* (σωφροσύνη, self-

* For σωφροσύνη, comp. Repub. 4. 430, D. It is there compared to a concord and harmony, and called κόσμος τις καὶ ἓδενως τιμώς καὶ ἴσως μετανοι ἵγνατος. This κόσμος consists in the subjugation of the worse part of the soul to the better. Kritter observes (2. 474) that the expression σωφροσύνη
restraint, soundness of mind in regard to all pleasures and excess). Instead of flattering them and following popular desires, such a politician will restrain and chastise the people. (-505, C.) This is further enforced in a most important and admirable passage, by pointing out that the ideas of true good, of virtue, of order, of self-restraint or orderliness, of justice and piety (or the observance of the laws of moral order), of courage, of the well-being of the individual and his happiness, are closely and necessarily connected; while the opposites of these are linked together with the pursuit of pleasure. Neither a man, then, nor a state, which would be happy, can have any end in view inconsistent with justice and temperance. If this be admitted, everything will follow which Socrates had maintained, and his three adversaries had controverted. The orator ought to be just, and to know justice; otherwise he cannot practise or promote it. To be wronged is better than to wrong, for it involves no violation of justice; and to be punished for wrong-doing, than to go unpunished, for it reconciles the soul to justice. The wonder of Callicles, when Socrates defended these latter points, was misplaced. Furthermore, by acting on such principles, he should help himself and his friends, to do which Callicles pronounced him unable. For by living according to these principles, he would avoid the basest and the greatest evil. (-509, C.) But cannot a man, it may be asked, gain the advantage arising from not being wronged, as well as that arising from not wronging others? For the latter, an art is needed. As no one does wrong because he prefers it, but because he thinks to gain some good by it, that art must inculcate

is vaguely used by Plato, especially in his early dialogues; and that the definition in the passages of the Repub. which he cites (4. 430, u. s., and 3. 389, D) almost reduces its notion to that of δίκαιότητα.
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the nature of true good; for example, must distinguish it from self-gratification. Is there, also, an art to avoid being wronged? The only way of preventing injuries in all cases is, to have supreme power yourself, or to be a friend of the supreme power; — for instance, if the people is that power, to gain its friendship by catering for its desires and following all its whims. But if this is done, the other and greater good must slip out of your hands. Nor is it of any use to say, that, if you do not thus conciliate the sovereign power in the state, you may lose your life. For it is not a man's business in this world to seek to save his life, nor ought the art of rhetoric to make higher pretensions because it saves life than the art of the pilot or the engineer, by each of which the life of those intrusted to its care is preserved, no matter whether it be better for such persons to live or to die. A man's part is to leave it to God how long he shall live, and to find out on what principles he shall pass the term of life given to him; whether on those of the flattering politician, which will involve the loss of the greatest good, or on those of the man who sacrifices pleasure to the really good and useful. (-514, A.) And the same will apply to the management of a state. Hence the apprenticeship of political life must be in philosophy, which reveals the good and just to those who search for them; and the true politician, contrary to what Callicles had maintained, must be a philosopher. A man who seeks to play the important part of a leader in the state must first ask himself whether, in his private capacity, he has cultivated justice and temperance, and made men better; for the aim in the public and in the private sphere is one and the same. With this in mind, we may return to the four great Athenians, and bring their characters to the touchstone. Did Pericles make the Athenians better? or did they not rather become idle, cowardly, talkative, and covetous through the measures of his admin-
istration? And did not those very Athenians, near the close of his long political life, show their degeneracy, by ungratefully bringing against him a charge of peculation? * The other three met with even worse treatment at the hands of those whom, if skilful politicians, they must have wished and known how to make better. Their ill-success is a proof that they understood not the true art of rhetoric, — that of persuading men to aim at the good, rather than the pleasant; and, indeed, that they were ignorant of the false art, also, if that enables its possessors, as is alleged, to sail in safety amid the storms of politics. (–517, A.)

In this remarkable attack on four of the greatest men of Athens,—men certainly not inferior, in any point, to hundreds of public characters who have been extolled by Christian historians,—we discover an exasperation of feeling in Plato, produced by the unjust fate of his master, and by the wide difference between his own political views and those of his native land. Nor can his character in general be freed from the charge of fault-finding. To this he was led by that uncommonly high standard which the nature of his mind compelled him to form; and, dwelling aloof, as he did, from the turmoil of politics, in contemplative retirement, he could not estimate all the practical difficulties which even a perfect statesman must encounter from a spoiled and self-willed people. But if we strike out what is due to these prejudices, we must find something of justice left in his blame of “the four.” The very fact that he draws a broad line between them and Aristides (526, B) is presumptive proof of a real difference. They were high-minded leaders of parties, who humored the people in many of its wishes for the sake of keeping power, and sought the

* See Appendix, No. II.

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greatness, but not the real well-being, of their country. Had they

"to divinity aspired,
Not on the breath of popular applause,
But through dependence on the sacred laws,
Framed in the schools where wisdom dwelt retired,
Intent to trace the ideal path of right,"

had they been philosophical statesmen, aiming at justice and the highest good, the allies of Athens would have been less oppressed; the people would not have grown worse so fast; they themselves would have impressed something of their own virtue upon the state, and been less likely to suffer unjustly from those to whom they had done good.

But is it not strange that Plato should reproach these politicians with their ill-success, as a proof of their want of virtuous statesmanship? This is the point which Aristides, the Sophist, presses most effectively in his long and wearisome defence of "the four." If ill-success is to be the test, what is to be argued from the two reprobate companions of Socrates, Critias and Alcibiades (Aristid. de Quatuorviris, 2. 322, Dindorf., de Rhet. 2. 111)? What from Plato's abortive attempts to make a man out of Dionysius of Syracuse (302–304, 324)? Nor is Plato, the Sophist goes on to allege, consistent with himself, since he praises Pericles, in the Phædrus, for his rhetorical skill.* In the Apology (31, E), he makes Socrates affirm that no one can be safe who opposes any populace, or strives to prevent injustice in a state, unless he avoid public life and live as a private citizen. (343, 353, 366.) And, in our dialogue itself, he pronounces safety to arise from being like the sovereign power, or from having supreme power in one's own hands. Again, he says: "I should be a fool not to know

* Comp. Appendix, No. II.
that at Athens any man may suffer anything." And yet
the fact, that these statesmen were not safe from the effects
of popular ingratitude, is his proof that they did not oppose
the people, or strive to prevent injustice.

How the reasonableness or consistency of Plato, as to this
point, can be defended, I do not see. Ill-success could
have the force which he gives it only in case the influence
of the four men outweighed the opposing influences of all
other causes acting at their time upon the opposite side. In
general, however, it may be said that politicians who com-
plain of ingratitude are only reaping what they have sown.
They have tickled the nice palate of the people until their
cookery pleases no longer; and now, by a rotation in office,
which was right in their eyes until they came into power,
and wrong afterwards, they are driven from the kitchen by
new hands, who pay a price for the situation, and have
learned some newer arts of falsehood. It was, perhaps, the
sight of such flatterers of the Athenian *demus* fallen into
disgrace, that led Plato beyond the bounds of truth, in im-
puting all the ill-success of politicians to their want of cor-
rect principles,—to their aiming at pleasure rather than
good. Being preoccupied by this partial view, and having
also in his mind the pretensions of the Sophists,—the
teachers of such politicians,—that they could make men
good, he loses sight of the great truth, that, in a corrupt
age, a good man must suffer ill from those whom he tries to
benefit.

But to return to the dialogue:—When Socrates had ex-
pressed such an opinion of these four great statesmen, Cal-
licles replied, that no one of his own contemporaries could
compare with them in the works they had done for the state.
In answer, Socrates admits that they had shown uncommon
ability in gratifying the desires of the people. They had
created the ships, walls, and docks of Athens, but they dif-
ferred in no respect from the politicians of the day in the motives of their administration. If the highest good of the state should be the statesman’s aim, they could no more claim this title, than a cook or a writer on cookery could claim to rank with the master of gymnastics in preserving the bodily health. And as such persons, if intrusted with the care of the body, would be blamed when the maladies arising from luxury should come on, so will the politician, who seeks to please rather than to profit, be punished for political evils which he or his predecessors have occasioned. The head of a state may not complain of ingratitude; for it is by his management that the character of those who compose it has grown worse. And the same holds good of the Sophists. They pretend that they can make their disciples better; and yet find fault with these very scholars for keeping back the price of tuition from them, and for other acts of unthankfulness. But what good, demands Callicles, can you say of such worthless men as the Sophists? They are the same with rhetoricians, answers Socrates, or nearly so; only somewhat above them, because they deal with principles which rhetoricians merely apply. If, now, their pretensions are well founded, they, as well as politicians, ought to fear no ingratitude; they should stipulate for no fees of instruction beforehand, trusting to the generosity of those pupils whom they had purged from vice.* (−521, A.)

Having thus compared the arts which aim at pleasure with those which aim at good, Socrates makes a personal

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* Schleiermacher thinks that this is aimed at Aristippus, who, by taking pay for his instructions, brought reproach upon the Socratic philosophers. The best account of the remunerations given to the Sophists which I have met with is contained in Welcker’s Essay on Prodicus, his Life and Writings, in Welcker and Nāke’s Rheinisches Museum, 1. 22, seq., and since reprinted in his “Kleine Schriften,” Part 2, p. 393, seq.
appeal to Callicles. "Which mode of serving the state do you now exhort me to follow; that of seeking its best interests, or that of catering for its desires?" Callicles persists in telling over the same story, that fidelity in doing good will make him suffer the loss of all things. Socrates acknowledges, with evident allusion to his trial and condemnation, that he is exposed to such dangers from bad men, and that he could say nothing in the court which would win him the favor of his judges. If he should urge, on his defence, that he had opposed the public will when it was base-ly clamorous for present gratification, that he had striven to make men good, and had their well-being in view, he would fare as a physician might fare before a jury of children with a cook for his accuser. What he called good, they called evil; what he called hurtful, they called pleasant. It was painful to be perplexed; and yet he must lead them through perplexity to truth. Would he not, then, before such judges, be himself perplexed, and at a loss for a defence? "And do you think, then," says Callicles again, "that it is well with a man who cannot help himself?" "Assured-ly," replies Socrates, "it would be very ill with me, if I could not give myself that help which has been shown to be truly such,—if I could not observe the rule of right in all my relations. Let a man show me that I am not seeking to help myself thus, and I shall be ashamed of my character, and be grieved if I need punishment. But if I die for want of the flattering art of rhetoric, I shall not be sorry. For no one who is a man, and has reason, fears death in itself, but rather to do wrong. For to go into the other world with a soul full of all manner of iniquity is the worst of evils." (523, A.)

Having thus brought the two principles of action to the confines of the two states of being, he closes very nobly, by presenting them in contrast beyond the grave. His views
are introduced as an explanation of the common *mythos* concerning a judgment after death; which, however, Plato scruples not to alter for his own purposes. The views are these:—The character formed by disregarding the good and right, and pursuing pleasure, must be lasting, while all the advantages it offers are temporary, being connected with the world and the wrong judgments of men. But, at death, men will come before a judge who will look at the bare soul, and give sentence according to its qualities. Among transgressors, there are some who are not gone too far in evil to be curable. For these, punishment, bitter as it must be, will prove a good. Others, having passed beyond the reach of a cure, will suffer eternally, as an example to all who shall behold them. Of this description, a large part will be tyrants and other men in power, who had on earth the greatest license to do evil. But if one of these, like Aristides, rises above the temptations of his station on earth, his reward will be so much the greater. The larger number, however, of those who receive rewards will be private persons; and, more especially, philosophers who had not mingled in public affairs. With this trial in view, Socrates asserts that he strives to bring his soul, in its most healthy condition, before the judge, and that he seeks to lead his fellow-men to do the same. And to this he now urges Cällicles, warning him that the trial then will be more serious than all earthly ones, and that, without such a preparation, he will be unable to help himself, but, speechless and perplexed, must submit to worse than earthly indignities. Cällicles, he continues, might despise such fables, and the truth they contain, if he could show anything better. But this, neither he, Polus, nor Gorgias had been able to do. They should, therefore, agree with Socrates, that to be, and not to seem to be, a good man is a good thing; that the next best thing is to become good by submitting to punishment;
that all flattery of one's self or others, of a few or a multitude, must be shunned; and that rhetoric, like everything else, must be used to promote the right, and that only. "Let us, then," he says in closing, "join together to live virtuously on such principles; then can we best apply ourselves to politics, when we are no longer afloat on the most momentous subjects. This is the only way to live well and to die well."

With respect to the close of the Gorgias, which must be counted among the finest passages in Greek, it may be observed that Plato shows elsewhere the same inclination to clothe in a mythical dress those truths which lie beyond the bounds of reason. It seems as if he felt the need of the venerable authority and positive assurances of a revelation upon such points, and resorted to the old traditions of his country as the best substitute which he could find, as having for their foundation real, though distorted, truth.* The mythus is something more than mere drapery, something more than a poetical fiction, which, with a beautifully plastic hand, he shapes into a form and meaning corresponding to his awakened moral sense. And yet the freedom with which he treats the mythus, and the readiness with which he alters its form on several occasions, prove that he accepted it only in its leading outlines as true; it was to him a μῦδος, and yet a μᾶλα καλὸς λόγος. It is found, also, at the close of the Phaedo and of the Republic. He who compares the three passages will perceive that they agree in affirming the rewards and punishments of another life, which are used, with all seriousness, as motives for living.

* This remark does not include those mythi which are of Plato's own invention. He was led to use them by his poetical temperament, and felt, perhaps, that the view suggested by a beautiful fable was as true as any which could be given; more true, because more beautiful, than if put into abstract propositions.
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well here below; and also in teaching that some criminals are healed by punishment, while others must suffer for ever without hope of a cure.* This Platonic view of the reme-

* Phædo, 113, E. "Those who are judged to be incurable on account of the enormity of their crimes, who have committed many and heinous sacrileges, or numerous unjust and lawless murders, or the like, these their appropriate destiny hurls into Tartarus, whence they never come forth." He then speaks of the punishment of those who have committed curable sins, in a passage too long to be inserted here, and then adds: "With respect to the mythus, to affirm positively that these things are as I have narrated them, is not the part of a reasonable man"; and then uses the truth taught in the mythus as a motive for virtuous action. In the Republic, the narrator of the mythus is represented as near a chasm (see Gorg. 526, B, note) in the ground, by the side of a person who asked another where Ardiaeus was. "Now this Ardiaeus was a tyrant in a Pamphylian city a thousand years before, and had slain his aged father and his elder brother, besides doing, as was said, many other unhallowed deeds. The person so asked replied, said the informant, 'He is not come, nor can he hereafter come hither.' Among the frightful spectacles that we saw, this was one, continued he: — When we were near the mouth of the chasm, and were expecting to go upwards, after enduring all the other things appointed, on a sudden we saw this Ardiaeus and others, nearly all of them tyrants; although some enormous transgressors among private persons were there also. When they thought that they should now go upwards (out of the chasm), the mouth would not let them pass, but uttered a bellowing sound whenever any such incurably wicked person, or any one who had not paid a sufficient penalty, endeavored to ascend. Thereupon, wild men, said he, all fiery to look upon, who stood by, when they heard the bellow, picked out and carried off a part of the transgressors; but Ardiaeus and others they bound hand and foot, and threw them down, and beat them hard, and dragged them along on one side of the road, scraping them upon thorns, while to the by-standers they told the reasons why these sinners suffered these things, and that they were drawn along to be plunged into Tartarus. There, said he, of all the fears many and various which fell upon us, this was the greatest, — lest, when each one was going upwards, the mouth should utter that bellow, and most gladly did each one hear no sound as he ascended." A conception worthy of the highest flights of Dante!
dial nature of punishment, in certain cases, even in another life, seems to have recommended the doctrine of purgatory to some of the Christian fathers.*

Having thus exhibited the argument of the Gorgias at some length, it will be in order for us to ask, What is the main subject of the dialogue? A question which it is almost as difficult to answer, in regard to some of the Platonic dialogues, as it would be to express the sum total of an evening's conversation among refined and intelligent persons: the delight you have felt, the instruction you have received, you are conscious of, and you carry away much in your memory; but it is hard to say what was the leading topic of the discourse, or whether there was any. The subject of the Gorgias is more easy to be perceived, and yet all have not been agreed concerning it. Olympiodorus (apud Routh) mentions three opinions besides his own: — Some say that it treats of rhetoric; others, of justice and injustice, considered especially in their relations to happiness; others still, absurdly enough, make it relate to the demiu-r-gus or divine builder of the world, on account of the mythus at the close. "But we say," continues the Platonic commentator, "that the scope is, to treat of the principles which lead men to political happiness." With the first of these opinions, Cousin and Stallbaum agree. The latter says, however, that "though the principal point of the discussion is to blame the civil and rhetorical art at that day in vogue, and to show that it could not attain to excellence without the knowledge and practice of philosophy," yet several other topics are closely united with this, as the difference of the just and the pleasant, the end of human actions, and the constancy of a good man in bearing evils and injuries. Nearly the same is the view taken by Ast. The Gorgias,

* Comp. Muenscher, Dogmengeschichte, Vol. II. § 298.
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saying he, "has a decidedly political tendency; and all the philosophical inquiries which it contains are intended to show, not only the unmeaning nature, but also the perniciousness, and, in fact, the profligacy, of the political art, when built on sophistry, that is, of the rhetoric there opposed." Another writer on the higher criticism of Plato, Socher, gives this dialogue a wider range. "The whole presents an arena, rising in three gradations. The prize of the contest is the better, happier mode of life; the parties are philosophy and rhetoric; that contends for righteousness and virtue; this for the possession of political power; the champion of the former is Socrates; on behalf of the latter, three steps forward, Gorgias, a rhetorician, Polus, a Sophist, and Callicles, an Athenian politician." Finally, Schleiermacher and C. F. Hermann, in the words of the latter, regard "the kernel of the dialogue to be, that the good alone is truly useful, and that men harm themselves by wrong-doing; that, accordingly, the rule of pleasure must give way to the higher rule of the good."*

* All these opinions may be found in the works of their respective advocates, viz. Cousin's in his transl. 3. 130, seq., Stallbaum's in Vol. 2, sec. 1, p. 38, of his second ed., Ast's in his work on Plato's life and writings, p. 133, Socher's in his similar work (Munich, 1820), p. 237, in which he is polemical towards Ast. C. F. Hermann's is contained in his Introd. to Plato (Heidelberg, 1838 - 39, the second vol. has not appeared), p. 476, and Schleiermacher's — the critic to whom the thorough understanding of Plato owes most — in Dobson's translation of his prefaces. While I am upon this subject, let me say, that Schleiermacher hardly receives justice from the hands of this translator. His style, indeed, offers serious difficulties, for his mind was not, "though deep, yet clear." It may be forgiven therefore, to a translator, that sometimes he constructs, out of Schleiermacher's formidable German sentences, something not exactly English, as though he were only half conscious of the meaning. But when such things as the turning of André Dacier, the French translator of parts of
Most of these opinions have something of justice in them, but, with the exception of the last, appear to me to look at a part of the dialogue, rather than at the whole. If rhetoric is the subject, why have the researches into the nature of pleasure, the comparison between suffering injustice and committing it, and the discussion of the efficacy of punishment, so great prominence? Much is said about rhetoric, but it is the vehicle for conveying thought rather than the subject, the starting-point of the dialogue rather than its goal. I should entertain just the opposite opinion to that of Ast above quoted: that the scientific part of the dialogue is the main thing, and rhetoric only an example. Schleiermacher's view, so far as I understand it, or one very similar to it, appears to me to deserve the preference. The main subject is the worthless nature of pleasure, and of the pursuits founded on pleasure, as opposed to the right and the good. Rhetoric, including politics in its corrupt condition at that time, is selected as the most prominent and most esteemed of the arts which minister to pleasure. This exhibition of the subject being admitted, we see a propriety in the introduction of every topic. The right and the good are inseparably linked to each other, and, in fact, united with all that pertains to man's excellence and well-being. But to these, pleasure, pursued for its own sake, is opposed. It is opposed to true good, for it blindly seeks present gratification, however pernicious or debasing. It is opposed to right or justice, for it tries to avoid suffering wrong by inflicting wrong on others. It is opposed to both, because its impulse is to escape from de-

Plato, into Madame Dacier occur, notwithstanding Schleiermacher's "dem Dacier," and "Seiner einleitung," it may be suspected that the translation was made before sufficient knowledge of German was acquired, — a suspicion from which only the plea of gross carelessness can free the translator.
served punishment, without regard to the good effects of punishment on virtue and happiness. The arts which minister to pleasure — one of which, and the chief in its pretensions, is false rhetoric — fall under the same condemnation. As truth is on the side of good, they have no communion with truth; they are arts of imposition or flattery, calculated to persuade the ignorant, and reared upon no basis of unchanging truth or scientific principles. In the end, as they sacrifice the highest good of those whom they please to their present gratification, they involve in ruin him who practises them, and those who are practised upon. Politics, especially, which, when genuine, aims at the public good, is, when based on these principles, a mischievous trade. And this supreme pursuit of pleasure affects the condition of man, not only in this life, but in the life to come.

Such appears to me to be the subject of the Gorgias. But it should be added, that Plato has so handled the subject that the dialogue answers also for a defence of himself and his master. The allusions to the trial of Socrates have been noticed already. He stands before us as the philosopher who suffers reproach and death for seeking men's good rather than their pleasure. But Plato defends himself, also, apparently against friends, who blamed him for not publicly serving the state, as well as against public men, who thought philosophy a useless pursuit. Politics, he asserts, must be founded on the theory and practice of philosophy. No man is a true politician until he becomes τεχνικός, — an artist, a philosopher able to distinguish useful from harmful pleasures, — and reduces his science to practice by making men better. That this is a fair defence I do not assert; for, with true good in view at the outset, the practice perfects a man in the science. He might have said, what he must have felt, that the corruption of the
times, the necessity of using flattering arts, to which he could not resort, would have altogether prevented his success. In such an age,—and such an age is a very long one,—the philosophical statesman,—let me add, the truly enlightened Christian statesman,—the sound pilot of the state, is thrust from the helm, and ignorant apprentices usurp his place. Plato's part, therefore, was to act on a few, and on future times.

I would gladly now draw the attention of my younger readers to the Gorgias, as a display of the mind and style of Plato; but the limits of an Introduction forbid me to enlarge upon this topic. I must, therefore, omit to speak of the exquisite style of Plato, and the dramatic form in which he clothes his works. I must only glance at the Platonic Socrates, the centre of Plato's writings; at his admirable irony, now playful and now severe, his unruffled good-nature, his hatred of show and pretence, his attitude as an inquirer rather than as already wise, his unaffected modesty, his propensity to illustrate the great by the small, philosophical truth by common life, his high estimate of moral truth above physical. There are, however, one or two points to be noticed, in which Gorgias differs from many of Plato's works. One is, the earnestness, almost amounting to bitterness, with which the argument is carried on. There is less here of playful irony than elsewhere. Another is, that Socrates expresses his opinion, and lays down his principles, more than in most of the dialogues of an earlier date. Another still is, that, compared with the Platonic works of the first period, it has less of the dramatic about it; we have no embellished preface, like that of Protagoras, but at the beginning, Socrates, without any delay on the part of the writer, enters into the discussion. All these characteristics may be explained by a predominance of moral feeling, which rises even into indignation, and deprives Plato of part
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of his usual tranquillity. With all this, the form is admirable.* The argument grows in interest and importance, until it ends in a strain of highest mood. To mention but a single characteristic, nothing can be finer than the way in which Socrates deals with Callicles in the third part, where he retorts his language upon him, and shows that the indignities which he had described as the rewards of the just man on earth will be heaped upon the unjust in a higher degree hereafter.

The opinion of the greater number of critics assigns the composition of the Gorgias to one of the years not long after the death of Socrates, while that event was still fresh in Plato's mind. Athenæus has a story (11. 505, D), that Gorgias read the work, and said, "How well Plato knows how to lampoon!" and another, that Gorgias declared that "he never heard or said such things as Plato reported." If Gorgias died soon after Socrates, as Foss maintains, these anecdotes, which may not be wholly unworthy of credence, would supply us with the latter term for the composition of the dialogue. But there is no certainty in regard to the dates of the birth of Gorgias, and of his age when he came to Athens as ambassador, on which the date of his death depends. A comparison of this dialogue with Plato's other works enables us to come somewhere near the time of its composition in another manner. It occupies a

* Stallbaum, in his Introdt. to the Repub., says: "Hoc monere juvat disserendi quoque elegantiam in Politia tantam regnare ut paucissimi sermons præter Gorgiam, Protagoram, Phædonem, Phædrum, et Symposium, hoc in genere ad eam comparandi sint." Ritter, 2. 192. "In regard to Plato's imitative art in dialogue (dialogisch-mimische kunst), we consider as his most finished works Protagoras, Gorgias, and Symposium, next to which, though at some distance, come Phædrus and Phædo." Here, however, style, rather than form, is spoken of. As a work of art, I should place Phædrus first among all the Platonic dialogues.
middle place, as Schleiermacher teaches us, between the
elementary writings of Plato's first years, and the construc-
tive ones of his maturer life. This critic conceives that it
was written after Plato's first visit to Sicily, in 389, B. C.,
when he was forty years of age. Stallbaum brings it much
nearer to the death of Socrates, in 399. To this conclu-
sion he is led by a strong resemblance he discovers between
the Gorgias and Meno, which latter dialogue he carries
back even to a time before the death of Socrates, on ac-
count of Plato's mildness there in attacking Anytus, the
accuser of his master. But neither of these considerations
has much weight; Plato might and does resemble himself
in works written at considerable intervals from one another;
and the more gentle tone of Meno may be owing to a frame
of its author's mind which is not to be accounted for. It
is safer to say, that the date cannot be ascertained pre-
cisely.
ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΚΑΛΛΙΚΛΗΣ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΧΑΙΡΕΦΩΝ, ΓΟΡΓΙΑΣ, ΠΩΛΟΣ.

447 ΣΑΡ. Ι. ΚΑΛ. Πολέμου καὶ μάχης φασὶ χρῆται, ὁ Σώκρατες, οὕτω μεταλαγχάνειν. ΣΩ. Ἄλλῃ ἦ, τὸ λεγόμενον, κατόπιν ἐστὴς ἤκομεν καὶ ὑποτευμεν; ΚΑΛ. Καὶ μάλα γε ἀστείας ἐστής· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ καλὰ Γοργίας ἤμων ὀλίγον πρὸτερον ἐπεδείξατο. ΣΩ. Τούτων μέντοι, Ἔδο Καλλίκλεις, αὐτὸς Χαιρεφὼν ὅδε, ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἀναγχάσας ἡμᾶς διατρίψα. ΧΑΙ. Οὐδὲν πράγμα, ὁ Σώκρατες· ἐγὼ γὰρ καὶ ἰᾶσομαι. φίλος γὰρ μοι Γοργίας, ὥστε ἐπιδείξεται ἤμων, εἰ μὲν δοκεῖ, νῦν, ἐὰν δὲ βούλη, ἔσαις. ΚΑΛ. Τι δαί, ὁ Χαιρεφὼν; ἔπιθυμει Σωκράτης ἄκουσαι Γοργίαν; ΧΑΙ. Ἑπ’ αὐτὸ γέ τοι τοῦτο πάρεσμεν. ΚΑΛ. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν βούλησθε παρ’, ἐμὲ ἤκειν οὐχαδε, παρ’ ἐμοὶ γὰρ Γοργίας καταλύει καὶ ἐπιδείξεται ἤμων. ΣΩ. Εὐ λέγεις, Κ ὁ Καλλίκλεις. Ἄλλῳ ἄρα ἔθελήσειν ἄν ἤμων διαλεγόμαι; βούλομαι γὰρ πυθέσθαι παρ’ αὐτοῦ, τίς ἡ δύναμις τῆς τέχνης τοῦ ἄνδρος, καὶ τί ἔστιν ὁ ἐπαγγέλλεται τε καὶ διδάσκει. τὴν δὲ
ἄλλην ἐπίδειξιν ἔσωθις, ὁσπερ σὺ λέγεις, ποιησάσθω. ΚΑΙ. Οὐδέν οἶδον τὸ αὐτὸν ἑρωτᾶν, ὃ Σύκρατες, καὶ γὰρ αὐτῷ ἐν τούτῳ ἢν τῆς ἐπιδείξεως ἐξέλευε γοῦν νῦν δὴ ἑρωτᾶν ὃ τι τις βούλιοι τῶν ἑνδὸν ὄντων, καὶ πρὸς ἀπαντᾷ ἑρή ἀποκρινεῖται. ΣΩ. Ὅδε λέγεις. ΣΩ. Ὁ Χαῖρεφῶν, ἔρου αὐτῶν. ΧΑΙ. Τί ἔρωμαι; ΣΩ. Ὅσπερ ἂν εἰ ἑτύγχανεν ὃν ὑποδημάτων δημιουργός, ἀπεκρίνατο ἂν δῆμον σοι, ὅτι σκυτοτόμος. ἦς ὁι μανθάνεις ὃς λέγω;

ΣΑΡ. Ι. ΧΑΙ. Μανθάνω καὶ ἑρήσομαι. — Εἰπέ μοι, ὃ Γοργία, ἀληθῆ λέγει Καλλικλῆς ὁδε, ὅτι ἐπαγγέλλει ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὃ τι ἂν τίς σε ἑρωτᾷ; ΓΩΡ. Ἀληθῆ, ὁ Χαῖρεφῶν καὶ γὰρ 448 νῦν δὴ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἑπιγγέλλομην, καὶ λέγω, ὅτι οὐδεῖς μὲ ποι ἡρώτηκε καινὸν οὐδὲν πολλῶν ἑτῶν. ΧΑΙ. Ὅδε που ἂν ἐξαίδιος ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ὃ Γοργία. ΓΩΡ. Πάρεσι τούτων πεῖραν, ὁ Χαῖρεφῶν, λαμβάνειν. ΠΩΛ. Νῇ Δα. ἂν δὲ γε βούλη, ὃ Χαῖρεφῶν, ἔμου. Γοργίας μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀπειρημέναι μοι δοκεῖ, πολλά γὰρ ἅρτι διελήλυθε. ΧΑΙ. Τί δαί, ὃ Πώλε; οἴει σὺ κάλλιον ἢν Γοργίου ἀποκρίνασθαι; ΠΩΛ. Τί δὲ τούτῳ, εἶν σοί γε ἔκανος; ΧΑΙ. Οὐδέν. ἄλλ' ἐπειδῆ Β σὺ βούλει, ἀποκρίνου. ΠΩΛ. Ἐφάτα. ΧΑΙ. Ἐρωτῶ δή, εἰ ἑτύγχανε Γοργίας ἐπιστήμων ᾧ τῆς τέχνης ἥσπερ ὃ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ Ἡρόδικος, τίνα ὃν αὐτὸν ἀνομιάζομεν δικαίως; οὐχ ὁπερ ἐκεῖνον; ΠΩΛ. Πάνω γε. ΧΑΙ. Ἰατρὸν
άρα φάσκοντες αὐτὸν εἶναι καλὸς ἂν ἐλέγομεν. Π.Ω.Α. Ναι. ΧΑΙ. Εἰ δὲ γε ἡμὴρ Ἀριστοφάνος ὁ Ἀγαλαφόντος ἢ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ ἤμπειρὸς ἢν τέχνης, τίνα ἂν αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς ἐκαλοῦμεν; Π.Ω.Α. Δῆλον, ὑπὸ ἠγαφάρων. ΧΑΙ. Νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ τίνος τέχνης ἐπιστήμων ἐστὶ, τίνα ἂν καλοῦντες αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς καλοῖμεν; Π.Ω.Α. 7Ω 
Χαιρεφάνων, πολλαὶ τέχναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰσὶν ἐκ τῶν ἐμπειριῶν ἐμπείρως ἐφημέρας· ἐμπειρία μὲν γὰρ ποιεῖ τὸν αἰώνα ἡμῶν πορεύεσθαι κατὰ τέχνην, ἀπειρία δὲ κατὰ τύχην. ἔκαστον δὲ τοῦτων μεταλαμβάνοντων ἄλλοι ἄλλων ἄλλως, τῶν δὲ ἀρίστων οἱ ἀρίστοι· ὢν καὶ Γοργίας ἐστὶν ὄδε, καὶ μετέχει τῆς καλλιστῆς τῶν τεχνῶν.

D 
ΣΑΡ. ΙII. ΣΩ. Καλὸς γε, ὁ Γοργία, φαίνεται Πόλος παρεσκευάσθαι εἰς λόγους· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὁ ἀπαγορεύεται Χαιρεφάνων οὗ ποιεῖ. ΘΟΡ. Τὶ μάλιστα, ὁ Σώκρατες; ΣΩ. Τὸ ἐρωτόμενον οὐ πάνυ μοι φαίνεται ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ΘΟΡ. Ἀλλὰ σὺ, εἰ βούλει, ἐφοῦ αὐτόν. ΣΩ. Οὐχ, εἰ αὐτῶ σοι βουλομένῳ ἐστὶν ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ ἂν ἦδον σέ. δῆλος γὰρ μοι Πόλος καὶ ἐξ ὧν εὑρίκειν, ὅτι τὴν καλομεμένην ὁθορικὴν Ἐμᾶλλον μεμελέτηκεν ἡ διαλέγεσθαι. Π.Ω.Α. Τί δή, ὁ Σώκρατες; ΣΩ. Ὅτι, ὁ Πόλες, ἐρωτόμενον Χαιρεφάνωτος τίνος Γοργίας ἐπιστήμων τέχνης, ἐγκωμιάζεις μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν τέχνην, ὅπερ τινὸς ψέγοντος, ἢτις δὲ ἐστὶν, οὐχ ἀπεκρίνω. Π.Ω.Α. Οὐ γὰρ ἀπεκρινάμην, ὅτι εἰπὴ ἡ καλλιστῇ; ΣΩ. Καὶ μάλα γε. ἀλλ' οὐδεὶς ἑρωτᾶ
ποία τις εἴη ἡ Γοργίου τέχνη, ἀλλὰ τίς, καὶ ὠντινα δέοι καλείν τῶν Γοργίαν. ὁσπερ τὰ ἐξηπροσθέν σοι ὑπετείνασε Νειφερόν καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ διὰ βραχέων ἀπεχών, καὶ νῦν οὕτως εἰπὲ τίς ἡ τέχνη καὶ τίνα Γοργίαν καλείν χρῆ ἡμᾶς. μᾶλλον δὲ, ὁ Γοργία, αὐτὸς ἡμῖν εἰπὲ τίνα σε χρῆ καλείν ὡς τίνος ἐπιστῆμονα τέχνης. Τῆς ἤτορικῆς, ὃ Σώφρατες. Σ.Λ. Ῥήτορα ἄρα χρῆ σε καλείν; ἄρα ἡ ταῦτα οὐ μόνον ἐνθάδε, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλως. Σ.Λ. Ἀρ' οὖν ἐθελήσας ἥν, ὁ Γοργία, ὁσπερ νῦν διαλεγόμεθα, διατελέσαι τὸ μὲν ἐρωτόν, τὸ δ' ἀποκρινόμενον, τὸ δὲ μὴνς τῶν λόγων τοῦτο, οἶνον καὶ Πῶλος ἢρξατο, ἑσαύρις ἀποθέθηκα; ἀλλ' ὅπερ ὑπισχνεί, μὴ ψεύσῃ, ἀλλὰ ἐθέλησαν κατὰ βραχὺ τὸ ἐρωτόμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι. Τοῦτοῦτον μὲν, ὁ Σώφρατες, ἐνεαὶ τῶν ἀποκρίσεων ἀναγκαῖα διὰ Κ μακρὸν τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ πειράσομαι γε ὅσ διὰ βραχυτάτων καὶ γὰρ αὖ καὶ τοῦτο ἐν ἐστιν ἃν φημι, μηδένα ἄν ἐν βραχυτέροις ἐμοῖ ὑπὸ αὐτὰ εἴπειν. Σ.Λ. Τούτον μὴν δεῖ, ὁ Γοργία· καὶ μοι ἐπίδειξιν αὐτοῦ τοῦτον ποίησαι, τῆς βραχυλογίας, μακρολογίας δὲ ἑσαύρις. ΠΟΡ. Ἀλλὰ ποιήσω, καὶ οὐδενὸς φήσεις βραχυλογωτέρον ἀκούσαι.
CAP. IV. ΣΩ. Φέρε δή—ἡ ηττορικὴ γὰρ

D φὶς ἐπιστῆμων τέχνης εἶναι καὶ ποιῆσαι ἂν καὶ ἄλλον ὡντον τυχάνει οὕσα; ὡσπερ ἡ ψυφαντική περὶ τὴν τῶν ἰματίων ἐργασίαν· ἡ γὰρ; ΓОР. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ μουσικὴ περὶ τὴν τῶν μελῶν ποίησιν; ΓОР. Ναί. ΣΩ. Νὴ τὴν Ὡθαν, ὁ Γοργία, ἀγαμαί γε τὰς ἀποκρίσεις, ὃτι ἀποκρίνει ὃς οἶδον τε διὰ βραχυτάτων. ΓОР. Πάνω γὰρ οἶμαι, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐπιεικῶς τούτο ποιεῖν. ΣΩ. Εὖ λέγεις. ἦδι δὴ μοι ἀπό-

Ε χριναὶ οὕτω καὶ περὶ τῆς ἡττορικῆς, περὶ τί τῶν ὅντων ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη; ΓОР. Περὶ λόγους. ΣΩ. Ποίους τούτους, ὁ Γοργία; ἀρὰ οἱ δηλοῦ-

σι τοὺς κάμνωτας, ὡς ἂν διαίτωμενοι ψηφιαίνοιεν; ΓОР. Οὐ. ΣΩ. Οὐχ ἀρὰ περὶ πάντας γε τοὺς λόγους ἡ ἡττορικὴ ἐστιν. ΓΟΡ. Οὐ δή-

τα. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν λέγεις γε ποιεῖ δυνατοὺς. ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν περὶ οὕτως λέγειν, καὶ φρονεῖν; ΓΟΡ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; ΣΩ. Ἀρ,"

450 οὐν καὶ ἢν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγχομεν, ἡ ἰατρικὴ περὶ τῶν καμνοντὸν ποιεῖ δυνατοὺς εἶναι φρονεῖν καὶ λέγειν; ΓΟΡ. Ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. Καὶ ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἀρά, ὡς ἔοικε, περὶ λόγους ἔστι. ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τοὺς γε περὶ τὰ νοσήματα; ΓΟΡ. Μά-

λιστα. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ γυμναστικὴ περὶ λόγους ἐστὶ τοὺς περὶ ευεξίαν τε τῶν σωμάτων καὶ καχεῖαν; ΓΟΡ. Πάνω γε. ΣΩ. Καὶ

Β μὴν καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι, ὁ Γοργία, οὕτως ἔχου-

σιν ἐκάστη αὐτῶν περὶ λόγους ἔστι τούτους, οὗ
τυγχάνουσιν οντες περὶ τὸ πράγμα οὐ ἔκαστη ἐστὶν ἡ τέχνη. ΓΟΡ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Τι οὖν ὁ͵ ποτε τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας οὐ ῥητορικὰς καλεῖς, οὕτως περὶ λόγους, εἴπερ ταύτην ῥητορικὴν καλεῖς, ἢ ἂν ἢ περὶ λόγους; ΓΟΡ. "Οτι, ὃ Σῶνορασ, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων τεχνῶν περὶ χειροφυγίας τε καὶ τοιαύτας πράξεις, ὡς ἔτοσ εἰπεῖν, πᾶσα ἐστιν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, τής δὲ ῥητορικῆς οὐδέν ἐστιν τοιοῦτον χειροφυγία, ἀλλὰ πάσα ἡ πράξεις καὶ ἡ κύρωσις διὰ λόγουν ἐστὶ. διὰ ταύτ' ἐγὼ τὴν Σ ῥητορικὴν τέχνην ἀξιῶ εἶναι περὶ λόγους, ὁρθῶς λέγων, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι.

ΣΑΡ. V. ΣΩ. "Ἀρ' οὖν μανθάνω οίαν αὐτὴν βουλεῖ καλεῖν; τάχα δὲ εἰσομαι σαφέστερον. ἀλλ' ἀπόχριναι. εἰςιν ἡμῖν τέχναι. ἢ γὰρ; ΓΟΡ. Ναι. ΣΩ. Πασῶν δὲ, οἴμαι, τῶν τεχνῶν τῶν μὲν ἐργασία τὸ πολὺ ἑστιν καὶ λόγου βραχέος δέονται, ἐναι δὲ οὐδενὸς, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῆς τέχνης περαινοῖτο ἃν καὶ διὰ σηγῆς, οἰον γραφική καὶ ἀνδριαντοποιία καὶ ἄλλα πολλαί. τὰς τοιαύτας μοι δοξεῖ λέγειν, περὶ ὡς οὐ φης τὴν ῥητορικὴν εἶναι. τῇ οὖ; ΓΟΡ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν καλῶς ὑπολαμβάνεις, ὃ Σῶνορας. ΣΩ. "Ετεραι δὲ γέ εἰς τῶν τεχνῶν, αὐτί διὰ λόγου πᾶν περαινοῦσιν, καὶ ἔρχομε, ὡς ἔτος εἰπεῖν, ἡ οὐδενὸς προσδέονται ἡ βραχέος πάνυ, οἰον ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ καὶ λογιστικὴ καὶ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ πεπετευκτικὴ γε καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ τέχναι, ὡς ἔναι σχεδὸν τι ὅπερ τοὺς λόγους ἔχουσι ταῖς πράξεσιν, αὐτί δὲ πολλαὶ πλείους καὶ τὸ παράπαν πᾶσα ἡ πράξεις Ε
καὶ τὸ κύρος αὐταῖς διὰ λόγων ἔστι. τῶν τοιούτων τινά μοι δοξεῖς λέγειν τὴν ὑθορικῆν. ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. Σ. Ω. Ἄλλ' οὕτωι τούτων γε οὐδεμίαν οἶμαι σε βούλεσθαι ὑθορικὴν καλεῖν, οὐχ ὅτι τῷ ὁμίατι οὕτως εἶπες, ὅτι ἡ διὰ λόγου τὸ κύρος ἔχουσα ὑθορικὴ ἔστι, καὶ ὑπολάβοι ἃν τις, εἰ βούλευτο δυσχεραίνειν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, Τῇν ἀριθμητικῆν άφα ὑθορικῆν, ὁ Γοργία, λέγεις; ἄλλ' οὖν οἶμαι σε οὕτε τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν οὕτε τὴν γεωμετρίαν ὑθορικῆν λέγειν. ΓΟΡ. Ὕρθος γὰρ οἴει, ὁ Σάκχατες, καὶ δικαίως ὑπολαμβάνεις.

ΣΑΡ. VI. Σ. Ω. 'Ἰθαί ὦν καὶ σὺ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἥν ἡρόμην διαπέρασον. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἡ ὑθορικὴ τυγχάνει μὲν οὖσα τούτων τις τῶν τεχνῶν τῶν τὸ πολὺ λόγῳ χρωμένων, τυγχάνουσι δὲ καὶ ἀλλαὶ τοιαύται οὖσαι, πειρῶ εἰπεῖν, ἡ περὶ τί ἐν λόγοις τὸ κύρος ἔχουσα ὑθορικὴ ἔστιν. ὡςπερ ἂν εἰ τίς με ἐροιτὸ ὄν νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον περὶ ἔστινοςον τῶν τεχνῶν, Σ. Ω. Σάκχατες, τίς ἔστιν ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ τέχνη; εἴποιμ' ἂν αὐτὰς ὡςπερ σὺ ἀρτί, ὅτι τῶν διὰ λόγου τις τὸ κύρος ἔχουσῶν. καὶ εἰ με ἐπανέρχοτοι. Τῶν περὶ τί; εἴποιμ' ὄν, ὅτι τῶν περὶ τὸ ἄρτιόντε καὶ περιττὸν [γνώσις], ὡσα ἄν ἐκάτερα τυγχάνοι ὑπα. εἰ δ' αὖ ἐροιτὸ. Τῇν δὲ λογιστικὴν τίνα καλεῖς τέχνην; εἴποιμ' ὄν, ὅτι καὶ αὕτη ἔστι τῶν λόγω τὸ πᾶν κυριομε- νον. καὶ εἰ ἐπανέρχοτοι, 'Ἡ περὶ τί; εἴποιμ' ὄν ὡςπερ οἱ ἐν τῷ δῆμῳ συγγραφόμενοι, ὅτι τὰ μὲν C ἄλλα καθάπερ ἡ ἀριθμητική ἡ λογιστικὴ ἔχει
περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ γάρ ἐστι, τὸ τε ἄρτιον καὶ τὸ πε-ριττὸν· διαφέρει δὲ τοσοῦτον, ὅτι καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα πᾶς ἔχει πλῆθος ἐπισκοπεῖ τὸ περιττὸν καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον ἡ λογιστικῆ. καὶ εἰ τις τὴν ἀστρονομίαν ἀνέφερε, ἐμοῦ λέγοντος, ὅτι καὶ αὐτή λόγῳ κυριότατα τὰ πάντα, Οἳ δὲ λόγοι οἱ τῆς ἀστρονομίας, εἰ φαίη, περὶ τί εἴσιν, ὁ Σώκρατες; εἴπομεν δὲν, ὅτι περὶ τὴν τῶν ἄστρων φορὰν καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης, πᾶς πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰντα ἔχει. ἘΩΡ. Ὄρθος γε λέγων αὐ, ὁ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Ἰθι δὴ καὶ σὺ, ὁ Γοργία. τυγχάνει μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἡ ὅθτοριχὴ οὖσα τῶν λόγων τὰ πάντα διαπρατομένων τε καὶ κυριότεροιν τις. ἢ γὰρ; ἘΩΡ. Ἐστι ταῦτα. ΣΩ. Δέχε- δὴ τῶν περὶ τί; * τί * ἔστι τούτο τῶν ὅντων, περὶ οὐ οὕτω οἱ λόγοι εἰσίν, οἷς ἡ ὅθτοριχὴ χρη- ταί; ἘΩΡ. Τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πρα- γμάτων, ὁ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἄριστα.

ΣΑΡ. VII. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ., ὁ Γοργία, ἀμφισβή- τῆσιμον καὶ τούτο λέγεις καὶ οὐδέν παύ σαφές. Εἰ- ούμας γὰρ σε ἀκηκοέναι ἐν τοῖς συμπεσόσιοις ἀδοντῶν ἀνθρώπων τούτο τὸ σχολιόν, ἐν ὁ κα- ταρθοῦμεν ἄδοντες, ὅτι υγιαίνειν μὲν ἄριστον ἐστι, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον καλὸν γενέσθαι, τρίτον δὲ, ὡς φησιν ὁ ποιητὴς τοῦ σχολιοῦ, τὸ πλούτειν ἀδόλας. ἘΩΡ. Ἀκήμνως γὰρ ἀλλὰ πρὸς τί τούτο λέγεις; ΣΩ. Ὅτι σοι αὐτίκα ἂν παρα-452 σταῖν οἱ δημιουργοὶ τούτων ὄν ἐπήνεσεν ὃ τὸ σχολιὸν ποιήσας, ἰσαρός τε καὶ παιδοτρίβης καὶ χρηματιστής, καὶ εἴποι πρῶτον μὲν ὁ ἰσαρός, ὅτι,
'Ω Σόκρατες, ἔκαπτά τι Ἐφιγιάς· οὐ γάρ ἑστὶν ἡ τούτων τέχνη περὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλ` ἡ ἐμή. εἰ οὖν αὐτῶν ἐγώ ἐρώτημα· Σὺ δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὰ τὰντα λέγεις; εἴποι ἄν ἰσώς, ὅτι Ἰατρός. Τί οὖν λέγεις; ἢ τὸ τῆς σῆς τέχνης ἔργον μέγιστον ἑστιν ἀγαθὸν; Πῶς γάρ οὔ, φαίη ἄν ἰσώς, ὡ Σόκρατες, ἱστεία; τί δ` ἑστὶ μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώποις ἱστείας; Εἰ δ` αὖ μετὰ τούτων ὁ παιδοτρίβης εἴποι, ὅτι Θαυμάζομί γ` ἄν, ὡ Σόκρατες, καί αὐτός, εἰ σοι ἔχει Ἐφιγιάς μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἐπιδείξαι τῆς αὐτοῦ τέχνης ἢ ἐγώ τῆς ἐμῆς· εἴποιμι` ἄν αὖ καὶ πρὸς τούτων. Σὺ δ` δὴ τίς εἰ, ὁ ἀνθρώπος; καὶ τί τὸ σὸν ἔργον; Παιδοτρίβης, φαίη ἄν, τὸ δ` ἔργον μοῦ ἑστὶ καλοὺς τε καὶ ἴομηρούς ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τὰ σώματα. Μετὰ δ` τὸν παιδοτρίβην εἴποι ἄν ὁ χρηματιστής, ὅς ἐγὼμαι, πάνω καταφθονῶν ἀπάντων, Σκόπει δητα, ὡ Σόκρατες, εάν σοι πλούτου φαινὴ τι μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ὅν ἡ παρὰ Ἐφιγιά ἡ παρ` ἄλλο ὀφθόν. φαίημεν ἄν οὖν πρὸς αὐτὸν· Τί δ` δή; ἢ σοι τούτων δημιουργός; Ψαῖν ἄν. Τίς ὅν; Χρηματιστής. Τί οὖν; χρίνεις οὐ μέγιστον ἀνθρώποις ἀγαθὸν εἶναι πλούτον; φήσομεν. Πῶς γάρ οὖκ; ἔρει. Καί μὴν ἀμφισβητεῖ γε Ἐφιγιάς ὅδε τὴν παρ` αὐτῶ τέχνην μεῖζονος ἀγαθοῦ αἰτεῖαν εἶναι ἡ τὴν σή, φαίημεν ἄν ἡμεῖς. δήλον οὖν, ὅτι τὸ μετὰ τούτῳ ἔροιτ` ἄν. Καὶ τί ἑστὶ τούτῳ τὸ ἀγαθὸν; ἀποκρινάσθω Ἐφιγιάς. Ἡθ οὖν νομίσας, ὡ Ἐφιγιά, ἐφωτάσθαι καὶ ὑπ` ἐκεί-
I-O TLATONIS

vuv xal xal iaov, dnoxQivai it Igtl jovto, o cf'ijs ov f.iEyi6iov, aya06v ilvai locg dvOgaitois.

xal OS di^^iiovQ/oi^ Sivai avzov.

"Oneg ioiiv, CO ^oxgaie?, ^iy diXydiia ^iyiaiov d-yadov xal aiTiov daa fiiei^ iXsvOegias aviO<; tols dv-dgcoTioiS, dua di xov aXlcov dg'/^siv Iv irj avzov TzoXsL ixdoTco.

2^FOP. To TzsiOsiv lycoy^ ollov t' uvai lotg Ao-
yoi? xal Iv SixaozL guo xal iv ^ovXiv-
izijgi(p ^ovXevidi xal iv ^xxXi^Giaoids xal iv dXXcp ^vXXoycp navzL oozgov,
SovXov di tov nai-
8ozgtf)}^v di
6 di ^gi^uazioryg ovzog dXXcp dvafpa-
vijasrai ^g)^^iaii^6{,i£vos xal ov/
avzco^ dXXd ool
Tw dvva^svcp Xlysiv xal ttelOelv zd nXi^dij.

Cap. VIII. ΣΩ. Νῦν μοι δοξεῖς δηλῶσαι, ὁ Γοργία, ἐγγύτατα τήν ὑητορικὴν ἤμινα τέ-453 χρην ἦγεῖ εἶναι, καὶ, εἰ τι ἐγὼ συνήμη, λέγεις, ὅτι πειθοῦσ δημιουργός ἔστιν ἡ ὑητορική, καὶ ἡ πραγματεία αὐτῆς ἀπασά καὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον εἰς τοῦτο τελευτᾷ. ἡ ἐχεις τι λέγειν ἐπὶ πλέον τήν ὑητορικὴν δύνασθαι ἡ πειθὼ τοῖς ἀκούονσιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ποιεῖν; ΓΟΡ. Οὐδαμῶς, ὁ Σόχρα-
tes, ἀλλά μοι δοξεῖς ἰκανῶς δρίξεσθαι· ἔστι γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῆς. ΣΩ. Ἀκουσον δὴ, ὁ Γοργία. ἐγὼ γὰρ εἲν ῥθ' ὅτι, ὅς ἐμαυτὸν Β πείθω, εἰπὲρ τις ἄλλος ἄλλος διαλέγεται βουλό-μενος εἰδέναι αὐτὸ τοῦτο, περὶ ὅτου ὁ λόγος ἔστι, καὶ ἐμὲ εἶναι τούτων ἔνα· ἀξιῶ δὲ καὶ σὲ.
ΓΟΡ. Τί οὖν δή, ὦ Σῶκρατες; ΣΩ. Ὑπὸ ἔρῳ νῦν. ἔγὼ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ὃτι τοιεῖσθαι, ἢτις ποτ᾽ ἔστιν ἢν σὺ λέγεις καὶ περὶ ὄντων πραγμάτων ἐστὶ πειθῶ, σαφῶς μὲν εὖ ἵσθ᾽ ὅτι σὺν οἴδα, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾽ ὑποπτεύω γε ἢν οἴμαι σε λέγειν καὶ περὶ ὄν· οὐδὲν μέντοι ἤτον ἐρήσομαι σε τίνα ποτὲ λέγεις τὴν πειθῶ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ὃτι τοιεῖσθαι καὶ περὶ τίνων ἀυτῆς εἰναι. τοῦ οὖν ἔνεκα δὴ αὐτός ὑποπτεύον σὲ ἐρήσομαι, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγω; οὐ σού ἔνεκα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου, ἵνα οὐτω προθῇ, ὥς μάλιστ᾽ ἂν ἦμῖν καταφανές ποιοὶ περὶ ὅτου λέγεται. σχύπτει γὰρ, εἰ σοι δοκῶ δικαιῶς ἀνεφαινέσθαι. ὁσπέρ ἢν εἰ ἐτύγχανον σε ἐρωτῶν τίς ἐστὶ τῶν ἤγοράρων Ζεύξις, εἰ μοι εἴπες, ὅτι ὁ τὰ ζῶα γράφων, ἂρ᾽ οὐκ ἂν δικαιοῦσθαι σε ἴρόμην ὁ τα ποιὰ τῶν ἔπων γράφων καὶ ποῦ; ΓΟΡ. Πάνω γε. ΣΩ. Ὅρια διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι καὶ ἄλλοι εἰσὶν ἤγοράροι γράφοντες ἄλλα πολλὰ ζῶα; ΓΟΡ. Ναι. ΣΩ. Εἰ δὲ γε μηδείς ἄλλος ἡ Ζεύξις ἔγραψε, καλῶς ἂν σοι ἀπεκέκριτο; ΓΟΡ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ΣΩ. Ἡ θεί δὴ καὶ περὶ τῆς ὃτι τοιεῖσθαι εἰπέ, πότερον σοι δοκεῖ πειθῶ ποιεῖν ἢ ὃτι τοιεῖσθαι μόνη, ἢ καὶ ἄλλαι τέχναι; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνυν ὅστις διδάσκει ὅτι οὐν πράγμα, πότερον δ ἐκδιδάσκει πειθεί, ἢ οὔ; ΓΟΡ. Οὐ δῆτα, ὦ Σῶκρατες, ἀλλὰ πάντων μᾶλιστα πειθεί. ΕΣΩ. Πάλιν δ᾽ εἰ ἐπὶ τῶν αὑτῶν τεχνῶν λέγομεν ὅπερ νῦν δή, ἢ ἀριθμητικὴ οὐ διδάσκει ἡμᾶς δόσα ἐστι τα τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ καὶ ἢ ἀριθμητικὸς ἄνθρωπος; ΓΟΡ. Πάνω γε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ
πείθει; ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Πειθοῦς ἄρα δημιουργός ἦστι καὶ ἡ ἀφικνητική. ΓΟΡ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Οὖν καί ἐάν τις ἔρωτα ἡμᾶς ποίας πειθοῦς καὶ περὶ τι, ἀποκρινούμεθα πον αὖτα, ὅτι τῆς διδασκαλικῆς τῆς περὶ τὸ ἀρτιόν τε καὶ τὸ περίπτων ὅσον ἦστι. καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν τέχνας ἀπάσας ἔξομεν ἀποδεῖξιν πειθοῦς δημιουργοῦς οὕσας καὶ ἡσινος καὶ περὶ ὅ τι. ἡ οὖ; ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὖν ἄρα δητορικὴ μόνη πειθοῦς ἦστι δημιουργός. ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΑΡ. ΙΧ. ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ τοῖνυν οὐ μόνη ἀπεργάζεται τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον, ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα, δικαίως, ὅσπερ περὶ τοῦ ζωγράφου, μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπανεφυμεθ᾽ ἂν τὸν λέγοντα, ποίας δὴ πειθοῦς καὶ τῆς περὶ τι πειθοῦς ἡ ἡτορικὴ ἦστι Β τέχνη; ἡ οὖ δοκεῖ σοι δίκαιων εἶναι ἐπανεφύμενος; ΓΟΡ. Ἐμοιγε. ΣΩ. Ἀπόκριναι δὴ, ὅ Γοργία, ἐπειδὴ γε καὶ σοι δοκεῖ οὔτω. ΓΟΡ. Ταῦτας τοῖνυν τῆς πειθοῦς λέγω, ὁ Σώκρατες, τῆς ἐν δικαστηρίων καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄχλοις, ὅσπερ καὶ ὧρτον ἔλεγον, καὶ περὶ τοῦτων, ἡ ἦστι δίκαια τε καὶ ἄδικα. ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐγὼ τοι ὑπώπτευσον ταύτην σε λέγειν τὴν πειθῶ καὶ περὶ τοῦτον, ὁ Γοργία· ἄλλ᾽ ἦνα μὴ ἡπιμικάθης, ἐὰν Σ ὀλίγον ὑστερον τοιούτων τί σε ἀνέφαιμαι, δ ὅσκει μὲν δήλων εἶναι, ἐγὼ δ᾽ ἐπανεφυμεθ᾽ ὡτερ γὰρ λέγω, τοῦ ἐξῆς ἐνέκα περαίνεσθαι τὸν λόγον ἐρωτῶ, οὐ σοῦ ἐνέκα, ἄλλ᾽ ἦνα μὴ ἑθιζόμεθα ὑπονοοῦντες προορισμένων ἀλλήλων τὰ λεγόμενα,
GORGIAS.

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άλλα συ τα σαυτού κατα την υπόθεσιν ὅπως αν βούλη περαίνης. ΓΟΡ. Καὶ οὖθὺς γέ μοι δοξείς ποιεῖν, ὃ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Ἰθι δὴ καὶ τόδε ἐπισκευῶμεθα. καλεῖς τι μεμαθηκέναι;

D ΓΟΡ. Καλῶ. ΣΩ. Τὶ δὲ; πεπιστευκέναι; ΓΟΡ. Ἑγώγε. ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν ταύτον δοξεί σοι εἶναι μεμαθηκέναι καὶ πεπιστευκέναι, καὶ μάθησι καὶ πίστις, ἥ ἄλλο τι; ΓΟΡ. Οἶομαι μὲν ἔγωγε, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο. ΣΩ. Καλῶς γὰρ οὖση· γνώσει δὲ ἐνθένδε. εἰ γὰρ τὶς σε ἑροῦτο Ἀρ’ ἔστι τις, ὃ Γοργία, πίστις γενοῦσα καὶ ἁληθὴς; φαίης ἂν, ὡς ἐγώ οἰμαι. ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τὶ δὲ; ἐπιστήμην ἔστι γενοῦσα καὶ ἁληθὴς; ΓΟΡ. Οὐδαμῶς. ΣΩ. Δήλον γὰρ Ε αὖ, ὅτι οὔ ταύτον ἔστιν. ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθὴ λέγεις. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οἳ τὲ γε μεμαθηκότες πεπιστευκέναι εἰσί καὶ οἱ πεπιστευκότες. ΓΟΡ. Ἐστι ταῦτα. ΣΩ. Βούλει οὖν δύο εἴδη θῶμεν πειθοὺς, τὸ μὲν πίστιν παρεχόμενον ἄνευ τοῦ εἰδέναι, τὸ δ’ ἐπιστήμην; ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Ποτέραν οὖν ἡ ὑποτικὴ πειθῶ ποιεῖ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡχλοῖς περὶ τῶν δικαίων τε καὶ ἄδικων; έξ ἢς τοῖς πιστεύειν γίγνεται ἄνευ τοῦ εἰδέναι, ἦ ἢς ἢς τοῖς εἰδέναι; ΓΟΡ.

Δήλον δήμου, ὃ Σώκρατες, ὅτι έξ ἢς τοῦ πιστεύουσαν. ΣΩ. Ἡ ὑποτικὴ ἄρα, ὥς ἐσικε, πειθοὺς δημοψήφισμα ἔστι πιστευτικής, ἄλλ’ οὖν διδασκαλικής περὶ τὸ δίκαιον τε καὶ ἄδικον. ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐδ’ ἄρα διδασκαλικὸς οὗ ὑπότοις ἔστι δικαστηρίων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡχλον δικαίων τε
πέρι καὶ ἀδίκουν, ἄλλα πιστικὸς μόνον. οὔ γὰρ δῆτον ὥρλον γ’ ἄν δύναιτο τοσοῦτον ἐν ὁλίγῳ χρόνῳ διδάξαι οὕτω μεγάλα πράγματα. ΓΩΡ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΑΡ. Χ. ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, ἱδομεν τί ποτε καὶ Ἐ
λέγομεν περὶ τῆς ἤθορικῆς· ἔγὼ μὲν γὰρ τοι
οὐδ’ αὐτὸς ποι δύναμαι κατανοήσαι ὁ τι λέγω.
ὅταν περὶ ἴατρῶν αἰφέσεως ἥ τῇ πόλει σύλλογος,
ἡ περὶ ναυπηγῶν, ἡ περὶ ἄλλου τινὸς δημιουργι-
κοῦ ἔθνους, ἄλλο τι ἡ τότε ὁ ἤθορικὸς οὐ συμ-
βουλεύει; δῆλον γὰρ, ὅτι ἐν ἐκάστῃ αἰφέσει
tῶν τεχνικῶτατον δεῖ αἰφέσθαι. οὐδ’ ὅταν τει-
χῶν περὶ οἰκοδομήσεως, ἡ λιμένων κατασκευῆς,
ἡ νεωρίων, ἀλλ’ οἱ ἀρχιτέκτονες· οὐδ’ αὐτὸν
ἀντὶ στρατηγῶν αἰφέσεως περὶ, ἡ τάξεως τινὸς πρὸς
πολεμίους, ἡ χορίων καταλήψεως συμβουλή ἢ,
C ἀλλ’ οἱ στρατηγικοὶ τότε συμβουλεύσουσιν, οἱ
ἤθορικοὶ δὲ οὐ. ἡ πῶς λέγεις, ὁ Γοργία, τά
tοιαῦτα; ἐπειδὴ γὰρ αὐτὸς τε φης ὧ̣τις εἶναι
καὶ ἄλλους ποιείν ἤθορικοὺς, εὖ ἔχει τά τῆς
σῆς τέχνης παρὰ σοῦ πινθάνεσθαι. καὶ ἔμε
νῦν νόμισον καὶ τὸ σὸν σπεύδειν. ἤσως γὰρ
καὶ τυχάνην τις τῶν ἐνδον ὄντων μαθητῆς σοῦ
βουλόμενος γενέσθαι, ὡς ἐγὼ τινας σχεδὸν καὶ
συχνώς αἰσθάνομαι, οἱ ἤσως αἰσχύνοιτ’ ἂν σε
ἀνεφέσθαι. ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ οὖν ἄνεφοιτόμενος νόμισον D
καὶ ὑπ’ ἔκεινον ἄνεφοιτάσθαι, Τῇ ἡμῖν, ὁ Γορ-
γία, ἔσται, ἐάν οἱ συνάντης; περὶ τίνων τῇ πό-
λει συμβουλεύειν οὐτοὶ τε ἐσόμεθα; πότερον περὶ
δικαίου μόνον καὶ ἀδίκου, ἡ καὶ περὶ ἄν νῦν δὴ
Σωκράτης ἔλεγε; πειρῶ σὺν αὐτοῖς ἀποκρίνε-σθαι. ΓΟΡ. 'Αλλ' ἐγὼ σοι πειράζομαι, ὁ Σῶ-κρατες, σαφῶς ἀποκαλύπτω τὴν τῆς ἤθητορικῆς δύναμιν ἀπασαν· αὐτὸς γὰρ καλῶς ψηφηγήσω. Ε ὦσθ'α γὰρ δῆπον, δι' τὰ νεώρια ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τείχη τὰ Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἡ τῶν λιμένων κατα-σκεύη ἐκ τῆς Θεμιστοκλέους συμβουλῆς γέγονε, τὰ δ' ἐκ τῆς Περικλέους, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκ τῶν δη-μιουργῶν. ΣΩ. Λέγεται ταῦτα, ὁ Γοργία, πε-ρὶ Θεμιστοκλέους· Περικλέους δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἤκουσαν, ὅτε συνεβοίλευεν ἤµιν περὶ τοῦ διὰ μέ-σου τείχους. ΓΟΡ. Καὶ ὅταν γέ τις αἷρες ἦ ὁν δ' ὑπὶ εἴλεγε, ὁ Σῶκρατες, ὄρας, ὅτι οἱ ἤθητορὲς εἰσάν οἱ συμβουλεύοντες καὶ οἱ νικῶντες τὰς γνώμας περὶ τούτων. ΣΩ. Ταῦτα καὶ σαμιάζων, ὁ Γοργία, πάλαι ἐρωτῶ τίς ποτε ἡ δύναμις ἐστὶ τῆς ἤθητορικῆς. δαιμονία γάρ τις ἔμοιρη καταφαίνεται τὸ μέγεθος οὕτω σχοποῦντι.

CAP. XI. ΓΟΡ. Εἰ πάντα γε εἰδεῖση, ὁ Σῶκρατες, ὅτι, ὁς ἐπος εἴπειν, ἀπάσας τὸς δυ-βό πάμενε συλλαβοῦσα ὑπ' αὐτῇ ἔχει· μέγα δὲ σοι τεκμήριον ἔριο· πολλάκις γὰρ ἤδη ἔγροχε με-τὰ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἅλλων ἰατρῶν εἰσελθὼν παρὰ τινα τῶν καινόντων οὐχὶ ἔθε-λοντα ἢ φάρσιακον πιεῖν ἢ τεμεῖν ἢ καῦσαι παρασχεῖν τῷ ἰατρῷ, οὐ δυναμένου τοῦ ἰατροῦ πείσαι, ἐγὼ ἔπεισα, οὐχ ἅλλη τέχνη ἢ τῇ ἤθ-τορικῇ. φημι δὲ καὶ εἰς πόλιν ὅπου βούλει ἐλθόντα ἤθητορικὸν ἄνδρα καὶ ἰατρόν, εἶ δέοι λόγῳ διαγωνίζεσθαι ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ
τινὶ συλλόγῳ, ὁπότερον δὲι αἰρεθῆναι, ὡπτομαὶ ὑ Ἰατρὸν, οὐδαμοῦ ἄν φανῆναι τὸν Ἰατρὸν, ἀλλ' αἰρεθῆναι ἀν τὸν εἰπεῖν δυνατὸν, εἰ θυλοῖτο. καὶ εἰ πρὸς ἀλλον γε δημιουργὸν οὐτινασοὺν ἀγνώςιοτο, πείσειν ἃν αὐτῶν ἥλεθαι ο ὡτορικὸς μᾶλλον ἢ ἀλλος ὦτισοῦν. οὐ γὰρ ἔστι περὶ ὅτου οὐχ ἁν πιθανότερον εἰποι ο ὡτορικὸς ἢ ἀλλος ὦτισοῦν τῶν δημιουργῶν ἐν πληθεί. ἢ μὲν οὐν ὄνωμας τοσαύτη ἔστι καὶ τοιαύτη τῆς τέχνης. δεὶ μέντοι, ο Σώκρατες, τῇ ὡτορικῇ χρῆσθαι ὡσπερ καὶ τῇ ἅλλῃ πάσῃ ἀγωνίᾳ. καὶ δ' ὑπὲρ τῇ ἅλλῃ ἀγωνίᾳ οὐ τούτον ἐνεκα δεὶ πρὸς ἀπαντας χρῆσθαι ἀνθρώπους, ὅτι ἔµαθε πυκτεύειν τε καὶ παγχρατιάζειν καὶ ἐν ὀπλοῖς μάχεσθαι, ὡστε κρείττων εἶναι καὶ φίλοι καὶ ἔχθροιν. οὐ τούτον ἐνεκα τοὺς φίλους δεὶ τύπτειν οὐδὲ κεντείν τε καὶ ἀποκτινύναι. οὐδὲ γε μα Δία ἐὰν τις εἰς παλαίστραν φοιτήσας, εὖ ἔχων τῷ σώμα καὶ πυκτικὸς γενόμενος, ἐπειτα τὸν πατέρα τύπτη καὶ τῇ μητέρᾳ ἦ ἁλλὸν τινὰ τῶν οἰκείων ἢ τῶν φίλων, οὐ τούτον ἐνεκα δεὶ τοὺς παιδο-Ε τρῶσας καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὀπλοῖς διδάκοντας μάχεσθαι μισεῖν τε καὶ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων. ἐκείνοι μὲν γὰρ παρέδοσαν ἐπὶ τῷ δικαίῳς χρησθαι τοῦτοι πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας, ἀμνομένους, μὴ ὑπάρχοντας. οἱ δὲ ἑστὶ μεταστρέψαντες χρῶναι τῇ ἱσχυ καὶ τῇ τέχνῃ οὐχ ὅρθος. οὐχον οἱ διδάξαντες πονηροὶ, οὐδὲ ἢ τέχνη οὔτε αἰτία οὔτε πονηρὰ τοῦτον ἐνεκά ἔστιν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὴ χρῶμενοι, οἴμαι, ὅρθος. δ
αὐτὸς δὴ λόγος καὶ περὶ τῆς ὑποτικῆς. δυνα-
τὸς μὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἀπαντᾶς ἔστιν ὁ ὑπὸ τοῦ καὶ
περὶ παντὸς λέγειν, ὡστε πιθανότερος εἶναι ἐν
τοῖς πλήθεσιν ἐμβραχύ περὶ ὅτου ἂν βούληται·

Β ἂλλ' οὖν τι μᾶλλον τοῦτον ἕνεκα δεῖ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἅτο-
μον περὶ τὴν δόξαν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, ὅτι δύνατο ὁν
tοῦτο ποιῆσαι, οὔτε τοῦτο ἄλλου δημιουργοῦς,
ἀλλὰ δικαίως καὶ τῇ ὑποτικῇ χρησθαι, ὡσπερ
καὶ τῇ ἁγιωτερίᾳ. Εἰπὶ δὲ, ὑμιᾶς, ὑποτικὸς γενό-
μενός τις κάτω ταύτη τῇ δυνάμει καὶ τῇ τέχνῃ
ἀδικῇ, οὐ τὸν διδάξαντα δεῖ μισεῖν τε καὶ ἐκβάλ-
λειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων. ἑκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ δικαίᾳ

C χρήσει παρέδωκεν, ὁ δ' ἐναντίως χρησὶ.
τὸν οὖν

Οἰμαί, ὁ Γοργία, καὶ σὲ ἐμπείρον εἶναι πολλῶν λόγων καὶ καθεσφακέναι
ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τοιόντε, ὅτι οὐ γράφωσι δύνανται
περὶ ὧν ἂν ἐπιχειρήσωσι διαλέγεσθαι διορισάμε-
νοι πρὸς ἄλλην καί μαθόντε καὶ διδάσκαντε

D ἐστιν οὖν διαλύεσθαι τὰς οἰνοποιίας, ἂλλ'
ἐὰν περὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητήσωσι καὶ μὴ φη ὁ ἔτερος
τῶν ἔτερον ὁρθῶς λέγειν ἢ μὴ σαφῶς, χαλεπά-
νυσι τε καὶ κατὰ φθόνον οὐσὶ τῶν ἐαυτῶν

λέγειν, φιλονεικοῦντας, ἂλλ' οὖ ἁπτώτας τὸ

προκείμενον ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, καὶ ἐνιοῦ γε τελευτώ-

νες ἀνοχίστα ἀπαλλάττονται, λοιδορθήσεις τε

καὶ εἰπόντε καὶ ἀκούσαντε περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν

τοιαῦτα, ὡς καὶ τοῖς παρόντας ἀχθεῖσθαι ὑπὲρ

σφῶν αὐτῶν, ὧ τοιοῦτων ἀνθρώπων ἡξίωσαν

αὐτῶν περὶ τῆς ὑποτικῆς.
αὐχορητάι γενέσθαι. Τὸν δὴ ἑνεκα λέγω ταῦτα; Ἐ ὅτι τῶν ἐμοὶ δοξεῖς οὐ οὐ πάνω ἀχόλουθα λέγειν οὖδὲ σύμφωνα οἷς τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγες περὶ τῆς ἤτορικῆς. φοβοῦμαι οὖν διελέγειν σε, μὴ με ὑπολάβῃς οὐ πρὸς τὸ πράγμα φιλονεικοῦντα λέγειν τοῦ καταφανές γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς σε. ἐγὼ οὖν, εἰ μὲν καὶ οὐ εἰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὄντες καὶ ἐγὼ, ἡδέως ἂν σε διερωτάῃ· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἐσθεν ἂν. ἐγὼ δὲ τίνων εἴμι; τῶν ἡδέως μὲν ἂν ἐλεγχθέντων, εἰ τι μὴ ἅληθὲς λέγω, ἡδέος δὲ ἂν ἐλεγχζάντων, εἰ τίς τι μὴ ἅληθὲς λέγοι, οὐκ ἀρχιστερον μὲντ' ἂν ἐλεγχθέντων ἢ ἐλεγχζάντων· μεῖζον γὰρ αὐτὸ ἁγαθόν ἠρούμαι, ὀφείλει μεῖζον ἁγαθὸν ἐστὶν αὐτὸν ἀπαλλαγῆναι κακοῦ τοῦ μεγίστου ἢ ἄλλον ἀπαλλάξαι. οὐδὲν γὰρ οἴμαι τοσοῦτον κακὸν εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ, οὐσαν δόξα ψευδής Β περὶ ὅν τυγχάνει νῦν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ὃν. εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ οὐ φης τοιοῦτος εἶναι, διαλεγόμεθα· εἰ δὲ καὶ δοξεῖ χρήναι ἑαν, ἐσμέν ἡδή χαίρειν καὶ διαλύομεν τὸν λόγον. ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλὰ φημὶ μὲν ἐγωγε, ὃ Σώφρατες, καὶ αὐτός τοιοῦτος εἶναι, οἴον οὐ ύφηγεί· ἵσως μέντοι χρήν ἐννοεῖν καὶ τὸ τῶν παρόντων. πάλαι γὰρ τοι, πρὶν καὶ ὑμᾶς ἐλθεῖν, ἔγω τοῖς παρούσι πολλὰ ἐπεδειξά-σμιν, καὶ νῦν ἵσως τόρος ἀποτενοῦμεν, ἢν διαλεγόμεθα. σκοπεῖν οὖν χρῆ καὶ τὸ τοῦτον, μὴ τινας αὐτῶν κατέχωμεν βουλομένους τι καὶ ἄλλο πράττειν.

ΣΑΡ. ΧΙΙII. ΧΑΙ. Τοῦ μὲν θορύβου, ὥ Γοργία ὑπὲρκαὶ Σώφρατες, αὐτοὶ ἄκουσε τοῦτων τῶν
ἀνδρῶν, βουλομένων ἀκούειν, ἐὰν τι λέγῃ τε ἐμοὶ δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μὴ γένοιτο τοσαύτη ἀσχολία, ὅστε τοιούτων λόγων καὶ οὕτω λεγομένων ἑφεμένοι προφυγαίτερον τι γενέσθαι ἀλλὸ πράττειν. ΚΑΔ. Νὴ τούς θεοὺς, ὡς Χαιρεθῶν. καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς πολλοῖς ήδη λόγοις παραγενόμενος οὐχ οίδ᾿ εἰ πάποτε ἠσθην οὔτος, ἀσπερ νυνί, ὡστε ἔμοιγε, κἂν τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην ἐξελήτη διαλέγεσθαι, χαριείσθε. Σ.Ω. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὡς Καλλίκλεις, τὸ γ' ἐμὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει, εἰπερ ἐθέλει Γοργίας. ΓΟΡ. Ἀδηχοῦν δὴ τὸ λοιπὸν, ὡς Σώκρατες, γίγνεται ἐμὲ γε μὴ ἐθέλειν, καὶ Εταύτα αὐτὸν ἐπαγγειλάμενον ἐξωτάν ὅ τι τις βούλεται. ἀλλ᾽ εἰ δοκεῖ τουτοιότι, διαλέγων τε καὶ ἐρώτα ὅ τι βούλει. Σ.Ω. Ἀκουεν δὴ, ὡς Γοργία, ὡς θαυμάζω ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ σου ἴσος γάρ τοι σοῦ ὀρθῶς λέγοντος ἐγὼ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνω. θητορικὴν φης ποιεῖν οἴσος τ᾽ εἶναι, ἐὰν τις βούληται παρὰ σοῦ μανθάνειν; ΓΟΡ. Ναὶ. Σ.Ω. Οὐκοῦν περὶ πάντων ὡστε 459 ὡς ὀχλο πιθανὸν εἶναι, οὐ διδάσκοντα, ἀλλὰ πειθοντα; ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Σ.Ω. Ἐλέγες τοι νῦν δὴ ὅτι καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὑμεινοῦ τοῦ ἱατροῦ πιθανότερος ἐσται ὁ ἡμῖν. ΓΟΡ. Καὶ γὰρ ἔλεγον, ἐν γε οὖν ὡς. Σ.Ω. Οὐκοῦν τὸ ἐν ὀχλῳ τοϋτο ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσιν; οὐ γὰρ δήμῳ ἐν γε τοῖς εἰδοῖ τοῦ ἱατροῦ πιθανότερος ἐσται. ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθὴ λέγεις. Σ.Ω. Οὐκοῦν εἰπερ τοῦ ἱατροῦ πιθανότερος ἐσται, τοῦ εἰδότος πιθανό-βερος γίγνεται; ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε. Σ.Ω. Οὐκ
ιατρός γε ὧν· ἦ γάρ; ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. 'Ο δὲ μὴ ιατρός γε δήποτε ἀνεπιστήμων ὃν ὁ ἱα-
τρὸς ἐπιστήμων. ΓΟΡ. Αἵλων ὦτι. ΣΩ. 'Ο
οὐκ εἰδὼς ἀρα τοῦ εἰδότος ἐν οὐκ εἰδόσι πιθανώ-
tεροσ ἔσται, ὅταν ὁ ὁμισός τοῦ ἱατρὸ⚽ πιθανώ-
tερος ἦ. τοῦτο συμβαίνει, ἦ ἄλλο τι; ΓΟΡ.
Τοῦτο ἐνταῦθα γε συμβαίνει. ΣΩ. Οὐκοὖν καὶ
περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἁπάσας τέχνας ὡσαντὸς ἔχει ὁ
ὁμισός καὶ ἡ ἡπτορική· αὐτὰ μὲν τὰ πράγματα
οὐδὲν δεῖ αὐτὴν εἰδέναι ὅπως ἔχει, μηχανὴν δὲ κ
τινα πειθοῦς εὐφηκέναι, ὡστε φαινεσθαι τοῖς οὐκ
εἰδόσι μᾶλλον εἰδέναι τῶν εἰδότων.

ϹΑΡ. ΧΙΒ. ΓΟΡ. Οὐκοὖν πολλῆς ἰαστάνης,
δὲ Σώκρατες, γίγνεται, μὴ μαθόντα τὰς ἄλλας
tέχνας, ἄλλα μιᾶν ταύτην, μηδὲν ἐλαττοῦσθαι
tῶν δημιουργῶν; ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν ἐλαττοῦται ἡ
μὴ ἐλαττοῦται ὁ ὁμισός τῶν ἄλλων διὰ τὸ οὔ-
tως ἔχειν, αὐτίκα ἐπισκεψόμεθα, εάν τι ἡμῖν
πρὸς λόγου ἦ· νῦν δὲ τὸδε πρότερον σχετώ-
μεθα, ἃρα τηγχάνει περὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδι-
χον καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἁγαθὸν
καὶ κακὸν οὐτὸς ἔχων ὁ ἡπτορικός ὡς περὶ τὸ
ὑγίεινον καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὃν αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι,
αὐτὰ μὲν οὐκ εἰδός, τὶ ἁγαθὸν ἢ τὶ κακὸν ἔστιν,
ἢ τὶ καλὸν ἢ τὶ αἰσχρὸν, ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἁδικον,
πειθώ δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν μηχανημένος, ὡστε δο-
κεῖν εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδὼς ἐν οὐκ εἰδόσι μᾶλλον τοῦ Ἐ
εἰδότος; ἢ ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι, καὶ δὲ προεπιστάμε-
νον ταύτα ἀφικέσθαι παρὰ σὲ τὸν μᾶλλοντα
μαθήσεσθαι τὴν ἡπτορικήν; εἰ δὲ μὴ, σὺ ὃ τῆς
γητορικῆς διδάσκαλος τούτων μὲν οὐδὲν διδάξεις τὸν ἀφικνούμενον·—οὗ γὰρ σον ἔγγον·—ποιήσεις δ' ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς δοξεῖν εἰδέναι αὐτὸν τὰ τοι- αύτα οὐχ εἰδότα καὶ δοξεῖν ἁγαθὸν εἶναι οὐχ ὄντα; ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐχ οἶδος τε ἐσει αὐτὸν διδάξαι τὴν γητορικῆς, εάν μὴ προειδὴ περὶ τού- των τὴν ἀλήθειαν; ἢ πῶς τὰ τοιαύτα ἔχει, ὁ ἹΩΑΓΙΑ; καὶ πρὸς ΔΙΟΣ, ὀσπερ ἄρτι εἴπεις, ἀποκαλύψας τῆς γητορικῆς εἰπὲ τῖς ποθ' ἡ δύναμις ἐστίν. ΓΟΡ. 'Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ μὲν οἴμαι, ὁ ὙΛΟΧΡΑ- τες, ἐὰν τύχῃ μὴ εἰδός, καὶ ταύτα παρ' ἐμοῦ μαθήσεσαι. ΣΩ. 'Εχε δὴ· καλὸς γὰρ λέγεις. εάνπερ γητορικὸς σύ τίνα ποιήσης, ἀνάγκη αὐ- τὸν εἰδέναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα ήτοι πρότε- ρον γε ἡ ὑπερούλιον μαθόντα παρὰ σοῦ. ΓΟΡ. 

Β Πάνος γε. ΣΩ. Τι οὖν; ὁ τὰ τεκτονικὰ μεμα- θηκῶς τεκτονικὸς, η οὖ; ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ τὰ μούσικὰ μούσικος; ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Καὶ ὁ τὰ ἱατρικὰ ἱατρικὸς; καὶ τάλλα οὔτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὁ μεμαθηκῶς ἐκαστα τοιοῦτος ἐστίν, οἷον ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐκαστὸν ἀπεργάζεται; ΓΟΡ. Πάνος γε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν κατὰ τούτον τὸν λόγον καὶ ὁ τὰ δίκαια μεμαθη- κῶς δίκαιος; ΓΟΡ. Πάντως δὴποιυ. ΣΩ. ὁ 

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη [τὸν γητορικὸν δίκαιον εἶναι], τὸν [δὲ] δίκαιον δίκαια βούλεσθαι πράτ- τειν; ΓΟΡ. Φαίνεται γε. ΣΩ. Οὐδέποτε ἀρα βουλήσεται ὃ γε δίκαιος ἄδικειν. ΓΟΡ. Ἄναγκη. ΣΩ. Τὸν δὲ γητορικὸν ἀνάγκη ἐκ
τοῦ λόγου δίκαιον εἴναι. ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐδέποτε ἄρα βουλήσεται οἱ ὕπερορικὸς ἢδικεῖν. ΓΟΡ. Οὐ φαίνεται γε.

ΚΑΠ. ΧV. ΣΩ. Μέμνησαι οὖν λέγων ὁλίγῳ δοὺρετον, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ τοῖς παιδοτρίβαις ἐγκαλεῖν οὐδὲ ἐκδιάλειν ἔκ τῶν πόλεων, ἐὰν ὁ πῦκτις τῆς πυκτικῆς [μὴ καλῶς] χρῆται τε καὶ ἢδικῆ; ὥστε δὲ οὗτο καὶ ἐὰν ὁ ὑμῖν τῇ ὕπερορικῇ ἢδικῷς χρῆται, μὴ τῇ διδάσκαλῳ ἐγκαλεῖν μὴ δὲ ἐξελαύνειν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἢδικοῦντι καὶ οὖν ὑφθοις χρωμένῳ τῇ ὕπερορικῇ; ἔφη ἢδικῇ ταῦτα, ἦ οὖ; ΓΟΡ. Ἔφηδη. ΣΩ. Νῦν δὲ γε ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος φαίνεται, ὁ ὕπερορικός, οὖν ἃν ποτὲ ἢδικησάς. ή οὖ; ΓΟΡ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις γε, ὁ Γοργία, λόγοις ἐλέγετο, ὅτι ἡ ὕπερορικῇ περὶ λόγους οὐ τού τοῦ ἀρτιόν καὶ περιττοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοὺς τοῦ δίκαιον καὶ ἢδικον. ἦ γὰρ; ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Ἡγὼ τοῖνυν οὐ πᾶς ταῦτα λέγοντος ὑπέλαβον, οὐ οὐδὲποτέ γὰρ τῆς ὕπερορικῆς ἢδικον πράγμα, ὃ γ' ἄλι περὶ δικαιοσύνης τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖται· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁλίγον ὑστερον ἐλεγεῖ, ὅτι ὁ ὑμῖν τῇ ὕπερορικῇ κἂν ἢδικὸς χρήστος, οὕτω θαυμάσας καὶ ἠγνώσαμενος ὁ οὖν συνήδειν τὰ λεγόμενα ἐκεῖνους εἶπον τοὺς λόγους, ὅτι, εἰ μὲν κέρδος ὅγοιο ἐϊναι τὸ ἐλέγχεσθαι, ὅπερ εὗρο, ἢξιον εἶπ διάλεγεσθαι, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἐὰν χαίρειν. ὑστερον δὲ ἴμων ἐπισκοπούμενοι, ὥρᾶς ἴν καὶ αὐτός, ὅτι αὐτὸς ὑμιλοῦντε τὸν ὕπερορικὸν ἢδύνατον εἶναι ἢδίκος χρήσθαι τῇ ὕπερορικῇ καὶ ἢδέλειν ἢδικεῖν. ταῦτα οὖν ὅπῃ ποτὲ
GORGIAS.

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Βέγκει, μα τὸν κύνα, ὁ Γοργία, οὖν ὀλέγης συννοι-σίας ἐστίν, ὡστε ἔκανὼς διασκέψασθαι.

Cap. XVI. ΠΩΛ. Τί δαί, ὃ Σώκρατες; οὕτω καὶ σὺ περὶ τῆς ὑπηρεσίας δοξάζεις, ὡσπερ νῦν λέγεις; ἢ οἰεῖ, ὅτι Γοργίας ἑκνύνθη σοι μὴ προσομολογήσαι τὸν ὑπηρετικὸν ἄνδρα μὴ σὺχι καὶ τὰ δίκαια εἰδέναι καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ ἀγα-θὰ, καὶ ἐὰν μὴ ἔλθῃ ταυτα εἰδὼς παρ' αὐτῶν, 

C αὐτὸς διδάξειν—ἔπειτα ἐκ ταύτης ὅσα τῆς ὁμολογίας ἐναντίον τι συνέβη ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, τοῦθ' ὃ δὴ ἄγαπᾶς, αὐτὸς ἄγαγὼν ἐπὶ τοιαύτα ἐφωτήματα. ἔπει τίνα οὖν ἀπαρνήσεσθαι μὴ σὺχι καὶ αὐτὸν ἐπιστασθαι τὰ δίκαια καὶ ἅλλους διδάξειν; ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ τοιαύτα ἂγειν πολλή ἀγροικία ἐστὶ τοὺς λόγους. ΣΩ. Τι κάλλιστε Πῶλε, ἀλλά τοι ἐξεπιτήθησας κτόμεθα ἔταφος καὶ νιές, ἵνα, ἐπειδὰν αὐτοὶ πρεσβύτεροι γιγνόμενοι σφαλλόμεθα, παρόντες ὑμεῖς οἱ νεᾶτεροι ἐπα- 

D νοσθοῖτε ἤμων τὸν βίον καὶ ἐν ἑργοῖς καὶ ἐν λόγοις. καὶ νῦν εἰ τι ἐγὼ καὶ Γοργίας ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σφαλλόμεθα, σὺ παρὼν ἐπανόρθον· δι-καίος δ' εἰ. καὶ ἐγὼ ἔθελο τῶν ὁμολογημένων εἰ τί σοι δοξῇ μὴ καλὸς ὁμολογηθῇ, ἀναθέ-σθαι ὡς ἐὰν σὺ βουλῇ, ἐὰν μοι ἐν μόνον φυλάττῃς. ΠΩΛ. Τί τούτῳ λέγεις; ΣΩ. Τὴν μα-κρολογίαν, ὃ Πῶλε, ἢν καθεῖρξῃ, ἢ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπεχείρησας χρήσθαι. ΠΩΛ. Τί δαί; οὐξ ἔξε- 

Ε σται μοι λέγειν ὅποσα ἄν βουλῶμαι; ΣΩ. Λέι-να μὲν' ἂν πάθοις, ὃ βέλλιστε, εἰ 'Αθήνας ἀφικόμενος, οὐ τῆς Ἑλλάδος πλείστη ἐστίν ἔξου-
οία τοῦ λέγειν, ἐπείτα σὺ ἐνταῦθα τούτοι μόνος ἀτυχήσαις. ἀλλὰ ἀντίθες τοι. " Σοῦ μακρά λέγοντος καὶ μὴ ἐθέλοντος τὸ ἐρωτόμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι, οὐ δεινὰ ἂν αὐ ἐγὼ πάθομι, εἰ μὴ ἑξεσται μοι ἀπιέναι καὶ μὴ ἀκούειν σου;” ἀλλ' εἰ 362 τι κίδει τοῦ λόγου τοῦ εἰρημένου καὶ ἐπανορθωσάσθαι αὐτῶν βούλει, ὡσπερ γνώ τῇ ἐλεγον, ἀναθέμενος ὁ τί σοι δοξεῖ, ἐν τῷ μὲν ἔρωταν τε καὶ ἐρωτόμενον, ὡσπερ ἔγω τε καὶ Γοργίας, ἐλεγχὲ τα καὶ ἐλέγχουν. φής γὰρ δήπου καὶ σὺ ἐπίστασθαι ἀπερ Γοργίας. ἣ οὐ; ΠΩΛ. Ἐγώγε. ΣΩ. Ὁυκοῦν καὶ σὺ κελεύεις σαυτοῦ ἔρωταν ἐκάστοτε ὁ τί ἂν τις βούληται, ὡς ἐπιστάμενος ἀποκρίνεσθαι; ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὕν. Β ΣΩ. Καὶ νῦν δὴ τούτων ὁπότερον βούλει ποίει· ἐρώτα, ἢ ἀποκρίνου.

ΣΑΡ. XVII. ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλὰ ποιήσω ταύτα. καὶ μοι ἀπόχριναι, ὁ Σώκρατες. ἐπειδὴ Γοργίας ἀπορεῖν σοι δοξεῖ περὶ τῆς ὑποτοιχῆς, σὺ αὐτήν τίνα φής εἶναι; ΣΩ. Ἀρα ἔρωτας ἦντινα τέχνην φημὶ εἶναι; ΠΩΛ. Ἐγώγε. ΣΩ. Οὐδεμία ἔμοιος δοξεῖ, ὁ Πάλις, ὡς γε πρὸς σὲ τάλαθή ἐφύησθαι. ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλὰ τί σοι δοξεῖ ἡ ὑποτοιχὴ εἶναι; ΣΩ. Πράγμα, ὁ φῆς σὺ ποιήσαι τέχνην ἐν τῷ συγγράμματι, ὃ ἐγὼ ἐναγχος ἀνέγγιον. ΠΩΛ. Τί τούτῳ λέγεις; ΣΩ. Ἐμ- ειπορίαν ἐγραφέ τινα. ΠΩΛ. Ἐμπειρία ἂρα σοι δοξεῖ ἡ ὑποτοιχὴ εἶναι; ΣΩ. Ἐμοιογε, εἰ μή τι σοῦ ἄλλο λέγεις. ΠΩΛ. Τίνος ἐμπειρία; ΣΩ. Χάριτος τινός καὶ ἤδωνης ἀπεργασίας.
Π.Ω.Α. Οὐκοὖν καλὸν σοι δοξεῖ ἡ ἤτορικὴ εἶναι, χαρίζεσθαι οἶον τ' εἶναι ἀνθρώποις; Σ.Ω. Τί δέ, ὃ Πῶλε; ἢδη πέπυσαν παρ' ἐμοῦ ὃ τι δ φημὶ αὐτὴν εἶναι, ὡστε τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἑρωτᾶς, εἰ οὖ καλὴ μοι δοξεῖ εἶναι; Π.Ω.Α. Οὐ γὰρ πέπυσμαι, ὅτι ἐμπερίαν τινὰ αὐτὴν φῆς εἶναι; Σ.Ω. Βούλει οὖν, ἐπειδὴ τιμᾶς τὸ χαρίζεσθαι, σμικρὸν τί μοι χαρίσασθαι; Π.Ω.Α. 'Εγώνε. Σ.Ω. Ἐροῦ νῦν με, ὁμοποιία ἦτε μοι δοξεῖ τέχνη εἶναι. Π.Ω.Α. Ἐφωτό δή, τίς τέχνη όμοποιία; Σ.Ω. Οὐδεμία, ὃ Πῶλε. Π.Ω.Α. Ἀλ- λὰ τί; φάθι. Σ.Ω. Φημὶ δή, ἐμπερία τις. Ε Π.Ω.Α. Τίνος; φάθι. Σ.Ω. Φημὶ δή, γάριτος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας, ὃ Πῶλε. Π.Ω.Α. Ταυτὸν δ' ἐστὶν όμοποιία καὶ ἤτορική; Σ.Ω. Οὐδαμῶς γε, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς ἐπιτηδεύσεως μό- ροιον. Π.Ω.Α. Τίνος λέγεις ταύτης; Σ.Ω. Μή ἀγροιχότερον ἢ τὸ ἄλθες εἰπεῖν· ὅσνὸ γὰρ Γοργίου ἔνεκα λέγειν, μὴ οὐκταί με διακαιωθεῖν 463 τὸ ἐαυτοῦ ἐπιτηδευμα. ἦγο δὲ εἰ μὲν τοῦτο ἐστὶν ἡ ἤτορικὴ ἡν Γοργίας ἐπιτηδεύει αὐξ ὅδα· καὶ γὰρ ἄρτι ἐκ τοῦ λόγου οὐδὲν ἡμῖν καταφανὲς ἐγένετο τί ποτε οὕτως ἥγεται· ὃ δ' ἦγο καλὸ τῇ ἤτορικῇ, πράγματος τινὸς ἐστὶ μόριον οὐδενὸς τῶν καλῶν. ΓΟΡ. Τίνος, ὃ Σώκρατες; εἰπὲ, μηδὲν ἐμε αἰσχυνθεῖς.

ΣΑΡ. ΧVIII. Σ.Ω. Δοξεὶ τοῖνυν μοι, ὃ Γορ- γία, εἶναι τι ἐπιτηδευμα τεχνικὸν μὲν οὖ, ψυχῆς δὲ στοχαστικῆς καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ φύσει δεινῆς Β προσομιλεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· καλὸ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἦγο
τὸ κεφάλαιον κολαχεῖαν. ταύτης μοι δοξεῖ τῆς ἐπιτηρήσεως πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα μόρια εἶναι, ἐν δὲ καὶ ἢ ὑποπουκή· ὁ δοξεῖ μὲν εἶναι τέχνη, ὡς δὲ ὁ ἐμὸς λόγος, οὐκ ἔστι τέχνη, ἀλλ' ἐμπειρία καὶ τριθή. ταύτης μόριον καὶ τὴν ὑποτοικὴν ἐγὼ καλῶ καὶ τὴν γε κομμωτικὴν καὶ τὴν σοφιστικὴν, τέταρτα ταύτα μόρια ἐπὶ τέταρτα πράγμασιν. εἰ οὖν βούλεται Πόλος πυνθάνεσθαι, πυνθανόεσθω· οὐ γὰρ πω πέπνυσιν ὁποῖον φημὶ ἐγὼ τῆς κολαχείας μόριον εἶναι τὴν ὑποτοικὴν ἀλλ' αὐτὸν λέληθα οὔτω ἀποκεχριμένος, ὁ δὲ ἐπανεφωτι, εἰ οὖ καλὸν ἡμοῦμαι εἶναι. ἐγὼ δὲ αὐτῷ οὖν ἀποχροινοῦμαι πρότερον εἴτε καλὸν εἴτε αἰσχρὸν ἡμοῦμαι εἶναι τὴν ὑποτοικὴν, πρὸν ἄν πρῶτον ἀποχρόνωμαι ὃ τι ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ δίκαιοι, ὁ Πόλε· ἀλλ' εἴπερ βουλεῖ πυνθέσθαι, ἐρῶτα ὁποῖον μόριον τῆς κολαχείας φημὶ εἶναι τὴν ὑποτοικὴν. Π.Ο.Α. Ἐρωτῶ δή, καὶ ἀποχρίναι, ὁ ὁποῖον μόριον. Σ.Ο. Ἀρ' οὖν ἣν μάθεις ἀποχροιναμένοι; ἔστι γὰρ ἢ ὑποτοικὴ κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον πολιτικῆς μορίου εἰδολον. Π.Ο.Α. Τί οὖν; καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν λέγεις αὐτὴν εἶναι; Σ.Ο. Αἰσχρὸν ἔγαγε· τὰ γὰρ κακὰ αἰσχρὰ καλῶ· ἐπειδὴ δει σοι ἀποχρίσασθαι, ὥς ἤδη εἰδότε ὃ ἐγὼ λέγω. ΓΩΡ. Μὰ τὸν Δία, ὁ Σῶκρατες, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ οὔδέ αὐτὸς συνήμην ὃ τι λέγεις. Σ.Ο. Εἰςό-Ε τός γε, ὁ Γοργία· οὐδὲν γὰρ ποι σαφὲς λέγω, Πόλος δὲ δὲ νέος ἔστι καὶ ὅξυς. ΓΩΡ. Ἀλλ' ὁ τούτος μὲν ἔα, ἐμοὶ δ' εἰπὲ πῶς λέγεις πολιτικῆς μορίου εἰδολον εἶναι τὴν ὑποτοικὴν. Σ.Ο.
'Ἀλλ᾽ ἐγὼ πειράσομαι φράσαι ὅ γέ μοι φαίνεται εἶναι ἡ ῥήτορική· εἰ δὲ μὴ τυγχάνει ὁν τοῦτο, 
Πόλος οὗτοί ἐλέγξει. σῶμα που καλεῖς τι καὶ 
ψυχήν; ΓΟΡ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; ΣΩ. Ὄνοχον 
καὶ τούτων οὔτε τινὰ εἶναι ἐκατέρου εὐεξίαν; 
ΓΟΡ. "Εγώγε. ΣΩ. Τῇ δὲ; δοξοῦσαν μὲν 
εὐεξίαν, οὕτων δ᾽ οὐ; οἴνον τούτων λέγω· πολ-
λοι δοξοῦσιν εὐ ἐξειν τὰ σώματα, οὗς οὐκ ἂν 
φαίνωσι αἰσθοῖτό τις, ὥστε οὐκ ἐξουσίων, ἄλλος 
ἡ ἰατρὸς τε καὶ τῶν γνιμναστικῶν τις. ΓΟΡ. 
Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ΣΩ. Τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγω καὶ ἐν 
σώματι εἶναι καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ, δ᾽ τι ποιεῖ δοξεῖν μὲν 
Β εὐ ἐξειν τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν, ἐχει δὲ οὐδὲν 
μᾶλλον. ΓΟΡ. "Εστὶ ταῦτα.

ΚΑΡ. XIX. ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ σοι, ἐὰν δύναιμαι, 
σαφέστερον ἐπιδείξω τὸ λέγω. Ἀνοίν ὄντοι τοῖν 
πραγμάτων δύο λέγω τέχνας· τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ 
ψυχῇ πολιτικῇ καλῶ, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ σῶματί μιᾶν 
μὲν οὖτως οὐκοῦόορα οὐκ ἐχώ σοι, μιᾶς δὲ οὖσις 
τῆς τοῦ σώματος θεραπείας δύο μόρια λέγω, τὴν 
μὲν γνιμναστικῆν, τὴν δὲ ἱατρικῆν. τῆς δὲ πολι-
τικῆς ἀντίστροφον μὲν τῇ γνιμναστικῇ τῆν νομο-
θετικῆν, ἀντίστροφον δὲ τῇ ἱατρικῇ τῆν δικαίο-
σύνην. ἐπικοινωνοῦσι μὲν δὴ ἀλλήλως, ἀτε περὶ 
tὸ αὐτὸ οὖσα, ἐκατέρας τούτων, ἢ τε ἱατρικῇ τῇ 
γνιμναστικῇ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῇ νομοθετικῇ · 
ὅμως δὲ διαφέρουσι τι ἀλλήλων. τετάρατον δὴ 
tούτων οὐσῶν, καὶ ἄει πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον θερα-
πευούσον, τῶν μὲν τὸ σῶμα, τῶν δὲ τὴν ψυχήν, 
ἡ κολαχευτικὴ αἰσθομένη, οὐ γνοῦσα λέγω ἄλλα
PLATONIS

στοχασαμένη, τέτραχα έαυτήν διανείμασα, ύποδύσα ύπο ἔκαστον τῶν μορίων, προσποιεῖται εἰ-Δ
ναι τούτο, ὅπερ ὑπέδυ, καὶ τοῦ μὲν βελτίστου
οὕδεν φροντίζει, τῷ δὲ ἄει ἡδίστῳ θηρεύεται τὴν ἄνοιαν καὶ ἔξαπατά, ὡστε δοξεὶ πλείστου ἄξια
eίναι. ύπὸ μὲν οὖν τὴν ιατρίκην ἡ ύποποικὴ
ὑποδέδυσε, καὶ προσποιεῖται τὰ βέλτιστα σιτία
τῷ σῶματι εἰδέναι, ὡστ', εἰ δέοι ἐν παιοὶ δια
gνωσίζεσθαι ύποποιόν τε καὶ ιατρὸν ἡ ἐν ἀνδράσιν
οὐτως ἀνοίητος ὁσπερ οἱ παίδες, πότερος ἔπαιει
περὶ τῶν χρηστῶν σιτίων καὶ πονηρῶν, ὁ ιατρὸς
ἡ ὁ ύποποιός, λιμῷ ἄν ἀποθαναίην τὸν ιατρὸν. Ε
κολαχεῖαν μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ καλῶ, καὶ αἰσχρόν φημι
eίναι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὁ Πῶλε, — τούτο γάρ πρὸς σὲ 465
λέγω, — ὅτι τοῦ ἡδεός στοχαζεῖται ἄνευ τοῦ βελ
tίστου: τέχνην δὲ αὐτὴν οὐ φημί εἶναι, ἀλλ'
ἐμπειρίαν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει λόγον οὐδένα ὁ προσ-
φέρει ὅποι' ἄττα τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν, ὡστε τὴν αἰ-
tίαν ἔκαστον μὴ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν. ἐργὸ δὲ τέχνην
οὐ καλῶ δ ἄν ἦ ἁλογον πράγμα. τούτων δὲ
πέρι εἰ ἀμφισβήτεις, ἐθέλω ὑποσχεῖν λόγον.

ΣΑΡ. ΧΧ. Τῇ μὲν οὖν ιατρίκη, ὁσπερ λέγω,
ἡ ύποποικὴ κολαχεία ὑπόκειται· τῇ δὲ γυμνα-
βικῇ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τούτον ἡ κομιω-
τική, κακούργος τε οὖσα καὶ ἀπατηλὴ καὶ ἀγε
νις καὶ ἀνελεύθερος, σχήματι καὶ χρώματι καὶ
λειτυργίᾳ καὶ ἐπιθέσει ἀπατῶς, ὡστε ποιεῖν ἀλλο-
tριον κάλλος ἐφελκομένους τοῦ οἰκείου τοῦ διὰ
tῆς γυμναστικῆς ἀμελείν. ἐν' οὖν μὴ μακρολο-
γῶ, ἐθέλω σοι εἰπεῖν ὁσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι— ἡδή
γὰρ ἄν ἵσως ἀχολουθήσαις — οὕτω ὁ κομμωτικὴ
πρὸς γυνικαστικῆν, τούτῳ ὁψοποικὶ πρὸς ἰατρικῆν. 
μάλλον δὲ ὀδε, ὦτι ὁ κομμωτικὴ πρὸς γυ-
μικαστικῆν, τούτῳ σοφιστικὴ πρὸς νομοθετικῆν,
καὶ ὦτι ὁ ὁποποικὶ πρὸς ἰατρικῆν, τούτῳ ἡγο-
ρικὴ πρὸς δικαιοσύνην. Ὑπερ μέντοι λέγω, διε-
στήκε μὲν οὔτω φύσει· ἀτε δ' ἐγγὺς ὑμτων φύ-
ρονται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ περὶ ταύτα σοφιστάται καὶ ἡ-
ὔτορες, καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅ τι χρῆςονται οὔτε 
αὐτοὶ ἐ αυτοῖς οὔτε οὐ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι τούτοις.

καὶ γὰρ ἄν, εἴ μη ἡ ψυχή τῷ σώματι ἐπεστάτει,
ἀλλ' αὐτῷ αὐτῷ, καὶ μη ὑπὸ ταύτης κατεθεωρή-
το καὶ διεκρίνετο ἦτι ὁ ὁποποικὴ καὶ ἡ ἰατρικὴ,
ἀλλ' αὐτῷ τῷ σῶμα ἔχρινε σταθμόμενον ταῖς 
χρώσι ταῖς πρὸς αὐτό, τῷ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου ἂν 
πολύ ἦν, ὁ φίλε Πάλλε—συ γὰρ τοῦτων ἐμπε-
ροσ·—ομοῦ ἃν πάντα χρῆματα ἔρφητο ἐν τῷ 
αὐτῷ, ἀκριτῶν ὑμτων τῶν τέ ἰατρικῶν καὶ ὑμει-
νῶν καὶ ὁποποικῶν. ὦ μὲν οὖν ἐγὼ φημι τὴν 
ἡτορικὴν εἶναι, ἄχρικος· ἀντίστροφον ὁψοποι-

Εἰς ἐν ψυχή, ὥς ἐκεῖνο ἐν σώματι. Ὅσος μὲν 
οὖν άτοπον πεποίηκα, ὅτι σε οὖν ἐών μαχροὺ 
λόγους λέγειν αὐτὸς συχνὸν λόγον ἀποτέλετακα. 
ἀξίων μὲν οὖν ἐμοὶ συγγνώμην ἔχειν ἄστι· λέ-
γοντος γὰρ μου βραχέα οὐχ ἐμάνθανες, οὐδὲ 
χρῆσαι τῇ ἀποκρίσει ἤν σοι ἀπεκρινάμην οὐδὲν 466
οἴος τ' ἴθα, ἀλλ' ἐδέου διηγήσεως. ἦν μὲν 
οὖν καὶ ἐγώ, σοῦ ἀποκρινομένον, μη ἔχω ὅ τι 
χρήσωμαι, ἀπότεινε καὶ σοι λόγον, ἦν δὲ ἔχω,
ξα με χρήσθαι· δίκαιον γάρ. καὶ νῦν ταύτη τῇ ἀποκρίσει εἰ τι ἐγείς χρήσθαι, χρῶ.

ΣΑΡ. ΧΧΙ. ΠΩΛ. Τι οὖν φής; κολακεία δοξεῖ σοι εἶναι ἡ ἠτοπικῆς; ΣΩ. Κολακείας μὲν οὖν ἔγγαγε εἰπὼν μόριον. ἀλλ’ οὐ μημονεύεις τιλικοῦτος ὁν, ὦ Πῶλε; τί τάχα δράσεις [προεβούτης γενόμενος]; ΠΩΛ. Ἐφ’ οὖν δοκοῦσι σοι ὁ δὲ κόλαξ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι φαῦλοι νομίζει· θαί οἱ ἄγαθοι ἠτόροις; ΣΩ. Ἐφ’ ὡς ἐγείς τούτ’ ἔρωτις, ἡ λόγου τινὸς ἀρχὴν λέγεις; ΠΩΛ. Ἐφ’ ὡς ἐγείς. ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ νομίζεσθαι ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσι. ΠΩΛ. Πῶς οὐ νομίζεσθαι; οὐ μέριστον δύνανται ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν; ΣΩ. Οὐκ, εἰ τὸ δύνασθαι γε λέγεις ἄγαθόν τι εἶναι τῷ δυναμένῳ. ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ λέγω γε. ΣΩ. Ἐλάχιστον τοῦν μοι δοκοῦσι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλεις δύνασθαι οἱ ἠτόροις. ΠΩΛ. Τί δὲ; οὖς, ἄσπερ οἱ τύφανοι, ἀποκτινωάσι τε ὁν ἀν βούλωνται, καὶ ἀφαιροῦνται χρῆματα καὶ ἐσβάλλουσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὁν ἀν δοξὴ αὐτοῖς; ΣΩ. Νη τὸν κύνα, ἀμφιγνῶ οὖντοι, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐφ’ ἐκάστον ὁν λέγεις, πότερον αὐτοὺς ταύτα λέγεις καὶ γνώμην σαυτοῦ ἀποφαίνει, ἡ ἡμὲ ἐρωταῖς. ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλ’ ἐγώγε σε ἔρωτῳ. ΣΩ. Εἶδεν, οὐ φίλε· ἐπείτα δῦο ἄμα με ἐρωτᾶς; ΠΩΛ. Πῶς δῦο; ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρτι οὖτο ποσ ἐλέγες, ὅτι ἀποκτιν-νύσιν οἱ ἠτόροι οὖσ ἀν βούλωνται, ἄσπερ οἱ τύφανοι καὶ χρήματα ἀφαιροῦνται καὶ ἐξελινοῦσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὁν ἀν δοξὴ αὐτοῖς; ΠΩΛ. Ἐγώγε.
GORGIAS.

Cap. XXII. ΣΩ. Ἀργο τοίνυν σοι, ὅτι δύο ταύτ' ἔστι τὰ ἐρωτήματα, καὶ ἀποκρινοῦμαι γέ σοι πρὸς ἀμφότερα. ήμι γὰρ, ὦ Πώλε, ἐγὼ καὶ τοὺς ὑπότος καὶ τοὺς τυφάννους δύνασθαι ἔμεν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι ὁμαχοταιον, ὡσπερ νῦν δὴ ἐλεγον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ποιεῖν ἄν βουλονται, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν· ποιεῖν μέντοι ὁ τι ἄν αὐτοῖς δόξῃ βέλτιστον εἶναι. ΠΩΛ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτὸ ἐστὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι; ΣΩ. Οὐχ, ὡς ἐφει Πώλε. ΠΩΛ. Ἠγὼ οὐ φημι; ήμι μὲν οἶν ἐγώγε. ΣΩ. Μὰ τὸν—οὗ σὺ γε, ἐπεὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι ἐφης ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τῷ δυναμένῳ. ΠΩΛ. ήμι γὰρ οἶν. ΣΩ. Ἀγαθὸν οὖν οἱ εἰναι, εάν τις ποιῇ ταύτα, ἡ ἄν δοκῇ αὐτῷ βέλτιστα εἶναι, νοῦν μὴ ἔχον; καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖς μέγα δύνασθαι; ΠΩΛ. Οὐχ ἐγώγε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀποδείξεις τοὺς ὑπότος νοῦν ἔχοντας καὶ τέχνην ἐφημορικὴν, ἀλλὰ μὴ κολακείαν, ἡμὲ ἐξελέγξαι; εἰ δὲ μὲ ἐάνεις ἀνελεγκτον, οἱ ὑπότος οἱ ποιοῦντες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄδοξεί αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ τύφαννοι οὐδὲν ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο κεχτήσονται, εἰ δὴ δυνάμει ἐστιν, ὡς αὐ φῆς, ἀγαθὸν, τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν ἄνευ νοῦ ἄδοξεί καὶ σὺ ὀμολογεῖς κακῶν εἶναι. ἦ οὖ; ΠΩΛ. Ἠγώγε. ΣΩ. Πῶς ἄν οὖν οἱ ὑπότος μέγα δύναστο ἦ οἱ τύφαννοι ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, εὰν μὴ Σωκράτης ἐξελέγχθη ὑπὸ Πώλεως, ὃτι ποιοῦσιν ἄδοξον; ΠΩΛ. Οὕτως ἀνήγο—ΣΩ. Οὐ φημι ποιεῖν αὐτούς ἄδοξον; ΠΩΛ. Οὐχ ἄρτι ὀμολογεῖς ποιεῖν ἄδοξεί αὐτοῖς βέλτιστα εἶναι,
τούτου πρόσθεν; Σ. Ο. Καὶ γὰρ νῦν ὁμολογῶ. Π. Ω. Α. Οὐκοῦν ποιοῦσιν ὁ βουλοῦνται. Σ. Ο. Οὐ φημ. Π. Ω. Α. Ποιοῦντες δὲ ὧ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς; Σ. Ο. Φημ. Π. Ω. Α. Σχέτλια λέγεις καὶ ὑπερφυῆ, ὁ Σωκράτες. Σ. Ο. Μὴ κατηγορεῖ, ὡ λάστε Πόλε, ἵνα προσεῖπο σε κατὰ σὲ· ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν μὲν σὲ ἔχεις ἐμὲ ἐρωτῶν, ἐπίδειξον, ὅτι θευδομαι, ἐὰν δὲ μη, αὐτὸς ἀποκρίνον. Π. Ω. Α. Ἀλλ᾽ ἐνελο ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἵνα καὶ εἰδῶ ὁ τι λέγεις.

Σ. Ο. Πότερον οὗν σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἀνθρωποι τούτο βούλεσθαι, ὃ ἂν πράττοσιν ἐκάστοτε, ἥ ἔκειν, οὗ ἔνεκα πράττονσι τοῦθ᾽, ὃ πράττοσιν; οἶον οἱ τὰ φάρμακα πίνοντες παρὰ τῶν ἱερῶν πότερον σοι δοκοῦσι τοῦτο βούλεσθαι, ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν, πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον καὶ ἄλγειν, ἡ ἔκειν, τὸ ψυχαίνειν, οὗ ἔνεκα πίνοντι; Π. Ω. Α. Άηλον, ὅτι τὸ ψυχαίνειν, οὗ ἔνεκα πίνοντι. Σ. Ο. Οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ πλέοντες τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον χρηματισμὸν χρηματιζόμενοι οὐ τοῦτο ἔστιν ὁ βουλοῦνται, ὁ ποιοῦσιν ἐκάστοτε· τὸς γὰρ βούλεται πλεῖν τε καὶ κυνδυνεύειν καὶ πράγματ' ἔχειν; ἀλλ᾽ ἔκειν, οἶμαι, οὗ ἔνεκα πλέονσι, πλέοντι· πλούτου γὰρ ἔνεκα πλέουσιν. Π. Ω. Α. Πάνω γε. Σ. Ο. Ἀλλο τι οὗν οὔτω καὶ περὶ πάντων; ἐὰν τίς τι πράττῃ ἔνεκά του, οὐ τοῦτο βούλεται, ὃ πράττει, ἀλλ᾽ ἔκειν, οὗ ἔνεκα πράττει. Π. Ω. Α. Ναι. Σ. Ο. Ἀρ' οὗν Ε ἐστι τι τῶν ὅντων, ὁ οὐχὶ ἦτοι ἄγαθὸν γ᾽ ἔστιν ἢ κακὸν ἢ μεταξὺ τούτων, οὔτε ἄγαθὸν οὔτε κακὸν; Π. Ω. Α. Πολλὴ ἀνάγχη, ὁ Σωκράτες.
ΣΩ. Οὖν οἷον λέγεις εἶναι ἁγαθὸν μὲν σοφίαν τε καὶ ψυχείον καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ τάλλα τὰ τοιαύτα, κακὰ δὲ τάναντια τούτων; ΠΩΛ. "Εγὼ γε. ΣΩ. Τὰ δὲ μὴτε ἁγαθὰ μὴτε κακὰ ἡρῴουδε λέγεις, ἡ ἐνίοτε μὲν μετέχει τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ, ἐνίοτε δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ, ἐνίοτε δὲ οὐδετέρον, οἷον καθήσαι καὶ βαδίζειν καὶ τρέχειν καὶ πλεῖν, καὶ οὖν αὐ λίθους καὶ ξύλα καὶ τάλλα τὰ τοιαύτα; οὖ ταῦτα λέγεις; ἥ ἀλλ᾽ ἅττα καλεῖς τὰ μὴτε ἁγαθὰ μὴτε κακὰ; ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα. ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν τὰ μεταξύ ταῦτα ἐνεχεὶ τῶν ἁγαθῶν πράττουσιν, ὅταν πράττωσιν, ἥ τάγαθα τῶν μεταξύ; ΠΩΛ. Τὰ μεταξύ δὴ-Β που τῶν ἁγαθῶν. ΣΩ. Τὸ ἁγαθὸν ἄρα διώκοντες καὶ βαδίζομεν, ὅταν βαδίζομεν, οἴομενοι βελτιών εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἔσταμεν, ὅταν ἐστώμεν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐνεχα, τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ. ἥ οὐ; ΠΩΛ. Ναι. ΣΩ. Οὖνοι καὶ ἀποκτίννυμεν, εἰ τιν' ἀποκτίννυμεν, καὶ ἐκβάλλομεν καὶ ἀφαλ-ρουμέθη κρήματα, οἴομενοι ἀμείων εἶναι ἡμῶν ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἦ μή; ΠΩΛ. Πάνω γε. ΣΩ. 'Ενεχ' ἄρα τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ ἀπαντὰ ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν οἱ ποιοῦντες. ΠΩΛ. Φημὶ.

CAP. XXIV. ΣΩ. Οὖνοι ὁμολογήσαμεν, ἃ C ἐνεχά τοις ποιοῦμεν, μὴ ἐκεῖνα βουλεσθαί, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνο, οὐ ἐνεχα ταῦτα ποιοῦμεν; ΠΩΛ. Μάνστα. ΣΩ. Οὖν ἄρα σφάτειν βουλόμεθα οὐδ' ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων οὐδὲ χρήματα ἀφαι-ρεῖσθαι ἀπλῶς οὕτως, ἀλλ᾽ εάν μὲν ἀφέλμα ἡ ταῦτα, βουλόμεθα πράττειν αὐτά, βλαβερὰ δὲ
ούντα οὐ βουλόμεθα. τα γὰρ ἀγαθὰ βουλόμεθα, ὡς φής σὺ, τα δὲ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακὰ οὐ βουλόμεθα, οὐδὲ τα κακά. ἦ γὰρ; ἀληθῆ σοι δοκᾷ λέγειν, ὡς Πῶλε, ἡ οὐ; Ὑποκρίνεις; Π.Π. Ἀληθῆ. Σ.Ο. Οὐχοῦν εἶπερ ταῦτα ὁμολογοῦμεν, εἰ τις ἀποκτείνει τινὰ ἢ ἐκβάλλει εἰκ pόλεως ἢ ἀφαιρεῖται χρῆματα, εἰτε τύφανος ὁν εἰτε ῥήτωρ, οὐδέμενος οὐμενίν εἰναι αὐτῷ, τυγχάνει δὲ ὁν κάκιον, οὕτως ὑπετο ποιεῖ ὃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ. ἦ γὰρ; Π.Π. Ν. Ν. Σ.Ο. Ἀρ’ οὖν καὶ ὁ βουλεύεται, εἶπερ τυγχάνει ταῦτα κακὰ οὗντα; Ὑποκρίνεις; Π.Π. Ἀλ. οὐ μοι δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ὃ βουλεύεται. Σ.Ο. Ὑποκρίνεις; Π.Π. Ν. Ν. Ἀρ’, ὡς ὁς σὺ, ὃ Σύξορατε, οὐκ ἂν δέξασθαι εἰκαίναι σοι ποιεῖν ὃ τι δοκεῖ σοι ἐν τῇ πόλει μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ, οὐδὲ ἕγινοι, ὅταν ἐδῆς τινὰ ἢ ἀποκτεῖνατα ὃν ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ ἢ ἀφελόμενον χρῆματα ἢ δήποτα. Σ.Ο. Δικαίως, λέγεις, ἢ ἀδικῶς; Π.Π. Ὀρ. ὁπότερ; ὃν ποιῇ, οὐκ ἀμφιβολῶς ἕγινεν ἐστιν; ἀδικῶς Σ.Ο. Ἐνφίλεις, ὡς Πῶλε. Π.Π. Τί δῆ; Σ.Ο. Ὑποκρίνεις; Π.Π. Ν. Ν. ὑπετε, οὐκ ἀμφιβολῶς ἕγινεν όντες ἀθλίους, ἀλλ’ ἐλέειν. Π.Π. Τί δαί; οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἐχεῖν περὶ ὃν ἐγὼ λέγω τῶν ἀνθρώπων; Σ.Ο. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Π.Π. Ὑποκρίνεις
οὖν ἀποκτίννυσιν δὲν ἡν δόξῃ αὐτῷ, δικαίως ἀποκτίννυσιν, ἅθλιος δοξεῖ σοι εἶναι καὶ ἔλεεινός; ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε, οὐδὲ μέντοι ζηλωτός. ΠΩ. Α. Β Οὐκ ἄρτι ἅθλιον ἐφησάθα εἶναι; ΣΩ. Τὸν ἀδίκως γε, ὁ ἐταίρη, ἀποκτείναντα, καὶ ἔλεεινόν γε πρὸς τὸν δὲ δικαίως ἄξιλωτον. ΠΩ. Α. Ἡ ποὺ ὅ ϑε ἀποκτίννυσιν, ὁ Πόλε, καὶ ἦτον ἡ ὁ δικαίως ἀποθνησκὼν. ΠΩ. Α. Πῶς ἤδη, ὁ Σώκρατες; ΣΩ. Οὕτως, ὁς μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν τυχάναι ὅν τὸ ἀδικεῖν. ΠΩ. Α. Ἡ γὰρ τοῦτο μέγιστον; οὐ τὸ ἀδικείσθαι μείζον; ΣΩ. Ἡχιστὰ γε. ΠΩ. Α. Σὺ ἄρα βούλοισ ἡν ἀδικείσθαι μᾶλλον ἡ ἀδικεῖν; ΣΩ. Βουλοίμην μὲν ἡν ἔγωγε οὐδέτερα· εἰ δ’ ἀναγκαίον εἰθ’ ἀδικεῖν ἡ ἀδικείσθαι, ἐλοίμην ἡν μᾶλλον ἀδικείσθαι ἡ ἀδικεῖν. ΠΩ. Α. Σὺ ἄρα τυραννεῖν οὐχ ἡν ἰδίαιο; ΣΩ. Οὐχ, εἰ τὸ τυραννεῖν γε λέγεις ὁπερ ἐγώ. ΠΩ. Α. Ἀλλ’ ἔγωγε τοῦτο λέγω, ὁπερ ἄρτι, ἐξεῖναι ἐν τῇ πόλει, ὁ ἡν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ποιεῖν τοῦτο, καὶ ἀποκτίννυντι καὶ ἐκβάλλοντι καὶ πάντα πράττοντι κατὰ τὴν αὐτῷ δόξαν.

ΚΑΡ. ΧΧ. ΣΩ. Ἡ θυρώτερε, ἢμοῦ δὴ λέγοντο τῷ λόγῳ ἐπιλαβοῦ. εἰ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἐν ἄγορῇ πληθούσῃ λαβὼν ὑπὸ μάλης ἔγχειρίδιον λέγοιμι πρὸς σέ, ὅτι ΣΩ Πόλε, ἢμοὶ δύναμίς τις καὶ τυραννὶς θαναμασία ἄρτι προσεγγοῦν· εἰ δὲν γὰρ ἄρα ἢμοὶ δόξῃ τινὰ τουτοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὃν σὺ ὅρας αὐτίκα μᾶλα δεῖν τεθνάναι, τεθνήξει
οὗτος, δὲν ἂν δοξή · κἂν τίνα δοξή μοι τῆς κεφαλῆς αὐτῶν κατεγέναι δεῖν, κατεγώς ἐσται αὐτίκα μάλα, κἂν θοιμάτιον διεσχίσθαι, διεσχισμένων ἐσται · οὕτω μέγα ἐγὼ δύναμιν ἐν τῇδε τῇ Ἐπόλει · εἰ οὖν ἀπιστοῦντι σοι δείξαι τὸ ἐγχειρίδιον, ἵσως ἂν εἰποὺς ἰδὼν, ὃι Ἡ Ὁρκατες, οὕτω μὲν πάντες ἂν μέγα δύναμιν, ἐπεὶ κἂν ἐμπροσθεὶν οίκία τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἤντιν' ἂν σοι δοξή, καὶ τὰ γε Ἀθηναίων νεώρια καὶ τριήρεις καὶ τὰ πλοῖα πάντα καὶ τὰ δημόσια καὶ τὸ ἤδια. ἀλλ' οὖν ἁρὰ τούτ' ἐστί τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι, τὸ ποιεῖν ἢ δοξεῖ αὐτῷ. ἢ δοξεῖ σοι; ΠΩΑ. Οὖντο ὅτα ὅτα ὅτα γε. ΣΩ. ἖χεις οὖν εἰπεῖν, διότι μέμφει τὴν τοιαύτην δύναμιν; ΠΩΑ. Ἐγώγε. ΣΩ. Τῇ δῇ; λέγε. ΠΩΑ. ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον τὸν οὕτω πράττοντα ζημιούσθαι ἐστί. ΣΩ. Τῷ δὲ ζημιούσθαι οὐ κακόν; ΠΩΑ. Πάννυ γε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ἢ θανάσις, τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι πάλιν αὖ σοι φαίνεται, ἐὰν μὲν πράττοντι ὥ δοξεῖ ἐπηται τῷ ἀφελίμως πράττειν, ἀγάθον τε εἶναι, καὶ τούτῳ, ὥς εἴοικεν, ἐστὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι· εἰ δὲ Β μῆ, κακῶν καὶ σμικρῶν δύνασθαι. Σχερώμεθα δὲ καὶ τόδε. ἀλλ' τι ὁμολογοῦμεν ἐνίοτε μὲν ἀμείνον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν, ὡ νῦν δῇ ἐλέγομεν, ἀποκτινώναι τε καὶ ἐξελαύνειν ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἀναφεσθαι χρήματα, ἐνίοτε δὲ οὐ; ΠΩΑ. Πάννυ γε. ΣΩ. Τούτῳ μὲν δῇ, ὡς ἐοίκε, καὶ παρὰ σοῦ καὶ παρ' ἐμοῦ ὁμολογεῖται. ΠΩΑ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Πότε οὖν σὺ φης ἀμείνον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν; εἰπὲ τίνα ὅρον ὃριζει. ΠΩΑ. Σὺ
μὲν οὖν, ὁ Σῶκρατες, ἀπόκριναι ταύτι τούτῳ. 

C Σ.Ω. Ἠγὼ μὲν τούτων φημί, ὁ Πώλε, εἰ σοι παρ' ἐμοῦ ἤδιον ἐστιν ἀκούειν, ὅταν μὲν δικαίως τις ταύτα ποιή, ἀμείνον εἶναι, ὅταν δὲ ἁδίκως, κάκιον.

Cap. XXVI. Π.Ω.Α. Χαλεπόν γέ σε ἐλέγξαι, ὁ Σῶκρατες· ἀλλ' οὐχὶ κἂν παῖς σε ἐλέγξειν, ὅτι οὐκ ἄληθῆ λέγεις; Σ.Ω. Πολλήν ἄρα ἐγὼ τῷ παιδὶ χάριν ἔξω, ἢπλὶ δὲ καὶ σοί, εάν με ἐλέγξης καὶ ἀπαλλάξῃς φλυαρίας. ἀλλ' μὴ κάμης φίλον ἄνδρα εὐφρέτων, ἀλλ' ἐλεγχε. Π.Ω.Α.

Ἡ ἀλλ' μήν, ὁ Σῶκρατες, οὐδέν γέ σε δεὶ παλαιός πράγμασιν ἐλέγχειν· τὰ γὰρ ἐχθές καὶ πρόθεν γεγονότα ταῦτα ἵκανα σε ἑξελέγξαι ἔστι καὶ ἀποδέξαι, ὅς πολλοὶ ἀδικοῦντες ἄνθρωποι εὐδαιμονές εἰσι. Σ.Ω. Τὰ ποία ταύτα; Π.Ω.Α. Ἀρχέλαον δῆπον τούτων τὸν Περδίκκου ὅρις ἄρχοντα Μακεδονίας; Σ.Ω. Εἶ δὲ μή, ἀλλ' ἀκούσ γε. Π.Ω.Α. Ἐνδαίμονον οὖν σοὶ δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ ἄθλιος; Σ.Ω. Οὐκ οἶδα, ὁ Πώλε· οὖ γὰρ πω συγγέγονα τῷ ἄνδρι. Π.Ω.Α. Τί δαί; Ἐ συγγεγομένους ἄν γνοίης, ἀλλοι δὲ αὐτὸθεν οὔ γνώσκεις ὅτι εὐδαιμονεῖ; Σ.Ω. Μὰ Δι' οὐ δῆτα. Π.Ω.Α. Δῆλον δή, ὁ Σῶκρατες, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα γνώσκεις φήσεις εὐδαιμονέα ὄντα. Σ.Ω. Καὶ ἄληθῆ γε ἐγώ· οὐ γὰρ οἶδα παιδείας ὅπως ἔχει καὶ δικαίοσύνης. Π.Ω.Α. Τί δὲ; ἐν τούτῳ ἡ πάσα εὐδαιμονία ἐστίν; Σ.Ω. Ὁς γε ἐγὼ λέγω, ὁ Πώλε· τὸν μὲν γὰρ καλὸν κἀραθὸν ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα εὐδαιμονά εἶναι
φημι, τὸν δὲ ἄδικον καὶ πονηρὸν ἄθλιον. ΠΩΛ. 471
"Ἀθλίος ἄρα οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ Ἀρχέλαος κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον; ΣΩ. Εἶπερ γε, ὃ φίλε, ἄδικος. ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ πῶς οὐχ ἄδικος; ὅ γε προσήκε μὲν τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐδέν, ἣν νῦν ἔχει, ὅντι ἐκ γυναικὸς, ἢ ἦν δούλη Ἀλκέτου, τοῦ Περδίκκου ἄδελφον, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸ δίκαιον δοῦλος ἢν Ἀλκέτη καὶ ἦν ἐυδαιμόν κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον· νῦν δὲ θαυμασίας ὡς ἄθλιος γέγονεν, Β ἐπεὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἡδίκησεν· ὅ γε πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτον αὐτὸν τὸν δεσπότην καὶ θεῖον μεταπεμφάμενος ὡς ἀποδώσαν τὴν ἀρχὴν, ἦν Περδίκκας αὐτὸν ἀφείλετο, ἐξενίσας καὶ καταμεθύσας αὐτὸν τε καὶ τὸν νῦν αὐτοῦ Ἀλέξανδρον, ἀνεμισὲν αὐτοῦ, σχεδὸν ἡλικιώτην, ἐμβαλὼν εἰς ἀμβατῖν, νύκτωρ ἔξαγαγὼν ἀπεσφαξε τε καὶ ἤφανσεν ἀμφοτέρους, καὶ ταῦτα ἀδικήσας ἔλαθεν ἑαυτὸν ἀθλιώτατος γενόμενος καὶ οὐ μετεμέλησεν αὐτῶ, ἀλλ' ὀλίγον ὑστερον τὸν ἄδελφον τὸν γυνήσιον, C τὸν Περδίκκου νῦν, παῖδα ὃς ἐπτάετη, οὐ ἢ ἀρχὴ ἐγίγνετο κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον, οὐχ ἐδούληθεν εὐδαιμόν γενέσθαι δικαίως ἐκθρέψας καὶ ἀποδοὺς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐκείνην, ἀλλ' εἰς φρέαρ ἐμβαλὼν ἀποπνίξας πρὸς τὴν μητέρα αὐτοῦ Κλεοπάτραν χῦνα ἔρη διώκοντα ἐμπεσεν καὶ ἀποθανεῖν, τουγάτοι νῦν, ὅτε μέγιστα ἡδίκησός τὸν ἐν Μακεδονία, ἀθλιώτατος ἐστὶ πάντων Μακεδόνων, ἀλλ' οὐκ εὐδαιμονεστάτος, καὶ οὐς ἐστίν ὅσις Ἀθηναίων ἀπὸ σοῦ ἀρξάμενος δέξαιτ' ἀν ἄλλος
Δόστισσον Μακεδόνων γενέσθαι μᾶλλον ἡ Ἀρ-χέλαιος.

Καὶ κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς τῶν λόγων, ὁ Πωλεῖος ἤρωγε σε ἐπίθεσα, ὅτι μοι δοκεῖς εὖ πρὸς τὴν ἡττορικήν πεπαθεύσαι, τού δὲ διώκεσθαι ἦμεληκέναι· καὶ νῦν ἀλλο τι οὕτως ἔστιν ὁ λόγος, ὅ με καὶ ἂν παῖς ἐξελέγξεις, καὶ ἐγὼ ὑπὸ σοῦ νῦν, ὡς σὺ οὖν, ἐξελήλεγκας τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ, φάσκων τὸν ἀδικοῦντα οὐκ εὐδαιμόνα εἶναι; πόθεν, ὅ γαθέ; καὶ μὴν οὖδέν γέ σοι τούτων ὁμολογῶ ἃν σὺ φῆς. Π. Ω. Α. Οὐ γὰρ ἐθέ-Ελείς, ἐπεί δοκεῖ γέ σοι ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω. Σ. Ω. ἡ οὐκὰριε, ἡττορικῶς γὰρ με ἐπιθείρεσι ἐλέγχειν, ὅσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἠρωμένοι ἐλέγχειν, καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ οἱ έτεροι τοὺς ἐτέρους δοκοῦσιν ἐλέγχειν, ἐπειδὰν τῶν λόγων ἢν ἂν λέγωσι μάρτυρας πολλοὺς παρέχονται καὶ εὐδοκίμους, ὃ δὲ τάναντε ἔλγων ἐνα τινά παρέχων, ἢ μηδένα. οὕτος δὲ ὁ ἐλέγχος οὖν οὖν ἢξίους ἐστὶν πρὸς τὴν ἀργάληθειον· ἐνίοτε γὰρ ἢν καὶ καταγενευδομαρτυρήθην τις ύπὸ πολλῶν καὶ δοκοῦντων εἶναι τι. καὶ νῦν περὶ ὅν σὺ λέγεις ὀλέγου σοι πάντες συμφήσοντες ταῦτα Ἀθηναίοι καὶ γένου· ἢ εὰν βούλη κατ᾽ ἐμοῦ μάρτυρας παρασχέσθαι ὡς οὐκ ἄληθῆ λέγω, μαρτυρήσοντι σοι, εὰν μὲν ἂν βούλῃ, Νικίας οὐ Νικηφάτου καὶ οὐ ἀδελφῶν μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ, ὅλον τις ἔριπος οἱ ἐφεξῆς ἑστᾶτες εἰσὶν ἐν τῷ Λιονυσίο, ἢν δὲ βούλῃ, Ἀριστοκράτης δὲ Β. Σκελλίου, οὐ αὖ ἔστιν ἐν Πυθίου τούτῳ τὸ κα-λὸν ἀνάθημα, ἢν δὲ βούλῃ, ἡ Περικλέους οἶλη
οίκιά, ἡ ἄλλη συγγένεια, ἤπειρα ἄν βούλη τῶν ἐνθέντε ἐκλέξασθαι. ἄλλ' ἐγὼ σοι εἰς ὃν ὁμολογῶ· οὐ γὰρ με σὺ ἀναγκάζεις, ἄλλα ἐνε- δομάτυρος κατ' ἐμοὶ πολλοὺς παρασχόμενος ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐκβάλλειν μὲ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς. ἐγὼ δὲ ἂν μή σε αὐτὸν ἔνα ὄντα μάρτυρα παράσχομαι ὁμολογοῦντα περὶ ἄν λέγω, οὐδὲν ὁμιαί ἄξιον λόγου μοι πεπεράνθαι περὶ ἂν ἄν ἤμιν ὁ λόγος ἤ· ὁμιαί δὲ οὐδὲ σοι, ἂν μή ἐγὼ σοι μαρτυρῶ εἰς ὃν μόνος, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους πάντας τούτους χαίρειν εἰς. ἐστι μὲν οὖν οὕτ- τος τις τρόπος ἐλέγχου, ὡς σὺ τε οἶει καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί· ἐστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλος, ὃν ἐγώ αὐτὸν ὁμιαί. παραβαλόντες οὖν παρ' ἄλληλους σχεσιώμεθα εἰ τι διόισσον ἄλληλων. καὶ γάρ τυχάνει περὶ ὃν ἀμφισβητοῦμεν οὐ πάνω σμικρὰ ὄντα, ἄλλα σχέδον τι ταύτα, περὶ ὃν εἰδέναι τε κάλλι- στον, μὴ εἰδέναι τε αἰσχρότον· το γάρ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ἡ γιγνώσκειν ἡ ἀγνοεῖν ὡστε τε εὐ- δαίμων ἐστι καὶ ὡστε μὴ. αὐτίκα πρῶτον, περὶ θανόν τοῦ ὃν ἄν λόγος ἐστὶ, σὺ ἢγεῖ οἶον τε εἶναι μακά- ριον ἄνδρα ἀδίκουντα τε καὶ ἀδίκουν ὄντα, εἰπερ Ἀρχέλαον ἀδίκουν μὲν ἢγεῖ εἶναι, εὐδαίμονα δὲ. ἄλλο τι ὃς οὔτω σοι νομίζοντος διανοοῦμεθα; ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.

CAP. XXVIII. Σ.Ο. 'Ἐγὼ δὲ φημί ἀδύνατον. ἐν μὲν τούτῳ ἀμφισβητοῦμεν. εἰεν· ἀδίκων δὲ δὴ εὐδαίμων ἐστιν ἄρ', ἄν τυχάνη δίκης τε καὶ τιμωρίας; ΠΩΛ. Ἡ κατά γε, ἐπεὶ οὔτω γ' ἄν ἀθλιώτατος εἰη. Σ.Ο. 'Αλλ' ἐὰν ὁρα μὴ τυγ-
χάνη δίκης ὁ ἀδικῶν, κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον εὐδαιμονίαν ἔσται. Π.Ω.Λ. Φησί. Σ.Ω. Κατὰ δὲ γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν, ὁ Πόλε, ὁ ἀδικῶν τε καὶ ἐ ἀδικος πάντως μὲν ἀθλιος, ἀθλιώτερος μέντοι, ἐὰν μὴ διδῷ δίκην μηδὲ τυγχάνῃ τιμωρίας ἀδικών, ἥττον δὲ ἀθλιος, ἐὰν διδῷ δίκην καὶ τυγ-
473 χάνη δίκης ὑπὸ θεῶν τε καὶ ἄνθρωπων. Π.Ω.Λ.

"Ατοπά γε, ὁ Σάκρατες, ἐπιχειρεῖς λέγειν. Σ.Ω. Πειράσομαι δὲ γε καὶ σὲ ποιῆσαι, ὃ ἑταῖρε, ταῦτα ἐμοί λέγειν· φίλον γὰρ σε ἡγοῦμαι. νῦν
μὲν οὖν ὃ διαφερόμεθα ταύτ', ἔστι· σκόπει δὲ καὶ σὺ. εἰπὼν ἕγὼ ποι ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον εἶναι. Π.Ω.Λ.

Πάνω γε. Σ.Ω. Σύ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι. Π.Ω.Λ. 

Ναι. Σ.Ω. Καὶ τοὺς ἀδικοὺντας ἀθλίους ἔφην εἶναι ἔγώ, καὶ ἐξηλεγχθην ὑπὸ σοῦ. Π.Ω.Λ.

Β Ναι μᾶ Λία. Σ.Ω. Ὁς οὖ γε οὖς, ὁ Πόλε. Π.Ω.Λ. Ἀληθῆ γε οἰόμενος ίσως. Σ.Ω. Σὺ δὲ γε εὐδαιμονας αὖ τοὺς ἀδικοὺντας, ἐὰν μὴ διδῶσι δίκην. Π.Ω.Λ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Σ.Ω. Ἕψω δὲ αὐτοὺς ἀθλιωτάτους φησί, τοὺς δὲ δεδώτας δίκην ἥττον. βούλει καὶ τοῦτο ἐλέγχειν; Π.Ω.Λ. Ἄλλ' ἔτι τοῦτ' ἐκεῖνον χαλεπώτερον ἔστιν, ὁ 

Σάκρατες, ἐξελεγκαί. Σ.Ω. Οὐ δήτα, ὁ Πόλε, ἄλλ' ἀδύνατον· τὸ γὰρ ἀληθὲς οὐδέποτε ἐλέγ-

χεται. Π.Ω.Λ. Πῶς λέγεις; ἐὰν ἀδικῶν ἄνθρω-

πος ληφθῇ τυφαννίδι ἐπιβουλεύων, καὶ ληφθεῖς 
στρεφάται καὶ ἐκτείνηται καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς 
ἐκκάμπται, καὶ ἄλλας πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας καὶ 
παντοδαπὰς λόθας αὐτὸς τε λωβηθεῖς καὶ τοὺς
Το αυτού ἐπιδῶν παίδας τε καὶ γυναῖκα τὸ ἔσχατον ἀνασταυρωθῆ ἢ καταπιττωθῆ, οὗτος εὐδαιμονείστερος ἐσται ἢ ἐὰν διαφυγὼν τύραννος καταστῇ καὶ ἄρχων ἐν τῇ πόλει διαθῷ ποιῶν ὅ τι ἀν βουλήται, ἔριωτος ὁν καὶ εὐδαιμονιζόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἱέρων; ταύτα λέος ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἐξελέγχειν;

erner Σ. "Εγώγε. Σ. Εὐδαιμονείστερος μὲν τοίνυν οὐδέποτε ἐσται οὐδέτερος αὐτῶν, οὔτε ὁ κατειργασμένος τὴν τυραννίδα ἀδίκως οὔτε ὁ δίκην διδοὺς· δυοὶ γὰρ ἀθλίου εὐδαιμονείστερος μὲν οὐχ ἂν εἴη· ἀθλίωτερος μέντοι ὁ διαφυγὼν καὶ τυραννεύσας. Τι ἔτοτο, ὃ Πόλε; γελᾶς; ἀλλο αὖ τοῦτο εἶδος ἐλέγχον ἐστίν, ἐπειδὰν τίς τι εἴη, καταγελᾶν, ἐλέγχειν δὲ μή; Π. Οὐχ οἷς ἐξεληλέγχθαι, ὁ Σ. οὗτος, ὅταν τοιαῦτα λέγῃς ἃ οὐδεῖς ἂν φήμειν ἄνθρώπων; ἐπεὶ ἔροῦ τινα τοιοῦτοι. Σ. Πόλε; οὐχ εἰμὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, καὶ πέρυσι βουλεύειν λαχῶν, ἐπειδὴ ἢ φυλή ἐπουτάνευε καὶ ἔδει μὲ ἐπιφημίζειν, γέλοτα παρείχον καὶ οὐχ ἡμιστάμην ἐπιφημίζειν. μὴ οὖν μηδὲ νῦν μη ἐξεῖς τούτων βελτίων ἐλέγχον, ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἐλέγχον, εἰμοι ἐν τῷ μέρει παράδος, καὶ πεῖρασα τού ἐλέγχον οἷον ἐγὼ οἷοι δεῖν εἰναι. ἐγὼ γὰρ ὃν ἂν λέγω ἐνα μὲν παρασχέσθαι μόρτυρα ἐπί-
σταμαὶ, αὐτὸν πρὸς ὑν ἄν μοι ὁ λόγος ἢ, τούς
dὲ πολλοὺς ἐὼ χαίρειν, καὶ ἕνα ἐπικήφηζε· ἐπὶ-
B σταμαὶ, τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς οὐδὲ διαλέγομαι. ὥρα
οὖν, εἰ ἑξελήσεις ἐν τῷ μέρει διδόναι ἔλεγξον
ἀποκρινόμενος τὰ ἑρωτάμενα. ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οἶ-
μαι καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους
tὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον ἥγεσθαι καὶ
tὸ μὴ διδόναι δίκην τοῦ διδόναι. ΠΩΛ. Ἕγὼ δὲ
γε οὔτ' ἐμὲ οὔτ' ἄλλον ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα. ἐπεὶ σὺ
δέξας ἃν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν; ΣΩ. Καὶ
σὺ γ' ἂν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες. ΠΩΛ. Πολλοὺ
gε δεῖ, ἀλλ' οὔτ', ἐγὼ οὔτε σὺ οὔτ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς.
C ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀποκρινεῖ; ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ μὲν
οὖν καὶ γὰρ ἐπιθυμῶ εἰδέναι ὅ τι ποτ' ἐρέις.
ΣΩ. Λέγε δὴ μοι, ὅν' εἰδῆς, ὡσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐξ
ἀρχῆς σε ἱρότων· πότερον δοκεῖ σοι, ὥς Πῶλε,
κάκιον εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι; ΠΩΛ.
Τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἔμοιγε. ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δὴ αἰσχρὸν;
pότερον τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι; ἂν ἀποκρινοῦν.
ΠΩΛ. Τὸ ἀδικεῖν.

ΣΑΡ. ΧΧΧ. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ κάκιον, εἶπερ
αἰσχρόν. ΠΩΛ. "Ἡκιστὰ γε. ΣΩ. Μανθάνω·
δοὺ ταῦτον ἥγει σὺ, ὡς ἔοικας, καλὸν τε καὶ ἄγα
θον καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν. ΠΩΛ. Οὐ δὴ
ΣΩ. Τί δὲ τόδε; τὰ καλὰ πάντα, οἴον καὶ
σώματα καὶ χρώματα καὶ σχῆματα καὶ φωνὰς
καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα, εἰς οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπων καλεῖς
ἐκάστοτε καλὰ; οἴον πρῶτον τὰ σώματα τὰ κα-
λὰ οὐχὶ ἦτοι κατὰ τὴν χρείαν λέγεις καλὰ εἶναι,
πρὸς δὲ ἂν ἐκαστὸν χρήσιμον ἢ, πρὸς τοῦτο, ἢ
κατὰ ἱδονῆς τινα, ἐὰν ἐν τῷ ἑωφείςθαι χαῖρειν ποιῆ τοὺς ἑωφοῦντας ἐξεις τι ἐκτὸς τούτων λέγειν περὶ σάματος κάλλους; Π.Ω.Α. Οὐκ ἐξω. Σ.Ω. Οὔκοιν καὶ τάλλα πάντα οὕτω καὶ σχῆματα καὶ χρώματα ἢ διὰ ἱδονῆς τινα ἢ διὰ ὀφέλειαν ἢ δι’ ἀμφότερα καλὰ προσαγορεῦεις; Π.Ω.Α. Ἐγώγε. Σ.Ω. Οὐ καὶ τὰς φωνὰς καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν μονσικήν πάντα ὀδούτως; Π.Ω.Α. Ναὶ. Σ.Ω. Καὶ μὴν τὰ γε κατὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα οὐ δὴπον ἐκτὸς τούτων ἐστὶ τὰ καλὰ τοῦ ὀφέλειμα εὑναι ἢ ἱδεα ἢ ἀμφότερα. Π.Ω.Α. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοξεῖ. Σ.Ω. 475 Ούκοιν καὶ τὸ τῶν μαθημάτων κάλλος ὀδούτως; Π.Ω.Α. Πάνυ γε καὶ καλός γε νῦν ὀρίζει ὧδε Ἐστάτες ἱδονὴ τε καὶ ἀγαθὸς ὀρίζομενος τὸ καλὸν. Σ.Ω. Οὔκοιν τὸ αἰσχρὸν τὸ ἐναντίω, λύπη τε καὶ κακῷ; Π.Ω.Α. Ἀνάγκη. Σ.Ω. Ὑμεῖς ἔριπον τὸ ἐρωτήσας ἢ ἢ τῷ ἑτέρῳ τούτῳ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις ὑπερβάλλον κάλλιον ἐστιν ἢ τοῦ ἱδονῆς ἢ ὀφέλειμα ἢ ἀμφοτέρως. Π.Ω.Α. Πάνυ γε. Σ.Ω. Καὶ ὅταν δὲ δὴ δυοῖν αἰσχροῖν τὸ ἑτέρον αἰσχρὸν ἢ ἢ τοῦ λύπη ἢ κακῷ ὑπερβάλλον αἰσχρὸν ἐσται. η οὐκ ἀνάγκη; Π.Ω.Α. Ναὶ. Σ.Ω. Φέρε δὴ, πῶς ἔλεγετο νῦν δὴ περὶ τοῦ ἅδικείν καὶ ἅδικεύσαι; οὐκ ἔλεγε τὸ μὲν ἅδικεύσας κάκιον εὑναι τὸ δὲ ἅδικεύν αἰσχρον; Π.Ω.Α. Ἐλεγον. Σ.Ω. Οὔκοιν εἴπερ αἰσχρὸν τὸ ἅδικείν τοῦ ἅδικεύσαι, ἢ τοῦ λυπηροτερῶν ἐστὶ καὶ λύπη ὑπερβάλλον αἰσχρόν ἢν εὑρεθήκη, ἢ κακῷ, ἢ ἀμφοτέροις; οὐ καὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη; Π.Ω.Α. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;
GORGIAS.

πρώτον μὲν δὴ σκευψώμεθα· ἄρα λύτη ὑπερβάλλει τὸ ἀδίκειν τοῦ ἀδίκεισθαι, καὶ ἀλγοῦσι μάλλον οἱ ἀδίκοινες ἢ οἱ ἀδικούμενοι; ΠΩΛ. Οὐδεμιῶς, ὁ Σῶκρατες, τούτο γε. ΣΩ. Οὐν ἄρα λύτη γε ὑπερέχει. ΠΩΛ. Οὐ δήτα. ΣΩ. Οὔκοιν εἰ μὴ λύτη, ἀμφοτέροις μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ὑπερβάλλοι. ΠΩΛ. Οὐ φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Οὔκοιν τῷ ἐτέρῳ λείπεται. ΠΩΛ. Ναι. ΣΩ. Τῷ κακῷ. ΠΩΛ. Ἑοικεν. ΣΩ. Οὔκοιν κακῷ ὑπερβάλλον τὸ ἀδίκειν κάκιον ἢν εἰή τοῦ ἀδίκεισθαι. ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον δὴ ὅτι. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τι οὖν ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ὑπὸ σοῦ ὀμολογεῖτο ἣμῖν ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν χρόνῳ αἰσχύνον εἶναι τὸ ἀδίκειν τοῦ ἀδίκεισθαι; ΠΩΛ. Ναι. ΣΩ. Νῦν δὲ γε κάκιον ἐφάνη. ΠΩΛ. Ἑοικεν. ΣΩ. Δέξαίον ἄν οὖν σὺ μάλλον τὸ κάκιον καὶ τὸ αἰσχῦν ἀντί τοῦ ἤττον; Μή ὅκνει ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὁ Πῶλε—οὐδὲν γὰρ βλαβήσει,— ἀλλὰ γενναίος τῷ λόγῳ, ἔσσερ ἵστρο, παρέχων ἀποκρίνου, καὶ ἢ φαθὶ ἢ μὴ ἢ ἔφοτα. ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλ᾽ οὖν ἂν δεξαίην, ὁ Σῶκρατες. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὸς δὲ τις ἀνθρώπων; ΠΩΛ. Οὐ μοι δοξεῖ κατὰ γε τούτον τὸν λόγον. ΣΩ. Ἀλήθη ἄρα ἐγὼ ἐλεγον, ὅτι οὔτ᾽ ἂν ἐγὼ οὔτ᾽ ἂν σὺ οὔτ᾽ ἂλλος οὔθεὶς ἀνθρώπων δέξατ᾽ ἂν μάλλον ἀδίκειν ἢ ἀδίκεισθαι· κάκιον γὰρ τυχάνει ὅν. ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Ὁρῶς οὖν, ὁ Πῶλε, ὁ ἐλεγχος παρὰ τὸν ἐλεγχον παρὰ-βαλλόμενος ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐοικεν, ἀλλὰ σοὶ μὲν οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ὀμολογοῦσι πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐμοὶ δὲ σὺ
εξαιρεῖται εἰς οὐν μόνον καὶ ὁμολογῶν καὶ μαρτυ-476
φών, καὶ ἐγὼ σὲ μόνον ἐπιστηρίζων τοὺς ἄλλους
ἐὼ χαίρειν. Καὶ τούτο μὲν ἡμῖν οὔτως ἔχετο·
μετὰ τούτο δὲ περὶ οὗ τὸ δεύτερον ἡμερεθήσα-
μεν, σκεφτόμεθα, τὸ ἀδικοῦντα διδόναι δίκην ἁρα
μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἔστιν, ὡς σὺ ὄνω, ἢ μείζον τὸ
μὴ διδόναι, ὡς αὐ ἐγὼ ἁμένη. σκοπώμεθα δὲ τῇ
tὸ διδόναι δίκην καὶ τὸ κολάξεσθαι δικαίως ἀδι-
κοῦντα ἁρα τὸ αὐτὸ καλεῖς; Π瓮Α. Ἑγώνε. Ἡ
Ἑχει οὖν λέγειν, ὡς οὐχὶ τὰ γε δίκαια β
πάντα καλὰ ἔστι, καθ' ὅσον δίκαια; καὶ διο-
σκεφτάμενος εἰπέ. Π瓮Α. Ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖ, ὁ
Σώκρατες.

ΚαΠ. XXXII. ΣΩ. Σχόπει δὴ καὶ τόδε· ἁρα
εἰ τίς τι ποιεῖ, ἁνάγκη τι εἶναι καὶ πᾶχον ὑπὸ
tούτον τοῦ ποιοῦντος; Π瓮Α. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Ἡ
Ἀρα τούτο πᾶχον ὃ τὸ ποιοῦν ποιεῖ, καὶ
tοιοῦτον οἰον ποιεῖ τὸ ποιοῦν; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοι-
όνε· εἰ τις τύπτει, ἁνάγκη τι τύπτεσθαι; Π瓮Α.
Ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. Καὶ εἰ σφόδρα τύπτει ἢ κ
ταχὺ τὸ τύπτων, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τυπτόμενον τύπτε-
σθαι; Π瓮Α. Ναὶ. ΣΩ. Τοιοῦτον ἁρὰ πά-
θος τῷ τυπτομένῳ ἔστιν οἰον ἃν τὸ τύπτων ποιῆ;
Π瓮Α. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ καὶ τις,
ἀνάγκη τι κάεσθαι; Π瓮Α. Πῶς γὰρ οὗ; ΣΩ.
Καὶ εἰ σφόδρα γε καὶ ἡ ἀλγεινῶς, οὕτω κάεσθαι
tὸ καθεμένον ὃς ἃν τὸ καῖν καὶ; Π瓮Α. Πάνυ
gε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ τέμνει τις, ὃ αὐτός
λόγος; τέμνεται γὰρ τι. Π瓮Α. Ναὶ. ΣΩ.
Καὶ εἰ μέγα γε ἡ βαθῦ τὸ τιμῆμα ἡ ἀλγεινῶν,
Δ τοιοῦτον τῷμια τέμνεται τὸ τεμνόμενον οἷον τὸ τέμνων τέμνει; Π.Ω.Α. Φαίνεται. Σ.Ω. Συλ-λήθην δὴ ὃρα, εἰ ὁμολογεῖς ὁ ἄρτι ἔλεγον περὶ πάντων· οἷον ἂν ποιῇ τὸ ποιοῦν, τοιοῦτον τὸ πά- σχον πάσχειν. Π.Ω.Α. Ἀλλ᾽ ὁμολογῶ. Σ.Ω. Τούτων δὴ ὁμολογομένων, τὸ δίκην διδόναι πό-
τερον πάσχειν τί ἔστιν ἡ ποιεῖν; Π.Ω.Α. Ἀνάγ-
κη, ὅ Σάκρατες, πάσχειν. Σ.Ω. Οὐκοῦν ὑπὸ τίνος ποιοῦντος; Π.Ω.Α. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; ὑπὸ γε τοῦ
Ε ὀλόζωντος. Σ.Ω. Ὁ δὲ ὀρθῶς κολάζον δικαίως κολάζει; Π.Ω.Α. Ναὶ. Σ.Ω. Δίκαια ποιῶν, ἡ
οὐ; Π.Ω.Α. Δίκαια. Σ.Ω. Οὐκοῦν ὁ κολαζό-
μενος δίκην διδόν δίκαια πάσχει; Π.Ω.Α. Φαίνεται. Σ.Ω. Τὰ δὲ δίκαιά που καλὰ ὁμο-
λόγηται; Π.Ω.Α. Πάννυ γε. Σ.Ω. Τούτων ἁρὰ
ὁ μὲν ποιεῖ καλά, ὁ δὲ πάσχει, ὁ κολαζόμενος.
Π.Ω.Α. Ναὶ.

ΚΑΡ. ΧΧΧΧ. Σ.Ω. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ καλά,
ἐπάγαθά; ἡ γὰρ ἤδεα ἡ ὁφέλιμα. Π.Ω.Α. Ἀνάγ-
κη. Σ.Ω. Ἀγαθά ἂρα πάσχει ὁ δίκην διδόν; Π.Ω.Α. Ἐοικευ. Σ.Ω. Ὁφελέται ἂρα; Π.Ω.Α.
Ναὶ. Σ.Ω. Ἀρα ἦνπερ ἐγὼ ὑπολομβάνω τὴν
ὀφέλειαν; βελτίων τὴν γυνὴν γίνεται, εἴπερ
dικαίως κολάζεται; Π.Ω.Α. Εἴκος γε. Σ.Ω.
Κακίας ἂρα γυνή ἀπαλλάττεται ὁ δίκην διδόν; Π.Ω.Α.
Ναὶ. Σ.Ω. Ἀρτὸν οὖν τοῦ μεγίστου
Β ἀπαλλάττεται κακοῦ; Ὁδὲ δὲ σχόπει. ἐν χρη-
μάτων κατασκευή ἀνθρώπου κακίαν ἀλλήν τινὰ
ἐνορίᾳ ἡ πενίαν; Π.Ω.Α. Οὖχ, ἀλλὰ πενίαιν.
Σ.Ω. Τί δὲ ἐν σώματος κατασκευή; κακίαν ἐν
φήσας ἀσθένειαν εἶναι καὶ νόσον καὶ αἰσχὸς καὶ τὰ τοιαύτα; ΠΩΛ. Ἡγουμένη. ΣΩ. Οὔχον καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ πονηρίαν ἤγεῖ τίνα εἶναι; ΠΩΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; ΣΩ. Γεύσθην οὖν οὐχ ἀδικίαν καλεῖς καὶ ἀμαθίαν καὶ δειλίαν καὶ τὰ τοιαύτα; ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Οὔχον χρημάτων καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς, τριῶν ὄντων, τριττάς εἰρήνας πονηρίας, πενίαν, νόσον, ἀδικίαν; ΠΩΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν τούτων τῶν πονηρίων αἰσχύσθη; οὐχ ἡ ἀδικία καὶ συλλήβδην ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρία; ΠΩΛ. Πολὺ γε. ΣΩ. Εἰ δὴ αἰσχύσθη, καὶ κακίστη; ΠΩΛ. Πῶς, ὥστε Σῶκρατες, λέγεις; ΣΩ. Οδί· ἄνε τὸ ἀισχυστὸν, ἦτοι λύπην μεγίστην παρέχον ἡ βλάβην ἡ ἀμφότερα, αἰσχυστόν ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογημένων ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν. ΠΩΛ. Μάλιστα. ΣΩ. Αἰσχύστων δὲ ἀδικία καὶ σύμπασα ψυχῆς πονηρία νῦν δὴ ὁμολογηται ἦμιν; ΠΩΛ. Ἡμιολογηται διὰ γὰρ. ΣΩ. Οὔχον ἡ ἀνιαροτάτων ἐστιν καὶ ἀνία ὑπερβάλλον αἰσχυστὸν τούτων ἐστιν, ἡ βλάβη, ἡ ἀμφότερα; ΠΩΛ. Ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν ἀληξεινότερον ἐστι τοῦ πένεσθαι καὶ καμίνειν τὸ ἀδικον εἶναι καὶ ἀχόλαστον καὶ δειλὸν καὶ ἀμαθῆ; ΠΩΛ. Οὐχ ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σῶκρατες, ἀπὸ τούτων γε. ΣΩ. Ἐπερρυθὲς τινὶ ἀρα ὅσι μεγάλη βλάβη καὶ κακὴ θαναμασία ὑπερβάλλουσα τάλλα ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρία αἰσχυστῶν ἔστι πάντων, ἐπειδή οὖν ἀληθῶς γε, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος. ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Ἁλλὰ μὴν πον τὸ γε μεγίστῃ βλάβῃ ὑπερβάλλον μέγιστὸν ἐν
κακόν εἰη τῶν ὄντων. ΠΩΑ. Ναί. ΢Ω. Ἡ ἀδικία ἄρα καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ὑψηλὴς πονηρία μέγιστον τῶν ὄντων κακόν ἐστι; ΠΩΑ. Φαίνεται.

Cap. XXXIV. ΢Ω. Τίς οὖν τέχνη πενίας ἀπαλλάττει; οὐ χρηματιστική; ΠΩΑ. Ναί. ΢Ω. Τίς δὲ νόσου; οὐχ ἰατρική; ΠΩΑ. 478 Ανάγχη. ΢Ω. Τίς δὲ πονηρίας καὶ ἀδικίας; Εἰ μὴ οὕτως εὐπορεῖς, διδὸ σκόπει· ποῖ ἄγομεν καὶ παρά τίνας τοὺς κάμνοντας τὰ σώματα; ΠΩΑ. Παρὰ τοὺς ἰατροὺς, ὁ Σώκρατες. ΢Ω. Ποῖ δὲ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας καὶ τοὺς ἀκολασταίνοντας; ΠΩΑ. Παρὰ τοὺς δικαστὰς λέγεις; ΢Ω. Οὐκοῦν δίκην δώσονται; ΠΩΑ. Φημί. ΢Ω. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ δικαιοσύνη τινὶ χρώμενοι κολάζοσιν οἱ ὀρθῶς κολάζοντες; ΠΩΑ. Δήλον

β δή. ΢Ω. Χρηματιστικὴ μὲν ἄρα πενίας ἀπαλλάττει, ἰατρικὴ δὲ νόσου, δίκη δὲ ἀκολασίας καὶ ἁδικίας. ΠΩΑ. Φαίνεται. ΢Ω. Τί οὖν τούτων κάλλιστον ἐστιν [ὁ ποτὲ λέγεις]; ΠΩΑ. Τίνων λέγεις; ΢Ω. Χρηματιστικῆς, ἰατρικῆς, δίκης. ΠΩΑ. Πολὺ διαφέρει, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἡ δίκη. ΢Ω. Οὐκοῦν αὐτὶ ἐκδονὴν πλείστην ποιεῖ, ἡ ὀφέλειαν, ἡ ἀμφότερα, εἶπερ κάλλιστὸν ἐστι; ΠΩΑ. Ναί. ΢Ω. Ἄρ' οὖν τὸ ἰατρεύ- ἐσθαι ἴδιον ἐστι, καὶ χαίροντιν οἱ ἰατρεύσμενοι; ΠΩΑ. Οὐκ ἐμοίγε δοξεῖ. ΢Ω. Ἀλλ' ὁφελή-

C μόνο γε. ἡ γάρ; ΠΩΑ. Ναί. ΢Ω. Μεγάλου γάρ κακοῦ ἀπαλλάττεται, ὡστε λυσιτελεῖ ὑπο-

μεῖναι τὴν ἀληθόνα καὶ ἔγειρε εἰναι. ΠΩΑ
Πάσα γὰρ οὖ; ΣΩ. Ἄρ’ οὖν οὗτος ἂν περὶ σῶ-μα εὐθαμονέστατος ἀνθρώπου εἰς, ἰατρευόμενος, ἡ μηδὲ κάμων ἄρχην; ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον, ὅτι μηδὲ κάμων. ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ τοῦτ’ ἦν εὐθαμονία, ὅσ ἑοικε, κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγῇ, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἄρχην μηδὲ κτῆσις. ΠΩΛ. Ἕστι ταῦτα. ΣΩ. Τί δὲ; ἀδιάφοροι πότεροι δυοῖν ἐχόντοι κακὸν εἰτ’ ἐν τοίς σώματι εἰτ’ ἐν ψυχῇ; ὁ ἰατρευόμενος καὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενος τοῦ κακοῦ, ἡ ὁ μὴ ἰατρευόμενος, ἔχον δὲ; ΠΩΛ. Φάινεται μοι ὁ μὴ ἰατρευόμενος. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ δίκην διδόναι μεγίστον κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγῆ ἦν, πονηρίας; ΠΩΛ. Ἡν γὰρ. ΣΩ. Σωφρονίζει γὰρ ποικὶ καὶ δικαιοτέραν ποιεῖ καὶ ἰατρικῇ γίγνεται πονηρίας ἡ δίκη. ΠΩΛ. Ναι. ΣΩ. Εὐθαμονέστατος μὲν ἄρα ὁ μὴ ἔχων ἐκακίαν ἐν ψυχῇ, ἐπειδή τοῦτο μέγιστον τῶν κα-κῶν ἐφάνη. ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον δὴ. ΣΩ. Δεύτερος δὴ τοῦ ἀπαλλαττόμενος. ΠΩΛ. Ἕστιν. ΣΩ. Οὗτος δ’ ἦν ὁ νοουθετοῦμενός τε καὶ ἐπι-πληττόμενος καὶ δίκην διδόνει. ΠΩΛ. Ναι. ΣΩ. Κάκιστα ἄρα ζῆν ὁ ἔχων ἀδικίαν καὶ μὴ ἀπαλλαττόμενος. ΠΩΛ. Φάινεται. ΣΩ. Οὐ-κοῦν οὕτως τυχάναι ὡς, ὡς ἂν τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικῶν καὶ χρόμενος μεγίστη ἀδικία διαπράξηται ὡστε 479 μὴ νοουθετεῖσθαι μὴ τε κολαζέσθαι μὴ δίκην διδόναι, ὡσπερ ὁ δὲ φήσι Ἀρχέλαον παρεσκευάσθαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τυφάννους καὶ ἥττορας καὶ δυ-νάστας; ΠΩΛ. Ἕστιν.

Cαρ. XXXV. ΣΩ. Σχέδον γὰρ ποι οὕτω, ὥ όριστε, τὸ αὐτὸ διαπεραγμένοι εἰσί, ὡσπερ ἂν
εἰ τις τοῖς μεγίστοις νοσήμασι συνισχύμενος διαπράξαιτο μὴ διδόναι δίκην τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐμαρτημάτων τοῖς ἱατροῖς μηδὲ ἱατρεύεσθαι, φο-βούμενος, ὃσπερανεῖ παῖς, τὸ κάεσθαι καὶ τὸ τέμνεσθαι, ὅτι ἄλγεινόν. ἢ οὖ δοκεῖ καὶ σοὶ οὕτως; Π.Ω.Α. Ἐμοιηγε. Σ.Ω. Ἀγνοσῶν γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὗν ἔστιν ἡ ὑγεία καὶ ἀρετή σῶματος. κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ ἐκ τῶν νῦν ἡμῖν ὁμολογημένων τοιούτων τι ποιεῖν καὶ οἱ τὴν δίκην φεύγοντες, ὁ Πῶλε, τὸ ἄλγεινόν αὐτοῦ καθοράν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ὁρέλιμον τυφλῶς ἔχειν καὶ ἄγνοειν ὁσοὶ ἀθλιώτερον ἔστι μὴ ὑγιοῦς σῶματος μὴ ὑγεῖς ψυχῇ οὐνοικεῖν, ἀλλὰ σαθρὰ καὶ ἀδίκο καὶ ἀνοσίᾳ. οὖν καὶ πάν ποιοῦσιν, ὡστε δίκην μὴ διδόναι μὴν ἀπαλλάττεσθαι τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ, καὶ χρήματα παρασχευαζόμενοι καὶ φίλους καὶ ὅπως ἄν ὅσιν ὡς πιθανότατοι λέγειν. εἰ δὲ ἡμεῖς ἄληθῇ ὁμολογήσαμεν, ὁ Πῶλε, ἂς αἰσθάνει τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τοῦ λόγου; ἡ βούλει συλλογισμένα αὐτά; Π.Ω.Α. Εἰ μὴ σοὶ γε ἄλλως δοκεῖ. Σ.Ω. ἂς οὖν συμβαίνει μέγιστον κακὸν ἡ ἀδικία καὶ τὸ ἀδίκειν; Π.Ω.Α. Φαίνεται ζε Σ.Ω. Καὶ μὴν ἀπαλλαγῆ γε ἐφάνη τοῦτο τοῦ κακοῦ τὸ δίκην διδόναι; Π.Ω.Α. Κινδυνεύει. Σ.Ω. Τὸ δὲ γε μὴ διδόναι ἐμισοῦ τοῦ κακοῦ; Π.Ω.Α. Ναι. Σ.Ω. Λεύτερον ἀρα ἐστὶ τῶν κακῶν μεγέθει τὸ ἀδίκειν τὸ δὲ ἀδίκοντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην πάντων μέγιστον τε καὶ πρῶτον κακῶν πέρικεν. Π.Ω.Α. Ἑοικεῖν. Σ.Ω. ἂς οὖν οὐ περὶ τούτου, ὁ φίλε, ἡμφροθητήσαμεν, σὺ
μὲν τὸν Ἀρχέλαον εὐθαμονύζων τὸν τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικοῦντα δίκην οὐδεμιᾶν διδόντα, ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦ-Ε ναντίον οἴμενος, εἰτ’ Ἀρχέλαος εἰτ’ ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων σοισοῦν μὴ δίδωσι δίκην ἀδικῶν, τούτῳ προσήκειν ἀθλίῳ εἶναι διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ἀεὶ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα τοῦ ἀδικομένου ἀθλιώτερον εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὴ διδόντα δίκην τοῦ διδόντος; οὐ ταῦτ’ ἢν τὰ ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ λεγόμενα; Π.ヲ.Α. Να. Σ.Ω. Οὐκοῦν ἀποδέδεικται, ὦτι ἀληθῆ ἐλέγετο; Π.ヲ.Α. Φαίνεται.

Σ.ΑΡ. ΥΤΤΥΥ. Ζ.Ω. Εἰεν. εἶ οὖν δὴ ταῦ-480 τα ἀληθῆ, ὁ Π.Ω.λε, τίς ἡ μεγάλη χρεία ἐστὶ τῆς ὁμοτοιχίας; δεῖ μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν νῦν ὁμολογημένων αὐτῶν ἑαυτῶν μάλιστα φυλάττειν, ὅπως μὴ ἀδικήσῃ, ὥς ἰκανῶς κακὸν ἤξοντα. οὐ γὰρ; Π.ヲ.Α. Πάνω γε. Σ.Ω. 'Εάν δὲ γε ἀδικήσῃ ἢ αὐτὸς, ἢ ἄλλος τις ὃν ἂν κήδηται, αὐτὸν ἑκόντα ἴδειν ἐξεῖσε ὅπως ὡς τάχιστα δῶσει δίκην, παρὰ τὸν δικαστὴν ὁπερ παρὰ τὸν ἰατρόν, σπευδοντα ὅπως μὴ ἐγχρονισθεὶν τὸ νόημα τῆς ἀδικίας Β ὑπολογίζοντα τὴν συγκεκριμένην καὶ ἀνικίαν· ἢ τῶν λέγομεν, ὁ Π.Ω.λε, εἰπερ τὰ πράτερον μὲνε ἡμῖν ὁμολογήσαται; οὐκ ἄναγκη ταῦτα ἐξεύροις οὐτω μὲν συμφωνεῖν, ἄλλος δὲ μὴ; Π.ヲ.Α. Τί γὰρ δὴ φῶμεν, ὁ Σ.ώρατασ; Σ.Ω. 'Επὶ μὲν ἄρα τὸ ἀπολογεῖσθαι ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀδικίας τῆς αὐτοῦ, ἢ γονίων, ἢ ἑταίρων, ἢ παιδῶν, ἢ πατρίδος ἀδικούσης οὐ χρῆσιμος οὖν ἡ ὁμοτοιχία ἡμῖν, ὁ Π.Ω.λε, εἰ μὴ εἶ τις ύπολόγησεν ἐπὶ τοῦ ναντιόν, ζ. κατηγορεῖτο δεῖν μᾶλιστα μὲν ἑαυτοῦ, ἔπειτα δὲ
καὶ τῶν οἰκείων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὃς ἂν ἄει τῶν φιλῶν τυγχάνῃ ἀδικῶν, καὶ μὴ ἀποκρύπτεσθαι,
ἀλλ' εἰς τοῖς φανερῶν ἄγειν τὸ ἀδίκημα, ἵνα δὴ
dίκην καὶ ύγιῆς γένηται, ἀναγκαζέιν τε καὶ αὐ-
tὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους μὴ ἀποδειλιᾶν, ἀλλὰ παρε-
χειν μόναντα καὶ ἄνδρεῖος, ὁσπερ τέμνειν καὶ
καίειν ἰατρῷ, τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν διόκοντα, μὴ

D ὑπολογίζόμενον τὸ ἀλγεινόν· ἐὰν μὲν γε πληγῶν
ἀδικα ὑδικηκὼς ἢ, τύπτειν παρέχοντα, ἐὰν δὲ δε-
σιοῦ, δεῖν, ἐὰν δὲ ζημίας, ἀποτίνοντα, ἐὰν δὲ φυ-
γῆς, φεύγοντα, ἐὰν δὲ θανάτου, ἀποθνῄσκοντα,
αὐτὸν πρῶτον οὖν τατήγορον καὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν
ἄλλων οἰκείων καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο χρώμενον τῇ ῥητοри-
κῇ, ὅπως ἂν καταδῆλων τῶν ἀδικημάτων γιργομέ-
νων ἀπαλάττωνται τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ, ἀδικίας.

Ε̈ φῶμεν οὐτωσ, ἢ μὴ φῶμεν, ὁ Πῶλε; Π.ΩΛ. Ἄ-
tοπα μὲν, ὁ Σάξωρατες, ἔμοιγε δοξεῖ, τοὺς μέντοι
ἐμπροσθεν ἴσως σοι ὑμιλογεῖται. Σ.Ω. Ὑπὸ καὶ
ἡ κάκεινα λυτέον, ἢ τάδε ἀνάγκη συμβαίνειν ;
Π.ΩΛ. Ναί, τούτῳ γε οὔτως ἔχει. Σ.Ω. Τοῦ-
ναντίον δὲ γε αὐτοὶ μεταβαλόντα εἰ ἄρα δεὶ τινα
κακῶς ποιεῖν, εἰτ' ἔχθρον εἴτε ὄντινον, ἐὰν μό-
νον μὴ αὐτὸς ἀδικήται ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχθρον,—τοῦτο
μὲν γὰρ εὐλαβητέον·—ἐὰν δὲ ἄλλον ἀδική ὁ

481 ἔχθρος, παντὶ τρόπῳ παρασκευαστέον καὶ πράτ-
τοντα καὶ λέγοντα, ὅπως μὴ δὴ δίκην μηδὲ ἔλθῃ
παρὰ τὸν δικαστήν· ἐὰν δὲ ἔλθη, μηχανήτεον
ὅπως ἂν διαφύγῃ καὶ μὴ δὴ δίκην ὁ ἔχθρος, ἀλλ' ἐὰν
tε χρυσίον ἥπαικός ἢ πολύ, μὴ ἀποδιδῷ
tοῦτο, ἀλλ' ἔχων ἀναλίσκεται καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν.
καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἐαυτοῦ ἄδικως καὶ ἀθέως, ἐὰν τε αὐθανάτου ἄξια ἢδικηκώς ἢ, ὅπως μὴ ἀποθανεῖται, ὡς ἀλλὰ τοιοῦτος ἐσται πο-Β νηρὸς ὦν, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ὅπως ὁς πλείστον χρόνον βιώσεται τοιοῦτος ὄν. ἑπὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐμοίγε δοκεῖ, ὁ Πόλε, ἡ φητορική χρήσιμος εἶναι, ἐπεὶ τῷ γε μὴ μέλλοντι ἄδικεῖν οὐ μεγάλη τίς μοι δοκεῖ ἡ χρεία αὐτῆς εἶναι, εἰ δὴ καὶ ἔστι τις χρεία, ὡς ἐν γε τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐδαιμή ἐφάνη οὖσα.

ΣΑΡ. ΧΧΧΥΠ. ΚΑΑ. Εἰπὼ μοι, ὁ Χαύρεφαῖν, σπουδάζει ταύτα Σωκράτης, ἢ παῖζει; ΧΑΙ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, ὑπερφυὸς σπουδάζειν· οὐδὲν μέντοι οἶον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐφοτάν. ΣΚΑΑ. Νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀλλ᾽ ἐπιθυμῶ. Εἰπὼ μοι, ὁ Σώκρατες, πότερον σε φῶμεν νυνὶ σπουδάζοντα, ἢ παῖζοντα; εἰ μὲν γὰρ σπουδάζεις τε καὶ τυγχάνει ταύτα ἁληθῆ ὄντα, ὥς λέγεις, ἀλλο τι ἡ ἡμῶν ὁ βίος ἀνατετραμμένος ὃν εἰῃ τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία πράττομεν, ὡς ἐκεῖκεν, ἡ ὡ δὲ; ΣΛΩ. Ἡ Καλλίκλεις, εἰ μὴ τι ἦν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πάθος, τοῖς μὲν ἀλλο τι, τοῖς δὲ ἀλλο τι, τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἡμῶν ἰδίον τι ἐπα- σχε πάθος ἢ οἱ ἀλλοί, οὐκ ἂν ἦν ἡδίου ἐνδείξασθαι τῇ ἐτέρῳ τὸ ἐαυτοῦ πάθημα. λέγω δ᾽ ἐννοησάς, ὅτι ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ νῦν τυγχάνομεν ταύτῶν τι πεπονθότες, ἐρώτω καὶ τοὺς διεὶν ἐκάτερος, ἐγὼ μὲν Ἀλκιβιάδον τὸν Κλεινίου καὶ φιλοσοφίας, σὺ δὲ τοῦ τὸν Αθηναίων δῆμον καὶ τοῦ Πυριλάμπους. αἰσθάνομαι οὖν σου ἐκάστοτε, καὶ περ ὡς τοὺς δεινοὺς, ὅτι ὁπόδ᾽ ἂν φη ὑ σου
τὰ παιδικὰ καὶ ὁπως ἀν φη ἔχειν, οὐ δυναμένου ἢ ἀντιλέγειν, ἀλλ’ ἄνω καὶ κάτω μεταβαλλομένου ἢν τε τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, ἐὰν τι σοῦ λέγοντος οἱ δῆμος ὁ Ἀθηναῖοι μη φῆ οὔτος ἔχειν, μεταβαλλόμενος λέγεις ἢ ἔκεινος βούλεται, καὶ πρὸς τὸν Πυρι-λάμπους νεανίαν τὸν καλὸν τοῦτον τοιαύτα ἔτε- ρα πέπονθας. τοῖς γὰρ τῶν παιδικῶν βουλεύ- μασί τε καὶ λόγους οὐχ οἴδος τ’ εἰ ἐναντιοῦσθαι, ὥστε, εἰ τίς σον λέγοντος ἐκάστοτε ὡ διὰ τούτου λέγεις Θαυμάζοι οὐκ ἄτοπα ἐστίν, ἦσος εἰποῖς ἂν

452 αὐτῷ, εἰ βούλοιο ταληθὴ λέγειν, ὅτι, εἰ μή τις παύσει τὰ σὰ παιδικὰ τούτων τῶν λόγων, οὐδὲ σοὶ παύσει ποτὲ ταύτα λέγων. νόμιζε τοῖνυν καὶ παρ’ ἐμοῦ χρὴναι ἔτερα τοιαύτα ἀκούειν, καὶ μὴ Θαυμάζε, ὃτι ἐγὼ ταύτα λέγω, ἰδία τὴν φι- λοσοφίαν, τὰ ἐμὰ παιδικὰ, παύσον ταύτα λέγου- σαν. λέγει γὰρ, ὃ φίλε ἐταίρη, ἀεὶ ὃ νῦν ἐμοῦ ἀκούεις, καὶ μοί ἔστι τῶν ἐτέρων παιδικῶν πολὺ ἤτοι ἐμπλήκτος. ὃ μὲν γὰρ Κλεινίειος οὔτος ἄλλοτε ἄλλων ἔστι λόγων, ἢ δὲ φιλοσοφία ἀεὶ

Β τῶν αὐτῶν. λέγει δὲ ὃ σοὶ νῦν Θαυμάζεις πα- ρήθας δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς λεγομένοις. ἦ σοὶ ἐκείνῃν ἐξέλεγξον, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, ὡς οὐ τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἐστὶ καὶ ἀδικοῦντα δίκην μη διδόναι ἀπαντῶν ἐχαῖτον κακῶν. ἦ εἰ τοῦτο ἐάσεις ἀνέλεγκτον, μᾶ τὸν κῦνα, τὸν Αἰγυπτίων Θέον, οὐ σοὶ ὑπο- λογίζει Καλλικλῆς, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλὰ διαφο- νήσει ἐν ἀπαντή τῷ βίῳ. καίτοι ἔγογε οἴμαι, ὃ βέλτιστε, καὶ τὴν λύραν μοι χρείττον εἶναι ἀναρ- C μοστεῖν τε καὶ διαφωνεῖν, καὶ χορὸν ὃ χορηγοῖν,
καὶ πλείστους ἀνθρώπους μὴ ὀμολογεῖν μοι ἀλλ' ἑναντία λέγειν, μάλλον ἢ ἑνα ὄντα ἐμὲ ἑμαντῷ ἀσύμφωνον εἶναι καὶ ἑναντία λέγειν.

Καπ. ΧΧΧVIII. ΚΑΛ. ΖΩ Σῶκρατες, δοκεῖς νεανιεύσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὃς ἀληθῶς δημιουργός ὁν· καὶ νῦν ταῦτα δημιουργεῖ ταύτῶν παθόντων Πόλου πάθος, ὅπερ Γοργίων κατηγορεῖ πρὸς σε παθεῖν. ἔφη γάρ πον Γοργίαν ἐφο-τώμενον ὕπο σοῦ, εἶν ἀφίκηται παρ' αὐτὸν μὴ ἐπιστάμενος τὰ δίκαια ὁ τὴν ὑποτροφίαν βουλός οἷον μαθεῖν, εἰ διδάξει αὐτὸν ὁ Γοργίας, αἰσχυνθῆναι αὐτὸν καὶ φανέραν διδάξειν διὰ τὸ ἔθος τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅτι ἀνανακτοῦν ἂν, εἰ τις μὴ φαίη· διὰ δὴ ταύτην τὴν ὀμολογίαν ἀναγκασθῆ- ναι ἑναντία αὐτὸν αὐτῷ εἰπεῖν, σὲ δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγαπᾷν. καὶ σοὶ κατεξέλα, ὅς γέ μοι δοκεῖν, ὀρθῶς τὸτε. νῦν δὲ πάλιν αὐτὸς ταύτων τοῦτο ἑπαθεὶς, καὶ ἔρωγε κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὑμὶν ἄγαμαι Πόλων, ὅτι σοὶ συνεχόρησε τὸ ἀδικεῖν αἰσχρόν Ε ἐίναι τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι· ἐκ ταύτης γάρ αὐ τῆς ὀμολογίας αὐτῶς ὑπὸ σοῦ συμποδισθεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐπεστομίσθη, αἰσχυνθεῖς ἀν ἐνείπειν. σὺ γὰρ τῷ ὄντι, ὁ Σῶκρατες, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγεις φορτικὰ καὶ δημιουργικὰ, φάσκων τὴν ἀλλήλην διόκειν, ἢ φύσει μὲν ὑμὶν ἔστι καλά, νόμῳ δὲ. ὡς τὰ πολλὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἑναντία ἀλλήλοις ἔστιν, ἢ τε φύσις καὶ ὁ νόμου. ἐὰν οὖν τοις αἰσχύνηται καὶ μὴ τολμᾷ λέγειν ἄπερ νοεῖ, ἀναγκάζεται 483 ἑναντία λέγειν. ὁ δὴ καὶ σὺ τοῦτο τὸ σοφὸν κατανενορκὸς κακουργεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ἐὰν μὲν
τις κατὰ νόμον λέγη, κατὰ φύσιν ὑπερωτῶν, ἐὰν δὲ τὰ τῆς φύσεως, τὰ τοῦ νόμου. Ὅσπερ αὐτίκα ἐν τούτοις, τὸ ἀδίκειν τε καὶ τὸ ἀδίκεισθαι, Πώ·

λον τὸ κατὰ νόμον αἰσχρὸν λέγοντος, σὺ τὸν νό·

μον ἐδιώκατες κατὰ φύσιν. φύσει μὲν γὰρ πάν ἀἰσχρὸν ἦστιν ὅσπερ καὶ κάκιον, * οἶον* τὸ ἀδι·

B κεῖσθαι, νόμῳ δὲ τὸ ἀδίκειν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ὄρος τούτῳ γ' ἦστι τὸ πάθημα, τὸ ἀδίκεισθαι, ἀλλ' ἀνδραπόδου τινος, ὃ κρείττον ἦστι τεθνάναι ἢ ζην, ὃστις ἀδικούμενος καὶ προπηλακίζομενος μὴ οἰόστε ἦστιν αὐτὸς αὐτὸ βοηθεῖν μηδὲ ἄλλῳ οὖ ἄν κηδηταί. ἀλλ', οἴμαι, οἱ τιθέμενοι τοὺς νό·

μους οἱ ἄσθενεῖς ἄνθρωποι εἰς καὶ οἱ πολλοί. πρὸς αὐτοὺς οὖν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸς συμφέρον τοὺς τε νόμους τίθενται καὶ τοὺς ἑπαίνους ἑπαίνονς καὶ C τοὺς φόνους ἰέγουσιν. — ἔξοφοβοντές τοὺς ἔξ·

φομενεστέρους τῶν ἄνθρωπων καὶ δυνατοὺς ὑπ·

τας πλέον ἔχειν, ἢν μὴ αὐτῶν πλέον ἔχωσι, λέγουσιν, ὅσ αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἀδίκων τὸ πλεονεκτεῖν, καὶ τούτῳ ἦστι τὸ ἀδίκειν, τὸ πλέον τῶν ἄλλων ἥτειν ἔχειν. ἀγαπῶσι γὰρ, οἴμαι, αὐτοὶ ἂν τὸ ἵσον ἔχωσι φαυλότεροι ὑπότες. Καπ. ΤΤΤΧ. 

διὰ ταύτα δὴ νόμῳ μὲν τοῦτο ἀδικῶν καὶ αἰσχροῦ

λέγεται, τὸ πλέον ἥτειν ἔχειν τῶν πολλῶν, καὶ ἀδίκειν αὐτό καλοῦσιν. ἢ δὲ γε, οἴμαι, φύσις τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐκ τῶν ἑξοκον 

πλέον ἔχειν καὶ τῶν δυνατῶτερον τοῦ ἀδυνατώτερον. δηλοῖ δὲ ταύτα πολλα·

χοῦ ὃτι οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἅλλοις ἥσσοι καὶ 

τῶν ἄνθρωπων ἐν ὅλαις ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς γέ·
νεσίν, ὅτι οὕτω τὸ δίκαιον κέχριται, τὸν χρείττω τοῦ ἥττονος ἀρχεῖν καὶ πλέον ἔχειν. ἔπει ποῦ ἔκαιρο χρώμενος Ἐρέξης ἐπὶ τὴν Ἕλλαδα ἔστρα-Ε τευσθεὶ, ἢ ὁ πατήρ αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ Σκύθας; ἢ ἀλλὰ μνημία ἂν τις ἔχοι τοιαῦτα λέγειν. ἀλλ' οἶμαι, οὕτως κατὰ φύσιν [τὴν τοῦ δικαίου] τοῦτα πράττοντι, καὶ ναὶ μᾶ Δία κατὰ νόμον γε τὸν τῆς φύσεως, οὗ μέντοι ίδιως κατὰ τούτον, ὃν ἡμεῖς τιθέμεθα πλάττοντες τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ ἐφρώ-μενεστάτους ἡμῶν αὐτῶν· ἐκ νέων λαμβάνοντες, ὅσπερ λέντας κατεπάδοντες τε καὶ γονευόντες 484 καταδουλομέθηα, λέγοντες, ὡς τὸ ἱερὸν χρη ἔχειν καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. ἐάν δὲ γε, οἶμαι, φύσιν ἴκανην ρένηται ἔχων ἄνηρ, πάντα τοῦτα ἀποσεισάμενος καὶ διαφρήξας καὶ διαφυγὼν, καταπατήσας τὰ ἡμέτερα χράμματα καὶ μαγγανεύματα καὶ ἐποδᾶς καὶ νόμους τοὺς παρὰ φύσιν ἀπαντας, ἐπαναστὰς ἀνεφάνη δεσπό- της ἡμέτερος ὁ δοῦλος, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐξέλαμψε τὸ Β τῆς φύσεως δίκαιον. δοξεῖ δὲ μοι καὶ Πίνδαρος ἀπερ ἔγω λέγω ἐνδείκνυθαι ἐν τῷ ἄσματι, ἐν δὲ λέγει, ὅτι Νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς ὑπατο- τῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων· οὕτος δὲ δὴ, φησίν, ἄγει δικαίων τὸ βιειοτάτον ὑπερτάτα δ' ἐκμαίρομαι ἐφ' ὦν Ἐρεξῆς Ἡρακλέος, ἐπεὶ ἀπριάτας—λέγει οὕτω ποσ· τὸ γὰρ ἄσμα οὐκ ἐπίσταται. λέγει δ' ὅτι οὖτε πριά- μενος οὐτε δόντος τοῦ Ἑλλάσατο τὰς βούς, ὃς τούτου ὄντος τοῦ δικαίου φύσει, καὶ Κ βούς καὶ τάλλα κτήματα εἶναι πάντα τοῦ Βελ-
τίνος τε καὶ κρείττονος τα τῶν χειρόνων τε καὶ ἡπτόνων. 

CAP. XL. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀληθὲς οὖτος ἔχει, γνώσει δὲ, ὅτι ἐπὶ τὰ μεῖζω ἔλθης ἐάσας ἢδη φιλοσοφίαν. φιλοσοφία γὰρ τοῦ ἔστιν, ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης, χαριέν, ἃν τις αυτοῦ μετρίως ἀγηται ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ· ἐὰν δὲ περαιτέρῳ τοῦ δέοντος ἐνδιατρίψῃ, διαφθορά τῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἐὰν γὰρ καὶ πάνυ εὐφυῆς ἢ καὶ πόρφυ τῆς ἡλικίας φιλοσοφῆ, ἀνάγκη πάντων ἀπειρον γεγονέναι ἔστιν, ὅτι χρῆ ἐμπειρὸν εἶναι τὸν μέλλοντα καλὸν καλὸν καὶ εὐδόκιμον ἔσεσθαι ἀνδρα. καὶ γὰρ τῶν νόμων ἀπειροὺ γίγνονται τῶν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν, καὶ τῶν λόγων, οἷς δεῖ χρόμενον ὀμιλεῖν ἐν τοῖς συμβολαῖοι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, καὶ τῶν ἰδιών τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων, καὶ συλλήβδην τῶν ἰδιῶν παντάπασιν ἀπειροὶ γίγνονται. ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἔλθωσιν εἰς τινα ἔδιαν ἡ πολιτικὴν πράξιν, καταγέλαστοι γίγνονται, ἀπειρο γε, οἶμαι, οἱ πολιτικοὶ, ἐπειδὰν αὖ εἰς τὰς ῥυμικὰς διατριβὰς ἔλθωσι καὶ τοὺς λόγους, καταγέλαστοι εἰσὶ. συμβαίνει γὰρ τὸ τοῦ Ἐυριπίδου· λαμπρὸς τ᾽ ἔστιν ἐκαστὸς ἐν τούτῳ, κἀπὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἐπείγεται, νέμων τὸ πλείστον ἡμέρας τοῦτοῦ μέρος, ἐν᾽ αὐτῶς αὐτοῦ τυρχάνη βέλτιστος ὦν. 

485 οὖν δ᾽ ἂν ρᾳῦλος ἡ, ἐντεῦθεν φεύγει καὶ λοιπὸν ὑπερτοῦ, τὸ δ᾽ ἐξερο ἐπαινεῖ, εὐνοία τῇ ἔαντος, ἡγούμενος οὖτος αὐτὸς ἐαυτόν ἐπαινεῖν. ἀλλ᾽, οἶμαι, τὸ ὀφθαλτὸν ἔστιν ἀμφοτέρων μετα
σχεῖν. φιλοσοφίας μὲν, ὅσον παιδείας χάριν, καλὸν μετέχειν, καὶ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν μειρακία ὅντι 
φιλοσοφεῖν• ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἢ ἡ ἡ πρεσβύτερος ὁ ἄν-
θρωπος ἔτι φιλοσοφή, καταγέλαστον, ὁ Σάκχα-
τες, τὸ χρῆμα γίγνεται, καὶ ἔγγυε ὁμοίωτατον 
pάσχω πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας ὁσπερ πρὸς τοὺς B 
ψελλιζόμενους καὶ παίζοντας. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ 
pαιδίων ἠδο, ὁ ἔτι προσήκει διαλέγεσθαι οὕτω, 
ψελλιζόμενον καὶ παίζον, χαῖρο τε καὶ χαρίζει 
μοι φαίνεται καὶ ἐλευθέροι καὶ πέρον τῆ τοῦ 
pαιδίου ἦλικία• ὅταν δὲ σαρώς διαλεγομένου 
pαιδαρίου ἀκούσω, πικρὸν τί μοι δοκεῖ χρῆμα 
eῖναι καὶ ἀνία μου τὰ ὁτα καὶ μοι δοκεῖ δουλο-
πρέπει τι εἶναι• ὅταν δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἀκουσθῇ τις 
ψελλιζομένου ἢ παιζοντα ὅρᾳ, καταγέλαστον 
φαίνεται καὶ ἄνανδρον καὶ πληγῶν ἄξιον. ταὐ-
τὸν οὖν ἔγγυε τούτο πάσχω καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φι-
λοσοφοῦντας. παρὰ νέῳ μὲν γὰρ μειρακίω ὁ ὅν 
φιλοσοφίαν ἄγαμαι, καὶ πρέπειν μοι δοκεῖ, καὶ 
ήγοιμαι ἐλευθέρον τινα εἶναι τοῦτον τὸν ἄνθρω-
πον, τὸν δὲ μή φιλοσοφοῦντα ἀνελευθέρον καὶ 
οὐδέποτε οὐδενὸς ἀξιόσοντα ἐαυτὸν οὐτε καλοῦ 
D 
οὔτε γενναίου πράγματος• ὅταν δὲ δὴ πρεσβύτε-
ρον ἵδω ἐτι φιλοσοφοῦντα καὶ μη ἀπαλλαττόμε-
νον, πληγῶν μοι δοκεῖ ὡδη δεῖσθαι, ὁ Σάκχατες, 
οὔτος ὁ ἄνηρ. ὁ γὰρ νῦν δὴ ἐλεγον, ὑπάρχει 
tοῦτο τὸ ἄνθρωπο, κἂν πάνιν εὐφυῆς ἢ, ἄνανδρο 
γενέσθαι φεύγοντι τα μέσα τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῶ 
ἀγορᾶς, ἐν αἰς ἔρη ὁ ποιητής τοὺς ἄνδρας ἄρι-
πρεπεῖς γίγνεσθαι, καταδεδοκτί δὲ τὸν λοιπὸν
βίον βιώναι μετὰ μειρακίων ἐν γονίᾳ τριῶν ἐθεττᾶτα δὲ καὶ μέγα καὶ έκανον μηδέποτε φθέγξασθαι. ΣΑΡ. ΧΛ. έγὼ δέ, ὁ Σωκρατες, προς σὲ ἐπιτεκίος έχω φιλικός. κινδυνεύω σὺν πεπονθέναι νῦν ὅπερ ὁ Ζήθος πρὸς τὸν Ἀμφίδωνα ὁ Ἐφιπίδων, οὔτε ἐμνή-
σθην. καὶ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τοιαύτη ἀττα ἐπέρχεται πρὸς σὲ λέγειν, οὔτε ἐκεῖνος πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφόν, ὅτι ἀμελεῖς, ὁ Σωκρατες, ἃν δὲ σὲ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι,
καὶ φύσιν ψυχῆς ὅπερ γενναίαν μειρα-
κιώδει τινὶ διαπρέπεις μορφώματι, καὶ
οὔτ’ ἄν δίκης βουλαίσι προθεὶ’ ἄν ὁρθῶς
λόγον, οὔτ’ εἰκός ἄν καὶ πιθανὸν λάβοις,
οὔθ’ ὑπὲρ ἄλλου νεανικὸν βουλευμα
βουλεύσαιο. καίτοι, ὁ φίλε Σωκρατες — καὶ
μοι μηδὲν ἀχθεσθῆς· εὐνοία γὰρ ἔρω τῇ σῇ —
οὐχ αὐχρὸν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ὡτός ἐχείν, ὡς ἐγὼ
σὲ οἴμαι ἐχείν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς πόρῳ ἀεὶ
φιλοσοφίας ἐλαύνοντας; νῦν γὰρ εἰ τις σοῦ λα-
βόμενος ἢ ἄλλον ὅτου ὅτων τῶν τοιοῦτων εἰς τὸ
δεσμωτήριον ἀπαγάγοι, φάσχων ἀδίκειν μηδὲν
Β ἀδικοῦντα, οὐδ’ ὅτι οὐκ ἄν ἔχοις ὁ τί χρῆσαι
σαντῷ, ἀλλ’ ἐλέγχεις ἄν καὶ χασίας ὃν ἔχων ὃ
τί εἶπος, καὶ εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ἀναβας, κατη-
γράφον τυχῶν πάνω φαύλου καὶ μοχθηροῦ, ἀπο-
θάνοις ἄν, εἰ βούλωτο θανάτου σοι τιμάσθαι.
καίτοι πῶς σοφὸν τούτῳ ἔστιν, ὁ Σωκρατες, εἰ τις
εὐφυὴ λαβοῦσα τῆς χρῆτα ἔθηκε χεὶ-
ρονα, μήτε αὐτὸν αὐτῷ δυνάμενον βοηθεῖν μηδ’
ἐξόδοις ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων μήτε ἔσωτον

6
μήτε ἄλλον μηδένα, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν περισυλλα-κθαι πᾶσαν τὴν ὑσίαν, ἀτεχνὸς δὲ ἄτιμον ἐὴν τῇ πόλει; τὸν δὲ τοιούτον, εἴ τι καὶ ἀγροικό-
τερον εἰρήσθαι, ἔξεστιν ἐπὶ κόρῳς τύπτοντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην. ἀλλ᾽ ὃ γαθεῖ, ἔμοι πείθουν, παῦ-
σαι δ᾽ ἐλέγχων, πραγμάτων δ᾽ ἐν μονοσίαν ἀσκεῖ, καὶ ἂσκει ὅποθεν δόξεις φρονεῖν, ἄλλοις τὰ χορμὰ ταῦτ᾽ ἀφεῖς, εἴτε ληρή-
ματα χρῆ φάναι εἶναι εἴτε φιλοσοφίας, εἶ ὅν κενοῖσιν ἐγκατοικήσεις δόμοις. ᾿Ηλῶν
οὐν ἐλέγχοντας ἀνδρᾶς τὰ μικρὰ ταῦτα, ἀλλ᾽ ὃ
οὐς ἐστὶ καὶ βίος καὶ δόξα καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ ἀγαθά.

ΣΑΠ. XLII. ΣΩ. Ἐι χρυσῆν ἔχων ἐτύγχα-
νον τὴν ψυχήν, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, οὐχ ἂν οἰεὶ με
ἀσμενὸν εὐφρεῖν τοὺς τινὰς τῶν λίθων, ἦ βα-
σανίζοντι τὸν χρυσὸν, τὴν ἀρίστην, πρὸς ἕτοις
ἰμέλλοις προσαγαγῶν αὐτὴν, εἴ μοι ὁμολογήσεις
ἐκεῖνη καλῶς τεθεραπεῦσθαι τὴν ψυχήν, εἴ εἰ-
σεσθαι, ὅτι ἴκανος ἔχω καὶ οὐδέν μοι δεῖ ἄλλης ἐ
βασάνου; ΚΑΛ. Πρὸς τί δὴ τούτ᾽ ἔρωτις, ὃ
Σώκρατες; ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ σοι ἔφο νῦν. οἶμαι
ἔγω σοι ἐντευχηκὼς τοιούτῳ ἐρμαίῳ ἐντευχηκέ-
ναι. ΚΑΛ. Τί δὴ; ΣΩ. Ἐνδιήδ᾽, ὅτι, ἄν
μοι ὑπὸ ὁμολογήσῃς περὶ ὧν ἡ ἐμὴ ψυχὴ δοξάζει,
tαῦτ᾽ ἡδή ἐστίν αὐτὰ ταληθῆ. ἐννοῶ γὰρ, ὅτι ἂν
τὸν μέλλοντα βασανίζειν ἴκανός ψυχῆς πέρι ὅρ-
θῶς τῷ ἐσώςς καὶ μὴ τρία ἄρα δεῖ ἔχειν, δὲ ὁ
πάντα ἔχεις, ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ εὐνοιαν καὶ
παράξειαν. ἔγω γὰρ πολλοῖς ἐντυγχάνω, οὐ
ἐμὲ ὧν ὤνι ὑπὲρ τοῦ Βασιλέα τοῦ μὴ σοφὸν εἶναι ὄσπερ σὺ· ἔτεροι δὲ σοφοὶ μὲν εἰσίν, ὥστε ἐθέλουσι δὲ μοι λέγειν τὴν ἀλήθειαν διὰ τὸ μὴ κηδεσθαι μου ὄσπερ σὺ· τῷ δὲ ἔξω τόδε, Γοργίας τε καὶ Πόλος, σοφοὶ μὲν καὶ φίλω ἔστον ἐμῷ, ἐνδεεστέρῳ δὲ παρθένως καὶ αἰσχύντηροτέρῳ μᾶλλον τοῦ δέντος· πῶς γὰρ οὗ; ὃς εἰς τοσούτου αἰσχύνης ἐληλύθατον, ὡστε διὰ τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι τολμᾶ ἔκατερος αὐτῶν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἐναντία λέγειν ἐναντίον πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ταῦτα περὶ τῶν μεγίστων. οὐ δὲ ταῦτα πάντα ἔχεις, ὃ οἱ ἄλλοι οὐκ ἔχουσι· πεπάіδευσαι τε γὰρ ἐκατός, ὡς πολλοὶ ἂν φῆσαιν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ C ἐμὸ γ(State) εἰ εὖνους. τίνι τεκμηρίῳ χρωμαί; ἐγὼ σοι ἐρῶ. οἱδα ὡς ἔγὼ, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, τέτταρας ὄντας, κοινωνίας γεγονότας σοφίας, σε τε καὶ Τίσανδρον, τὸν Ἀριδναίον, καὶ Ἀνδρόνα, καὶ Ναυσικάδην, τὸν Χολαργέα. καὶ ποτε ὡς ἐγὼ ἐπικονύσαν βουλευομένων μέχρι ὅποι τὴν σοφίαν ἄσχητεν εὖ, καὶ οἶδα, ὅτι ἑνίκα ἐν ὡς τοιάδε τις δόξα, μὴ προθυμεῖσθαι D εἰς τὴν ἀξιόλειται φιλοσοφεῖν, ἀλλὰ εὐλαβεῖσθαι παρεκαλεῖσθαι ἀλλήλους, ὅπως μὴ πέρα τοῦ δέντος σοφοτέρων γεγομένων λήσετε διαφαράγετε. ἐπειδὴ οὐν σον ἀκοῦσα ταῦτα ἐμοὶ συμβουλεύσοντος, ἄπερ τοῖς σεαυτοῦ ἐσαρκοτάτοις, ἐκατόν μοι τεκμηρίων ἔστιν, ὅτι ὁ ἄλλθως μοι εὖνους εἰ. καὶ μὴν, ὅτι τε οἶος παραδησίαςθαι καὶ μὴ αἰσχύνεσθαι, αὐτὸς τε φής καὶ ὁ λόγος, ὃν ὁλίγον πρότερον ἔλεγες, ὁμολογεῖ σοι. ἔχει δὴ οὐτωσὶ
δῆλον ὦτι τούτων πέρι νυνι. ἐάν τι σὺ ἐν τοῖς Ε.

λόγοις ὁμολογήσῃς μοι, βεβαιασανισμένον τοῦτο, ἢδη ἔσται ἰκανῶς ὑπ' ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ, καὶ οὐκέτι αὐτὸ δεησε ἕπ' ἀλλην βάσανον ἀναφέρειν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε αὐτὸ συνεχόρθησας σὺ οὔτε σοφίας ἐνδείξῃ οὐτ' αἰσχύνῃς περιουσία· οὔτ' αὖ ἀπατῶν ἐμὲ συγχωρήσασι ἂν· φίλος γάρ μοι εἰ, ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς φής. τῷ ὄντι οὖν ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ σῇ ὁμολογίᾳ τέλος ἢδη ἐξεὶ τῆς ἀληθείας. πάντων δὲ καλλίστη ἔστιν ἡ σχέψις, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, περὶ τούτων ὃν σὺ δῆ μοι ἐπετίμησας, ποιόν τινα χρή ἔνυαι τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ τί ἐπιτηδεύεις καὶ μέχρι τοῦ, καὶ προσβύτερον καὶ νεότερον ὄντα. ἔγω γὰρ εἰ τι μὴ ὁρθὸς πράττωσι πατὰ τὸν βίον τὸν ἐμαυτού, εὖ ἔσθι τούτῳ ὅτι οὐχ ἔχων ἐξαιρετάνω, ἀλλ' ἀμαθίας τῇ ἡμή. σὺ οὖν, ἀόρηρ ἡρῴο νοουθετεῖ με, μή ἀποστῆς, ἀλλ' ἰκανῶς μοι ἐνδείξαι τί ἐστι τούτο, δ ἐπιτηθευτέον μοι, καὶ τίνα τρόπον κηρ.

σαίμην ἂν αὐτό. καὶ ἐάν με λάβης νῦν μέν σοι ὁμολογήσαντα, ἐν δὲ τῷ ύπεροφρόνῳ μὴ ταῦτα πράττοντα, ἀπερ ὁμολογήσα, πάνιν με ἤργου βλά-

κα εἶναι καὶ μηχεῖ τοτέ με νουθετήσῃς ύπεροφρόνοι, δέ μηδενοῦ ἀξιόν ὄντα. ἐξ ἀρχῆς δὲ μοι ἐπανά-

λαβέ, πῶς φης τὸ δίκαιον ἔχεις καὶ σὺ καὶ Πίν-

δαρός τὸ κατὰ φύσιν; ἄγειν βία τὸν κρείττω το- 

tῶν ἰττόνων καὶ ἄρχειν τῶν βελτίω τῶν χειρόνων 

καὶ πλέον ἔχειν τὸν ἀμείνο τὸν παυλοτέρον; μή 

τι ἄλλο λέγεις τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, ἡ ὁρθὸς με-

μημαι;

Cap. XLIII. ΚΑΔ. Ἄλλα ταύτα ἔλεγον
καὶ τότε, καὶ νῦν λέγω. ΣΩ. Πότερον δὲ τὸν Ο αὐτὸν βελτίων καλεῖς οὔ καὶ κρείττω; οὔδε γὰρ τοι τότε οἶδος τ’ ἡ μαθεῖν σου τί ποτε λέγεις. πότερον τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους κρείττους καλεῖς καὶ δεῖ ἁχροάσθαι τοῦ ἰσχυροτέρου τοὺς ἀσθενεστέ- ρους, οἶδον μοι δοξεῖς καὶ τότε ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὡς αἱ μεγάλαι πόλεις ἐπὶ τᾶς σιμφράς κατὰ τὸ φύσει δίκαιον ἔρχονται, ὅτι κρείττους εἰσὶ καὶ ἰσχυρό- τεροι, ὡς τὸ κρείττων καὶ ἰσχυρότερον καὶ βέλτιον ταύτων ὦν, ἦ ἐστι βελτίω μὲν εἶναι, ἥττω δὲ καὶ ἀσθενεστέρον, καὶ κρείττω μὲν εἶναι, μοχθηρότε- Dρον δὲ· ἦ ὁ αὐτὸς ὀρός ἔστι τοῦ βελτίωνος καὶ τοῦ κρείττων; τούτῳ μοι αὐτὸ σαφῶς διόρισον, ταύτων, ἦ ἐτερῶν ἔστι τὸ κρείττων καὶ τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ ἰσχυρότερον; ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλ’ ἐγὼ σοι σα- φῶς λέγω, ὅτι ταύτων ἔστιν. ΣΩ. Οὐχοῦν οἱ πολλοὶ τοῦ ἐνὸς κρείττους εἰσὶ κατὰ φύσιν; οἱ δ’ καὶ τοὺς νόμους τίθενται ἐπὶ τῷ ἐνί, ἀσπέρ καὶ οὐ ἄρτι ἔλεγες. ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; ΣΩ. Τὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἄρα νόμιμα τὰ τῶν κρείττων Ἐ ἔστι. ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Οὐχοῦν τὰ τῶν βελτίωνον; οἳ γὰρ κρείττους βελτίων πολὺ κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον. ΚΑΛ. Ναι. ΣΩ. Οὐ- χοῦν τὰ τοῦτον νόμιμα κατὰ φύσιν καλὰ, κρειττό- νον γε ὄντων; ΚΑΛ. Φημί. ΣΩ. Ἄρ’, οὖν οἰ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν οὔτως, ὡς ἄρτι αὔ συ ἔλεγες, 489 δίκαιον εἶναι τὸ ἵσον ἔχειν καὶ αἰσχινὸν τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι; ἔστι ταύτα, ἦ οὐ; καὶ ὅπως μὴ ἀλώσῃ ἐνταῦθα σὺ αἰσχυνόμενος. νομίζουσιν, ἦ οὔ, οἳ πολλοὶ τὸ ἵσον ἔχειν ἀλλ’ οὐ τὸ πλέον
δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ αἰσχίνον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι; Μή φθόνει μοι ἀποκρίνασθαι τούτο, Καλλίκλεις, ἵνα, ἐὰν μοι ὀμολογήσῃς, βεβαιώσω·


Μή φθόνει μοι ἀποκρίνασθαι τούτο, Καλλίκλεις, ἵνα, ἐὰν μοι ὀμολογήσῃς, βεβαιώσω·


ΚΑΛ. Ἅλλος οἴε γε πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν οὕτως. ΣΩ. Οὐ νόμιφρ ἄρα μόνον ἐστὶν αἰσχίνον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐδὲ δίκαιον τὸ ἵσον ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ φύσει. ὡστε κινδυνεύεις Βούλῃ ἀληθῆ λέγειν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐδὲ ὀρθῶς ἐμοὶ καθηγορεῖταί λέγων ὅτι ἐναντίον ἐστίν ὁ νόμος καὶ ἡ φύσις, ὁ δὲ καὶ ἕγα γνοὺς κακομυγδῷ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ἐὰν μὲν τις κατὰ φύσιν λέγῃ, ἐπὶ τὸν νόμον ἄγων, ἐὰν δὲ τις κατὰ τὸν νόμον, ἐπὶ τὴν φύσιν.

ΚΑΠ. XLIV. ΚΑΛ. Οὕτως ἄνὴρ οὐ παύσεται φλυαρῶν. Εἰπὲ μοι, ὡ Σόκρατε, οὐκ αἰσχύνεις, τηλικοῦτος οὖν, ὀνόματα θηρεύων, καὶ ἐὰν τις φήματι ἀμάρτῃ, ἔρμαιον τοῦτο ποιούμενος; ὡς γὰρ οἴει ἀλλο τι λέγειν τὸ κρείττον εἶναι ἢ τὸ βελτίους; οὐ πάλαι σοι λέγω, ὅτι ταυτὸν φημὶ εἶναι τὸ βελτίον καὶ τὸ κρείττον; ἢ οἴει με λέγειν, ἐὰν συφρετός συλλεγῇ δούλων καὶ παντοδαπῶν ἀνθρώπων μηδενὸς ἄξιόν πλὴν ὅσως τῷ σώματι ἱσχυρισάσθαι, καὶ οὕτως φῶςιν, αὐτὰ ταύτα εἶναι νόμιμα; ΣΩ. Εἴειν, ὡ σοφῶτατε Καλλίκλεις· οὕτω λέγεις; ΚΑΛ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν ὡς ΣΩ. Ἅλλος ἐγὼ μὲν, ὡ δαιμόνι, καὶ αὐτὸς πάλαι τοπάζω τοιοῦτον τῇ σέ λέγειν τὸ κρείττον, καὶ ἀνεφεύγω γυλιχωμένος σαρᾶς εἰδέναι ὡ τι λέγεις. οὐ γάρ δήποτε οὐ γε τούς δύο βελτίους ἦγεὶ τοῦ
εύς, οὐδὲ τοὺς σοὺς δούλους βελτίους σοῦ, ὅτι ἰσχυρότεροί εἰσίν ἡ σύ. ἀλλὰ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἴπε, τί ποτὲ λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους, ἐπειδή οὐ τοὺς ἰσχυρότέρους; καὶ, ὦ θαυμάσιε, πραότερον με ἐπροδίδασκε, ἵνα μὴ ἀποφοιτήσω παρὰ σοῦ. ΚΑΛ. Εἰρωνεύει, ὁ Σάκρατες. ΣΩ. Οὐ μᾶ τὸν Ζήθον, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, ὦ σὺ χρώμενος πολλὰ νῦν ὅτι εἰρωνεύον πρὸς με. ἀλλ᾽ ἢθι εἴπε, τίνας λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους εἶναι; ΚΑΛ. Τοὺς ἀμείνοντες ἔργον. ΣΩ. Ὁρᾶς ἄρα, ὦ σὺ αὐτὸς ὀνόματα λέγεις, δηλοῖς δὲ οὐδέν. οὖν ἐρείς τοὺς βελτίους καὶ χρείττον πότερον τοὺς φρονιμοτέρους λέγεις, ἡ ἀλλού τινάς; ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ ναὶ μᾶ Δία τούτοις λέγω, καὶ σφόδρα γε. ΣΩ. Πολλάκις ἄρα εἰς φρονῶν μυρίων μὴ φρονοῦν-

τοις κρεῖττοις ἐστὶν κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ τούτον ἄρχειν δεῖ, τοὺς δ᾽ ἄρχεσθαι, καὶ πλέον ἔχειν τὸν ἄρχοντα τῶν ἀρχομένων. τούτο γὰρ μοι δοξεῖς βουλεύσαι λέγειν — καὶ οὐ ρήματα θηρεύω —, εἰ δὲ εἰς τῶν μυρίων κρεῖττον. ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ὁ λέγω. τούτο γὰρ οἶμαι ἔγω τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι φύσει, τὸ βελτίῳ ὡντα καὶ φρονιμότερον καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ πλέον ἔχειν τῶν φαντασμόνων.

B Cap. XLV. ΣΩ. Ἐξε δὴ αὐτοῦ. τὶ ποτὲ αὐ νῦν λέγεις; ἕαν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὄμεν, ὁσπερ νῦν, πολλοὶ αὐθοῦν ἀνθρώποι, καὶ ἢμῖν ἡ ἐν κοινῷ πολλὰ σιτία καὶ ποτά, ὄμεν δὲ παντοδαποί, οἱ μὲν ἰσχυροὶ, οἱ δὲ ἀσθενεῖς, εἰς δὲ ἢμῶν ἡ φρονιμότερος περὶ ταύτα ἰατρὸς ἦν, ἦ δὲ, οἴον εἰχός,
τῶν μὲν ἴσχυρότερος, τῶν δὲ ἀσθενέστερος, ἀλλο τι ἡ οὕτως φρονιμώτερος ἦμων ὢν βελτίων καὶ κρείττων ἐσται εἰς ταύτα; ΚΑΛ. Πάνω γε. ΣΩ.

Ἡ οὖν τούτων τῶν σιτίων πλέον ἦμων ἐκτεόνις αὐτῷ, ὅτι βελτίων ἐστίν, ἡ τοῦ μὲν ἄφεσιν πάντα ἔχεινον δει νέμειν, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀναλίσκειν τε αὐτὰ καὶ καταχρῆσθαι εἰς τὸ ἐκατούτο σῶμα οὐ πλεονεκτητέον, εἰ μὴ μέλλει ζημιούσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν πλέον, τῶν δ᾿ ἐλαττῶν ἐκτεόνις· ἢν δὲ τύχῃ πάντων ἀσθενεστάτων ὢν, πάντων ἐλάχιστον τῷ βελτίστῳ, ὁ Καλλίκλεις; οὐχ οὕτως, οὐ γαθε; ΚΑΛ. Περὶ στία λέγεις καὶ ποτὰ καὶ ἱατροὺς καὶ φλυαρίας· ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ ταύτα λέγω. ΣΩ. Πότερον δ᾿ οὖν τῶν φρονιμότερον βελτίω λέγεις; Φάθι η ἡ μῆ. ΚΑΛ. Ἕγωγε. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ᾿ οὐ τῶν βελτίων πλέον δειν ἔχειν; ΚΑΛ. Οὐ σιτίων γε οὐδὲ ποτῶν. ΣΩ. Μανθάνω, ἀλλ᾿ ἵσος ἰματίων, καὶ δεῖ τῶν ψυχοτικάτων μέγιστον ἰμάτιον ἔχειν καὶ πλεῖστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἀμυτεχήςινον περιμεναί. ΚΑΛ. Ποίων ἰματίων; ΣΩ. Ἀλλ᾿ εἰς υποδήματα δὴλον ὅτι δεῖ πλεονεκτεῖν τὸν φρονιμότερον εἰς ταύτα καὶ βέλτιστον. τὸν σκυτοτόν· Εμον ἵσος μέγιστα δεῖ υποδήματα καὶ πλεῖστα υποδεδεμένον περιπατεῖν. ΚΑΛ. Ποία υποδήματα φλυαρεῖς· ἔχων; ΣΩ. Ἀλλ᾿ εἰ μὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεις, ἵσος τὰ τοιάδε· οὖν γεωργικὸν ἀνδρὰ περὶ γῆν φρονιμῶν τε καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἁγάθων, τούτων δὲ ἵσος δεῖ πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν σπερμάτων καὶ ὡς πλείστοι σπέρματι χρῆσθαι εἰς τὴν αὐτοῦ γῆν. ΚΑΛ. Ὡς αἰεὶ ταύτα λέγεις, ὥ
Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Οὐ μόνον γε, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, 491 ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν. ΚΑΛ. Νη τοὺς θεοὺς, ἀτεχνῶς γε ἀεὶ σκυτέασ τε καὶ καφέασ καὶ μαγείρους λέγων καὶ ἱατροὺς οὐδέν παύει, ὡς περὶ τούτων ἡμῖν ὄντα τὸν λόγον. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὃν ἐρείς περὶ τίνων ὁ κρείττων τε καὶ φρονιμότερος πλέον ἔχων δικαίως πλεονεκτεῖ; ἢ οὔτε ἐμοὶ ὑποβάλλοντος ἀνέξει οὔτ' αὑτῶς ἐρείς; ΚΑΛ. 'Αλλ' ἔγογς καὶ πάλαι λέγω. πρὸς τούς κρείττους οί εἰςιν, οὐ σκυτότο-θ' Μοὺς λέγω οὐνδε μαγείρους, ἀλλ' οί ἄν εἰς τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα φρονίμους ὅσιν, ὄντινα ἄν τρόπων εὐ οἴκοτο, καὶ μὴ μόνον φρονίμου, ἀλ-λα καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, ἵκανοι ὄντες ἢ ἄν νοῆσωσιν ἐπιτελεῖν, καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμνωσι διὰ μαλακίαν ἴσως.

ΚΑΠ. XLVI. ΣΩ. 'Ορᾷς, ὁ βέλτιστε Καλ-λίκλεις, ὃς οὐ ταυτὰ σὺ τ' ἐμοὶ κατηγορεῖς καὶ ἐγὼ σοῦ; σὺ μὲν γὰρ ἔμε φῆς ἂς ταυτὰ λέγειν, καὶ μέμφει μοι· ἐγὼ δὲ σοῦ τοὐναντίον, ὅτι οὐ-θ' ἔποτε ταυτὰ λέγεις περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τοτὲ μὲν τοὺς βελτίωνς τε καὶ κρείττους τοὺς ἱσχυ-ροτέρους ὅριζον, ἀὐθίς δὲ τοὺς φρονιμιστέρους, νῦν δ' αὖ ἔτερον τι ἢκεις ἔχων· ἀνδρειότεροί τινες ὕπο σοῦ λέγονται οἱ κρείττους καὶ οἱ βελτίωνς. ἀλλ' ὁ 'γαθέ, εἰπὼν ἀπαλλάγητι τίνας ποτὲ λέ-γεις τοὺς βελτίωνς τε καὶ κρείττους καὶ εἰς ὦ τι. ΚΑΛ. 'Αλλ' εἰηθά γε ἐγογε τοὺς φρονίμους ὃ地带 τῆς πόλεως πράγματα καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, τούτους γὰρ προσήκει τῶν πόλεων ἄρχειν, καὶ
τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτ’ ἐστὶ, πλέον ἔχειν τούτους τῶν ἄλλων, τοὺς ἀρχοντας τῶν ἀρχομένων. Σ. Ὡ. Τί δὲ; αὐτῶν, ὃ ἐταίρη; [ἢ τί ἀρχοντας ἢ ἀρ- χομένους;] ΚΑΑ. Πῶς λέγεις; Σ. Ὡ. Ὑπάρχοις αὐτῶν ἀρχοντας. ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν δεῖ, αὐτῶν ἐαντοῦ ἀρχεῖν, τῶν δὲ ἄλ- λων; ΚΑΑ. Πῶς ἐαντοῦ ἀρχοντα λέγεις; Σ. Ὡ. Οὐδὲν ποικίλον, ἀλλ’ ὅσπερ οἱ πολλοί, σώφρονα ὑντα καὶ ἐγχρατῆ αὐτῶν ἐαντοῦ, τῶν ἱδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμίων ἀρχοντα τῶν ἐν ἐαντοῦ. Ἐ ΚΑΑ. Ἡς ἡδῆς εἰ! τοὺς ἡλιθίους λέγεις τοὺς σώφρονας. Σ. Ὡ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐκ ἂν γνοίη, ὅτι οὐκ λέγω. ΚΑΑ. Πάννυ γε σφόδρα, ὃ Σόφρατες: ἐπεὶ πῶς ἂν εὐδαίμων γέ- νοιτο ἄνθρωπος δουλεύον ὄτι φοῦν; ἀλλὰ τούτ’ ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον, ὃ ἐγὼ σοὶ τὴν παράθυρον ἑστήκειν λέγω, ὅτι δεὶ τὸν ὅρθως βιωσόμενον τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας τᾶς ἑαυτοῦ ἐὰν ὡς μεγίστας εἶναι καὶ μὴ κολάζειν, ταύταις δὲ ὡς μεγίσταις οὖσας ἵκανον εἶναι ὑπηρετεῖν δι’, 492 ἄνδρείαν καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ ἀποπιμπλάναι ὃν ἂν ἄει ἡ ἐπιθυμία γίγνηται. ἀλλὰ τούτ’, οἷμαι, τοῖς πολλοῖς οὐ δυνατόν ὃθεν ἤγγοι τοὺς τοιούτους δι’ αἰσχύνην ἀποχυποτόμενοι τὴν αὐ- τῶν ἄδυναμίαν, καὶ αἰσχρὸν δὴ φασίν εἶναι τὴν ἀκολασίαν· ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, δουλούμενοι τοὺς Βελτίων τὴν φύσιν ἄνθρω- πους, καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐκπορίζεσθαι ταῖς ἱδοναῖς πλήρωσιν ἐπανοῦσι τὴν σωφροσύνην Β καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἀνανδρίαν.
ἐπεὶ γε οἷς ἡ ἀρχή ὑπήρξεν ἡ βασιλέων νείσιν εἶναι ὑ αὐτοῦ τῇ φύσει ἑκανοῦς ἐκπορίσασθαι ἀρχὴν τινα ἡ τυφαννίδα ἡ δυναστείαν, τὶ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ αὐξην καὶ κάκιον εἰ τὶ σωφροσύνης [καὶ δικαιοσύνης] τούτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις; οἷς ἔξον ἀπολαύειν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ μηδενὸς ἐμποδών ὄντος, αὐτοὶ ἔαντος δεσπότην ἐπαγάγοιν τὸν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων νῦνον τε καὶ λόγον C καὶ γράμον; ἡ πόσο οὖν ἂν ἄθλοις γεγονότες εἰησαν ὑπὸ τοῦ καλοῦ τοῦ τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς σωφροσύνης, μηδὲν πλέον νέμοντες τοὺς φίλους τοὺς αὐτῶν ἡ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, καὶ ταῦτα ἄρχοντες ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῶν πόλει; ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, δ Σώκρατες, ἢν φῆς σὺ διόκειν, ὀδ' ἔχει· τρυφῇ καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ ἑλευθερία, ἐὰν ἐπικουρίαν ἔχῃ, τούτ' ἐστὶν ἄρετή τε καὶ εὐθαμονία· τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ καλλιστημένα, τὰ παρὰ φύσιν συνθηκόμενα, ἀνθρώπων φιλαρία καὶ οὐθενὸς ἄξια.

D ΣΑΡ. XLVII. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἀγεννῶς γε, δ Καλλίκλεις, ἐπεξέρχει τῷ λόγῳ παράθεσιαζόμενος· σαφῶς γὰρ σὺ νῦν λέγεις ὡς οἱ ἄλλοι διανοοῦνται μὲν, λέγειν δὲ οὐκ ἔθελονς. δέομαι οὖν ἐγὼ σου μηδενὶ τρόπῳ ἀνεῖναι, ἵνα τῷ ὅτι κατάδηλον γένηται πῶς βιωτέον. καὶ μοι λέγε· τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας φῆς σὺ κολαστεῖον, εἰ μέλλεις τις οἴον δὲ εἶναι, ἐστιν δὲ αὐτῶς ὡς μεγίστας πλήρωσιν αὐταῖς ἀμόθεν γε ποθὲν ἐτοιμάζειν, καὶ τοῦτο εἰναι τῇν ἀρετήν; ΚΑΔ. Φημὶ Εταύτα ἐγώ. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἀρὰ ὧριθὸς λέγονται οἱ
μηδενὸς δεύμενοι ευδαίμονες εἶναι. ΚΑΔ. Οἱ λίθοι γὰρ ἂν οὕτως γε καὶ οἱ νεκροὶ ευδαιμονέ-
στατοι εἶν. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ καὶ ὡς γε σὺ
λέγεις δεινὸς ὁ βίος. οὐ γὰρ τοῦ ἰαμάζομι, ἀν,
εἰ Εὐρυπίδης ἀληθῆ εἴ τοῖς δὲ λέγει, λέγων
τίς δ' οἶδεν, εἰ τὸ ζῆν μὲν ἐστὶ καθανεῖν,
τὸ καθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν;
καὶ ἡμεῖς τῷ οὐν τίς τέθναμεν ὁπερ ἡδὴ τουφα
ἔγαγε καὶ ἡκουσα τῶν σοφῶν, ὡς ἰνή ἡμεῖς τέθνα-
μεν, καὶ τὸ μὲν σῶμα ἑστὶν ἡμῖν σῶμα, τῆς δὲ
ψυχῆς τούτοι, ἐν ὃ επιθυμίαι εἰσί, τυχχᾶνει ὁν
οῖον ἀναπείθεσθαι καὶ μεταπίπτειν ἁνω κάτω,
καὶ τούτῳ ᾧρα τις μυθολογῶν κομψὸς ἀνήρ, ἦσως
Σικελός τις ἡ Ἰταλικός, παράγον τῷ ὀνόματι διὰ
tὸ πιθανόν τε καὶ πιστικὸν ὀνόμασε πίθον, τοὺς
dὲ ἀνοίητους ἀνυήτους· τῶν δ' ἀνυήτων τούτων θ
τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡς αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσί, τὸ ἀκόλαστον
αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐ στεγανῶν, ὡς τετρημένοι εἰς πίθος,
dιὰ τὴν ἀπληστίαν ἀπεικάσας. τοῦνατιόν δὴ
οὕτος σοὶ, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, ἐνδείκνυται, ὡς τῶν ἐν
"Αἰδοὺ — τὸ ἀειδὲς δὴ λέγων — οὕτω ἀδιόλοτα-
tοι ἂν εἶχεν οἱ ἀμῦντοι, καὶ φοροῦν εἰς τὸν τετρη-
μένον πίθον ὑδαρ ἐτέρῳ τοιοῦτῳ τετρημένῳ κο-
σκίνῳ· τὸ δὲ κόσκινον ἄρα λέγει, ὡς ἔρχε ὁ πρὸς
ἐμὲ λέγων, τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι· τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν κο-
σκίνῳ ἀπεικάσα τῇ τῶν ἀνοίητων ὡς τετρημένην,
ἀτε οὐ δυναμένην στέγειν δὴ ἀπιστίον τε καὶ
λήθην. ταῦτ' ἐπιεικῶς μὲν ἔστιν ὑπὸ τι ἄτοπα,
ὅτι οὐκ ἔγραβούλομαι σοι ἐνδειξαμενός, ἐάν
ποι ὁ πεῖσαι μεταιδέσθαι, ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀπλή-

στος καὶ ἀκολούθως ἔχοντος βίου τὸν κοσμίως καὶ τοῖς ἄει παροῦσιν ἰκανῶς καὶ ἕξαρχοῦντος ἔχοντα βίον ἐλέσθαι. ἀλλὰ πότερον πείθω τί σε D καὶ μετατίθεσαι εὐδαιμονεστέρους εἶναι τοὺς κοσμίους τὸν ἀκολόστον, ἢ οὐδέν, ἀλλ' ἂν καὶ πολλὰ τοιαύτα μυθολογῶ, οὐδέν τι μάλλον μετα-
θήσει; ΚΑΔ. Τοῦτ' ἀληθέστερον εἰρήκας, ὁ Σώκρατες.

ΚΑΡ. XLVIII. ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, ἀλλην σοι εἰ-
κόνα λέγω εὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γυμνασίου τῇ νῦν. σχό-
pει γάρ, εἰ τοιόνδε λέγεις περὶ τοῦ βίου ἐκατέρω 
tοῦ τε σώφρονος καὶ τοῦ ἀκολόστου, οἶον εἰ δυ-
eῖν ἀνδροῦν ἐκατέρω πίθοι πολλοὶ εἶχαν, καὶ τῷ 
Ε μὲν ἐτέρῳ ὑγείᾳ καὶ πλήρεις, ὁ μὲν οἶνου, ὁ δὲ 
μέλιτος, ὁ δὲ γάλακτος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πολλῶν, 
nάματα δὲ σπάνια καὶ χαλεπὰ ἐκάστον τούτων 
eῖη καὶ μετὰ πολλῶν πόνων καὶ χαλεπῶν ἐκπο-
ριζόμενα· ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐτέρος πληρωσάμενος μήτ' 
ἐποχετεύοι μήτε τι φροντίζοι, ἀλλ' ἔνεκα τούτων ἰσιχιάν ἔχοι· τῷ δ' ἐτέρῳ τὰ μὲν νάματα, ὄσπερ 
καὶ ἕξεινο, δυνατὰ μὲν πορίζεσθαι, χαλεπὰ δὲ, 
tά δ' ἀγγεία τετρημένα καὶ σαθρὰ, καὶ ἀναγκά-
ζοιτο οἱ καὶ νύκτα καὶ ἠμέραν πιμπλάναι αὐτά, 
ἡ τόσ ἐσχάτας λυπώτατο λύπας· ὁρα τοιοῦτον ἐκατέρω ὅντος τοῦ βίου, λέγεις τόν τοῦ ἀκολά-
στου εὐδαιμονεστέρον εἶναι ἢ τόν τοῦ κοσμίου; 
πείθω τί σε ταῦτα λέγων συγχωρήσαι τοῖς κόσμι-
ον βίον τοῦ ἀκολόστου ἀμείνῳ εἶναι, ἢ οὐ πείθω; 
ΚΑΔ. Οὐ πείθεις, ὁ Σώκρατες. τῷ μὲν γὰρ 
πληρωσαμένῳ ἐκείνῳ οὐκέτ' ἐστιν ἓδονή οὐδεμία,
άλλα τούτ’ ἕστιν, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, τὸ ὁπέρ λίθον ἦν, ἐπειδάν πληρώσῃ, μήτε χαίροντα ἢ τ’ μὴτε λυποῦμενον. ἀλλ’ ἐν τούτῳ ἕστι τὸ ἥδεως ἦν, ἐν τῷ ὁς πλείστον ἐπιφέδειν. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη γ’, ἄν πολὺ ἐπιφέδεῃ, πολὺ καὶ τὸ ἀπιόν εἶναι καὶ μεγάλ’ ἀττα τὰ τρῆματα εἶναι ταῖς ἐχροαῖς; ΚΑΛ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Χαρα-δρινόν τινα αὖ σὺ βίον λέγεις, ἀλλ’ οὐ νεκρὸν οὐδὲ λίθον. καὶ μοι λέγε, τὸ τοιόνδε λέγεις, οἶον πεινήν καὶ πεινώντα ἐσθίειν; ΚΑΛ. "Εγώγε. ΣΩ. Καὶ διαμήν γε καὶ διψώντα πίνειν; ΚΑΛ. ο Λέγω, καὶ τὰς ἀλλὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἀπάσας ἔχοντα καὶ δυνάμενον πληροῦντα χαίροντα εὐδαιμόνως ἦν.

ΚΑΡ. XLIX. ΣΩ. Εὖγε, ὃ βέλτιστε· διατε-λεί γὰρ ὁπέρ ἢρξο, καὶ ὅπως μὴ ἀπαισχυνέι. δεὶ δέ, ὃς ἔστι, μηδ’ ἐμὲ ἀπαισχυνθήναι. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν εἰπὲ, εἰ καὶ γεράντα καὶ κυησάντα, ἀρθόνως ἔχοντα τοῦ κυήσαν, κυνόμενον διατε- λοῦντα τὸν βίον εὐδαιμόνως ἐστι ζῆν. ΚΑΛ. Ὁ οὐκοῦσ’ εἰ, ὃ Σάρκατες, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς δημη-γόρος. ΣΩ. Τοιγάροι, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, Πόλον μὲν καὶ Γοργίαν καὶ ἐξεπληξα καὶ αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐποίησα, σὺ δε οὐ μή ἐκπλαγῆσ’ οὐδὲ μή αἰσχυνθήσ’ ἀνδρείον γὰρ εἰ. ἀλλ’ ἀποχρίνου μόνον. ΚΑΛ. Φημὶ τοίνυν καὶ τὸν κυνόμενον ἥδεως αὖ βιῶναι. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰπὲρ ἥδεως, καὶ εὐδαιμόνως; ΚΑΛ. Πάνω γε. ΣΩ. Πάτερον εἰ τὴν κεφα-Ε λὴν μόνον κυησά, ἢ ἔτι τ’ σε ἔρωτ’; ὅρα, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, τί ἀποχρίνει, ἢν τίς σε τὰ ἔχομενα
τούτοις ἐφεξῆς ἀπαντᾷ ἔρωτα. καὶ, *τὸ* τούτων τοιούτων οὖν τον κεφάλαιον, ὃ τῶν κυνάιδων βίος οὖτος οὐ δεινός καὶ αἰσχρός καὶ ἀθλίος; ἦ τούτους τολμήσεις λέγειν εὐθαίμονας εἶναι, ἕαν ἀφθόνως ἔχωσιν οὐν δέονται; ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ αἰσχύνει εἰς τοιαύτα ἄγων, ὁ Σώκρατες, τοὺς λόγους; ΣΩ. Ἠ γὰρ ἔγω ἄγω ἔνταυθα, ὁ γενναῖς, ἦ ἔκεινος, ὃς ἂν φῇ ἀνέδην οὔτω τοὺς 495 χαίροντας, ὁπως ἂν χαίροσθν, εὐθαίμονας εἶναι, καὶ μὴ διορίζηται τῶν ὑδόνων ὁποῖαν ἀγαθαὶ καὶ κακαὶ; ἄλλα ἔτι καὶ νῦν λέγε, πότερον φῆς εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἦδι καὶ ἄγαθόν, ἦ εἰναι τι τῶν ἠδειν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθον; ΚΑΛ. Ἡν δὴ μοι μὴ ἀνομολογοῦμεν ὃ ὁ λόγος, ἔαν ἔτερον φῆσα εἶναι, τὸ αὐτὸ φημὶ εἶναι. ΣΩ. Διαφθείρεις, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, τοὺς πρῶτους λόγους, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι μετ᾽ ἐμοῦ ἵκανός τὰ ὄντα ἐξετάζοις, εἴπερ παρὰ τὰ B δοξοῦντα σαντὸ ἐφείς. ΚΑΛ. Καὶ γὰρ σὺ, ὁ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Οὐ τοῖνυν ὁρθῶς ποιῶ οὔτ᾽ ἔγω, εἴπερ ποιῶ τοῦτο, οὔτε σὺ. ἄλλα, ὁ μακάρις, ἄθρωτι μὴ οὐ τοῦτο ὃ τὸ ἀγαθόν, τὸ πάντως χαίρειν· ταῦτα τε γὰρ τὰ νῦν δὴ αἰνιχθέντα πολλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ φαίνεται συμβαῖνοντα, εἰ τοῦτο οὔτως ἔχει, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά. ΚΑΛ. Ὡς σὺ γε οὔει, ὁ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Σὺ δὲ τῶ ὄντι, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, ταῦτα ἴχνυμι; ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε. c ΣΑΡ. Λ. ΣΩ. Ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἄρα τοῦ λόγον, ὡς σοῦ σπουδάζοντος; ΚΑΛ. Πάνω γε σφόδρα. ΣΩ. Ἡθ δὴ μοι, ἐπειδὴ οὔτω δοξεῖ, διελοῦ τάδε. ἐπιστήμην πον καλεῖς τι; ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε.
ΣΩ. Οὐ καὶ ἀνδρείαν τινὰ εἶναι μετὰ ἐπιστήμης; ΚΑΛ. "Ελεγον γάρ. ΣΩ. 'Ἤλλο τι οὐν ὁς ἔτερον τῆς ἀνδρείας τῆς ἐπιστήμης δύο ταύτα ἐλεγες; ΚΑΛ. Σφόδρα γε. ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἡδονήν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ταύτων, ἡ δ ἔτερον; ΚΑΛ. "Ετερον δήμου, ὁ σοφῶτατε σὺ. ΣΩ. "Η καὶ ἀνδρείαν ἔτεραν ἡδονής; ΚΑΛ. Πώς γὰρ οὗ; ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ ὅπως μεμνημόθεα ταύτα, ὦτι Καλλικλῆς ἔφη ὁ Ἀχαρνεὺς ἢδυ μὲν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ταύτων εἶναι, ἐπιστήμην δὲ καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ ἀλλήλων καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔτερον. ΚΑΛ. Σωφράτης δέ γε ἢμιν ὁ Ἀλκασηθένον ὄψιν ὀμολογεῖ ταύτα· ἡ ὀμολογεῖ; ΣΩ. Οὔχ ὀμολο-Ε γεί· οἶμαι δὲ γε οὐδὲ Καλλικλῆς, ὦτιν αὐτὸς αὐτὸν θεάσηται ὁρθῶς. εἰπὲ γάρ μοι, τοὺς εὗ πράττοντας τοῖς κακῶς πράττονσιν οὐ τούναντιον ἤγεῖ πάθος πεπονθέναι; ΚΑΛ. "Εγώγη. ΣΩ. 'Αρ' οὖν, εἶπερ ἑναντία ἔστι ταύτα ἀλλήλως, ἀνάγκη περὶ αὐτῶν ἔχειν ὡστερ περὶ υγιείας ἔχει καὶ νόσου; οὐ γάρ ἢμα δήμου ύγιαίνει τε καὶ νοσεῖ ὁ ἀνθρώπος, οὐδὲ ἢμα ἀπαλλάττεται υγιείας τε καὶ νόσου. ΚΑΛ. Πῶς λέγεις; ΣΩ. Οἶνον περὶ ὅτου βούλει τοῦ σώματος ἀπολαβῶν σχόπευ.496 νοσεῖ πον ἀνθρώπως ὀρθαλμῶς, ὃ όνομα ὀρθαλμία; ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὗ; ΣΩ. Οὗ δήμου καὶ ύγιαίνει γε ἢμα τοὺς αὐτόν; ΚΑΛ. Οὖν ὁπωσοστιοῦν. ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ὦτιν τῆς ὀρθαλμίας ἀπαλλάττεται, ἢμα τότε καὶ τῆς υγιείας ἀπαλλάττεται τῶν ὀρθαλμῶν καὶ τελευτῶν ἢμα ἀμ- φοτέρων ἀπηλλακται; ΚΑΛ. "Ηκιστά γε.
ΓΟΡΓΙΑΣ.  77

Β ΣΩ. Θαυμάσιον γάρ, οὖν, καὶ ἄλογον γίγνεται. ἢ γάρ; ΚΑΛ. Σφόδρα γε. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐν μέρει, οὖν, ἐκάτερον καὶ λαμβάνει καὶ ἀπολυεῖ; ΚΑΛ. Ψημί. ΣΩ. Ὀυκοῦν καὶ ἵσχυν καὶ ἀσθενεῖαν ὁσανίως; ΚΑΛ. Ναὶ. ΣΩ. Καὶ τάχος καὶ βραδυτητα; ΚΑΛ. Πάνω γε. ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ τάγαθα καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τάναντια τούτων, κακά τε καὶ ἀθλιότητα, ἐν μέρει λαμβάνει, καὶ ἐν μέρει ἀπαλλάττεται ἐκατέρθου; ΚΑΛ. Πάντως δήπου. ΣΩ. Ἐὰν εὗρει τρεις ἄρα ἄττα, ὅν ἄμα τε ἀπαλλάττεται ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἄμα ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι ταῦτα γε οὐκ ἢν εἴη τὸ τε ἄγαθον καὶ τὸ κακὸν. ὁμολογοῦμεν ταῦτα; Καὶ εὗρα μᾶλα σκεπασμένος ἀποκρίνον. ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλ' ὑπερήφανός ὁ ὁμολογοῖ.

россий. ΛΙ. ΣΩ. Ἡθι δὴ ἔπι τα ἐμπροσθεν ὁμολογημένα. τὸ πεινην ἔλεγες πότερον ἤδι, ἢ ἀνιαρόν εἶναι; αὐτὸ λέγω τὸ πεινην. ΚΑΛ. Ἐν δ' ἄνιαρόν ἔρωγε· τὸ μέντοι πεινῶντα ἐσθείειν ἤδι. ΣΩ. Μενθανω· ἀλλ' οὖν τὸ γε πεινην αὐτὸ ἀνιαρόν. ἢ οὐχί; ΚΑΛ. Ψημί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ διψῆν; ΚΑΛ. Σφόδρα γε. ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν ἐτὶ πλεῖο ἔρωτο, ἡ ὁμολογεῖσ ἀπασαν ἔνδειαν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαιν ἀνιαρόν εἶναι; ΚΑΛ. Ὀμολογᾷ, ἀλλα μὴ ἔροτα. ΣΩ. Ἐξεν. διψῶντα νος ἔτη τὴ πίνειν ἄλλο τι ἢ ἢδι φης εἶναι; ΚΑΛ. Ἐγώγη. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τούτων οὖ λέγεις \E τὸ μὲν διψῶντα λυτούμενον δήπου ἔστι; ΚΑΛ. Ναὶ. ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ πίνειν πληρώσει τε τής ἐνδειας καὶ ἓδονη; ΚΑΛ. Ναὶ. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν 7.
κατὰ τὸ πίνειν χαίρειν λέγεις; ΚΑΔ. Μάλιστα. ΣΩ. Λυπώντα γε; ΚΑΔ. Φημί. ΣΩ. Λυπουμένον; ΚΑΔ. Ναι. ΣΩ. Λεγόμενε οὖν τὸ συμβαίνον, ὅτι λυπουμένον χαίρειν λέγεις ἀμα, ὅταν διψῶντα πίνειν λέγης; ἢ οὖν ἀμα τούτο γίγνεται κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον καὶ χρόνον εἰτε γυμνῆς εἰτε σώματος βούλει; οὐδὲν γάρ, οἴμαι, διαφέρει έτι ταύτα, ἢ οὐ; ΚΑΔ. "Εστίν. ΣΩ. Ἄλλα μήν εὖ γε πράττοντα κακῶς πράττειν ἀμα ἀδύνατον ἕρης εἶναι. ΚΑΔ. Φημί γάρ. ΣΩ. Ἀνιώμενον δὲ γε χαίρειν δυ-αντὸν ὁμολόγηκας. ΚΑΔ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Οὖν ἀρα τὸ χαίρειν εἴστε εὖ πράττειν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀνιώμενον κακῶς, ὅστε ἔτερον γίγνεται τὸ ἢδυ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ΚΑΔ. Οὖν οἴδ᾿ ἄττα σοφίζει, ὁ Σόφρατε. ΣΩ. Οἴσθα, ἄλλα ἄκκίζει, ὁ Καλλίκλεις. καὶ προβίθι γε ἐτὶ εἰς τοῦμπροσθεν, ὅτι ἔχον λῃστῆς, ἢν εἰδῆς ὃς σοφός ὁν με νοουθε-βεῖς. οὖν ἀμα διψῶν τε ἐκάστος ἢμῶν πέπανται καὶ ἀμα ἢδύμενος διὰ τοῦ πίνειν; ΚΑΔ. Οὖν οἴδα ὅ τι λέγεις. ΓΟΡ. Μηθαμίως, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, ἄλλ᾿ ἀποκρῖνον καὶ ἢμῶν ἑνεκα, ἢν περανθοῦσιν οἱ λόγοι. ΚΑΔ. Ἄλλ᾿ ἂει τοιοῦτος ἐστὶ Σωκράτης, ὁ Γοργία· σωκράτε καὶ ὁλίγου ἄξια ἀνεφώτα καὶ ἐξελέγχει. ΓΟΡ. Ἄλλα τι σοι διαφέρει; πάντως οὐ σὺ αὕτη ἢ τιμὴ, ὁ Καλλίκλεις· ἄλλ᾿ ὑπόσχες Σωκράτει ἐξελέγχαι ὡς ὁν βούληται. ΚΑΔ. Ἐρῶτα δὴ οὖ τοις σωκράτε τε καὶ στενὰ ταύτα, ἐπείπερ Γοργία δο-κεῖ οὕτως.
Cap. LII. ΣΩ. Ευθαίμων εἰ, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, ὅτι τὰ μεγάλα μεμύησαι πρὶν τὰ σμιχρά· ἐγὼ δ’, οὐχ ὃμιλην θεμιτόν εἶναι. ὅθεν οὐν ἅπελιπες, ἀποχρίνου, εἰ οὐχ ἂμα παύεται διηνὸν ἐκαστὸς ἡμῶν καὶ ἱδόμενος. ΚΑΔ. Φημὶ. ΣΩ. Οὐκ-οὖν καὶ πεινῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμίων καὶ ἱδονῶν ἂμα παύεται; ΚΑΔ. ἑστι ταύτα. ΣΩ. Οὐκοὖν καὶ τῶν λυπῶν καὶ τῶν ἱδονῶν ἂμα παύεται; ΚΑΔ. Ναι. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τῶν ἁγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν οὐχ ἂμα παύεται, ὅσον ὁμολογεῖς· νῦν δὲ οὐχ ὁμολογεῖς; ΚΑΔ. Ἐγὼ. τί οὖν δή; ΣΩ. Ὅτι οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ γίγνεται, ὃ φίλε, τἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἠδέσιν οὐδὲ τὰ κακὰ τοῖς ἀνιαροῖς. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἂμα παύεται, τῶν δὲ οὐ, ὡς ἐτέρων όντων. πάς οὖν ταύτα ἄν εἰη τὰ ἴδεα τοῖς ἁγαθοῖς ἢ τὰ ἀνιαρὰ τοῖς κακοῖς; Ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, καὶ τῆδ᾿ εἶποκεῖσαι· οἴμαι γάρ ἐςοι οὐδὲ ταύτῃ ὁμολογεῖσθω. ἀδρεί δέ· τοὺς ἁγαθοὺς οὐχ ἁγαθῶν παροσίᾳ ἁγαθοὺς κα- λεῖς, ὡσπερ τοὺς οίς ἂν κάλλος παρῆ; ΚΑΔ. Ἐγὼ. ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἁγαθοὺς ἄνδρας καλεῖς τοὺς ἄρρονας καὶ δειλοὺς· οὐ γὰρ ἃρτι γε, ἄλλα τοὺς ἀνδρείους καὶ φρονίμους ἐλέγες. ἢ οὐ τού- τους ἁγαθοὺς καλεῖς; ΚΑΔ. Πάντω μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Τί δε; παῖδα ἄνοιγτον χαῖροντα ἢδη εἴδες; ΚΑΔ. Ἐγὼ. ΣΩ. Ἀνδρα δὲ οὐπω εἴδες ἄνοιγτον χαίροντα; ΚΑΔ. Οἶμαι ἐγὼ. ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο; ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν· ἀλλ᾿ ἀποχρίνου. ΚΑΔ. Εἶδον. ΣΩ. Τί δε; νοῦν ἔχοντα λυ- ποῦμενον καὶ χαίροντα; ΚΑΔ. Φημὶ. ΣΩ.
Πότεροι δὲ μᾶλλον χαίρουσι καὶ λυποῦνται, οἱ φρόνιμοι, ἡ οἱ ἄφρονες; ΚΑΛ. Οἴμαι ἔγωγε οὐ πολὺ τι διαφέρειν. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἀρκεῖ καὶ τούτῳ. ἐν πολέμῳ δὲ ἦδη εἴδες ἄνδρα δειλόν; ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὗ; ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἄπιοντον τῶν πολεμίων πότεροι σοι ἔδοξον μᾶλλον χαί-
ρειν, οἱ δειλοὶ, ἡ οἱ ἄνδρείοι; ΚΑΛ. Ἀμφότε-
ροι ἔμοιγε μᾶλλον· εἰ δὲ μῆ, παραπλησίως γε. Β
ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν διαφέρει. χαίρουσι δ' οὖν καὶ οἱ
dειλοὶ; ΚΑΛ. Σφόδρα γε. ΣΩ. Καὶ οἱ ἄφρονες, ὡς έσοικε. ΚΑΛ. Ναι. ΣΩ. Προσ-
πιόντων δὲ οἱ δειλοὶ μόνον λυποῦσθαι, ἡ καὶ οἱ
ἀνδρεῖοι; ΚΑΛ. Ἀμφότεροι. ΣΩ. Ἀρα
ὁμοίως; ΚΑΛ. Μᾶλλον ἓσσω οἱ δειλοὶ. ΣΩ.
'Απιόντων δ' οὐ μᾶλλον χαίρουσιν; ΚΑΛ.
'Ησσως. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν λυποῦνται μὲν καὶ χαί-
ρουσι καὶ οἱ ἄφρονες καὶ οἱ φρόνιμοι καὶ οἱ δει-
λοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄνδρείοι παραπλησίως, ὡς οὖ φῆς,
μᾶλλον δὲ οἱ δειλοὶ τῶν ἄνδρείων; ΚΑΛ. c
Φημί. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐ γε φρόνιμοι καὶ ἄν-
δρεῖοι ἀγαθοὶ, οἱ δὲ δειλοὶ καὶ ἄφρονες κακοὶ;
ΚΑΛ. Ναι. ΣΩ. Παραπλησίως ἀρα χαίρουσι καὶ λυποῦνται οἱ ἄγαθοι καὶ οἱ κακοὶ; ΚΑΛ.
Φημί. ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν παραπλησίως εἰσὶν ἀγα-
θοὶ καὶ κακοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τε καὶ οἱ κακοὶ; ἡ καὶ
ἐτι μᾶλλον ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοὶ εἰσίν οἱ κακοὶ;
ΣΑΡ. LIII. ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Λή' οὖν οἴδ' δ
ὁ τι λέγεις. ΣΩ. Οὐχ οἴσθ', ὅτι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἀγαθῶν φῆς παρουσίᾳ εἶναι ἀγαθοὺς, κακοὺς δὲ
κακῶν; τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι τὰς ἡδονὰς, κακὰ δὲ
τὰς ἀνίας; ΚΑΛ. "Εγγρεῖ. Σ.Ο. Οὖκοιν τοῖς χαίροντι πάρεστι τάγαθα, αἱ ἴδοναι, εἰπερ χαίροντι; ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὗ; Σ.Ο. Οὖκοιν ἄγαθὸν παρόντων ἄγαθοι εἰσών οἱ χαίροντες; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. Σ.Ο. Τί δέ; τοῖς ἂνιομένοις οὐ πάρεστι τὰ κακά, αἱ λύπαι; ΚΑΛ. Πάρεστι. Σ.Ο. Κακῶν δὲ γε παρούσια φης οὐ εἶναι κακοὺς τοὺς κακοὺς. ἢ οὐκέτι φῆς; ΚΑΛ. "Εγγρεῖ. Σ.Ο. Ἀγαθοί ἄφα οὐ ἄν χαίροντι, κακοὶ δὲ οὐ ἄν ἂνιομέναι; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. Σ.Ο. οἱ μὲν γε μᾶλλον μᾶλλον, οἱ δ’ ἢπτον ἢπτον, οἱ δὲ παραπλησίως παραπλησίως; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. Σ.Ο. Οὖκοιν φῆς παραπλησίως χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι τοὺς φρόνιμους καὶ τοὺς ἄφρονας καὶ τοὺς δειλοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρεῖους, ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τοὺς δειλοὺς; ΚΑΛ. "Εγγρεῖ. Σ.Ο. Συλλόγισαι δὴ κοινῇ μετ’ ἔμοι, τί ἡμῖν συμβαίνει ἐκ τῶν ὀμολογημένων καὶ διὸς γὰρ τοι καὶ τρίς 499 φασί καλὸν εἶναι τὰ καλὰ λέγειν τε καὶ ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι. Ἀγαθὸν μὲν εἶναι τὸν φρόνιμον καὶ ἄνδρεῖον φαμεν. ἢ γὰρ; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. Σ.Ο. Κακῶν δὲ τὸν ἄφρονα καὶ δειλόν; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. Σ.Ο. Ἀγαθὸν δὲ αὐ τὸν χαίροντα; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. Σ.Ο. Κακῶν δὲ τὸν ἀνιομένον; ΚΑΛ. Ἀνάγκη. Σ.Ο. Ἀνισοθα δὲ καὶ χαιρείν τὸν ἄγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν ὁμοίως, ἢσος δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον τὸν κακὸν; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. Σ.Ο. Οὐκοῦν ὁμοίως γίγνεται κακὸς καὶ ἄγαθὸς τῷ ἄγαθῷ ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον ἄγαθὸς ὁ κακὸς; οὐ ταῦτα συμβαίνει, καὶ τὰ πρότερα ἐκείνα, ἐὰν τις ταύ-
τὰ φη ὑδαί τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ εἰναι; οὗ ταῦτα ἀνάγκη, ὡς Καλλίκλεις;

**Καπ. ΛIV. ΚΑΛ.** Πάλαι τοί σου ἀχροῦμαι, ὡς Σώκρατες, καθομολογῶν, ἐνθυμούμενος, ὅτι, κἂν παῖζων τίς σοι ἐνδῷ ὅτι οὗτον, τούτου ἄσμενος ἔχει ὁσπερ τὰ μειράκια. ὡς δὴ σὺ οἴει ἡ ἡ καὶ ἄλλον ὄντινον ἀνθρώπων οὐχ ἠφείσθαι ταῦτα μὲν βελτίων ἰδονάς, τάς δὲ χείρους. ΣΩ. Ἰον ἴν, ὡς Καλλίκλεις, ὡς πανοῦργος εἰ, καὶ μοι ὁσπερ παιδὶ χρη, τοτέ μὲν αὖ φάσκων οὕτως ἔχειν, τοτέ δὲ ἔτερος, ἔξαπατὼν με. καῖτοι οὐκ ὁμην γε κατ' ἀρχῆς ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐκόντος εἰναι ἔξα-

πατηθήσεθαι, ὡς ὄντος φίλουν· νῦν δὲ ἐμεύ-

σην, καὶ ὡς οἴσικεν, ἀνάγκη μοι κατὰ τὸν παλαιὸν λόγον τὸ παρὸν εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦτο δέχεσθαι τὸ

dιδόμενον παρὰ σοῦ. ἔστι δὲ δὴ, ὡς οἴσικεν, ὁ

νῦν λέγεις, ὅτι ἠδοναὶ τινὲς εἰσιν αἱ μὲν ἀγαθαὶ,

αἱ δὲ κακαί. ἦ γαρ; ΚΑΛ. Ναι. ΣΩ. 'Αρ' οὖν ἀγαθαὶ μὲν αἱ ὀφέλιμοι, κακαὶ δὲ αἱ βλα-

θεραί; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Ὠφέλιμοι δὲ

γε αἱ ἀγαθῶν τι ποιοῦσαι, κακαὶ δὲ αἱ κακῶν τι; ΚΑΛ. Φημί. ΣΩ. 'Αρ' οὖν τὰς τοιάσδε λέ-

γεις, οὖν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ὡς νῦν δὴ ἔλεγομεν ἐν
tὸ ἐσθεῖν καὶ πίνειν ἰδονᾶς· εἰ δὲ τούτων αἱ μὲν ὑγείαις ποιοῦσιν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἣ ἵσχυν ἡ ἀλλὴν τινὰ ἄρετὴν τοῦ σῶματος, αὕται μὲν ἀγα-

θαί, αἱ δὲ τάναντα τούτων κακαί; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ
gε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ λῦται ὀσαύτως αἱ ἐ

μὲν χρησταὶ εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ πονηραὶ; ΚΑΛ. Πῶς
gαρ οὖ; ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰς μὲν χρηστάς καὶ
ὅδονας καὶ λύπας καὶ ἀφετέον ἐστὶ καὶ πρακτέον; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Τὰς δὲ πονηρὰς οὐ; ΚΑΛ. Ἀὴλον δή. ΣΩ. Ἐνεκα γὰρ ποὺ τῶν ἁγαθῶν ἀπαντα ἢμῖν ἐδοξε πρακτέον εἶναι, εἰ μνημονεύεις, ἔμοι τε καὶ Πῶλο. ἀφα καὶ σοι συνδοκεῖ οὕτω, τέλος εἶναι ἀπασών τῶν πράξεων τὸ ἁγαθὸν, καὶ ἐκεῖνον ἐνεκεν δεῖν πάντα τόλλα 500 πράττεσθαι, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐκεῖνο τῶν ἄλλων; σὺν- ψήφῳ ἢμῖν εἰ καὶ οὐ ἐκ τρίτον; ΚΑΛ. Ἐγώ- γε. ΣΩ. Τῶν ἁγαθῶν ἀφα ἐνεκα δεὶ καὶ τόλλα καὶ τὰ ἤδεα πράττειν, ἀλλ’ οὐ τἀγαθὰ τῶν ἤδεων. ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Ἀφ’ οὖν παντὸς ἁν- δρός ἐστιν ἐκλέξασθαι ποία ἁγαθὰ τῶν ἤδεων ἐστὶ καὶ ὅποια κακὰ, ἢ τεχνικὸν δεὶ εἰς ἑκαστὸν; ΚΑΛ. Τεχνικοῦ.

ΚΑΡ. ΛV. ΣΩ. Ἀναμνησθόμεν δὴ ὃν αὖ ἐγὼ πρὸς Πῶλον καὶ Γοργίαν ἑτύχακον λέγων. Β ἔλεγον γάρ, εἰ μνημονεύεις, ὅτι εἶεν παρασκευαὶ αἱ μὲν μέχρι ἤδονῆς, αὐτὸ τὸντο ὅμον παρα- σκευάζουσαι, ἄγνοοις δὲ τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ κείρον, αἱ δὲ γιγνάσκονσαι ὦ τι τε ἁγαθὸν καὶ ὦ τι κακὸν· καὶ ἐὔθην τῶν μὲν περὶ τὰς ἤδονὰς τὴν μακειρικὴν ἔμπειριαν, ἀλλ’ οὖ τέχνην, τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸ ἁγαθὸν τὴν ἑαυτικὴν τέχνην. καὶ πρὸς φιλίου, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, μήτε αὐτὸς οὖν δεῖν πρὸς ἐμὲ παίζειν μηδ’ ὦ τι ἄν τύχησι πα- θῶν τα ὀφθάλμην ἀποκρίνου, μήτ’ αὖ τὰ παρ’ ἐμοῦ οὕτως ἀποδέχου ὡς παίζοντος. ὅρας γὰρ, ὅτι περὶ τούτου εἰσὶν ἢμῖν οἴ λόγοι, οὐ τι ἄν μᾶλλον σπουδάσεις τοὺς καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἐχων
άνθρωπος, ἢ τοῦτο, ὄντωνα χρή τρόπον ἣν πότε·

ρον ἐπὶ ὄν σὺ παρακαλεῖς ἐμὲ, τὰ τοῦ ἄνδρος ἡ
tαὐτα πράττοντα, λέγοντά τε ἐν τῷ δήμῳ καὶ θη
tορικὴν ἀσκοῦντα καὶ πολιτεύομενον τοῦτον τὸν
tρόπον, ὃν ὑμεῖς τὴν πολιτεύεσθε, ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν θι

νὸν τὸν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, καὶ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν οὕτως

ἐκεῖνον διαφέρων; ὑσως οὐν βέλτιστον ἐστίν, ὅς

ἀρτι ἐγὼ ἐπεχείρησα, διαφέρειται, διελομένοις δὲ ὑ

καὶ ὑμολογήσαντας ἀλλήλους, εἰ ἔστι τοῦτο διπτο
tὸ βίῳ, σχέψασθαι τί τε διαφέρετον ἀλλήλουν καὶ

ὁπότερον βιωτέουν αὐτοῖν. ὑσως οὐν οὕτω οὕτα

tί λέγω. ΚΑΛ. Ὡν δῆτα. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἔγω

σοι σαφέστερον ἔρω. ἐπειδὴ ὑμολογήκαμεν ἔγω

tε καὶ σὺ εἶναι μὲν τὸ ἄγαθὸν, εἶναι δὲ τὶ ἤδιν,

ἐτερον δὲ τὸ ἤδιν τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ, ἐκατέρον δὲ αὐτοῖν

μελέτην τινα εἶναι καὶ παρασκευήν τῆς κτήσεως,

τὴν μὲν τὸν ἴδεος θήραν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἄγαθου — Ε

αὐτὸ δὲ μοι τοῦτο πρῶτον ἓ σύμφασι, ἡ μη·

σύμφρας; ΚΑΛ. Οὕτω φημι.

ΣΑΡ. ΛVI. ΣΩ. Ἡθι δῆ, ἢ καὶ πρὸς τούτῳ

ἔγω ἐλέγον διομολογῆσαι μοι, εἰ ἄρα σοι ἐδοξα
tότε ἀληθῆ λέγειν. ἐλέγον δὲ ποι, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ὑμο-

ποικὴ ὃν μοι δοξεῖ τέχνη εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἐμπειρία, ἡδο

δ' ἱατρικὴ, λέγων, ὅτι ἡ μὲν τοῦτον οὐ Θεραπεῦς

καὶ τὴν φύσιν ἔσχεσται καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ἤν πράττε
tει, καὶ λόγον ἔχει τοῦτον ἑκάστον δοῦναι, ἡ

ἱατρικὴ· ἡ δ' ἔτερα τῆς ἱδονῆς, πρὸς ἢν ἡ Θε

ραπεία αὐτῇ ἔστιν ἄπασα, κυμιδὴ ἀτέχνως ἐπ' ἀυτῆν ἔρχεται, οὔτε τι τὴν φύσιν σχεφαμένη τῆς

ἡδονῆς οὔτε τὴν αἰτίαν, ἀλόγως τε παντάπασιν,
ὅς ἔπος εἴπειν οὐδὲν διαφημισμένη, τριθή καὶ
· ἐμπειρία, μνήμην μόνον σοφομένη τοῦ εἰωθότος
Β γίγνεσθαι, ὡς ἢ καὶ ποριζέται τάς ἱδονάς. ταῦτ',
όν πρῶτον σκόπει εἰ δοξεῖ σοι ἔκανάς λέγεσθαι,
καὶ εἶναι τινας καὶ περὶ ψυχήν τοιαῦται ἄλλαι
πραγματεῖαι, αἱ μὲν τεχνίαι, προμηθειάν τινα
ἐχουσαι τοῦ βελτίστου περὶ τὴν ψυχήν, αἱ δὲ
tούτων μὲν ὁλιγωροῦσαι, ἐσκεμμέναι δ' αὖ, ἀσπερ
ἐκεῖ, τήν ἱδονήν μόνον τῆς ψυχῆς, τίνα ἄν αὐτὴ
τρόπον γίγνοιτο, ἡτίς δὲ ἡ βελτίων ἡ χείρων τῶν
ἡδονῶν οὔτε σκοποῦμεναι, οὔτε μέλον αὐταῖς
C ἀλλο ἡ χαριζέσθαι μόνον, εἴτε βέλτιον εἴτε χεῖ-
ρον. ἔμοι μὲν γάρ, ὃς Καλλίκλεις, δοκοῦσι τε
εἶναι, καὶ ἐγωγὲ φημὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον κολακείαν εἶναι
καὶ περὶ σῶμα καὶ περὶ ψυχήν καὶ περὶ ἀλλο,
ὅτου ἂν τις τὴν ἱδονήν θεραπεύῃ ἀσκέτως ἔχων
τοῦ ἀμείνονος τε καὶ τοῦ χείρων; σὺ δὲ ἡ πό-
τερον συγκατατίθεσαι ἥμιν περὶ τούτων τὴν αὐ-
τὴν δόξαν ἡ ἀντίφης; ΚΑΛ. Όνχ ἐγὼγε, ἀλλὰ
συγχωρῶ, ἵνα σοι καὶ περανθῆ ὁ λόγος καὶ Γορ-
Дγία τάδε χαριζομαι. ΣΩ. Πότερον δὲ περὶ μὲν
μίαν ψυχήν ἐστι τούτο, περὶ δὲ δύο καὶ πολλὰς
οὐχ ἐστίν; ΚΑΛ. Οὐχ, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ δύο καὶ
περὶ πολλὰς. ΣΩ. Οὐχοῦν καὶ ἄθροίας ἄμα
χαριζέσθαι ἐστι μηδὲν σχοπούμενον τὸ βέλτιστον;
ΚΑΛ. Οἶμαι ἐγὼγε.

Cap. LVII. ΣΩ. Ἔχεις οὖν εἴπειν αὐτίνες
eἰσιν αἳ ἐπιτηθεύσεις αἳ τοῦτο ποιοῦσαι; Μάλλον
dὲ, εἰ βούλει, ἐμοῦ ἐρωτῶντος, ἢ μὲν ἂν σοι δοξῆ
τούτων εἶναι, φάθι, ἢ δ' ἂν μή, μή φάθι. πρῶ-
τον δὲ σκεπώμεθα τὴν αὐλητικήν. οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἐν τοιαύτῃ τις εἶναι, ὃς Καλλίκλεις, τῆν ἥδονὴν ἦμων. μόνον διόκειν, ἀλλὰ δὲ οὐδὲν φροντίζειν; ΚΑΛ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ αὐτὶ τοιαίδε ἀπασαί, οὖν ἡ κιθαριστικὴ ἡ ἐν τοῖς ἁγίοις; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τί δὲ ἡ τῶν χορῶν διασκαλία καὶ ἡ τῶν διθυράμβων ποίησις; οὐ τοιαύτῃ τίς σοι καταφαίνεται; ἢ ἢγεῖ τι φροντίζειν Κινησίων τὸν Μέλιτον, ὅπως ἔρει τι τοιοῦτον, ὅθεν ἂν οἱ ἀκούοντες βελτίων γίγνοιτο, ἢ ὃ τι σέλην 502 λεί χαριεῖσθαι τῷ ὁχλῷ τῶν θεατῶν; ΚΑΛ. Ἁήλιον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὃ Σώκρατες, Κινήσεων γε πέρι. ΣΩ. Τί δὲ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ Μέλις; ἢ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον βλέπον ἔδοξεί σοι κιθαρῳδεῖν; ἢ ἐκείνος μὲν οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸ ἡδίστον; ἢ μία γὰρ ἄδων τοὺς θεατὰς. ἀλλὰ δὴ σκότει· οὐχὶ ἢ τε κιθαρῳδικὴ δοκεῖ σοι πᾶσα καὶ ἡ τῶν διθυράμβων ποίησις ἠδονῆς χάριν εὐφημίσαι; ΚΑΛ. Ἔμοιγε. ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δὴ ἡ σεμινὴ αὐτῆ καὶ Θανασίστὶ Β ἡ τῆς τραγῳδίας ποίησις ἔρ' ὃ ἔσπυρδακε; πότερον ἐστὶν αὐτὴς τὸ ἐπιχείρημα καὶ ἡ σπουδὴ, ὅσι δοκεῖ, χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς θεαταῖς μόνον, ἢ καὶ διαμάχεσθαι, εάν τι αὐτοῖς ἢδον ἡ καὶ κεχαρισμένον, ποιητὴν δὲ, ὅπως τοῦτο μὲν μὴ ἔρει, εἰ δὲ τι τυχάναι ἄρθες καὶ ὀφέλιμον, τοῦτο δὲ καὶ λέξει καὶ ἄστει, εάν τε χαῖρωσιν εάν τε μη; ποτέρως σοι δοκεῖ παρασκευᾶσθαι ἡ τῶν τραγῳδίων ποίησις; ΚΑΛ. Ἁήλιον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὃ Σώκρατος, ὅτι πρὸς τὴν ἠδονήν μᾶλλον ὀρμηται καὶ τὸ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς θεαταῖς. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ
τοιούτων, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, ἔφαμεν νῦν δὴ κολα-
κείαν εἶναι; Ἐνεχθείς, εἰ τις περιέλθῃ τῆς ποιήσεως πάσης τοῦ τε
μέλους καὶ τῶν ὀνόματος καὶ τοῦ μέτρου, ἄλλο τι ἢ
λόγοι γίγνονται τὸ λειπόμενον; ΚΑΛ. Ἀνάγ-
κη. Σ.Ο. Οὖν καὶ πρὸς πολὺν ὁχλὸν καὶ δήμον
διούτων λέγονται οἱ λόγοι. ΚΑΛ. Ψηφί. Σ.Ο.
Ἀποκεφαλικόν ἀρα τίς ἐστιν ἡ ποιητική. ΚΑΛ.
Φαίνεται. Σ.Ο. Οὖν καὶ ἡ τοῖς ἓρωικῆς ἡμερολογία
ἀν εἴη. ἢ οὐ ὡς ἐφθείρεσιν δοξοῦσι σοι οἱ ποιηταὶ
ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις; ΚΑΛ. ἕμοιγε. Σ.Ο. Νῦν
ἀρα ὡς εὑρίκαμεν ἡττορικήν τινα πρὸς δήμον
τοιούτων, οἰον παίδων τοῦ διοῦ καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ
ἀνδρῶν, καὶ δουλῶν καὶ ἐλευθέρων, ἢν οὐ πάνω
ἀγάμεθα· κολακικὴν γὰρ αὐτὴν φαμεν εἶναι.
ΚΑΛ. Πάνω γε.

ΚΑΠ. ΛVIII. Σ.Ο. Εἰεν. τί δὲ ἢ πρὸς τὸν
Ἀθηναίων δῆμον ἡττορικὴ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους
Ἐν τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι δήμους τους τῶν ἐλευθέρων
ἀνδρῶν, τί ποτε ἢμιν αὐτῇ ἔστι; πότερον οὐ δο-
κοῦσι πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον οἱ λέγειν οἱ ὡς ἡττορικῆς,
tοῦτων στοιχαζόμενοι, ὅτες οἱ πολῖται ὡς βέλτι-
στοι ἠσονται διὰ τοὺς αὐτῶν λόγους, ἢ καὶ οὗτοι
πρὸς τὸ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς πολῖταις ὁμιμεῖνοι, καὶ
ἐνεκα τοῦ ἰδίου τοῦ αὐτῶν ἰδίων, ὡς ἡττορικῆς,
τοῦτοι πρὸς τὸ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς πολῖταις ὁμιμεῖνοι, καὶ
ἐνεκα τοῦ ἰδίου τοῦ αὐτῶν ἰδίων, ἢ καὶ οὗτοι
πρὸς τὸ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς πολῖταις ὁμιμεῖνοι, εἰ δὴ 
γε βέλτιστος ἠσονται ἢ χείρους διὰ ταύτα, οὐδὲν 
φροντίζουσιν; 503 ΚΑΛ. ὄνυ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐρωτήσας· εἰδὰ 
μὲν 
γὰρ οὐ κηδόμενοι τῶν πολίτῶν λέγουσιν ἢ λέγου-
σίν, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ οἶνοι σὺ λέγεις. Σ.Ο. Ἐξάρχει. εἰ γάρ καὶ τούτο ἔστι διπλοῦν, τὸ μὲν ἔτερον πον τούτου κολακεῖα ἂν εἰη καὶ αἰσχρὰ δημιουργία, τὸ δ’ ἔτερον καλόν, τὸ παρασκευάζειν, ὅπως ὡς βέλτισται ἔσονται τῶν πολιτῶν αἱ ψυχαί, καὶ διαμάχεσθαι λέγοντα τὰ βέλτιστα, εἴτε ἥδιο εἴτε ἀγαθεστέρα ἔσται τοῖς ἀκούονσιν. ἄλλ’ οὐ πώς ποτε θ’ οὐ ταύτην εἶδες τὴν ἤρητορικὴν· ἂν εἴ τινα ἔχεις τῶν ἤρητορῶν τοιοῦτον εἰπεῖν, τί οὐχὶ καὶ ἔμοι αὐτὸν ἔφρασας τίς ἐστιν; ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλ’ µᾶ δ’ οὐκ ἔχω ἔγονε σοι εἰπεῖν τῶν γε τῶν ἤρητορῶν οὐδένα. Σ.Ο. Τί δὲ; τῶν παλαιῶν ἔχεις τινὰ εἰπεῖν, δε’ ὅντινα αἰτίαν ἔχουσιν Ἀθηναίου βελτίους γεγονέναι, ἑπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος ἠµέλιος δηµιουργεῖν, ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ χεῖρος ὀντες; ἔγω µὲν γὰρ οὐκ οἶδα τίς ἐστιν οὕτως. ΚΑΛ. Τί δὲ; Ὑπ’ ὑστοκλέα οὐκ ἄκουες ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γεγονότα καὶ Κύμωνα καὶ Μυλητίδην καὶ Περίκλεα τουτοῦ τὸν νεοστὶ τετελευτηκότα, οὐ καὶ σὺ ἀκήκοας; Σ.Ο. Εἰ ἔστι γε, δ’ Καλλίκλεις, ήν πρότερον οὐ ἔλεγες ἀφετήν, ἀληθῆς, τὸ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἀποτιμᾶναι καὶ τὰς αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων· εἰ δὲ µὴ τοῦτο, ἅλλ’ ὅπερ ἐν τῷ ὑστέρῳ λόγῳ ἡναγκάζομεν ἡµεῖς ὁµολογεῖν, ὅτι αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἐπιθυμίων πληροῦμενει βελτίῳ ποιοοῦσι τὸν ἀν-θρώπον, ταύτας µὲν ἀποτελεῖν, αε’ δ’ χείρα, µη’ τοῦτο δὲ τέχνη τοῖς εἶναι· τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα τουτοῦ τινὰ γεγονέναι ἔχεις εἰπεῖν; ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ ἔχω ἔγονοι πῶς εἴποι.

Carl. LIX. Σ.Ο. Ἀλλ’ ἔδω ζητῆς καλῶς,
εὐρήσεις. ἦδομεν δή οὕτωσιν ἄτρεμα σχοποῦμεν, εἴ τις τούτων τοιοῦτος γέγονε. φέρε γάρ, Ἐ ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἄνηγ καὶ εἴπ τὸ βέλτιστον λέγον ἢ ἂν λέγῃ ἄλλο τι οὐχ εἰκῇ ἐρεῖ, ἀλλ᾽ ἀποβλέπων πρὸς τι; ὡσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες δημιουργοὶ βλέποντες πρὸς τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον ἔκαστος οὐκ εἰκῇ ἐκλεγόμενος προσφέρει ἢ προσφέρει πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ᾽ ὅπως ἂν εἰδὸς τι αὐτῷ σχῆ τοῦτο, ὁ ἐργάζεται. οὖν εἰ βούλει ἰδεῖν τοὺς ὄγουσα-φοις, τοὺς οἰκοδόμους, τοὺς ναυπήγους, τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας δημιουργοὺς, ὀντῖνα βούλει αὐτῶν, ὡς εἰς τάξιν τινὰ ἔκαστος ἔκαστον τίθησαν ὁ ἂν τιθῇ, καὶ προσαναγκάζει τὸ ἔτερον τῷ ἔτερῳ.

504πρέπον τε εἰναι καὶ ἀριστέειν, ἦδω ἂν τὸ ἄπαν συστήσαιται τεταγμένον τε καὶ κεκοσμημένον πράγμα, καὶ οὗ τε δὴ ἄλλου δημιουργοὶ καὶ οὗς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, οἱ περὶ τὸ σάμα παιδοτρίβως τε καὶ ἰατροὶ, κοσμοῦσι ποι τὸ σάμα καὶ συντάττουσιν. ὁμολογοῦμεν οὕτω τοῦτ᾽ ἔχειν, ἢ οὐ; ΚΑΛ. "Ἔστω τούτῳ οὕτω. Σ.Ο. Τάξεως ἄρα καὶ κόσμου τυχοῦσα οἰκία χρηστῇ ἂν εἴη, ἀταξίας Β ἰν μορχηρά; ΚΑΛ. Φημί. Σ.Ο. Οὐχοῦν καὶ πλοίου ὥσαυτος; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. Σ.Ο. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰ σώματά ραφεῖν τα ἡμέτερα; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. Σ.Ο. Τῇ δ᾽ ἡ ψυχή; ἀταξίας τυχοῦσα ἐσται χρηστῇ, ἢ τάξεώς τε καὶ κόσμου τινός; ΚΑΛ. Ἀνάχαρι ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν καὶ τούτῳ συνο-μολογεῖν. Σ.Ο. Τῇ οὖν ὄνομα ἐστιν ἐν τῷ σώματι τῷ ἐκ τῆς τάξεως τε καὶ τοῦ κόσμου γιγνομένῳ; ΚΑΛ. Ὑγίειαν καὶ ἰσχύν ἔσως λέγεις.
ΣΩ. Ἑγώγε. τί δὲ αὐ τῷ ἐν τῇ ψυχῆ ἐγγίγνον-ς μένῳ ἐκ τῆς τάξεως καὶ τοῦ κόσμου; πειρῶ εὐ-φείν καὶ εἰπείν ὅπερ εἴκείντο τὸ ὅνομα. ᾿ΚΛ.Α. Τί δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγεις, ὁ Σώκρατες; ΣΩ. Ἀλλ᾽ εἰ σοι ᾗδίον ἔστιν, ἐγὼ ἐρῶ. σὺ δὲ, ἂν μὲν σοι δοκῶ ἐγὼ καλῶς λέγειν, φάθει εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἐλέγχε καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπε. ξειογε δοκεῖ ταῖς μὲν τοῦ σώματος τάξεσιν ὅνομα εἰναι ψυχειν, ἐξ ὧν ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ψυχεῖα γίγνεται καὶ ἡ ἀλλη ἄρετη τοῦ σώματος. ἔστι ταῦτα ἡ οὐκ ἔστιν; ᾿Εστι. ΣΩ. Ταῖς δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τάξεσι τε καὶ κοσμήσει πόμιμον τε καὶ νόμις, θεν καὶ νόμι-μοι γίγνονται καὶ κόσμιοι· ταῦτα δ᾽ ἔστι δικαιο-σύνη τε καὶ σωφροσύνη. φῆς, ἡ οὐ; ᾿ΚΛ.Α. ᾿Εστω.

ΚΑΡ. LX. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πρὸς ταῦτα αὐ βλέ-πον ὁ ῥήτωρ ἔκεινος, ὁ τεχνικὸς τε καὶ ἀγα-θός, καὶ τοὺς λόγους προσούσει ταῖς ψυχαῖς οὐς ἂν λέγῃ καὶ τὰς πράξεις ἀπάσας, καὶ δῶρον ἐὰν τί διδῶ, δόσει, καὶ ἐὰν τί ἀφαιρήται, ἀφαι-ρήσεται, πρὸς τούτο ἂεὶ τὸν νοῦν ἔχων, ὅπως ἦν αὐτοῦ τοὺς πολίτας δικαιοσύνη μὲν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς γίγνεται, ἀδικία δὲ ἀπαλλαττηται, καὶ σωφροσύνη μὲν ἐγγίγνεται, ἀκολοωια δὲ ἀπα-λαττηται, καὶ ἡ ἀλλη ἄρετη ἐγγίγνεται, κακία δὲ ἄπιθ; συγχώρεϊς, ἡ οὐ; ᾿ΚΛ.Α. Ἐνηχορῶ. ΣΩ. Τί γὰρ ὅρελος, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, σώματι γε κάμνοντι καὶ μοχθηρὸς διακειμένος σιτίᾳ πολλὰ διόδναι καὶ τὰ ἡδίστα ἡ ποτὰ ἡ ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι δένον, ὁ ὡς ἡ νῆστε αὐτῷ ἐσθ᾽ ὅτε πλέον ἡ τοῦνατιον, κα-
ΓΟΡΓΙΑΣ.

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Γοργίας. Σ. Ου γάρ, οἷμαι, λυσίτελεὶ μετὰ μοχθηρίας σώματος δὴν ἀνθρώπος ἄνάγχη γάρ οὕτω καὶ δὴν μοχθηρὸς. ἦν οὖν

ΚΑΛ. Ναί. Σ. Οὐχοῦν καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἀποπιπλάνας, οἷον πεινῶντα φαγεῖν ὅσον βούλεται δὴ διηρωντα πιεῖν, ὑγιαίνοντα μὲν ἐδοὺσιν οἴς ἱατροὶ ὡς τὰ πολλά, κάμυνοντα δὲ, ὡς ἔστο εἰπεῖν οὐδέποτ᾽ ἑδοὺ έμπιπλάσθαι ὑν ἐπιθυμεῖ; συγχωρεῖς τοῦτο γε καὶ σὺ; ΚΑΛ.

Β’ Εὐγος. Σ. Ο. Περὶ δὲ ψυχῆν, ὃ άριστε, οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος; ἔως μὲν ἄν πονηρᾷ ἦ, ἀνόητός τε οὕσα καὶ ἀχόλαστος καὶ ἄδικος καὶ ἀνόσιος, εἰργείν αὐτὴν δὲ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν ἄλλ᾽ ἀτα ποιεῖν ἤ ἀφ᾽ ὧν βελτίων ἔσται; φῆσι, ἦν οὖ; ΚΑΛ. Φημί. Σ. Ο. Οὐτω γάρ ποιν αὐτὴν ἀμείνουν τῇ ψυχῇ. ΚΑΛ. Πάντα γε. Σ. Ο. Οὐχοῦν τὸ εἰργεῖν ἐστίν ἀφ᾽ ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖ κολάζειν; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. Σ. Ο. Τὸ κολάζεσθαι ἄρα τῇ ψυχῇ ἀμείνον ἐστίν ἦ ἢ ἀχόλασία, ἀσπερ σὺ νῦν δὴ ὁ ὁ. ΚΑΛ. Οὐχ οἶδ᾽ ἀτα λέγεις, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ᾽ ἀλλον τινὰ ἐρώτα. Σ. Ο. Οὕτως ἄνηρ οὐχ ὑπομένει ὠρέλουμενοι καὶ αὐτὸς τοῦτο πάσχον, περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος ἔστι, κολαζόμενοι. ΚΑΛ. Οὐδὲ γε μοι μέλει οὐδὲν ὅν σὺ λέγεις, καὶ ταῦτα σοι Γοργίου χάριν ἀπεξορισμὴν. Σ. Ο. Εἶξεν τί οὖν δὴ ποιήσωμεν; μεταξὺ τὸν λόγον καταλύσωμεν; ΚΑΛ. Αὐτὸς γνώσει. Σ. Ο. Ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ τοὺς μῦθους φασὶ μεταξὺ Θέμες εἴναι καταλείπειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπιθέντας κεφαλῆν, ἵνα μὴ ἀνεύ
κεφαλής περίτη. ὀπόκριναι οὖν καὶ τὰ λοιπά, ἢν ἦμεν ὁ λόγος κεφαλῆς λάθη.

Cαρ. LXI. ΚΑΛ. Ἔως βίαιος εἶ, ὁ Σῶκρατες. εάν δὲ ἐμοὶ πείθῃ, ἔδειξις χαίρειν τούτων τοῦ λόγου, ἢ καὶ ἄλλω τῷ διαλέξει. Σ.Ω. Τίς οὖν ἄλλος ἔθελε; μὴ γὰρ τοι ἀτέλη γε τὸν λόγον καταλείπομεν. ΚΑΛ. Αὐτὸς δὲ οὐκ ἂν δύνασθη διελθεῖν τὸν λόγον, ἢ λέγων κατὰ σαυτὸν ἢ ἀποκρινόμενος σαυτῷ; Σ.Ω. Ἰνα μοι τοῦ Ἐπιχάρισμον γένηται, ἤ πρὸ τοῦ δύο ἄνδρες ἔλεγον, εἰς οὖν ἰκανὸς γένωμαι. ἀτὰρ κυνδυνεύει ἀναγκαίωτατον εἶναι οὕτως. εἰ μέντοι ποιήσομεν, οὔμαι ἔγορα χρῆναι πάντας ἡμᾶς φιλονείχως ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ ἀληθὲς τί ἐστι περὶ ὧν λέγομεν καὶ τί ψεύδος· κουινὸν γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἄπασι φανερὸν γενέσθαι αὐτό. δείξω μὲν οὖν τῷ λόγῳ ἢ γω ὅς ἀν μοι δοκῇ ἔχειν· εὰν δὲ τοῦ ὑμῶν μη τὰ οὖντα δοκῶ ὁμολογεῖν ἐμαιτῷ, χρῆναι ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ ἐλέγχειν. οὔδὲ γὰρ τοῦ ἔγορα εἰδοὺ λέγοι ὧν ἔλγω, ἀλλὰ ζητῶ κουινῇ μεθ' ὑμῶν, ὡστε, ἃν τι φαίνηται λέγων ὁ ἀμφιβολῶν ἐμοῖ, ἔγω πρῶτος συγχωρήσομαι. λέγω μέντοι ταῦτα, εἰ δοκεῖ χρῆναι διαπερατῆναι τὸν λόγον· εἰ δὲ μή βούλεσθε, ἔσθην δὴ χαίρειν καὶ ἀπίστων. Γ.ΟΡ. Ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐ δοκεῖ, ὁ Σῶκρατες, χρῆναι πω ἀπειναί, ἀλλὰ διεξέλθειν β σε τὸν λόγον· φαίνεται δὲ μοι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκεῖν. βούλομαι γαρ ἔγορα καὶ αὐτῶς ἀκούσαί σου αὐτοῦ διώντος τὰ ἐπίλοιπα. Σ.Ω. Ἀλλ' μὲν δή, ὁ Γοργία, καὶ αὐτῶς ἢδεσ μὲν ἀν Καλ-
Δικλεί τούτῳ ἐτὶ διελεγόμην, ἦσα αὐτῷ τήν τοῦ Ἀμφίονος ἀπέδωκα ἡμῖν ἀντὶ τῆς τοῦ Ζήθου. ἔπειτῇ δὲ σὺ, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, οὐκ ἐδέξεις συνήθως περάναι τὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' οὖν ἔμοι γε ἀκούων ἐπιλαμβάνων, εάν τι σοι δοκῆ μή καλῶς λέγειν. καὶ με ἔδω ἐξελέγησις, οὐκ ἀχθεσθήσομαι σοι, ἀπερ σοῦ ἐμοῖ, ἀλλὰ μέγιστος εὐφρένητης παρ' ἔμοι ἀναγεγράψει. ΚΑΛ. Λέγε, ὃ γαθεῖ, αὐτός καὶ πέρανε.

ΚΑΠ. LXII. ΣΩ. "Ἀκούει δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐμοὶ ἀναλαβόντος τὸν λόγον. Ἄρα τὸ ἱδ' καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ αὐτὸ ἔστιν; Οὐ ταῦτάν, ὅς ἔγει καὶ Καλλικλῆς ὀμολογήσαμεν. Πότερον δὲ τὸ ἱδ' ἔνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ προκέχεων, ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔνεκα τοῦ ἱδέος; Τὸ ἱδ' ἔνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Ἡδ' δὲ ἔστι τούτῳ, οὗ παραγεγρημένου ἡδομέθα; ἀγαθὸν δὲ, οὗ παρόντος ἀγαθοὶ ἔσμεν; Πάνω γε. Ἄλλα μὴν ἀγαθοὶ γέ ἔσμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ τὰλλα πάντα ὅσα ἀγαθὰ ἔστιν, ἁρετής τίνος παραγεγρημένης; "Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ ἀναγχαῖον εἶναι, ὁ Καλλικλής. Ἄλλα μὲν δὴ ἢ γε ἁρετὴ ἔκαστον, καὶ σκεύους καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς αὐ καὶ ἵπ τοῦ παντός, οὐ τῷ εἰκῇ κάλλιστα παραγίγνεται, ἀλλὰ τάξει καὶ ὀρθότητι καὶ τέχνῃ, ἢ τις ἔκαστος ἀποδέδοται αὐτῶν. ὁρα ἔστι ταῦτα; ἕγω μὲν ἐγαρφημί. Τάξει ὁρα τεταγμένων καὶ κεκοσμημένων ἔστιν ἢ ἁρετὴ ἔκαστον; Φαίην ἄν ἐγώγε. Κόσμος τις ὁρὰ ἐγγενὸμενος ἐν ἔκαστῳ ὁ ἔκαστος ὁ συχείος ἀγαθὸν παρέχει ἔκαστον τῶν ὄντων; "Εμοιγε δοκεῖ. Καὶ ψυχῇ ὁρα κόσμων ἔχουσα.
τον ἐαυτῆς ἀμείων τῆς ἀκοσμητοῦ; Ἀνάγκη.
Ἀλλά μὴ ἡ γε κόσμιον ἔχουσα κοσμία; Πᾶς
γὰρ οὐ μέλλει; Ἡ δὲ γε κοσμία σώφρων; 507
Πολλῆ ἀνάγκη. Ἡ ἀρὰ σώφρων ψυχῇ ἀγαθῇ.
Ἔγὼ μὲν οὖν ἔχω παρὰ ταύτα ἄλλα φάναι, ὥ
φίλε Καλλίκλεις· σὺ δὲ ἐὰν ἔχεις, δίδασκε. ΚΑΛ.
Ἄργ', ὥ ῥαθέ. ΣΩ. Ἀργῳ δῆ, οτι, εἰ ἡ σώφρων
ἀγαθῇ ἐστιν, ἡ τούναντίου τῇ σώφρονι πεπονθεῖα
κακῇ ἐστιν. ἦν δὲ αὐτῇ ἡ ἀφρον τε καὶ ἀχό-
λαστος; Πάνω γε. Καὶ μὴ ο γε σώφρων τὰ
προσήκοντα πράττοι ἁν καὶ περὶ Θεοὺς καὶ περὶ
ἀνθρώπους; οὐ γὰρ ἂν σώφρονοι τὰ μὴ προσε-
κοντα πράττοι. Ἀνάγκη ταῦτ' εἶναι οὔτω.
Καὶ μὴν περὶ μὲν ἀνθρώπους τὰ προσήκοντα B
πράττων δίκαιαν πράττοι, περὶ δὲ Θεοὺς ὁσια·
tὸν δὲ τὰ δίκαια καὶ ὁσια πράττοντα ἀνάγκη δι-
καιον καὶ ὁσιον εἶναι; Ἡ ἔστη ταῦτα. Καὶ μὲν
δῆ καὶ ἄνθρειόν γε ἀνάγκη; οὐ γὰρ δῆ σώφρονος
ἀνδρὸς ἐστὶν οὔτε διώκειν οὔτε φεύγειν ὁ μὴ προσε-
ῄζει, ἀλλ' ὁ δεὶ καὶ πράγματα καὶ ἀνθρώπους
καὶ ἰδονᾶς καὶ λύπας φεύγειν καὶ διώκειν, καὶ
ὑπομένουντα καρτερεῖν ὅποιον δεὶ· ὥστε πολλῆς
ἀνάγκης, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τὸν σώφρονα οὔστερ διήλ-
θομέν, δίκαιον ὅντα καὶ ἄνθρειόν καὶ ὁσιον ἀρα-
θῶν ἄνδρα εἶναι τελεός, τὸν δὲ ἀγαθῶν εὖ τε καὶ
καλῶς πράττειν ὧν πράττη, τὸν δ' εὖ πράττον-
tα μακαρίων τε καὶ εὐθαμίουνα εἶναι, τὸν δὲ πο-
νηρὸν καὶ κακῶς πράττοντα ἅθλιον. οὖτος δ' ἂν
εἰη ὃ ἐναντίων ἔχων τῇ σώφρονι, ὁ ἀχόλαστος, ὃν
σὺ ἐπήνεις. ΚΑΡ. LXIII. Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα
οὖτω τίθεμαι καὶ φημι ταῦτα ἀληθῆ εἶναι. εἰ δὲ 
Θέστιν ἀληθῆ, τὸν βουλόμενον, ὡς έσικεν, εὐδαί-
μονα εἶναι σωφροσύνην μὲν διωκτέον καὶ ἁσχη-
τέον, ἀκολασίαν δὲ φευκτέον ὡς ἔχει ποδῶν ἐκα-
στος ἡμῶν, καὶ παρασκευαστέον μᾶλλον μὲν 
μηδὲν δεῖσθαι τοῦ κολάξεσθαι, ἐὰν δὲ δεηθῇ ἡ 
αὐτὸς ἡ ἄλλος τις τῶν οἰκείων, ἡ ἰδιότης ἡ πόλις, 
ἐπιθετέον δίκην καὶ κολαστέον, εἰ μέλλει εὐδαί-
μον εἶναι. οὔτος έμοιγε δοξεὶ ὁ σκοπὸς εἶναι, 
πρὸς ὅν βλέποντα δεῖ ζῆν, καὶ πάντα εἰς τοῦτο 
τὰ αὐτοῦ συντείνοντα καὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως 
Ἐ δικαιοσύνη παρέσται καὶ σωφροσύνη τῷ μακαρίῳ 
μέλλοντι ἐσθίσθαι, οὔτω πράττειν, οὐκ ἐπιθυμίας 
ζῶντα ἄκολαστον εἶναι καὶ ταῦτα ἐπιχειροῦντα 
πληροῦν, ἀνήνυτον κακὸν, λῃστοῦ βίον ζῶντα. 
οὔτε γὰρ ἂν ἄλλο ἀνθρώπῳ προσφιλῆ ἦν εἰ ὁ 
τοιοῦτος οὔτε Θεός· κοινονεῖν γὰρ ἁδύνατος· 
ὅτι δὲ μὴ ἔνι κοινωνία, φιλία οὐκ ἂν εἴη. φασὶ 
ἐξ' οἶς σοφοὶ, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, καὶ οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν 
508 καὶ Θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους τὴν κοινωνίαν συνέχει 
καὶ φιλίαν καὶ κοσμίωτητα καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ 
δικαιότητα, — καὶ τὸ ὅλον τούτο διὰ ταῦτα κό-
σμον καλοῦσιν, ὁ ἑταῖρε, — οὐκ ἀκοσμίαν οὐδὲ 
ἀκολασίαν. οὐ δὲ μοι δοξεῖς οὐ προσέχειν τὸν 
νοῦν τοῦτος, καὶ ταῦτα σοφὸς ἂν, ἄλλα λέληθε 
σε, ὅτι ἡ ἰσότης ἡ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ ἐν Θεοῖς καὶ ἐν 
ἀνθρώποις μέγα δύναται. οὐ δὲ πλεονεξίαν οἴει 
δεῖν ἀσχεῖν· γεωμετρίας γὰρ ἀμέλεις. Εἶπεν, ἢ 
Βῆξελεγκτέος δὴ οὕτως ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἑστιν, ὅσ 
δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης κτίσει εὐδαίμονες
οι εὐθαμιονες, κακίας δὲ οἱ ἀθλιοὶ· ἢ εἰ οὕτος ἀληθῆς ἐστι, σχετέον τι τὰ συμβαίνοντα. τὰ πρόσθεν ἐκείνα, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, συμβαίνει πάντα, ἐφ’ ὃς σὺ με ἃρον, εἰ σπουδάζων λέγομι, λέ- γοντα, ὅτι καθηγορητέου εἰη καὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ νίεος καὶ ἐταίρου, ἐάν τι ἀδικη, καὶ τῇ ἡτορικῃ ἐπὶ τούτῳ χρηστέον. καὶ ὁ Πῶλον αἰσχύνη ἦν συγχωρεῖν, ἀληθῆ ἃρα ἢν, τὸ εἰναι τὸ ἄδικεὶν τοῦ θ ἄδικεῖθαι, ὀσφερον αἰσχρον, τοσοῦτον κάχιον καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα ὅρθως ἡτορικὸν ἔσεθαι δίκαιον ἃρα δεὶ εἰναι καὶ ἐπιστήμονα τῶν δικαίων, ὁ αὐτὸ Γοργίαν ἔφη Πῶλος δι’ αἰσχύνην ὁμολογήσασα. 

ΚΑΡ. LXIV. Τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων, σχετῶ-μεθα τι ποτ’ ἐστὶν ἢ σὺ ἐμοὶ ὅνειδέζεις, ἃρα καλὸς λέγεται, ἢ οὐ, ὅς ἃρα ἐγώ σὺν οὐσὶ τ’ εἰμί βοη-θήσαι ὑπὲρ ὑπὲρ ὑπὲρ ὑπὲρ ὑπὲρ ὑπὲρ εἰμίντὸν οὔτε ἐμαυτῷ πρὸς τῶν κίλων συνδέοι συνδεί συνδεί συνδεί συνδεί συνδεί πλησίων, εἰμί δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ ὀσφερον οἱ ἄτιμοι τού ἑδέλουντο, ἢν τε τύπτειν βούληται, τὸ νεα-νικόν δὴ τοῦτο τοῦ σοῦ λόγου, ἐπὶ κόρης, εάν τε χρήματα ἁφαιρεῖσθαι, εάν τε ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἐάν τε, τὸ ἔσχατον, ἀποκτείνω καὶ οὕτω διακεῖσθαι πάντων δὴ αἰσχρὸν ἑστιν, ὅς ὁ σὸς λόγος. ὁ δὲ δὴ ἐμὸς, ὅστις πολλάκις μὲν ἡ ἰδὴ εἰ-ρηταί, οὐδὲν δὲ κωλύει καὶ ἐτι λέγεσθαι· οὐ φη-μι, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, τὸ τύπτεσθαι ἐπὶ κόρης ἀδίκως ἐαἰσχυστὸν εἶναι, οὐδὲ γε τὸ τέμνεσθαι οὔτε τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἐμὸν οὔτε τὸ βαλάντιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ τύπτειν καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ τὰ ἔμα ἀδίκως καὶ τέμνειν καὶ αἰ- σχρον καὶ κάχιον, καὶ κλέπτειν γε ἀμα καὶ ἀνδρο-
ποδίζεσθαι καὶ τοιχωρυχεῖν καὶ συλληβδῆν ὤτοιν ἄδικεῖν καὶ ἕμε καὶ τὰ ἐμα τῷ ἄδικοντι καὶ ἀδικίας καὶ κάκιον εἶναι ἢ ἐμοὶ τῷ ἄδικομένῳ. ταῦτα ἡμῖν ἄνω ἔχει ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν λόγοις 509 οὗτοι φανέντα, ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω, κατέχεται καὶ δε- δεται, καὶ εἰ ἄγοικότερον τι εἰπεῖν ἐστὶ, σιδηροῖς καὶ ἀδαμαντίνοις λόγοις, ὡς γοῦν ἂν δόξειν οὕτωσίν, οἷς εἰ μὴ λύσεις ἡ σοῦ τις νεανικώ- τερος, οὐχ οἶον τε, ἀλλὰς λέγοντα ἢ ὡς ἐγὼ νῦν λέγω, καλῶς λέγειν· ἐπεὶ ἐμοί γε ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστὶν ἂεί, ὅτι ἐγὼ ταῦτα οὐκ οἶδα οἷος ἔχει, ὅτι μέντοι ὃν ἐγὼ ἐντεῦχηκα, ὀσπερ νῦν, οὐδεῖς οἴός

Β τ' ἐστὶν ἀλλως λέγων μὴ ού καταγέλαστος εἶναι. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν αὐ τίθημι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν. εἰ δὲ οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ μεγιστόν τῶν κακῶν ἐστιν ἡ ἀδι- κία τῷ ἄδικοντι, καὶ ἐτούτου μείζον μεγίστον ὄντος, εἰ οἶον τε, τὸ ἄδικοντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην, τίνα ἂν βοηθειαν μὴ δυνάμενοι ἄνθρωπος βοη- θεῖν ἐαυτῷ καταγέλαστος ἂν τῇ ἀλθείᾳ εἶν; ἄρ' οὐ ταύτην, ἢτις ἀποτρέψει τὴν μεγίστην ἡμῶν βλάβην; ἀλλὰ πολλή ἀνάγκη ταύτην εἶναι τὴν αἰσχίστην βοηθεῖαν, μὴ δυνάσθαι βοηθεῖν μήτε ἐαυτῷ μήτε τοῖς αὐτοῦ φίλοις τε καὶ οἰκεί-

οις, δευτέραν δὲ τὴν τοῦ δευτέρου κακοῦ καὶ τρί- την τὴν τοῦ τρίτου, καὶ τάλλα ὄντως· ὡς ἐκά- στου κακοῦ μέγεθος πέρνειν, οὕτω καὶ κάλλος τοῦ δυνατοῦ εἶναι ἐφ' ἐκαστὰ βοηθεῖν καὶ αἰσχυ- νή τοῦ μή. ἄρα ἄλλως, ἢ οὕτως ἔχει, ὡς Καλλί- κλεις; ΚΑΔ. Οὐχ ἄλλως.

Cap. LXV. Σ.Ω. Δυοίν οὐν ὄντοι, τοῦ ἀδι-
κείν τε καὶ ἀδικειόθαι, μειζον μὲν φαμεν κακὸν τὸ ἀδικείν, ἐλαττον δὲ τὸ ἀδικειόθαι. τι οὖν ἂν παρασκευασμένος ἀνθρώπος βοηθήσειν αὐτῷ, ὡστε ἀμφοτέρας τὰς οἰρελείαις ταῦτας ἔχειν, τὴν τε ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι; πότερα δύναμιν, ἢ βούλησιν; ὡδε δὲ λέγω· πότερον ἐὰν μὴ βούληται ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐκ ἀδικήσειται, ἢ ἐὰν δύναμιν παρασκευάσηται τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐκ ἀδικήσεται; ΚΑΔ. Ἀὴλων δὴ τοῦτο γε, ὅτι ἐὰν δύναμιν. ΣΩ. Τι δὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀδικείν; πότερον ἐὰν μὴ βούληται ἀδικείν, ἵκανον τοῦτ’ ἐστίν — οὐ γὰρ ἀδικήσει —, ἢ καὶΕ ἐπὶ τοῦτο δεὶ δύναμιν τινα καὶ τέχνην παρασκευάσασθαι, ὡς, ἐὰν μὴ μάθῃ αὐτὰ καὶ ἀσκήσῃ, ἀδικήσει; Τι οὖν αὐτό γε μοι τοῦτο ἀπεξῆθιν, ὁ Καλλίκλεις; πότερον σοι δοκούμεν ὅρθας ἀναγκασθήναι ὁμολογεῖν ἐν τοῖς ἐμπρόσθεν λόγοις ἐρῶ τε καὶ Πόλος, ἢ οὖ, ἢνίκα ὁμολογήσαμεν μηδένα βουλόμενον ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἄκοντας τοὺς ἀδικούντας πάντας ἀδικεῖν; ΚΑΔ."Εστο σοι τοῦτο, ὁ Σώκρατες, οὔτος, ἵνα διαπεράνησιο τῶν λόγων. ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἄρα, ὡς ἔστη, παρασκευαστέον ἐστὶ δύναμιν τινα καὶ τέχνην, ὅπως μὴ ἀδικήσωμεν. ΚΑΔ. Πάνω γε. ΣΩ. Τις οὖν ποτ’ ἐστι τέχνη τῆς παρασκευῆς τοῦ μηδὲν ἀδικειόθαι ἢ ὅσ ἀλλίγιστα; σκέψαι, εἰ σοι δοκεῖ ἢπερ ἐμοί. ἐμοί μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ ἦδε· ἢ αὐτὸν ἄρχειν δεῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἢ καὶ τυραννεῖν, ἢ τῆς ὑπαρχούσης πολιτείας ἔταιρον εἶναι. ΚΑΔ. ὁ Ορᾶς, ὁ Σώκρατες, ὃς ἐγὼ ἐτοιμὸς εἰμὶ
Β ἔπαινειν, ἂν τι καλῶς λέγης; τούτο μοι δοξεῖς πάντα καλῶς εἰρηκέναι.

Cap. LXVI. Σ.Ο. Σχόπτει δὴ καὶ τόδε ἣν σοι δοξά ἐν λέγειν. φίλος μοι δοξεῖ ἐκαστος ἐκαστὸς εἶναι ὡς οἶδ' τον τὸ μάλιστα, ὁπερ' οἱ παλαιοὶ τε καὶ σοφοὶ λέγουσιν, ὁ ὁμοίος τῷ ὁμοίῳ. οὐ καὶ σοι; ΚΑΛ. "Ἐμοιγε. Σ.Ο. Οὐχοῦν ὅπων τύραννος ἔστιν ἀρχὸν ἄργιος καὶ ἀπάθεντος, εἰ τις τούτων ἐν τῇ πόλει πολὺ βελτίων εἰῆ, φο- βοῖτο δὴπον ἄν αὐτὸν ὁ τύραννος καὶ τούτῳ εἴ 

C ἀπαντος τοῦ νοῦ ὡς ἂν ποτε δύνατο φίλος γενέσθαι; ΚΑΛ. "Ἐστι ταῦτα. Σ.Ο. Οὐδὲ γε εἰ τις πολὺ φαυλότερος εἰη, οὐδ' ἂν οὗτος καταφροννοι γὰρ ἂν αὐτὸν ὁ τύραννος καὶ οὐκ ἂν ποτε ὡς πρὸς φίλον σπουδάσει. ΚΑΛ. Καὶ ταῦτ' ἀληθῆ. Σ.Ο. Λείπεται δὴ ἐκείνος μόνος ἄξιος λόγου φίλος τῷ τοιοῦτῳ, ὃς ἂν, ὀμοίβης ἡν, ταῦτα ψέγων καὶ ἐπαινῶν ἐθέλη ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ὑποσκέσθαι τῷ ἀρχοντὶ. οὐτὸς μέγα ἐν ταῦ-

D τῇ τῇ πόλει δυνήσεται· τούτων οὗτοις χαίρων ἀδικήσει. οὐχ οὗτος ἔχει; ΚΑΛ. Ναι. Σ.Ο. Εἰ ἄρα τις ἐννοήσειν ἐν ταῦτῃ τῇ πόλει τῶν νέων, Τίνα ἂν τρόπον ἐγὼ μέγα δυναίμην καὶ μηδείς με ἀδικοίη, αὐτή, ὃς ἐσικεύ, αὐτῷ δόθε ἐστίν, εὐθὺς ἐκ νέου ἐθέζειν αὐτὸν τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν καὶ ἀχθεσθαι τῷ δεσπότῃ, καὶ παρα- σκευάζειν, ὡπως ὅτι μάλιστα ὁμοίους ἔσται ἐκείνο. Ε οὐχ οὗτος; ΚΑΛ. Ναι. Σ.Ο. Οὐχοῦν τοῦ- 

tο τῷ μὲν μη ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ μέγα δύνασθαι, ὡς ὁ ὑπέτερος λόγος, ἐν τῇ πόλει διαπεράζεται.
ΚΑΔ. Πάνω γε. Σ.Ο. Ἕλ πολλοὺ δεῖ, εἰπερ ὤμοιος ἦσται τῷ ἀρχοντὶ, ὅτι ἀδίκῳ, καὶ παρὰ τούτῳ μέγα δυνῆσεται ᾧ ἐλλ. οἵμαι ἐγωγε, πάν τούναντιον οὐ-τοσί ἡ παρασκευὴ ἦσται αὐτῷ ἐπὶ τὸ οἴρο τε εἶναι ὡς πλείστα ἀδίκειν καὶ ἀδίκουντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην. ἦ γάρ; ΚΑΔ. Φαίνεται. Σ.Ο. Ὁν̄ο ὑ ἐξ ἀρχοντὸν αὐτῷ κακὸν ὑπάρξει, μοχθηρῷ ὅτι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ λειωθημένω διὰ τὴν μήμην τοῦ δεσπότου καὶ δύναμιν. ΚΑΔ. Οὖν οἶδ’ ὃτι στρέφεις ἕξαστοτε τοὺς λόγους ἄνω καὶ κάτω, ὥ Σ.Ο. Χρατεῖς. ἦ οὖν οἴδα, ὅτι οὗτος ὁ μιμοῦμενος τὸν μὴ μιμούμενον ἔκεινον ἀποκτενεῖ, ἐὰν βουληταί, καὶ ἀφαιρήσεται τὸ ὄντα; Σ.Ο. Οἶδα, ἐ ὧ γαθὲ Καλλίκλεις, εἰ μὴ κωφός γ’ εἰμὶ, καὶ σοῦ ἀκούων καὶ Πόλον ἄρτι πολλάκις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὀλίγον πάντων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει. ἀλλὰ καὶ σοὶ ἐμοὶ ἄκουε, ὅτι ἀποκτενεῖ μὲν, ἂν βουληταί, ἀλλὰ πονηρὸς ὃν καλὸν κἀγαθὸν ὄντα. ΚΑΔ. Ὁν̄ο ὑ ἐξ ὑ ἐχοντι, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει. ἦ οἰδ’ ἐδεῖν τούτῳ παρασκευάζεσθαι ἀνθρωπον, ὡς πλείστων χρόνον ἦν, καὶ μελετάν τὸς τέχνας ταύτας, αὐτὶ ἡμᾶς ἄει ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων σώζον, ὡσπερ καὶ ἦν ς η σε-λεύεις ἐμε μελετάν τὴν θητορικὴν, τὴν ἐν τοῖς δι-καστήριοις διασώζουσαν; ΚΑΔ. Ναὶ μα τι’ όρθος γε σοι συμβουλεύων.

ΣΑΡ. LXVII. Σ.Ο. Τί δέ, ὥ βέλτιστε; ἦ καὶ ἦ τοῦ νεῦν ἐπιστήμην σεμνὴ τίς σοι δοκεῖ εἶ-ναι; ΚΑΔ. Μα τι’ οὖν ἐμοιγε. Σ.Ο. Καὶ
μήν σώζει γε καὶ αὕτη ἐκ θανάτου τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ὅταν εἰς τοιούτον ἐξπέσωσιν, οὐ δεῖ ταύτης ὁ τῆς ἐπιστήμης. εἰ δὲ ἀὕτη σοι δοκεῖ σμικρά εἰ- ναι, έγὼ σοι μείζονα ταύτης ἤρῶ, τῇ κυβερνητι- κῇ, ὅ ὅμον τάς ἴσχυας σώζει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ σῶματα καὶ τὰ χρῆματα ἐκ τῶν ἑσχάτων κινδύ- νων, ὅπερ ἡ ὑποτοκία. καὶ ἀὕτη μὲν προσε- σταλμενὴ ἐστὶ καὶ κοσμία, καὶ οὐ σεμνόνεται ἐσχηματισμένη ὡς ὑπερήφανόν τι διαπραττομένη, ἀλλὰ ταύτα διαπραχαμενὴ τῇ δικαικῇ, ἐὰν μὲν ἐξ Αἰγύπτου δεύορο σώσῃ, οἶμαι, οὐ' ὀδολούν ἐπρα- τεῖς τοῦ, ἐὰν δὲ ἐξ Αἰγύπτου ἦ ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου, ἐὰν πάμπολν ταύτης τῆς μεγάλης ἐνεργεσίας, σώσας' ὅ νῦν δὴ ἐλεγον, καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ παῖδας καὶ χρῆ- ματα καὶ γυναῖκας, ἀποθείβασαν' εἰς τὸν λιμένα δόσο δραχμὰς ἐπράξατο, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἐχὼν τὴν τε- χνὴν καὶ ταύτα διαπραχαμενὸς ἐκβᾶς παρὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν καὶ τὴν ναῦν περιπατεῖ ἐν μεταίχῳ σχῆ- ματι. λογίζεσθαι γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐπίσταται, ὅτι ἀδηλόν ἐστὶν οὐστινας τε ὀφέληκε τῶν συμπλεόν- των οὐχ ἐδάσεις καταποντοθηκαὶ καὶ οὐστινας ἐβλαμεν, εἴδως, ὅτι οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς βελτίως ἐξεβι- 512βασεν ἢ οὐκ ἐνέβησαν, οὐτε τὰ σῶματα οὔτε τὰς ἴσχυας. λογίζεται οὖν, ὅτι σοι, εἰ μὲν τις μεγά- λος καὶ ἀνατέοις νοσήμασι κατά τὸ σῶμα συνε- χόμενος μὴ ἀπεπνήγη, οὗτος μὲν ἀθλεῖ ἔστιν, ὅτι οὐχ ἀπέθανε, καὶ οὐδὲν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὀφέλησαι· εἰ δὲ τις ἁρα ἐν τῷ τοῦ σῶματος τιμωτέρῳ, τῇ ἴσχῃ, πολλὰ νοσήματα ἔχει καὶ ἀνίατα, τούτῳ δὲ βιωτέον ἐστὶ καὶ τούτον ὁνήσειν, ἥν τε ἐξ
Θαλάττης ἂν τε ἐκ δικαστηρίου ἂν τε ἄλλοθεν ὁποθὲνοῦν σῶσῃ, ἀλλ᾿ οἶδεν, ὅτι οὐκ ἁμείνον ἔστι Β ἵππι τῷ μοχθηρῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· κακῶς γὰρ ἀνάγκη ἔστι Ἕν. Cap. LXVIII. Άια ταῦτα οὐ νόμιος ἐστὶ σεμινύνεσθαι τῶν κυβερνήτην, καίπερ σώζοντα ἤμας. οὐδὲ γε, ὃ Θαυμάσιε, τὸν μηχανοποίον, ὃς οὐτε στρατηγοῦ, μὴ ὅτι κυβερνήτου, οὐτε ἄλλου οὐδενὸς ἐλάττω ἐνίοτε δύναται σώζειν· πόλεις γάρ ἐστιν ὅτε ὅλας σώζει. μὴ σοι δοξεῖ κατὰ τὸν δικανικὸν εἶναι; καίτοι εἰ βούλοιτο λέγειν, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, ἀπερ ὑμεῖς, σεμινύνων τὸ πράγμα, καταχώσειεν ἂν ἤμας τοῖς λόγοις, λέγων καὶ πα梣 φακαλῶν ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖν γίγνεσθαι μηχανοποίους, ὃς οὐδὲν τάλλα ἐστιν· ἴκανός γὰρ αὐτῷ ο λόγος. ἀλλὰ σὺ οὐδὲν ἦτον αὐτοῦ καταφρονεῖς καὶ τῆς τέχνης τῆς ἐκείνου, καὶ ὃς ἐν ὑνείδει ἀποκαλέσαι ἂν μηχανοποίον, καὶ τῷ νείπ αὐτοῦ οὖτ᾿ ἂν δοῦναι θυγατέρα ἑθέλοις, οὔτ᾿ ἂν αὐτὸς τῷ σαντοῦ λαθεῖν τὴν ἐκείνου. καίτοι ἦς ἂν τὰ σαντοῦ ἔπαινεις, τίνι δικαίῳ λόγῳ τοῦ μηχανοποίου καταφρονεῖς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἃν νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον; οἶδ᾿ ὅτι D φαίησ ἂν βελτίων εἶναι καὶ ἐκ βελτίων. τὸ δὲ βελτίων εἰ μὴ ἔστιν ὃ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἀλλ᾿ αὐτὸ τοῦτ᾿ ἐστὶν ἀρετῇ, τὸ σώζειν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ὅντα ὁποῖος τὰς ἐπικε, καταγέλαστὸς σοὶ ὁ γύρος γίγνεται καὶ μηχανοποίον καὶ ἵστρον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν, ὅσι τοῦ σώζειν ἔνεκα πεποίηνται. ἀλλ᾿, ὃ μιαρές, ὃρα μὴ ἄλλο τι τὸ γενναίον καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν ἢ τοῦ σώζειν τε καὶ σώζεσθαι. μὴ γὰρ τούτῳ μὲν, τὸ Ἕν ὀποσοῦν ἡ χρόνον, τὸν γε ὡς Ε


αληθῶς ἄνδρα ἔστεον ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ φιλοψυχητέον, ἀλλὰ ἐπιτρέψαντα περὶ τούτων τῷ Θεῷ καὶ πιστεύσαντα ταῖς γυναῖξιν, ὅτι τὴν εἰμιαμένην οὐδ’ ἂν εἰς ἐκρύγοι, τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ σχεπτέον, τίν’ ἂν τρόπον τούτον ὃν μέλλει χρόνον βιώναι ὡς ἀρίστα βιώῃ, ἢρα ἐξομοιῶν αὐτὸν τῇ πολιτείᾳ βιοτικῷ, ἐν ἡ ἂν οἰκῇ, καὶ γνῶν δὲ ἢρα δεῖ σὲ ὡς ὀμοιότατον γίγνεσθαι τῷ δήμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων, εἰ μέλλεις τούτῳ προσφιλῆς εἶναι καὶ μέγα δύνασθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει; τοῦθ’ ἢρα εἰ σοὶ λυπατέλει καὶ ἐμοί, ὡπως μή, ὅ δαιμόνιε, πεισόμεθα ὅπερ φασί ταῖς τὴν σελήνην καθαρούσας, ταῖς Θετιαλίδαις· σὺν τοῖς φιλτάτοις ἡ αἴρεσις ἡμῖν ἔσται ταύτης τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς ἐν τῇ πόλει. εἰ δὲ σοι οἰεὶ ὑπὸ τυνοῦν ἀνθρώπων παραδώσειν τέχνην τινὰ τοιαῦτα τῇ πλῆθεῖ εἰς μέγα δύνασθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει τῇ διὸς ἀνόμοιον ὄντα τῇ πολιτείᾳ εἰς’ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον εἰς ἐπὶ τὸ χείρον, ὡς ἢμοι δοκεῖ, οὐχ ὀρθῶς βουλεύει, ὁ Καλλίκλεις· οὐ γὰρ μιμητὴν δεῖ εἶναι, ἀλλ’ αὐτοφυῶς ὄμοιον τούτοις, εἰ μέλλεις τῇ γνώσει ἀπεργάζεσθαι εἰς φιλίαν τῷ Ἀθηναίων δήμῳ καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία τῷ Πυριλάμπους γε πρός. ὅστις οὖν σε τούτοις ὀμοιότατον ἀπεργάζεται, οὗτός σε ποιήσει, ὡς ἐπιθυμεῖς πολιτικός εἶναι, ποιήσεις καὶ ἡθορικόν· τῷ αὐτῶν γὰρ ἢθει λεγομένων τῶν λόγων ἔκαστοι χαίρονσι, τῷ δὲ ἀλλοτρίῳ ἄχρονται. εἰ μή τι σὺ ἀλλο λέγεις, ὁ φίλη κεφαλή. Αἰγομέν τι πρὸς ταύτα, ὁ Καλλίκλεις;

CAP. LXIX. ΚΑΛ. Οὐχ οἶδ’ ὄντινά μοι τρόπον δοκεῖς εὕ λέγειν, ὁ Σώκρατες. πέπονθα δὲ
τὸ τῶν πολλῶν πάθος· οὐ πάνυ σοι πείθομαι. ἩΜ. Ὁ δὴμος γὰρ ἔρως, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, ἐνῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τῇ σῇ ἀντιστατεῖ μοι· ἀλλ' ἐὰν πολλὰς ὑσσι τάς καὶ βέλτιον ταύτα ταύτα διασκοπῶμεθα, πεισθήσει. ἀναμνησθητί δ' οὖν, ὅτι δῇ ἐφαμεν εἶναι τὰς παρασκευὰς ἐπὶ τὸ ἔκαστον Θεραπεύειν καὶ σῶμα καὶ ψυχήν, μίαν μὲν πρὸς ἱδονήν ὁμολειν, τὴν ἔτεραν δὲ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, μὴ καταχαρίζομενον, ἀλλὰ διαμαχόμενον. οὐ ταύτα ἢν ἢ τότε ὑποτιμεθα; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ἩΜ. Οὐκ- οὖν ἢ μὲν ἔτέρα, ἢ πρὸς ἱδονήν, ἀγενής καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ κολακεία τυγχάνει οὖσα. ἦ γάρ; Ε ΚΑΛ. Εἰστώ, εἰ βούλει, σοὶ οὔτως. ἩΜ. Ἔν δὲ γε ἔτέρα, ὅπως ὁ βέλτιστον ἔσται τοῦτο, εἰτε σῶμα τυγχάνει ἢν εἰτε ψυχή, ὁ Θεραπεύομεν; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ἩΜ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὔτως ἡμῖν ἐπιχειρήτεον ἔστι τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς πολιταῖς Θεραπεύειν ὡς βελτίστους αὐτοὺς τοὺς πολίτας πολυ- σῦντας; ἄνευ γάρ δὴ τοῦτον, ὡς ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθε- θεν εὐφύεσχομεν, οὐδὲν ὠρέλος ἀλλήν εὐφυεσίαν τὴν οὐδεμίαν προσφέρειν, ἔως μὴ καλῇ κἀγαθῇ ἡ δι- ἀνοια ἢ τῶν μελλόντων ἡ χρήματα πολλὰ λαμβάνειν ἢ ἀρχῆν τινον ἢ ἀλλήν δύναμιν ἤντινον. θῶμεν οὔτως ἔχειν; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε, εἰ σοι θήδιον. ἩΜ. Εἰ οὖν παρεκαλοῦμεν ἀλλήλους, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, δημοσίως πράξαντες τῶν πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων, ἐπὶ τὰ οἰκοδομικά, ἡ τειχῶν ἡ νεωρί- ων ἢ νέσων ἐπὶ τὰ μέγιστα οἰκοδομήματα, πότε- ρον ἔδει ἢν ἡμᾶς σκέψασθαι ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ Β ἔξετάσαι, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἐπιστάμεθα τὴν τέχνην, ἦ
οὐχ ἐπιστάμεθα, τὴν οἰκοδομικὴν, καὶ παρὰ τοῦ ἐμάθομεν; ἐδει ἄν, ἡ οὐ; ΚΑΛ. Πάνω γε. 
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν δεύτερον αὐ τόδε, εἰ τι πάποτε οἰκοδομικὰ οἰκοδομήκαμεν ἴδια ἢ τῶν φύλων τίνι ἢ ἡμέτερον αὐτῶν, καὶ τοῦτο τὰ οἰκοδομήματα καλῶν ἢ αἰσχρῶν ἔστι. καὶ εἰ μὲν εὐφρόσυνην σχο-
C πούμενοι διδασκάλους τε ἡμῶν ἁγαθούς καὶ ἐλλο-
γίμους γεγονότας καὶ οἰκοδομήματα πολλὰ μὲν καὶ καλὰ μετά τῶν διδασκάλων οἰκοδομήμένα ἡμῖν, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἴδια ύψ. ἡμῶν, ἐπειδὴ τῶν διδασκάλων ἀπηλλάγημεν, οὗτο μὲν διαχειμένων, νοῦν ἔχοντον ἂν ἂν ἐναὶ ἔπι τὰ δημοσία ἔργα, εἰ δὲ μὴν διδάσακαλον εἰχομεν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπι-
δείξαι οἰκοδομήματα τε ἡ μηδὲν ἡ πολλὰ καὶ μη-
δέν ἄξια, οὗτο δὲ ἀνόητον ἄν δήμου ἀπειρεῖειν τοῖς δημοσίοις ἔργοις καὶ παρακαλεῖν ἄλληλους ἐπ᾽ αὐτά. φάμεν ταῦτα ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι, ἢ οὐ; 
D ΚΑΛ. Πάνω γε.

CAP. LXX. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὐτώ πάντα, τά τε ἄλλα, κἂν εἰ ἐπιχειρήσαντες δημοσίευειν παρεκα-
λοῦμεν ἄλληλους ὡς ἐκανοί ἐαριοὶ ὄντες, ἐπεκε-
ψάμεθα δήμου ἂν ἂν ἔγω τό τε καὶ σὺ ἐμὲ, Φέρε 
πρὸς Θεῶν, αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ Σωκράτης πῶς ἔχει το σῶ-
μα πρὸς υἱέσαι; ἢ ἥδη τίς ἄλλος διὰ Σωκράτην 
ἀπηλλάγη νόσου, ἢ δοῦλος ἢ ἐλεύθερος; Κἂν 
Ε ἔγω, οὐμεν, περὶ σοῦ ἔτερα τοιαύτα ἐσκόπουν. 
καὶ εἰ μὴν πορίσομεν δι᾽ ἡμῶς μηδένα βελτίων γε-
γονότα τὸ σῶμα, μήτε τῶν ἐξένων μήτε τῶν ἀστῶν, 
μήτε ἄνδρα μήτε γυναῖκα, πρὸς Διὸς, ὁ Καλλι-
κλεις, οὐ καταγέλαστον ἂν ἄν τῇ ἄληθείᾳ εἰς το-
σούτον ἀνοίας ἐλθεῖν ἀνθρώπους, ὡς τε, πρὶν ἰδιωτεύοντας πολλὰ μὲν ὅπως ἔτυχομεν ποιήσαι, πολλὰ δὲ κατορθώσαι καὶ γνωμάσασθαι ἵκανως τὴν τέχνην, τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τούτο, ἐν τῇ πίθῳ τῆς περισσεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖν μανθάνειν, καὶ αὐτοὺς τε δημοσιεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖν καὶ ἄλλους τοιούτους παρακαλεῖν; οὐκ ἀνόητόν σοι δοκεῖ ἂν εἶναι οὕτω πράττειν; ΚΑΛ. Ἑμοίγε. Σ.Ω. Νῦν δὲ, ὁ 515 βέλτιστε ἀνδρῶν, ἐπειδὴ σὺ μὲν αὐτός ἂρτι ἄρχει πράττειν τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα, ἐμὲ δὲ παρακαλεῖς καὶ ὑνειδίζεις, ὅτι οὐ πράττο, οὐκ ἐπισκεπτόμεθα ἀλλήλους, Φέρε, Καλλικλῆς ἢ ἢ τινὰ βελτίω πεποίηκε τῶν πολιτῶν; ἔστιν ὅτις πρότερον πονηρὸς ὦν ἄδικος τε καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ ἀφρων διὰ Καλλικλέα καλὸς τε κάγαθος γέγονεν, ἡ δὲ ἄστος, ἡ δούλος ἥ ἔλευθερος; Λέγε Β μοι, ἐὰν τίς σε ταύτα ἐξετάζῃ, ὁ Καλλικλῆς, τί ἐρεῖς; τίνα φήσεις βελτίω πεποιηκέναι ἀνθρώπων τῇ συνοισίᾳ τῇ οί.; — Ὁκνεῖς ἀποκρίνασθαι, εἴ περ ἔστι τοιόνδε τῇ ἐγγον ὑπὸν ἐπὶ ἰδιωτεύοντος, πρὶν δημοσιεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖν; ΚΑΛ. Φιλόνεικος εἰ, ὁ Σόκρατες.

*CAP. LXXI. Σ.Ω. 'Ἀλλ' οὐ φιλονεικίᾳ γε ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλ' ὁς ἄληθος βουλόμενος εἰδέναι ὣντινα ποτε τρόπον οἰεί δεῖν πολιτεύεσθαι ἐν ἡμῖν, εἰ ἄλλον τὸν ἄρα ἐπιμελήσει ἡμῖν ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς Σ πόλεως πράγματα ἢ ὅπως ὦτι βέλτιστοι οἱ πολῖται ὦμεν. ἡ οὐ πολλάκις ἢ ἢ ὡμολογήκαμεν τούτῳ δεῖν πράττειν τὸν πολιτικὸν ἀνδρα; ὡμολογήκαμεν, ἢ οὗ; ἀποκρίνων. Ὡμολογήκαμεν· ἐγὼ.
ΰπερ σοῦ ἀποκρινόμαι. Εἰ τοῖνυν τοῦτο δεῖ τὸν ἁγαθὸν ἄνδρα παρασκευάζειν τῇ ἔστιν τῷ πόλει, νῦν μοι ἀναμνησθείς εἰπέ περὶ ἐκείνων τῶν ἁγάραν ὃν ὀλίγο πρῶτερον ἔλεγες, εἰ ἔτι σοὶ δο- ό κουσίν ἁγαθοὶ πολίται γεγονέναι, Περικλῆς καὶ Κήρων καὶ Μιλτιάδης καὶ Θεμιστοκλῆς. ΚΑΛ. "Εμοίγε. Σ.Ω. Οὐχοῦν εἰπερ ἁγαθοὶ, δῆλον ὅτι ἐκαστὸς αὐτῶν βελτίως ἐποίει τοὺς πολῖτας ἀντὶ χειρόνων. ἐποιεῖ, ἦ οὖ; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. Σ.Ω. Οὐκοῦν ὅτε Περικλῆς ἠρχέτο λέγειν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ, χείρος ἦςαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἦ οὗτο τὰ τελευταῖα ἔλεγεν; ΚΑΛ. Ἰσώς. Σ.Ω. Ὁν ἢςως δῆ, ὃ βέλτιστε, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν ἀμοιλογημένων. Εἰ ἐπερ ἁγαθὸς γ' ἦν ἐκείνως πολίτης. ΚΑΛ. Τ'] σοῦ δῆ; Σ.Ω. Οὐδέν. ἀλλὰ τάδε μοι εἰπὲ ἐπὶ τούτῳ, εἰ λέγονται Ἀθηναίοι διὰ Περικλέα βελτίως γεγονέναι, ἢ πᾶν τοῦναντίον διαφθαρῆναι ὑπ' ἐκείνου. ταυτὶ γὰρ ἠγγεια ἄκουο, Περικλέα πεποιηκέναι Ἀθηναίους ἄφρος καὶ δειλοὺς καὶ λάλους καὶ φιλαργύρους, εἰς μισθοφορίαν πρῶτον καταστήσαντα. ΚΑΛ. Τῶν τὰ ὑπατευό- τον ἄκουες ταῦτα, ὃ Σάκτας. Σ.Ω. Ἀλλὰ τάδε οὐκέτι ἄκουο, ἀλλ' οἶδα σαφῶς καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ σύ, ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον νῦν αὐτοῦ Περικλῆς καὶ οὐδεμιάν αἰχμαν δίκην κατεψηφίσαντο αὐτοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἦνίκαι χειρὸς ἦςαν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ καλοὶ σικάγαθοι γεγόνεσαν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, ἐπὶ τελευτῆ τοῦ βίου τοῦ Περικλέους, κλοπῆν αὐτοῦ κατεψηφί- σαντο, ὅλγου δὲ καὶ θανάτου ἔτιμησαν, δῆλον ὅτι ὃς πονηροῦ ὄντος.
Τά τάκτη · Περίκλης

ΣΩ. Οὐ οὐν ἄν ἐπιμετήθης καὶ ὑπεφών καὶ βοῶν τοιούτος ὑπί κακὸς ἂν ἐδόξη εἶναι, εἰ παραλαῖπον μὴ λακτίζοντας μὴδὲ κυρίττοντας μὴδὲ δάκνοντας ἀπέδειξα ταῦτα ἀπαντα ποιοῦντας δι' ἀγριότητα. ἢ οὐ δοξεῖ σοι κακὸς εἶναι ἐπιμετήθης δασίσουν ὅτου ὡν, ὡς Β ἂν παραλαῖπον ἠμεράτερα ἀποδείξῃ ἀγριότερα ἡ παρέλαβε; Δοξεῖ, ἢ οὐ; ΚΑΑ. Πάνω γε, ἦν σοι χαρίσωμαι. ΣΩ. Καὶ τόδε τοίνυν μοι χάρισαι ἀποκρινόμενος, πότερον καὶ ὁ ἀνθρώπος ἐν τοῖς ἱω ἢ τινὲς ἢ στίν, ἢ οὐ; ΚΑΑ. Πᾶς γὰρ οὐ; ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀνθρώπων Περίκλῆς ἐπιμέλετο; ΚΑΑ. Ναὶ. ΣΩ. Τἳ οὖν; οὐκ ἔδει αὐτούς, ὥς ἀρτι ὀμολογοῦμεν, δικαίωτέρους γεγονέναι ἀντί ἀδικωτέρων ὑπ' ἑκείνου, εἰτέρ ἑκεῖνος ἐπιμελεῖτο οὐκ ἀναγόμεν ἄν τὰ πολιτικά; ΚΑΑ. Πάνω γε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὐ γε δίκαιοι ἡμεροὶ, ὥς ἔφη Ὁμήρος. οὐ δὲ τῷ φής; οὐχ οὔτως; ΚΑΑ. Ναὶ. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγριωτέρους γε·αὐτούς ἀπέφηνεν ἡ οἶκους παρέλαβε, καὶ ταύτ' εἰς αὐτούς, ὅν ἦκιστ' ἂν ἐβούλετο. ΚΑΑ. Βούλει σοι ὄμολογησώ; ΣΩ. Εἰ δοξά γε σοι ἀληθῆς λέγειν. ΚΑΑ. ᾿Εστώ δὴ ταύτα. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰτέρ ἀγριωτέρους, ἀδικωτέρους τε καὶ χείρους; ΚΑΑ. ᾿Εστώ. ΣΩ. Οὐχ ἄρ' ἀναγόμεν τὰ πολιτικά Περίκλῆς ἦν ἐν τούτον τοῦ λόγου. ΚΑΑ. Οὐ σὺ γε φής. ΣΩ. Μάλ' ἀν' οὐδὲ γε σὺ ἢ ἔξ ἢν ὀμολογεῖς. Πάλιν δὲ λέγε μοι περὶ Κύμωνος· οὐκ ἔξωστράξισαν αὐτὸν οὕτω, οὕς ἔθεράπευεν, ἦνα
αυτοῦ δέκα ἐτῶν μη ἀκοῦσειν τῆς φωνῆς; καὶ Θεμιστοχέα ταύτα ταύτα ἐποίησαν καὶ φυγῇ προσεξεξιμώσαν; Μικτιάδην δὲ τὸν ἐν Μαραθῶνι ἔες τὸ βάραθρον ἐμβαλεῖν ἐψηφίσαντο, καὶ εἰ μὴ διὰ τῶν πρύτανιν, ἐνέπεσεν ἄν; Καίτοι οὖντοι, εἰ ἦσαν ἀνδρεῖς ἄγαθοί, ὡς σὺ φῆς, οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ ταύτα ἐπασχον. οὐχον οὐ γέ ἄγαθοι ἁνιόχοι κατ’ ἀρχὰς μὲν οὐκ ἐκπίπτουσιν ἐκ τῶν ξενῶν, ἐπειδὰν δὲ θεραπεύσωσι τοὺς ὑπόνους καὶ αὐτοὶ ἁμείνους γένονται ἁνιόχοι, τότ’ ἐκπίπτουσιν. οὐχ ἐστὶ ταύτ’ οὔτ’ ἐν ἁνιοχεία οὔτ’ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἔργῳ οὐδενί. ηδοκεί σοι; ΚΑΑ. Οὐκ ἐμοιγε. ΣΩ. Ἀληθεῖς ἄρα, ὡς ἐοικεν, οἱ ἐμπροσθέν Λόγοι σιτησαν, ὥτι οὐδένα ἠμεῖς ἐσμὲν ἀνδρα ἁγαθον γεγονότα τὰ πολιτικὰ ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει. οὐ δὲ ὄμο- λόγεις τῶν γε νῦν οὐδένα, τῶν μέντοι ἐμπροσθέν, καὶ προείλου τοῦτοσ τουσ ἀνδρασ. οὔτοι δὲ ἀνεφάνησαν εξ ἵσου τοῖς νῦν ὄντεσ, ὡστε, εἰ οὔτοι ὤτοροι ἦσαν, οὔτε τῇ ἀληθινῇ ὤτορικῇ ἐχρόντο — οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐξέπεσον — οὔτε τῇ χολακικῇ.

Cap. LXXIII. ΚΑΑ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι πολλοὶ Β γε δεῖ, ὡ Σώκρατες, μὴ ποτὲ τις τῶν νῦν ἔργα τοιαῦτα ἐγράσηται, οἰacam tootwv òs boûlei egragra- stai. ΣΩ. Ὕ δαιμόνις, οὖν’ ἐγὼ ἴσχω τοῦτοσ, ὡς γε διακόνους εἶναι πόλεως, ἀλλὰ μοι δοκοῦσι τῶν γε νῦν διακονικώτεροι γεγονέναι καὶ μᾶλλον οἴοί τε ἐκπορίζειν τῇ πόλει ἄν ἐπεθύμει. ἀλλὰ γὰρ μεταβιβάζειν τὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ μη ἐπιτρέ- πειν, πείθοντες καὶ βιαζόμενοι ἐπὶ τοῦτο, οἶδεν ἐμελλὼν ἁμείνους ἐσεθαί οἱ πολίται, ὡς ἐπος
εἶπεν οὖθεν τοῦτων διέφερον ἐκείνοι· ὅπερ μόνον Κ ἔργον ἔστιν ἀγαθοῦ πολίτου. ναὶς δὲ καὶ τείχη καὶ νεώρια καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαύτα καὶ ἐγώ σοι ὁμολογῶ δεινοτέρους εἶναι ἐκείνους τούτων ἐκπο- ρίζειν. Πράγμα ὦν γελοῖον ποιοῦμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. ἐν παντὶ γὰρ τῷ χρόνῳ, ὃν διαλεγόμεθα, οὐδὲν πανόμεθα εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ περιφρόμενοι καὶ ἁγνουούντες ἀλλήλων ὁ τι λέ- γομεν. ἐγώ γοῦν σε πολλάκις οἶμαι ὁμολογηκέναι καὶ ἐγνωκέναι, ὡς ἁρὰ διττή αὐτὴ τις ἡ πραγμα- τεία ἐστὶ καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ περὶ τινὸς ψυχῆν, καὶ ἡ μὲν ἐτέρα διακονικὴ ἔστιν, ἢ δυνατόν εἶναι ἐκπορίζειν, ἐὰν μὲν πεινῇ τὰ σώματα ἡμῶν, σιτία, ἐὰν δὲ δυνη, ποτά, ἐὰν δὲ ρηγῆ, ἱμάτια, στρώμα- τα, ὑποδήματα, ἄλλα ὅπερ ἔρχεται σώματα εἰς ἑπι- θυμίαν. καὶ ἐξεπιτηδές σοι διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν εἰκό- νων λέγω, ἵνα ὑδόν καταμάθῃς. τούτων γὰρ ποριστικῶν εἶναι ἡ κάπηλον ὅντα ἡ ἐμπορον ἡ ὅμιλουργὸν τοῦ αὐτῶν τοῦτων, σιτοποιοῦν ἡ ὁψο- Ε ποιοῦν ἡ ὑφάντην ἡ σκυτοτόμον ἡ σκυτοδεφρόν, οὐ- δὲν Θανυμαστὸν ἔστιν, ὅντα τοιοῦτων δόξαι καὶ αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Θεραπευτὴν εἶναι σώματος, παντὶ τῷ μη εἰδότι, ὅτι ἐστὶ τὸς παρὰ ταῦτας ἀπάσας τέχνη γυμναστικῆ τε καὶ ἱατρικῆ, ἡ δὲ τῷ ἄντι ἐστὶ σώματος Θεραπεία, ἦπερ γὰρ καὶ προσή- κει τοῖς τούτων ἄρχειν πασῶν τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ χρή- σθαι τοῖς τούτων ἔργοις διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι ὅ τι τὸ χρηστόν καὶ πονηρὸν τῶν σιτίων ἡ ποτῶν ἔστιν εἰς ἄρετὴν σώματος, τὰς δ' ἄλλας πάσας ταῦτας ἀγνοεῖν· διὸ δὴ καὶ ταύτας μὲν δουλοπρεπεῖς τε
καὶ διακονικᾶς καὶ ἀνελευθέρους εἶναι περὶ σώματος πραγματείαν, τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας· τὴν δὲ γυμναστικὴν καὶ ἰατρικὴν κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον δε-σποίνας εἶναι τούτων. ταύτα οὖν ταύτα ὅτι ἔστι καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς, τοτὲ μὲν μοι δοκεῖς μανθάνειν ὅτι λέγω, καὶ ὁμολογεῖς ὡς εἰδῶς, ὃ τι ἐγὼ λέγω· ἦκεις δὲ ὅλιγον ὑπεροῦν λέγων, ὅτι [ἀνθρωποί]

Β καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασι πολίται ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἐγὼ ἐρωτῶ οὐτίνες, δοκεῖς μοι ὁμοιοτάτους προτείνεσθαι ἀνθρώποις περὶ τὰ πολιτικὰ, ὅσπερ ἂν εἰ περὶ τὰ γυμναστικὰ ἐμοὶ ἐρωτῶντος οὐτίνες ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν ἡ εἰδὸς σωμάτων θεραπευταί, ἐλεγές μοι πάνυ σπουδάζων, θεαρίων ὁ ἀρτοκόπος καὶ Μίθαικος ὁ τὴν ὁμοποίαν συγγεγραφὼς τὴν Συκελικῆν καὶ Σάραμβους ὁ κάπηλος, ὅτι οὕτω θαυμάσιοι γεγόνασι σωμάτων θεραπευταί, ὃ μὲν C ἀρτοὺς θαυμαστοὺς παρασκευάζων, ὃ δὲ ὅψιν, ὃ δὲ οἷον. Ὁμ. λ. 1.4. "Ἰσως ἄν οὖν ἑγα-νάκτεις, εἰ σοι ἐλεγόν ἐγὼ, ὅτι, ἀνθρώπαι, ἐπαίεσε οὐδὲν περὶ γυμναστικῆς· διακόνους μοι λέγεις καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦν παρασκευαστὴς ἁνθρώπους, οὐχ ἐπαίκοντας καλὸν κἀγαθόν οὐδὲν περὶ αὐτῶν, οὐ, ἂν οὖσα τύχωσιν, ἐμπλήσαντες καὶ παχύναντες τὰ σῶματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπαινοῦμενοι ἦπ᾽ αὐ-

D τῶν, προσαπολοῦσιν αὐτῶν καὶ τὰς ἀρχαίας σάρ-

κας. οἱ δὲ αὐτοί δι᾽ ἀπειρίαν οὐ τοὺς ἐστιῶντας αἰτιάσονται τῶν νόσων αὐτῶν εἶναι καὶ τῆς ἀπο-βολῆς τῶν ἀρχαίων σαρκῶν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ ἂν αὐτοῖς τύχοσι τότε παρόντες καὶ συμβουλεύοντες τι, ὅταν ὅτι αὐτοῖς ἦκεν ἢ τότε πλησιμονί νόσου φέρουσα
συνήθισεν υστερον χρόνω, ἀτε ἄνευ τοῦ ὑγείων γεγονοῦν, τούτους αἰτιάσοντας καὶ πέζουσι καὶ κακῶν τι ποιήσουσιν, ἂν οἴοι τ' ὤσι, τοὺς δὲ προτέρους ἐκείνους καὶ αἰτίους τῶν κακῶν ἐγκαμίασον. καὶ σὺ νῦν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὁμοιότατον τούτῳ ἐργάζεται ἐγκαμίαζεις ἀνθρώπους, οἱ τούτους εἰστιάκασιν ἐνυχώντες ὅν ἐπεδήμουν, καὶ φασὶ μεγάλην τὴν πόλιν πεποιηκέναι αὐτοῖς· ὅτι δὲ οἴδει καὶ ὑπουλός ἔστι δὲ ἐκείνους τοὺς παλαιούς, οὐκ αἰσθάνονται. ἄνευ γὰρ σοφροσύνης ἡ καθ' ἡ μὲν ἑπτάνειας, τοὺς τότε παρόντας αἰτιάζονται συμβούλους, Θεμιστοκλέα δὲ καὶ Κίμωνα καὶ Περικλέα ἐγκαμίασον, τοὺς αἰτίους τῶν κακῶν· σοῦ δὲ ἑσθε ἐπιλήψονται, ἕαν μὴ εὐλαβῆς καὶ τοῦ ἐμοῦ ἑταῖρου Ἀλκιβιάδου, ἔταν καὶ τὰ ἀρχαῖα προσαπολλύονται πρὸς ὁς ἐκτήσαντο, ὥς Β αἰτίων ὄντων τῶν κακῶν, ἀλλ' ἑσθε συναίνεις, καὶ τοῖς ἔγονε ἀνόητον πράγμα καὶ νῦν ὁδὸ γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀκούσαν τῶν παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν πέρι. αἰσθάνομαι γὰρ, ὅταν ἡ πόλις τινὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν μεταχειρίζεται ὡς ἀδικοῦντα, ἀγανακτοῦντων καὶ σχέτισοντων, ὡς δὲινὰ πάσχουσι· πολλά καὶ ἀγαθὰ τὴν πόλιν πεποιηκότες ἀφα ἀδίκως ὑπ' αὐτῆς ἀπόλλυμαι, ὥς ὁ τούτων λόγος. τὸ δὲ ὅλον ψεῦδος ἔστι. προστάτης γὰρ πόλεως οὕτω ὃς ἐξε ποτὲ ἀδίκως ἀπόλλυτο ὑπ' αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως, ἦς προστατεῖ. κινδυνεύει γὰρ ταύταν
εἶναι, ὅσοι τε πολιτικοὶ προσποιοῦνται εἶναι καὶ ὅσοι σοφισταῖ. καὶ γὰρ οἱ σοφισταὶ, τῶλα σοφοὶ ὄντες, τοῦτο ἀτοποῦν ἐργάζονται πρᾶγμα· φάσκοντες γὰρ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλοι εἶναι πολλάκις καθηγοῦσί τῶν μαθητῶν, ὡς ἀδικοῦσι σφᾶς αὐτούς, τοὺς τε μισοῦσι ἀποστεροῦντες καὶ ἠλλῆν χάριν ὑμᾶς ἀποδίδοντες, εὐ πάθοντες ὑπ’ αὐτῶν.

Δ καὶ τούτου τοῦ λόγου τί ἄν ἄλογότερον εἰη πράγμα, ἀνθρώπους ἀγαθοὺς καὶ δικαίους γενομένους, ἐξαιρεθέντας μὲν ἀδικίαν ὑπὸ τοῦ διδασκάλου, σχόντας δὲ δικαιοσύνην, ἂδικεῖν τοῦτο ὦ ὑμᾶς ἔχονσιν; οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τούτῳ ἀτοποῦν εἶναι, ὡς ἐταίρε; ἦς ἀλήθες δημιουργεῖν με ἡμᾶς ἀνεύρισας, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, ὑμᾶς ἔθελον ἀποφύγεσθαι.

ΚΑΡ. ΛΧΧΒ. ΚΑΛ. Σὺ δ’ οὐχ ἂν οἶδος τ’ Ἐεῖς λέγειν, εἰ μή τίς σοι ἀποκρίνοντο; ΣΩ. Ἐοικᾶ γε· νῦν γούν συχνοὶ τείνω τῶν λόγων, ἑπειδὴ μοι οὐχ ἔθελες ἀποφύγεσθαι. ἀλλ’, ὃ γαθὲ, εἰπὲ πρὸς φιλίου, οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἄλογον εἰναί ἁγαθὸν φάσκοντα πεποιηκέναι τίνα μέμφεσθαι τοῦτῳ, ὅτι ὑπ’ ἐκείνου ἁγαθὸς γεγονός τε καὶ ὅν ἔπειτα πονηρὸς ἔστιν; ΚΑΛ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἁκοῦεις τοιαῦτα λεγόντων βιοτῶν φασκόντων παλινδεύειν ἀνθρώπους εἰς ἀρετὴν; ΚΑΛ. Ἐγορε. ἂλλα τί ἂν λέγους ἀνθρώπων πέρι οὐδενὸς ἄξιον; ΣΩ. Τί δ’ ἂν περὶ ἐκείνων λέγους, οὐ φάσκοντες προεστάναι τῆς πόλεως καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ὅπως ὁς βελτίστη ἔσται, πάλιν αὐτῆς καθηγοροῦσιν, ὅταν τύχωσιν, ὡς πονηροτάτης; οὐει τι διαφέρειν τούτοις ἐκείνων; ταύτον, ὃ μα-
κάρι', ἔστι σοφιστής καὶ ὑπότος, ἡ ἐγνύς τι καὶ παραπλῆσιον, ὀσπερ ἕγω ἔλεγον πρὸς Πώλων. σὺ δὲ δὲ ἄγνοιαν τὸ μὲν πάγκαλόν τι οὔτε εἶναι, Β τὴν ὑποτηκήν, τοῦ δὲ καταφρονεῖς. τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ κάλλιον ἔστι σοφιστικῇ ὑποτηκῆσι σώφρερ νομοθετικῇ δικαστικῆς καὶ γυμναστικῇ ἱπτηκῆς. μόνοις δ' ἐγγογε καὶ ὃμην τοῖς δημηγόροις τε καὶ σοφισταῖς οὐχ ἐγχορεῖν μέμφεσθαι τούτῳ τῷ πράγματι, ὧν αὐτοὶ παιδεύονσιν, ὡς ποιησάν ἔστιν εἰς σφᾶς, ἢ τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ ἀμα καὶ ἕαντῶν κατηγορεῖν, ὅτι οὐδὲν ὦφελήκασιν οὐσ φασιν ὄφελεῖν. οὐχ οὖτως ἔχει; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. c

Καὶ προέσθησα γε δήπω τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἄνευ μισθοῦ, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, μόνοις τούτοις εὐεχόρει, εἰπερ ἀληθῆ ἔλεγον. ἀλλήν μὲν γὰρ εὐεργεσίαν τις εὐεργετηθεῖσ, οὖν ταχὺς γενόμενος διὰ παιδοτριβήν, ἵς ἀν ἀποστρήσει τὴν χάριν, εἰ προοίτο αὐτῷ δ' παιδοτριβής καὶ μὴ συνθέμενος αὐτῷ μισθὸν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀμα μεταδίδους τοῦ τάχους δ' ἠμβάναν τὸ ἀργύριον· οὐ γὰρ τῇ βραδυτήτι, οὕμαι, ἀδίκουσιν οἱ ἀνδρῶποι, ἄλλ' ἀδίκισι. ἦ γὰρ; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ τις αὐτὸ τούτῳ ἀφαιρεῖ, τὴν ἀδίκιαν, οὐδὲν δεινὸν αὐτῷ μὴποτε ἀδίκηθῇ, ἄλλα μόνῳ ἀσφαλεῖς ταύτῃ τὴν εὐεργεσίαν προέσθαι, εἰπερ τῷ ὑπτὶ σύναιτο τις ἀγαθὸς ποιεῖν. οὐχ οὖτως; ΚΑΛ. Πημίι.

ΚΑΡ. ΛΧΧΒΙ. ΣΩ. Διὰ ταῦτ' ἄρα, ὡς ἔστε, τὰς μὲν ἄλλας συμβουλὰς συμβουλεύειν λαμβάνοντα ἀργύριον, οἶον οἰκοδομίας πέρι ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν, οὐδὲν αἰσχρὸν. ΚΑΛ. "Εοικέ Ε
γε. ΣΩ. Περὶ δὲ γε ταύτης τῆς πράξεως, ὅτιν' ἂν τις τρόπον ὡς βέλτιστος εὕη καὶ ἄριστα τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικῆσαι ἤ πόλιν, αἰσχρὸν νεώμισται μὴ φάναι συμβουλεύειν, εὰν μὴ τις αὐτῶ ἁργύριον διδῷ. ἥ γὰρ; ΚΑΛ. Ναὶ. ΣΩ. Ἀνὴν γὰρ, ὅτι τούτῳ αὐτῶν ἔστιν, ὅτι μόνῃ αὐτῇ τῶν εὐφρενείων τὸν εὐ παθόντα ἐπιθυμεῖν ποιεῖ ἀντ᾽ εὐ ποιεῖν, ὅστε καλὸν δοκεῖ τὸ σημεῖον εἶναι, εἰ εὖ ποιήσας ταύτην τὴν εὐφρενείαν ἀντ᾽ εὖ πείσε-521ται· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐ. ἔστι ταύτα οὕτως ἔχοντα; ΚΑΛ. Ἑστίν. ΣΩ. Ἐπὶ ποτέραν οὖν με παρακαλεῖς τὴν θεραπεύειν τῆς πόλεως; διόρισών μοι· τὴν τοῦ διαμάχεσθαι Ἀθηναίως, ὅταν ὅσ βέλτιστον ἔσονται, ὅς ιατρὸν, ἥ ὅσ διακονήσωντα καὶ πρὸς χάριν ὡμίλησοντα; Τάληθη μοι εἰπέ, ὃ Καλλίκλεις· δίκαιος γὰρ εἰ, ὃςπέρ ἦρξον παραφθονάζεσθαι πρὸς ἐμὲ, διατελεῖν ὃ νοεῖς λέ-Β γρω. καὶ νῦν εὖ καὶ γενναίως εἰπέ. ΚΑΛ. Ἀἐ-γγο τοῖνυν, ὅτι ὅσ διακονήσωντα. ΣΩ. Κολα-κεύσοντα ἄρα με, ὃ γενναῖότάτε, παρακαλεῖς. ΚΑΛ. Ἐι σοὶ Μυσὸν γε ἥδιον καλεῖν, ὃ Σῶ-κρατες· ὃς εἰ μὴ ταύτα γε ποιήσεις — ΣΩ. Μή εἰπης ὃ πολλάχις εἰρήκας, ὅτι ἀποκτενεῖ με ὃ βουλόμενος, ἵνα μὴ ἄν καὶ ἐγὼ εἴπω, ὃτι ποιησός γε ἐὼ ἀγαθὸν οὐντα· μηδ' ὅτι ἀραφήσεται, ἐὰν C τι ἔχω, ἵνα μὴ ἄν ἐγὼ εἴπω, ὅτι ὡς Ἀλλ.' ἀφελό-μενος οὐχ ἔξει ὃ τι χρήσεται αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ' ὃςπέρ με ἄδικως ἀφεῖλε, οὕτω καὶ λαθὼν ἄδικως χρή-σεται· εἰ δὲ ἄδικως, αἰσχρῶς· εἰ δὲ αἴσχρῶς, κακῶς.
CAP. LXXVII. ΚΑΛ. "Ως μοι δοκεῖς, ὃ Σῶκρατες, πιστεύειν μηδ' ἄν ἐν τούτων παθεῖν, ὅσοι ἐὰν ἐπτοσών καὶ οὐκ ἄν εἰσαχθεῖς εἰς δικαστή-
ριον ὑπὸ πάνω ἰσός μοχθῆρος ἀνθρώπων καὶ φαύλου! ΣΩ. Ἀνόητος ἄρα εἰμί, ὃ Καλλι-
κλείς, ὃς ἀληθᾶς, εἰ μὴ οἴομαι ἐν τῇ δι' ἑκάτοι ὄντινον ἄν, ὃ τι τύχοι, τοῦτο παθεῖν. τὸδε μέν ὃ τοι εὖ οἶδ᾽, ὅτι, ἐάνπερ εἰσίοι εἴς δικαστήριον περὶ
tούτων τινὸς κυνδυνεύον ὃν ὑπὸ λέγεις, ποιηρὸς
tὸς μὲ ἔσται ὁ εἰσάγων· οὐδὲις γὰρ ἄν χρήστος
μη ἀδίκουντ' ἀνθρώπον εἰσαγάγοι. καὶ οὐδὲν
gε ᾗτοπον, εἰ ἀποδάνοιμι. Βουλεῖ σοι εἴπω, διότι
tαῦτα προσδοκῶ; ΚΑΛ. Πάνω γε. ΣΩ. Οἶ-
μαι μετ' ὀλίγων Ἀθηναίων, ὃν μὴ εἴπω μόνος,
ἐπιχειρεῖν τῇ ὅς ἀληθῶς πολιτικὴ τέχνη καὶ
πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ μόνος τῶν νῦν. ἄτε οὖν
οὔ πρὸς χάριν λέγον τοὺς λόγους οὖς λέγω ἐκά-
stote, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, οὔ πρὸς τὸ ἡδί-
E στον, καὶ οὖν ἑθέλων ποιεῖν ἃ σὺ παραπεῖς, τὰ
κομψὰ ταῦτα, οὔχ ἔξω ὅ τι λέγω ἐν τῷ δικαστή-
ριῷ. ὁ αὐτὸς δὲ μοι ἤκει λόγος, ὅπερ πρὸς Πῶ-
λον ἔλεγον· κρινοῦμι γὰρ ὃς ἐν παιδίοις ἱατρὸς
ἄν κρίνοιτο κατηγοροῦντος ὑψηλοῖ. ὁ σχόπει
gάρ, τὸ ἄν ἀπολογοῖτο ὃ τοιοῦτος ἀνθρώπως ἐν
tούτοις ληφθεῖς, εἰ αὐτοῦ κατηγοροῦ τις λέγων,
ὅτι Ω παιδεῖς, πολλὰ ὑμᾶς καὶ κακὰ ὅδε εἰργα-
στατι ἄνιηρ καὶ αὐτούς, καὶ τοὺς νεωτάτους ὑμῶν
dιαφθείρει, τέμνον τε καὶ κάσων καὶ ἰσχυροῖνον
καὶ πνέων ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ, πιθρότατα πάματα δι-
δοὺς καὶ πεινήν καὶ δυσην ἀναγκάζων, οὔν ὁσπερ
ἔγω πολλά καὶ ἱδέα καὶ παντοδαπά εὐφόρουν ὑμῖν. τι ἄν οὐεὶ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ κακῷ ἀποληφθέντα τὸν ἰατρὸν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν; ἢ εἰ εἴποι τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὅτι Ταῦτα πάντα ἔγω ἔποιον, ὃ παῖδες, ύψι σῶς, ὅποσον οὐεὶ ἂν ἀναβοήσαι τοὺς τοιούτους δικαστὰς; οὗ μέγα; ΚΑΛ. Ἰσως οἴσεθαί γε χρῆ. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οἴει ἐν πάσῃ ἀπορίᾳ ἂν αὐτῷ τὸν ἔχεσθαι ὁ τι χρῆ εἰπεῖν; ΚΑΛ. Πάννυ γε.

ΚΑΡ. ΛΧΧΒ. ΣΩ. Τοιούτων μέντοι καὶ ἔγω οἶδ’ ὅτι πάθος πάθοιμι ἃν εἰσελθὼν εἰς δικαστήριον. οὔτε γάρ ἡδονᾶς ἂς ἐκπεπορίκα ἔξω αὐτοῖς λέγειν, ἢς οὐτοὶ εὐφρενεῖς καὶ ὠφελεῖς νομίζοντι, ἔγω δὲ οὔτε τοὺς πορίζοντας ἔηλῷ οὔτε οἷς πορίζεται· ἔαν τε τίς με ἡ νεωτέρους φη διαφθείρειν ἀπορεῖν ποιοῦντα, ἢ τοὺς προσβυτερους κακηγοροεῖν λέγοντα πικροὺς λόγους ἡ ἴδια ἡ δημοσία, οὔτε τὸ ἀλήθες ἔξω εἰπεῖν, ὅτι Δικαίως 

C πάντα ταῦτα ἐγώ λέγω, καὶ πράττω τὸ ὑμέτερον δὴ τούτο, ὃ ἄνδρες δικασταί, οὔτε ἅλλο συνέδειν. ὅστε ἴσως, ὃ τι ἃν τύχω, τούτο πείσομαι. ΚΑΛ. Δοξεῖ οὖν σοι, ὃ Σάκρατες, καλῶς ἔχειν ἄνθρωπος ἐν πόλει οὕτω διακείμενος καὶ ἀδύνατος ὃν ἔαντ᾽ ὑποθεῖν; ΣΩ. Ἐι ἐκεῖνο γε ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχοι, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, ὃ σὺ πολλάκις ὀμολόγησας· εἰ βεβοηθήκος εἰς αὐτῷ, μήτε περί ἄνθρωπος Ποὺς μήτε περί θεοὺς ἄδικον μηδὲν μήτε εἰρηκον μήτε εἰρασμένος. αὕτη γάρ τις θεοθεία ἔαντ᾽ πολλάκις ἦμιν ὀμολόγηται κρατίστη εἶναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἔμε τῇ ἐξελέγχοι ταῦτῃ τῷ βοήθειαν ἀδύνατον ὑπ᾽ ἔμαυτό καὶ ἅλλῳ βοηθεῖν, αἰσχυ-
νοίμην ἀν καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ ἐν ὀλίγοις ἤξελεγχό-
μενος καὶ μόνος ύπό μόνου, καὶ εἰ διὰ ταύτην τὴν
ἀδυναμίαν ἀποθνήσκοιμι, ἀγανακτοῖν ἂν· εἰ δὲ
κολακικῆς οἰτωρικῆς ἐνδεία τελευτηῆν ἔγορε, εὐ
οἶδα, ὅτι φαντασὶ ἵδος ἂν με φέροντα τὸν Θάνα-
τον. αὐτό μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀποθνησχεὶν οὐδεὶς φοβεῖ-
tαι, ὅστις μὴ παντάπασιν ἀλόγιστός τε καὶ ἀνα-
βρός ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἀδίκειν φοβεῖται· πολλῶν γὰρ
ἀδικημάτων γέμιοντα τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς ᾽Αἰδον ἄφι-
κέσθαι πάντων ἐσχατον κακῶν ἐστὶν. εἰ δὲ βού-
λει, σοί ἐγὼ, ὥσ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ἐθέλω λόγον
λέξαι. ΚΑΔ. Ἀλλ᾽ ἐπείπερ γε καὶ τάλλα ἐπέ-
φανας, καὶ τοῦτο πέρανον.

ΣΑΡ. LXXIX. Σ᾽ Ὡ. Ὅκους δὴ, φασί, μάλα 523
καλοῦ λόγου, ὅν σὺ μὲν ἤγισε μῦθον, ὡς ἔγω οὐ-
μαί, ἔγω δὲ λόγον· ὥσ ἀληθὴ γὰρ ὄντα σοι λέξω
ὁ μέλλω λέγειν. Ὡσπέρ γὰρ Ὁμήρος λέγει,
διενείμαντο τὴν ἀρχὴν ὁ Ζεὺς καὶ ὁ Ποσειδῶν
cαὶ ὁ Πλούτων, ἐπειδὴ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς παρέλα-
βον. ἢν οὖν νόμος ὅδε περὶ ἀνθρώπων ἐπὶ Κρό-
νος, καὶ ἀεὶ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἔστιν ἐν θεοῖς, τῶν ἀν-
θρώπων τὸν μὲν δικαίως τὸν βίον διελθόντα καὶ
ὁσίως, ἐπειδὰν τελευτηῆσθη, ἐς μικάρον νήσους ἀπι-
Β ὄντα οἰκεῖν ἐν πάσῃ εὐδαιμονιᾷ ἐκτὸς κακῶν, τὸν
δὲ ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως εἰς τὸ τῆς τίσεως τε καὶ δίκης
δεσμωτήριον, ὃ δὴ τάρταρον καλοῦσιν, ἱέναι. τού-
τον δὲ δικασταὶ ἐπὶ Κρόνον καὶ ἐτὶ νεωστὶ τοῦ
Αἰῶς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντος ζῶντες ἥσαν ζώντων, ἔκει-
νη τῇ ὡμέρᾳ δικάζοντες, ὡς μέλλοιεν τελευταῖν.
kακῶς οὖν αἰ δίκαι ἐκρίνοντο. δε το ὁφ Πλούτων
καὶ οἱ ἐπιμεληται οἱ ἐκ μακάρων νήσων ἱόντες
C ἔλεγον πρὸς τὸν Δία, ὅτι φοιτῶν σιν ἄνθρωποι ἐκατέρωσε ἀνάξιοι. εἶτεν οὖν ὁ Ζεὺς, Ἄλλ᾽ ἐγώ, ἔφη, παύσοι τοῦτο γιγνόμενον. νῦν μὲν γὰρ κακῶς αἰ δίκαι δικάζονται. ἀμπεχόμενοι γὰρ, ἔφη, οἱ κρινόμενοι κρίνονται. ζῶντες γὰρ κρίνον-
tαι. πολλοὶ οὖν, ᾧ δ᾽ ὦς, ψυχὰς ποιησάς ἔχοντες ἡμιρεσμένοι εἰςά σώματά τε καὶ καὶ ἑνή καὶ πλούτους, καὶ, ἐπειδὰν ἥ κρίσις ἥ, ἔχονται αὐ-
tοῖς πολλοὶ μάρτυρες, μαρτυρήσοντες, ὁς δικαίως
D βεβιώκασιν. οἱ οὖν δικασταὶ ὑπὸ τε τούτων ἐξ-
πλήττονται, καὶ ἀμα καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀμπεχόμενοι δι-
καζούσι, πρὸ τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς αὐτῶν ὀρθαλμοὺς καὶ ὅτα καὶ ὅλον τὸ σῶμα προσκαλυμμένοι. ταῦτα δὴ αὐτοῖς πάντα ἐπίπροσθεν γίγνεται, καὶ τὰ αὐ-
tῶν ἡμιρεσμένα καὶ τὰ τῶν κρινόμενον. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, πανστέον ἐστὶ προειδότας αὐτοὺς τῶν θάνατον· νῦν μὲν γὰρ προῆσασι. τούτο μὲν
οὖν καὶ δὴ εἶφε ὁ Προμηθέη ὡς ὁ παῦσῃ
Ε αὐτῶν. ἔπειτα γυνινὸς κριτέον ἀπάντων τού-
tων· τεθνεῶτας γὰρ δεῖ κρίσεσθαι. καὶ τὸν κρι-
tήν δεῖ γυμνὸν εἶναι, τεθνεῶτα, αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ σωφρονίτη ἐξαιρήθη ἀπὸ διαθυμω-
tος ἐκάστου, ἔρθουν πάντων τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ
καταλιπόντα ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς πάντα ἐκείνον τὸν
χόσμον, ἕνα δικαία ἡ κρίσις ἤ. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦ-
tα ἐγνωκὼς πρότερον ἥ ὡμείς ἐποιήσαμην δικα-
σταὶ νεῖσι εἰμιντοῦ, δύο μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας, Μίνω
521ε καὶ Ἐράμαην, ἕνα δὲ ἐκ τῆς Ἔλυράτης,
Διακόν. οὖτοι οὖν ἐπειδὰν τελευτῆσοσι, δικά-
σουσιν ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι, ἐν τῇ τριώδῃ ἐξ ἡς φερετον
tῶ ὀδῶ, ἡ μὲν εἰς μακάρων νήσους, ἡ δ' εἰς τάρ-
tαρον. καὶ τούς μὲν ἐν τῇ Αἰσίᾳ Παράμιανθος
χρινεῖ, τοὺς δὲ ἐν τῇ Ἕλειφόρὴς Αἰακός. Μίνω
δὲ πρεσβεία δῶσω, ἐπιδίακρινεῖν, εἴπω ἀπορητὸν τι
tῷ ἐτέρῳ, ἦν ὡς δικαιοτάτη ἡ κρίσις ἡ περὶ τῆς
πορείας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

ΣΑΡ. ΛXXX. Ταυτ' ἑστιν, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, ὁ
ἐγώ ἀκριβῶς πιστεύω ἀληθῆ εἶναι· καὶ ἐν τοῦ-
tων τῶν λόγων τοῦνδε τι λογίζομαι συμβαίνειν.
Ὁ θάνατος τυγχάνει δὲν, ὡς ἔμοι δοκεῖ, οὐδὲν
ἀλλο ἢ δυοῖν πραγμάτων διάλυσις, τῆς ἴταχῆς
καὶ τοῦ σώματος, ἀπ' ἀλλήλουν. ἐπειδὰν δὲ δια-
lυθητὸν ἄρα ἀπ' ἀλλήλουν, οὐ πολὺ ἦτον ἐκά-
tερον αὐτοῖν ἔχει τὴν ἐξιν τὴν αὐτοῦ ἤνπερ καὶ
οὔτε ἐξὶ ᾧ ἀνθρώπος, τὸ τε σῶμα τὴν φύσιν τὴν
αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰ θεραπευματα καὶ τὰ παθήματα,
ἐνδηλα πάντα. οἶνον εἰ τίνος μέγα ἦν τὸ σῶμα C
φύσει ἡ τροφή ἡ ἀμφότερα ζῶντος, τούτου καὶ
ἐπειδὰν ἀποθανῆ ὁ νεκρὸς μέγας· καὶ εἰ παχύς,
pαχύς καὶ ἀποθανόντος, καὶ τάλλα ὕπτως. καὶ
εἰ αὐ ἐπετήθηευε κοιμᾶν, κοιμήτης τούτου καὶ ὁ νε-
κρός. μαστιγίας αὐ εἰ τις ἢ καὶ ἱχνη ἦγε τῶν
πληγῶν οὐλὰς ἐν τῷ σώματι ἢ ὑπὸ μαστίγων ἢ
ἀλλοι τραγμάτων ζῶν, καὶ τεθνεώτος τὸ σῶμα
ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ταῦτα ἔχον. κατεχότα τε εἰ τοῦ ἢ
μέλη ἡ διεστραμμένα ζῶντος, καὶ τεθνεῶτος ταύτα Δ
ταὐτά ἐνδηλα. ἐνὶ δὲ λόγῳ, οἶος εἶναι παρε-
σχεύσατο τὸ σῶμα ζῶν, ἐνδηλα ταύτα καὶ τελευ-
tήσαντος ἡ πάντα ἡ τὰ πολλὰ ἐπὶ τινα χρόνον.
ταύτων δὴ μοι δοκεῖ τοὺτ’ ἀρά καὶ περὶ τὴν ψυχήν εἶναι, ὁ Καλλίκλεις· ἐνδηλα πάντα ἐστίν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἐπειδὰν γυμνωθῇ τοῦ σώματος, τά τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ τὰ παθήματα τί διὰ τήν ἐπιτήδευσιν ἐκάστου πράγματος ἔσχεν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὁ Ἐ ἀνθρωπος. Ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἀφίκωνται παρὰ τῶν δικαστήρι, οἱ μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας παρὰ τὸν Ἁρδαμάνθιον, ὁ Ἁρδαμάνθιος ἐκείνους ἐπιστήμως θέαται ἐκάστου τήν ψυχήν, οὐχ εἰδὼς ὅτου ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως ἐπιλαβόμενος ἃ ἀλλού οἰκοῦν βασιλέως ἡ δυνάμειν κατεῖ-δειν οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ὁ ὅτι ψυχής, ἀλλὰ διαμεισσί-525 γραμμένην καὶ οὐλὸν μεστὴν ὑπὸ ἐπιρροκίων καὶ ἀδικίας, ἢ ἔκαστο ἢ πράξει αὐτοῦ ἐξωμόρξατο εἰς τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ πάντα σκολιὰ ὑπὸ μενύδους καὶ ἀλαζονείας καὶ οὐδὲν εὑθὺ διὰ τὸ ἀνευ ἀληθείας τεθράφθαι· καὶ ὑπὸ ἐξουσίας καὶ τρυφῆς καὶ ύψεως καὶ ἀκρατίας τῶν πράξεων ἀνυμμετρίας τε καὶ αἰσχρότητος γέμουσαν τὴν ψυχήν εἶδεν. ἵδιων δὲ ἀτίμως ταύτην ἀπέπεμψεν εὐθὺ τῆς φρον-ράς, οἱ μέλλει εἴλθοῦσα ἀνατιθήναι τὰ προσίκοντα πάθη. Ὁρθοί καὶ παντὶ τῷ ἐν τιμωρίᾳ ὄντι, ὑπ’ ἄλλου ὑρθὸς τιμωρομένῳ, ἢ βελτίων γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὄνισσαθαι ἢ παραδείγμα-τε τοῖς ἄλλοις γίγνεσθαι, ὅτι ἄλλοι ὑρθὸντες πά-σχοντα ἃ ἄν πάσχῃ φρονούμενοι βελτίους γίγνον-ται. ἐσὶ δὲ οἱ μὲν ὁφελοῦμενοι τε καὶ δίκην διδόντες ὑπὸ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων οὐτοί, οἱ ἃν ἰδίᾳ παρατήματα ἀμάρτωσιν· ὅμως δὲ δι’ ἄλγη-δόνων καὶ ὀδυνῶν γίγνεται αὐτοῖς ἢ ὁφελεία καὶ
ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Ἀιδών· οὐ γὰρ οἶδον τε ἄλλως ἀδικίας ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. οὐ δὲ ἂν τα ἐσχατα ἀδικής σοσί καὶ διὰ τα τοιαῦτα ἀδικήματα ἀνίατοι γένονται, ἐκ τούτων τὰ παραδείγματα γίγνεται, καὶ οὔτοι αὐτοὶ μὲν ὀυκέτι ὀνύνανται οὔδέν, ἀτε ἀνίατοι ὁντες, ἀλλοὶ δὲ ὀνύνανται οἱ τούτοις δραυν- τες διὰ τὰς ἁμαρτίας τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ὀδυνηρότατα καὶ φοβερότατα πάθη πάσχοντας τὸν ἅει χρόνον, ἀτεχνῶς παραδείγματα ἁμηρτημένους ἔχει ἐν Ἀι- δών ἐν τῷ ἰσημοτηρίῳ, τοῖς ἅει τῶν ἁδύκων ἁρι- κυνομένων θέαμα καὶ νοοθετίματα. ὃν ἐγὼ Θρημί ἔνα καὶ Ἀρχέλαον ἔσεσθαι, εἰ ἄληθή λέγει Πόλος, καὶ ἄλλον οὕτως ἂν τοιοῦτος τύχανος ἦ. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς εἶναι τοιούτων τῶν πα- ῥαδειγμάτων ἐκ τυράννων καὶ βασιλέων καὶ δυ- ναστῶν καὶ τα τῶν πόλεων πραξάντων γεγονότας· οὔτοι γὰρ διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν μέγιστα καὶ ἀνοσιώ- τατα ἁμαρτήματα ἁμαρτάνουσι. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τούτως καὶ Ὅμηρος· βασιλέας γὰρ καὶ δυνά- στας ἐκείνος πεποίηκε τοὺς ἐν Ἀιδών τὸν ἅει Εχρώνον τιμωρουμένους, Τάνταλον καὶ Σίσυφον καὶ Τιτνόν. Θερσίτην δὲ, καὶ εἰ τις ἄλλος πονη- ρὸς ἢν ἰδιώτης, οὐδεὶς πεποίηκε μεγάλαις τιμω- ρίαις συνεχόμενον ὡς ἀνίατον· οὐ γὰρ, οἴμαι, ἐξῆν αὐτῷ· διὸ καὶ εὐδαιμονέστερος ἢν ἢ οἶς ἐξῆν. ἄλλα γὰρ, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, ἐκ τῶν δυναμένων εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ σφόδρα πονηροὶ γιγνόμενοι ἀνθρωποί· 526 οὔδὲν μὴν κωλύει καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἀγαθοὺς ἀνθρώπος ἐγγίγνεσθαι, καὶ σφόδρα γε ᾧδιον ἀγαθεῖ τῶν γιγνομένων· χαλεπῶν γὰρ, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, καὶ
Πολλοὶ ἐπαίνου ἀξίων ἐν μεγάλῃ ἐξουσίᾳ τοῦ ἀδικείν γενόμενον δικαίως διαβείοναι. ὃλιγοι δὲ γίγνονται οἱ τοιούτοι· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἄλλοθι γεγόνασιν, οἴμαι δὲ καὶ ἔσονται καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ. Ἐπὶ ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν τὴν τοῦ δικαίως διαχειρίζειν ὃ ἀν τις ἐπιτρέψῃ· εἰς δὲ καὶ πάντων ἐξίζωμοι γέρονε καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους Ἔλληνας Ἀριστείδης ὁ Λυσιμάχος. οὐ δὲ πολλοὶ, ὃ ἀριστε, κακοὶ γίγνονται τῶν δυναστῶν. ΣΑΡ. ΛΞΞΞΙΙ. Ὅπερ οὖν ἔλεγον, ἐπειδὰν ὁ Ραδάμανθιος ἐκεῖνος τοιούτων τινα λάβῃ, ἄλλο μὲν περὶ αὐτοῦ οὐχ οἶδεν οὐδέν, οὐθέν ὅστις οὐθ' ὄντων, ὃτι δὲ ποιησός τις· καὶ τούτῳ κατιδῶν ἀπέπεμψεν εἰς τάρταρον, εἰς ἐπισημαναίμενος, ἐὰν τε ἰάσιμος ἐὰν τε ἄνιατος δοξῇ εἶναι· ὃ δὲ ἐκεῖσε ἄφικόμενος τὰ προσήκοντα πᾶσχει. ἔνιοτε δ' ἄλλην εἰσιδῶν ὅσίως βεβιωκυιάν καὶ μετ' ἀληθείας, ἀνδρός ἰδίωτον ἢ ἄλλον τινός, μάλιστα μὲν, ἔγογε φημι, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, φιλοσόφου τὰ αὐτὸν πράξαντος καὶ οὐ πολυφραγμονήσαντος ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ἡγάσθη τε καὶ ἐς μακάρων νήσους ἀπεπεμψε. ταύτα ταῦτα καὶ ὁ Ἁἰαῖος. ἔκατερος δὲ τούτων ραβδὸν ἔχων δικαίει. Ὅδ' ὁ δὲ Μίνας ἐπισκοπῶν κάθηται μόνος, ἔχων χρυσοῦν σχήματον, ὃς φησὶν Ὁδυσσεὺς ὁ Ὁμήρου ἰδεῖν αὐτὸν χρύσουν σχήματον ἔχοντα, θεμιστεύοντα νέκυσιν.

Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, ὑπὸ τούτων τῶν λόγων πέπεισμα, καὶ σκοπῶ, ὅπως ἀποφανοῦμαι τῷ κριτῷ ὃς ὑγιεστάτην τὴν ψυχήν. χαίρειν οὖν
έάσας τας τιμὰς τὰς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, τὴν ἀλήθειαν σκοπῶν πειράσομαι τῷ ὄντι ὡς ἂν δύνω-μαι βέλτιστος ὡν καὶ ζῆν καὶ, ἐπειδὰν ἀποθνῄσκω, ἀποθνῄσκειν. παραχάλῳ δέ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας ἀνθρώπους, καθ' ὅσον δύναμαι, καὶ δή καὶ σε ἀντιπαραχάλῳ ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸν βίον καὶ τὸν ἄρωνα τοῦτον, ὅν ἐγὼ φημὶ ἄντι πάντων τῶν ἔνθαδε ἁγώνων εἶναι, καὶ ἄνειδίζω σοι, ὅτι οὐχ οἷός τ' ἐσεὶ σαυτῷ βοηθῆσαι, ὅταν ἡ δίκη σοι ἤ καὶ ἡ κρίσις ἡν νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ἀλλὰ ἔλθαν παρὰ τὸν δικαστὴν τὸν τῆς Διήνης νίον, ἐπειδὰν 527 σοι ἐπιλαβόμενος ἁγη, χασμήσει καὶ ἰληγνάσεις οὐδὲν ἤτοιν ἢ ἐγὼ ἐνθάδε σὺ ἐκεῖ, καὶ σὲ ἑσος τυπτῆσε τις καὶ ἐπὶ κόρος· ἀτύμως, καὶ πάντως προσηλκύει.

Τάχα δ' οὖν ταύτα μὴν σοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι, ὅσπερ γραφός, καὶ καταφρονεῖσ αὐτῶν. καὶ οὐδὲν γ' ἂν ἦν ἡμιμαστὸν καταφρονεῖν τούτοις, εἰ πη ζητοῦντες εἰχόμεν αὐτῶν βελτίω καὶ ἀληθεστέρα εὑρέθην· νῦν δὲ ὄργας, ὅτι τρεῖς ὄντες ὑμεῖς, οὐ̣περ σοφότατοι ἑστε τῶν νῦν Ἑλλήνων, σὺ τε καὶ Β Πάλος καὶ Γοργίας, οὐ̣χ ἔχετε ἀποδείξαι, ὡς δὲι ἄλλον τινὰ βίον ζῆν ἢ τούτον, ὅσπερ καὶ ἐκεῖες φαίνεται συμφέρων, ἀλλ' ἐν τοσούτοις λόγοις τῶν ἄλλων ἐλεγχομένων μόνοις οὕτως ἤρεμεί· ὁ λόγος, ὡς εὐλαβητέον ἑστὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἀδι- κεῖσθαι, καὶ παντὸς μᾶλλον ἄνδρι μελετητέον οὐ τὸ δοκεῖν εἶναι ἁγαθῶν, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι καὶ ἴδια καὶ δημοσία· ἐὰν δὲ τις κατὰ τι πακός γίγνηται, κολαστέος ἑστὶ, καὶ τοῦτο δεύτερον ἁγαθὸν μετὰ.
то εἶναι δίκαιον, τό γέγνεσθαι καὶ κολαζόμενον 
διδόναι δίκην· καὶ πᾶσαν κολαξείαν καὶ τὴν 
περὶ ἔαντόν καὶ τὴν περὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, καὶ περὶ 
οὕνως καὶ περὶ πολλούς, φευκτέον· καὶ τῇ ἤτ-
τορικῇ οὕτῳ χρηστέον, ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἀεί, καὶ τῇ 
ἀλλη πάση πράξει.

ΚΑΠ. ΛXXXIII. Ἐμοὶ οὖν πειθόμενος ἀκο-
λουθησον ἐνταύθα, οἱ ἀφικόμενοι εὐδαιμονήσεις 
καὶ ζῶν καὶ τελευτήσας, ὁς ὁ λόγος σημαινεῖ. 
καὶ ἔασον τινὰ σοι καταρροησαί ὁς ἄνοιγτον 
καὶ προπηλακίσατι, ἐὰν βουληταί, καὶ χαὶ μὰ Δία 
όυ γε ἢαρφὼν πατάξαι τὴν ἀτιμον ταύτην πλη-
γήν· οὐδὲν γὰρ δεινὸν πείσει, ἐὰν τὸ ὄντι ἦς κα-
λὸς κάραθος, ἁσκῶν ἁρετήν. κατείτα οὕτῳ κοινῇ 
ἀσχίσαντες, τότε ἤδη, ἐὰν δοξῇ χρῆναι, ἐπιθησό-
μεθα τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, ἥ ὅποιον ἄν τι ἡμῖν δοξῇ, 
tότε βουλευσόμεθα, βελτίως ὄντες βουλεύσεσθαι 
ἡ νῦν. αἰσχῶν γὰρ ἐχοιτάς γε ὅσ νῦν φαινό-
μεθα ἔχειν, ὑπειτα νεανιεύσεθαι ὅς τι ὄντας, οἷς 
Ε ὡνδέτοτε ταύτα δοκεῖ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ ταύτα 
περὶ τῶν μεγίστων· εἰς τοσοῦτον ἤκομεν ἀπαὶδευ-
σίας! ὁσπερ οὖν ἡγεμών τῷ λόγῳ χρησάμεθα 
tῷ νῦν παραφανέντι, ὁς ἡμῖν σημαινεῖ, ὃτι οὗτος 
ὁ τρόπος ἀριστος τοῦ βίου, καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην 
καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἁρετήν ἁσκοῦντας καὶ ἦν καὶ 
τεθνάναι. τούτῳ οὖν ἐπόμεθα, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους 
παρακαλώμεν, μη ἐκείνῳ, ὃ σύ πιστεύον ἔμε πα-
ρακαλεῖσ· ἐστι γὰρ οὐδενὸς ᾧξιος, ὃ Καλλίκλεις.
NOTES.

N. B. The references follow the marginal pages and letters of the text, which are those of the Paris edition of 1578, edited by H. Stephanus. Mt. stands for Matthew's Grammar, second edition; K., for Kühner's Middle Grammar, translated by Edwards and Taylor; Cr., for Crosby's, second edition; and Soph., for that of Sophocles, quoted according to the original sections: — in the new edition (1847) the earlier and present sections are collated at the beginning.

447 A. οὐτώ μεταλεγχάνειν, so to take part in; i. e. in the present instance, to take no part in at all. Callicles says, "It were well to have such a share in a battle, as you have had in listening to Gorgias"; i. e. it were well to arrive too late for an unpleasant employment, but not for a feast such as we have had. For the selection of war in this proverbial phrase, comp. Phædr. 212, B, οὐ πόλεμον ἀγγελλεῖν, what you tell me is not at all disagreeable; and so Laws, 702, D. — τὸ λεγόμενον, as the saying is. Soph. § 167, N. 2. Cr. § 334. 8. The accusative may be explained by considering it as the object of the general notion of action contained in the verbs, — are we doing τὸ λεγόμενον, i. e. are we too late. — ἐπεδείξατο. This verb in the middle, with an accus. (e. g. σοφίαν or a neuter adjective) or without, especially denotes that ostentatious display of their art, which the sophists and rhetoricians at this time were wont to make. — τούτων refers to ἡκομεν καὶ ὑπεροῦ-μεν. As the verbs denote but one act, τούτων might be used equally well, and the plural is not unfrequently used in referring to a single verb. Comp. 492, C.
B. ἐγὼ γὰρ καὶ ἱσομαι. καὶ, also, refers to a suppressed clause. No matter: for if I did the harm, I will also find the remedy. According to Olympiod. and a Schol., the words are drawn from the Telephus of Euripides, being spoken by Achilles, who wounded that hero.—ei μὲν δοκεῖ. The indic. implies belief that such is the view of Socrates; while in eiν δὲ βούλη the subjunctive expresses the wish as a mere possible contingency.—εἰσαίθε, again, at another time, hereafter. So εἰσαίθε ἀναβαλοῦ, Sympos. 174, E; εἰσαίθε ὑποδέσθαι, Euthydem. 275, A.—τί δαί; usually, where δαί is found, δὲ is in some MSS. as a various reading. The longer form, it is now admitted, is properly retained after τί and πῶς, where wonder or indignation is expressed.—οὐκοῦν ... ὡμῖν. Stallb., Ast, and others explain the construction by regarding ἤκειν as used imperatively (Soph. § 219, N. 6; Cr. § 625; K. § 306, R. 11), ἀκοῦσαι γοργίων being understood. I incline to regard ἐπιδεῖξεται ὑμῖν as the proper apodosis, which, owing to the intervention of the clause beginning with γὰρ, deserts its own construction for that of the interposed clause. The sense is, Well, then, whenever you wish to come to my house, Gorgias will exhibit to you, for he lodges with me. So, apparently, Heindorf. Comp. Soph. (Ed. R. 227—229, where the clause πείσεται γὰρ οὐδὲν turns the apodosis following it, which would be naturally γῆς ἀπίτω ἀβλαβῆς, into γῆς δὲ ἀπείναν ἀβλαβῆς.—ei λέγεις, i. e. you are very civil in inviting us to your house, and quite right in wishing to spare Gorgias further fatigue. But, etc.

C. διαλέξωνα, here, to discourse by way of question and answer, tacitly contrasted with an ἐπιδείξεις, in which Gorgias would be the sole speaker. Hence, to hold a discussion, or search for truth in that way, as Socrates did. Socrates, in Xen. Mem. 4. 5. 12, defines it κοινὴ βουλευσθαι διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη τὰ πράγματα. In the end, the
notion of question and answer faded away from the derivatives of this word; and that of logical reasoning, or that of the science of unchangeable, absolute truth, remained. — δύναμις, essence, nature. — τοῦ ἀνδρός pronominis fere partes agit, ut exprimi possit pronomine possessivo.

Ast. The art of the man = his art, with perhaps something of contempt in τοῦ ἀνδρός. — τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν, to ask him in person, or himself. And so 481, B. αὐτῶν is taken with the object of ἐρωτᾶν not expressed.

D. ἐροῦ, second aor., not ἐροῦ. No present is used by the Attics. Soph. § 118, sub voce; K. § 166; Cr. § 298. — ὥστε ἐπαγγέλλει ἀποκρίνεσθαι. Cic. de Fin. 2, init.: “Quorum [sophistarum] e numero primus est ausus Leontinus Gorgias in conventu poscere quæestionem, id est, jubere dieere, qua de re quis velit audire.” This is spoken of at length by Philostr. Vit. Sophist., Proœm.

448 A. Ἡ ποι ... ἀποκρίνει, no doubt, then, you answer with ease, O Gorgias. Ast translates ῥαδίως, libenter, but his power to answer, and not his willingness, is in question. — ἀν δὲ γε βουλῇ, ἐμοῦ, sc. λάμβανε πείραν. For λ. πείραν spoken of a person, comp. εἰ βούλει λαβεῖν μον πείραν, Protag. 341, E, cited by Ast. — τί δὲ ... ἵκνωσ; but what difference does that make, if I answer well enough for you? To the common formula, τί τούτο; is sometimes added διαφέρει, which Stallb. here supplies. But τί can well be a nominative. τί τούτο; what is that? i. e. what of that?

B. Ἡρόδικος, a brother of Gorgias, of whom we know nothing besides his name and calling. He is not to be confounded, as the Scholiast well observes, with another man often mentioned by Plato, Herodicus of Selymbria in Thrace, and originally of Megara; who first taught gymnastics, but on the failure of his health gave himself up to the attempt to recover it; and was among the earliest to
cure diseases by exercise. —— τίνα ἄν . . . ὀνομάζομεν. The predicate-accusative with καλέιν, ὀνομάζειν, may be τίνα, referring to any one by name or by some appellation taken from his art, business, etc.; or τί, which is neuter on account of ὀνόμα. Here in τίνα ἄν . . . οὐχ ὀπερ both forms occur together. —— ἡ ὁ ἀδέλφος αὐτοῦ. Polygnotus of Thasos, the most celebrated of this family of painters. He painted upon the wall of the Stoa Poecile at Athens gratuitously, and at Delphi. Of his pictures from epic subjects in a hall near the Delphian temple, Pausanias gives a minute account (10. 25. seq.), which has enabled two artists of the present day to reproduce his designs in the spirit of ancient art.

C. νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ. In this sentence, both the main clause and that which furnishes the reason are interrogative, a usage which would be awkward in English, but is lively and favorable to brevity. A little below, 451, Α, we have the interrogative included between the article and participle (ἡ περὶ τί . . . ἔρχοντα), as it often is found within a relative sentence. Comp. Cr. § 539. 2. —— δ Χαρέφων. The words which follow are plainly not in the style of conversation. The juxtaposition of words from the same root (ἐμπειρῶν ἐμπείρος, ἄλλοι ἄλλων ἄλλως, ἀρίστων ἀρίστοι), ἀδῶν for βίον, and the antithetical form of the clauses, all show, that either the style of Polus is imitated by Plato, or that words from a treatise of his are here put into his mouth. They are quoted as his by Syrianus on Hermogenes. (4. 44. Walz.) See 462, Β.

D. σοὶ βουλομένος ἐστίν. Soph. § 196, Ν. 2; Cr. § 408; K. 284. 10. c. —— δῆλος γὰρ . . . διαλέγομαι, for it is plain to me, even from what he has said, that Polus has studied the art of rhetoric, so called, rather than how to discourse (logically) by way of question and answer. δῆλος, etc., for δηλον ἐστιν, ὅτι Πάλος, by attraction, as it is sometimes called. The
tendency to give prominence to the main word — here the subject — of the second clause caused it to be pushed forward into the leading clause. This made that clause personal instead of impersonal, and bound the two clauses together more closely.

E. ἐρωτᾷ. So all the MSS., but the editors give ἐρώτα, on account of ποια τις εἶη. But this is unnecessary, for the present may be rhetorically for the imperfect, or may include it. Nobody asks you = nobody asked you or now asks you. Comp. Xen. Anab. 1. 1. 3, διαβάλλει ... ὡς ἐπι-βουλεύοι, for διεβάλλε. In this sentence, ποίασ and τίς, which belong to direct inquiry, are found in company with δος τίς, by which indirect questions are introduced. Comp. ποία and ὁποία together, 500, A. Comp. also οίαν for ὁποίαν, 450, C, δος for ὁπόσα, 451, B, and other passages. — ὅσπερ τὰ ἐμπροσθεν. For the asyndeton, comp. 450, B, note. For τὰ ἐμπροσθεν, comp. Soph. § 141, N. 1; Cr. § 478, a. The second clause begins at καὶ νῦν οὕτως.

449 οὐσείνεσθαι, est quæstionem ita proponere ut alteri subjicias quid respondendum sit, et in universo proponere quæstionem. Ast. — ὡς τίνος ... τέχνης. Another form of compound interrogation, when one clause has the participial structure (ἐπιστήμων, sc. ὄντα). — ἀγαθῶν γε, not bene moratum, as Routh translates it, but plainly egregium certe. — ὁς ἐφη Ἄμφρος. II. 6. 211, and elsewhere.

B. οὐκοῦν. See Preface. — ἄλλοθι. See Introd. pp. xiii., xiv. — ἄλλῳ ὅσπερ, etc., but be not false to the promise you make. Socrates takes for granted that he consents. Hence ὅσπερ, which Ast would change into εἰσπερ, is justly defended by Stallb. — εἰσὶ ... ποιεῖσθαι, = ἀναγκαῖον ἔστω ἐνίας (Heind.), or ἐν ἐνίας ποιεῖσθαι. See 448, D. In some of the answers it is necessary to discourse at length.

* Stallb. has ἐρωτᾷ in his second edition.
C, D. ὡς διὰ βραχυτάτων = ὡς βραχύτατα, or ὡς οἶνον τε διὰ βραχυτάτων, just below. — With this boast of Gorgias, comp. the ironical passages in Protag. 329, B, 334, D. The latter runs thus: "O Protagoras, I happen to be an oblivious sort of person, and if I have a long speech made to me, I forget what is the topic of discourse; therefore, as, in case I were somewhat deaf, you would think that you ought to talk in a louder tone with me than with others, to carry on a conversation with me; so, seeing I am so forgetful, abridge your answers, and make them shorter, to enable me to follow you." — πάνω... ἐπιεικῶς, quite sufficiently, or very well.

E. ποίους τούτους... ἤγιαίνους; what kind of words? are they those which make known by what sort of regimen the sick can get well? Understand ἤπειρι with ποίους τούτους; as in 450, Α, line 4. This is a condensed expression for ποίου εἰσίν οὕτως ἤπειρι οὕς ἔστιν; The subject of ἤγιαίνους is attracted forwards to δῆλοις as its object. ὡς is quomodo, not ut, and to be taken with διατόμενοι. The two words have the same sense as τίνι διάτη. Comp. 453, C. — οὐκοῦν ἠπείρι διατερ, etc. = οὐκοῦν ποιεῖ διατατοῖς καὶ φρονεῖν ἠπείρι τούτων ἠπείρι διατερ λέγειν διατατοῖς ποιεῖ.

B. οὐτως ἔχονεν· ἐκάστη. One of a number of the in-450 stances of asyndeton which occur in this dialogue. Some are owing to earnestness of feeling (449, Α, ἄπειρος... ἀπεκρίνω); some heighten the effect of contrast by bringing clauses closely together (503, Ε, τοὺς ἡγράφους... τοὺς ἀλλούς), or making a word more emphatic (510, Κ); but in the greater number the second clause is added without a particle to explain the first, and, like a noun in apposition, would rather be separated than connected by a particle. Comp. Κ. § 325. — ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν. This common phrase nearly always, in this work, moderates the force of some universal word, as πᾶς, ὦδεῖς. According to Lobeck (para-
lipom. Gram. Græc. 59), εἴπως εἴπειν occurs very often, εἴπειν εἴπως rarely. It denotes, 1. ut ita dicam, as here; 2. speaking inaccurately, the opposite of ἀκριβέα λέγει. — τῆς δὲ ἤπειρωμῆς. The sense is, But there is no such manual operation pertaining to rhetoric, but all its activity and efficiency are exercised by means of words. The Scholiast says, that χειρούργημα and κύρωσις are provincial words brought by Gorgias from his native town, Leontini. This is probably a mere random assertion, and unlikely in itself. But the use of these words, instead of χειροπηγία and κύρος, may be intended to show forth the artificial and elaborate style of Gorgias. Thucydides uses κύρωσις (Lib. 6. 103).

C. ἃρ' ὦν . . . καλεῖν; Indeed, I perceive what sort of art you wish to call it. So Ast. "Formula ἃρ' ὦν eodem modo ut ὁκ ὦν initio per interrogationem cum negatione junctam affirmat." Hermann on Soph. Antig. 628 (632). Or we need only say that ἃρα, as it often does, requires an affirmative answer. Stahlb. retains the interrogative force of ἃρα, and supposes the question to require a negative answer. Do I understand, etc., i. e. I do not understand. But μανθάνω can denote a perception that is not yet clear. Prof. Crosby remarks on this passage as follows: — "Is there not a species of anacoluthon at the beginning of this chapter? 'Do I then understand what you would call it? However, I shall soon know.' He seems to me to be first intending to ask Gorgias directly, whether the idea he obtains from his answer is the true one; but then another mode of satisfying himself occurs, and he changes the discourse abruptly." — For τῶν μὲν . . . ἐναι δὲ, comp. Soph. § 142, N. 3.

E. ὦCH ὅτι . . . εἰπεῖς, although in the expression which you make use of you so said. ὦτως refers to the succeeding subordinate clause. ὦCH ὅτι is properly elliptical for ὦ λέγω, or ὁκ ἔρω ὅτι, and sometimes, followed by ἀλλά, means not
only, or not only not. Comp. Mt. § 624. 4. — δυσχεραινεν, to be captious in the discourse or discussion.

B. εἴπομεν ἀν ... ὀντα. Complete the sentence by τίς τῶν κόρων ἔχουσῶν, I would say that it is one of those arts that exert their power with regard to (whose efficiency consists in inquiring concerning) the odd and even, how many there can be of each, i. e. that it is an art, which asks how many there are, and whose elements are odd and even numbers. γνώσει is due to a copyist, who thought the structure deficient. — ὅσπερ οἱ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ συγγραφόμενοι, as those say who draw up written motions in the meetings of the people, i. e. who offer amendments in the assembly. The clearest light has been thrown upon this phrase recently by Boeckh, in his Inscriptiones Graecae, Vol. I. No. 84. The allusion is to the formula τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καθαύπερ τῇ βουλῇ, sc. ἐδοξέω, which was used by those who, in the assembly, made amendments to the decrees or probouleumata brought down from the council. They employed the phrase to avoid the trouble of reading over those parts of the decree which they left unaltered. σύγγραμμα is so used of a clause in a decree by Ἀeschines c. Ctes. § 127 Bekker. The Scholiast, with less success, explains these words of cases where two or more bills proposed by the same person followed one another in succession. It was the custom to prefix the names of the citizen, of his father, his demus, and tribe, to his resolution. In such cases the herald, says he, to save time, would say τὰ μὲν ἄλλα κατὰ ταύτα, the same as before. But this explanation is unfortunate for several obvious reasons. Still more so is Coray's, who understands οἱ συγγραφόμενοι of public contractors.

C. διαφέρει δὲ τοσοῦτον, etc., but it differs (ἡ λογιστική) thus much: that the art of calculating considers how the odd and the even are related to themselves (i. e. odd to odd and even to even) and to each other in respect to number.
For πῶς ἐξει πλῆθους, see Soph. § 188, N.; Cr. § 363, β; K. § 274. 3. This definition of λογιστική is found again in Charmides, 166, Α. Arithmetic seems in Plato’s definition to be employed with number in general, and λογιστική to be the vulgar art of reckoning, in which numbers are considered in their relations. A later distinction in the science of number was into Arithmetic, which inquired περὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ καθ’ ἑαυτό, and Music περὶ τοῦ πρὸς ἄλλο; i. e. concerning the relations of numbers. Sometimes, as here, the former term included the whole science of number, but was used ἰδιαίτερον περὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ καθ’ ἑαυτό, more especially of numbers in themselves considered.

D. The second τι is added by Stallbaum from a conjecture of Heindorf, and seems necessary to the text. The stars denote insertion.—ἀμφισβήτησιν καὶ τοῦτο λέγεις. See Eurip. Alcest. 106, and p. 452, E, τί . . . τοῦτο λέγεις; also Cr. § 528.

E. τοῦτο τὸ σκολίον. This scolium, or table-song, is ascribed by the Scholiast to Simonides or to Epicharmus. It is often quoted, as by Athenæus at the end of his work. Comp. a fine passage, Laws 1. 631. The whole song is,—

"ιγαίνειν μὲν ἀριστον ἀνδρὶ θυατῷ,
δευτέρων δὲ καλὸν φυλὸν γενέσθαι,
τὸ τρίτον δὲ πλουτεῖν ἄδολως,
καὶ τὸ τέταρτον ἡβαῖν μετὰ τῶν φίλων."

Plato does not allude to the last line, because no trade or employment is concerned with it.

452 Α. ἱατρὸς τε . . . χρηματιστής. They are named in the order suggested by the scolium. Heindorf wished to read ὁ ἱατρὸς τε, but Buttmann observes (the remark does not appear in the second ed. of Heind.), that the article so used would denote that one person had all the attributes mentioned: ὁ τε ἱατρὸς καὶ χρηματιστής, on the contrary, would
sufficiently discriminate the persons; or, in ambiguous cases, ὅ τε λατρῶς καὶ ὁ χρηματιστής. —— εἰποι . . . ὅτι . . . ἔσπαρά. For oratio recta after ὅτι, comp. Cr. § 609, a.

B. θαυμάζομι γ' ἄν . . . εἰ σοι ἢ σοι. The reason, according to Stallb., why there is here an indic. in the protasis with an opt. in the apodosis is, that what the paedotribe says, "interlocutoris mentem potius quam ipsius opinionem respiciat." As, however, ἢ σοι ἢ σοι is, in his own opinion, only a possibility, he says θαυμάζομι ἄν. But perhaps θαυμάζομι ἄν may be considered the optative of politeness, which expresses, under the form of a possibility, something real and absolute. Comp. Kühner's largest Gr. § 817. 6. —— τέχνης depends on ἄγαθον, good pertaining to his art.

C. πάνι καταφρονῶν ὀπάντων is added in satire, to show the higher pretensions of the meanest of the three employments. Gorgias and the sophists held philosophy in like contempt, compared with the arts of show. One of the comic poets, Anaxandrides (Athenaeus, 694, F), proposes to comply with these high claims so far as to change the place of the second and third lines of the scolium. He says, "when the author of it named making money as the third best thing,"

"τοῦθ', ὅρας, ἐμαίνητο,
μετὰ τὴν ἥγειαν γὰρ τὸ πλοῦτεον διαφέρειν.
καλὸς δὲ πεινῶν ἐστὶν αἰσχρῶν βηρίου;"

—— καὶ μὴν . . . δε, and yet you see Gorgias here maintains on the contrary.

D. καὶ σι . . . αὐτοῦ. There is here a change not unknown to our language from the relative to the demonstrative construction. —— αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἄνθρώποις, i. e. the cause why the men themselves who are possessed of the art are free. αὐτοῖς is used on account of the contrast with others whom they govern. There is here a certain rhetorical col-
oring, which may be intended as an imitation of the style of Gorgias.

E. τὸ πείθειν ἐγώ ὅπ' ὁν τ' εἶναι, I certainly pronounce it, or mean by it the being able to persuade, etc.—ἐν ἀλλῳ συνλόγῳ, facile intelligas τοὺς συλλεγέτας. Stallb.—ἐν ταῦτῃ τῇ δυνάμει, i. e. when in or invested with this power.—ἀλλὰ σοὶ is added as if ἀλλῷ had not gone before. Comp. 521, D, ὦ πρὸς χάρῳ...ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, ὦ πρὸς τὸ Ἑδίστον.

453 A. τὸ κεφάλαιον εἰς τὸν τελευτά, i. e. its sum and substance, its essential quality ends in this or tends to this as its result, τὸν τοῦτο referring to πειθοῦς. τελευτάω, meaning to end, takes the preposition εἰς and adverbs of motion to a place after it, as including the previous motion, together with the end itself; = to come to an end. So ἀρχεῖν, to begin, is joined with ἀπὸ, εκ, and adverbs of motion from a place, = to start.—ἡ ἐξει...δύνασθαι. Here τι seems to be taken with δύνασθαι, and ἐπὶ πλέον is to a greater extent, plus. Comp. ταῦτα ἐπὶ πλέον εἰπεῖν, Laws, 697, C; ἐπὶ πλέον τι δύναται, Politicus 305, B. So also ἐπὶ ἔλαττον, ἐπὶ πολὺ, ἐπὶ σμικρὸν (Soph. Electr. 414), are used.

B. ἐγὼ γὰρ...τοῦτων ἡν, be assured that I, as I flatter myself,—if any other person engages in conversation with another, because he wishes to know the very nature of that about which the discourse is held, that I also, I say,—am a person of that description. It is often the case, as here, that an infinitive and its subject are introduced after ὅτι. This happens, for the most part, when a clause intervening between ὅτι and the infinitive renders the change from the grammatical construction to its equivalent one less obvious. But here there is an anacoluthon also. Owing to the change just mentioned, ἐγὼ is left by itself, and ἐμὲ takes its place.—ἐγὼ...οὐκ οἶδα. Here notice the emphatic position of ἐγὼ, the attraction of τὴν...πειθό to the main
sentence, in which οἶδα is, and the interposition of εὖ ἵσθ' ἐτι between the adverb and the verb.

C. οὖ σοῦ ἔνεκα ... λέγεται, not on your account (to draw anything further from you), but on account of the discussion, that it may go on in the way in which it can make the subject discussed most clear to us. Some authorities have ποιητί, which arose from not perceiving that ὡς here is quod modo, and not ut. See 449, E.— ὁσπερ ἄν. ἄν belongs to ἡπόμην, and is repeated on account of its distance from the verb, occasioned by the conditional clause. Comp. 447, D.— Ζεύξις. As this great painter painted for Archelaus, king of Macedon, who died in the same year with Socrates, there is here no anachronism, and Pliny's date for his entrance on his art (Olymp. 95. 4, after the death of Socrates) must be incorrect.— καὶ ποῦ. These words have given no little trouble to the interpreters, because the place where a painter's works are, which is their natural meaning, has nothing to do with the definition of his art. Ast's explanation of ποῦ as meaning where, in what thing, in regard to what (i.e. what animals and what properties of them, etc.), and Cousin's, where, on what, as canvas or stone, are hardly deserving of mention. Others suppose the text corrupt. Heind. conjectures πὼσον, for how much, and Coray, τοῦ, whose son. But how the compensation or the father of Zeuxis had anything more to do with the definition of his art than the place where he painted, they do not inform us. Stallb., after Routh, would read πῶς, which makes good sense, though it departs too much from the letters of the actual text. I conjecture (that I likewise may contribute my mite) that the sentence originally ended at γράφων; which, indeed, may be argued from the fact, that Plato afterwards only alludes to τὰ ζώα. To this τὰ ποῖα τῶν ζώων, and ἄλλα πολλὰ ζώα, point; and no other definition of the art of Zeuxis is hinted at. Next to γράφων
came Ἡ οὖ, ὙΟΥ, which was corrupted into ΠΟΥ; and then καὶ was added to bring τοῦ into grammatical connection with the sentence. For the confusion of Ἡ and Π in the MSS., Bast’s Epist. Palæograph. in Schaefer’s Gregory Corinth., p. 716, may be consulted. A similar corruption of Ἡ οὖ into τοῦ, in Repub. 437, D, is removed in modern editions.

D. καλῶς ἄν σοι ἀπεκεκρίτο; would your answer have been a good one? This verb, like several other deponents, is used both actively and passively, — a usage almost confined to the perfect, pluperfect, and aorist. Comp. Soph. § 208, N. 2; K. § 252; Cr. § 564. — οὖ δῆτα denies the latter part of the alternative, οὐ πείθει.

454 A. τὸν λέγοντα, him who makes this assertion, that rhetoric is the art of persuasion.

B, C. ταῦτας ... τῆς πειθοῦς λέγω, sc. τῆν ῥητορικὴν τέχνην εἶναι. — ἄλλ' ἵνα μὴ θαυμάζῃς, etc. The form of this sentence changes a little as it proceeds. ὅπερ γὰρ λέγω is written as if μὴ θαύμαζε had gone before. The proper apodosis of ἵνα ... θαυμάζῃς is τοῦ ἐξῆς ... ἐφοσῶ, but the connection is broken up by γὰρ in ὅπερ γὰρ λέγω. The sense of ὅπερ ... λέγω is, for as I say (i. e. as I was just saying, 453, C), I put the inquiry that the discourse may be finished in due order, — not on your account, but that we may not be in the habit of too soon catching up each other’s words on mere suspicion (of what they mean, and without giving one another time for explanation). With προορισμένω ... τὰ λεγόμενα, comp. Herodot. 9. 91, ὁ δὲ ἵππαρπάσας τὸν ἐπιλογοιν λόγον.

E. βούλει ... δῶμεν like visne videamus, volo hoc contin- gat. Soph. § 219. 3, last ed.; Cr. § 611. 3; K. § 259. 1. 6.

455 A. πιστεύων, productive of belief. — διδασκαλικής, able to impart instruction or knowledge, i. e. knowledge founded upon absolute, unchangeable principles.— ἄλλα πιστικὸς
μόνον, able to cause belief and nothing more (aiming at conviction, and not at truth). This word has been altered into πειστικός by Stephens, Heindorf, Coray, and Buttmann; and some MSS. favor the change. Bekker, Stallb., and Ast, with reason, retain πιστικός. For, as is shown by Ast at great length, πειστικός denotes (having relation to, having to do with, i.e.) able to produce πειθώ, and is the more general word, and not necessarily opposed to διδασκαλικός; while πιστικός means able to produce πίστιν, which has just been contrasted with ἐπιστήμην (454, D). Again, as to the form of the word,—which, according to Buttmann, cannot analogically be derived from πίστις,—Ast observes that adjectives in -ικός are freely derived, not only from verbs, but also from nouns (ἀρχή, ἀρχικός), adjectives (φίλος, φιλικός), and imaginary forms (νομοθετικός from νομοθετής). What objection, then, is there to regarding πιστός, or πίστις (comp. φύσις, φυσικός, φύσις, φθυσικός), as the source of πιστικός? However derived, such words may take a genitive. But here there is no necessity of supplying a genitive with πιστικός.

B. ἵδωμεν τί ποτὲ καὶ λέγομεν. The force of καί in such a case, before a verb, seems to me to correspond with that of even. Let us see what we are even saying, where an emphasis is thrown on the verb; = what we can mean. A few MSS. have λέγομεν, which gives the inapposite sense of let us see what we shall say. — περὶ ἱατρῶν αἱρείσεως. "The ancient states maintained public physicians at a salary; and Hippocrates is said to have been so employed at Athens. Such physicians had assistants, especially slaves, who practised among the poorer sort of people. The famous Demo- cedes of Croton, about Olymp. 60, although as yet little money was in circulation, received the large salary of thirty-six Αἰγινητικά minæ or an Attic talent of silver ($1,017). When he was called to Athens, he received one hundred minæ
(§1,692), until Polycrates, tyrant of Samos, engaged his services for two talents (§2,034)."—Boeckh’s Civil Econ. of Athens, I. § 21. — ἄλλο τι η (literally, is there anything else than, is it not true) is a very common formula in Plato, meaning no more than nonne. Very often ἄλλο τι, without η, is found in the same sense at the beginning of a sentence; and Bekker always prefers it to ἄλλο τι η. According to Hermann on Viger, note 110, when the latter is used, the interrogation extends to the end of the sentence; but when ἄλλο τι, it stops with those words. — αἰρεῖσθαι is in the middle. — After η νεορίων, supply συμβουλεύει στρατηγικός. And, just below, a similar clause, which is to be supplied in thought before ἄλλ’ οτι στρατηγικοί, is afterwards in part expressed. — A passage precisely like this occurs in Protag. 319, B.

C. τὸ σὸν σπείδειν, tuis rebus studere. See 458, B, note. — τῶν σχεδῶν καὶ συχνῶς. tuis includes many and few, as the more generic word (Wyettenbach on Phædo, p. 116), and therefore πολλοί, ὀλέγοι, and similar words, often follow to define it. Here καὶ, on account of the position of σχεδῶν, seems to me not to be and, but even. The sense is, some, almost even many, i. e. some, indeed even quite a number.

D. αὐτὸς ... καλῶς ὑπηγήσω, for you yourself have admirably led the way, i. e. in speaking about the docks, etc., just now you suggested a good answer.

E. τὰ δ’ ἐκ τῆς Περικλείουσ. τὰ δὲ is used as if τὰ μὲν had preceded: and partly through that of Pericles.— ἐκ τῶν δημοσφηγῶν, through the advice of the artificers. Heind. and Buttmann wish to read τῆς δημοσφηγών. But there is no need of this, because a man effects what his advice effects; and such brevity is common in Greek. Thus, in Alcibiad. I. 135, E, cited by Ast, we have πελαργοῦ ἄρα ὃ ἐμὸς ἔρως οὐδὲν διώσει, my love then will not differ
from a stork, i. e. from a stork’s love; and in Repub. 375, Λ, we have οἷς τι διαφέρειν φύσιν γενναίον σκύλακος εἰς φυλακήν (in respect to keeping guard) νεανίσκου εὐγενοῦς; Comp. Soph. § 186, N. 1. — τοῦ διὰ μέσου τείχους. According to Colonel Leake (Topography of Athens, 354 - 357), this expression denotes both the long walls, which, as he supposes, reached from Athens to Piræus and Port Phalerum; so named as being between the city and the seaports, and also called τείχος in the singular, as forming a sort of fortification. Plutarch (Vita Pericl. § 13) alluding to this passage, interprets the words — perhaps carelessly — by τὸ μακρὸν τείχος, and thus sanctions Leake’s view. But Harpocration, s. v. διὰ μέσου τείχους, explains the phrase of the southern of the two long walls, so styled as being between the northern and the Phaleric wall; and this southern wall it is, says he, which Plato mentions in Gorgias. This is so confirmed by Thucyd. 2. 13, — who speaks of a Phaleric wall reaching to the city, and also of the long walls reaching, both of them, from the city to Piræus, the outer or northern one of which was guarded, — that it is not easy to see how the opinion of Leake can stand. See the commentators on Thucyd. i. e., especially Dr. Arnold. Now this inner or southern leg of the long walls, τὸ μακρὸν τείχος τὸ νότιον (Æschin. de Fals. Leg. § 174, Bekker), was built after the thirty years’ peace with Sparta, i. e. after B. C. 445, when Pericles began to be at the head of affairs, and when Socrates was over twenty years old.

A. οἱ νικῶντες τὰς γνώμας, Soph. § 164, N. 2; K. § 278. 456 2; Cr. § 433. — πᾶλαι ἐρωτῶ. πᾶλαι is very often found with the present of an action begun in the past and still continued. — Join τὸ μέγεθος with διαμονία, as the accus. of specification. — εἰ πάντα γε εἰδείησ. The apodosis must be something like διαμονία ἄν καταφαίνοιτα, which is pointed at by γε.
B. \(\mu\varepsilon\tau\alpha\ \tau\omicron\omicron\upsilon\ \delta\epsilon\lambda\phi\omicron\upsilon\). See 448, B.—\(\eta\ \tau\epsilon\mu\epsilon\iota\nu\ \eta\ \kappa\alpha\omega\sigma\iota\), etc., to put himself into the physician's hands, to be cut or cauterized. A heated iron was applied to the wound for the purpose of stanching blood by the \(i\alpha\tau\rho\omicron\), who, as Routh observes, exercised both the medical and the surgical arts. \(\pi\alpha\alpha\sigma\chi\epsilon\iota\nu\), sc. \(\epsilon\alpha\upsilon\tau\eta\nu\); comp. 475, D. For \(\tau\epsilon\mu\epsilon\iota\nu\), \(\kappa\alpha\omega\sigma\iota\), see Soph. § 219. 2; Cr. § 621. \(\beta\). An infinitive so used, if it have the direct object of the leading verb for its subject, is in the passive, but otherwise in the active.

C. \(\omicron\upsilon\delta\alpha\mu\omicron\upsilon\ldots\phi\alpha\nu\iota\nu\alpha\iota\), would be of no account. Comp. Soph. 'Antig. 183, \(\tau\omicron\omicron\upsilon\ \omicron\upsilon\delta\alpha\mu\omicron\upsilon\ \lambda\iota\gamma\omega\); Xen. Memorab. 1. 2. 52, \(\mu\nu\delta\alpha\mu\omicron\upsilon\ \epsilon\iota\alpha\iota\), to be nowhere, in no estimation.—\(\epsilon\iota\ \beta\omicron\omicron\upsilon\omicron\upsigma\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\upsilon\) is elegantly added, says Stallb., to denote the arrogance and pretension of Gorgias, — if he chose to give himself the trouble.

D. \(\zeta\mu\alpha\theta\epsilon\), sc. \(\tau\iota\iota\iota\). Soph. § 157, N. 8; K. § 238, R. 3; Cr. § 516. This omission of the indefinite subject \(\tau\iota\iota\iota\) is common in this dialogue, as is also the transition from a singular verb to a plural, or the contrary, where the subject is an indefinite one.—\(\epsilon\iota\ \partial\pi\lambda\omicron\upsilon\ \mu\acute{a}\chi\epsilon\sigma\theta\omicron\upsilon\) dicuntur qui veris armis certare discunt. Nam vulgo juventus non veris armis se exercebat sed rudibus, aut pilis præpilatis, quæ dicuntur Græcis \(\epsilon\sigma\varphi\alpha\rho\omicron\mu\acute{e}\iota\nu\ \acute{a}\kappa\omicron\upsilon\tau\iota\upsilon\) [i. e. with a ball covering the point]. Quæ sunt verba Casauboni ad Theophrast. Charact. p. 79, ed. Fischer. Stallb.

E. \(\epsilon\kappa\epsilon\iota\nu\ \mu\epsilon\nu\ \gamma\dot{\alpha}p\), etc., for they intrusted (them to their scholars) for the purpose of using them aright against their foes, and those who wrong them, in defending themselves, not in beginning an assault. \(\tau\omicron\omicron\upsilon\upsilon\) refers to the means of defence used in the arts just named. The subject of \(\chi\rho\eta\omicron\sigma\theta\alpha\upsilon\) is to be gathered from the context, viz. such persons as learn to box, and beat their friends. The forms of \(i\tau\alpha\rho\chi\epsilon\iota\nu\), and those of \(\acute{a}m\upsilon\nu\omega\omicron\alpha\iota\), are often contrasted, in the senses of acting on the offensive and defensive.—\(\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\)
στρέψαντες, turning round, i. e. on the contrary. Comp. μεταβαλὼν, 480, E.

A. ἐμβραχύ, in short, is taken with περὶ ὅτου ἄν βουληταί, 457 to show that that phrase comprises all that can be said, or is used in its widest sense. Its force is like that of omnino.

B. καὶ τῇ ὑπορικῇ . . . ὥσπερ καί. For καί, in each member of the sentence, comp. the note on Electr. 1301, where it is said that καί often stands after words of comparison to show connection, without any force that can be given in English. See also 458, A, at the beginning. — κατά. Post participia, καί εἶτα, καὶ ἑπειτα inferuntur, ubi εἶτα et ἑπειτα expectes. Stallb. A frequent idiom.

C. δύνανται, sc. οἱ λέγοντες, implied in τῶν λόγων; or, more exactly, the subject is indefinite, and plural, because the action of conversing requires more than one. — οὕτω repeats and recalls the participles. Join διαλύεσθαι to δύνανται.

D. μὴ σαφῶς, i. e. μὴ φύ (deny) τὸν ἔπερον σαφῶς λέγεω. — καὶ κατὰ φθόνον, etc., and they think that they are (i. e. each thinks that the other is) speaking out of envy, or with ill feelings towards each other, having a contentious spirit, and not seeking after that which was proposed in the discussion. For ἔντον = ἀλλήλων, Soph. § 145, N. 2; K. § 302. 7; Cr. § 507. 7. — τελευτώτες, Cr. § 457. a; K. § 312, R. 3. — οἷα καί, etc., so that even the by-standers feel vexed for themselves, because they consented to be listeners to such people. The infinitive follows οἷα here, as it so often does ὡστε.

E. διελέγχεω, to go on, or through with a refutation of. διὰ has the same force in διερωτήν below. In the next words, the sense is, Lest you should suppose that I speak with my zeal for debate not directed towards the subject, that it may become plain, but against you. For τοῦ γενέσθαι, comp. Soph. § 187. 1; K. § 308. 2. (b); Cr. § 372.
With genitives in this relation of the motive, ἐνεκά is often found.

458 A. τῶν ἡδίως ... ἄν ἐλεγχθέντων = τούτων οἷ ἡδίως ἄν ἐλεγχθεῖν. K. § 260. 2. (5); Cr. § 615. 2. Comp. Euthyphro 3, D, where Socrates says, that he converses, not only without taking pay for it, ἄλλα καὶ προστιθέειν ἄν ἡδίως, sc. μισθῶν, but even with a willingness to give pay, if any one is disposed to hear him. Here προστιθέειν without ἄν would mean, that he actually paid his listeners. — Just below, for εἰ τι μὴ ἀληθές λέγω, we should expect εἰ τι ... λέγοιεν, or, with the transition to the first person, λέγομι, parallel to the succeeding λέγαι. The reason for using λέγω seems to be that given by Stallb., which Ast opposes: that Socrates, in speaking of himself, denotes the probability of his being in an error by εἰ with an indicative; but only the possibility of error on the part of another by εἰ and an optative. — αὐτῶν ἀπαλαγήναι. Comp. for αὐτὸν emphatic (the word with which it agrees being omitted), 447, C, οὐδὲν οἶνον αὐτὸν ἐρωτάν.

B. ὅσον δόξα ψευδῆς. Græci in hujusmodi comparationibus modo casus præcedenti nominis accommodant, modo nominativum ponunt, intellecto verbo superiore. Stallb. Comp. Repub. 334, B, τούτῳ μέντοι ἐρωτεῖ δοκεῖ ἐτι, ὥφελεν μὲν τοὺς φίλους ἡ δικαιοσύνη, where τὴν δικαιοσύνην would have been more common. See Cr. § 655. 4. — τὸ τῶν παρόντων, the interests or feelings of the present company. And so τὸ τούτων, just below; τὸ σὸν σπεύδουσαν ἁμα, καὶ τοῦ μοῦ αὐτῆς, Soph. Electr. 251. Such formulae are sometimes little more than circumlocutions for the pronoun. Comp. τὸ γ' ἐμὼν, 458, D. — The Schol. thinks that Gorgias is here finding an excuse to break off. But probably nothing more than polite attention to the wishes of the auditors is intended. Gorgias is uniformly polite to Socrates, and willing to continue the discourse. Comp. 497, B, 506, A.
C. πορρώ ἀποτενοῦμεν, we shall extend too far, be too prolix. The verb is here used without an object, or, if anything is understood, it is ἤμασ aιτοῦς, rather than τὸν λόγον. — ἐμοὶ δ' οὖν, etc., and as for that (οὖν), may I myself also never have so much business, that leaving a conversation such as this, and so carried on (i. e. on a subject of such importance, and so interesting), it may be of more importance for me to do anything else.

D. τὸ ἐμὸν is the subject of κωλύει. — τὸ λοιπόν, after this, i. e since all the others wish that the debate should continue. — καὶ ταῦτα, etc., and that too (i. e. and especially) when I myself announced, that whatever questions any one wishes to put he may do so.

A. ἔλεγης τοι νῦν δῆ, you were saying certainly just now. 459 I have written τοι νῦν δῆ for τοῖν νῦν δῆ, at Bekker's suggestion, on account of the sense. — τὸ ἐν ὦχλῷ τοῦτο, this expression ἐν ὦχλῳ. This is the subject of ἐστὶν, and the remaining words the predicate. — ἐν τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσιν. Compare the negative μὴ here, and in ὥ μὴ ἰατρός, with οὐ in ὥ οὐκ εἰδόσ, ἐν τοῖς οὐκ εἰδόσιν, just below. In the first two cases, the negation is general and indefinite: "before such as do not know, whoever they are," "he who is no physician, supposing such a person to exist." In the other two cases, the negation being made concerning something definite and particular (the orator and the crowd), οὐ is properly used.

B. ἐνταῦθα, i. e. in the case of the art of medicine.

C. ῥαστωνη, saving of trouble, convenience. — ἔαν τι ἤµιν πρὸς λόγον ἦ, if it come at all within the scope of our discourse. πρὸς, (literally,) on the side of, in favor of, to the advantage of.

D. οὐτως εὔχων. This clause is afterwards defined by αὑτὰ μὲν οὐκ εἰδόσ.

A. ἄσπερ ἀρτη εἴπες. See 455, D. —— οἴμαι is paren-
thetical: hence μαθησεται follows, and not μαθησεσθαι. — ἐξε δὴ, as Ast says, is a formula of exhorting, like ὑε γῆ; as Heindorf, a "formula subsistendi et inhibendi," = ἐξε σεαυτῶν; as Stallb., after Hermann, one of admonishing another to remember something, and perceive its results, = ἐξε τοῦτο. Its use, here, at least, consists in drawing attention, in causing one to stop and consider something, especially some objection derived from what had been said.

B. τάλλα οὖτω, sc. ἐξει. — κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, after the same form of speech, after the same analogy. The next words, being explicative of this clause, are without a connecting particle.

C. The words here inclosed in brackets are so injurious to the sense, that there can be little doubt, I think, of their being interpolations. The reasoning is this: He who has learned justice is just. The just does justly. Therefore he wills or prefers to do justly. Therefore he never will prefer to do unjustly. The orator, if taught justice by Gorgias, is just, and therefore will never will or prefer to do unjustly. For this passage, consult the Introduction. — ἐκ τοῦ λόγου, from what has been said; as follows from the argument. These words show that Socrates begins here to apply what has been conceded to the case of the rhetorician, which is proof that the words in brackets are indefensible.

D. ἐκθάλλειν, sc. αὐτοῦς, and so with ἐξελαύνειν, just below. When the same noun follows two verbs, or a participle and a verb, in different cases, the Greeks content themselves usually with expressing it once. Comp. Mt. § 428. 2. — ὀσοντως οὖτω, in the selfsame way. These adverbs answer, as Coray observes, to ὁ αὐτῶς οὖτος.

E. φαίνεται ... οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἄδικήσως, appears incapable of ever doing injustice, = φαίνεται ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἄδικήσει. F. A. Wolf, on Demosth. c. Leptin. (p. 468, ed. Reiske),
lays down the rule, that φαίνομαι with an infin. = videor, but with a particip. palam sum. —— δ’ γ’...ποιεῖται, since it is always discoursing. For the use of the relative, comp. note on 488, D. Here δ, which refers to ή ρητορική, is put in the gender of the predicate πρᾶγμα, by attraction. Comp. 463, E.

A. εἰπον ... ὅτι ... ἄξιον εἶη. Here ἄν is not used, because the sense is, I said that it was worth while. With ἄν the sense would be, I said that it would be worth while. The first is a direct assertion, in oratio obliqua; the second a hypothetical one, in the same form. And so just above, 460, E, ἔλεγετο ὅτι ή ρητορική ... εἶη, that rhetoric was, but ἐπέλαβον ὡς οἰδίποτ’ ἄν εἶη, that it never could be.

B. μὰ τὸν κῦνα. A very common oath in the mouth of Socrates, concerning which much has been written. In 482, B, we have μὰ τὸν κῦνα, τὸν Λιγυπτίων θεόν, i. e. “la-trator Anubis,” which is either a comic addition to the original formula, μὰ τὸν κῦνα, or else shows the oath to be of Egyptian origin. Mr. Mitchell (Aristoph. Wasps, Appendix, Note D) is of the latter opinion. We refer those who wish to pursue this point further to the Comment. and the Scholl. on that play, v. 83, Solanus on Lucian’s Vit. Auct. (Vol. III. p. 520, ed. Lehm.), and Coray on this place. The ancients thought that such oaths were introduced by Rhadamanthus, to avoid swearing by a divinity on a common occasion. Zeno, the Stoic, in imitation of Socrates, swore by the caper-bush. —— ὃδ’ ἐλίγγης συνονομασ, haud exigui est sermonis. —— καὶ ... δοξάζεις. According to Ast, καὶ affects δοξάζεις, being a little out of its place. Do you even or really think? —— ἡ ὁτει ... ἐρωτήματα. A passage of considerable difficulty, which seems to be best explained by regarding the sentence, with Schleierm., as a broken one; which is indicated in this edition by a dash after διδάξειν. Polus is so eager, that he cannot end his
sentence grammatically, but must make a rhetorical exhibition of his feelings. The sense is, Or do you think, because Gorgias was ashamed not to admit, both that the orator must understand the just, beautiful, and good; and that he himself would give instruction in these subjects, if one should come to him (to study oratory) ignorant of them; then, perhaps, from this admission, an inconsistency arose in the discussion, to wit (ὁδ' τι) the very thing which you take satisfaction in, though you yourself led the way to such questions (i.e. though you alone, by your artful questions, are to blame for the inconsistency). For the first sentence, Schleierm. supplies a close from τοῦθ' ὁ δὴ ἀγαθὸς, as if Polus had at first meant to say, "Or do you think, because Gorgias," etc. . . . "to find your pleasure therein." But perhaps some other close of more emphasis may be gathered from the context, such as, ("do you think, because Gorgias, through shame, made certain admissions,) that therefore his inconsistency is to be charged to rhetoric." The other attempts to explain this sentence which I have seen are, — 1. Ast's, who gives to ὅτι the sense of ἐνιότειτις, and supplies ὅτι. Or do you think so because, etc. 2. Stallb., in his first ed., translates thus: an putas Gorgian præ pudore negasse, etc. But this perverts the sense. Comp. 482, C, D, where the passage is alluded to and in part explained. He also ends the sentence beginning with ἡ ὅτι at τετερα,—a strange and flat close to the period. 3. In his second edition, where he blames Ast for his "mira commenta," deserting his former view, he continues the sense in an unbroken period, and treats ὅτι as though it did not affect the structure. The sense then becomes, because Gorgias was ashamed to deny, etc. . . . did therefore, do you suppose, from this admission an inconsistency arise, etc.? But an inconsistency did arise, for the very reason contained in the words ὅτι ἀγαθοῖς, etc. This is evident from
The words of Polus then become unmeaning.—

μὴ προσωμολογήσαι . . . μὴ οὐχί. μὴ οὐ sometimes, as here, follows a simply negative expression, = quin before a sub-junctive. But more usually it follows a verb of negative import, when οὐ precedes such a verb. Thus ἀπαρνοῦμαι μὴ ἐπίστασθαι, I deny that I know, but οὐκ ἀπαρνοῦμαι μὴ οὐκ ἐπίστασθαι, I do not deny that I know. An analogous formula to this latter is found just below, 461, C, — τίνα οἶει ἀπαρνήσεσθαι μὴ οὐχί καὶ αὐτῶν ἐπίστασθαι,—where the interrog. implies a negative.

D. ἐπανορθοῦτε. Most of the MSS. have the opt. here in lieu of the subj. after a present in the principal clause. The reasons given for the opt. in the present case by Stallb. and Ast are scarcely sufficient.—δίκαιος δ’ εἴ, and it is right for you so to do. For δίκαιος, see Mt. § 297; K. § 307, R. 6; Cr. § 551. It is for δίκαιον ἐστὶ σε, etc., owing to the cause explained in the note on 448, D.—ἀναθέσθαι, to retract, properly, to put a piece over again, to change a move in playing draughts. Comp. Xen. Memorab. 2. 4. 4. Cicero, in a frag. of his Hortensius, says, “Itaque tibi concedo, quod in duodecim scriptis sollemus, ut calculus reducas, si te alicujus dicti pœnitet,” borrowing his figure perhaps from Plato. The subject of ἀναθέσθαι Ast takes to be σε understood. “Quod fieri non posse manifestum est,” says Stallb. But such cases are possible, and we believe Ast to be right. Here, σοι δοκεῖ, just before, and δ’ τι ἀν σῦ βούλη, just after, almost forbid us to supply με. A stronger case occurs Theæt. 151, C: “For many feel so towards me, as positively to be ready to bite me, when I strip them of some folly of theirs,” — καὶ οὐκ οἶονται εἶνοι τοῦτο ποιεῖν, i. e. that I do this. (Such is the MS. reading.) ——φιλάττης, if you will only observe one thing. The middle, if you will guard against, might stand here.
E. ὅ... λέγειν, where of all Greece there is the greatest liberty of speech, Ἑλλάδος being a genitive partitive. — ἀντίθεσεν, put over against it, sc. this, viz. σοῦ μακρὰ λέγοντος, etc. For this latter passage, compare Aristoph. Acharn. § 303, σοῦ δ᾽ ἐγὼ λόγους λέγοντος οὐκ ἀκούσμαται μακρούς. — ταῖ, though.

462 B. νῦν δὴ, nunc igitur. — ἐν τῷ συγγράμματι. Aristotle (Metaphys. init.) refers to this treatise, or to the words of Polus of like import on 448, C, and approves of his opinion making experience the foundation of art.

C. οὐκόνων καλῶν... ἀνθρώπων; does not rhetoric, then, namely, to have the faculty of giving pleasure to men, seem to you to be a good thing? The last clause of the sentence explains, and is in apposition with, ἡ ῥητορική. οἶνον τὲ εἶναι = τινα οἶνον τalleries.

D. βούλεις ὅν, etc., are you willing, then, since you prize giving pleasure, to give me a little pleasure? For the play on χαρίσμαι (which itself playfully alludes to χάριτος τίνος καὶ ἧδονῆς, just above), comp. 516, B. In this sentence, the present infinitive denotes the habit of Polus; χαρίσαισθαι, that which Socrates wishes him to do in this instance.

E. τίνος λέγεις ταύτης; Comp. 449, E, note on ποιόν τούτον. — μὴ ἀγροικότερον γὰρ, I fear that it may seem too rude. For διδωκα omitted, comp. Soph. § 214, N. 4; Cr. § 602. 2. The comparative, which here denotes a lower degree of the quality than the positive, is usual in such apologies.

463 A. δοκεῖ τοῖσιν μοὶ... ἀνθρώποις, it seems to me, then, to be a sort of study, that has not indeed the properties of an art, but which belongs to a mind dexterous in attaining its ends, and manly, and possessed of a natural talent to communicate with men.

B. ὡς δὲ ὁ ἔμος λόγος, etc., yet, as I maintain, is not an art but experience, or a routine and practice, i. e. has
nothing to do with absolute truth and reason, but proceeds from accidental discovery that a certain end is gained by certain means. — κομμωτική differ a κοσμητική qua honestus ornatus quaeritur. Stallb.

C. τέταρτα . . . πράγματα, four divisions these (of flattery or the art of show) relating to four matters or subjects. These four subjects, according to Coray and Stallb., are words, food, the ornamenting of the body, and philosophical disquisitions. — ἀποκριμένος. Comp. 453, D, note. — πρίν ἄν . . . ἀποκρινόμαι. With πρίν “subjunctivum non usurpant tragici, nisi in priore membro adsit negandi aut prohibendi significatio.” Elmsley on Medea, 215. In which case ἄν accompanies πρίν, with some exceptions almost confined to poetry, and the subjunctive aorist has the sense of the exact future of Latin; e. g. here priusquam respondero. For the reason why the subjunctive follows πρίν, see Mt. § 522, C.; K. § 337. 9. b.

D. ἀποκριμένου, sc. μου. Comp. 461, D, note. — πολιτικής μορίαν εἰδωλον, a shadow or semblance of a division of the political art, “civilitatis particularis simulacrum,” as translated by Quintil. 2. 15. 25, where this passage is examined.

E. Πόλος δὲ δέ. There is here, probably, an allusion to the meaning of the name colt, as Schleierm. remarks. For another pun on the name of Polus, comp. Aristot. Rhet. 2. 23: ὡς Κόνων Ὑρασύβουλον “Ὑρασύβουλον” ἐκάλει, καὶ Ὑράδικος (of Selymbria, comp. 448, B, note) Ὑρασύμαχον, “αἱ Ὑρασύμαχος ἐί,” καὶ Πόλον, “αἱ Ὡ σὺ πόλος ἐί,” καὶ Δράκοντα τὸν νησιφέτην, ὅτι σὺν ἄνθρώπου οἱ νόμοι ἀλλὰ δράκοντος. — In τυγχάνει ἄν τούτο, the predicate τούτο determines the gender of ἄν by attraction, instead of ἰητορική, to which it refers. Comp. 460, E.

A. οἷον τοῦτον λέγω, for instance I mean as follows, literally, “cf which sort I mention such a thing as this, viz.”
This, with or without the article before τοιοῦνδε, is a common formula in Plato, when examples are adduced. — τὰ σώματα is the accus. of specification.

B. ἔχει δὲ σωθῆν μᾶλλον, i. e. εὖ. The subject of ἔχει is supplied by the preceding accusatives, σῶμα and ψυχήν. But, or, while yet they (soul and body) are none the more in a good condition. Another construction also is possible: ὅτι ποιεῖ (τινα) δοκεῖν μὲν εὖ ἔχειν (κατὰ) τὸ σῶμα . . . ἔχει δὲ, while he is none the more in a good condition. — τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ σώματι, etc., but the art for the body I am not able to name to you off-hand by one name. σῶμα and ψυχή freely take and lose the article (comp. 465, D). They lose it, perhaps, as approaching the nature of abstract nouns. In 463, E, they could not have it. μιὰν is the predicate-accusative. οὖν, thus, in these present circumstances, is often equivalent to illico. Comp. 509, A. — τῆς δὲ πολιτικῆς, etc. Here λέγω is to be supplied in thought, and τῆς πολιτικῆς depends on τὴν νομοθετικὴν, its part. The sense is, And of the political art I mention (one branch) the legislative as the counterpart to the gymnastic art, and (the other) justice as the counterpart to medicine. The political art, or the general art of securing the public good, has two divisions, first, that which consists in securing the moral welfare by law, which prescribes what is right, and according to which the public health will be preserved; and, secondly, that which restores this health when once impaired, or justice, the judge's art. (See Introduction.) Analogous to these arts for the soul are, for the body, gymnastics, or the art of preserving, and medicine, or that of restoring health. Plato elsewhere insists on the analogy between the healing art and justice, e. g. in Republic. 444, C, — a fine passage, where, however, justice is taken in the higher sense of that controlling virtue, which brings all the parts of the soul, like those of a well-regulated state, into their due place and order.
C. πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, with a view to the greatest good.
— ὃν γροῦσα λέγω ἀλλὰ στοχασμένη. As αἰσθομένη is a general word denoting mental perceptions, whencesoever derived, it is explained by this clause, not guided by knowledge, I would have you understand, but by guess. Comp. 463, A. — ὑποδίσα ὑπὸ ἔκαστον, having slipped under, or by stealth put on the garb of each of the four divisions.

D. θηρέωται τὴν ἄνων, hunts for, seeks to captivate ignorance, or the unwary. — τῷ . . . δει ἡδίστο, by that which is at the time the most agreeable.

A. τοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς σὲ λέγω alludes to 463, D, where Plato puts the question concerning the quality of rhetoric. Comp. 448, C—E. — ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει λόγον οὐδένα ἀ προσφέρει, because it cannot explain what sort of things those are in their nature, which it makes use of. Here we see what Plato thought that a τεχνη must be. The MSS. give, almost unanimously, ὃ προσφέρει ἀ προσφέρει, and the editors, without MS. authority, ὅν προσφέρει. I have restored a part of the MS. reading, and have since observed that Stallb., in his second edition, has made the same change. — ὑποσχεῖν λόγον, to submit the reason, or rationale, to explain and defend a position.

B. ὑπόκειται, puts itself under, puts on the form or mask of, = ὑποδίνει above. — ὅστε ποιεῖν . . . ἀμελεῖν, so as to make men attach to themselves adventitious beauty, and neglect their own, obtained through the gymnastic art.

C. ὅπερ μέντοι λέγω. In the ensuing words, down to ὕφοποικῶν, the thoughts seem to be only half expressed, as if Socrates, anxious to avoid a long speech, were hastening to an end. Some editors suppose that the text has sustained an injury, but, as I think, without reason. Such, says Socrates, are these arts in their nature; but in practice the Sophists’ art and rhetoric are confounded together;
and the like would be true of cookery and medicine, if the body judged of them without a presiding mind. The thoughts are not essential to the argument, and are only thrown out en passant. \( \delta \sigma \varepsilon \rho \ldots \lambda \gamma \omega \) refers to what has just preceded; but as I say, or was just saying. — \( \delta \iota \varepsilon \sigma \tau \eta \kappa \eta \).

The subject of this verb, according to Buttmann in Heindorf's edition, is all the arts before mentioned, and \( \delta \nu \tau \omega \nu \) has the same subject, which is \( \tau \alpha \nu \tau \alpha \) understood, referring to these arts. Stallb. restricts \( \delta \iota \varepsilon \sigma \tau \eta \kappa \eta \), with reason, I think, in his first edition, to \( \sigma \sigma \phi \iota \sigma \tau \iota \kappa \eta \) καὶ \( \rho \eta \tau \omicron \rho \omicron \). \( \delta \nu \tau \omega \nu \) may be used instead of \( \delta \nu \tau \varepsilon \), referring to \( \sigma \sigma \phi \iota \sigma \tau \tau \alpha \) καὶ \( \rho \eta \tau \omicron \rho \omicron \), next following. A participle is sometimes found in the genitive absolute, when its subject is the same as that of the verb; the cause of which seems to be a desire of the writer to express the thought contained in the participle more distinctly. The grammatical construction is caused by Plato's passing in thought from the arts to those who pursue them. — \( \delta \tau e \ \delta \epsilon \gamma \gamma \upsilon \delta \nu \tau \omega \nu \), but, inasmuch as they are conterminous arts, sophists and orators are (mixed together in the same place and about the same things, i. e. are) confounded together, and indiscriminately give themselves to the same pursuit, and they know not what to make of themselves, nor their fellow-men of them (i. e. neither they nor others have any exact idea of their so-called arts).

For the thought, comp. 520, \( \Lambda \); ταυτών, \( \delta \mu \alpha \kappa \alpha \rho \iota \epsilon \), \( \epsilon \sigma \tau i \) σοφιστής καὶ \( \rho \nu \tau \omicron \rho \omicron \), \( \iota \epsilon \gamma \gamma \upsilon \iota \) καὶ \( \pi \alpha \rphi \alpha \iota \phi \lambda \xi \iota \sigma \iota \), \( \delta \omega \sigma \tau e r \epsilon \gamma \omega \) \( \epsilon \lambda \gamma \eta \upsilon \) \( \pi \rho \delta \) Πάλου.

D. το τοῦ 'Αναξαγόρου ἀν πολὺ ἕν, what the well-known (τοῦ) Anaxagoras said (his tenet) would hold extensively (in regard to these arts). For the uses of the article, see Soph. § 176, and § 139, N. 1; Cr. §§ 477. a, 479. Anaxagoras taught that all things were in a chaos at first; then came mind, and arranged them. In other words, he ascribed to an intelligent author, not creation, nor motion and
quality, but only arrangement; which was, however, a step beyond the earlier Ionic philosophers, who accounted for all phenomena by the physical properties of matter. — *συ γὰρ τούτων ἐμπειρος.* The Schol. of the Clarke MS. supposes these words to allude to the rhetorical figure called *παρίσωσις,* which takes place when similar words, as *φιλε Πολε* here, are brought together. Another Schol. explains them of the acquaintance of Polus with the philosophy of Anaxagoras,—to which sect, says he, Polus belonged,—a piece of information probably picked out of the text. Perhaps nothing more than ironical praise of Polus for great knowledge is intended. Comp. 462, A.

E. *ὡς εἷκενο εὖ σώματι, sc. ἀντίστροφον ἔστι τῆς ῥήτορικῆς.* The clause might be removed without injury to the sense. *ἀντίστροφον* here governs a genitive, but a dative, 464, B. Some other compounds of *ἀντὶ* vary in the same way as to their regimen. *εἷκενο,* referring to *ὁφοιοιας,* accommodates its gender to that of *ἀντίστροφον.*

A. Init. *If, therefore, I too, when you answer, shall not know what to make (of it), do you likewise prolong your discourse; but if I shall, let me make use of it.* The dative, which should follow *χρῆσωμαι,* is contained in *ἀποκρινόμενον.*

B. *οἶδε νομίζεσθαι, not even to be thought of, i.e. to be held in no estimation at all.* This verb, which just above has a predicate, *φαίλοις,* is here used absolutely. Our verbs *to regard, to consider,* and others, are capable of the same twofold use.

C. The colon, which most editors put after *κώνα,* ought, as it seems to me, to be erased. Comp. *μὰ τὸν Δία ... ἄλλ' 463, D, νῇ τῶν θεῶν ἄλλ' 481, C,* where the formula of swearing unites in one clause with what follows. Socrates does not answer Polus by the phrase *νῇ τὸν κώνα,* but only begins his answer in the next chapter.
E. oûdèν γὰρ ποιεῖν, etc. Comp. Repub. 9. 577, E.
"Is not the state that is enslaved and under a tyrant far from doing what it wishes? Very far. And the soul, accordingly, that is governed by a tyrant, will be very far from doing what it may wish (if we speak of the whole soul); and, drawn along forcibly by urgent lust, will be full of agitation and regret." For ως ἐπος εἰπεῖν, qualifying oûdèν, see 450, B. — ἐγὼ οὗ φημι; egone nego? — μᾶ τὸν.
The Schol. on Aristoph. Frogs, 1421, thinks that the name of the divinity is omitted out of reverence. But the omission seems intended rather for comic effect, as though the right divinity did not readily occur to the mind. — καὶ τέχνην τὴν ρήτορικὴν. Supply οὕσαν. Comp. 495, C.

A. εἰμὲ ἐξελέγξας. The aorist participle, which Heindorf declares to be used for the present, has its own force. Pohlus could come to his conclusion, when he had refuted, or by refuting. The argument may be considered as the preliminary to the conclusion, or as the means of reaching it. In the first case, the aorist is needed; the present, if used, would have the second sense. — oûdèν ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο κεκτήσωνται. By τοῦτο, he means τὸ ποιεῖν ἄ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς. — ἐξελέγγξάν ... ὦ τι. The verb is here used in sensu praegnan-ti, unless Socrates be refuted, and it be shown that, thus answering nearly to our verb convince.

B. οὔτος ἀνήρ. An instance of aposiopesis or reticentia, a figure often caused by excited feelings, which cannot find the language to express themselves. "In hac formula recte omititur articulus, quoniam dicitur δείκτικως de eo qui præ-sens est." Stallb. οὔτος contains a shade of contempt sometimes like iste. Comp. 489, B, 505, C. — καὶ γὰρ non est etenim, sed καὶ pertinet ad νῦν. Stallb.; i. e. καὶ is also. — ὑπαρχεῖσκατὰ σὲ κατὰ σὲ, that I may address you in your own style. This refers to λέοντες Πώλες, and the artificial juxtaposition of words of equal length, or of similar form or sound. Comp. 448, C, 465, D.
C. πίνουτες παρά, i. e. πίνουτες τὰ φάρμακα, λαβόντες αὐτὰ παρὰ τῶν ἱατρῶν, a constructio praegnans.

D. οἱ πλέοντες, i. e. who make voyages for commercial purposes. — ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο . . . πλουτεῖν, when a demonstrative pronoun thus prepares the way for the infinitive, the latter often loses its article. Comp. τοῦτο . . . ἐξείναι, 469, C. But, just above, we have not only τοῦτο, πίνειν, but also ἐκεῖνο, τὸ υγιαίνειν. — ἄλλο τι . . . οὕτω. Supply ἔχει. Is it not so, then, in all cases?

E. πολλὴ ἀνάγκη. The preceding question of Socrates is equivalent to a negative proposition, which is here to be supplied; see. that there is nothing which is not either good or bad, etc.

A. πράττονσι, on fait, like λέγονσι, on dit. The same 468 indefinite subject appears just before in the first person plural, βαδίζομεν, etc.

C. ἀπλῶς οὕτως, thus in themselves considered, without respect to something further.

E. ἐν τῇ πόλει ταύτῃ. Not in this city, Athens, nor does ταύτῃ denote in this way, but in this just-mentioned city, i. e. in the supposed city. If Athens had been intended, Socrates, living there, would have said, as Stallb. after Boeckh on Pindar (Not. Crit. in Olymp. 6. 102) observes, ἐν τῇ δε τῇ πόλει. Comp. this formula so used, 469, D, fin.; Leges 932, A. ὅς seems to be the strongest, and, so to speak, most objective of the demonstratives, and to point especially at that which has a close outward relation (as that of place) to the speaker. — ἔστω . . . δύνασθαι. ἔστω = sici potest. — ὡς δὴ, as forsooth, just as though. Stallb. translates these words by quasi vero, Ast by nam revera.

A. περὶ δὲν . . . τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Comp. Soph. § 151. 3; 469 K. § 332. 8; Cr. § 522.

B. καὶ ἀλεεινόν γε πρὸς· praepositioni πρὸς absolute posi-
te (praeterea) adjungi solet particula γε. Ast, = yes, and pitiable besides. — πῶς, cur. — οὕτως, ὡς, for this reason that. And so, in English, we say how is this? nearly in the sense of why is this? the reason of which is, that the manner in which a thing is done often involves the cause why it is done.

C. εἴγειναι. Supply τιν, to which αὐτῷ refers, in the next line.

D. τῷ λόγῳ is added to explain the sense in which ἐπι-λαβοῦ is used, attack in your discourse, refute by argument. δι' seems to belong to the imperative, with the usual hortatory sense. — εἰν αὐρώπι πληθοῦσα, in the agora, when it is crowded, which it was between early morning and midday. This phrase denotes place, — not time, as Stallb. says, to which εἰν is opposed. περὶ αὐρωπί πληθοῦσαν is a common phrase for time. αὐρώπι, even when definitely used, is often without an article, like πόλις, πατήρ, and many other nouns. And this is particularly frequent after prepositions. Comp. 447, A. — τεθνήζει, he shall be dead, the meaning of τέθνηκα put into a future. This appears to be the received form in old Attic, and τεθνήζεται came into use afterwards. See Elmsl. on Aristoph. Acharn. 590. — τινα ... τῆς κεφαλῆς αὐτῶν κατεχέων, that any of them shall have his head broken, like σωπριθήκεα τῆς κεφαλῆς, Aristoph. Peace, 71. But the accusative may also follow this verb, as in 515, E. Yet the accusative of κεφαλῆ was disallowed by the Atticists, although used by Lysias and others of the best writers.

E. τριήρεις, desidero articulum. Stallb. αὐτ, which may have been absorbed by καλ (ΚΑΙ for ΚΑΙΑΙ), is added by Coray. But the article is unnecessary, being implied or contained in τά, as Ast observes. One article often suffices, even for two substantives of different genders, or for two

A. τό μέγα δύνασθαι, etc. The construction is anacoluthous; καὶ τοῦτο . . . ἐστὶ τό μέγα δύνασθαι being, for the sake of greater emphasis, in the place of καὶ εἴναι μέγα δύνασθαι. The sense is, To have great power appears to you to be a good, if success follows a man while he acts as seems best to him; and this (i. e. the use of great power when accompanied with success), as it seems, is to have great power; but otherwise to have great power is a bad thing, and is to have little power. Socrates shows the absurdities into which Polus, on his own ground, falls.

B. εἰπὲ τίνα ὤρον ὀρίζει. τίς is here used like ὀστίς in indirect inquiry. See 447, C, 448, E, etc.

C. χαλεπὼν γέ σε ἔλεγξαι. These words are obviously spoken in irony.

D. ἀλλ' ἄκοινο γε. Routh and other editors since suppose that by this form of words Socrates conveys ridicule of ὀρᾶς, just above, which is used quite rhetorically. This may be so, but ἄκοινο is often thus used for ἄκηκοα. Comp. 515, E; Cr. § 579, ζ; K. § 255. 1. R. — οὐκ οἶδα. The noble passage down to ἀλλ' μέν δὴ is freely translated by Cicero, Tusc. Quæst. 5. 12.—aūtōdeν, ex ipsa re. Stallb., from the nature of the case itself.

E. παυδεύς ὁπως ἔχει. See 451, C — τὸν . . . ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα. See 469, E, note.

A. Archelaus began his reign by the foul means mentioned in the text, in 413 B. C., and died by assassination in 399. He seems to have been an able prince, and he made, according to Thucyd. (2. 100), more internal improvements in Macedonia than all his predecessors. His desire of the society of men of letters is well known; besides Euripides, the poet Agathon and others resorted to his court. (Ælian. Var. Hist. 2. 21.) Socrates, also, is said to have been in-
vited, and to have replied, ἦβριν εἶναι μὴ δύνασθαι ἀμύνασθαι ὁμοίως εὗ παθόντα ὠσπέρ καὶ κακῶς. (Aristot. Rhet. 2. 23.) He said, also, that Archelaus had spent 400 minæ in getting his palace painted by Zeuxis, but had spent nothing on himself. (Aelian. u. s. 14, 17.) Athenæus, in a bitter passage, filled with aspersions of Plato (Lib. 11. sub fin.), says that the philosopher was, according to the testimony of his nephew, Speusippus, on very good terms with the man whom he here speaks so ill of. But as Plato was scarcely thirty when Archelaus died, and until that time a man of little distinction, the story is probably distorted and exaggerated. — ἐδούλευεν ἦν. Some few MSS. give ἐδούλευσεν. Heindorf condemns Routh for adopting ἐδούλευεν, saying that the latter, with ἦν, is serviret; the former, servisset. But this is not so. The imperfect indicative with ἦν, "plerumque refertur ad prsesens. Ssepe vero etiam ad præteritum, ejusmodi quidem, quod diuturnitate aliquam vel repetitionem facti continet." Hermann de partic. ἦν, II. 10. B. θαυμασίως ὡς ἀθλιος. See 477, D, note. — μετα-πεμψάμενος, etc. "Insignis est hic locus eo, quod plurima participia cumulantur, copula non intercedente." Stallb. In this, the style of rhetoric seems to be imitated. The circumstances are compressed into one sentence, and vibrated, so to speak, one after another with rapidity, for the sake of the greater effect. C. ἐμβαλὼν εἰς φρέαρ, according to Ast and Stallb., denotes the manner in which the action of ἀπανίζας took place, having drowned him by throwing him into a well. Perhaps it may suit the rhetorical style here better, if they are taken side by side, as if καὶ were in the text, having thrown him into the well (and so) drowned him. For ἀπανίζας, comp. 512, A. — ἀρχίμενως ἀπὸ σοῦ, τuoque im-primis, seu interque eos tu primus. Heindorf, who has ad-duced a number of examples of the phrase.
D. τοῦ ... ἡμεληκέναι. This clause is brought, by a negligent freedom of style, under the influence of ὅτι, although Socrates of course did not praise Polus for ignorance of the art of conversation. δὲ has the force of quamquam; although you seem to have neglected the art of discussing. —— πόθεν. Comp. my note on Eurip. Alcest. 95.

A. δοκούντων εἶναι τι. Cr., § 450, regards τι as indeclinable, eorum qui videntur esse aliquid; not as predic. accus., eorum qui se putant esse aliquid. Aliquis and aliquid are both used by classical Roman writers in the same emphatic way. Cic. Tusc. Quæst. 5. 36. 104: an quidquam stultius, quam quos singulos contemnas, cos esse aliquid putare universos. And so τίς, τινές, as in the noted line of Pindar, τί δὲ τίς; τί δ’ οὖ τίς; σκιάς ὄναρ ἄνθρωπος, Pyth. 8. 95; and in Demosth. c. Mid. § 213, πλούσιοι πολλοὶ ... τὸ δοκεῖν τινές εἶναι δὲ εἰπορίων προσειληφότες, which favors Crosby's view. —— ὀλίγον. Soph. § 220 (223. 2); Cr. § 623. —— Νικίασ. This well-known wealthy general perished in the Sicilian disaster, some seven years before the time when this dialogue is feigned to have been held. He is, however, without anachronism, selected as a witness, in the same way that the testimony of Homer might be appealed to. The men here named were not selected on account of their unjust actions,—for they were, perhaps, all of them, among the best Athenian public men,—but probably on account of their wealth, illustrious connections, and ancestry. Socrates means to say, that the spirit of all the great and opulent families in the city led them to prefer prosperous injustice before depressed goodness. —— οἱ τριπόδες. A favorite kind of votive offering. The tripods here spoken of were set up on the top of small temples in the inclosure of the temple of Bacchus, in commemoration of victories in which the dedicators were the choragi of their tribes. —— Ἀριστοκράτης, son of Scellias. This man,
one of the more moderate aristocrats, after helping, in 411 B. C., to overthrow the Athenian constitution, soon again united with Theramenes to put down the more violent revolutionists. His dislike of democracy is punned upon in Aristoph. Birds, 125. We find probably the same person acting as general with Alcibiades, 407 B. C., and one of the commanders in the great sea-fight of Arginusæ, 406 B. C. With five colleagues, he perished, the victim of the popular frenzy which succeeded that event. It would not, then, seem very apposite to cite him the next year as a witness of the tenets of Polus, which his own experience so sadly belied. Either Plato forgot the date of this transaction, or with concealed irony selects the case of this man as really disproving what it is intended to prove. And he may have adduced the others with the same feeling.

B. ἐν Πυθιῶν, sc. ιερῶ, in the temple of Apollo Pythius at Athens. So I have no hesitation in reading, with Coray, after one MS., for the common Πυθώ, Delphi. For τῶτο points at a votive offering well known and familiar to Athenians, and this temple (i. e. its sacred precinct) was the place where those who conquered in the cyclic choruses at the Thargelia deposited their tripods. Comp. Boeckh’s Inscript., no. 213, and Thucyd. 6. 54. — τῶν ἐνθέους is for τῶν ἐνθάδε, by attraction or accommodation to ἐκλίξασθαι, which contains the notion of taking from. — ἐκβάλλειν . . . ἀληθοῦς. In these words there is an elegant allusion to actions of ejectment. There is, also, according to Stallb., a play upon ὀφία, which means not only substance, estate, but reality, truth. ἐκβάλλειν, also, may allude to the tyrants before mentioned; as though Socrates had said, “You mean to act the part of one of these tyrants, whom you admire so much, and expel me from my only substance, the truth, by getting a multitude of opinions in your favor.”
C. βν' ἐγὼ αὐτοὶ οἷς. Supply τρόπων ἐλέγχου εἶναι, and comp. 473, C, 508, B.

D. σὺ ἤγει οἷον τε εἶναι. οἷον is neuter, and εἶναι is to be taken with μακάριον ἄνδρα; another εἶναι being understood, unless we say that the one in the text by brachylogy performs a double part. Comp. Repub. 486, A: οἶον τε οἷον τοῦτο μέγα τι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸν ἀνθρώπων βιόν. — ἀλλα τι ... διανοώμεθα; shall we not suppose that you think so? For the genitive absolute with ὦς, after a verb of knowing, comp. Soph. § 192, N. 2; Mt. § 569. 5; K. § 312, R. 12; Cr. § 640. — ἄρα interrogative is sometimes found out of its usual place at the beginning of the sentence, like other words of the same class. It is, however, before the most important clause. Comp. 476, A.

A. ὑπὸ θεῶν. ὑπὸ is used because τνγχάνῃ δίκης con-473 tains a passive idea = κολάζῃται.

B. ἀληθῆ ... ἱσως. Hoc ἱσως cumb irrisione dictum de re certa ut Lat. fortasse. Stallb. — ἄλλα ἐτι τοῦτο ... χα- λεπώτερων alludes to 470, C, χαλεπόν γε σε ἐλέγξαι, and is ironical.

C. ἐκτέμνεται, exsecetur. Ast. — τοὺς αὐτοῦ ἐπιδῶν παιδας. Supply λαβηθέντας. ἐπιδεῖν (to look upon, to live to see), "ponitur semper in rebus gravioribus, et ἐπὶ συμ- φορὰς ut ait Thomas Magister, p. 335." Wytenbach on Plut. de sera num. vindict., p. 17, referred to by Heindorf and others. Not semper, but sepe. We have, for instance, Eurip. Med. 1025, πρίν σφιφν ὄνασθαι καπίδειν εὐθαίμων; Plut. Pelopid. § 34, Διαγόραν ἐπιδώτα νίον στεφανομέ- νους Ὀλυμπίασων, and so several times in Plutarch's lives. — καταπιτωθῆτι, pice obilitus cremetur. — ὁτὸς εὐθαίμω- νέστερος ἐσται. The compar. here has far less authority in its favor than the superl.; and quite a number of MSS. have εὐθαίμων. Stallb. inclines to the superl., but no sure example has been adduced of this degree used for the compara-
tive and followed by ἡ. — καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων, and by strangers besides, or and by the rest of men, viz. strangers. This seemingly pleonastic use of ἄλλος is quite common. Comp. 480, D; Phædo, 110, E, γῆ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ξέωσι; Leg. 7. 789, D, κάλλος καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ῥώμην; Xen. Cyrop. 7. 3, βοῦς καὶ ἱπποὺς ... καὶ ἄλλα πρόβατα πολλά.

D. μορμολύττει αὖ, etc., you are this time bringing up bugbears, and not attempting a refutation; and just now you were bringing up witnesses. Socrates is making game of the rhetorical substitutes for philosophical proof used by Polus. For ἀρτι δὲ ἐμαρτύρων, comp. 470, D, 472, A, to which places there is a reference. — δοῦν γὰρ ἄθλιοι. Supply οὐδέτερος.

E. ἄλλο αὖ τούτο εἶδος ἐλέγχου. This may allude to a rhetorical precept of Gorgias mentioned by Aristot. Rhet. 3. 18, that the "impression produced by the serious discourse of the adverse party must be destroyed by mirth; and that of his mirth by seriousness." — καὶ πέρυσι βουλεύειν λαχών ... οὐκ ἡπιστάμην ἐπιψηφίζειν. Socrates, in his ironical way, attributes to ignorance a proceeding which sprang from a conscientious regard to law, and crowned him with the highest honor. It is narrated by Xenophon, in his Hellenics, 1. 7, and mentioned by him (Memorab. 1. 1. 18, and 4. 4. 2) and Plato (Apol. Socr. 32, A), and in the dialogue Axiochus, § 12. Socrates happened to be the Epistates or president of the Prytanes, and as such the presiding officer in the assembly, on the day when the generals who had conquered at Arginusæ (comp. 472, A, note) were brought before the people on a charge of having neglected to pick up the bodies of the citizens that were floating in the water. It was proposed, contrary to the laws, to try them all at once by a summary process. Some of the Prytanes, who declared that they would not put the vote contrary to the laws, were frightened from their pur-
pose by the rage of the people, "and all promised that they would put the vote, except Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus, who only said that he would do everything according to the laws." (Xen. Hellen. u. s.) Whether Socrates was overruled by his colleagues it does not appear. One is tempted to conjecture that they took the affair out of his hands, and pretended that his delay in allowing the assembly to vote proceeded from ignorance; and that to this he playfully alludes. His conduct, however, was viewed by all in its true light. There is some reason to believe, however, that for that day he stayed proceedings upon the proposition. "But on the next day, Theramenes and Callixenus, with their party, by suborning fraudulently chosen proedri, procured the condemnation of the generals without a trial." (Axiochus, u. s.) This passage from a work ascribed to a disciple of Socrates, but commonly regarded as spurious, is important, not only for this item of information, but also for the statement, which may have some historical basis, that the foul plot against the generals was consummated by means of the proedri non-contribules, as they are called, who were drawn according to a pretended lot, on the day of the assembly, by the Epistates for the day, who was the successor of Socrates.

A. ὁπερ νῦν δὴ ἕγω ἑλεγον is to be taken with ἐμοί... 474 παράδος, as I was saying just now, hand over the proof to me in my turn. He refers to 472, C.

B. τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς οὖθε διαλέγομαι. These words with some bitterness silently contrast the philosopher with the orator, who aims to persuade the many. — διδόναι ἑλεγχον, to give an opportunity of refutation, to let (another) take up the argument. — πολλοῦ γε δει. In this formula, καὶ is often added before δει in the sense of even.

D. τι δὲ τῶδε; intellige λέγεις. Stalm. — εἰς οὖθεν ἀποζλίπων, etc. Do you call beautiful things in general
NOTES.

474, D.] (τὰ καλὰ πάντα) beautiful in each instance without having reference to anything further? i.e. do you consider beauty a fundamental quality, or resolve it into something else? — πρὸς ὁ ἄν. These words down to τοῦτο are epexegetical of the preceding clause.

E. καὶ μὴν τὰ γε . . . ἁμφότερα. In this sentence, Ast wishes to write καλὰ without the article, thus making it a predicate. τὰ καλὰ is added by way of explanation. τὰ κατὰ . . . νόμους = oi νόμοι. The sense is, And, moreover, laws and studies — those that are beautiful, that is — are not removed from (are not without) these properties, viz. the useful or pleasant, or both.

475 A. τὸ τῶν μαθημάτων καλὸς όσαύτας. Supply ἔχει. — καλὸς . . . ὀρίζει. This conveys a bitter satire of Polus, who by pleasure and the good meant the same thing. — οὐκοῦν τὸ αἰσχρὸν τῷ ἐναντίῳ, i.e. οὐκοῦν καλὸς ὀρίζομαι, τῷ ἐναντίῳ ὀρίζομενος τὸ αἰσχρόν.

B. οῦ καὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη; frequens apud Plat. dictio pro quā quis expectet οῦ καὶ τοῦτο ἀναγκαῖον; infra, p. 499, B, οὐ ταῦτα ἀνάγκη. Stallb.

C. οὐκοῦν τῷ ἐτέρῳ λείπεται, sc. ὑπερβάλλειν αὐτό.

D. ἀντὶ τοῦ ἤττου, sc. κακοῦ καὶ αἰσχροῦ.

E. For παρέχων, see 456, B. — ὁ ἐλεγχὸς . . . οὐδὲν ἐοικεν, my mode of proof when put by the side of your mode of proof is quite unlike it.

476 A. σκεψάμεθα, σκοπώμεθα. The present imperative, and the subjunctive used for it, seem sometimes to have a closer reference to the present time than the aorist; and therefore to be more urgent. Comp. let us be going, and let us go, in English. It has been remarked (first, I believe, by Elmsley), that in the present and imperfect the Attics say σκόπω, ἐσκόπουν, or σκοποῦμαι, ἐσκοποῦμην, but not σκέπτομαι, ἐσκεπτόμην. There is only one instance of σκέπτομαι in Plato to very many of σκοπώ. On the con-
trary, they never use ὑκοπόω in the future, aorist, or perfect.

B. διασκεψάμενος, after careful consideration. — ἀρα τοῦτο πᾶσχον, sc. ἐστί, or better, ἀνάγκη τοῦτο πᾶσχον εἶναι (i. e. πᾶσχειν), τοῦτο being the object. The participle is used to continue the form of the preceding discourse.

C. The Attic form καὶω is justly preferred by all modern editors to καὶα, having, as it does, the support of several MSS.

D. τοῦτων δὴ ὁμολογουμένων. The participle is properly in the present, as the clause may be resolved into ἐπειδὴ ταῦθ' ὁμολογοῦμεν.

A. ἀρα ἦπερ ἔγω ὑπολαμβάνω τὴν ὄφελειαν; Supply 477 ὄφελειται, to be taken with its cognate noun, and for the place of ὄφελειαν in the sentence, comp. Soph. § 151, Rem. 7; K. § 332. 8.; Cr. § 522.


C. ἀεὶ τὸ ἀσχιστον, etc. In every case, that which is most ugly is most ugly, from what has been admitted before, either as occasioning pain in the greatest degree, or harm, or both. The student will have observed that καλὸς, αἰσχρός, preserve the same sense throughout the discussion, and there seems to be no fit word except ugly by which to translate the latter of the two. And yet ugly will not bear to be used in as wide an extent as αἰσχρός. ἀγαθός, κακός, denote the relation of anything to our well-being, especially to future and ultimate well-being as opposed to pleasure in the present time.

D. οὐκόν ἥ ἀναρώτατον, etc. Therefore it is either most unpleasant, and the ugliest of them because it exceeds
(them) in unpleasantness, or (it is so because it exceeds them) in hurtfulness, or in both. ὑπερφνεῖ τίν... ὡς μεγάλη βλάβη, by some extraordinarily great harm. This may be explained as a confusio duarum locutionum, ὑπερφνεῖ ἐστὶν ὡς μεγάλη βλάβη, it is astonishing by how great a harm, and ὑπερφνεῖ τίν βλάβη, by some astonishing harm. The common formula ὑπερφνῶς ὡς, θαυμαστῶς ὡς, with an adjective, can be explained in the same way, or by an attraction by which the adjectives ὑπερφνεῖ, θαυμαστῶν (ἐστίν) are changed in their form by the relative adverb.

E. ἀπαλλάττει. This means no more than "has a tendency to free." Some are beyond the reach of cure by punishment (525, C). Nor does Socrates teach here that the ultimate object of punishment is to free the bad man from his badness, as that of medicine is to cure the sick. The comparison is not to be pressed in all respects.

478 A. εἰ μὴ οὕτως εἰπορεῖς, if on this view of the subject you are not prepared to answer.

C. ἀπαλλάττεται. The subject is to be found in οἱ ἵστον ὑπομενόντες, such as are under cure, which, being indefinite, readily gives place to a singular. — ἵστον ὑπομενόν is added to explain οὕτως. — ἀρχὴν, omnia, used chiefly with negatives. Comp. Soph. Antig. 92. — τὴν ἀρχὴν μηδὲ κτήσει, the not even possessing it at all.


E. οὕτως δ' ἦν, but this was, i. e. this is, as we proved, he who, etc.

479 A. διαπράξῃ ταῖς ὡστε. This verb and ἐκπράσσω are often followed by ὡστε before an infinitive. Comp. Soph. Antig. 303. Eurip. Alcest. 298. — ὡσπέρ ἄν εἰ τις. In phrases like this, an apodosis to which ἄν belongs is to be supplied:
here διαπράξατο is to be repeated. A little below ὄσπερανεί παίς — ὄσπερ φοβοῦτο ἂν εἰ πᾶς εἴη.

B. τὸ ἀλγεμενὸν αὔτοῦ καθορᾶν is added to explain τοιοῦτών τι. αὐτοῦ refers to δῖκην διδώνα, implied in δῖκην, just above. — μὴ ὅγιοις σώματος stands, with a brevity which is not uncommon in comparisons, for τοῦ συνοικεῖν μὴ ὅγιει σώματι, in order to prevent the repetition of συνοικεῖν. Comp. 455, E, note; Soph. Antig. 75; and Soph. § 186, N. 1; K. § 323, R. 6; Cr. § 461, R. 2.

C. παρασκευαζόμενος. This verb can be followed by an accusative, and by a clause beginning with ὅπως. The two constructions are here united. — ὅπως ἀν ὄσων, the means whereby they may be. — συμβαίνει μέγιστον κακῶν. This verb may be united with the participle or infinitive of εἰμί, or with a simple predicate, as here. Comp. Soph. Electr. 261; note in my ed.

E. τὸν ἄδικοντα ... διδόντα, the one who, though he commits the greatest wrongs, suffers no punishment for them. — φαίνεται, sc. ἀπωδείχθαι.

A. αὐτὸν ἣαυτὸν ... φιλάττειν, etc. For one needs to keep guard especially over himself, lest he act unjustly, on the ground that (if he so act) he will be possessed of a serious evil. The subject of φιλάττειν is τινά, with which αὐτὸν is to be joined; and the same omission of the indefinite subject occurs a few lines below. — ὅπως μὴ ἄδικησῃ. One MS. has ἄδικησει, and one other ποίησει, just below. The old doctrine of Dawes, that ὅπως μὴ cannot be followed by a first aorist subjunctive, but requires either a second aorist subjunctive or future indicative, is now exploded by all respectable scholars.

B. ἦ πῶς λέγομεν. λέγομεν, which Bekker prefers, would be equally good here. Comp. τι φῶμεν, just below. The difference is, that πῶς λέγομεν = what is our opinion? πῶς λέγομεν, what shall we say? what ought to be our opinion? what have we good reason to believe?
C. *ei μη ei.* "Sometimes a second *ei* follows *ei μη*, as in Latin *nisi si.*" Mt. § 617. d; K. § 340, R. 5; Cr. § 667. 2. Stallb., on Sympos. 205, E, says: "Alterum *ei* rem magis etiam reddit incertam, ut quod exceptioni conditionem adjiciat." — *ei τοναντιον.* According to Stallb., *χρήσιμον εινα* is here to be supplied, and the clause *κατηγο-ρειν δειν*, being explanatory of *τοναντιον*, follows without a copula. But this view of the construction overlooks δειν. It may explained by supplying *οù χρήσιμος ... ημιν* again in thought with *ei μη τις*, etc., or in other words, Plato, studious of brevity, proceeds as if he had forgotten all of the sentence preceding *οù χρήσιμος*. For making a defence, etc., ... *rhetoric is of no use at all to us* (nor is it of any use), unless one should suppose, on the contrary, that he ought to be an accuser first of all of himself, etc. — ος ἄν ἰη. Here ἰη = at any time. — ἀλλὰ παρέχειν μόσαντα, etc., but to give himself up, with his eyes closed and manfully, as to a physician, etc. *μόσαντα* expresses endurance of calamity with determination, the impressions concerning pain derived from the sense of sight, and their effects in weakening resolution, being thus prevented by the will of him who shuts his eyes. Comp. Soph. Antig. 421.

E. *σοι όμολογείται.* Heindorf and Coray would exclude *σοι* from the text. If it be the pleonastic dative, as it is called, the sense is *for you*, i.e. *I am willing to own to you* that they agree with what was said before. — *τοναντιον,* etc. If, on the other hand, says Socrates, one would do evil to another, he must save him by the use of rhetoric from punishment. Thus the rhetoricians, who place the value of their art in doing good to a friend, and harming an enemy, do just the contrary; they harm their friends by saving them from justice, and do good to their enemies by the opposite. All this proceeds upon the principles with regard to justice and injustice which Polus has been com-

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pelled to admit. The parenthesis \( \epsilon\nu \mu\nu\nu \ldots \epsilon\iota\lambda\alpha\beta\eta\tau\epsilon\omicron \), as understood by Buttmann, amounts to this: that this method of doing evil to an enemy is only applicable in case the enemy wrongs a third person; for when the enemy wrongs the orator himself, to do evil to him thus, namely, to save him from justice, would be but exposing the orator to fresh injuries from him. By rhetoric, then, he cannot gain the point he desires, namely, to do evil to his adversary without injuring himself.—

\( \mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\beta\epsilon\lambda\omicron\nu\tau\alpha\), \( \mu\nu\tau\alpha\tau\alpha\,\tau\omicron\tau\iota\omicron\epsilon, \omicron \omicron \). Comp. \( \mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\sigma\tau\rho\epsilon\gamma\alpha\), 456, E. It agrees with the subject of \( \pi\alpha\epsilon\iota\omega \). The abundance of words to denote opposition is worthy of notice: \( \tau\omicron\nu\nu\nu\nu\tau\iota\omicron\nu, \alpha\delta, \) and this participle. —

\( \epsilon\nu \delta\nu \delta\lambda\lambda\nu, \) etc. \( \delta\nu \) often resumes the subject after a parenthesis. The sense of the first part of this sentence is as follows: *But on the other hand, again, if, reversing the case, one has need to do harm to any person, whether enemy or anyone whomsoever,—provided only one be not himself wronged by his enemy; for that must be guarded against,—if, I say, an enemy wrong another, he (that other) must procure in every way, by deed and word, that he (the enemy) suffer not punishment nor come before the judge.*

A. \( \acute{\alpha}n\acute{\alpha}\lambda\acute{i}\acute{s}\acute{k}\epsilon\tau\alpha\). This, according to Coray, is an isolated instance of the middle of \( \acute{\alpha}n\acute{\alpha}\lambda\acute{i}\acute{s}\kappa\omega \) used as the active, and to be altered into \( \acute{\alpha}n\acute{\alpha}\lambda\acute{i}\acute{s}\kappa\eta\). This word and \( \acute{\alpha}p\acute{o}\delta\acute{i}\acute{d}\phi \) are in a different tense from the aorists preceding, as containing the signification of continuance, which, however, rather belongs to \( \mu\eta \, \acute{\alpha}p\acute{o}\delta\acute{i}\acute{d}\phi \) taken together than to the verb in itself.

C. \( \nu\eta \, \tau\omicron\uomicron\, \theta\omicron\omicron\omicron\, \acute{\alpha}l\alpha\acute{\lambda} \). Comp. 466, C, note.—

\( \nu\omicron\eta \, \tau\omicron\epsilon\omicron\nu \, \sigma\omicron\phi\omicron\nu\omicron \, \sigma\omicron\nu\omicron\delta\acute{i}\acute{d}\acute{\epsilon}\omega\omicron\tau\nu\eta \). For verbs meaning to speak construed with a participle, see Mt. § 555, Obs. 2.—

\( \epsilon\i\nu\, \gamma\omicron, \) etc. *If men had not the same state of mind, some of them some one, and others some other (i. e. if classes or portions of mankind did not agree in one or another state*
of mind), but each of us had a peculiar state of mind different from what the rest of mankind had, it would not be easy to manifest your own state of mind to another.

D. ἵδιον ἦ. This construction with ἦ, which belongs to ἄλλος, ἐναντίον, and similar words, is adopted here by ἵδιος, on account of the notion of difference implied in it. — πενθότες. Soph. § 137, N. 6; Cr. § 337. α; K. § 241, R. S. Then follows ἔρωντε, because δύο renders the duality of the persons more striking. — 'Ἀλκιβίαδος. At the time when Plato would have us suppose this dialogue to be spoken, Alcibiades, then a man of forty and upwards, had retired for the last time from Athens, and long before that the intimacy between him and Socrates had ceased. That intimacy was of the purest kind on the part of Socrates. He saw in the young Alcibiades high natural endowments, and hoped to win him over to the love of wisdom and virtue. But political ambition and his passions were more attractive. — τοῦ Πυριλάμπους, the son of Pyrilampes, whose name was Demus. Pyrilampes was a wealthy Athenian, and a friend of Pericles. He reared peacocks (see Plutarch. Pericl. § 13; Athenæus, p. 397, C), as did his son Demus; and this, being then a new bird in Greece, attracted visitors from so far off as Sparta and Thessaly. On the first day of the month, and at no other time, this living picture-gallery was open to all. Demus was as much admired for his beauty as one of his peacocks. Hence the parody in Aristoph. Wasps, 97 (acted seventeen years before the date of this dialogue): καὶ νὴ Δὴ ἡν ἤδη γέ που γεγραμμένον | τὸν Πυριλάμπους ἐν θύρᾳ Δήμου καλόν, | ίόν παρέγγραψε πλησίον, "Κημός καλός," i. e. where he finds written Δήμος καλός, "Demus is beautiful," he writes close by it, "Κημός" — the top-piece of the judge's ballot-box — "is beautiful." Pyrilampes also was considered as handsome and as large a man as any in Asia, whither he went on embassies to the great king and
others. (Charmides, 158, Α, if another person of the name be not meant.) We find Demus commanding a galley at Cyprus, before the battle of Cnidus, which happened in 394 B. C. (Lysias de Bonis Aristoph. § 25, Bekker.) The object of Socrates here is to teach Callicles, in a playful way, that he feels constrained to follow his object of attachment, philosophy, wherever it leads him; just as Callicles obeys the whims of the people. I know not why Alcibiades is brought in, unless it be for the reason which Ast has given: that, though aside from his main object, it serves to put Socrates in contrast with the politicians and orators. "I love beauty of mind," he says, "in Alcibiades, truth and justice in philosophy; but you love external beauty in Demus, and an ignorant, unjust Athenian people."

There is here a confusion of two expressions, ὃτι...οὐ δυναμένου. There is here a confusion of two expressions, ὃτι...οὐ δυναμένου, and δυναμένου, without ὃτι, construed with σοῦ. ὃτι thus becomes idle.

A. τῶν ἐπίρων παιδικῶν. The latter word could have an 482 honest sense.—ἐμπληκτος, fickle. It has this sense in Lysis, 214, C (where it is joined to ἀστάθμητος), Soph. Ajax, 1358, and elsewhere.

B. ἐκινην ἐξελέγξων...ὡς, refute her (philosophy) and show that. See 467, Α.

C. ὁ Σωκράτης. The sense is, O Socrates, you seem to take airs upon yourself in your discourses, being in very truth nothing but an haranguer; and in the present instance you make this harangue because the same thing has befallen Polus, which, he said, befell Gorgias in respect to you. The first clause relates to the general habit of Socrates, which, as Callicles, judging him falsely, says, was that of bringing a man into perplexity by sophistical arguments, and then of crowing over him, as from a loftier moral ground. The second clause asserts this to be true in the instance of Polus. δημηγόρος (comp. δημηγορικά, 482, Ε)
means one who, like a popular speaker, gains his ends by sophistry and pretence of honesty. — ταύτων παθότους furnishes the ground or else the occasion why Socrates indulged in this spirit.

D. οτι ἀγανακτοειν ἂν, εἰ τις μὴ φαίη, because they would be displeased if any one were to refuse. Without ἂν the sense would be, they were displeased. With ἂν, the verb, if put into ορατίο recta, would be in the optative; without ἂν, in the indicative. Comp. 461, A.

E. οὐ γὰρ τῷ ὑπηρῆ, ὁ Σωκράτης, etc. For, O Socrates, while you profess to be in pursuit of the truth, you in reality turn (the conversation) to such vulgar and popular things as these, which are not beautiful by nature, but by law. For φορτικά, comp. Mitchell on Aristoph. Wasps, 66. It may be translated, also, disagreeable, disgusting. Schol. φορτικά ἐστι τὰ βάρος ἐμποτούντα, and so Ast, Stallb. It is joined with δικαικά, in the style of pleadings, in Plat. Apol. Socr. 32, Α. δημηγορικά, Schol. τὰ πρὸς τὴν τῶν πολλῶν βλέπουντα δόξαν, i. e. in the style of a δημηγόρος. — ὃς τὰ πολλὰ δὲ. δὲ is rarely found after the third word of the clause. Here, however, ὃς τ. π. are in a manner one word. See Poppo’s note on ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι δέ, Thucyd. 1. 6.
be, When Polus spoke of that which was more ugly, you urged the law, i.e. you spoke of that which was by law more ugly. For the phrase, διωκ. κατὰ νόμον, comp. Repub. 5. 451, B, κατὰ τὸ ἐνομί διώκειν, to pursue an inquiry according to the letter, and not the idea. For ἐδιώκαθες (which Elmsley on Medea, 186, regards as an aorist, but which here seems to be an imperfect, and its infinitive, Euthyphron 15, D, a present). I beg leave to refer to my note on Antigone, 1096, second edition. — τὸ ἀδίκεισθαι: οἶον, though in no MS., is added before τὸ by several editors, and assists the sense; though without it ἀδίκεισθαι (a part) may be regarded as added in apposition, to explain πᾶν (the general idea). Being pronounced by the scribes like the ending οὖν of κάκιον, οἶον might easily be absorbed by that word.

B. οἱ τιθέμενοι τοὺς νόμους. See 488, D.

C. ἐκφοβοῦντες. After this word, τε stands in a few MSS. It seems to have been added to do away with the asyndeton; which, however, is allowable here, as what follows is an illustration of the foregoing. — ἀγαπῶσι γάρ, etc. For they are contented if they are put on an equality when they are inferior. — η... φῦσις. Stalib. observes, that οἷμαι is sometimes interposed between a noun and its article or preposition.

D. δῆλοι. Not φῦσις δῆλοι, but ταῦτα δῆλοι, these things show that they are so. But Stalib. and Ast give the verb an intransitive sense here. These things are evident that they are so, i.e. it is evident.

E. κατὰ φῦσιν τὴν τοῦ δικαίου. The three last words, though in all the MSS., are looked on by several editors as interpolated. Ast retains them, translating φῦσιν δικαίου, not the nature of justice, but natural justice. He remarks, that a noun governing a genitive may sometimes be resolved into an adjective qualifying that genitive; and cites,
in his support, Aristoph. Plut. 268, ὧ ξυνοῦ ἀγγείλας ἐπῶν, i. e. golden words; Phædrus, 275, A, σοφίας... ἀλήθειαν πορίζεις, true wisdom.—ὁ ἡμείς τιθέμεθα πλᾶττοντες, etc. The primary idea, as Heindorf observes, is expressed by the participle. The sense is, Not however, perhaps, according to that law which we enact, (thereby) moulding those among us who have the best gifts and most strength;—taking them in their youth, by our incantations and jugglers, we tame them as we would lions, etc. The asyndeton at ἐκ νεῶν is like a number already noticed: the clause is epexegetical of the foregoing. See 450, B. ἵσως is used sarcastically, the thing being regarded as certain by Callicles.

A. ἅνηρ, according to Stallb. and Ast, is here used unemphatically as a man, a person. If contempt were expressed, ἄνθρωπος would have been chosen, as in 518, C. ἀποσεισάμενος contains a figure drawn from a horse throwing his rider.—γράμματα, written ordinances.—ἐπαναστὰς, etc. He rises upon us and turns out our master,—this slave that was, i.e. this one whose spirit we had curbed by laws against nature. The aorists ἀνεφάνη, ἐξίλαμψε, denote an action wholly indefinite in regard to time, and thus answer to ἐὰν γένηται in the protasis, instead of presents or futures. The aorist, in such cases, represents a general truth as a matter of experience; the present, as something oft occurring in the existing state of things; the future, as something sure to happen, as the effect of existing causes.

B. νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλείς. This fragment of an uncertain poem of Pindar’s is often referred to, especially by Plato. It is treated of at large by Boeckh, Pind. Vol. III. 640. Boeckh makes it probable that the words κατὰ φύσιν, or something equivalent, belong to the passage; φύσιν, having the same sound, and almost the same letters, as φύσιν,
may have caused that word to be omitted. οὗτος δὲ δὴ are interposed by Callicles. Something like this followed in Pindar: ἐπὶ γηρυώνα βῶς κυκλωπίων ἐπὶ προθύρων ἔγρυσθεός ἀναιρήτας (?) τῇ καὶ ἀπριμάς ἡλασέν. Coray supposes that Callicles perverted the sense of Pindar, but the same turn is given to the words in Leges, 10. 890, A, and Aristides (2. 69, Dindorf) knows no other. The sense of ἄγει δικαίων τὸ βιοικότατον, according to Bocckh, is affert vim maximam, justam can efficiens; i. e. law (the law of nature) makes use of might, and calls it right. ἄγει and δικαίων have the same object. Socrates interprets ἄγει, below (488, B), in the sense of carrying off, plundering, which is suited to the action of Hercules. Hence Ast derives his translation, lex abigit s. rapit, ex suo jure agens, violentissime; where τὸ β. is treated as an adverbial phrase. But Aristides, by using the opposite phrase, ἄγει τὰ δίκαια πρεσβεύων, shows that τὸ βιοικότατον is at least the object of δικαίων.

—— τοῦτον refers forward to καὶ βοῦς . . . εἶναι.

C. The changes of number here are worthy of notice: τέ . . . ἄγεται, . . . τῶν ἀνθρώπων, . . . εὐρυθῆς ἢ . . . γέγονταί. — ἡλικία de ætate juvenili intelligendum. Itaque πόρρῳ τῆς ἡλικίας est ultra juventutem. Stallb. πόρρῳ can take a genitive in two relations. 1. That of the thing from which one is far off; as, Phædrus, 238, D, οὐκέτι πόρρῳ διεύραμβων φθέγγομαι, my words are not far from the style of dithyrambs. 2. That in respect of which one is far advanced; as Symposium, 217, D, διελεύσην πόρρῳ τῶν νυκτῶν, I conversed to a late hour of the night; infra 486, A, πόρρῳ αὐτῇ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἐλάύνοντας, always pushing forwards in philosophy; and in the text the sense can be, to too late a period of his youth.

D. καλὸς καγαθὸς ἀνήρ, in the mouth of Callicles, means quite another thing from what the same words would intend if used by Socrates. In earlier times the optimates were
so called, i. e. the name was given to men of a certain birth. By the standard of Callicles, it would belong to a man of the highest rank in public estimation. The moral character of the individual gave him a right to this title, in the estimation of Socrates. Comp. Welcker, Prael. to Theogis, p. 25.—ἐν τοῖς συμβολαίοις, in stipulations, or business transactions in general. The word denotes both private and public contracts, and treaties of commerce. —ηθῶν, characters.

E. τὸ τοῦ Ε. See 465, D. The following lines are from the Antiope, and, as the Schol. says, from a speech of Zethus to Amphion. Valckenauer, in his Diatribe on the frag. of Eurip. (the seventh and eighth chapters of which are devoted to this play), gives these words to Amphion. —ἀν αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ, etc., where, i. e. in whatsoever, he happens to do his best, whereinsoever he most excels. One MS. only has τυγχάνει, a reading which the editors before Stallb. generally preferred. But it is now admitted on all hands, that in the poets relative words occasionally are joined to the subjunctive without ἄν. Cousin translates this line, “afin de se surpasser lui-même.” It is strange that he did not see that in the very next line Plato interprets the ancient and poetical ἵνα, where (which the Attic prose-writers did not entirely give up), by ὅποιον ἄν. —For αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ, see Soph. § 144, N. 4, and § 232; and for βέλτιστος αὐτοῦ, § 177, N. 5; Cr. § 464. The comparative with the reflexive pronoun in the genitive denotes the having gone beyond a previous or usual state; the superlative with the same, the possession of the quality in the highest degree to which the person spoken of attains.

485 Α. εὖνοια τῇ ἐαυτοῦ, out of regard to himself, through self-love. The genitive is objective, as is the possessive pronoun, 486, Α, εὖνοια τῇ σῇ. —όσον παιδείας χάρω, just for the sake of education. —ὁμοιότατον πάσχω, I feel very

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much the same thing. To ὃμοιος, in the second clause, ὁσπερ succeeds, instead of ὥσπερ or ὥσιν. Comp. Xen. Symposium, 4. 37, ἀμοια μοι δοκοῦσι πᾶσχειν ὅσπερ εἰ τις πολλὰ ἐσθίων μηδέποτε ἐμπίπλατο, and 518, B.

D. ἐφι ο ποιήσεως, in Iliad, 9. 441.


A. In the Antiope of Euripides, a dialogue between the brothers Zethus and Amphion was contained, in which the former, who was a shepherd, exhorts the other to give up the art of music, to which he had devoted himself. The dialogue, as the remains show, involved a brilliant comparison between the life of the practical man and of one devoted to the arts. See Appendix, No. 3. — μειρακιώδει... μορφόματι, you strive to ornament a soul so nobly endowed by a puerile form, or outside. μορφόματι denotes external decoration; here, the musical and poetical pursuits of Amphion. — ποτ' ἀν δίκης, etc., nor in the counsels of justice couldst thou put forth thy words, nor take hold of anything probable and persuasive; i.e. Zethus denies to his brother the power to defend himself in suits at law, and to use the arts of persuasion. — ἀπαγάγως. The word points at the ἀπαγωγή of Attic law, a summary process by which the accused could be dragged before the proper magistrate, and locked in prison, without previous citation. One of the crimes to which this process was applicable was ἀσέβεια, the offence for which Socrates, though by another process, was actually tried. There is an allusion below, no doubt, to what actually happened; to the seeming helplessness and unskilfulness of Socrates at his trial; to his
accusers, who were men of little influence or repute; and especially to the leading one, Meletus, a bad poet and a bad man; as well as to the penalty of death, which they attached to their indictment. — ἄδικεῖν, says Stallb., accipiendum pro ἥδικηκένω. Heindorf on Protag. p. 310, D, makes the same remark, and brings a number of examples in proof of it. One is from Lysias, p. 678, Reiske: οἱ δ' ἥδικηκότες ἐκπράμενοι τοὺς κατηγόρους οὔδεν ἐδοξαν ἄδικεῖν. According to Ast, the present includes the past, = to have done and to be still doing wrong. This is often true, but it will not explain such a case as this from Lysias, p. 136, Reiske, cited by Heindorf: ἄξιω δὲ, ὧ βουλή, εἰ μὲν ἄδικῳ, μηδεμᾶς συγγρώμης τυγχάνειν, where one crime some time before committed is spoken of. The true explanation is, perhaps, that ἄδικῶ properly means, I am a wrong-doer, as well as I am doing wrong. But he is a wrong-doer who has done wrong.

B. κατηγόρου . . . μοχθηροῦ, a very common and paltry sort of accuser; referring to the accuser's standing in general. — βανίτου . . . τιμάσθαι, to lay his damages against you at death, which happily is an expression we do not use, because our law, unlike that of Athens, never places human life in the power of a vile or revengeful accuser, and of a throng of unrestricted judges. τιμάσθαι, to make his own estimate, set his price, is the usual word for the plaintiff's claim of satisfaction, whether pecuniary or penal. The court were said τιμᾶν. The defendant was said ἀντι-τιμάσθαι, to estimate in his turn what ought to be the verdict, or ἰποτιμάσθαι, to give his reduced estimate, in case he had been voted guilty by the judges. And all this was allowed only in certain suits called ἀγώνες τιμητοί, or those in which the laws had not settled the penalty, but left it to the judges. One of these was ἀκέβες, for which Socrates was tried. On being found guilty, his ἰποτιμήμα was called
for; and instead of naming some small mulet which might have saved his life, he named support in the Prytaneum. This led the judges, who usually chose between the accuser's estimate and that of the accused, to sentence him to death. — περισσωλάσθαι, ἦν. These infinitives, as Stallb. remarks, depend on ἐθήκε, which is followed at first by a participle, δυνάμενον, added as a paraphrase of the poet's χείρονα, and then by an infinitive. — ἀτέχνως. See 491, Λ.

C. εἴ τι καὶ ἀγροκότερον. See 509, Α, note. — εἰτὶ κόρφης τύπτειν, to strike a person upon the side of the head or temples, is spoken only of blows with the flat hand, and was the highest insult at Athens. See 527, D. — πραγμάτων ... εὐμονοίαν. This expression is from Eurip., and alludes to Amphion's pursuit. His brother says, No longer practise music, but musicalness of conduct, i. e. that which is in harmony with your nature and powers.

D. ἀγαθά. A. Gellius (10. 22) has quoted the passage from φιλοσοφία γάρ, 484, C, to this place, but misapprehends its import. — τὴν ἀριστὴν is in opposition to τινὰ τῶν λίθων. Just above we should expect αἰς βασανίζουσι for ἦ, referring to τούτων τῶν λίθων; but ἦ comes from Plato's having τινὰ λίθον in his mind. — προσαγαγὼν, admoveens, is used with allusion to gold, which was brought to the touchstone to be rubbed upon it, that a judgment might be formed by the color. The order here is, πρὸς ἦν προσαγαγὼν αὐτήν, ἐμελλον εἴ ἐπισεβάι εἰ. Comp. Herodot. 7. 10: "Pure gold we do not distinguish by itself, but when we rub it (viz. on the touchstone) by the side of other gold, then we distinguish the better."

E. ἄν = â ἄν. — αὐτὰ τάληθη, true in themselves, or the very truth.

Α. ψυχῆς πέρι ... μή, as to the soul's living rightly and 487 the opposite.
NOTES.

B. μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος. μᾶλλον is often thus used with a comparative instead of a positive; and in the same way πέρα, just below, 487, D.

C. Andron is mentioned in Protag. 315, C. He was probably the father of Androtion, an orator and disciple of Isocrates, against whom an oration of Demosthenes was written. — ἵππονονα. So Bekker, Ast, and others, with most MSS. Stallb. prefers ἵππονονα, I overheard. (This he retracts in his second edition.)

D. εὐλαβεῖσθαι ... διαφθαρέντες. Strikingly like Ecclesiastes vii. 16: "Neither make thyself overwise. Why shouldst thou destroy thyself?"

E. δῆλον ὅτι are often interposed in the middle of a sentence, without having an effect on the construction. And so ὅσον ὅτι. — τέλος τῆς ἄληθειας, de veritate perfecta et consummata accipio. Heindorf. — τὸν ἄνδρα, i. e. mankind. The article is used because ἄνδρα has its widest generic sense, and thus forms a definite whole.

488 A. εὖ ἵσθι τοῦτο ὅτι. τοῦτο traxerim ad ἐξαμαρτάνω. Nam Demostheni familiaris formula εὖ ἵσθι τοῦθ᾿ ὅτι, Platonii, quod sciam, non item. Heindorf.

B. ἄγεν. See 484, B, note. If ἄγεν is there correctly explained by Boeckh, we must suppose that Socrates plays upon the word, without essentially injuring the sense of the passage from Pindar.

C. ἀκρωάσθω, obedire, like ἀκούειν. — τότε, i. e. antea, quum de his rebus disputares. Sic τότε passim ponitur. Stallb. — τί ποτε λέγεις. The present embraces the whole time of the present discussion. Hence it is here for ἔδειξες.

D. οἱ δὴ καὶ, etc. Since, indeed, they even make laws for the one, i. e. to control the one. The relative, as often elsewhere, renders a reason; i. e. = the demonstrative with γάρ. τίθεμαι νόμον is used of a people, or one empowered by them, making laws, the maker being one of the party.
to be governed; τίθημι νόμον, of a sovereign or a divine lawgiver.

A. ὅπως μὴ ἀλώσει. See Soph. § 214, N. 3; Cr. § 602. 489 3; K. § 330, R. 4. — αἰσχυνόμενος. Socrates refers with admirable irony to 482, C, D. — ἵνα . . . βεβαιώσωμαι, etc., that I may get confirmation (for it) from you, seeing that a man who is competent to decide has admitted it.

B. κινδυνεῖσιν οὐκ ἄλθη λέγειν, it seems that you were not speaking the truth; for λέγειν is the infinitive of the imperfect. — ἀ . . . κακουργώ. — He quotes what Callicles said, 483, A. — ὄνοματα θηρείων, verba aucupans. Comp. 490, A. The same metaphor is seen in our word captious.

—— ὄντως ἀμαρτείν, to use a wrong expression.

C. ἦ ὀτι ὁ λέγειν, etc. Or do you think my opinion to be, that if a rabble should be collected of slaves and of all sorts of men, of no account except by reason of their bodily strength, and these persons should say anything, that these very things which they say ought to have the force of law. Join τῷ ἵσχυσασθαί together. This verb can mean pollicere, contendere, fidere. For the first meaning, which is less common, but seems to belong to it here, comp. Dio Cass. 44, p. 406, Reimar: χαλεπῶν ἵσχυσασθαί τῷ τῷ σώματι φρονμῶσατον ἐκθέμα, difficile est corpore esse valido, et animo prudenti. φῶσων must be taken absolutely, without an object, in the sense of decreeing, determining, but with contemptuous disparagement; unless we read, with Heindorf, ἄτα for αἴτα. And αἴτα ταῦτα refers to the edicts implied in φῶσων.

D. τοῖς δύο . . . τοῦ ἐνός. As the numerals are opposed to one another, they have a certain definiteness. Hence the article. So τὰ δύο μέρη, sc. out of three, two thirds. Comp. Cr. § 483. — τί ποτε λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους is as legitimate an expression as τίνας ποτε, which Routh wished to put into its place.
NOTES.

E. προδίδασκε. Schol. περιττεύει ἡ πρόθεσις Ἀττικῶς. I believe that in προδίδασκεν, προμανθάνειν (Aristoph. Clouds, 476, 966), πρό means forwards, and that it is prefixed without adding much to the meaning of the verbs, because the idea of advance is involved in learning and teaching. This word alludes to a school, as is shown by ἀποφοιτήσω. — οὐ μὰ τὸν Ζήθον. Comp. 485, E. Most MSS. want οὐ, which, however, is necessary here, for although μὰ is almost confined to oaths expressly or impliedly negative, it is in itself merely affirmative, being connected, perhaps, in origin with μὴ, μὲν. — ὃ σὺ χρόμενος, etc., whose words you used of me just now with much raillery. — ὄνοματα λέγεις, you utter mere words.

490 B. πολλοί ἀθρόοι, multi simul. Sæpenumeno sic jun- guntur. Stallb.

C. η οὖν τούτων τῶν σιτίων, etc. Must he then have more of these provisions than we, because he is better; or ought he, in virtue of his authority, to distribute them all, etc. — εἰ μὴ μᾶλλει ξημοῦσθαι, unless he intends to pay the penalty (by making himself ill). — πάντων ἑλάχιστον τῷ βελτίστῳ. Supply ἄδικον.

D. ποίων ηματίων; sc. δεῖ αὐτὸν πλέον ἔχειν. ποῖος is often used in questions conveying wonder, indignation, or contempt. Aristoph. Clouds, 366, Ὡ Ζεὺς . . . οὐ θεὸς ἐστιν; | ποίως Ζεὺς; οὗ μὴ ληρήσεις; οὐδ' ἐστι Ζεὺς. Just below we have ποία ὑποδήματα . . . ἔχω; what shoes are you talking nonsense about? ἔχων here takes an accusative, unless we write ποία ὑποδήματα; φλυαρεῖς ἔχω. Of this last phrase explanations, not quite satisfactory, are given by Hermann on Viger, note 228; Mt. § 567; Cr. § 632; K. § 668, R. 1 (largest Gr.). Comp. 497, A.

E. ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν. Comp. Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 6, δὲ δὲ γε ταύτου δεινόστερον, ἐφη, ὁ Ἰππία, οὐ μόνον ἀεὶ τὰ αὐτὰ λέγω, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν· σὺ δ' ἰσως, διὰ τὸ πολυμαθῆς εἶναι, περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν οὐδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ λέγεις.
A. ἀνεχῶς, absolutely, positively. You never stop talking always about cobblers and fullers and cooks, and positively nothing else. In the sense without art, the penult has the acute accent.—ἀεὶ...λέγων...οὐδὲν παύει. αἰεὶ is joined thus redundantly with οὐδὲν παῦσαν again, 517, C, and in Leges, 2. 662, E. Socrates was often thus reproached or derided for drawing his illustrations from homely sources. He was led to it by love of simplicity, contempt for pretension, the desire to find a general truth by means of familiar instances, and frequent conversations with artisans. See a fine passage in Symposium 221, E.—περὶ τίνων...πλέον ἔχων. Heind. remarks that περὶ τι, not περὶ τινος, is the usual formula with πλέον ἔχειν.—τοὺς κρεῖττος οἱ εἰσιν, etc., by the better, namely, by who they are I do not mean, etc. οἱ εἰσιν dictum est cum abundantia quadem qualem Callicles in hac oratione sectatur passim. Poterat enim omitti. Stallb.

B. For κατηγορεῖν with the genitive of the person, see Soph. § 183. 2 (§ 194, N. 3).

D. τι δὲ;...ἀρχομένους; The reading and pointing here are quite uncertain. The passage in brackets is omitted by Bekker, after one MS. It has the look of an explanation of τι δὲ. Nor does Socrates afterwards do anything with ἀρχομένους, while ἀρχοντας is easily supplied with αὐτῶν. The sense without this passage is, But what? Does justice consist in this, that those who rule themselves should have more than others. Stallbaum’s reading in his second ed. is αὐτῶν...τι [ἡ τι] ἀρχοντας ἡ ἀρχομένους; where τι is quatenus, qua in parte. But how can ἀρχομένους be the subject of πλέον ἔχειν? or how could he say quatenus sibimet ipsis imperantes unless he had already spoken of governing one’s self.—ἡ τοῖς μὲν οὐδὲν δει. δει sometimes takes an accusative of the thing, when that is a pronoun.
E. ὃς ἡδος εἷς answers nearly to the French comme vous êtes plaisant! how ridiculous or foolish you are! γλυκὸς is used in the same way. — τοὺς ἡλιθίους λέγεις τοὺς σω-φρόνας, you mean those fools the temperate. The one accusative is in apposition with the other; unless, with Stallb., we make τοὺς ἡλιθίους the predicate-accusative; in which case the sense is, by the temperate you mean the silly. The sophists struck a disastrous blow against morality by giving it this title. Comp. Repub. 348, D. “What!” says Socrates to the sophist Thrasymachus; “do you call justice (κακίαν) badness?” “No,” said he, “but (πάνω γεννάιαν εὐθείαν) very noble folly.” — πάνω γε σφόδρα, sc. τοῦτο λέγεις.

492 B. οἰς ... ὑπηρέτευ... νίεσεν εἶναι ἢ αὐτούς... ἰκανούς. εἶναι belongs to both clauses. For the transition from the dat. dependent on the verb to the accus. construed with the infinitive, comp. 510, E, fin., and Soph. Electra, 962. — τί ... κάκιον εἶ, for τί ἀν ... κάκιον εἰ. Comp. τίς ... κατάσχοι, Soph. Antig. 605; Mt. § 515, Obs. ἀν may have dropped out here, as τί itself is wanting in ten MSS., both being absorbed, so to speak, by the last two syllables of δυνάστειαν. — οἰς ἔξων, etc. A contracted expression for οἱ, ἔξων αὐτῶς ... αὐτοὶ ἐπαγάγοντο, which is much the same as εἰ, ἔξων αὐτῶς, etc., if, when they had it in their power, they were themselves to introduce. Comp. Repub. 465, fin.: “Do you remember that some one reproved us, because we, in his opinion, made (παοώμεν) our guards not happy, οἰς ἔξων πάντα ἔχεω τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν οὐδέν ἔχοις, who, when they could possess everything belonging to the citizens, were to have nothing.”

C. τοῦτο ἐστιν ἄρετή, etc. τοῦτο refers, not to the three nouns just preceding, but rather to ἔν ἐπικουρίαν ἔχει, — to the condition of things when τρυφή, etc. are able to supply their wants. — τὰ δὲ ἄλλα. The predicate is φιλαρία καὶ οὐδένος ἀξία.
D. ἀμόΘεν γέ ποθεν, undecunque, from obsol. ἀμός, Attic ἀμός, = τις, whence μηδαμοῦ. This is Bekker’s emendation of ἀλλοθεν ποθεν, which is evidently a false reading. — ἐτοιμάζεω is for ἐτοιμαστέων, which the construction of the first clause would require. With this infin. supply δεῖν involved in κολαστέων.

E. ὡς γε σο λέγεις . . . ὡ βίος, such a life as you mention. — The lines here quoted are probably from the Polyidus of Eurip., and very similar to another fragment from his Phrixus. The second trimeter is completed by κατώ νομίζεται. The passage is parodied by Aristoph. in the Frogs, 1477.

A. The singular passage next following is introduced by the way, and perhaps half in sport. At the beginning of an argument concerning the good and the pleasant, Socrates takes breath a moment, and changes reasoning for playful illustration. He first mentions an opinion concerning the true life, which was expressed by the Orphic and Pythagorean theologists; — that the body is the tomb of the soul, release from which will admit it into real existence. To this dogma Plato alludes in Cratylus, 400, C. He says (ironically throughout), upon the derivation of σῶμα, that it may come from σήμα, because some call the body the σήμα of the soul, as being that in which in this present it is buried; or because the soul σμαίνει by means of the body its thoughts and wishes. But he thinks that the name is due to the followers of Orpheus especially, who taught that the soul was inclosed and kept (σωζεῖν) in it to atone for its crimes in an earlier state. This derivation, he says, would require no change of letter. The Pythagorean Philolaus (Boeckh’s Philolaus 181, Clem. Alex. Strom. 3. 3, p. 518, Potter) says, that “the old thelogers and diviners testify, that the soul is joined to the body to suffer a certain penalty, and is buried in it καθάπερ ἐν σάματι.” To this, and to the
comparison of the body to a prison, there is frequent allusion. Socrates now passes on to an allegorical explanation of the fable of the Danaides, which illustrates the unsatisfactory nature of devotion to animal desire. It was the doctrine of some Mysteries (the Orphic or Bacchic especially), that the initiated fared better in the world below than the uninitiated, and use was made of this fable to show the difference in their condition. The fable was afterwards spiritualized, as we see in the text, and applied to the soul and its parts. It may be doubted who is the author of this punning allegory. Boeckh contends that it was Philolaus, who was a native of Croton or Tarentum. But there is no evidence that this allegory, and the dogma first spoken of, are to be attributed to the same person. The Schol. refers it to Empedocles, and Olympiod. (apud Stallb.) does the same. But their assertions may be mere guesses. Ast regards it as Plato's own invention, playfully ascribed to an Italian or Sicilian, for the purpose of laughing at the countrymen of Polus and Gorgias.——τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς, etc. And that that part of the soul in which the desires lodge is capable of being persuaded, and of changing from one side to the other. There may be a side-thrust at rhetoric, the object of which is πείθειν, when it is said that the part of the soul which contains the desires is moved this way and that by persuasion.——μυθολογῶν, expressing in the form of a fable.——The ensuing words, as Buttmann, in Heindorf's ed., observes, seem to be taken from a song of Timocreon of Rhodes, a lyric poet contemporary with the Persian war; of which song a few words in Ionic a minore dimeters preserved by Hephestion (p. 71, Gaisford) are as follows: Σικελὸς κομψὸς ἀνὴρ ποτὶ τὰν ματέρα ἔφα.——κομψὸς. On this word, Ruhnken (Timæus s. v.) says: κομψὸν dicitur quicquid scitum et venustum est. Plerisque autem locis, apud Platonem vox habet aliquid ironice Socraticae, ut non
Gorgias.

tam de vera et naturali, quam de nimia et adscititia venustate capienda videtur. Gorg. 521, E. Pro splendidis nugis sumendum est Gorg. 486, C. Neque tamen desunt loci ubi simpliciter et sine ironia ad laudem referatur: which he considers to be the case here. It answers to nice, fine, refined, and witty. I cannot help thinking that it here contains something of irony. —— παράγων τῷ ὁνόματι, making a change in the word, altering its sound a little.

B. τῶν δ' ἁμνήτων, etc., and that that part of the soul of the uninstructed, where the desires reside, —its incontinent and irreterentive part, — he said that this was a cask with holes in it; making the comparison on account of its ἀτακτικία. ἁμνήτων, besides its similarity to ὁνόματων, seems to have a double sense, uninstructed (ὁ, μνεῖ) and not closing, unable to contain, as if from ὅ, μνεῖ. The construction is completed by supplying ἐφη, suggested by ὁνόματε. αὐτοῦ seems to refer to ἡφι, although no reason appears why the neuter should here be chosen. Heindorf wished to read διὰ τὸ ἀκολαστὸν, in which case αὐτοῦ would refer to τοῦτο τῆς ἡφῆ.—— τούναντιν and σωῖ are to be joined, the opposite of what you have expressed.—— τὸ ἀείδες δὴ λέγων, meaning of course the invisible, i. e. the intellectual, as opposed to the material. Comp. Phædo 80, D, ἢ δὲ ψυχῇ ἄρα, τὸ ἀείδες, τὸ εἰς τοιοῦτον ἔτερον τόπον οἰχόμενον.—— οὕτωι ... κοσκίνῳ, that these uninstructed persons are, as it would seem (ἐὰν ἂν), the most wretched, and carry water into the cask with holes in a sieve likewise perforated. The early mysteries seem to have consisted of purifications, the effect of which was to remove guilt. Hence the initiated escaped the punishment in the future world which was to fall on others. This was denoted by making use of certain fables of the poets, which exhibited the popular view of the punishment of great offenders, and applying them to the uninstructed.
C. ἄτε οὖ δυναμένη, etc., on account, namely, of its inability to retain, through unbelief and forgetfulness. ἀπωτι-νός alludes to πίθον. — ἐπεικῶς. Non explicuerim cum Heindorfio satis, admodum, sed habet vim affirmandi atque concedendi, ut Latinorum utique, sane quidem. Stallb. Ut candide loquar. Routh. — ὑπὸ τι, aliquatenu, quodammodo. Stallb. — δηλοὶ μὴν, etc. Yet they make that clear, by the exhibition of which I wish to persuade you — if in any wise I can — to change your mind. — μεταθέσθαι, sc. γνώσην or ψήφον. The next words explain μεταθέσθαι, and therefore have no need of καί, which is in some editions. Just below, μεταθέσθαι is used in what is called the constructio praemans like ἐξελέγχω, p. 482, B. The sense is, And do you change your opinion, and say that, etc.

D. ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γυμνασίου τῇ νίν, from the same school with that just now, from some allegorizing sophist. For ὁ αὐτὸς followed by the dative, in brief phrases, see Soph. § 195, N. 3. — After οἶνον supply λέγοις ὅν.

E. νάματα . . . ἐκάστου τούτων, liquors belonging to, or put into, each of these tubs.

494 B. χαραδροῦ. A bird, so called from the ravines and beds of torrents where it lives, of a yellowish color, and very voracious. ἄμα τῷ ἐσθιεὶν ἐκρίνει, says the Schol. The Schol. on this place, and many others, mention that these birds were reputed to cure the jaundice by being looked at; whence those who brought them into town for sale kept them covered, lest they should effect a cure for nothing. More about the bird will be found in Schneider on Aristot. Hist. Animal., Vol. IV. 80, seq. He thinks it to be the Charadrius cedicnemus or C. hiaticula of Linnaeus. — τὸ τοιώθε λέγεις, οἶνον, do you allow that there is such a thing as.

C. λέγω, καί, etc. λέγω, to be repeated after καί in the
sense of speaking of, takes a personal object with which the participles agree. The sense is, Yes, and I speak of (allow that there is such a thing as) a man having all the other desires, and able to live happily by taking pleasure in feeding them. — ὅπως μὴ, i.e. σκόπει ὅπως μὴ, as usual. ἀπαυσχυνεῖ is used with allusion to what Callicles has said of the modesty of Gorgias and Polus, as in 489, A. — κατέλοιυτα τῶν βίων explains the preceding clause. Hence the asyndeton. — δημηγόρος, coarse, vulgar.

D. ἀνδρείας γὰρ εἰ. This alludes ironically to his definition of the βέλτιστοι as being the ἀνδρεῖοι (491, C).

E. τὸ ... κεφάλαιον, id quod rerum hujus generis (i.e. turpissimarum) caput est. Ast. κεφάλαιον is in apposition with ὁ βίος. — ἀνέδην, freely or openly.

A. ἀνυμολογούμενος, inconsistent, disagreeing; from ὁμο- 495 λογούμενος, used as an adjective, and ἀ priv. — διαφθείρεις ... λόγους, you make what we have said before good for nothing.

B. καὶ γὰρ σὺ. Well, what of that? For you do too, i. e. παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα σαντῷ λέγεις.

C. διελοῦ τάδε, etc. Explain the following. You mean something probably by ἐπιστήμη (certain knowledge), do you not? — ἀλλο τι οὖν, etc. Did you not accordingly, on the ground that knowledge was a different thing from manliness, speak of these as τῶ; The allusion in this and the prior question is to 491, A, B. With τὴν ἀνδρείαν, οὖν is to be supplied. The accus. absol. is often found without the participle of εἰμί expressed. Dekker, without MS. authority, adds ὅν after ἔτερον, which is a very probable conjecture, as ὅν may easily have been swallowed up by ἔτερον. The participle ὅν would be attracted in gender to the predicate.

D. ὃ Ἀχαρνεὺς. Socrates playfully but severely imitates the solemn style of covenants, in which the ἀνεμος of the
parties was mentioned. Some of the *demi*, as that to which
Socrates belonged, had no corresponding adjective forms.
The want was in most cases supplied by an adverb in *θεν*
taken with the article.

496 A. *περὶ ὅσου ... ἀπολαξῶν*, look at this with regard to
any part of the body you please, taking it by itself, or sepa-
arátely. — *ὁ*, which disease, refers to *νοσεῖν* implied in

C. *ὑπερφυῶς ὅσ.* Comp. 447, D.

D. *οὐκὸν τοῦτον οὗ λέγεις*, etc. In that of which you
are speaking, the one part, viz. *διψῶντα*, being thirsty, is
then feeling pain, is it not? He was speaking of *διψῶντα*

E. *κατὰ τὸ πίνειν χαίρειν λέγεις; do you speak of taking*
pleasure so far forth as the act of drinking is concerned?

i. e. does the pleasure go with the drinking? — *λυποῦμε-
νον*; at the same time that the person feels pain? — *ἐπε*
ψυχῆς *ἐπε σῶματος*. Stallb. would read *ψυχῆς πέρι*. But
there can be no objection to taking *τὸ τού* with the genitives;
and *χρόνον* is excused by being in its company.

apud Stallb. *προστοίχι κυρίαν καὶ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι*. Mæris de-
fines *ἀκκιζόμενος* as the Attic expression for *προστοίχιον*. *(*)
From examples of the use of the word, its meaning evi-
dently is, to pretend that you do not, particularly to decline
taking a thing (as food at table) when you want it. Comp.
Coray on Heliodor. 2. 64. *θρόπτομαι* has sometimes much
the same sense, e. g. in Plut. Anton. § 12, where it is used
of the feigned reluctance of Cæsar to wear the crown. —

*ὅτι ἔχων λαρεῖς*. Comp. 490, E, note. Stallb. (first ed.) and
Ast suppose this to be a gloss. Stallb. (second ed.), after
Winckelmann on Euthydem. 295, C (quite a parallel pas-
sage, ὅνκ ἀποκρίνει, ἔφη, πρὸς ἀν ἑπολαμβάνης, ὅτι ἔχων φλυ-
πεῖς καὶ ἄρχωματέρος εἰ τοῦ δέοντος), gives καὶ προιθε γε ...
voutheis to Callicles, and oix ama...pivei to Socrates. On this passage we may remark, — 1. That oti echon lphereis, a choice Attic expression, has not the look of a gloss, and it is not easy to say what it is a gloss upon. 2. The phrase is not in dramatic keeping with the politeness of the Platonic Socrates. But then, 3. As Callicles wishes to break off the discourse, proth eis toimprosothev is not what he would say. 4. voutheis can only point at the advice given by Callicles to Socrates, on pp. 484—486, and not to anything said by Socrates. Comp. 488, A, wopep erixou vouthe- teiv me, referring to Callicles. 5. There is no mark of a change of person at oix ama, and little at kat prothi. These last considerations induce me to reject Winckelmann's view, and to regard it even more probable that oti echon lphereis are words spoken by Socrates. But I can arrive at no sure affirmative conclusion respecting the passage.

B. ov oit ayto ti, this damage or cost is not yours, i. e. this does you no harm.

C. oti ta megal meimnetai. There is an elegant allusion to the mysteries of Ceres; which were divided into the small, held in the city, and the great, held chiefly at Eleusis. The latter could not be witnessed until a year or more after initiation into the other. The sentiment is something like that in Artegaill's words to the Giant:

"For how canst thou those greater secrets know,
That dost not know the least thing of them all?
Ill can he rule the great, that cannot reach the small."

—othen apelipei apokrinou, answer beginning where you left off. The usual construction of apxow with an adverb of motion is here adopted by apokrinomai. — peinov is a participle; paustai here adopts two constructions.

D. omologoxtai seems to mean to agree with itself; sou being the ethical dative, and twv logon or tauta understood the subject. But omol. sou may also denote to be consistent with your previous admissions. Comp. 487, D.
E. τοῦς ὅσ ἁν κάλλος παρῇ. Supply καλοῦς καλεῖς. The article is here used as a demonstrative, — a usage not uncommon before a relative sentence introduced by ὅσ, ὅσος, or ὅσο.

498 Α. ἀμφότεροι ἕμοιγε μᾶλλον, ὅ. ἐ. χαίρειν δοκοῦσι. This is said in contempt, as if Socrates were not deserving of a sensible answer.

C. ἢ καὶ ἐτι μᾶλλον, etc. If cowards, who, according to Callicles, are the bad, feel more pleasure and pain than brave men when enemies retire and advance, and if pleasure and pain are the same as good and evil, then the bad are both bad and good in a higher degree than the good, which is absurd. After μᾶλλον ἀγαθοί, the MSS. have οί ἀγαθοί, which Routh and succeeding editors have justly left out, as wholly perverting the sense.

E. δις γὰρ τοι, etc. A proverb, imputed by the Schol. to Empedocles, a part of one of whose hexameters v. 164 in Sturz's Emped.) is καὶ δις γὰρ ὅ δει καλὸν ἔστιν ἐνιστεῖν. τοι, you know, is often used in making familiar remarks or citing well-known passages. A little below, in 499, B, πάλαι τοι, it has, according to Stallb., "vim confirmandis cum quadam admiratione vel indignatione," = really, or don't you know.

499 B. ὅσ δή, see 468, E. — ἵν sometimes expresses grief, sometimes joy, or, as here, wonder. It is oxytoned by all the editors of Plato. Others would write ἵν, either always, or when it does not denote grief.

C. ἄν, again, refers to 491, C. He is again inconsistent with himself. — ἑκὼντος εἶναι, if you could help it, if you had your way about it. See Soph. § 221, N. 3; Cr. § 623, N.; K. § 306, R. S. According to Hermann (Append. to Viger, de pleonasmo), it is not simply sponte, but quantum quis sponte quid faciat, and is used "de eo potissimum quod quis facere detrectat." Dr. Arnold (on Thu-
cyd. 2. 89), after Hermann, says that *ἐκὼν εἶναι* "is used generally in negative sentences where the speaker wishes to qualify his denial or refusal, by saying that he will not do it if he can help it, but that very possibly he may not be able to help it." He adds, that in Prometheus, 266 (ἐκὼν ἔμαρτον), ἐκὼν εἶναι would make nonsense. — τὸ παρὸν εἰς τοιεῖν, to do well what is in one's power, to make the best of what you have. This proverb again occurs in Leges, 12. 959, C. — ἡδοναί τινες . . . αὐτὸ μὲν . . . αὐτὸ δὲ. The constant use of ὁ μὲν, ὁ δὲ, in antitheses, seems to be the reason why (by a kind of apposition, perhaps) they follow τινες here. Instead of τινες μὲν . . . ἄλλα ὁ δὲ, some . . . others, we have, as if the contrast needed to be made stronger, some, these I say . . . those. Comp. Eurip. Hec. 1185, πολλαί γὰρ ἡμῶν, αὐτὸ μὲν εἰς ἐπέφθοναι | αὐτό δ', etc. In Ἀσchin. c. Ctes. (§ 11, Bekk.), αὐτὸ μὲν follows τινες, and the second αὐτὸ is suppressed, as is often the case with ὁ μὲν, ὁ δὲ alone. The formula often occurs as in Plat. Repub. 8. 560, A.

D. *εἰ ἃρα τοῦτον.* Græci frequenter relativam orationis structuram permutant cum conditionali. Stallb. The relative structure would be αὐτὸ μὲν ἃρα τοῦτον, etc.

E. *τέλος, etc.* Comp. Cic. de Fin. 2. 2. 5: Hunc ipsum sive finem sive extremum sive ultimum definiebas, id esse, quo omnia, quae recte fierent, referrentur, neque id ipsum usquam referretur.

A. *ἐκ τρίτων,* and *ἐκ τρίτον,* in the third place, third. 500 Eurip. Orest. 1173, σωτηρίαν σοι, τὸ δε τ', ἐκ τρίτου τ' ἐμοί. Sympos. 213, B. ὑπολύσετε Ἀλκιβιάδην, ἵνα ἐκ τρίτων κοστακήται. — Cap. 55. ἦν αὖ for αὖ ἦν. αὖ is out of its clause for the sake of rhythm.

B. See 461, B, seq. — παρασκευαί, the Schol. observes, is a middle term, standing for τέχναι and ἔμπειρίαι both, like ἐπιτηδεύσεις. — μέχρι ἡδονῆς, terminating in pleasure. This is explained by the next words, where
Notes.

Antâ tou toîo refers to ḥdovû, i.e. to ḥdû. — καὶ ἐτίθην, etc., and among those pursuits which relate to the pleasures, I set down cookery as a knack, and not an art; but of those which have to do with good (I set down) medicine as an art.
— πρὸς φιλίον, supply Διός. — μὴν αὐτῶς ὄιον, etc. In this sentence, the two main clauses begin with μὴτε; and the clause beginning with μὴδε is the second part of the first clause. Comp. K. largest Gr. § 743, R. 4. — μηδ' ὅ τι ἀν τύχησι, etc., and do not, contrary to your opinion, answer whatever comes into your head, nor take what I say as though I were in sport.

C. οὖ τί ἀν μᾶλλον ... ἦ τοῦτο. The last words are added to recall οὖ to mind, and τοῦτο takes the construction of τί rather than of περὶ τοῦτον οὖ. It often happens that ἦ and quam are so inserted after a genitive depending on a comparative. — ἐπὶ ὄν, i. e. τοῦτον ἐφ' ὄν. — τὰ τοῦ ἄν-δρας δὴ ταῦτα πράττουσα, whether I ought to spend my life in doing those deeds of the real man, forsooth, that you spoke of. The reference is to 485, A—D. δὴ is ironical. — ἦ ἐπὶ τώνδε τῶν βίου. We should expect τῶνδε τῶν βίου, sc. ξῆν; but Plato forms this clause as though he had written πότερον ἐμὲ παρακαλεῖσ ἐπὶ τοῦτον, etc.

D. εἰ ἐστὶ ... τῶ βίω. A rare instance of a dual agreeing with a singular verb. As is usual in similar examples in Attic writers, where plurals not neuter are joined with a singular verb, the verb is ἐστὶ, and it precedes the noun.

E. Socrates breaks off in the middle of the sentence, to know whether Callicles is so far of the same opinion.

501 A. ἦ δ' ἴατρική, i. e. δοκεῖ μοι τέχνη εῖναι. Just below, ἴατρική is added to explain ἦ μέν. Comp. ὃ μέν ... ὃ κοιλαζόμενος, 476, E. —— ἦ δ' ἐτέρα τῆς ἴδουνης ... ἐπ' αὐτῆν ἔρχεται. There is a striking change of construction here. The sentence begins with ἴδουνης, as if Plato had in his mind the form of the preceding sentence, and were going
to say, τῆς ἥδονῆς οὕτε τῷ φύσιν ἐσκεπταὶ οὕτε τῷ αἰτίαν. But this thought, which afterwards appears in the participial form, is postponed, and the intervening clause, πρὸς ἦν ἡ θεραπεία... ἀπάσια, determined him to say, ἐπ' αὐτήν ἐρχέται, accommodated to πρὸς ἦν, and to leave ἥδονῆς in the lurch, so to speak. It may be asked, why, when he read it over, he did not dismiss ἥδονῆς from its irregular position. The answer is, that the Greeks were governed in their style by nature,—a higher rule than grammar,—and did not object to such irregularities of structure as arise from the nature of the mind, and are heard in good conversation. —ἀτέχνως, and not ἀτεχνῶς. Comp. 491, A. — ἄλογος τε παντᾶςαςυν, in a manner altogether irrational, making, I may say (i.e. almost), no estimates (or discriminations), a mere practice and experience.

B. ὅς δὴ καὶ πορίζεται. ὅ refers to τῷ μνήμην σώζονθαυ τοῦ εἰσόδοτος γίγνεσθαι. — καὶ εἶναι τινες, i.e. καὶ εἶ δοκοῦσι τοι εἶναι τινες. It might have been said equally well, εἶναι τινας, etc. — ὡσπερ ἐκεί, i.e. as in the case of the body. —οὕτε μὴν αὐταῖς, etc., nor having any concern about aught else but gratification merely, no matter whether it be for the better or the worse. Here the structure changes to the impersonal participle, and the subject of the prior clause becomes αὐταῖς.

C. ἐμοὶ... δοκοῦσι εἶναι, it seems to me that there are such, or they seem to me to exist. The words refer to εἶναι τινες πραγματείας, etc. It is strange that Stalb. and Ast, overlooking this plain sense, understand κολακεία as the predicate. —οὐγκατατίθεται. The word means, properly, to drop one's vote in the same vessel with another person, as a judge in the court. ἥμων is ironical, as he had compelled Gorgias and Polus to agree with him.

D. οὐκ, ἄλλα καί. οὐκ denies the previous sentence taken as a whole. —χαρίζεσθαι ἔστι, i.e. ἔξεστι.
E. τοιαύτη τις ... διώκειν. The infinitive explains the demonstrative, and depends on διώκει repeated. — ἀλλο συν-δὲν φροντίζειν. This verb, in the sense of caring about, usually takes a genitive, or a genitive with περί, but sometimes a neuter accusative. Soph. § 182, N. 1. — ἡ καθαριστική ἡ ἐν τοῖς ἀγώνισ. Plato condemned all music on the flute, as tending to render the young unmanly and fond of pleasure. He was, however, for retaining the lyre and harp in education, but disapproved of some of the occasions where they were used, such as the public contests of choruses, dramatic or dithyrambic, thinking that pleasure and not good was their object, and that they tended to agitate and not to calm the soul. Comp. Repub. 3. 398–403. — ἡ τῶν χορῶν διδασκαλία, the exhibition of choruses, so called because the instruction of the chorus was the principal preparative. The chorus in dithyrambic poetry is especially intended. — Κυμησίας of Thebes, so called, it is said, because ἐν τοῖς χοροῖς ἐχρήτο πολλὴ κυμήσει. He was much laughed at for his poetry by the comedians (Aristoph. Birds, 1377, and Schol.), and attacked by the orators on account of his character (Lysias in Athenæus, 551, 552).

502 A. τί δὲ ... Μέλης; i. e. ἐδόκει σοι, as above τί ἡ διδασκαλία καὶ ποίησις; i. e. καταφαίνεται σοι. A little below, τί δὲ δὴ ἡ σεμνὴ, etc., the construction is different, namely, τί δὲ δὴ ἐστὶ τούτο ἐφ' ὧν ἐσπούδακε ἡ σεμνή, etc. What is said here is a mere passing fling at Meles on account of the badness of his odes.

B. ἡ ... θαυμαστὴ ἡ τῆς τραγῳδίας ποίησις. The ordinary collocation, as Stallb. remarks, would be ἡ θαυμαστὴ ποίησις, ἡ τῆς τραγῳδίας. He cites Herodot. 7. 196, ὁ ναυ-τικὸς ὁ τῶν βαρβάρων στρατός; Repub. 565, D, τὸ ἐν Ἀρκαδίᾳ τὸ τοῦ Δίως τοῦ Λυκαίου ἱερόν, and other examples. — δια-μάχεσθαι ... ὅπως μῇ ἐρεί. Is its aim ... to insist upon it
... that it will not say, etc. — 


C. εἰ τις περιέλαυτο. Aristides, in opposing this passage, and the Schol., have περιέλαυ, which Coray and Stallb. prefer. Ast, in defending the text, says that εἰ περιέλαυ de-notes if one were to strip off, εἰ περιέλαυτο, if one were to strip off for himself, i.e. in his own mind to conceive of it as stripped off. — μέλος, musical accompaniment; ὑθομόν, definite succession of arses and theses; μέτρον, definite succession of long and short syllables. — ἄλλο τι ἡ λόγος γίνεται. The verb is attracted in number to the predicate λόγοι.

D. οἶκοιν . . . ἀν εἰ, It (tragedy) would be then a rhetorical species of popular speaking. — δῆμον τοιοῦτον, οἶνον παιδῶν, i.e. to a people (or audience) composed of boys, etc. The grammatical construction, which would be οἶος ἐστὶ (δῆμος) παιδῶν, is forsaken through a singular kind of attraction, by which οἶος, ὁσος, ἄλικος, with the noun or adjective they accompany, adopt the case of the antecedent. It has been inferred from this, and a few other passages of Plato, that women attended the theatre at Athens, at least in tragic exhibitions. Comp. Leges, 2. 658, D, 7. 817, C, and Becker’s Charicles, excursus to Scene 10.

A. οὐχ ἀπλοῖν, etc. — τοῦτο ὁ ἐρωτᾶς οὐκέτι ἐστιν ἄπλοῖν, 503 i.e. does not admit of a simple answer. — διαμάχεσθαι λέγοντα, to persist in saying, or steadily to say.

B. τι οὐχὶ . . . αὐτῶν ἔφρασας. Mt. § 503, c, says: “After τι oü an aorist often follows, where we should have looked for a present.” A degree of urgency is contained
in this mode of speaking. It may be explained by the practice of expressing a wish by means of an interrogative sentence. "Why did you not tell me?" = "I wish you had already told me," and by implication, "Tell me at once." — αἰτίαν ἔχουσιν, have it ascribed to them, is here used in a good sense.

C. οὐκ ἄκουεις. Präsesens hujus verbi de durante fama, — perpetuo ponitur. Stalb. ; i. e. it is used of something which is said and may be heard until now. Comp. the editor's note on Prometh. 683 (ed. sec.). — νεωστί, i. e. about twenty-three years before. — οὗ καὶ ἄκηκοας. See 455, E. For Plato's opinion of Pericles, see the Introduction.

— ei ἔστι γε . . . ἢν σὺ ἔλεγες ἀρετήν, ἄληθῆς. Comp. for ἀρετήν, Soph. § 151, Rem. 6. The apodosis of this sentence, which might be "they are good men," is omitted. "When a proposition with ei μέν, or ἢν μέν, has another with ei δὲ opposed to it, the ἀπόδοσις is often suppressed in one of the two." Mt. § 617. In the ensuing clause, the predicate, ἔστιν ἄληθὲς, is left out, and ἕτε before the infinitive is redundant. Examples are given by Heindorf, on Phædo, 63, C. Comp. 453, B, above. ἕτε was used as though δὲ ἀποτελεῖν was to follow; but when Plato came to that part of the sentence, he accommodated ἀποτελεῖν to ei δὲ μὴ τούτο: "if this, viz. ἀποτιμήπλαναι, is not virtue, but this, viz. ἀποτελεῖν, etc., is so."

D. τούτο δὲ τέχνη τις εἶναι. The nominative here is used by anacoluthon, as if, instead of ἡγαγκάσθημεν ὁμολογεῖν, Plato had written ὁμολογήθη. — οὕτωσιν ἄπρεμα, quite calmly, or pretty calmly. οὕτως, like sic in Latin, throws into the adverb before which it stands a certain modification of its meaning, which cannot be easily expressed. Comp. Eurip. Alcest. 680, for an analogous use of οὕτως with verbs.

E. ὡσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, etc. ἄλλοι is used here as in 473,
C. The verb προσφέρει leaves the number required by δημουργοί, through the influence of ἐκαστὸς, added in apposition to that noun. Comp. Mt. § 302, Obs. — οὖν εἰ βούλει ἰδεῖν. In this sentence the apodosis is omitted. One can supply in thought ῥαδίως τούτο ὀψει. But the true account of the sentence is, that the apodosis should have begun at ὡς εἰς τάξιν ("if you wish to look at painters, etc., — you will see that, etc."); but by a change of style the clause ὡς εἰς τάξιν is made to depend on ἰδεῖν, and the apodosis loses its proper form under the impression that an imperative, ἰδε εἰ βούλει, instead of εἰ βούλει ἰδεῖν, had commenced the sentence.

B. καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰ σώματα φαμέν, i. e. τάξιν τυχόντα χρη-504 στὰ εἶναι.

C. ἔπειν ὡσπερ ἐκεῖνο τὸ ὄνομα, to mention the name for it, as you did for that. In the MSS., ἐκεῖνο stands, which, if genuine, is put briefly for ἐκεῖνον τὸ ὄνομα.

E. ἢ ἄλλ' ὅπως, etc., or anything else which sometimes will not be of more use to it (the body) than the contrary (i. e. abstinence from such gratifications will be) according to a right view of the case; — nay, even of less. So this clause must be rendered as it stands. But I am persuaded, notwithstanding what Stallb. says, that ἢ ought to be inserted before κατά, as Heindorf proposes, or ye turned into δὲ. For since ye shows that the clause κατά... λόγον relates to the foregoing, καὶ ἔλαστον stands quite by itself; and the asyndeton (καὶ being etiam) is intolerable.

B. οὐκοῦν... κολάζεις; ἦπ' δὲν ἔπιθυμεῖ belongs to εἰρ-505 γεῖν. — ὡσπερ... ὄνω relates to ἀκολασία. See Chap. 46, 48.

C. οὗτος ἄνηρ. See 467, B. — κολ ἐζόμενος is obviously in apposition with πάσχον; but we might have also had κολάζεσθαι in apposition with τοῦτο. According to Aristotle on Rhet. 1. 10. 17, cited by Stallb., κολάζειν (to chastise,
correct, lit. to cut off, prune) differs from τιμωρεῖσθαι (to take satisfaction from, punish) in this; that the former takes place for the sake of the sufferer, the latter for that of the doer. —— μεταξὺ τῶν λόγων καταλύσωμεν; are we ending the discourse in the middle? Some inferior MSS. have καταλύσωμεν, are we going to end, and some καταλύσωμεν, which (or rather καταλύσωμεν, as the action is momentary) would be shall we end. The present denotes that they are doing that which is equivalent to stopping, that they are beginning to stop. —— αὐτὸς γνώσει, you yourself must judge, i. e. I wish to stop, but leave it to you.

D. θέμις. This word, being here an accusative, must be indeclinable. Of this use few will doubt, after reading what Elmsley and Hermann (Soph. Æd. Col. 1191), and Buttmann (largest Gram. 1. § 58, and 2. p. 405) have written. The other examples occur in Æd. Col. u. s., Xen. Æcon. 11. 11, and Æsch. Suppl. 331. In Æsch. Choeph. 632, it is a neuter nominative. No phrases are found besides θέμις εἶστι, θέμις εἶναι. This is a strange, but not a solitary anomaly. Comp. χρεῶν, δεῖνα sometimes indeclinable, κράτα in Sophocles nominative and accusative. —— περίη, sc. τὸ μύθος. The style changes from the plural to the singular. Comp. for the expression, Leges, 6. 752, Α, οὐκον ἢ... ἄν μύθον ἀκέφαλον καταλίπομι, πλανόμενος γὰρ ἄν ἀπίστη τοιοῦτος ὄν ἄμορφος φαινοίτο.


506 Α. οὐδε γὰρ... εἰδὼς λέγω. Socrates often places him-
self in the attitude of a searcher after truth, unable of himself to find it, and hoping that others know where it is.

B. \(\varepsilon\circ s \ldots \zeta\iota\delta\circ\nu\), till I had given him back the speech of Amphion for that of Zethus, i. e. until I had defended philosophy from his attack. See 485, E. \(\varepsilon\circ s\) with an imperfect or aorist indicative accompanies another clause containing the same tenses with \(\dot{\alpha}\nu\), when a \textit{res non facta} is spoken of.

C. \(\acute{\alpha}x\theta\varepsilon\sigma\theta\circ\sigma\circ\mu\alpha\). This form is condemned by Meiris as un-Attic, but is found several times in Attic writers, where, however, it may have come from the scribes. \(\acute{\alpha}x\theta\varepsilon\sigma\theta\circ\sigma\circ\mu\alpha\) is the approved form. \(\varepsilon\nu\varepsilon\gamma\varepsilon \circ\eta\nu\\ldots \acute{\alpha}n\alpha\gamma\varepsilon\gamma\varepsilon\phi\varepsilon\iota\). An allusion to the honorary votes recorded on marbles, in favor of foreigners who had rendered Athens a service. \(\lambda\gamma\varepsilon \ \acute{\alpha}v\tau\circ\). \(\acute{\alpha}v\tau\circ\) is by \textit{yourself}, \textit{without another speaker}, and so in \(\sigma\circ\circ \acute{\alpha}v\tau\circ\ \delta\iota\omicron\omicron\omicron\tau\circ\) above.

D. \(\omicron\upsilon \tau\omega \ \epsilon\iota\kappa\jmath\). An elegant and certain emendation of Stallb. (ed. sec.) for \(\omicron\upsilon\chi \ \acute{\alpha}v\tau\circ\ \epsilon\iota\kappa\jmath\). \(\kappa\alpha\lambda\lambda\iota\circ\sigma\tau\aum\pi\rho\alpha\gamma\iota\gamma\nu\varepsilon\tau\aum\). One would expect \(\kappa\alpha\lambda\lambda\iota\sigma\tau\eta\). Coray wishes to strike out the word; Heindorf, to read \(\mu\alpha\lambda\iota\sigma\tau\aum\). The sense is, \textit{attends upon it, or is present most beautifully}, i. e. \textit{is present in its greatest beauty, or highest perfection}.

A. \(\acute{\eta}\nu \ \delta\dot{e} \ \acute{\alpha}\tau\eta\), i. e. now this we found to be. \(\acute{\eta}\nu\) points 507 to the time when such a soul \textit{was} (subjectively to them, i. e. appeared to be) \(\acute{\alpha}f\rho\omega\), etc. Comp. 478, E, note.

B. \(\dot{\alpha} \ \delta\dot{e}i \ldots \phi\varepsilon\gamma\varepsilon\nu\ \kappa\iota\ \delta\iota\omega\kappa\varepsilon\varepsilon\iota\). With the definition of the \(\sigma\acute{\omega}f\rho\omega\ \acute{\alpha}n\rho\) here given, Routh compares Aristotle's in the Eth. Nicom. 3, sub fin.: \(\acute{\epsilon}\pi\omicron\nu\mu\epsilon\iota\ \circ\sigma\acute{\omega}f\rho\omega\ \dot{\alpha}n\ \delta\dot{e}i \kappa\iota\ \dot{\omega} \ \delta\dot{e}i \kappa\iota\ \acute{\omicron}\tau\varepsilon\).

C. \(\tau\circ\nu \ \dot{\alpha} \ \epsilon\upsilon \ \pi\acute{r}\acute{a}\tau\tau\omega\tau\aum\ldots \epsilon\iota\delta\alpha\acute{i}\mu\omega\nu\ \epsilon\iota\nu\). Plato passes in this same way from \(\epsilon\upsilon \ \pi\acute{r}\acute{a}\tau\tau\circ\) to \(\epsilon\iota\delta\alpha\acute{i}\mu\omega\nu\ \epsilon\iota\nu\) in Repub. 1. 353, E, Charmides 172, A, Alcibiad. 1. 116, B. As \(\epsilon\upsilon \ \pi\acute{r}\acute{a}\tau\tau\circ\) has the two senses of \textit{acting well}, and \textit{being prosperous}, Plato may seem to have unfairly used this am-
bignity in his argument. So Heindorf and Stallb. view the passage. Routh, on the contrary, says: "Vult philosophus consequens esse necessario ex antecedentibus cum qui recte agit felicem esse. Vix enim potest credi ut Plato duplici sensu verborum eō πράττειν ad argumentum probandum abutii vellet." Finally, Ast, after Schleierm., correctly, as I think, observes, that Plato "in his conclusionem non ducit ex ambiguous, — sed usum loquendi cogitandum est in rem suam convertere, curnque quodammodo corrigerre voluisse, ex ea enim quam posuit ratione, — nisi bonum quod est, nihil est prosperum ac beatum." With this Stallb., in his second edition, agrees.

D. βουδίμενον εὐδαίμονα ἐίναι ... διωκτέον. The subject of the action of a verbal may be in the accusative or in the dative. — ὁς ἔχει ποδῶν = ὁς ἔχει τάχους, Thucyd. 2. 92, = ὁς τάχιστα. Comp. Soph. § 188, N.; Cr. § 363, B. — παρασκευαστέον is the verbal of the middle voice here, = δεῖ παρασκευάσασθαι. Mt. § 447. 2. — ἰδιώτης (when opposed to the state), an individual. — In the next sentence, εἰς τοῦτο refers to ὅπως ... ἔσεσθαι, and στὸν πράττειν to συντείνουτα and what follows it.

E. ἄνύρντων κακῶν, an endless or cureless evil, is in apposition with the participial clause preceding it, and in the accusative. Soph. § 167, N. 4; Cr. § 334. 8; K. § 266, R. 2. — φασὶ δ' οἱ σοφοὶ, etc. The allusion is more particularly to Empedocles, who made φίλα τα and νεῖκος fundamental causes in his world of phenomena; the former, or the attracting principle, the cause of union among things unlike, of organization and of motion when one is made out of many, and the latter, or the dissolving principle, the cause of separation. He is the Agrigentine who taught in verse, that "quæ in rerum natura constarent, quæque moverentur, ea contrahere amicitiam, dissipare discordiam." Cic. de Amicit. 7. His causes for the phenomena of the world
were physical; and Socrates here gives playfully a moral turn to his doctrine.

A. τὸ ὀλον τούτο...κόσμον καλοῦσιν. The universe owed the name κόσμος, order, system, to Pythagoras. Comp. Xen. Mem. 1. 1. 11, ὁ καλοῦμενος ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν κόσμος, which shows that even then the appellation had not become very current.—ἡ ἱσότης ἡ γεωμετρική. Geometrical equality is that of ratios, arithmetical, of numbers. It exists figuratively in morals and politics, when the receipts of one are to his claims as those of another to his, i.e. when justice prevails and assigns to each according to his due, and not according to his power of receiving. But πλεονεξία or selfishness disturbs and destroys this kind of equality. In the state, this equality takes power from the bad, i.e. from the unjust and ignorant, and gives it to the wise and virtuous, because it is right that only they should govern who can govern well. There is a noble passage on the two equalities in the Leges, 6. 757, B, cited by Routh.

B. ἐξελεγκτέος...ὡς. See 467, A, note.—κακίας δὲ οἵ ἄθλιοι. The predicate ἄθλιοι is omitted. See K. § 852. 2, largest Gr. This is the more natural, because the preceding words, εὕδαιμονες οἵ εὕδαιμονες, clearly indicate the construction. Stallb. has added ἄθλιοι, without authority or sufficient reason.—τί τὰ συμβαίνοντα. This use of τί in the predicate with a plural subject is not uncommon. Comp. Εσchin. c. Ctes., ἀπὸδειξιν ποιήσας τί ποτ' ἤν ἃ ἐπραξα, καὶ τί ποτ' ἤν ἃ ἐλεγες. (§ 165, Bekker.) The same formula is repeated just below, τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἃ...ἀνειδίζεις.

D. εἰμὶ δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ, etc. And that I am in the power of any one who has the will, as those punished by civil infamy are in any one's hand who wishes it (lit. belong to any one). There were three kinds of civil infamy at Athens, and they are particularly described by Andocides (p. 35, Reiske). The lowest consisted in a deprivation of
certain particular rights, as that of bringing an action as a public accuser. The next involved the taking away of all civil rights; and to this the highest added confiscation. As, in the two latter kinds, the person affected with ἀτυχία could not appear in court as a prosecutor or a witness, or complain of his wrongs before the people, he was plainly in the power of his enemies. — μενυκόν denotes high-spirited, or rather overbearing. The clause is in apposition with τύπτειν ἐπὶ κόψης. Comp. 507, E. The same is true of τὸ ἔσχατον, as it respects ἀποκτεῖναι. Socrates refers to 486, A – C.

E. τέμνεσθαι, when taken with σώμα, is in frusta dissecuri.

509 A. καὶ εἶ ἄγρουκότερον . . . ἔστι. These words are used to excuse the confidence and want of deference to others which Socrates here displays. Comp. 462, E, 486, C. In the latter passage, we have εἶ καὶ ἃ., and here καὶ εἶ ἃ. According to Herm. (on Viger, note 307), referred to by Stallb., καὶ εἶ, etiam si, is used concerning that which we only assume as true; εἶ καὶ, quamquam, concerning that which we declare to be true. Socrates, then, does not here admit that his expression is impolite; but in 486, C, Callicles acknowledges by εἶ καὶ his trespass against the rules of good-breeding. — οὕτωσιν ut Latinorum sic est primo aspectu. Ast.

B. τίνα ἂν βοήθειαν, etc. By his inability to afford what kind of aid to himself would a man be in truth ridiculous? This alludes to 486, B, μὴ τε αὐτὸν αὐτῷ δυνάμενον βοήθειαν. — ταῦτην εἶναι τὴν αἰσχυστὴν βοήθειαν, μὴ δύνασθαι βοήθειαν is for αἰσχυστὸν εἶναι ταῦτην τὴν βοήθειαν μὴ δύνασθαι βοήθειαν, that it is most disgraceful not to be able to render this assistance, etc. (viz. this assistance which will avert the greatest evil). With this very strange instance of attraction, if it be such, we may compare the expression in
our own language which Routh adduces, this is the most shameful thing to be without, for it is most shameful to be without this thing.

C. τὴν τοῦ δευτέρου κακοῦ, sc. βοήθειαν, and that the aid given to prevent the evil next in magnitude is second (second in shame if inadequate, and in honor if adequate; for this latter is implied). βοήθεια κακῶν is like ἄλκη κακῶν in Euripides.—καὶ τῶλα οὕτως, sc. ἔχειν, not ἔχει, which Stallb. supplies.

D. ἀδικήσται. See Soph. § 207, N. 6; Cr. § 554, a; K. § 251, R. 1.—τί δὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν; well, but what about doing wrong? This genitive without a preposition may be compared with that which accompanies verbs of speaking. Comp. Soph. Electr. 317.

E. τι οὖκ ... ἀπεκρίνω. See 503, B, note. The imperfect ἀπεκρίνω is in most MSS.; but in this formula that tense is not used.—μηδένα βουλόμενον ἀδικεῖν. See 468, C, and the Introduction, p. xxiv.

A. ὁποῖς μὴ ἀδικήσωμεν. See 480, A, note.

B. φίλος μοι δοκεῖ, etc. Here ὁπέρ refers forward to ὁ ὁμοιός, and ὧς οἶνον τε μάλιστα is taken with φίλος. οἱ παλαιὸι τε καὶ σοφοὶ alludes especially to Hom. Odys. 17. 218, ὥς αἰεὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ἔχει θέος ὡς τῶν ὁμοίων. The thought is found also in Sympos. 195, B, ὁ γὰρ παλαιὸς λόγος εὗ ἔχει, ὡς ὁμοίος ὁμοίῳ αἰεὶ πελάξει, and in Lysis, 214, where it is said that the bad, being unlike themselves, that is, variable and unstable, cannot be friends. Comp. also Leges, 716, C, τὸ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὁμοῖον ὄντι μετρίῳ φίλον ἄν εἴη, τὰ δὲ ἄμετρα οὐτ' ἀλλήλοις οὐτε τοῖς ἐμμέτροις.

C. δύναιτο φίλος γενέσθαι. Repentina subjecti mutatio, says Stallb., i. e. τοῦτο refers to ὁ τύραννος, and the subject of δύναιτο is ὁ τοῦ τύραννος βελτίων. This appears most probable, as Plato might easily return in his mind to the earlier subject of the clause, εἰ τις ... εἶη; and as οὐδ' ἄν
οὗτος shows that the same subject was still in his mind. It is not, however, necessary, because either this person or the tyrant might be called a friend to the other. — ἐν τῷ ἡ πόλει. See 468, E, note.

D. χαίρων, impune, the opposite of κλαίων, passim apud dramaticos. And so gaudens is used in Latin. — αὐτῇ, ὁδὸς ἑστὶν. αὐτῇ, the subject of ἑστὶ, refers to ἔθιζεν, but is attracted, as often happens, in gender, to the predicate ὁδὸς.

E. ἑσται ἐπὶ τῷ ὑπὲρ τε ἐἶναι, will be in favor of, or will tend to his being able. Here the construction of the dative with the infinitive is followed by that of the accusative. See 492, B.

511 B. οὐκοῦν ... ἀγανακτησάντων; Well, then, is not this just the thing to rouse indignation?

D. προσεσταλμένη, simple, properly spoken of garments, drawn close to the body, in contrast to a garment which spreads out with numerous folds and plaits. — ἀλλὰ ταῦτα διαπραξαμένη, etc. But when it has effected the same things with the forensic art, it charges, I presume, but two obols if it has brought a man safe from Ἑγίνα hither; and if from Egypt or the Pontus, — at the highest rate (ἐὰν πάμπολυ), when it has conveyed in safety what I just now spoke of, the man himself, and his children, and property, and women; having landed them in the port, it demands but two drachms. Ast and Coray wish to change the order in this sentence. I see not why; for it is not more broken than often happens in earnest conversation. ἐπιράξαστο is the aorist of indefinite time. See 484, A. With ἐὰν πάμπολυ, supply πράττονται.

512 A. λογίζεται οὖν ὅτι οὐκ, etc. Here οὐκ belongs to βιω-τέου ὑπὲρ καὶ ὅνησειεν, which is the primary clause. But the sentence assumes an antithetical structure, the clauses εἰ μὲν τις, . . . εἰ δὲ τις, and οὗτος μὲν, τούτῳ δὲ being paired off
against one another. On this form of sentences, Mt. § 622. 4, remarks, that "clauses are put in contrast with one another by means of μεν and δὲ, of which only the second clause suits the connection, while the first in other languages would be treated as a parenthesis." Preserving the Greek order and form nearly, we may translate, "He reflects that it cannot be (οὐχ), if a man afflicted with great and incurable diseases, whom he has saved from drowning, is miserable because he lost not his life, that he on the other hand ought to live, who has many incurable maladies in that which is more precious than the body, the soul, and that he (the person so reflecting) will do him good if he deliver him from the dangers of the sea, or the tribunal, or any other place. Nay, he knows," etc. The use of the optative όνυφείν is to me at least perplexing. Stallb. renders it, with its attendant words, neque a se ullo modo juvari posse, and then in defence of it refers to Mt. § 529, on the oratio obliqua. But if I am not deceived, such a form as λογιζεται (being a present not equivalent to a historical tense, and not reducible to the form of oratio obliqua, as cases like λέγεται ὅσ τινά τις δέξατο are) ὃτι οὐκ ὀνυφείν would not be Greek, and if it were, must mean, not can benefit, but probably benefits. Heindorf conjectured ὀνυφείν ἄν, can (not) do him good, which in some degree removes the difficulty. I beg leave to offer an opposite conjecture, ὀνυφείς, on the supposition that the final syllable είν may owe its birth to ἄν wrongly repeated.

B. ο appréμοσ ἐστι, it is not the custom. —— μὴ ὅτι κυβερνήτου, i. e. μὴ εἰπης ὅτι, not to say, or to pass by the pilot, who is not mentioned in order to select a stronger case, that of the general. Comp. οὔχ ὅτι, 450, E, note. —— ἐλάττω σώζειν = ἐλάττονα σωτηρίαν πορίζειν, or ἀπεργάζεσθαι. —— μὴ σοι δοκεῖ κατὰ τὸν δικαιόν εἶναι; does he seem to you to be on a level with (and not rather above) the forensic man?
Comp. Repub. 466, B, μὴ πη κατὰ τῶν τῶν σκυτοτόμων φαίνεται βίων; does it seem to you to rank with the shoemaker's kind of life?

C. λέγων καὶ παρακάλῶν ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖν. Briefly for λέγων δεῖν, καὶ παρακάλων ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖν. — ὁσ οὐδὲν ταλλὰ ἐστὶν, on the ground that everything else is of no value (in comparison with engineering). — ἀποκαλέσαι. This compound of καλέω, as Stallb. remarks, is often used when a name is given in anger or contempt, = to call by a nickname, to call contemptuously, or with a scornful air. Examples may be found in Æschin. c. Ctes., and in Reiske's Index to Demosth. — ἐξ ōν τὰ σαυτοῦ ἐπαινεῖσ = ἐκ τῶν ἐπαινῶν οὐς τὸν σαυτὸ τέχνην ἐπαινεῖς.

D. μὴ γὰρ τοῦτο ... ἔστων ἐστὶ. μὴ denoting suspicion that something is true, or mild expression of opinion, may be joined with an indicative; and the like may be said of ὅρα μὴ also. Comp. Soph. Electr. 581, 584 (where τίθης, and not τιθῆς, is supported by the MSS.); Alcibiad. 2. 139, D, ἀλλ' ὅρα μὴ ὅχι οὕτω ταῦτα ἔχει. μὴ may here be translated by perhaps, or I suspect. The sense is, I suspect that a man deserving the name ought to throw away the idea of living as long as ever he can, and not love his life too well; and yielding the disposal of all such things to the Deity, as well as believing what the women say, that no one, whosoever he be, can escape his destiny, that he ought to consider thereupon how he can best live during the life which he is probably about to live, etc. A fine parallel passage occurs in Leges, 2. 661; C. ἐπιτρέπειν, in the sense of committing or referring to, and of giving up to, takes a dative of a person, often with a genitive with peri. Æschin. c. Ctes. § 83, εἰ ἐπιτρέπειν ἑξῆς πόλει των ἴση καὶ ὁμοία peri τῶν ἐγκλημάτων, if he wished to refer the grounds of complaint to some impartial and disinterested state. Alcibiad. 1. 117, D, τῷ κυβερνητῇ ἐπιτρέψα σὺν Ἰονίαν ἔχουσ; would you let the pilot have his
own way, and be quiet? For ὧν εἰς, more emphatic than ὀθέοις, comp. Eurip. Alcest. 671 (note in my ed.).

A. καὶ νῦν δὲ ἄρα δεί depends on σκέπτεσθαι ἄρα. — τὰς τὴν σελήνην καθαιροῦσας. The Thessalian sorceresses, who drew down the moon by their incantations, drew down mischief also upon themselves. They lost, it was thought, their eyes or their children, to which last τοῖς φιλτάτους alludes. Even an astrologer, in predicting an eclipse of the moon, which was akin, in the minds of the vulgar, to magical arts, was supposed to incur calamity. Hence ἐπὶ σαυτῷ σελήνῃ καθαιρεῖς, or καθέλκεις, is used proverbially of those who draw down calamities upon themselves by their conduct. The next words, σὺν τοῖς φιλτάτους, must mean with the loss of what we hold most dear, i. e., as Soocrates estimates things, of virtue and truth. σὺν here properly denotes the means, and it is only by inference from the connection that the phrase can imply the loss of. The preposition, as Stallb. observes, seems to be chosen with allusion to Iliad, 4. 161, σὺν τε μεγάλῳ ἀπέτισαν | σὺν σφήσιν κεφαλῆς γυναιξὶ τε καὶ τεκέσσες.

B. ἐν τῇ πόλει τῇ δε, i. e. in Athens. See 469, D, and 468, E, note. — ἀνόμωσον ... χεῖρον, so long as you are unlike the political institutions either on the better side or on the worse, i. e. so long as you are not assimilated exactly to the democracy of Athens, but are either like the true philosopher, in favor of better institutions, under which knowledge and virtue, and not the popular will, shall govern, and resemble such institutions in your character; or, on the other hand, have the selfish spirit in the extreme, like the tyrant who first corrupts, and then destroys, popular liberty. Thus, I suppose, the politics of Plato, as set forth in the Republic and Laws, require us to understand these words. — τι γνῶσαν ἀπεργύζεσθαι, etc., to effect any genuine or real result in regard to obtaining the friendship
of the Athenian people, i.e. to be on terms of true friendship with Athens. ἔμφω depends on φιλίαν. For τῷ Πυριδάμπος, see 481, D. — ὥσ ἐπιθυμεὶς πολιτικὸς εἶναι. Ast, after one MS., omits πολιτικὸς, but Stallb. justly says of it, iteratur non sine vi et gravitate. There is, as it seems to me, even something of scorn in the emphatical repetition of the word. ὥσ is since, seeing that; not as, i.e. according to (your wishes).

D. πρὸς ἡδονὴν ὁμλεῖν, i.e. τὸ των πρὸς ἡδ. σῶματι καὶ ψυχῇ ὁμλεῖν. With the indefinite subject of the infinitive agree the two subsequent participles.

E. ἡ δέ γε ἐτέρα, ὅπως. Supply ὁμλεῖ, as ὁμλοῦσα is understood just above with ἡ πρὸς ἡδονὴν.—ἐπιχειρητέον ... θεραπεῖν. The infinitive is added epexegetically, and the datives depend on the verbal. Comp. Soph. Electr. 543, 1277. For the construction of ποιοῦντας, see 492, B, note. It is without a copula as explaining οὗτος, and ὥσ is taken with βελτίστους only.

514 A. έφισκόμεν. The Atticists and MSS. vary in regard to the augment of verbs beginning with εν. The earlier practice seems to have been, to leave the diphthong unchanged. Mt. § 167. 6. Below, 514, E, two of the best MSS. give ἡφίσκομεν, and ἡφίσκει, 515, E. — εἰν μὴ ... ἠρτινοῦν explains and defines ἀνευ τοῦτου. Comp. a similar apposition of a clause beginning with εἰν μὴ in Soph. Antig. 87. — δημοσία πράξαντες τῶν πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων, after we had engaged in a public capacity in any transactions of the state. The genitive is taken partitively. The words πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων denote any employment in the state's service, as that of an ἐργολάβος, or contractor, like Phidias, and of an ἀρχιτέκτων, like Ictinus, the builder of the Parthenon.

B. εἰ ἐπιστάμεθα, and a little below, εἰ φοινοδημήκαμεν. After would it be incumbent on us to examine, we should add
in English, whether we knew, *ει ἡπιστάμεθα*, relative to *εἰδειν*, and not *εἰ επιστάμεθα*, which is absolute: and so whether we had *built* (in the pluperfect), not whether we have *built*. But the Greeks, in many kinds of dependent clauses, preferred the absolute to the relative form, as here. The cause of this lay in that liveliness of mind which made the past present and the possible real, and often led them to the use of *oratio recta* for *oratio obliqua*.

C. *ἰδια... ἡμῶν*. According to Ast, *ἡμῶν* depends on *ἰδια*, which would alone express the idea, were not *ἡμῶν* wanted for the contrast with *μετὰ τῶν διδασκάλων*. Those who would reject such an expression as *ἰδια ἡμῶν*, which is destitute of the support of parallel examples, must read with Stallb., after one MS., *ἰδια ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν.* — *οὔτω μὲν δι- ακεφειώτων*, etc. *It would be the part of prudent men, if so situated, to engage in public works*. Here ἦν has ἄν, but just below is without it. I think, with Ast, that although ἦν is often used without ἄν, (see Mt. § 508, Obs. 2,) yet here the influence of ἄν can extend to the second ἦν.

D. A very similar passage may be found in Laches, 186, B, C. In the first sentence, ἄν belongs to *ἐπεσκεψάμεθα*, which verb is taken with *πάντα... ἄλλα*, as well as with *εἰ παρεκαλοῦμεν*. The aorist, with ἄν following the imperfect, here denotes transitory action referable to present time (*if we were urging... we would examine*: see Hermann de partic. ἄν, 1. 10), or possibly (since we have *ἐσκόπον* just below) there may be an inaccuracy of style, like that of using our potential pluperfect for the imperfect, — *would have for would*. Comp. 447, D, for the opposite use of the imperfect (*εἰ ἐτύχανεν ἄν... ἀπεκρίνατο*), in speaking of something continuing in past time. Some would read *ἐπισκεπτόμεθα* here, but it is scarcely Attic. See 476, Α, note.

E. *ἄνθρωπος... ἐτύχομεν*. The style passes freely from
the first person plural, as a representative of a general truth, to the third, and then back again. There is no reason why we should suspect ἀνθρώπους, or read ἔτυχον. ὡστε goes with ἐπιχειρεῖν. — ὅπως ἔτυχομεν, = in an ordinary way, as we could, utcunque. — τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τούτο. See 447, A. δὴ is just or even. — ἐν τῷ πίθῳ, etc., to try to learn the potter's art by beginning with the jar,—the largest vessel, and therefore the hardest to make. This proverb occurs again in Laches, 187, B, in company with its opposite, ἐν τῷ Καρί ἡμῶν ὁ κῑνδυνός, i. e. to risk what you value least, attempt what you can best afford to fail in; which refers to the Carian mercenaries in war, whose blood was less precious than their employer's.

515 B. σὸν ἰδιωτέωντος. Soph. § 174; Cr. § 454; K. § 266. 2.
D. For what is here said of "the four," see the Introduction. — ἀγαθοὶ πολίται here is much the same as ἀγαθοὶ τὰ πολιτικά, which is used as an equivalent, 516, C, 517, A.

E. ἀκοῦω. See 503, C. — εἰς μυσθοφορίαν ... καταστήσαντα, by being the first to bring them into the practice of taking pay for performing their political duties. Pericles introduced the practice of paying the judges. The pay was one obolus per diem at first, and then three. After the death of Pericles, the people also drew pay for attending in the assembly. All this is explained at large in that admirable book, Boeckh's Civil Economy of Athens, Book II. §§ 14, 15. — τῶν τὰ ὅτα καταγῶτων. See 469, D. This phrase is explained fully by Protag. 342, B. "The Lacedæmonians," Socrates there says, "conceal their philosophy, and thus deceive those in other states who affect Spartan manners, and who, in imitation of them, have their ears bruised by blows received in boxing, (ὅτα κατάγωνται μηνούμενοι αὐτοῦ,) and bind the cæstus round their
hands and study gymnastics, and wear short tunics, just as
though the Lacedaemonians surpassed the rest of Greece by
such means." The phrase, then, denotes the partisans of
Sparta, those who admire Spartan institutions, and are ill-
affected towards Athens.

A. γεγόνεσαν. Comp. Soph. § 79 (91. 6, N. 4); Cr. 516
§ 194. 1; K. § 120, R. 2. — κλοπήν αυτοῦ κατεψηφίσαντο.
Thucyd. merely says (2. 65) χρήμασιν εξημίωσαν. Plutarch
mentions an accusation and a fine (Vit. Pericl. § 35), as
does Diodorus also (12. 45); but the charge was no doubt
false: he was χρημάτων διαφανῶς ἅδερτασος by the testi-
mony of the most impartial of historians. See Appendix,
No. II. — θαυμάτων ἐτίμησαν. See 486, B, note: δῆλον ὅτι,
1. 2. 32, for a similar passage. — ἀπεδείξε ἢ... ποιοῦντος,
if he had caused them to do. This verb and ἀποφαίνω are
often used in the sense of causing something to appear, of
effecting, rendering, and, like φαίνω, δείκνυμι, take their
complement in the form of a participle.

B. καὶ τόδε... χάρισμα. There is a similar play upon
χαρίζομαι in Republic. 1. 351, C, σοι γάρ, ἐφη, χαρίζομαι. ἐξ
γε σοῦ ποιῶν· ἀλλὰ δῇ καὶ τόδε μοι χάρισμα καὶ λέγε.

C. ὡς ἐφη ὁμηρος. Nusquam disertis verbis hoc dic-
tum in eo quem hodie habemus Homero, nisi quis huc trau-
here velit quod Routhius secut Odys. 6. 120, 9. 175, ἡ ρ' ἀγγειων τε καὶ ἄγγιων, οὐδὲ δίκαιοι. Heindorf. Plato
puts the ἄγαθον and ἡμερον together, in Republic. 5. 470, E,
and makes τὸ ἡμερον a part of the philosophic nature in Re-
pub. 3. 410, E. — δὲ ἡμερ', ἄν ἐβούλετο, i. e. eis ὃν.

D. What is here said of Cimon and Themistocles is
well known. What is said of Miltiades rests on the au-
thority of Plato, and of the Scholiast on Aristides 3. 677,
Dindorf, whom Valck. on Herodot. 6. 136 first cited from
a MS. The Scholiast says ὃτε ἐκρίνετο ἐπὶ τῇ Πάρῳ (i. e.

[résumé of the text, possibly with a summary or key points]
on account of his fruitless attack upon the island of Paros soon after the battle of Marathon), ἡθέλησαν αὐτὸν κατακρη-
µήσαι, ὁ δὲ πρύτανις εἰσελθὼν ἐξητήσατο αὐτὸν. Plato per-
haps exaggerates a little in saying ἐνηφόσατο. The Pry-
tanis, being president of the assembly of the people which tried the case, was probably one of those friends of Miltiades of whose advocacy Herodot. speaks, and by his inter-
cessions led the judges to lower the penalty from death to a heavy fine. But for that, death, by being thrown into the pit, would have been his portion. See Grote’s Greece, Vol.
IV. p. 491. — τὸν ἐν Μαραθώνι, him who was at Marathon, the general there. ἐν is used because the action was “in Marathoneio agro.” See Soph. Electr. 1. Thucyd. 2. 85, τῆς ἐν Στράτῳ μάχης, at, near Stratus. — τὸ βάραθρον is de-
fined by Timaeus (Lex. Plat. s. v.), “a place like a well, where the condemned were thrown,” and in Bekker’s An-
ecdot. 1. 219, is said to be “an excavation in Keiriadæ, a demus of the Õneid tribe, where they threw down the capi-
tally condemned, as the Lacedæmonians did into Καῦδας.”
Herodot. 7. 133, says that the heralds of Darius were thrown
by the Athenians into this place. Comp. Aristoph. Clouds,
1450, and the Schol. on Aristoph. Plut. 431.

E. ἐι ὑπὶ διά, but for. This not unfrequent formula has al-
ways the same sense as if some part of κωλὺω were under-
stood. The origin of the phrase is not clear. Ast ac-
counts for it as a confusion or union of two forms of speak-
ing; e. g., in this case, ἐι ὑπὶ ὁ Πρύτανις ἤν, if the Prytanis had not existed, . . . ἐνέπεσεν ἂν, and διὰ τὸν Π. . . . οὐκ ἐνέ-
πεσεν. — οὐκοῦν οὐ γε ἄγαθοι ἥνισχοι, etc. This sentence
is formed like that explained in the note on 512, A. The
sense is, It is not true that good drivers are not at first
thrown from their chariots, but when they have improved their
horses by care, and have become better drivers themselves, that
they are then thrown out. Ζεῦγος is often used of the vehi-
cle, as well as of the yoke or pair of animals drawing it.
A. τῶν μέντοι ἐμπροσθεν. Here, by a kind of zeugma, ἔλεγε 517 γες, readily suggested by ὧμολογεῖς, is to be supplied, together with τινὰς, which is contained in οὐδένα. Comp. Soph. Antig. 29. — οὐ γὰρ ἄν ἐξέπεσον. The metaphor is borrowed from charioteers, and is the more natural, as persons who lost their rank or authority were said ἐκπεσεῖν. Comp. Soph. Antig. 679. — οὔτε τῇ κολακίκῃ. If they had used the true art of rhetoric, that is, had been good politicians, they would have made the people better, and not have had to rue its ingratitude: if the flattering art of rhetoric, they would have escaped from dangers, because that art, according to the Sophists, σῶζει ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων μάλιστα μὲν ἐαντὸν. Aristides triumphs in a supposed inconsistency of Plato, who had before called "the four" κόλακες, and now says that they did not use τῇ κολακίκῃ ῥητορίκῃ. But he does not see into the meaning. The words contain a sneer at the rhetoricians. They were κόλακες, inasmuch as they studied to gratify, not to benefit; and carrying such a motive into their public addresses, they imbued all their words with it. But if the false art of rhetoric can rescue from dangers, and makes that its first aim, they fell short of it. In other words, the art cannot gain its own dearest ends. They had the principles of the false rhetoric, but could not gain that for which the art was esteemed.

B. πολλοῦ γε δεῖ ... μὴ ... ἐργάσηται. πολλοῦ δεῖ is usually followed by an infinitive, and Stallb. says that he knows of no example like this. The reason for the construction seems to be, that πολλοῦ δεῖ, being in sense a negative, adopts the construction appropriate to οὐ. οὗ μὴ ἐργάσηται would be a familiar formula. — ὅς βούλει, a singular expression for (τις) ὄν βούλει, to be referred to the rule of attraction of the relative. Comp. Cr. § 526. γ. The verb must be regarded as coalescing with ὅς to form one notion, like quivis in Latin. — ὅς γε διακόνους εἶναι πόλεως, as to
their being servants of the state, or considering them merely as (ὡς γε) being servants of the state. Stallb. thinks that the phrase arises, by a *confusio duarum locutionum*, out of ὡς . . . διακόνους, and διακόνους εἶναι. But the infinitive with ὡς can be used in this relation to the main verb, as well as in others. — καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν, and in regard to not letting them have their own way. The infinitives limit διέφερον.

—τοίτων, politicians of the present day.

C. οὐδὲν πανόμεθα . . . ἄεί. Comp. 491, A. — ἀγνοοῦντες ἀλλήλων ὦ τι λέγομεν. ἀγνοεῖ takes a genitive, like μαθάνω and other verbs of learning or understanding. Soph. § 182; Cr. § 375. β; K. § 273. 5, 1.

D. ἢ διανατόν εἶναι is for ἢ δ. ἐστὶ, by a change of style from direct to suspended discourse. Supply ὧμολογήκαμεν. — ρηγὸ is for ρηγοῖ, subjunctive of ρηγῶ; and so ρηγὸν for ρηγοῦν infinitive, in Aristoph. Clouds, 442. This is quite analogous to the contraction of πεινῶ, and a few others in α.ω, by η instead of α, but is usual with no other verb except ἑδρῶ. Buttmann (largest Gr. 1. 506, and note in Heindorf) thinks that both contractions are relics of a general method prevailing in old Ionic. — τοίτων γὰρ ποριστικῶν εἶναι, etc. This sentence changes its structure, and proceeds as if ὤντα, and not εἶναι, had stood here. The anacoluthon is caused by the explanatory clause ἦ κατηχοῦν ὁντα . . . σκυντοδεψόν, and by the difficulty of carrying out the original construction.

518 A. διὸ δὴ καὶ ταῦτα . . . εἶναι. The construction changes from ὦτι and a finite verb, εἰδότι ὦτι ἐστὶ τις, etc., to an infinitive with its subject accus. — ταῦτα οὖν ταῦτα, etc. Now at one time you seem to be aware that I say that the self-same thing holds good of the soul also, and you agree to it, as if understanding what I mean. τοτε μὲν answers to ὀλίγον δὲ ὑπερεῖν, and δὲ is, in a sense, out of its place.

B. προτεινώθαι, to hold forward as a sample of what
one has got, hence to take, or select as a specimen. — όμοιοτάτως . . . ὁσπερ. See 485, A. — Θεαρίων must have been the fashionable baker at Athens. He is thus spoken of in a fragment of the Gerytades of Aristophanes (Athenæus, 3. 112, E): ἢκω Θεαρίωνος ἀρτοπώλιον | λιπών, ἵν ἐστὶ κριβάνων ἐδῶδια, — which is a parody of the beginning of the Hecuba. And a longer fragment from the Omphale of Antiphanes, preserved in the same place, asks, (by way of parody on Soph. Electr. 257, perhaps,) how a man of noble birth could ever go out of the house where he saw the white loaves of bread . . . ὅτι δημόται | Θεαρίων ἐδειξεν. — ἀρτοκόπος. In a number of MSS., ἀρτοπώως appears. Still another word for the same thing is ἀρτοπότος, which has most commendation from the Atticists, and which has probably been without reason thrust out of its place by the other words in a number of instances. See Lobeck on Phrynichus, 222. — Μίθακας, etc. Mithæcus, who wrote the treatise called "La Cuisine Sicilienne." The Sicilians were in the gastronomic art to the Greeks what the French are now to the world, and Mithæcus was a Syracusean cook. Repub. 3. 404, D, Συρακοσίων τράπεζαν καὶ Σικελικῆν ποικιλίαν δψων, ὡς έικος, οἰκίν αἰνεῖς. Athenæus, 12. 518, C, διαβόητοί εἶσαι ἐπὶ τρυφῆ καὶ αἰ Σικελῶν τράπεζαν. Comp. also Cicero de Fin. 2. 28. According to Maximus Tyrius (23. 1), cited by Routh, Mithæcus went to Sparta, but they, thinking that too many cooks would spoil their broth, drove him away. — To Sarambus (or Sarabus, as Meineke, Com. Græc. frag. 4. 525, would write the name) many later writers allude, but they seem to have derived their knowledge of him from this passage. See the commentators on Suidas, sub voce.

C. παρασκευαστάς ἀνθρώπους. ἀνθρώπος is often added in contempt, having something of the force of our fellow. ἀνηρ is used, on the contrary, with an honorable sense. This
is shown at large in Valckenaer's Opusc. 2. 243, ed. Lips. —— οὗ, ἀν οὕτω τίχωσον, etc. Who, it may be, after they have filled and fattened the bodies of the men, and while they are praised by them, will cause the loss (not only of this increase of flesh, but) of their old flesh besides.

D. ὅταν δὴ αὐτοῖς ἡκη, when now their former repletion shall have brought on disease a good while afterwards. ἡκω φέρων is often nearly the same as φέρω, and can only be figuratively explained here of the repletion acting as a cause bringing in its train disease as the effect.

E. Nothing is truer than these remarks. The seeds of present national evil are sown in the past, and yet we blame the men of the present for what we suffer, and praise the men of the past, who are the true source of our calamities. It is thus that some, who look with alarm on the turn our affairs are taking, worship Jefferson as a political saint. —— καὶ φασι . . . αἰτοῦσ is for καὶ οὕς φασί, by a change of style from the relative to the demonstrative.

519 A. καταβολή. περιοδικὴ λῆψις πυρετοῦ, interpreté Timæo Lex. p. 154 ubi v. Ruhnken. Heindorf. ——'Αλκιβιάδου. As he had some time before left Athens for the last time, Plato is here forgetful of dates. See 481, D, note, and Appendix, No. I.

B. ἀγανακτοῦντων, sc. αὑτῶν, these politicians.

C. Comp. 460, C, and Xen. Memorab. 1. 2. 7. —— κιν-δυνεῖς ταῦτον εἶναι, (τούτος,) ὅσοι, the same thing seems to hold good of those who, etc. But Mt. § 632, has a different explanation of the form of the sentence.

D. καὶ τοῦτον τοῦ λόγου. For καὶ, Heindorf, without authority, writes καίτοι. But καὶ, in the beginning of imperative and interrogative sentences, marks liveliness of transition (Mt. § 620), like our and in animated questions, particularly in those where objections are refuted. —— δὴ-μηγορεῖν μὲ ἡνάγκασας. See 482, C, 494, D.
E. συχνοὺς τείνω τῶν λόγων. The construction seems to be τινὰς τῶν λόγων συχνοῖς τείνω, i. e. ὅστε συχνοῖς εἶναι, some things which I have to say I dwell largely upon. But if λόγον depends on συχνοῖς, as it well can (comp. Soph. § 177. 1), the sense must be, I think, a good many of my discourses I extend in length. — πρὸς φίλουν. See 500, B.

A. ὅταν τίχωσιν. Comp. 511, E, 518, C. — What is said here refers to Protagoras, Prodicus, and other professed teachers of virtue, as Heindorf remarks; and it is amusing to see the contempt felt by the friend of Gorgias, a mere teacher of words (λέγειν οίεται δεῖν ποιεῖν δεινούς, Meno, 95, C), for the Sophists, whose pretensions were as much higher as wisdom is higher than eloquence.

B. ἤ... ἅμα καὶ εαυτῶν κατηγορεῖν. Here supply δεῖν or ἀνάγκην εἶναι, which is readily suggested by ἐγχωρεῖν. Comp. 517, A.

C. προσέβας, to bestow freely, and in the first instance, without knowing what return the party receiving the favor will make. Comp. Thucyd. 2. 43, κάλλιστον ἔραυνον αὐτῇ προέμενοι, bestowing upon their country a most precious contribution. So προεμένως εὐφρεσίαν, Xen. Anab. 7. 7. 47, where Schneider adverts to this sense. — ἄνεν μισθοῦ. Protagoras, who first openly called himself a Sophist and took pay (Protag. 349, A), says (328, B) that he had a price, which his student might give if he pleased; but if not, that the student went to a temple, and paid so much as he (the student) pronounced on oath the instructions to be worth. For the opinions of Socrates on this point, see, among the rest, Xen. Memorab. 1. 6. 13. — ἐνέχωρετ. The absolute form without ἄν is here used for the hypothetical with it. See Mt. § 508, Obs. 2; K. § 260, R. 3. — τὸν χάρων, the favor due, the compensation, as a mark of a grateful mind. — καὶ μὴ συνέμενος... τὸ ἀργύριον, and should not take the money in consequence of a bargain made
with him (i.e. should not take it as the payment which was stipulated) at the very time when he was imparting to him the power of swiftness. ὅτι μάλιστα is joined with ἄμα to increase its preciseness.

E. εἶν μὴ τις αὐτῷ δίδῃ. αὐτῷ refers to the indefinite subject of φάναι. — ἄντι εὗ ποιήσαν. There can be little doubt that Stallb. is right in separating these words, in opposition to Buttmann (2. 361, largest Gr.), who writes in one word ἀντενποιεῖν. εὗ and δεῖ are united only to derivative forms, except in the instance of the strange word δυνήσκων, used by Euripides. — εἰ εὗ ποιήσαν. Heindorf writes ὃ εὗ ποιήσας, "sed fallitur, loco qui repudiat articulum non recte explicato." Hermann on Eurip. Hecuba, 485, 2d ed. The indefinite subject is understood, and εὗ ποιήσας denotes after conferring a favor.

521 A. ὃς διακονήσωτα καὶ ὄμιλήσωτα. Instead of writing τὴν τοῦ διακόνειν καὶ ὄμιλεῖν, Plato deserts the construction of the nearest words, through the influence of ὃς ἰατρῶν, and accommodates the participles to παρακαλεῖσ. See Mt. § 555, Obs. 2. Just below, Heindorf, Coray, and Stallb. think that ὃς has fallen out before κολακεύσωτα.

B. εἰ σοι Μυσῶν γε ἧδιον καλεῖν. The sense of this vexed passage seems to be that which Stallb. and Olympiod., whom he cites from the MSS., give to it, if you like better to call (such a man) a Mysian, call him so; i.e. "You may give the political man the most contemptible name that you can find. Do as you like about that, since if you will not act so as to gratify the Athenians (εἰ μὴ ... ποιήσεις) you will —-.

The apodosis to εἰ ... καλεῖν is omitted, being readily suggested by the sense of the passage. It is οὔτως καλεῖ, or οὔτεν καλῶν, or something equivalent. The apodosis which εἰ μὴ ... ποιήσεις would have had, if Socrates had not cut the sentence short, is to be found in his words. With καλεῖν must be understood τοῦ-
\(\tau ν, t h i s \ p o l i t i c a l \ m a n,\) whom in fact, though not in so many words, Socrates calls a \(κόλακα.\) But the connection with the foregoing must be owned to be rather loose. The My- 
sians stood low among the people of Asia Minor. \(Μυσών \varepsilonχάτος\) (Theaetet. 209, B) is a proverb for the vilest of the 
vile. Cicero, in his Or. pro Flacco, § 27, says: "Quid 
porro in Græco sermone, tam tritum atque celebratum est, 
quam, si quis despicatui ducitur, ut Mysorum ultimus esse 
dicatur?"

C. \(ο\(ιχ \varepsilon\θει \ο ν \chiρήσει\) αυτοίς. \) αυτοίς is \(h i s \) \(p r o p e r t y,\)
before spoken of in \(εϊ\(ώ\)ν \(τι \varepsilonχω.\) In 465, C, the indicative, 
but in many places the subjunctive, follows \(\varepsilonχω\) in this for-
\(mula.\) The distinction seems to be, that with the future the 
action is viewed as simply future; with the subjunctive, as 
connected with and dependent on some contemplated cause 
and ground of action. Thus, in \(ο\(ικ \varepsilon\θει \ο ν \chiρήσει\) τι, the 
subject is in doubt about his future action; in \(ο\(ικ \varepsilon. \) \(ο ν \chiρήσει\)
\(τι,\) about his rational future action. — \(ος \) \(μοι \) \(δοκεῖ\)\(s. \) \(ος\) 
is exclamatory. — \(ος \) \(οικών \ldots \) \(κα\) \(οικ \) \(αν \) \(εισαχθεί\)\(s,\) as 
\(t h o u g h\) you were \(l i v i n g\) \(a l o o f, a n d\) \(c o u l d\) \(n o t\) \(b e\) \(b r o u g h t\) (on 
\(t r i a l\) \(i n t o\) \(c o u r t.\) \) \(F o r \) \(εισαχθεί\) \(αν\) \(c o m p. 458, \) \(A, n o t e.\)

D. \(ο ν \varepsilonχα.\) Mireris Heindorfium \(ο ν \varepsilonχα \) \(c o r r i-
gentem.\) Nam optativus post relativa in obliqua oratione 
\(h a u d\) \(q u a c h s\) \(i n f r e q u e n t s\) \(c e s.\) Addito \(αν \) hoc loco \(s c r i b e n-
dum\) \(e r a t \varepsilonχα.\) Stalb. — The dissatisfaction with the 
political institutions of Athens, which is here clearly im-
plied, was felt by Socrates to some degree, but far more by 
Plato, whose ideal turn of mind was not fitted to find satis-
\(f a c t i o n\) in the present under any system, particularly under 
one where \(d e m a g o g u e s\) reigned, and philosophers had to 
\(d r i n k\) \(p o i s o n.\) — \(πονηρός.\) An allusion, no doubt, to the 
\(a c c u s e r s.\) — \(ου\) \(δε\) \(γε \) \(ατοπον, s c. \varepsilonν.\)

E. \(τα \) \(κομψά\) \(ταύτα.\) An allusion to what Callicles says, 
486, C. — \(ο\) \(δε \) \(ε\) \(ργασται \) \(ανύρ. \) \(ο\) \(δε, l i k e \) \(ο\) \(τος, 489, B,\)
used of a person who is present and pointed at, has no article. —— καὶ αὐτοῦς, καὶ τοὺς νεωτάτους. αὐτοῦς is taken with ὑμᾶς εἰργασταί, and serves to contrast the whole ὑμᾶς with the part νεωτάτους. καὶ = and especially. —— νεωτάτους διαφθείρει. An allusion to the actual charge against Socrates. Comp. 522, B.

522 A. For εὐωχεῖν governing two accusatives, see Mt. § 421, Obs. 1; Cr. § 430. This construction (which γεῦω also sometimes takes) seems to be owing to this; that the verb means substantially to make to eat, and needs an object for each of these notions. —— The sentiment conveyed by this comparison of the cook and the physician is expressed in another way by Crates of Thebes, a Cynic philosopher who flourished at Athens in Alexander's time (Diog. Laert. 6. 86): τίθει μαγείρῳ μνᾶς δέκ', ιατρῷ δραχμήν. | κολακὶ ταλαντα πέντε, συμβούλῳ καπνὸν. | πάρῃ τάλαντον, φιλοσόφῳ τριώμβολον.

B. oὔτε γὰρ ἡδονᾶς. To oὔτε, εάν τε answers. An affirmative and a negative proposition are often thus bound together by oὔτε and τε; but oὔτε must come first. αὐτοῖς the judges implied in δικαστήριον. —— oὔτε οἰς πορίζεται, i. e. oὔτε τούτος, οἰς ταῦτα (referring to ἡδοναὶ) πορίζεται. —— ἀπορεῖν ποιώντα. This was a frequent charge against Socrates. The doubt he threw upon their former opinions, and the unsettled state of mind which he produced, may have been unwelcome to a few, and regarded as dangerous by a few more; but probably nothing made him more unpopular than his provoking way of bringing men who argued with him to a stand, so that they did not know what to say. Meno.says (79, D, cited by Heindorf), "O Socrates, I used to hear it said of you, before I became acquainted with you, that you do nothing else except αὐτὸς τε ἀπορεῖς, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖς ἀπορεῖν."

C. πράττω τὸ ύμέτερον δή τοῦτο, and herein I am doing
just (δῆ) what is for your interest. Ast takes πάντα ταύτα with πράττω, as well as with λέγω, and ιμέτερον...τὸῦτο as added in apposition.—οὖτως διακείμενος (not οὖτω). Videtur οὖτως, etiam sequente consone litera, usurpatum esse ubi vi et pondere suo pollet plurimum. Stallb.—ἐν αὐτῷ ἐπάρχει. Heindorf wishes to erase ἐν, or write ἐν, with some reason, as ἐπάρχει takes with it a simple dative.

D. βοήθεια ἐαυτῷ. This noun with the dative denotes help afforded to; with the genitive, against (comp. βοήθεια κακοῦ, 509, C, βαρβάρων, Plat. Epist. 7. 332, E), or to any one.—There is an allusion here to 486, B.

E. αὐτὸ τὸ ἀποδηνησεῖν. Comp. for the sentiment Plato's Apol. 28, B, et seq.—φοβείται, sc. τὸς τις, by brachylogy supplied from οὖθείς, just above. See my note on Soph. Antig. 29.—ὡς τοῦτο οὖτως ἔχει depends on λόγον λέει, as if it were λόγῳ δείξας ὡς...ἔχει.

A. φασί, i. e. as story-tellers say, when they begin a 523 story.—λόγος opposed to μῦθος is a historical narrative, a true story, as opposed to a fictitious narrative.—"Ομηρός λέει. Iliad. 15. 187.—καὶ ἀεὶ καὶ νῦν ἐτί, et semper et nunc etiam. Ast. ἐστιν includes a past tense.

B. νεωτι, in modern times, used relatively to the days of Saturn.—οἱ ἐκ...νήσων. The preposition is accommodated to ιῶτες (see Soph. Electr. 137), because the officers set over the blessed islands came from thence. Comp. Cr. § 659; K. § 300. 4; and 472, B, note.

C. ἐκατέρωσε, in each direction, to the blessed islands, and to the prison of punishment.

D. προκεκαλυμμένω = ἔχοντες προκεκαλυμμένον. See Æsch. Prometh. 362; Soph. Electr. 54. "The sense is, having eyes and ears, and the whole body, spread as a veil before the soul.—αὐτῶς...ἐπίσραθεν γίγνεται, are in their way.—τοῦτ’ αὐτῶν, this property of theirs, this in them.
E. ἐξαιρήσει ἀποθανόντος = εἰθεὶς ἀποθανόντος, the moment he is dead. Soph. § 222, N. 4. — By a construction ad sensum, ἐφημοῦ ... καταλιπόντα are in the masculine, because τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκάστου is the same as each person. — ὅπο ἐκ τῆς Ἁσίας. Routh explains this by their being born of Europa, a Phœnician, and adds, that Minos was regarded by some as a stranger in Crete. “Sed Cretam insulam Asiae assignasse videntur veteres sicut Libyam modo Europæ modo Asiae contribuerunt; ut duas orbis terrarum partes posuerint, Asiae et Europam.” Ast. But no proof has been found elsewhere, that Crete was assigned to Asia.

524

A. ἐν τῷ λεμὼν, etc. Virgil, Æneid, 6. 540: —

“Hic locus est, partes ubi se via findit in ambas:
Dextera, quae Ditis magni sub moenia tendit,
Hac iter Elysium nobis: at leva malorum
Exercet pœnas, et ad impia Tartara mittit.”

B. οὐ πολὺ ἤττον ... ἡνπερ καὶ ὅτε ἐξη. A free and rather irregular construction, instead of οὐ πολὺ ἤττον ... ἡ ὅτε ἐξη. ἡνπερ is brought in through the influence of τὴν ἐξιν τὴν αὐτοῦ, and alters the ensuing words to suit itself.

D. οῖος εἶναι παρεσκεύαστο, etc., such as he had prepared himself to be while living in regard to his body, i. e. such as were his ways of using his body. Just below, ἐνθηλα ταῦτα refer to the qualities of body implied in οῖος εἶναι παρεσκεύαστο, as if οἷα ἔσχεν ἐν τῷ σώματε had been written.

E. κατείδεν ... ψυχῆς. The aorist marks indefinite time (484, A, note): ψυχῆς depends on οὐδέν; nothing belonging to, or in, the soul. Comp. Republic. 376, A, ὅ καὶ ἄξιον θαύμασαι τοῦ θηρίου. — ἀλλὰ διαμεματισμένην, etc. Tacit. Annal. 6. 6, “Neque frustra prestantissimus sapientiae firmare solitus est, si recludantur tyrannorum meutes, posse adspici laniatus et ictus; quando, ut corpora verbibus, ita sævitia, libidine, malis consultis animus dilacetur.”
B. οἱ ὁφελοῦμενοι ... καὶ διδότες, i. e. those who, while they suffer, are made better ... are such as, etc.

C. τοῖς ἅ. See 464, D; Prometh. 937.

D. τοὺς πολλοὺς ... παραδειγμάτων. By a constructio ad sensum, παραδειγμάτων used of the persons who serve as examples, is joined to πολλοὺς, as if it were masculine. — Ὁμήρος. Odys. 11. 575, seq.

E. οὐ γὰρ ἐξῆν αὐτῷ, sc. συνέχεσθαι. — ἐκ τῶν ... ἀνθρώπων, the men who prove to be even very wicked are of the class of the powerful. Here, 497, A, 526, B, and elsewhere, γίγνεσθαι means to become subjectively, i. e. to become in the view of the mind, to be found out to be.

C. ἐπυθηματίμενος, ἐὰν τε, etc., putting his mark upon him to show whether he thinks him curable or not. Comp. Repub. 10. 614, which I will give in English. "When, therefore, his soul went out of his body, he began a journey, with a number of others, and they came to a wonderful place, where there were two openings in the ground close by one another, and others opposite to them above in the sky. Between these judges sat, who, whenever they finished judging, bade the just take the road on the right and upwards through the sky, having first attached certificates (σημεῖα) to those who had been judged, in front; and ordered the unjust to take the road to the left and leading downward, with marks behind indicating all their conduct.

—— οὐ πολυπραγμονήσαντος, who has not been "a busybody in other men's matters," who has not gone out of his own sphere of duties, to perform a part belonging to another. In Repub. 4. 433, A, it is made a definition of justice, that a man ῥὰ αὐτὸν πράττει καὶ οὐ πολυπραγμονεῖ. Here the words especially point at taking an active part in politics, which, for a man who is not yet qualified for political life, is undertaking another's duty to the neglect of his own.
C, D. ἐκάτερος ... νεκυσιον. This passage is considered to be spurious by Heindorf and Ast, for reasons which, as far as I can see, are altogether insufficient. The passage from Homer is in Odys. 11. 568.

E. ἀντιπαρακαλῶ. ἀντί denotes in my turn, in reply to the exhortations which you gave me to engage in politics. Just below, ἀντὶ ... ἀγώνων denotes worth all the trials here, i.e. to be set against or equal in importance to all the trials before human tribunals, where rhetoric, as its advocates alleged, would save a man from condemnation. ἐνθάδε, ἐκεῖ, and ἐκεῖσε are often used of this life, and of death or a future state; the context of course suggesting the explanation. Comp. Soph. Antig. 76; Electr. 356; Eurip. Alcest. 363.

527 A. τὸν τῆς Αἰγίνης νιόν. Αἰacus (son of Jupiter and Αἴγινα), as being the judge for all from Europe. Olympiod. apud Stallb. says, "He adds Αἴγινα because Callicles was from Αἴγινα." But as that Platonic Scholiast can have known nothing about Callicles, I suspect that the last word, Αἰγίνης, is an error in transcribing for Εἰρώπης, occasioned by the similar word preceding it. — χισμήσει, etc. This noble passage alludes to 486, B. — τυπτήσει. The Attic form of the future of τύπτω, according to Thomas Magister and Mæris sub voce. Comp. Aristoph. Clouds, 1379, 1443. The later writers used all the forms from τυπτέω, unless it be the present and imperfect.

B. ἐκεῖσε ... συμφέρων, advantageous there. See 526, E. The adverb of motion is used, because the journey from this world is thought of. It is the same as when we go thither. Comp. the opposite in Αἰσχιν. c. Ctes. § 97, Bekker: "He said that he wished to report to you τὴν ἐκ Πελοποννήσου προσβείν ἣν ἐπρέσβενος, his embassy into Πελοποννήσου, strictly the embassy into Π. from which he had returned. — ἡρεμεῖ, remains quiet, unshaken, i.e. unre-
futed. — ou to dokein einai agathon, alla to einai. Comp. the noble words in Repub. 2. 361, Α, ἐσχάτη ἀδίκων dokein dikaiou einai, μὴ ὀντα. Ἀeschylus was the source of the expression, Sept. c. Theb. 574, ou γὰρ dokein ἀριστος ἄλλ' εἶναι δὲλει, upon which words all the theatre turned and looked at Aristides, according to Plutarch in his life.

C. ouw xρηστέων. ouw is immediately explained by επὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἀεί. — ενταῦθα, to that kind of life. ενταῦθα came perhaps to be used with a verb of motion, because with the motion its end, rest in the place, is often thought of. — ὃς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει, as the discourse shows. Stallb. gives ὃς ὁ σὸν λόγος, with the best of the MSS., to which Ast very justly objects. The same false reading appears 511, B, 460, C, and Socrates could not call the argument, so far as it proved this point, the argument of Callicles, to whom he here speaks.

D. πατάξαι. The interpreters are divided between πατάξαι, with which ἐκαύν των and σε, from σου, just above, are to be supplied, and πατάξαι sine te verberari. Buttmann even denies that the middle can have this sense, and, I incline to think, with reason. It may denote strike yourself, or get yourself struck (i. e. do something which shall cause the action of striking to come back upon yourself), but not allow yourself to be struck, i. e., in this place, “bear such an infliction without thinking it the greatest evil in the world.” Stallb., in defence of the middle so used, cites from Aristoph. Clouds, 494, φέρ' ἰδω τι δρᾶς, ἢν τίς σε τύπτη; where Strepsiades replies, τύπτομαι: this word Stallb. takes in the sense of ἐω ἐμαυτῶν τύπτεσθαι. I apprehend that τύπτομαι is in the passive. “What do you do,” says Socrates, “if a person beats you?” “I am beaten,” is the reply; i. e. I do nothing but suffer, I get beaten. We need not be troubled by σὺ γε θυφρών; for σὺ is occasionally repeated with γε in the second clause, with a certain increase of
force in the exhortation. Comp. Herodot. 7. 10, "I shall hear of you as being torn to pieces by dogs and birds, ἦ κοῦ ἐν γῇ τῇ Ἀθηναίων ἦ σὲ γε ἐν τῇ Δακεδαμονίων;" Soph. OEd. Tyr. 1101, τίς σε ... ἐτικτε ... Πανὸς ... προσπελασθείσ', ἦ σὲ γε ... Λοξίου; The sense is true of δι' γε, and lu in Latin. Nor do I see how ἑαρρῷν opposes this construction any more than ἑαρροῦντως would. The sense, then, is, Yes, indeed, and do you calmly let him give you this dishonorable blow.——Stallb., I find, has given up his defence of πά-ταξαι, imperative middle, in his second edition.

E. οἶς οὐδέποτε ταύτα δοκεῖ. Comp. 491, B. He includes himself in the censure, to give it a milder form.
APPENDIX.

No. I.

Where and when does Plato represent this Dialogue to have taken place?

1. Where? In the house of Callicles, say all with whose opinion I am acquainted, except Schleiermacher. He decides in favor of some public place, such as the Lyceum, where other conversations of Socrates were held. His reasons, given in a note on his translation of Gorgias (Vol. III. 473, of his Plato), are principally these. 1. Socrates (447, B) seems to be going into the place where Gorgias is. He meets Callicles without, who says, "Whenever you wish to come to my house, Gorgias will exhibit to you, for he lodges with me." (See the note on that place.) The words, whenever you wish to come, must relate to some future time. What does Callicles do, then, if they are at his house, (Schl. leaves to be implied,) but shut the door in his visitors' faces. To tell a stranger just entering your house to call at any time, without asking him in, is to turn him away. 2. Schl. finds it strange, and not consistent with Athenian politeness, that Callicles should have deserted his guests, and be going away from his own house. To these reasons of Schleiermacher's may be added two others. 3. If Socrates and his friend were at the door of Callicles's house to hear Gorgias display his rhetorical powers, and if Chærephon knew Gorgias well, why should they need the information that Gorgias lodged there? 4. Perhaps it may be
regarded as a slight argument, that Socrates says (506, A), ἔώμεν χαίρειν καὶ ἀπίστομεν: to which Gorgias replies, "It does not seem to me that we ought yet ἀπιέναι." For ἀπιέναι must have the same subject as the preceding ἀπίστομεν. Here, then, Socrates expects that the other parties to the conversation will go away from the place when the discourse is broken off; and Gorgias repeats what Socrates had said, including himself among those who would leave the place. But this could not be, if they were where Gorgias was staying.

No one within my knowledge has examined what Schleiermacher says on this point, or given reasons for choosing the house of Callicles as the scene of the Dialogue, except Cousin. His reasons, I must think, have little weight. 1. There would have been some allusion, direct or indirect, to the place, if a public one. The same might be said, with equal reason, I think, on the other side. 2. It was mainly in private houses, as Plato affirms in Hippias Major, that Gorgias spoke. Plato's expression is ἰδία ἐπίδειξις ποιόμενος, and ἰδία, contrasted with ἐν τῷ δήμῳ, just preceding, means nothing more than in other places besides the assembly. 3. Of Callicles leaving his guests, and going out to talk with Socrates, he says, "Nothing is more natural than to go to meet persons who are visiting you, and whom you are to receive, at the entrance of your house." If I mistake not, the porter would have admitted the strangers, and the master of the house have been in a distant part of the building. 4. To Schleiermacher's main remark, he replies, that, as Gorgias was fatigued, Callicles could not ask him to repeat his exhibition, and therefore begged the visitors to call at another time. But need they be turned away? Might they not be invited in, without the necessity of a new exhibition on the part of Gorgias?

2. *When?* The passage 473, E, which is treated of at
large in the note, has been usually supposed to determine the time. But several scholars, as Boeckh (which I learn from C. F. Hermann’s work, I. 634) and Foss, have ascribed an earlier date to the Dialogue, and one so early even as the first visit of Gorgias to Athens. The arguments, so far as I know them, with a single exception, are of little importance. They are,—1. Pericles is spoken of as νεωστὶ τετελευτηκός, 503, C. But νεωστὶ may be widely used. Comp. 523, B. "Nuper, id est paucis ante sæculis." Cic. de Nat. Deor. 2. 50. It was twenty-four years before 405 B.C. And Pericles in this passage is contrasted tacitly with Themistocles, Cimon, and Miltiades, whose deaths were considerably earlier. 2. Archelaus is said to have committed the crimes by which he gained the throne "yesterday and the day before." But this is very plainly a rhetorical contrast with the παλαιὸς πράγμασιν, just before spoken of. See 470, D. 3. Demus, son of Pyrilampes, was a youth when the Wasps was written, seventeen years before 405 B.C. See 481, D. Suppose him thirty-two in 405, Plato, I imagine, if he had been aware, at the time of writing, of his exact age, would not have scrupled to say what he does. 4. The passage, 473, E, where Socrates speaks of his ignorance of the way to put the question when he was a presiding officer, is inconsistent with Apology 32, B, which refers to the famous occasion in 406 B.C. Socrates, therefore, must allude to something else. I can scarcely conceive how any one, used to the style of the Platonic Socrates, can take what he says 473, E, as sober earnest. 5. In 481, D, and 519, A, Alcibiades is spoken of as beloved by Socrates after their intimacy must long have ceased, and as likely to be punished by the Athenians, after his last departure from Athens, and a little before his death. This appears to me the most serious objection to the year 405. But I apprehend that this is by
no means the only instance in which Plato assigns the relations of one time to another, changing the more immaterial circumstances, as the tragic poets did those of the fables, to suit his design.

No. II.

On what is said of Pericles, 516, A, and on the Character given to him in this Dialogue.

An eminent historian (Thirlwall, Hist. of Greece, Vol. III., chap. 18, and Appendix, 2) has examined the passage above quoted, and thinks that Plato's charge of peculation at this time arose out of a confusion of dates and circumstances. This may be so, but there are two things which ought to be said on behalf of Plato, before we fully condemn him for injustice towards his great countryman. The first is, that he expresses no opinion as to the justice of the charge. If it is admitted to be unjust, his argument is so much the stronger, for it turns upon the ingratitude of a people towards its public servants. Indeed, taken in connection with the charges against Themistocles, Cimon, and Miltiades, it wears the appearance of an unfounded accusation. The other is, that the fact may have been as Plato represents it: the people, in a sudden outburst of displeasure, may have at this time fined him, upon a charge of peculation so frivolous, that Thucydides does not think it worthy of mention. The circumstances were these. Pericles was deposed from his office of general (Plut. Pericl. §. 35, Diodor. 12. 45), — it may be at one of the epicheirotoniae, or in consequence of a special process, an eisangelia. A suit was brought against him, — probably a γραφή, though Plutarch calls it a δίκη. Cleon, Simmias, or Lacratidas
was his accuser, and he was fined in a sum variously estimated at fifteen, fifty (Plut.), and eighty (Diodor.) talents. The nature of the suit is not stated, but it certainly may have been κλοπὴ δημοσίων πραγμάτων, based upon some trifling circumstance, occurring at a time when moneys would be under his control, as commander of the forces. The general Timotheus, with no more reason, perhaps, was accused of treason, and then, at the rendering of his accounts (euthynae), charged with bribery, and fined one hundred talents. To this it may be added, that Aristides, in his vindication of Pericles, nowhere, so far as I have observed, taxes Plato with inaccuracy, but follows his statement, as if he thought it true. And this he does in a work where he accuses Plato of anachronisms and misquotations. (Aristid. 2. 319, 327, de Quatuorv. ed. Dindorf. In the latter place the Sophist says:—"If one should ask Plato whether, supposing he had been one of Pericles's judges when he was tried for peculation, he would have been one to condemn him, and would have given more weight to the words of Cleon than to those of Pericles, or," etc.)

Plato, then, in this very serious and not at all ironical passage (see Thirlwall, Ill. 91), may have given no credit to the charge against Pericles, and, notwithstanding the silence of historians as to the nature of the suit, may be right in calling it one for peculation.

Upon another point,—Plato's consistency in the character which he gives to Pericles,—I will say but a word. There are three passages which concern us here; Gorg. 515, C—517; Meno, 99, B—100, B, compared with 94, B; and Phaedrus, 269, A—270, B. In Meno, ἐδοξία, or correct opinion, is ascribed to Pericles, without wisdom, and in Phaedrus he has the credit of possessing consummate eloquence, derived from the discipline of Anaxagoras. In
Gorgias, he is denied to be a true orator, but in Phædrus is declared to be πάντων τελεωτατος εἰς τὴν ῥητορικήν. The seeming inconsistency can be explained by taking into consideration, that Plato judges of the orator in Gorgias by a moral standard, and in Phædrus looks at him as capable of producing a work of art; and perhaps by this consideration also, that while he would grant to Pericles all that knowledge of the mind which the physical instructions of Anaxagoras could furnish, he might still refuse to him the attributes of a truly philosophical artist.

No. III.

See 486, A, note.

The verses yet extant of this dialogue between the brothers have been collected and emended by Valckenaeer, Matthiæ, and others. We here add the passage adjacent to the lines cited or alluded to by Plato, according to Hartung’s arrangement in his Euripides Restitutus (Hamburg, 1843). Zethus invites his brother Amphion to go a hunting, and, on his refusal, reproaches him with effeminacy of mind, as giving himself up to the musical art and to indolence, while he neglects useful pursuits. To this scene Horace alludes (Epist. 1. 18. 39): —

"Nec tua laudabis studia, aut aliena reprehendes,
Nec, cum venari volet ille, poemata panges.
Gratia sc fratrum geminorum, Amphionis atque
Zethi, dissiluit, donec specta severo
Conticuit lyra; frateruis cessisse putatur
Moribus Amphion."

Zethus first speaks: —

'Αμφιον, ἀμελεῖς ὅν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι σε δεί.
ψυχής δὲ . . . ὥδε γενναίαν φύσιν
γυναικομίας διαπρέπεις μορφώματι·
oúτι ἐν δίκης βουλαίσιν ὄρθος ἢν λόγον
προβείο πιθανῶν, οὔτι ἢν ἀστίδος κύτει
... ὀμιλήσεις, οὔτι ἄλλων ὑπὲρ
νεανίκων βουλευμα βουλεύσειο.

κακῶν κατάρχεις τῆς Μοῦσαν εἰσάγων
ἀσύμφορων τιν’ ἀτοπον...

ἀργὸν φίλοις χρημάτων ἀτημελη.

πολλοὶ δὲ θυητῶν τούτο πάσχουσι κακῶν.

γνώμη φρονοῦστε ὡς ἑλοῦντ’ ὑπηρετεῖν
ψυχῇ, τὰ πολλὰ πρὸς φίλων νικώμενοι.

αὖρῃ γὰρ ὅσις εὖ βύον κεκτημένοι
tὰ μὲν κατ’ οίκους ἀμελία παρεῖς ἐὰ,
μολπαίσι δ’ ἡσθείς τούτ’ ἀεὶ δηρεύσται,
ἀργὸς μὲν οίκουs καὶ πόλει γενήσται,

φίλοις δ’ οὐδεῖς· ἢ φύσις γὰρ ωἰκεῖται
ὅταν γλυκεῖς ἡδονῆς ἱττοσον τις ἢ
καὶ πῶς σοφὸν τοῦτ’ ἐστίν, εἰ τις εὐφυὴ

λαβοῦσα τέχνη φῶς’ ἐθηκε χείρονα
μήτ’ αὐτὸν αὐτῷ δυνάμενον προσάρκεσαι;

... μισῶ...

σοφὸν λόγοι, ἐς δ’ ὑψησιν οὐ σοφῶν.
... ἄλλ’ ἐμοὶ πιθοῦ,

παῦσαι δ’ ἀσέδων, πολεμίων δ’ εὐμοσσιά
ἀσκεί, τοιαύτ’ ἀείō ἄφ’ δὲν δύσεις φρονεῖν,

σκάπτων, ἀρῶν γῆν, ποιμνίους ἐπιστατῶν,

ἀλλιω τὰ κομψά ταῦτ’ ἀφεῖς σοφίσματα
ἐξ ὡν κενοῖσιν ἐγκατοικήσεις δάμοις.

ΑΜΦΙΩΝ.

ἐκ παιτὸς ἢν τις πράγματος δισσῶν λόγων

21
ἀγώνα θεῖ' ἂν, εἰ λέγειν εἴη σοφός

. . . . . ὅς ὦ εὐγλωσσία
νικά, σοφός μέν, ἀλλά τοι τὰ πράγματα
κρείσσω νομίζω τῶν λόγων αἰεὶ ποτε.

. . . . . λαμπρὸς ὦ ἐκλειστος κατ' τοῦτ' ἐπείγεται,
νέμων τὸ πλείστον ἡμέρας τούτων μέρος
ἐν αὐτῶς αὐτοῦ τυχήνη κράτιστος ὄν.

κ. τ. λ.

THE END.
George S. Jones
Class of '59

Drafter

In an age marked for the fertility of its novel theories and doctrines, in science as well as religion, the subject treated of in this volume would seem to recommend itself to every person who desires to reason forcibly or correctly. This elementary treatise holds a very high rank among the educational works of the day, having been introduced into many of the best managed and popular seminaries of learning, both in England and the United States. It is got up in the usually correct and beautiful style of most Boston books."—Merchant's Magazine.

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The preface and commentary to the Antigone are even more creditable to Mr. Woolsey's ability than those to the Alcestis. The sketch of the poem, in the preface, is written with clearness and brevity. The difficulties in this play, that call for a commentator's explanation, are far more numerous than in the Alcestis. In Mr. Woolsey's commentaries on these numberless knotty passages, he puts them together in a more intelligible form, and shows a sharper perception of delicate shades of meaning, than we have ever met with in the explanations of any other edition whatever.

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