THE GORGIAS OF PLATO.
THE GORGIAS

OF

PLATO,

CHIEFLY ACCORDING TO STALLBAUM'S TEXT;

WITH

NOTES,

BY

THEODORE D. WOOLSEY.

Athenis diligentius legi Gorgiam: quo in libro in hoc maxime admirabam Platonem, quod mihi in oratoribus irridendis ipse esse orator summus videbatur.

Cic. de Oratore, I. 11.

NEW EDITION, WITH ADDITIONS.

BOSTON AND CAMBRIDGE:

JAMES MUNROE AND COMPANY.

1848.
TO

PROFESSOR FELTON

OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY

THIS EDITION OF GORGIAS

IS INSCRIBED,

AS A MEMORIAL OF LONG FRIENDSHIP,

BY

THE EDITOR
1. The text of this edition principally follows Stallbaum's, published at Gotha in 1840. After examining the various readings, as Ast has given them, the editor was led to make about forty changes in the text of Stallbaum's first Gotha edition of 1828. On receiving, not very long since, the same critic's second edition of 1840, mentioned above, the editor was pleased to find a large part of these alterations, and nearly all the more important ones, made by Stallbaum himself. A number of others have since been made, in reliance upon Stallbaum's long study of Plato and ability; and the text now differs from his last revision chiefly in the following places.

the words in brackets. — 494, E, omits *τὸ*. — 496, A, reads ἀνδρονικός. — 497, A, gives καὶ... νουθετεῖς to Callicles. Vid. not. — 500, B, brackets κατὰ τὸ σῶμα after μυγειρικὴν, which I have omitted. — 505, E, joins οὖν to the next sentence. — 508, B, inserts ἀνθρωπίνοι*. — 514, C, I have bracketed ἐφ’. — 522, C, have given οὖν. Vid. not. — 525, D, have omitted τοῖς before τοῦτων. — 527, C, Stallb. gives ὁ σῶς λόγος. Vid. not.

In the text, like other editors of Plato, I have allowed οὖξον, nonne igitur, to be thus accented, and, as I think, for good reasons. In the notes, I have followed what is, I believe, Hermann’s practice, in treating a single Greek oxytoned word in an English sentence just as it would be treated in a Greek one. If, for example, ἂν occurs in the middle of a clause, it is not written ἂν.

2. I have had access to the following editions of Gorgias, which include all the modern ones of much value. 1. Routh’s, Oxford, 1784. 2. Findeisen’s,— an edition of indifferent judgment. Gotha and Amsterdam, 1796. 3. Heindorf’s second, edited by Buttmann, Berlin, 1829, — excellent, especially for the Commentary. 4. Bekker’s. 5. Stallbaum’s Leipzig ed. These are concerned only with the text. Bekker’s has some Scholia. 6. Coray’s, Paris, 1825, together with Xenophon’s Memorab. 7. Ast’s, in his Plato. The bulky Commentary on Gorgias is in Vol. XI., Leipzig, 1832; valuable, but ill-arranged and tedious, and not always judicious. 8. Stallbaum’s, in his Gotha ed. of Plato, 1828 and 1840. Both text and interpretation owe much to him, and he has collected most of what is useful in other editions.
From these editions, above all from the last, I have derived great assistance, which is often acknowledged and often not. In a work like this, it would be plainly impossible to trace every thing up to its source, but nothing has been adopted without examination; much, also, is original; but I fear that if any one should pass the severe judgment upon the edition, that much of what is faulty is original, he would not be very far out of the way.

Besides these editions, I have consulted several of those works relating to Plato, to which an editor of his dialogues would naturally think of turning for aid. Of this description are Ast’s Lexicon Platonicum (the first three vols.), which is of no great use after all, Ast’s, Socher’s, and the first vol. of C. F. Hermann’s Introduction to Plato, Schleiermacher’s and Cousin’s translations, and Dobson’s translation of Schleiermacher’s Prefaces.

3. An introduction is prefixed to the text of the dialogue, with a view to give an explanation and critique of the argument. To this are added, in notes, rather literal translations of a few illustrative passages out of very many from Plato’s other writings, most of which I have read with reference to the present edition during its preparation. I had intended to add an index, in which some things omitted in the notes were to find their place, and had made some progress in it, but was tempted by the overpowering tediousness of the task to lay it aside until too late.

4. I have said nothing, thus far, as to the propriety of laying the Gorgias before American students of Greek, rather than some other dialogue of the same great author. To persons familiar with the Platonic
dialogues, perhaps nothing need be said on this point. Let me say, however, that while many of the dialogues would not have suited my design, on account of their abstruseness or their length, the Gorgias deserved to be preferred to others equally finished in style, on account of its positive inculcation of truth and its high moral tone. Something better is to be found in it than the miserable doctrine of instruction, and the duty of the politician to obey the popular will.

Yale College, New Haven,
July, 1842.

A second edition of the Gorgias being called for, the editor has done what he could, amid the pressing cares of a new office, to render it, by the necessary changes and additions, less imperfect than the former. In doing this, he has received kind aid from several friends, and takes this opportunity of making his acknowledgments to Professor Crosby of Dartmouth College, Mr. Sophocles of Harvard University, Mr. Hadley of Yale College, and C. A. Bristed, Esq., of New York.

Yale College, June 1, 1848.
INTRODUCTION.

The times in Greece which just preceded the age of Socrates gave birth to a class of men denominated the Sophists. This title, which before was honorably applied to such as excelled in wisdom or ingenuity, was then chiefly confined to those who, with mercenary views, professed a vain and shallow kind of wisdom. Such is in substance Aristotle's definition of a Sophist. In the successive sketches of Plato's Sophistes, he is hit off as a mercenary hunter after rich young men; a dealer and huckster in intellectual wares, especially of his own production; a logomachist; one who, by his power of taking the opposite on all subjects, gets a reputation for wisdom; one who is employed about that which is false, or merely appearing, instead of the invariable objects of true science, and who conceals his ignorance of true science by artificial and crafty turns of words. This last characteristic is one which gives the relation of the Sophist to philosophy. He denied all objective truth, and stood only on the fluctuating, uncertain ground of subjective opinion. Hence, as to truth, he was an unbeliever. He could accommodate himself to one side or its opposite, contending for or against any point, as interest might dictate. Finding nothing in philosophy to employ himself with, he withdrew from the study of it to the arts of practical life, and aimed, by attract-
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ing admiration and educating the young, to gain wealth and honor. Gratification or pleasure was the immediate object in his view, and he could have no higher; for to instruct in virtue would imply the existence of unalterable moral differences, which he denied. Or, if he professed to teach virtue and justice, it was only in accommodation to a vague opinion of those who employed him; and it was necessary for him to pervert these notions, in order to make his instructions consistent with the rule of gratification by which he was governed.

It would carry us far beyond our bounds, were we to attempt to exhibit at any length the causes to which this class of men owed their origin and their prominence. These causes lay partly in the unsatisfactory results to which the prevailing systems of Greek philosophy had arrived, and partly in the circumstances of the times. On the one hand, many of the philosophers either wholly denied the existence of truth within the reach of man, or so contracted its dimensions as to make it not worth pursuing. Hence arose skepticism, despair, and the fading away of a serious regard for truth, which were succeeded by frivolity and by the purpose to gain immediate selfish ends through pretensions to superior knowledge. On the other hand, the decay of religious belief which attends upon increasing civilization in heathen countries, and the disregard of political morality so prevalent in Greece, threw uncertainty into the opinions of men upon the most important subjects. Thus the same disease attacked the roots of philosophy, religion, and morals.

In the schools of the philosophers, the art of reasoning and its instrument had received by degrees some attention. Thus logic had been cultivated by the Eleatic sect, but was turned, in the hands of the Sophists, into an art of disputing, applied to puzzle the unpractised and display their
own dexterity. The right and elegant use of words was employed by other Sophists to procure for themselves admiration and pupils. Many of this class of men exhibited their knowledge in public by answering any question that might be proposed to them, or gave lectures prepared with great care; while in private they imparted such instructions to young men as would give them polish and ability in civil and political life. All of them took money for their instructions,—a practice not regarded as entirely honorable at that time in Greece.

The sophistical principles of the time were brought into closer connection with public affairs by means of the art of rhetoric, which arose at about the same era. Rhetoric began to be taught as a means of gaining a cause in the courts at Syracuse after the year 466, when a popular government, succeeding to the sway of Hiero's family, greatly multiplied judicial proceedings. An art like this was calculated to be popular in free states, and especially in Athens, where the judicial function of the people was the most important one; where the crowds of ignorant judges were easily deceived by sophistry; and where there was an uncommon fondness for displays of skill in the use of words.

The sophistical tendency, which we have represented as one in its origin, affected all branches of truth and every art which can be referred to scientific principles. In metaphysics it may be exemplified by the tenets of Protagoras, that all knowledge consists in sensation, and that whatever appears true to any man is true to him; and by the doctrine of Gorgias, that there is no truth which men can ascertain or communicate to one another. In morals and politics, it appeared in the opinions, that there is no natural justice, or that justice is the interest of the stronger; and that pleasure is the chief good. In the use of rhetoric, it showed its nature when Protagoras offered to teach how to prevail
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by the worse argument (τὸν ἡττὸν λόγον κρίττω ποιεῖν), and when Tisias and Gorgias said that the probable must be held in higher esteem than the true.

The Sophists could not fail to disgust a man like Socrates, who hated show and pretension, and who had a deep veneration for truth. Hence he was sometimes brought into collision with them, and in a degree his doctrines, as well as those of Plato, were shaped by opposition to theirs. And in accordance with this, Plato, especially in his first works, represents Socrates arguing against some false opinion or other maintained by a person imbued with this spirit.

One of the more prominent Sophists, with whom Socrates was contemporary, was Gorgias, after whom this dialogue is named. Gorgias was a Sicilian Greek of Leontini, a Chalcidian town, which lay some twenty miles to the north of Syracuse, and suffered much from its nearness to that powerful Doric state. The birth of Gorgias is assigned by Foss* to the first year of the 71st Olympiad, or 496 B. C. But there is good reason, I think, for putting it several years later. For the art of rhetoric began to flourish at Syracuse after 466 B. C., and Gorgias learned this art from Tisias, a scholar of Corax, the first preceptor.† And with this it accords, that Gorgias heard Empedocles in philosophy, whose birth even Foss places no earlier than the 71st Olympiad, while the ancients say that he flourished from forty to sixty years afterward.

From this time we know nothing of Gorgias until he was

* De Gorgia Leontino Commentatio. Halle. 1828.
† This is asserted by the author of the Prolegomena to the Rhetoric of Hermogenes (in Walz's Collection, Vol. IV. p. 14). The passage is inserted by Spengel into his valuable book entitled Artium Scriptores. Stuttgart. 1828. Foss denies it without authority, "tum propter alius testimonii inopiam, tum propter Tisiae ætatem."
sixty years old or upwards. In the interval he may have taught rhetoric in Sicily, for Polus of Agrigentum appears at Athens as his disciple, and he probably stood high in his native state. In the second year of the 88th Olympiad, he came to Athens on the following occasion. "The Leon-tines (Diodor. 12. 53), who were emigrants from Chalcis, and of the same stock with the Athenians, were invaded by the people of Syracuse. As they were pressed by the war, and in danger of being reduced by the superior might of Syracuse, they sent ambassadors to Athens, begging the people to help them as speedily as possible, and rescue their state from its dangers. The principal ambassador among those who were sent was Gorgias, the orator, a man who excelled all of his time in eloquence, and first invented the artifices of rhetoric* (τεχνας φητορικας). — On his arrival at Athens he was introduced into the Assembly, and discoursed before the people concerning the alliance. The Athenians, who were fond of displays of genius and skill in the use of words, were struck with wonder by the novelty of his style, by his various antitheses, his clauses of equal length, his words of similar forms and endings, and the like artifices; which then, being new, met with favor, but now seem to be a waste of labor, and are ridiculous if repeated so often as to produce satiety. At last, having persuaded the Athenians to form an alliance with the Leontines, and gained admiration at Athens for his rhetorical art, he returned to his native town." The sensation which his rhetoric produced at Athens is spoken of by others also. The days on which he made his exhibitions were called festivals, and his discourses themselves torches.† "He won great praise," says

* See Spengel, u. s., p. 81.

† This is said by the commentator on Hermog. u. s., p. 15, by Olym-piodor. apud Routh, p. 562, and other late writers.
Socrates in Plato's Hippias Maj. (282, B), "by his speeches in the Assembly, and by his private displays of his eloquence. By the instructions he imparted to the young (συντοίς νέοις) he gained a large amount of money, and carried it with him from Athens." If Plato, who is sometimes careless about precise facts and dates, may here be relied upon, he must have stayed long enough at Athens to act the part of a teacher before he went elsewhere. It is probable that, after discharging his mission, he soon returned to Greece, where the rest of his life seems to have been spent. Thessaly was his principal residence, and that he passed no very long time in Athens may be argued from the fact, that Isocrates, an Athenian, received his instructions in that country. There, also, he taught Meno, and Aristippus, one of the nobles of Larissa, and there, or in Boeotia, Proxenus, the comrade of Xenophon. The wealthy families of Thessaly had that rude taste which would make them fond of the glitter and ostentation of Gorgias, and were able to pay him well. He lived in splendor, affecting in his dress the same show and parade which marked his eloquence. (Aelian, Var. Hist. 12. 32.) Owing to his habits of temperance, he attained to a very great age, to six or eight years over a century, and acted the rhetorician to the last, by saying, according to Aelian (u. s. 2. 35), when invaded by a lethargic sleep, premonitory of his end,—"Sleep is now beginning to lay me in the hands of his brother." His works, in his capacity as a rhetorician, were,—1. One on the art, or on one branch of it, the art of speaking suitably to the occasion. 2. A number of orations, declamatory and laudatory. One of these was delivered at the Olympic festival, in which, like Isocrates afterwards, he tried to unite the Greeks against the Persians. Another was a funeral discourse in honor of Athenians slain in battle, a fragment of which, preserved by a Scholiast on Hermogenes,
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supplies us with the longest extant specimen of his style. These works exhibited a stately, uncommon, and poetical diction, together with frequent rhetorical figures, which must have been tedious and frigid in the extreme.* Two declamations still extant, bearing his name, are unlike his fragments in style, and ought probably to be regarded as spurious.

Gorgias was, as we have said, at bottom a Sophist,† but he avoided the title, which was not very popular, “and laughed at the Sophists, who professed to know how to make men better, confining himself to instructions concerning the art of speaking.” (Plat. Meno, 95, C.) His literary labors in the more appropriate sphere of the Sophist were confined, so far as we know, to a work entitled περὶ ὀρθοῦ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, which may have been unknown to Plato, but is analyzed in a little treatise among the works of Aristotle. In this work, with such an ominous title, he attempted to prove, first, that nothing exists, then, if any thing exists, that it cannot be known, and, finally, that if known, it cannot be made known to others. Olympiodorus (in Routh’s ed. of Gorgias, p. 567) says, that this work was written in the 84th Olympiad, that is, sixteen years or thereabouts before his embassy to Athens. For the sophis-

* The fragments, which are few, are collected by Foss, but not completely. Thus, Clem. Alex. Strom. 1. 11, § 51, cites some words of Gorgias, apparently from his Olympian oration. The following words are a good sample of the style of Gorgias, and show some just thought. They are cited by Foss from Plutarch.  

† And so the men of that time regarded those who displayed their talents after the manner of Gorgias. Thucyd. 3. 38, ἂνοιξ ἢδον ἱπατήματι καὶ σοφοτῶν ἰδιαῖς ἱοικέσι καθημένοις. For the estimation in which the Sophists were held, comp. Protag. 316, seq.  


tries out of which, with the help of the principles of the Eleatic Sect, he built up this triple wall against truth, I must refer to the treatise of Aristotle,* and to Ritter's history of philosophy.

Such was Gorgias. Of Polus, another speaker in the dialogue, little is known. He was a Sicilian of Agrigentum, a scholar of Gorgias in rhetoric, and perhaps of Empedocles in philosophy. He wrote, together with other works, a treatise, probably on rhetoric, to which Plato refers in the Gorgias. As we learn from the Phædrus and other sources, he gave great prominence to the figures of that artificial rhetoric of which his master was so fond; such as equality of periods and correspondence of adjoining words in sound; and taught the mode of using maxims and similes under separate heads, to which he gave pedantic names.

Callicles is an unknown Athenian, not a Sophist, as some have regarded him, but rather a contemner of the Sophists; although he carried out in practical life those principles which they laid down. He is a specimen of a considerable number of Athenians of his time, who, while they courted the people, despised it; who would have grasped at tyrannical power, without scruple as to the means; who looked down upon the pursuits of philosophy, when compared with the honors of political life; who had no faith in the distinction between right and wrong, and held pleasure to be the supreme good.

Besides these and Socrates, Chærephon bears a small part at the opening of the dialogue. He was an early friend and a follower of the philosopher, ardent in whatever he undertook, whose variance with his brother is mentioned in Xen. Memorab. 2. 3, and who obtained a response from

* It is edited by Foss, in his Commentatio before mentioned, and by Mullach (Berlin, 1845).
the Pythia commendatory of Socrates, according to the Apologies of Plato and Xenophon. He went into exile in the time of the thirty tyrants, and died soon afterwards, before his friend’s condemnation. He injured his health and complexion through his studies, and received the nicknames of νυξτερίς, νυξτός παῖς (Aristoph. Birds, 1564, and Horarum frag.), for never coming abroad during the day, and of πιξινος θάψινος, for his sallow hue (Eupolis Πόλεων frag., Aristoph. Wasps, 1413), as well as other ridicule from the comic poets.* When, according to the Scholiast on Plato’s Apology, these reckless jesters proceeded further to call him a sycophant, a parasite, and a thief, we may put by the side of these aspersions the testimony of Xenophon, who classes him among those friends of Socrates who sought his company to improve themselves in household and civil relations, and who, at no time of their lives, either did, or were charged with doing, any wrong.

The persons of this dialogue are represented as having met in the year after the sea-fight at Arginusae. Gorgias, being then on a visit at Athens, was lodging at the house of Callicles, and there, it is generally supposed, the dialogue was spoken. There is, however, good reason, I think, to accede to the opinion of Schleiermacher, who lays the scene in some public place, like the Lyceum, where the parties in several other dialogues convened.† At the opening of the

* In the proemium to Philostrat. Vitae Sophist., another Chærephon, as we are there expressly told, is brought into connection with Gorgias. He asked the Sophist a foolish question, Διὰ τί εἰ κύκλως τὴν μὴν γαστίσα φυσίσσι τὸ δὲ τῶν ὀφυσάρι; To which the other replied, Τότεν εἰ καταλίπτω συντήντω τὴν ἀυτὸν ταλαιαίνοι τῆς τῇ γῇ τῶν νάσθηκας ἢ τῶν τοιοῦτων φωτον. I have seen the opinion somewhere expressed, that the story was first told of this Chærephon, the declaration of Philostrat. notwithstanding.

† For some observations on the time and place of the dialogue, see Appendix, No. I.
work, Socrates and his friend find that they have reached the place where Gorgias and others were assembled, too late to witness his exhibitions of rhetorical skill. In the hope, however, of drawing from him his views concerning his art, they approach and begin the conversation. Gorgias being fatigued, the younger rhetorician, Polus, volunteers to take his place, and answer to the inquiries concerning the nature of rhetoric; but as it is soon apparent that he is unwilling or unable to observe a logical method, Socrates transfers the discourse to Gorgias, from whom he professes to think that more brevity and accuracy of definition may be expected. (447–449.) By a series of questions in his peculiar manner, he gathers from Gorgias that he is a rhetorician, and able to make others such; and that his art is employed about words as instruments of thought. Socrates asks whether the definition is not too general, since several arts called by other names are also employed about words. To this Gorgias replies, that other arts ask principally, "What is to be done?" and use words as a secondary thing; but that rhetoric inquires, "What is to be said?" (−450, B.) Socrates objects that there are other arts, such as those of calculation and astronomy, which mainly depend on words, and demands to what the words relate which rhetoric employs. The most important of human affairs, says Gorgias. (−451, B.) But what are the most important? asks Socrates; for other arts might make a similar claim. The good, replies Gorgias, to which rhetoric opens the way, is freedom for the orator and the power of controlling other men, and this it effects by the power of persuading public assemblies. By this power it brings every other art under its control. (−453.) Socrates still is not satisfied. For although Gorgias has defined rhetoric to be the art of persuasion, he inquires whether other arts, which have to do with words, do not aim at persuasion also. What, then, is
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the province and the nature of rhetorical persuasion? Gorgias is brought to admit that its province is to persuade judicial and other popular assemblies concerning things right and wrong; and that it attains its end rather by plausible arguments than by proofs drawn from absolute truth. (-455.) But Socrates still finds it hard to comprehend what is the peculiar sphere of rhetoric. In all public deliberations, the artificer, the general, or other person acquainted with the point in question, can give the best counsel. Where, then, is the orator’s place? In reply, Gorgias refers to matters of fact. It was the advice of the political leaders which led to the building of the Athenian walls and docks, and not that of the artificers. He himself had often persuaded sick persons to comply with the directions of physicians, who had exhausted their arguments in vain. There was no occasion when an orator was opposed to an artificer, without gaining an easy victory. Such was the power of rhetoric, but, like other arts, it might be abused by those who learned it. Yet that abuse was no good cause of complaint against the teacher. (-457, C.) Socrates, after offering an apology for his seemingly contentious spirit, now forces Gorgias to allow that the orator may be ignorant of the subject-matter of other arts; all his study being concerned with finding the means of appearing to “those who do not know to know more than those who do.” This Gorgias regards as an advantage, since it furnishes the orator with power acquired by small pains.* Socrates, without stopping to examine into the extent of this advantage, inquires whether the case is the same with justice and injustice, good and evil, and the like; whether, without know-

* Philebus. 58, A. “I heard Gorgias say, on a variety of occasions, that the art of persuasion far surpassed all the other arts, since it brought all things under its sway, not by force, but by their own will.”

C*
ing what these are in themselves, the orator can gain a reputation for such knowledge; and whether, as a master in rhetoric, Gorgias would teach a scholar justice, who should come to him unacquainted with its nature. Gorgias has here to reply, either that there is no need of knowing any thing about right and wrong in order to be an orator, and that, too, when he is perpetually employed upon questions involving right and wrong; or that he will teach his students their nature. He chooses the latter alternative, although the previous conversation shows that, to be consistent, he should have taken the former. Socrates now forces him to admit that he who knows justice is just. The rhetorician, then, under his training, must be a just man. But he had before said, that the art might be used for a good or a bad purpose,—to favor justice or injustice. Socrates brings forward this inconsistency as needing explanation, when this, the first part of the dialogue, is broken off by the impatience of Polus. (–461, B.)

There are two remarks which this portion of the discussion seems to demand. The first is, that, while it ends with an argumentum ad hominem, and with fastening upon Gorgias an inconsistency of no importance in itself to philosophical truth, it is not without its use. It shows how little the Sophists had reflected upon the nature of their arts, and how little they cared for truth or justice.*

* Several passages of Phædrus, a work which treats of the worthlessness of rhetoric when not dependent on philosophy, may be adduced in illustration of what is here said. On 260, A, Phædrus tells Socrates that he hears the remark made, "that one who wishes to be an orator has no need to learn true justice, but only what may seem to be such to the multitude, who will exercise the office of jurymen; nor the truly good or beautiful, but only the seeming; for from these sources, and not from the truth, persuasion is derived." And, again, 272, D, —"They say that there is no need of making so much of this, or of taking such a long, round-about
art itself, having in its own nature no reference to truth, but merely to the force of arguments upon the minds of others, and, at the same time, being employed in discussions concerning what is good and just, could in its best estate be as easily used against truth as in its behalf. But, as it then was, it was based on sophistical principles and opposed to sound philosophy, its aim being something else than the greatest good. It was an art of acting on the ignorant, and of acting on them by pretending to knowledge. It must use such arguments as were suited to persuade the masses, who are not capable of taking the true philosophical view of things. What arguments could a person ignorant of justice use before an audience also ignorant, when the question related to justice, but such as almost necessarily mislead?

course to reach it. For the orator, who would be well versed in his art, (they maintain,) has no occasion to possess true views in regard to just or true actions, or in regard to men that are such either by nature or education. In fact, they assert that no one in the courts cares for the truth about these things, but only for that which is adapted to persuade. And this is the probable," etc. Plato goes on to illustrate this by an example drawn from Tisias, one of the rhetoricians. If a brave man of weak body should have beaten and stripped of his garment a strong but cowardly man, and the case be brought before a court, neither ought to tell the truth; the coward ought to deny that the weak but courageous man was alone in beating him; while the other should ask, "how he, being so deficient in bodily strength, could have attempted it." He then shows how weak, at its very foundation, that unphilosophical rhetoric is which is built on merely empiric rules; since he who knows what is true must know, also, what is like truth, and he who studies the classes of human minds with philosophy for his guide will know by what arguments each class of minds is most influenced. "But," he adds, very nobly, "the virtuous man will not study this art of rhetoric for the sake of speaking and acting before men, but that he may be able to speak in a manner acceptable to the divinities, and to act so as to please them to the extent of his power."

Plato’s opinion of advocates, which was none of the highest, may be found in Book XI. of the Laws, at the end.
But in the second place, if the art taught or presupposed the teaching of justice, its scholars would be a very different sort of persons from what even Gorgias allows that they were. For he who has learned justice is just. This looks to us like sophistry on the part of Socrates himself, as if the knowledge and practice of virtue could not exist apart. But whatever of untruth there is in the proposition, it was not meant for sophistry; it is a part of the system of Socrates and Plato. In the view of Socrates, and in that of Plato at first, all virtue could be resolved into science; all vice into ignorance.* Nor was the reason voluntarily ignorant, but merely deceived by the conceit of knowledge, and false opinion. When this was removed, and knowledge took possession of the mind, there was no cause why he who knew should not act in conformity with his knowledge.

In the second part of the dialogue, Polus takes his master’s place. He begins by complaining that Socrates had unfairly involved Gorgias in inconsistency. Gorgias had said that he would teach justice to a scholar ignorant of it, only in accommodation to the prejudices of mankind, who regarded instruction upon that point as of high importance. A discussion now arises, in which Socrates explains in part his views of rhetoric. It is not an art, but a knack, or practical observation of rules aiming to produce pleasure. It belongs to a nature which is adroit, courageous, and skilled in mingling with mankind. It is reducible to flattery; like the arts of cookery, cosmetics, and sophistry, being mere routine or practice, not guided by the laws of absolute truth, and

* Comp. Aristot. Ethic. Eudem. 1. 5, ἵστορέμεν (Σωκράτης) καὶ ἦν πᾶσας τὰς ἀρετὰς, ὡς ηὶ ομβασίνων ἔδεινας τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ ηὶ δίκαιον. See, also, Xen. Memorab. 3. 9. 5. Plato appears at first to have entertained the same opinion, but afterwards made virtue to consist in this: that the faculties of the soul respectively perform their parts, and are all obedient to the reason.
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aiming at gratification. The real arts relating to the soul and body are two, with a twofold division each; of which the one,—the political art, or that which conserves the public good,—when it seeks to secure that good, is called the legislative art, when to restore it, is called justice. To these two arts, two touching the body correspond: gymnastics, aiming to preserve bodily good or health, and medicine, to bring it back. To these four arts four arts of flattery answer, and, acting adroitly without settled principles, slip into their places. These are sophistry, answering to legislation, rhetoric to justice, cosmetics to gymnastics, and cookery to medicine. Aiming at pleasure, and not at the highest good, these false arts attract and deceive the ignorant and thoughtless. And, being incapable of exact limits from their want of a scientific basis, they run into one another. (−466.) Polus is displeased at this brand of flattery put upon rhetoric, and asks if good orators are so regarded in the states where they live. Socr. "They are not regarded at all." Pol. "How not regarded? Have they not the greatest power in their countries?" To this Socrates replies by admitting that they do what seems good to them, but denies that they do what they wish. In explaining this, he shows that what men wish is not what they do, but that for the sake of which they do it. It is a good in prospect which moves to action. Unless, then, the great power which enables orators to dispose, as Polus says, of the lives and fortunes of others is a good, it is not what they wish. And if to have great power is a good, orators cannot have it, seeing they use that which they call such as an evil. They may do, then, what seems good to them, without either really having great power, or doing what they wish. (−469.) Polus sneers at these views expressed by Socrates. "Just as though you would not choose the liberty of doing what seemed good to you in the state, and would feel no envy if you saw one killing
whom he liked, or stripping him of his goods, or binding him." Socrates earnestly declares that he regards such a one, if doing this unjustly, as most wretched, and to do wrong as the greatest of evils. Polus is surprised that he should think so, and affirms, that to be wronged is a greater evil than to wrong; and that the possession of supreme power in the state — which is won by the orator — is to be desired as enabling him to do what he thinks fit, — to wrong, if he pleases, and to keep others from wrongdoing him. Upon this, Socrates makes his opponent own that uncontrolled power in the state, if it is a good, may also be an evil. It cannot, therefore, be a good in itself, and something beyond it must determine when it is good and when the contrary. This criterion is, that it shall be justly or unjustly exercised. (-470, C.) Polus responds in a superior tone to this, as going against the common sense of men, and appeals rhetorically to the prosperity of Archelaus, king of Macedon, which was begun by atrocious crimes. If you wish, says Socrates, to support yourself by examples and by testimony, you will have no want of them. But I shall not consider the matter settled until I force you, with whom I hold the argument, to acknowledge that the unjust man is unhappy, or you compel me to the contrary admission. (-472, D.)

The discussion during the rest of this part of the dialogue embraces two points, arising out of the proposition, that it is better to wrong than to be wronged: —1. That the unjust man is, in every event, miserable; and, 2. That if he escapes punishment for his crimes, he is more miserable than if he suffers. And hence no man can prefer doing wrong to being wronged, which Polus says is the choice of all men.

1. Polus acknowledges that it is baser (ἀμάχιον, more ugly) to wrong, but denies that it is more evil (χάκιον). This leads to an analysis of the ideas of the beautiful and the base (τὸ καλὸν, τὸ αἰσχρὸν), in which Socrates shows that
a thing is beautiful owing to its utility or pleasure, or both; and base, owing to its evil or pain. But to wrong—which has been owned to be baser than to be wronged—is not more painful; therefore it must be more evil. Neither Polus, then, nor any other man, as desirous of the highest good, can prefer the more evil and base to the less. (—476.)

2. Polus admits, that to be the object of justice (διδόναι δίκη) and to be justly punished for wrong-doing are the same; that a just punisher supposes one who suffers what is just, and that every thing just is ἱστόων as far as it is just. If, then, what is suffered is just, it is ἱστόων, and if so, either useful or pleasant. But suffering for doing wrong is not pleasant; therefore, it is useful or good. This goodness consists in removing pravity of soul, which, of all kinds of badness, is the greatest. Justice, the medicine of the soul, effects this removal: hence, to escape from punishment is more miserable than to be punished. It is better to go unhealed of a disease, than not cured of this inward severer malady. And not to seek this cure from justice is like fearing the pain necessary for attaining to health. (—480.)

If these things are so, of what use is rhetoric? For if it place a man in a situation where he can wrong more easily than be wronged, it does him so much the more harm; and if he be enabled by it to escape the punishment of his misdeeds, again it does him so much the more harm. If it help him to punish an enemy, it benefits that enemy,—an object at which he is far from aiming. He cannot even defend himself against an enemy without doing the enemy this good.* (—481, C.)

The end reached in this second division of the Gorgias is to set forth in a clear light that a pretended art, like the rhetoric of Gorgias and Polus, which has the gratification

* See Buttmann's view, in the note on 480, E.
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of others, as well as one's own, in view, fails, by running against the law of right, to attain to any thing good or useful, defeats its own objects, and falls into inconsistency with itself. It will not be doubted by the reader, that the moral tone of this discussion is worthy of the highest praise, and the conclusion most gratifying, considering it is formed by a heathen. But there are several places in the stream of the argument, where we may fancy that we see shallows, or touch upon the ground. In the first place, we may question the accuracy of the comparison of the legislative art and justice with the self-styled arts of sophistry and rhetoric. What is the truth of the distinction, and what sphere must we suppose that Plato assigns to rhetoric? In reply, it must be owned, I think, that Plato fluctuates a little,* owing to his analogy between rhetoric and medicine, on the one hand, and between rhetoric and justice, on the other. If we press the resemblance to medicine, rhetoric must be confined to the reparation of injustice, and restoration of the public health. If we follow the parallel with justice, rhetoric must embrace within its limits every case where the question of conformity to the rule of right is involved; the rule of true right being laid down at the outset by the legislative art, and that of seeming right or gratification, in the place of justice, by sophistry. In this part of the dialogue, the narrower notion of rhetoric, determined by comparing it with medicine, seems to prevail in Plato's mind: the art has to do with the courts. And in this Plato was fully justified by the practice of writers on this art, who all, as Aristotle affirms (Rhet. 1. 1. 10), said nothing about the popular assembly, and confined their rules of art to the judicial

* Comp. Aristides (2. 377, Dindorf.), τοτε μεν γι, φησι, ταυτών ιστιν, ἡ μακάριν, βίτωρ καὶ σοφιστής, τοτὲ δ' αὖ τὴν σοφιστικὴν κρίσιν ἕνας τῆς ἰητεροκής καὶ διαφέρειν. See 517, A, note.
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(περὶ τοῦ δικαίωμας πάντες πειρώνται τεχνολογεῖν). But in the latter division of this work, Plato treats the rhetorician and the political man as the same, which accords with the analogy between rhetoric and justice. This is the truer view of the subject, for otherwise the assembly of the people, where there lay open a wide field for false art, must be unoccupied.* We must recollect that Plato himself speaks of the boundaries of rhetoric as uncertain; and, also, that he is not opposing the bare “art of inventing and arranging arguments,” but a sophistical art opposed to truth.†

In the second place, we may doubt whether the analysis of the beautiful into the pleasant and the good, that is, the useful, and of the opposite to the beautiful into the painful and the harmful, is correctly made out, and, consequently, whether the principles of the latter part of the discourse be-

* With more justice still, Socrates, in Phædr. 261, A, regards it “as the art of bending men’s minds by words without respect to the occasion, not only in courts and other public assemblies, but also in private meetings; being the same in nature, whether small or great affairs are in question.” To which, in reply, Phaedrus says, that the rules of art are used in speaking and writing when suits at law are brought, and in speaking when addresses are made to the Assembly; but that he has not heard of a wider application of rhetorical precepts.

† Whately’s definition. Aristotle’s is, δύναται ἐπὶ ἓκαστον τοῦ θεωρητή" τὸ ἱστέρματος τοῦ διαλεκτικαί. It is worthy of remark how Aristotle alludes to this dialogue without naming it. He begins with saying, that rhetoric is ἄντιστροφος τῇ διαλεκτικῇ. In speaking of its abuse, he says, “It tries to put on the garb (ὑσοδύται) of the political art”; and, soon afterwards, ἵστε γὰρ μὲν ὁπὶ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς. Comp. 464, B, C.—This conduct of rhetoricians is ascribed to ignorance, or vanity, or other human reasons (1.2. 7); and doubtless he joined with Plato in condemning the sophistical rhetoric of the preceding age. (Comp. 1. 1. 3.) But when he says that the judge himself ought to know whether a thing is just or not, and not learn it from the parties, whose only duty is to discuss the fact, he must be regarded not only as opposing Plato’s views (454, B), but as condemning the Athenian and every other system where the judges were ignorant.
between Socrates and Polus, true as we feel them to be, are not built upon the sand. If I am not deceived, Plato does not here intend to enter into a close dialectical exposition of what is meant by τὸ ἀλὸν, the beautiful. But, still, his definition is exact enough for the argument and the purposes of the dialogue. The attempts of others to analyze this idea prove this. Whether the term beautiful is or is not applied on account of pleasure derived from contemplating the object so called, or on account of the perception of a certain fitness, implying a relation of the parts to the whole, and of the whole to some good or pleasant end; — whatever we may decide to be the primary and essential characteristic of beautiful objects, it is sufficient, I think, for the argument to say, that pleasure or utility, or both, invariably attend on objects so called, and the author was not required to stop and subject this idea to a closer examination. It is also to be remarked, that the good and the useful are treated here as identical.* Upon this point we need only say, that it is assumed that whatever is good tends to promote the perfection or well-being of the person; in other words, is useful in reaching a good end.

Again, it may be thought that the last argument, concerning the good or utility of punishment, renders it necessary that punishment should reform the offender, whereas Plato, in this work and elsewhere, speaks of incorrigible criminals.†

* Comp. Repub. 2. 379, B. "Is not God truly good, and ought he not to be spoken of as such? Certainly. But nothing good is harmful. Is it? I think not. Can what is not harmful, then, do harm? By no means. Does that which does no harm do any evil (τὰκὸν τι)? No, no more this than the other. But whatever does no evil can be the cause of no evil. Is it so? Assuredly. But what? is the good useful (ὁφιλιμοῖ)? Yes. Is it, then, the cause of well-being (τεύχοντας)? Yes." Etc.

† On the design and efficacy of punishments in society, a number of
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If to suffer δίκαιον = to suffer καλόν = to suffer ὑπερφιλίμα or ᾠγαθόν, can the criminal help being profited? and does not passages from the Laws give us Plato’s views. One is found in Book XI. 934, A. “Not suffering for the sake of his crime,—for what he has done can never be undone,—but in order that for the future he and they who see him suffering justice (δίκαιομετρεῖν) may either altogether hate wrong-doing, or, at least, that a considerable part of so great an evil may cease.” Another occurs in Book IX. 854, D. “For, perhaps, if he suffer this penalty, he may become better, by being rendered more sober-minded (σωφρονεῖται). For no penalty which is inflicted by law is inflicted for evil (γιγνεῖται ἵνα κακόν), but has, for the most part, one of two effects: it improves him who is punished, or, at least, checks the growth of his depravity.” He then goes on to speak of incurable offenders doing good as examples. On page 862, E, after remarking on the excellence of legal expe-
dients by which transgressors shall be made “to hate wrong, and to love or not hate the nature of right,” he continues thus: — “When a lawgiver finds men incurable, he will provide some law and penalty for them, being assured that, for such persons themselves, it is not the better part to live, and that, by withdrawing from life, they will confer a twofold benefit on others: they will serve as an example to others to deter from evil, and will rid the state of bad inhabitants. Thus [that is, on these principles], in the case of such persons must the lawgiver establish death as the penalty for crimes, and in no other way.”

In Book V. 728, C, he speaks of becoming like the wicked, and being separated from the good, as the greatest penalties for wrong-doing. “Though this is not penalty (δίκη), — since justice and penalty are always beautiful, — but vengeance, which is suffering attendant on iniquity. And as well he who has suffered this vengeance is miserable, as he who avoids suffering it; the one, because there is no cure for him; the other, because he is lost, that many may be saved.” In these passages, the end of punish-
ishment is to cure and deter, or, at least, such is its result. And with these may be compared such places as Repub. 1. 335, where it is said, that a just man cannot harm even an enemy and a bad man. It is true that the notion of ἀαρμ is confined there to making such a man worse, but the reasoning appears to include pain if unproductive of good. Cousin, in his Preface to Gorgias, contends very brilliantly, and in some degree justly, that the right to punish in society is derived, not from the good effects of
the argument look like a dead algebraic formula, more than like living moral truth? This difficulty must attend the argument at the first view of it. Nor can it be removed, unless we allow δίκαιον and καλά to be what they are, not only in themselves, but also in the apprehension of the sufferer, while ὑπερλίμνυον is simply objective. The argument now becomes tenable. Punishment can be a good to none who do not receive it as just; nor can it, in the arrangements of this world, fail of being more or less of a good to him who feelingly owns that it is rightly inflicted. But there may be some who do not own this, and they are the incorrigible.

Polus being reduced to silence, Callicles steps forth as the third champion of the arts of show. He begins with doubting whether Socrates is in earnest in maintaining these principles, which would throw human life and conduct off from their old foundations. To this Socrates answers, that he follows wherever philosophy shows the way, just as implicitly as Callicles obeys the popular will, and that, before he can change his tone, he must hear her strike a different key. In reply, Callicles says that it was not philosophical reasoning, but trick, by which Polus was beaten. He had made the incautious admission, that to do wrong is baser (ἀθανασιόν) than to be wronged. It is so, indeed, by law, but not by nature. This ambiguity it is between the naturally

punishment upon the criminal or others, but from the duty of punishing, which is based on the instinctive feeling of desert of evil for doing wrong. He adds, "This theory is, without doubt, only indicated in Plato, but it occurs in a number of places, briefly but positively expressed." I could wish that the learned translator had proved this assertion, which his familiar acquaintance with Plato must have rendered easy. Doubtless Plato could not get rid of the conviction written on the heart, that the sinner ought to suffer, or of the tendency to view suffering as a debt owed to justice. But did not Plato try to go farther back than this conviction, and search into the reason of the right which it admits?
and the legally beautiful or right which enables crafty reasoners to gain their points. When Polus spoke of that which is legally base, Socrates shuffled the natural into its room. But by nature nothing is baser which is not more harmful. The natural feelings of men, which, when injured, instantly rise against the aggressor, show, that to be wronged is no property of a man. The legal definitions of base and wrong deeds are introduced by the many and the weak, in order to keep the strong in check. But herein law is opposed to nature, which teaches that the better ought to have more* than the worse, and the more powerful

* πλευκτίων. πλευξία is substantially selfishness, to which cause in a very striking passage Plato ascribes all the wrong actions of men. Leges, V. 731, D : πάντων δὲ μέγιστον, etc. "The greatest of all evils is inherent in the souls of the mass of men, for which they excuse themselves and seek no deliverance from it. This is what the vulgar saying implies, that every man by nature loves himself, and that it is right so to do. But in truth the cause of all errors in every case is to be ascribed to too great self-love. For the lover becomes blind in regard to the object beloved, so that he judges wrongly of the beautiful, the good, and the just, thinking that he ought to honor what pertains to himself before the truth. The man who will be truly great ought not to love himself or his own things, but what is just and right, whether pertaining to his own actions or another man's. From this fault it comes, that all think their own ignorance wisdom. Whence, though we know next to nothing, we think we know every thing; and, being unwilling to intrust to others that which we are not well skilled to do, we are forced to make mistakes in doing it. Therefore ought every man to avoid undue self-love, and to seek out some one better than himself, allowing no shame to prevent his taking such a course."

In another fine passage of the same work (IX. 875, B), the necessity of law is partly ascribed to the selfishness of man. δι' αυτοῦ δὲ, etc. "In the second place, should any one in theory properly comprehend that this is so [that is, that the political art ought to care for the community more than for the individual, and that it is for the interests of both to have the community, rather than the individual, well arranged], and then rule a state with irresponsible and autocratical power, yet can he not adhere to this persuasion,
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than the less powerful. The "good old plan, that they should get who have the power," is the law of nature — ay, and of right — in animals and man, as they show whenever they can seize the occasion. All this is very evident to the man of the world. But philosophy makes a man blind to these truths of common sense, and, if pursued beyond the requirements of education, is the ruin of a man. It unfit him for civil and political life; it is unbecoming for a full-grown man, who should be practical and mix with his fellows; it makes one slink away to a corner with two or three disciples; and, if attacked by foes in the courts, he cannot help himself, but falls into their hands, as defenceless prey, to be slain at their pleasure. (−486, D.)

In this brilliant passage we see described the contempt felt by the vulgar politician for the true philosopher, and the sympathy of such a man with false and sophistical principles. He aims at pleasure rather than good, and the Sophists give their maxims for the prudential attainment of the same end. There is a plain allusion, also, to the behaviour of Socrates at his trial, and to the charges against Socrates and Plato, — especially the latter, — of neglecting the service of the state. The ground which Callicles takes is evidently the only one which can be taken against Socrates,*

and through life keep the interests of the community foremost in the state, and his private interests subordinate; but his mortal nature will ever drive him into selfishness and the pursuit of his own ends (πλενιζιαν και διαστρα-γιαν), since it blindly shuns pain and seeks pleasure. Thus it will give a higher place to pleasure and pain than to the more just and good; and, by producing darkness in itself, will at length plunge the man himself and the state into all sorts of evils."

* The philosopher Archelaus, who was, perhaps, an Athenian and a scholar of Anaxagoras, taught (although he may not have meant by his words what the Sophists taught) τὸ δίκαιον ὑμῖν καὶ τὸ αἰτχρῖν ὑμῖν ἀλλὰ νέματε. This principle is admirably ridiculed in the Clouds, 1421, seq. Pla-
but it is equally the foundation of an attack against all morality. If the idea of right is admitted, it must be supreme; and pleasure, if opposed to it, must bow before it. The only escape is to show that pleasure is never inconsistent with the right and the good. But right, as fixed by law, restrains the individual, and is therefore inconsistent with self-gratification. Hence the advocate for pleasure must yield, unless he can show that natural right — which is really such — is another thing from what the opinions of men, expressed in their laws, call such, and that it authorizes selfish indulgence. But if this be natural right, it contains no moral element, implies no relation of one man to others, and sanctions obedience to every desire which looks towards pleasure.

Socrates first answers with exquisite irony to the maxim of Callicles, that the better ought, by natural right, to have more than the worse. If his opponent means, as he admits that he does, by the better (βελτιωτὸς), the superior and stronger, then, since the many are stronger than the one, as is shown by their enforcing their laws, they have a natural right to make laws for the one. Now they say, in their laws, that to wrong is baser than to be wronged; and hence, according to Callicles, it must naturally be so. (−489, B.)

2. Callicles now shifts his ground, and makes the better the more intelligent. If so, replies Socrates, and if the more intelligent ought to have more than another of that to which his intelligence relates, then, in a mixed collection of men, a physician ought to have more food and drink than others, while yet the greater portion thus assigned to

to refers to it in a striking passage, Leges, X. 890. The discussion with Thrasymachus, in the first part of the Republic, attacks a kindred principle, and may be read here to advantage. Hobbes went to the length of any of the ancient Sophists on this point. See Mr. Hallam's Critique, Hist. of Lit., Vol. III. 365–382, especially the close of the chapter.
him may do him extreme harm. In short, there is no end to the absurdities which will follow from the principle, that intelligence should move in an orbit around desire and not around good. (−491, B.) 3. Callicles forsakes this definition, and the better now become the more intelligent and courageous in politics,—such as are capable of governing.* Socrates here changes his point of attack, and takes a position nearer to the enemy's inner works. For whatever definition Callicles gives, to have more than others (πλεονεκτεῖν), or self-gratification, is the centre of the system, and must be laid bare in all its deformity. Do you mean, says he, by governing, governing one's self? At this the man of the world sneers, and pronounces a man's well-being to consist in having as large desires as possible, with the courage and intelligence to fulfil them. These qualities the many do not possess, whence, to hide their weakness, they praise self-restraint and blame incontinence. But it was not so from the beginning; the great and mighty of old acted by another rule; they regarded justice and self-restraint as base and evil, and got all they could from their enemies for themselves and their friends. Good and pleasure are the same. (−492, C.)

Socrates answers this in two ways. He first tries, by selecting some examples of low bodily pleasures, to awaken Callicles to the consciousness of the amazing baseness and evil which may attend a life of enjoyment.† The illustrations which form the long prologue of this part show that a most important topic is begun. (−495, B.) In the second place, he searches for some tests of the nature of pleasure,

* This may be regarded as the notion of the ἀγαθῶν, the optimates, which was somewhat in vogue at the time, only a little altered.

† Comp. Philebus (an important dialogue, in which the nature of the good and the pleasant is closely examined), 46, A, B.
which shall show that it differs from good. To do this, he makes Callicles allow that courage, science, and pleasure are not the same; and that εὖ πράττειν and κακῶς πράττειν are opposites, so that one cannot be in both states at once, any more than he can be well and ill at once. The same may be said of weakness and strength, of swiftness and slowness, of good and bad, of happiness and misery. But pleasure and pain can coexist in the same person at the same time; as, for instance, thirst, a pain, exists, until drinking, which is pleasant, slakes it.* Thus pleasure wants an essential characteristic of good, and pain of evil. (*497, E.) Another test follows, grounded on the admission of Callicles, that the manly and intelligent are good. A foolish boy or man may be glad, and so may a wise one.† In war a coward is as glad, if not more so, when the enemy goes away, than the man of courage. Then the coward is as good as the courageous man, or even better, and yet bad by the concession of Callicles. (*499, B.) In other words, if good is relative to desire, as such, then its absolute nature ceases, it is in a perpetual flux, and alters with every change of desire or character.‡

Callicles now admits that some pleasures are evil and some good. He thus overthrows his argument, for if pleas-

* Comp. Cie. de Fin. 2. 3. 9.
† Comp. Philebus, 55, B, “And, besides, to be compelled to say that a man who feels grief is bad when he feels it, though he be the best of all men, and that one who is glad, the more he is so, at the time when he is so, is the more virtuous.”
‡ In a fine passage, Leges, II. 663, Plato teaches that the good and bad judge of pleasure subjectively, or relatively to their own character. He then inquires whose judgment is to be received, as accordant with the truth, and answers, that of the good. Neither the lawgiver, then, should ever separate the pleasant from the right, the good, and the beautiful, nor any one else engaged in educating the young.
ure is in itself a good, evil cannot be affirmed of it. Socrates seizes upon the acknowledgment, and carries him back to a point debated in the first part of the dialogue, — that the good being the end of all actions, the pleasant must be sought for its sake, and not vice versâ. (−500, A.)

Now to know what pleasures are good and what evil needs an artist, — a man who has studied the invariable absolute principles of true good and right; — whilst the knowledge how to gratify, acquired by observation, and resting on no unchanging truth, has nothing of the nature of true art, and to apply that knowledge calls simply for an exercise of memory.

If this be so, we have a standard by which we may try the pursuits of men; and, according to this standard, must condemn the music which is in vogue at the public contests, dithyrambic poetry, and even tragedy itself, with all its lofty pretensions. But how is it with rhetoric and the orators or statesmen? Do they neglect their own or the public interests? Do they seek to benefit or gratify the community? To this Callicles responds, that the question admits of a double answer; the orators of the present day seek to please the people, and follow their will, but he thinks that Miltiades, Themistocles, Cimon, and Pericles were good men, and aimed at the highest public good. (−503, D.) This Socrates denies, and, to make the matter clearer, goes at some length into the motives which should influence the good orator, — the true political artist. As the physician has health in view, so has he the health of the community, which consists in justice and temperance* (σωφροσύνη, self-

* For σωφροσύνη, comp. Repub. 4. 430, D. It is there compared to a concord and harmony, and called κόσμος τις καὶ ἱδανίων τίων καὶ ἱσινθημιῶν ἱγκράτια. This κόσμος consists in the subjugation of the worse part of the soul to the better. Ritter observes (2. 474) that the expression σωφροσύνη
restraint, soundness of mind in regard to all pleasures and excess). Instead of flattering them and following popular desires, such a politician will restrain and chastise the people. (–505, C.) This is further enforced in a most important and admirable passage, by pointing out that the ideas of true good, of virtue, of order, of self-restraint or orderliness, of justice and piety (or the observance of the laws of moral order), of courage, of the well-being of the individual and his happiness, are closely and necessarily connected; while the opposites of these are linked together with the pursuit of pleasure. Neither a man, then, nor a state, which would be happy, can have any end in view inconsistent with justice and temperance. If this be admitted, every thing will follow which Socrates had maintained, and his three adversaries had controverted. The orator ought to be just, and to know justice; otherwise he cannot practise or promote it. To be wronged is better than to wrong, for it involves no violation of justice; and to be punished for wrong-doing, than to go unpunished, for it reconciles the soul to justice. The wonder of Callicles, when Socrates defended these latter points, was misplaced. Furthermore, by acting on such principles, he should help himself and his friends, to do which Callicles pronounced him unable. For by living according to these principles, he would avoid the basest and the greatest evil. (–509, C.) But cannot a man, it may asked, gain the advantage arising from not being wronged, as well as that arising from not wronging others? For the latter, an art is needed. As no one does wrong because he prefers it, but because he thinks to gain some good by it, that art must inculcate

is vaguely used by Plato, especially in his early dialogues; and that the definition in the passages of the Republic which he cites (4. 430. u. s., and 3. 389, D) almost reduces its notion to that of ἀκαίρον.
the nature of true good; for example, must distinguish it from self-gratification. Is there, also, an art to avoid being wronged? The only way of preventing injuries in all cases is, to have supreme power yourself, or to be a friend of the supreme power; — for instance, if the people is that power, to gain its friendship by catering for its desires and following all its whims. But if this is done, the other and greater good must slip out of your hands. Nor is it of any use to say, that if you do not thus conciliate the sovereign power in the state, you may lose your life. For it is not a man's business in this world to seek to save his life, nor ought the art of rhetoric to make higher pretensions because it saves life than the art of the pilot or the engineer, by each of which the life of those intrusted to its care is preserved, no matter whether it be better for such persons to live or to die. A man's part is to leave it to God how long he shall live, and to find out on what principles he shall pass the term of life given to him; whether on those of the flattering politician, which will involve the loss of the greatest good, or on those of the man who sacrifices pleasure to the really good and useful. (—514, A.) And the same will apply to the management of a state. Hence the apprenticeship of political life must be in philosophy, which reveals the good and just to those who search for them; and the true politician, contrary to what Callicles had maintained, must be a philosopher. A man who seeks to play the important part of a leader in the state must first ask himself whether, in his private capacity, he has cultivated justice and temperance, and made men better; for the aim in the public and in the private sphere is one and the same. With this in mind, we may return to the four great Athenians, and bring their characters to the touchstone. Did Pericles make the Athenians better? or did they not rather become idle, cowardly, talkative, and covetous through the measures of his admin-
istration? And did not those very Athenians, near the close of his long political life, show their degeneracy, by ungratefully bringing against him a charge of peculation? * The other three met with even worse treatment at the hands of those whom, if skilful politicians, they must have wished and known how to make better. Their ill-success is a proof that they understood not the true art of rhetoric, — that of persuading men to aim at the good, rather than the pleasant; and, indeed, that they were ignorant of the false art, also, if that enables its possessors, as is alleged, to sail in safety amid the storms of politics. (—517, A.)

In this remarkable attack on four of the greatest men of Athens, — men certainly not inferior, in any point, to hundreds of public characters who have been extolled by Christian historians, — we discover an exasperation of feeling in Plato, produced by the unjust fate of his master, and by the wide difference between his own political views and those of his native land. Nor can his character in general be freed from the charge of fault-finding. To this he was led by that uncommonly high standard which the nature of his mind compelled him to form; and, dwelling aloof, as he did, from the turmoil of politics, in contemplative retirement, he could not estimate all the practical difficulties which even a perfect statesman must encounter from a spoiled and self-willed people. But if we strike out what is due to these prejudices, we must find something of justice left in his blame of "the four." The very fact that he draws a broad line between them and Aristides (526, B) is presumptive proof of a real difference. They were high-minded leaders of parties, who humored the people in many of its wishes for the sake of keeping power, and sought the

* See Appendix, No. II.
greatness, but not the real well-being, of their country. Had they

"to divinity aspired,
Not on the breath of popular applause,
But through dependence on the sacred laws,
Framed in the schools where wisdom dwelt retired,
Intent to trace the ideal path of right,"

had they been philosophical statesmen, aiming at justice and the highest good, the allies of Athens would have been less oppressed; the people would not have grown worse so fast; they themselves would have impressed something of their own virtue upon the state, and been less likely to suffer unjustly from those to whom they had done good.

But is it not strange that Plato should reproach these politicians with their ill-success, as a proof of their want of virtuous statesmanship? This is the point which Aristides, the Sophist, presses most effectively in his long and wearisome defence of "the four." If ill-success is to be the test, what is to be argued from the two reprobate companions of Socrates, Critias and Alcibiades (Aristid. de Quat. viiris, 2. 322, Dindorf., de Rhet. 2. 111)? What from Plato's abortive attempts to make a man out of Dionysius of Syracuse (302-304, 324)? Nor is Plato, the Sophist goes on to allege, consistent with himself, since he praises Pericles, in the Phædrus, for his rhetorical skill.* In the Apology (31, E), he makes Socrates affirm that no one can be safe who opposes any populace, or strives to prevent injustice in a state, unless he avoid public life and live as a private citizen. (343, 353, 366.) And, in our dialogue itself, he pronounces safety to arise from being like the sovereign power, or from having supreme power in one's own hands. Again, he says, — "I should be a fool not to know

* Comp. Appendix, No. II.
that at Athens any man may suffer any thing." And yet the fact, that these statesmen were not safe from the effects of popular ingratitude, is his proof that they did not oppose the people, or strive to prevent injustice.

How the reasonableness or consistency of Plato, as to this point, can be defended, I do not see. Ill-success could have the force which he gives it only in case the influence of the four men outweighed the opposing influences of all other causes acting at their time upon the opposite side. In general, however, it may be said that politicians who complain of ingratitude are only reaping what they have sown. They have tickled the nice palate of the people until their cookery pleases no longer; and now, by a rotation in office, which was right in their eyes until they came into power, and wrong afterwards, they are driven from the kitchen by new hands, who pay a price for the situation, and have learned some newer arts of falsehood. It was, perhaps, the sight of such flatterers of the Athenian demos fallen into disgrace, that led Plato beyond the bounds of truth, in imputing all the ill-success of politicans to their want of correct principles,—to their aiming at pleasure rather than good. Being preoccupied by this partial view, and having also in his mind the pretensions of the Sophists,—the teachers of such politicians,—that they could make men good, he loses sight of the great truth, that, in a corrupt age, a good man must suffer ill from those whom he tries to benefit.

But to return to the dialogue:—When Socrates had expressed such an opinion of these four great statesmen, Callicles replied, that no one of his own contemporaries could compare with them in the works they had done for the state. In answer, Socrates admits that they had shown uncommon ability in gratifying the desires of the people. They had created the ships, walls, and docks of Athens, but they dif-
fired in no respect from the politicians of the day in the motives of their administration. If the highest good of the state should be the statesman’s aim, they could no more claim this title, than a cook or a writer on cookery could claim to rank with the master of gymnastics in preserving the bodily health. And as such persons, if intrusted with the care of the body, would be blamed when the maladies arising from luxury should come on, so will the politician, who seeks to please rather than to profit, be punished for political evils which he or his predecessors have occasioned. The head of a state may not complain of ingratitude; for it is by his management that the character of those who compose it has grown worse. And the same holds good of the Sophists. They pretend that they can make their disciples better; and yet find fault with these very scholars for keeping back the price of tuition from them, and for other acts of unthankfulness. But what good, demands Callicles, can you say of such worthless men as the Sophists? They are the same with rhetoricians, answers Socrates, or nearly so; only somewhat above them, because they deal with principles which rhetoricians merely apply. If, now, their pretensions are well founded, they, as well as politicians, ought to fear no ingratitude; they should stipulate for no fees of instruction beforehand, trusting to the generosity of those pupils whom they had purged from vice.* (-521, A.)

Having thus compared the arts which aim at pleasure with those which aim at good, Socrates makes a personal

* Schleiermacher thinks that this is aimed at Aristippus, who, by taking pay for his instructions, brought reproach upon the Socratic philosophers. The best account of the remunerations given to the Sophists which I have met with is contained in Welcker’s Essay on Prodicus, his Life and Writings, in Welcker and Näke’s Rheinisches Museum, 1. 22, seq., and since reprinted in his “Kleine Schriften,” Part 2, p. 393, seq.
appeal to Callicles. "Which mode of serving the state do you now exhort me to follow; that of seeking its best interests, or that of catering for its desires?" Callicles persists in telling over the same story, that fidelity in doing good will make him suffer the loss of all things. Socrates acknowledges, with evident allusion to his trial and condemnation, that he is exposed to such dangers from bad men, and that he could say nothing in the court which would win him the favor of his judges. If he should urge, on his defence, that he had opposed the public will when it was basely clamorous for present gratification, that he had striven to make men good, and had their well-being in view, he would fare as a physician might fare before a jury of children with a cook for his accuser. What he called good, they called evil; what he called hurtful, they called pleasant. It was painful to be perplexed; and yet he must lead them through perplexity to truth. Would he not, then, before such judges, be himself perplexed, and at a loss for a defence? "And do you think, then," says Callicles again, "that it is well with a man who cannot help himself?" "Assuredly," replies Socrates, "it would be very ill with me, if I could not give myself that help which has been shown to be truly such,—if I could not observe the rule of right in all my relations. Let a man show me that I am not seeking to help myself thus, and I shall be ashamed of my character, and be grieved if I need punishment. But if I die for want of the flattering art of rhetoric, I shall not be sorry. For no one who is a man, and has reason, fears death in itself, but rather to do wrong. For to go into the other world with a soul full of all manner of iniquity is the worst of evils." (−523, A.)

Having thus brought the two principles of action to the confines of the two states of being, he closes very nobly, by presenting them in contrast beyond the grave. His views
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are introduced as an explanation of the common mythus concerning a judgment after death; which, however, Plato scruples not to alter for his own purposes. The views are these:—The character formed by disregarding the good and right, and pursuing pleasure, must be lasting, while all the advantages it offers are temporary, being connected with the world and the wrong judgments of men. But, at death, men will come before a judge who will look at the bare soul, and give sentence according to its qualities. Among transgressors, there are some who are not gone too far in evil to be curable. For these, punishment, bitter as it must be, will prove a good. Others, having passed beyond the reach of a cure, will suffer eternally, as an example to all who shall behold them. Of this description, a large part will be tyrants and other men in power, who had on earth the greatest license to do evil. But if one of these, like Aristides, rises above the temptations of his station on earth, his reward will be so much the greater. The larger number, however, of those who receive rewards will be private persons; and, more especially, philosophers who had not mingled in public affairs. With this trial in view, Socrates asserts that he strives to bring his soul, in its most healthy condition, before the judge, and that he seeks to lead his fellow-men to do the same. And to this he now urges Callicles, warning him that the trial then will be more serious than all earthly ones, and that, without such a preparation, he will be unable to help himself, but, speechless and perplexed, must submit to worse than earthly indignities. Callicles, he continues, might despise such fables, and the truth they contain, if he could show any thing better. But this, neither he, Polus, nor Gorgias had been able to do. They should, therefore, agree with Socrates that to be, and not to seem to be, a good man is a good thing; that the next best thing is to become good by submitting to punishment;
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that all flattery of one’s self or others, of a few or a multitude, must be shunned; and that rhetoric, like every thing else, must be used to promote the right, and that only. “Let us, then,” he says in closing, “join together to live virtuously on such principles; then can we best apply ourselves to politics, when we are no longer afloat on the most momentous subjects. This is the only way to live well and to die well.”

With respect to the close of the Gorgias, which must be counted among the finest passages in Greek, it may be observed that Plato shows elsewhere the same inclination to clothe in a mythical dress those truths which lie beyond the bounds of reason. It seems as if he felt the need of the venerable authority and positive assurances of a revelation upon such points, and resorted to the old traditions of his country as the best substitute which he could find, as having for their foundation real, though distorted, truth.* The mythus is something more than mere drapery, something more than a poetical fiction, which, with a beautifully plastic hand, he shapes into a form and meaning corresponding to his awakened moral sense. And yet the freedom with which he treats the mythus, and the readiness with which he alters its form on several occasions, prove that he accepted it only in its leading outlines as true; it was to him a μυστικός, and yet a μάλα καλὸς λόγος. It is found, also, at the close of the Phædo and of the Republic. He who compares the three passages will perceive that they agree in affirming the rewards and punishments of another life,

* This remark does not include those mythi which are of Plato’s own invention. He was led to use them by his poetical temperament, and felt, perhaps, that the view suggested by a beautiful fable was as true as any which could be given; more true, because more beautiful, than if put into abstract propositions.
which are used, with all seriousness, as motives for living well here below; and also in teaching that some criminals are healed by punishment, while others must suffer for ever without hope of a cure.* This Platonic view of the reme-

* Phædo, 113, E. "Those who are judged to be incurable on account of the enormity of their crimes, who have committed many and heinous sacrileges, or numerous unjust and lawless murders, or the like, these their appropriate destiny hurls into Tartarus, whence they never come forth." He then speaks of the punishment of those who have committed curable sins, in a passage too long to be inserted here, and then adds,—"With respect to the mythus, to affirm positively that these things are as I have narrated them is not the part of a reasonable man"; and then uses the truth taught in the mythus as a motive for virtuous action. In the Republic, the narrator of the mythus is represented as near a chasm (see Gorg. 526, B, note) in the ground, by the side of a person who asked another where Ardiaeus was. "Now this Ardiaeus was a tyrant in a Pamphylian city a thousand years before, and had slain his aged father and his elder brother, besides doing, as was said, many other unhallowed deeds. The person so asked replied, said the informant, 'He is not come, nor can he hereafter come hither.' Among the frightful spectacles that we saw, this was one, continued he: — When we were near the mouth of the chasm, and were expecting to go upwards, after enduring all the other things appointed, on a sudden we saw this Ardiaeus and others, nearly all of them tyrants; although some enormous transgressors among private persons were there also. When they thought that they should now go upwards (out of the chasm), the mouth would not let them pass, but uttered a bellowing sound whenever any such incurably wicked person, or any one who had not paid a sufficient penalty, endeavoured to ascend. Thereupon, wild men, said he, all fiery to look upon, who stood by, when they heard the bellow, picked out and carried off a part of the transgressors; but Ardiaeus and others they bound hand and foot, and threw them down, and beat them hard, and dragged them along on one side of the road, scraping them upon thorns, while to the by-standers they told the reasons why these sinners suffered these things, and that they were drawn along to be plunged into Tartarus. There, said he, of all the fears many and various which fell upon us, this was the greatest,—lest, when each one was going upwards, the mouth should utter that bellow, and most gladly did each one hear no sound as he ascended." A conception worthy of the highest flights of Dante!
dial nature of punishment, in certain cases, even in another life, seems to have recommended the doctrine of purgatory to some of the Christian fathers.*

Having thus exhibited the argument of the Gorgias at some length, it will be in order for us to ask, What is the main subject of the dialogue? A question which it is almost as difficult to answer, in regard to some of the Platonic dialogues, as it would be to express the sum total of an evening's conversation among refined and intelligent persons: the delight you have felt, the instruction you have received, you are conscious of, and you carry away much in your memory; but it is hard to say what was the leading topic of the discourse, or whether there was any. The subject of the Gorgias is more easy to be perceived, and yet all have not been agreed concerning it. Olympiodorus (apud Routh) mentions three opinions besides his own: — Some say that it treats of rhetoric; others, of justice and injustice, considered especially in their relations to happiness; others still, absurdly enough, make it relate to the demiuergus or divine builder of the world, on account of the mythus at the close. "But we say," continues the Platonic commentator, "that the scope is, to treat of the principles which lead men to political happiness." With the first of these opinions, Cousin and Stallbaum agree. The latter says, however, that "though the principal point of the discussion is to blame the civil and rhetorical art at that day in vogue, and to show that it could not attain to excellence without the knowledge and practice of philosophy," yet several other topics are closely united with this, as the difference of the just and the pleasant, the end of human actions, and the constancy of a good man in bearing evils and injuries. Nearly the same is the view taken by Ast. The Gorgias,
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says he, "has a decidedly political tendency; and all the philosophical inquiries which it contains are intended to show, not only the unmeaning nature, but also the perniciousness, and, in fact, the profligacy, of the political art, when built on sophistry, that is, of the rhetoric there opposed." Another writer on the higher criticism of Plato, Socher, gives this dialogue a wider range. "The whole presents an arena, rising in three gradations. The prize of the contest is the better, happier mode of life; the parties are philosophy and rhetoric; that contends for righteousness and virtue; this for the possession of political power; the champion of the former is Socrates; on behalf of the latter, three step forward, Gorgias, a rhetorician, Polus, a Sophist, and Callicles, an Athenian politician." Finally, Schleiermacher and C. F. Hermann, in the words of the latter, regard "the kernel of the dialogue to be, that the good alone is truly useful, and that men harm themselves by wrong-doing; that, accordingly, the rule of pleasure must give way to the higher rule of the good."*

* All these opinions may be found in the works of their respective advocates, viz. Cousin's in his transl. 3. 130, seq., Stallbaum's in Vol. 2, sec. 1, p. 38, of his second ed., Ast's in his work on Plato's life and writings, p. 133, Socher's in his similar work, (Munich, 1820,) p. 237, in which he is polemical towards Ast. C. F. Hermann's is contained in his Introd. to Plato, (Heidelberg, 1838 - 39, the second vol. has not appeared,) p. 476, and Schleiermacher's — the critic to whom the thorough understanding of Plato owes most — in Dobson's translation of his prefaces. While I am upon this subject, let me say, that Schleiermacher hardly receives justice from the hands of this translator. His style, indeed, offers serious difficulties, for his mind was not, "though deep, yet clear." It may be forgiven, therefore, to a translator, that sometimes he constructs, out of Schleiermacher's formidable German sentences, something not exactly English, as though he were only half conscious of the meaning. But when such things as the turning of André Dacier, the French translator of parts of
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Most of these opinions have something of justice in them, but, with the exception of the last, appear to me to look at a part of the dialogue, rather than at the whole. If rhetoric is the subject, why have the researches into the nature of pleasure, the comparison between suffering injustice and committing it, and the discussion of the efficacy of punishment, so great prominence? Much is said about rhetoric, but it is the vehicle for conveying thought rather than the subject, the starting-point of the dialogue rather than its goal. I should entertain just the opposite opinion to that of Ast above quoted: that the scientific part of the dialogue is the main thing, and rhetoric only an example. Schleiermacher's view, so far as I understand it, or one very similar to it, appears to me to deserve the preference. The main subject is the worthless nature of pleasure, and of the pursuits founded on pleasure, as opposed to the right and the good. Rhetoric, including politics in its corrupt condition at that time, is selected as the most prominent and most esteemed of the arts which minister to pleasure. This exhibition of the subject being admitted, we see a propriety in the introduction of every topic. The right and the good are inseparably linked to each other, and, in fact, united with all that pertains to man's excellence and well-being. But to these, pleasure, pursued for its own sake, is opposed. It is opposed to true good, for it blindly seeks present gratification, however pernicious or debasing. It is opposed to right or justice, for it tries to avoid suffering wrong by inflicting wrong on others. It is opposed to both, because its impulse is to escape from de-

Plato, into Madame Dacier occur, notwithstanding Schleiermacher's "dem Dacier," and "Seiner einleitung," it may be suspected that the translation was made before sufficient knowledge of German was acquired,—a suspicion from which only the plea of gross carelessness can free the translator.
served punishment, without regard to the good effects of punishment on virtue and happiness. The arts which minister to pleasure — one of which, and the chief in its pretensions, is false rhetoric — fall under the same condemnation. As truth is on the side of good, they have no communion with truth; they are arts of imposition or flattery, calculated to persuade the ignorant, and reared upon no basis of unchanging truth or scientific principles. In the end, as they sacrifice the highest good of those whom they please to their present gratification, they involve in ruin him who practises them, and those who are practised upon. Politics, especially, which, when genuine, aims at the public good, is, when based on these principles, a mischievous trade. And this supreme pursuit of pleasure affects the condition of man, not only in this life, but in the life to come.

Such appears to me to be the subject of the Gorgias. But it should be added, that Plato has so handled the subject that the dialogue answers, also, for a defence of himself and his master. The allusions to the trial of Socrates have been noticed already. He stands before us as the philosopher who suffers reproach and death for seeking men's good rather than their pleasure. But Plato defends himself, also, apparently against friends, who blamed him for not publicly serving the state, as well as against public men, who thought philosophy a useless pursuit. Politics, he asserts, must be founded on the theory and practice of philosophy. No man is a true politician until he becomes τεχνικός, — an artist, a philosopher able to distinguish useful from harmful pleasures, — and reduces his science to practice by making men better. That this is a fair defence I do not assert; for, with true good in view at the outset, the practice perfects a man in the science. He might have said, what he must have felt, that the corruption of the
times, the necessity of using flattering arts, to which he could not resort, would have altogether prevented his success. In such an age,—and such an age is a very long one,—the philosophical statesman,—let me add, the truly enlightened Christian statesman,—the sound pilot of the state, is thrust from the helm, and ignorant apprentices usurp his place. Plato's part, therefore, was to act on a few, and on future times.

I would gladly now draw the attention of my younger readers to the Gorgias, as a display of the mind and style of Plato; but the limits of an Introduction forbid me to enlarge upon this topic. I must, therefore, omit to speak of the exquisite style of Plato, and the dramatic form in which he clothes his works. I must only glance at the Platonic Socrates, the centre of Plato's writings; at his admirable irony, now playful and now severe, his unruffled good-nature, his hatred of show and pretence, his attitude as an inquirer rather than as already wise, his unaffected modesty, his propensity to illustrate the great by the small, philosophical truth by common life, his high estimate of moral truth above physical. There are, however, one or two points to be noticed, in which Gorgias differs from many of Plato's works. One is, the earnestness, almost amounting to bitterness, with which the argument is carried on. There is less here of playful irony than elsewhere. Another is, that Socrates expresses his opinion, and lays down his principles, more than in most of the dialogues of an earlier date. Another still is, that, compared with the Platonic works of the first period, it has less of the dramatic about it; we have no embellished preface, like that of Protagoras, but at the beginning, Socrates, without any delay on the part of the writer, enters into the discussion. All these characteristics may be explained by a predominance of moral feeling, which rises even into indignation, and deprives Plato of part
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of his usual tranquility. With all this, the form is admirable.* The argument grows in interest and importance, until it ends in a strain of highest mood. To mention but a single characteristic, nothing can be finer than the way in which Socrates deals with Callicles in the third part, where he retorts his language upon him, and shows that the indignities which he had described as the rewards of the just man on earth will be heaped upon the unjust in a higher degree hereafter.

The opinion of the greater number of critics assigns the composition of the Gorgias to one of the years not long after the death of Socrates, while that event was still fresh in Plato's mind. Athenæus has a story (11. 505, D), that Gorgias read the work, and said, "How well Plato knows how to lampoon!" and another, that Gorgias declared that "he never heard or said such things as Plato reported." If Gorgias died soon after Socrates, as Foss maintains, these anecdotes, which may not be wholly unworthy of credence, would supply us with the latter term for the composition of the dialogue. But there is no certainty in regard to the dates of the birth of Gorgias, and of his age when he came to Athens as ambassador, on which the date of his death depends. A comparison of this dialogue with Plato's other works enables us to come somewhere near the time of its composition in another manner. It occupies a

"Stallbaum, in his Introd. to the Repub., says: — "Hoc monere juvat disserendi quoque elegantiam in Politia tantam regnare ut paucissimi sermo-
nes præter Gorgiam, Protagoram, Phædonem, Phædrum, et Symposium, 
hoc in genere ad eam comparandi sint." Ritter, 2. 192. "In regard to 
Plato's imitative art in dialogue (dialogisch-mimische kunst), we consider as 
his most finished works Protagoras, Gorgias, and Symposium, next to which, 
though at some distance, come Phædrus and Phædo." Here, however, 
style, rather than form, is spoken of. As a work of art, I should place 
Phædrus first among all the Platonic dialogues.
middle place, as Schleiermacher teaches us, between the elementary writings of Plato's first years, and the constructive ones of his maturer life. This critic conceives that it was written after Plato's first visit to Sicily, in 389, B.C., when he was forty years of age. Stallbaum brings it much nearer to the death of Socrates, in 399. To this conclusion he is led by a strong resemblance he discovers between the Gorgias and Meno, which latter dialogue he carries back even to a time before the death of Socrates, on account of Plato's mildness there in attacking Anytus, the accuser of his master. But neither of these considerations has much weight; Plato might and does resemble himself in works written at considerable intervals from one another; and the more gentle tone of Meno may be owing to a frame of its author's mind which is not to be accounted for. It is safer to say, that the date cannot be ascertained precisely.
ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΚΑΛΛΙΚΛΗΣ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΧΑΙΡΕΦΩΝ, ΒΟΡΓΙΑΣ, ΠΩΛΟΣ.

447 ΣΛΡ. Ι. ΚΑΛ. Πολέμου καὶ μάχης φασὶ χρῆναι, ὁ Σόφρατες, οὕτω μεταλαγχάνειν. ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἢ, τὸ λεγόμενον, κατόπιν ἐορτῆς ἥκομεν καὶ ύστεροῦμεν; ΚΑΛ. Καὶ μάλα γε ἄστείας ἐορτῆς πολλὰ γἀρ καὶ καλὰ Γοργίας ἡμῖν ὀλιγὸν πρότερον ἐπεδείξατο. ΣΩ. Τούτων μέντοι, Β ὁ Καλλίκλεις, αὐτίος Χαιρεφῶν ὅδε, ἐν ἀγορῇ ἀναγκάσας ἡμᾶς διατρίψας. ΧΑΙ. Οὐδὲν πράγμα, ὁ Σόφρατες· ἐγὼ γὰρ καὶ ἰάσομαι. φίλος γὰρ μοι Γοργίας, ὥστε ἐπιδείξηται ἡμῖν, εἰ μὲν δοξεῖ, νῦν, ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, ἑσάνθησι. ΚΑΛ. Τί δαί, ὁ Χαιρεφῶν; ἐπιθυμεῖ Σοφράτης ἀκούσαι Γοργίου; ΧΑΙ. Ἐπ' αὐτὸ γέ τοι τούτο πάρεσμεν. ΚΑΛ. Οὐχοῦν ὅταν βούλησθε παρ' ἐμὲ ἥκεν οἴκαδε, παρ' ἐμοὶ γὰρ Γοργίας καταλύει καὶ ἐπιδείξηται ἡμῖν. ΣΩ. Εὐλέγεις, Κ ὁ Καλλίκλεις. ἄλλ' ἄρα ἐθελήσεις ἢν ἡμῖν διαλεχθῆναι; βούλομαι γὰρ παρὰ σοῦ παρ' αὐτῶν, τίς ἡ δύναμις τῆς τέχνης τοῦ ἀνδρός, καὶ τί ἔστιν ὃ ἐπαγγέλλεται τε καὶ διδάσκει. τὴν δὲ
"Διδυσίων ένεμεν ἐξαυθίς, ὡςπερ οὐ λέγεις, ποιησάθω. ΚΑΛ. Οὔδεν οἶνον τὸ αὐτῶν ἔρωτάν, ὡς Σάκρατος. καὶ γὰρ αὐτῷ ἐν τούτῳ ἦν τῆς ἐπίδειξεως· ἐκέλευε γοῦν νῦν δὴ ἐρωτάν ὃ τι τις βουλότοι τῶν ἔνδον ὦντων, καὶ πρὸς ἀπαντὰ ἔφη ἄποκρινεῖσθαι. ΣΩ. Ἡ καλῶς λέγεις. Ω Χαιρεφᾶν, ἔροι αὐτῶν. ΧΑΙ. Τῇ ἔφοραί; ΣΩ. Ὁστις ἔστι. ΧΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις; ΣΩ. Ὁ σπερ ἀν εἶ ἐτύχανεν ἃν ὑποδημάτων δημιουργός, ἀπεκφάνατο ἂν δῆμον σοι, ὡς σκυτοτόμος. ἦ οὖ μανθάνεις ὡς λέγω;

ΣΑΡ. Ι. ΧΑΙ. Μανθάνω καὶ ἔφορομαι.—Εἰπέ μοι, ὁ Γοργία, ἀληθῆ λέγει Καλλικλῆς ὅδε, ὃτι ἐπαγγέλλει ἄποκρινεῖσθαι ὃ τι ἄν τίς σε ἔρωτά; ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ, ὁ Χαιρεφᾶν καὶ γὰρ νῦν δὴ αὐτὰ ταύτα ἐπηγγελλόμην, καὶ λέγω, ὃτι σύνεις μὲ πώ ἡρώτηκε καίνον οὐδὲν πολλῶν ἐτῶν. ΧΑΙ. Ἡ ποι ἄρα ὡρία ὡς ἄποκρίνει, ὁ Γοργία. ΓΟΡ. Πάρεστι τούτων πεῖραν, ὁ Χαιρεφᾶν, λαμβάνειν. ΠΩΛ. Νὴ Δίας ἂν δὲ γε βούλη, ὁ Χαιρεφᾶν, ἐμοῦ. Γοργίας μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀπειρημέναι μοι δοκεῖ τολλα γὰρ ἄρτι διελήλυθε. ΧΑΙ. Τῇ δαί, ὁ Πόλε; οἴει σύ κάλλιον ἃν Γοργίον ἄποκρινασθαι; ΠΩΛ. Τῇ δὲ τούτῳ, ἐὰν σοὶ γε ἴκανῶς; ΧΑΙ. Οὔδεν· ἄλλ’ ἐπειδὴ Β οὐ βούλει, ἄποκρίνουν. ΠΩΛ. Ἐρώτα. ΧΑΙ. Ἐρωτῶ δή. εἰ ἐτύχανε Γοργίας ἐπιστήμον ἄν τῆς τέχνης ἦσπερ ὁ ἀδελφὸς ἃντοι Ἰρόδικος, τίνα ἂν αὐτὸν ἀνομάζομεν δικαίως; οὐχ ὡς ἄπερ ἐκεῖνον; ΠΩΛ. Πάνω γε. ΧΑΙ. Ἰατρὸν
ἀρα φάσκοντες αὐτὸν εἶναι καλῶς ἂν ἔλέγομεν. Π.Δ.Ναῦ. ΧΑΙ. Εἰ δὲ γε ἢσπερ Ἀριστοφάνου ὁ Ἀγλαοφάντος ἢ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ ἐμπειρός ἤν τέχνης, τίνα ἂν αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς ἐκαλούμεν; Π.Δ.Ν. Ἀῆλον, ὦτι Ἑοράφων. ΧΑΙ. Νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ τίνος τέχνης ἐπιστήμων ἔστι, τίνα ἂν καλούντες αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς καλοίμεν; Π.Δ.Ν. ὁ Χαιρεφάν, πολλαὶ τέχναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰσὶν ἐκ τῶν ἐμπειρῶν ἐμπειρῶς εὐθυμεῖναι ἐμπειρία μὲν γὰρ ποιεῖ τὸν αἰῶνα ἥμισυ πορεύεσθαι κατὰ τέχνην, ἀπειρία δὲ κατὰ τύχην. ἔκαστον δὲ τούτων μεταλαμβάνουσιν ἄλλοι ἄλλων ἄλλως, τῶν δὲ ἄριστον οἱ ἄριστοι· ὥς καὶ Γοργίας ἐστίν οὕς, καὶ μετέχει τῆς καλλιστῆς τῶν τεχνῶν.

D ΚΑΡ. ΙΙΙ. ΣΩ. Καλῶς γε, ὧ Γοργία, φαίνεται Πόλος παρασκευᾶσθαι εἰς λόγους· ἄλλα γὰρ ὁ ὑπέσχετο Χαιρεφάντης οὐ ποιεῖ. θΟΡ. Τί μάλιστα, ὦ Σόκρατες; ΣΩ. Τὸ ἐφωτάμενον οὐ πάνυ μοι φαίνεται ἀποκρίνεσθαι. θΟΡ. Ἀλλὰ σὺ, εἰ βουλεῖς, ἔροῦ αὐτῶν. ΣΩ. Οὐκ, εἰ αὐτῷ γε σοὶ βουλομένῳ ἐστίν ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἄλλα πολὺ ἂν ἢδιον σε. δῆλος γὰρ μοι Πόλος καὶ εξ ὧν εἰρηκεν, ὅτι τὴν καλουμένην δητορικήν ἔμαλλον μεμελετήκην ἥ διαλέγεσθαι. Π.Δ.Ν. Τί δὴ, ὦ Σόκρατες; ΣΩ. Ὕμι. ὡς Πόλε, ἐφορεῖν Χαιρεφάντος τίνος Γοργίας ἐπιστήμων τέχνης, ἐγκομιάζεις μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν τέχνην, ὡςπερ τινὸς ψέγοντος, ἢτις δὲ ἐστὶν, οὐκ ἀπεκρίνω. Π.Δ.Ν. Οὐ γὰρ ἀπεκρίναμην, ὅτι εἴη ἡ καλλιστή; ΣΩ. Καὶ μάλα γε. ἄλλ᾽ οὕδεῖς ἐρωτή
ποία τις εἶ ἢ Γοργίου τέχνη, ἀλλὰ τίς, καὶ ὅντινα δέοι καλεῖν τὸν Γοργίαν. ὁσπερ τὰ ἐμπροσθέν σοι ὑπετείνατο Χαρισσάν καὶ αὐτῶ 440 καλῶς καὶ διὰ βραχέων ἀπεχρίνω, καὶ νῦν οὐτος εἰπὲ τίς ἡ τέχνη καὶ τίνα Γοργίαν καλεῖν χρῆ ἡμᾶς. μᾶλλον δέ, ὃ Γοργία, αὐτὸς ἡμῖν εἰπὲ τίνα σε χρῆ καλεῖν ὁς τίνος ἐπιστήμονα τέχνης. ΓΟΡ. Τῆς ἤτορικῆς, ὡς Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Ἐφτορα ἄρα χρῆ σε καλεῖν; ΓΟΡ. Ἀγαθόν γε, ὃ Σώκρατες, εἰ δὴ ὃ γε εὐχομαι εἶναι, ὃς ἔφη ὁ Ομηρος, βούλει με καλεῖν. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ βούλομαι. ΓΟΡ. Κάλει δὴ. ΣΩ. Ὁν κοῦν καὶ ἄλλους σε φῶμεν δυνατῶν εἶναι Β ποιεῖν; ΓΟΡ. Ἐπαγγέλλομαι γε δὴ ταῦτα υὗ μόνον ἐνθάδε, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοθι. ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν ἐθελήσαι ἂν, ὃ Γοργία, ὁσπερ νῦν διαλεγόμεθα, διατελέσαι τὸ μὲν ἑρωτῶν, τὸ δ' ἀποκρινόμενος, τὸ δὲ μήκος τῶν λόγων τοῦτο, οὗν καὶ Πῶλος ἦρξατο, ἐσαύθις ἀποθέοσαι; ἀλλ' ὅπερ ὑπισχνεῖ, μὴ ψεύσῃ, ἀλλὰ ἐθέλησον κατὰ βραχύ τὸ ἑρωτῶμεν ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ΓΟΡ. Εἰδί μὲν, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἐνιαὶ τῶν ἀποκρίσεων ἀναγκαῖαι διὰ Κ μαχρῶν τῶν λόγων ποιεῖσθαι· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ πειράσομαι γε ὡς διὰ βραχυτάτων. καὶ γὰρ αὕτοι τοῦτο ἐν ἑστὶ οὖν φημι, μηδένα ἂν ἐν βραχυτέροις ἐμὸν τὰ αὐτὰ εἴπειν. ΣΩ. Τούτου μὴν δεῖ, ὃ Γοργία· καὶ μοι ἐπίδειξιν αὐτῶ τούτου ποιήσαι, τῆς βραχυλογίας, μαχρολογίας δὲ ἐσαύθις. ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλὰ ποιήσω, καὶ οὐδενὸς ϕήσεις βραχυλογωτέρου ἀκούσαι.
GORGIAS.

CAP. IV. ΣΩ. Φέρε δή—ήθορικῆς γὰρ

Δ ψῆ ἐπιστήμων τέχνης εἶναι καὶ ποιήσαι ἂν καὶ ἀλλην ὤντορα.—ή θηρικὴ περὶ τι τῶν ὀντῶν τυχανὲν οὔσα; ὡσπερ ἡ υφαντικὴ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἰματίων ἔργασιάν· ἡ γὰρ; ΓΟΡ. Ναι. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ μονακτικὴ περὶ τὴν τῶν μελῶν ποίησιν; ΓΟΡ. Ναι. ΣΩ. Νη τὴν Ἡραν, ὁ Γοργία, ἀγαμαὶ γε τὰς ἀποκρίσεις, ὅτι ἀποκρίνεται ὡς οἶνον τε διὰ βραχυτάτων. ΓΟΡ. Πάνω γὰρ οἶμαι, ὃ Σόφρατες, ἐπιτεκίκῃς τοῦτο ποιεῖν. ΣΩ. Εὖ λέγεις. ἦδι δή μοι ἀπό-

Ε κρίναι οὖτω καὶ περὶ τῆς θηρικῆς, περὶ τί τῶν ὀντῶν ἐστίν ἐπιστήμη; ΓΟΡ. Περὶ λόγους. ΣΩ. Ποίον τούτου, ὁ Γοργία; ἀρα οὖ δηλοῦ-

σι τοὺς κάμνοντας, ὡς ἐν διαιτόμενοι ύμαίνοιεν; ΓΟΡ. Οὐ. ΣΩ. Οὐχ ἀρα περὶ πάντως γε 

tοὺς λόγους ἡ θηρικὴ ἐστὶν. ΓΟΡ. Οὐ δή-

tαι. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν λέγειν γε ποιεῖ δυνατοὺς. 

ΓΟΡ. Ναι. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν περὶ ὄντερ λέγειν, καὶ φρονεῖν; ΓΟΡ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; ΣΩ. Ἀρ' 450 

οὖν καὶ ἧν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἡ ἱατρικὴ περὶ τῶν κάμνοντων ποιεῖ δυνατοὺς εἶναι φρονεῖν καὶ 

λέγειν; ΓΟΡ. Ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. Καὶ ἡ ἱατρικὴ ἀρά, ὡς ἐσχιζε, περὶ λόγους ἐστὶ. ΓΟΡ. Ναι. 

ΣΩ. Τοὺς γε περὶ τὰ νοσήματα; ΓΟΡ. Μά-

λιστα. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ γυμναστική περὶ 

λόγους ἐστὶ τοὺς περὶ εὐεξίαν τε τῶν σωμάτων 

καὶ καχεξίαν; ΓΟΡ. Πάνω γε. ΣΩ. Καὶ 

Β μὴν καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι, ὁ Γοργία, οὕτως ἔχου-

σιν. ἐκάστη αὐτῶν περὶ λόγους ἐστὶ τούτους, οὗ
τυχάνουσιν ὄντες περὶ τὸ πράγμα οὗ ἐκάση ἔστιν ἡ τέχνη. ΓΟΡ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ὅτι ποτε τάς ἄλλας τέχνας οὗ ἡτορικάς καλεῖς, οὐσας περὶ λόγους, εἰπερ ταῦτην ἡτορικὴν καλεῖς, ἢ ἂν ἢ περὶ λόγους; ΓΟΡ. Ἐστι, ὁ Σό-κρατες, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων τεχνῶν περὶ χειροφηγίας τε καὶ τοιαύτας πράξεις, ὃς ἔπος εἰπείν, πᾶσα ἕστιν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, τῆς δὲ ἡτορικῆς οὐδὲν ἔστι τοιοῦτον χειροφηγήμα, ἀλλὰ πᾶσα ἡ πράξεις καὶ ἡ κύρωσις διὰ λόγων ἔστι. διὰ ταῦτ' ἐγὼ τὴν Σ ἡτορικῆν τέχνην ἀξίω εἰναι περὶ λόγους, ὥρθος λέγων, ὃς ἐγὼ φημι.

Cap. V. ΣΩ. Ὁ Ἀρ' οὖν μανθάνω οὖν αὐ-τὴν βουλεῖς καλεῖν; τάχα δὲ εἰσομαι σαφέστερον. ἀλλ' ἀπόκριναι. εἰσίν ἡμῖν τέχναι. ἢ γὰρ; ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Πασῶν δὲ, οἴμαι, τῶν τεχ-νῶν τῶν μὲν ἑργασία τὸ πολὺ ἐστὶ καὶ λόγου βραχεὸς δέονται, ἔνιαι δὲ οὐδενὸς, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῆς τέχνης περαινοῦτο ἂν καὶ διὰ σιγῆς, οἶον γραφη-κῇ καὶ ἀνδριαντοποία καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαῖ. τὰς τοιαύτας μοι δοξεῖς λέγειν, περὶ ὡς οὖ φῆς τῆν ἡτορικὴν εἶναι. ἢ οὖ; ΓΟΡ. Πάντα μὲν οὖν καλῶς ὑπολαμβάνεις, ὃς Σόκρατες. ΣΩ. Ἠπε-ραί δὲ γέ εἰσι τῶν τεχνῶν, αἰ διὰ λόγου πᾶν περαινοῦσι, καὶ ἔργον, ὃς ἔπος εἰπείν, ἢ οὐδενὸς προσδέονται ἢ βραχεὸς πάντων, οἶον ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ καὶ λογιστικὴ καὶ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ πεπτευτικὴ γε καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ τέχναι, ἢν ἔνιαι σχεδὸν τι ἴσους τοὺς λόγους ἔρχουσι ταῖς πράξεσιν, αἰ δὲ πολλαὶ πλείους καὶ τὸ παράπαν πᾶσα ἡ πράξεις Ε
καὶ τὸ κὺρος αὐταῖς διὰ λόγων ἔστι. τῶν τοι-οῦτων τινά μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν τὴν ὑποτοικίν. ΚΌΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ’ οὕτω τοῦ-των γε συνεμίαν οἴμαι σε βουλεύονται ὑποτοικίν καλείν, οὐχ ὅτι τῷ ὁμιματι οὕτως εἶπες, ὅτι ἡ- διὰ λόγου τὸ κὺρος ἔχουσα ὑποτοικία ἔστι, καὶ ὑπολάβοι ἂν τις, εἰ βούλοιτο δυσχεραίνειν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, Τῆν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀρχα ὑποτοικίαν, ὁ Γοργία, λέγεις; ἀλλ’, οὐχ ἦμαι σε οὕτω τῆν ἀριθμητικὴν ὀυτὲ τῆν γεωμετρίαν ὑποτοικίαν λέ-γειν. ΚΌΡ. Ὁρθὸς γὰρ οἶκε, ὁ Σώκρατες, καὶ δικαιῶς ὑπολαμβάνεις.

ΚΑΠ. VI. ΣΩ. Ἡθων οὖν καὶ σύ τὴν ἀπόκρι-σιν ἢν ἡρόμην διαπέρανον. ἔπει γάρ ἡ ὑποτοικία τυγχάνει μὲν οὔσα τοῦτων τις τῶν τεχνῶν τῶν τὸ πολὺ λόγῳ χρωμένων, τυγχάνουσι δὲ καὶ ἀλ-λαὶ τοιαύτας οὔςει, πειρῶ εἶπεν, ἡ περὶ τί ἐν λόγοις τὸ κὺρος ἔχουσα ὑποτοικία ἔστιν. ἄσπερ ἂν εἰ τίς μὲ ἔροιτο ἢν νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον περὶ ἡς-τινοσσὸν τῶν τεχνῶν, Ὁ Σώκρατες, τίς ἔστιν ἡ Β ἀριθμητικὴ τέχνη; εἶποιμ’ ἂν αὐταῖ, ἄσπερ σὺ ἄρτι, ὅτι τῶν διὰ λόγου τις τὸ κὺρος ἔχουσαν. καὶ εἰ με ἔπανέροιτο. Τῶν περὶ τί; εἶποιμ’ ἂν, ὅτι τῶν περὶ τὸ ἄρτιόν τε καὶ περιττῶν γνώσεις, ὅσα ἂν ἐκάτερα τυγχάνοι ἄντα. εἰ δ’ αὖ ἔροιτο. Τὴν δὲ λογιστικὴν τίνα καλεῖς τέχνην; εἶποιμ’ ἂν, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὴ ἔστι τῶν λόγῳ τὸ πᾶν κυρομε- νὸν. καὶ εἰ ἔπανέροιτο, Ἡ περὶ τί; εἶποιμ’ ἂν ἄσπερ οἱ ἐν τῷ δὴμο ςυγγραφόμενοι, ὅτι τά μὲν Σ ἀλλὰ καθάπερ ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ ἡ λογιστικὴ ἔχει.
περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ γὰρ ἐστὶ, τὸ τε ἀρτιον καὶ τὸ περιττὸν· διαφέρει δὲ τοσοῦτον, ὅτι καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλα πᾶς ἔχει πλῆθος ἐπισκοπεῖ τὸ περιττὸν καὶ τὸ ἀρτιόν ἡ λογιστική. καὶ εἴ τις τὴν ἀστρονομίαν ἀνέφορον, ἔμοι λέγοντος, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὴ λόγῳ κυριοῦται τὰ πάντα, Οἶ δὲ λόγοι οἱ τῆς ἀστρονομίας, εἰ φαίη, περὶ τί εἰσιν, ὁ Σάκρατες; εἴπομι ἂν, ὅτι περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀστραν φοράν καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης, πῶς πρὸς ἀλλήλα διὰ τόχους ἔχει. ΓΟΡ. Ὁρθῶς γε λέγων οὐ, ὁ Σάκρατες. Σ.Ω. "Ἰθι δὴ καὶ οὐ, ὁ Γοργία. τυγχάνει μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἡ θητορικὴ ὀψα τῶν λόγων τὰ πάντα διαπρατομένων τε καὶ κυριοῦμένων τις. ἢ γὰρ; ΓΟΡ. "Εστι ταύτα. Σ.Ω. Λέγε δὴ τῶν περὶ τί; *τί * ἐστι τούτῳ τῶν ὄντων, περὶ οὐ οὖν οἱ λόγοι εἰσίν, οἷς ἡ θητορικὴ χρῆται; ΓΟΡ. Τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πράγματων, ὁ Σάκρατες, καὶ ἄριστα.

ΣΑΡ. VII. Σ.Ω. 'Αλλ', ὁ Γοργία, ἀμφισβητήσιμον καὶ τούτῳ λέγεις καὶ οὐδὲν πιο σαφές. Εἰ οὔσιν γὰρ σε ἀνηκοοῦν ἐν τοῖς συμποσίοις ἀδόντων ἀνθρώπων τούτῳ τῷ σχολίῳ, ἐν ὧν καταριθμοῦνται ἄδοντες, ὅτι υγιαίνειν μὲν ἀριστὸν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον καλὸν γενέσθαι, τρίτον δὲ, ὁς φησίν ὁ ποιητῆς τοῦ σχολίου, τὸ πλούτειν ἁδύλιος. ΓΟΡ. Ἀφήσωσα γὰρ ἀλλὰ πρὸς τί τούτῳ λέγεις; Σ.Ω. "Οτι σοι αὐτίκα ἄν παρα-452 σταϊέν οἱ δημιουργοὶ τούτων δὲν ἐπήνεσιν ὁ τοῦ σχολίου ποιήσας, ἱατρὸς τε καὶ παιδοτρίβης καὶ χρηματιστής, καὶ εἴποι πρῶτον μὲν ὁ ἱατρὸς, ὁτι,
Δ. Σάκρατες, ἐξαπατᾶτε σε Γοργίας· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἡ τούτων τέχνη περὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἁγαθὸν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλ’ ἡ ἐμή. εἰ οὖν αὐτὸν ἐγὼ ἔροιμην· Σὺ δὲ τίς ὤν ταῦτα λέγεις; εἴποι ἂν ἵσως, ὅτι Ἰατρός. Τί οὖν λέγεις; ἢ τὸ τῆς σῆς τέχνης ἔργων μέγιστόν ἔστιν ἁγαθὸν; Πῶς γὰρ

Β οὖ, φαίη ἂν ἵσως, ὃ Σάκρατες, ὑγίεια; τί δ’ ἐστὶ μείζων ἁγαθὸν ἀνθρώποις ὑγίειας; Εἰ δ’ αὐτῇ τούτων ὁ παιδοτρίβης εἴποι, ὅτι Θαυμαζομαι γ’ ἂν, ὃ Σάκρατες, καὶ αὐτός, εἰ σοι ἔχει Γοργίας μείζον ἁγαθὸν ἐπιδείξει τῆς αὐτοῦ τέχνης ἢ ἐγὼ τῆς ἐμῆς· εἴποιμ’ ἂν αὖ καὶ πρὸς τούτον. Σὺ δὲ δὴ τίς εἰ, ὃ ἀνθρωπε; καὶ τί τὸ σὸν ἔργων; Παιδοτρίβης, φαίη ἂν, τὸ δ’ ἔργων μοῦ ἔστι καλὸς τε καὶ ἵσχυος ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τα σῶματα. Μετὰ δὲ τὸν παι-

D σὸν καταφρονῶν ἀπάντων, Σκόπει δὴ, ὃ Σάκρατες, ἐὰν σοι πλοῦτον φαίη τι μείζον ἁγα-

Cθόν ὃν ἡ παρὰ Γοργία ἢ παρ’ ἄλλῳ ὁτροῦν. φαίμεν ἂν οὖν πρὸς αὐτόν. Τί δὲ δὴ; ἢ σὺ τούτων ὅμισυρος; Φαίη ἂν. Τίς ἂν; Χρη-

Ματιστὴς. Τί οὖν; κρίνεις σὺ μέγιστον ἀνθρώ-

Πως γὰρ οὖ; ἔρει. Καὶ μὴν ἀμφισβητεῖ γε Γορ-

γίας ὅδε τήν παρ’ αὐτῷ τέχνην μείζονος ἁγαθοῦ ἀιτίαν εἶναι ἡ τῆς σῆς, φαίς καὶ ἡμεῖς. δὴ λοι

D οὖν, ὅτι τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐροτ’ ἂν. Καὶ τί ἐστι

Το τούτῳ τὸ ἁγαθὸν; ἀποχρισάσθω Γοργίας. Ἡθὶ

O οὖν νομίσας, ὃ Γοργία, ἔρωτάσθαι καὶ ὑπ’ ἐκεῖ-
νων καὶ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ, ἀπόκριναι τί ἦστι τοῦτο, ὦ φής σὺ μέγιστον ἄγαθὸν εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ σὲ δημιουργὸν εἶναι αὐτοῦ. ΠΟΡ. Ὁπερ ἔστι, ὁ Σόκρατες, τῷ ἀληθείᾳ μέγιστον ἄγαθὸν καὶ αὐτίον ἀμα μὲν ἐλευθερίας αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀμα δὲ τοῦ ἄλλου ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ πόλει ἔκάστῳ. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν δὴ τούτῳ λέγεις; Ε Ἐ ΠΟΡ. Τὸ πείθειν ἔγωγ' οἶον τ' εἴναι τοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ δικαστᾶς καὶ ἐν βουλευτηρίῳ βουλευτᾶς καὶ ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ ἐκκλησιαστᾶς καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ ξύλλογῳ παντὶ, ὡσις ἂν πολιτικὸς ξύλλογος γίγνεται. καίτοι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει δούλων μὲν ἔξεις τὸν ἱατόν, δοῦλον δὲ τὸν παιδοτρίβην· δὲ ἡ χρηματιστής σοῦ ἄλλο ἀναφανήσεται χρηματιζόμενος καὶ οὐχ αὐτὶ, ἀλλὰ σοὶ τῷ δυναμενῷ λέγειν καὶ πείθειν τὰ πλῆθη.

CAP. VIII. ΣΩ. Νῦν μοι δοξεῖς δηλάσαι, ὡ Γοργία, ἐγγύτατα τὴν ἡθορικὴν ἦντινα τῇ κηνὴν ἦγει εἶναι, καὶ, εἰ τί ἐγὼ συνήιμι, λέγεις, ὅτι πειθοῦσ δημιουργὸς ἔστιν ἡ ἡθορική, καὶ ἡ πραγματεία αὐτῆς ἀπασα καὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον εἰς τοῦτο τελευτᾷ. ἡ ἔχεις τι λέγειν ἐπε πλέον τὴν ἡθορικὴν δύνασθαι ἡ πειθῶ τοῖς ἄκουοιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τοιεῖν; ΠΟΡ. Οὐδεμιῶς, ὁ Σόκρατες, ἀλλὰ μοι δοξεῖς ικανῶς ὀρίζεσθαι· ἔστι γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῆς. ΣΩ. Ἀκούσον δή, ὡ Γοργία. ἐγὼ γὰρ εὖ ὢθῇ ὅτι, ὡς ἐμαυτῶν Β πείθω, εἰπερ τὸς ἄλλος ἄλλῳ διαλέγεται βουλόμενος εἰδέναι αὐτὸ τοῦτο, περὶ ὅτον ὁ λόγος ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐμὲ εἶναι τούτων ἕνω· ἀξιός δὲ καὶ σέ.
GORGIAS.

ΓΟΡ. Τ οὖν δή, ὃ Σώκρατες; ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ ἔφα νῦν. ἐγὼ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ὑποτοχῆς πειθώ, ἦτες ποτ' ἐστίν ἢν οὐ λέγεις καὶ περὶ δινικών πραγμάτων ἐστὶ πειθώ, σαφῶς μὲν εὖ ἠθό' ὅτι οὐκ οἶδα, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὑποπτεύω γε ἢν οἴμαι σε λέγειν καὶ περὶ ὧν οὐδέν μέντοι ἤτεν ἔρησο-μαι σε τίνα ποτὲ λέγεις τὴν πειθῶ την ἀπὸ τῆς ὑποτοχῆς καὶ περὶ τίνων αὐτήν εἶναι. τοῦ ὦν ἔνεκα δὴ αὐτὸς ὑποπτεύων σε ἔρησομαι, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγω; οὐ σοῦ ἔνεκα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου, ἢν οὖτω προῆ, ὥς μάλιστ' ἂν ἢμίν καταφανὲς ποιοὶ περὶ ὧτον λέγεται. σχόπει γὰρ, εἴ τοι δοκῶ δικαίως ἀνεροτάν σε. ὁσπερ ἢν εἰ ἐτύγχανον σε ἐρωτῶν τίς ἔστι τῶν ζωγράφων Ζεύξις, εἴ μοι εἴπες, ὅτι ὃ τὰ ζῶα γράφων, ὧν οὖκ ἂν δικαίως δ σε ἱρόμην ὃ τὰ ποία τῶν ἱών γράφων καὶ πού; ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Ἄρα διὰ τούτο, ὅτι καὶ ἄλλοι εἰσὶ ζωγράφοι γράφοντες ἄλλα πολλὰ ζῶα; ΓΟΡ. Ναι. ΣΩ. Εἴ δὲ γε μηδεὶς ἄλλος ἡ Ζεύξις ἔγραψε, καλῶς ἢν οἱ ἀπεκέχρισο; ΓΟΡ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; ΣΩ. Ἰδι δὴ καὶ περὶ τῆς ὑποτοχῆς εἰπέ, πότερον σοι δοκεῖ πειθῶ ποιεῖν ἢ ὑποτοχή μόνη, ἢ καὶ ἄλλαι τέχναι; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε· ὅσις διδάσκει ὁποῖον πράγμα, πότερον ὃ διδάσκει πείθει, ἢ οὐ; ΓΟΡ. Οὗ δήτα, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἄλλα πάντων μάλιστα πείθει. Ε ΣΩ. Πάλιν δ' εἰ ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τεχνῶν λέγωμεν ὃνπερ νῦν δή, ἡ ἀριθμητική οὐ διδάσκει ἡμᾶς ὃσα ἐστὶ τα τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ καὶ ὃ ἀριθμητικὸς ἄνθρωπος; ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ
πείθει; ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Πείθος ἀφα δημιουργός ἐστι καὶ ἡ ἀριθμητική. ΓΟΡ. Φαλλεται. ΣΩ. Όνυχον ἐὰν τις ἔρωτα ἡμᾶς ποιάς πείθους καὶ περὶ τί, ἀποκρυνόμεθα πον αὐτῷ, ὅτι τῆς διάσωστικῆς τῆς περὶ τὸ ἄρτιον τε καὶ τὸ περίττον ὅσον ἐστὶ. καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν τέχνας ἀπάσας ἔξομεν ἀποδείξας πειθοῦς δημιουργοὺς οὕσει καὶ ἥστινος καὶ περὶ τι. ἦ οὖ; ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Όνυ ἀφα ἡττορικῆ μόνη πειθοῦς ἐστί δημιουργός. ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

Cap. IX. ΣΩ. 'Επειδῆ τοῖνον οὐ μόνη ἀπεργάζεται τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον, ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα, δικαίως, ὅσπερ περὶ τοῦ ᾿Ηαγόραφον, μετὰ τοῦτο ἔπανεροιμέθ᾽ ἄν τὸν λέγοντα, ποῖας δή πειθοῦς καὶ τῆς περὶ τί πειθοῦς ἡ ἡττορικὴ ἐστὶ Β τέχνη; ἢ οὔ δοξεῖ σοι δίκαιον εἶναι ἔπανεροθαί; ΓΟΡ. Ἐμοιγε. ΣΩ. Ἀπόκριναι δή, ὃ Γοργία, ἐπειδῆ γε καὶ σοι δοξεῖς οὕτω. ΓΟΡ. Ταύτης τοῖνον τῆς πειθοῦς λέγω, ὃ Σώκρατος, τῆς ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὕχλοις, ὅσπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, καὶ περὶ τούτων, αὕτη δίκαια τε καὶ ἅδικα. ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐγώ τοι ὑπάπτευον ταύτην σε λέγειν τῆν πειθὼ καὶ περὶ τούτων, ὃ Γοργία· ἀλλ᾽ ἢν μὴ ἦναμαξίης, ἐὰν ζ οἶλγον ὅσπερ τοιοῦτον τί σε ἀνέφεραι, δ ὅσπερ μὲν δήλον εἶναι, ἐγώ δ᾽ ἐπανερατῶ· ὅσπερ γὰρ λέγω, τοῦ ἔξης ἐνεκά περαίνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου ἔριτῶ, οὔ σοῦ ἐνεκά, ἀλλ᾽ ἢν μὴ ἔθιξόμεθα ὑπονοοῦντες προαρπάζειν ἄλληλων τὸ λεγόμενα,
διὰ σιν τὰ σαυτοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὅπως ἂν βούλῃ περαίνῃς. ΓΟΡ. Καὶ ὁρθὸς γέ μου δοξεῖς ποιεῖν, ὃ Σώκρατες. Σ.Ω. Ἔστι δὴ καὶ τὸ δεῖ πεπιστευκέναι καὶ μαθησις καὶ πίστις, ἢ ἄλλο τι; ΓΟΡ. Οἴομαι μὲν ἔγορε, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο. Σ.Ω. Καλὸς γὰρ οἶκε γνῶσι ἔδε ἐνθένδε. εἰ γὰρ τύ σε ἔρουτο Ἀργ. ἔστι τύς, ὃ Γοργία, πίστις ἑυδής καὶ ἀληθῆς; φαίης ἂν, ὃς ἐγὼ οἶμαι. ΓΟΡ. Νάι. Σ.Ω. Τί δὲ; ἐπιστήμη ἔστι ἑυδής καὶ ἀληθῆς; ΓΟΡ. Οὐδαμῶς. Σ.Ω. Ἅβλων γάρ Ε αὖ, ὅτι οὐ ταυτὸν ἔστιν. ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. Σ.Ω. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οἶ τὺ γε μεμαθηκότες πεπεισμένοι εἰσί καὶ οἱ πεπιστευκότες. ΓΟΡ. Ἐστι ταῦτα. Σ.Ω. Βούλει οὖν δύο εἰδὴ θάμεν πειθοὺς, τὸ μὲν πίστιν παρεχόμενον ἀνεν τοῦ εἰδέναι, τὸ δ’ εὐπιστήμην; ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε. Σ.Ω. Ποτέραν οὖν ή ὕπτορικὴ πειθω ποιεῖ ἐν δικαστηρίοις τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅλοις περὶ τῶν δικαίων τε καὶ ἄδικων; ἐξ ἢς τὸ πιστεύειν γίγνεται ἂνεν τοῦ εἰδέναι, ἢ ἐξ ἢς τὸ εἰδέναι; ΓΟΡ. Ἅβλων δὴς, ὃ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ἐξ ἢς τὸ πιστεύσειν. Ἅβλων γάρ, ὃ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ἐξ ἢς τὸ ἐπεισεύσειν. 455 Σ.Ω. Ἡ ἴπτορικὴ ἄρα, ἢς ἔστι πειθοῦς ἀλλ᾽ ὅς διδασκαλικὸς ἂν πεί τὸ δικαίων τε καὶ ἄδικων. ΓΟΡ. Νάι. Σ.Ω. Οὐδὲ ἄρα διδασκαλικὸς ὁ ἴπτωρ ἂν τὸ δικαστηρίου τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅχλων δικαίων τε
πέρι καὶ ἀδίκων, ἄλλα πιστικὸς μόνον. οὐ γὰρ δήπον ὥχλον γ' ἀν δύναιτο τοσοῦτον ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ διδάξαι οὕτω μεγάλα πράγματα. ΓΟΡ. Οὐ δήτα.

ΚΑΡ. Χ. ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, ἵδωμεν τί ποτε καὶ Β λέγομεν περὶ τῆς ὑπορικῆς· ἔγορ μὲν γὰρ τοι ὀυδ' αὐτὸς πιθὸν δύναμαι κατανοῆσαι ὅ τι λέγω. ὅταν περὶ ἵπτηῶν αἱρέσεως ἢ τῇ πόλει σύλλογος, ἢ περὶ ναυπηγῶν, ἢ περὶ ἄλλου τινὸς δημιουργικοῦ ἐθνος, ἄλλο τι ἡ τότε ὁ ὑπορικὸς οὐ συμβουλεύει; δήλον γὰρ, ὅτι ἐν ἐκάστῃ αἱρέσει τὸν τεχνικότατον δεῖ αἱρείσθαι. οὐδ' ὁταν τειχῶν περὶ οἰχοδομήσεως, ἡ λιμένων κατασκευὴς, ἡ νεωρία, ἀλλ' οἱ ἀρχιτέκτονες· οὐδ' αὖ ὅταν στρατηγῶν αἱρέσεως περὶ, ἡ τάξεως τινος πρὸς πολεμίους, ἡ χαρών καταλήψεως συμβουλή ἢ, C ἀλλ' οἱ στρατηγικοὶ τότε συμβουλεύσουσιν, οἱ ὑπορικοὶ δὲ οὐ. ἡ πῶς λέγεις, ὁ Γοργία, τὰ τοιαῦτα; ἐπειδὴ γὰρ αὐτὸς τε φης ὃςτροφ εἶναι καὶ ἄλλους ποιεῖν ὑπορικοὺς, εὖ ἔχει τὰ τῆς σῆς τέχνης παρὰ σοῦ πυνθάνεσθαι. καὶ ἐμὲ νῦν νόμισον καὶ τὸ σὸν σπείδειν. ἵσως γὰρ καὶ τυχάνει τις τῶν ἐνδον ὄντων μαθητῆς σου βουλόμενος γενέσθαι, ὃς ἐγὼ τινας σχεδὸν καὶ συγχωρὸς αἰσθάνομαι, οὐ ἵσως αἰσχύνοιτ' ἂν σε ἀνεφέσθαι. ὃπ' ἐμοῦ οὖν ἀνεφστώμενος νόμισον Δ καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνων ἀνεφικάσθαι, Τί ἤμιν, ὁ Γοργία, ἔσται, ἐὰν σοι συνώμεν; περὶ τίνος τῇ πόλει συμβουλεύειν οὖσι τε ἐσόμεθα; πότερον περὶ δίκαιον μόνον καὶ ἀδίκου, ἢ καὶ περὶ ὅν νῦν δὴ
Σωκράτης ἐλεγε; πειρᾷ οὖν αὐτοῖς ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ὍΠ. Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ σοι πειράσομαι, ὁ Σωκράτες, σαφῶς ἀποκαλύπτω τὴν τῆς ὃτε ἡτορικῆς δύναμιν ἀπασαν. αὐτὸς γὰρ καλῶς ὑφηγήσω.

Ε οἶδα πάντα ὑπὲρ τοῦ, ὅτι τὰ νεότατα τάτα καὶ τὰ τείχῃ τὰ Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἡ τῶν λιμένων κατασκευὴ ἐκ τῆς Θεμιστοκλέους συμβουλῆς γέγονε, τὰ δ' ἐκ τῆς Πειρικέλεους, ἄλλως οὔ τι τῶν δημιουργῶν. Σ.Π. Δέγεται τάτα, ὁ Γοργία, περὶ Θεμιστοκλέους. Πειρικέλεους δὲ καὶ αὐτῶς ἤκουν, ὅτε συνεβούλευσεν ἦμιν περὶ τοῦ διὰ μέσου τείχους. ὍΠ. Καὶ ὅταν γε τις άρεσις ἤ δὲ συ ἐλεγε, ὁ Σωκράτες, ὅρας, ὅτι οἱ ἡμεροὶ εἶσιν οἱ συμβουλεύοντες καὶ οἱ νικῶντες τὰς γνώμας περὶ τούτων. Σ.Π. Τάτα καὶ Ἑμιδάξων, ὁ Γοργία, πάλαι ἔρωτο τὸς ποτὲ ἡ δύναμις ἐστὶ τῆς ὃτε ἡτορικῆς. δαμανία γάρ τις ἥμισυ καταφαίνεται τὸ μέγεθος οὕτω σχοιτοῦντι.

ΚΑΠ. XI. ὍΠ. Εἰ πάντα γε εἰδείης, ὁ Σωκράτες, οὕτως εἴπεις, ἀπάσας τὰς δυ- νάμεις συλλαβοῦσα ὑπ' αὐτῇ ἔχει· μέγα δέ σοι τεχνὴν ἔχων· πολλάκις γὰρ ἥδη ἔγραφέ μετὰ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἰατρῶν εἰσελθὼν παρὰ τινὰ τῶν καρυώτων οὐχὶ ἔθε- λοντα ἡ φάρμακον πιεῖν ἡ τεμεῖν ἡ καῦσαι παρασχείν τῷ ἰατρῷ, οὐ δυναμένου τοῦ ἰατροῦ πείσαι, ἐγὼ ἠπείσα, οὐχ ἄλλῃ τέχνῃ ἢ τῇ ὃτε ἡτορικῇ. φημὶ δὲ καὶ εἰς πάλιν ὅποι βούλει ἐξελθόντα ὃτοιρικὴν ἄνδρα καὶ ἰατρὸν, εἰ δέοι λόγῳ διαγωνίζεσθαι ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ
τινὶ συλλόγῳ, ὑπότερον δέι αἰσθῆναι, ὅπτορας ἢ ἱατρὸν, οὐδαμοῦ ἂν φανῆναι τὸν ἱατρὸν, ἀλλ’ αἰσθῆναι ἂν τὸν εἰπεῖν δυνατόν, εἰ βοῦλοιτο. καὶ εἰ πρὸς ἄλλον γε δημιουργὸν ὄντιναύον ἀγωνίζοιτο, πείσειν ἂν αὐτὸν ἐλέσθαι ὁ ὑποτοικὸς μᾶλλον ἢ ἄλλος ὀστίσοιν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι περὶ ὧτον οὐκ ἂν πιθανότερον εἴποι τὸ ὑποτοικὸς ἢ ἄλλος ὀστίσοιν τῶν δημιουργῶν ἐν πλῆθει. Ἡ μὲν οὖν δύναμις τοσαύτη ἐστὶ καὶ τοιαύτη τῆς τέχνης. δεῖ μέντοι, ὃ Σώκρατες, τῇ ὑποτοικῇ χρήσθαι ὑστερὸ καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ πάσῃ ἀγωνίᾳ. καὶ γὰρ τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀγωνίᾳ οὔ τούτον ἔνεκα δεῖ πρὸς ἀπαντας χρήσθαι ἀνθρώπους, ὅτι ἐμαθεὶ πυκτεύειν τε καὶ παγχρατιάζειν καὶ ἐν ὑπόλοις μάχεσθαι, ὡστε κρείττων εἴναι καὶ φίλον καὶ ἔχθρον· οὐ τούτου ἔνεκα τοὺς φίλους δεῖ τύπτειν οὐδὲ κεντεῖν τε καὶ ἀποκτινώναι. οὐδὲ γε μᾶ λία ἐὰν τις εἰς παλαιότεραν φοιτήσας, εὔ ἔχων τὸ σῶμα καὶ πυκτικὸς γενόμενος, ἔπειτα τὸν πατέρα τύπτη καὶ τὴν μητέρα ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν οἰκείων ἢ τῶν φίλων, οὔ τούτου ἔνεκα δεῖ τοὺς παιδο-Ε τρίδας καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὑπόλοις διδάσκοντας μάχεσθαι μισεῖν τε καὶ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων. ἔκεινοι μὲν γὰρ παρέδοσαν ἐπὶ τῷ δικαίως χρήσθαι τούτως πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας, ἀμινομένους, μὴ ὑπάρχοντας· οἱ δὲ μεταστρέφονται χρῶντα τῇ ἀσχύνται καὶ τῇ τέχνῃ οὐκ ὀρθῶ· οὐχοιν οἱ διδάξαντες πονηροὶ, οὐδὲ ἡ τέχνη οὔτε αἰτία οὔτε πονηρὰ τοῦτον ἔνεκα ἐστίν, ἀλλ’ οἱ μὴ χρώμενοι, οἴμαι, ὀρθῶς.
αὐτὸς δὴ λόγος καὶ περὶ τῆς ὕθορικῆς. δυνατὸς μὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἀπαντᾶς ἔστιν ὁ ὅθτωρ καὶ περὶ παντὸς λέγειν, ἢστε πιθανότερος εἶναι ἐν τοῖς πλῆθεσιν ἐμβραχύν. περὶ ὅτου ἂν νοῦ θελήται.

Β ἀλλ' οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον τούτῳ ἔνεκα δεῖ οὔτε τοὺς ἴατροὺς τὴν δόξαν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, ὅτι δύνατο ἂν τούτο ποιήσαι, οὔτε τοὺς ἄλλους δημιουργοὺς, ἀλλὰ δικαίως καὶ τῇ ὕθορικῇ χρῆσθαι, ὅσπερ καὶ τῇ ἄρωσίᾳ. ἐὰν δὲ, οἴμαι, ὕθορικὸς γενόμενός τις κάτα ταύτη τῇ δυνάμει καὶ τῇ τέχνῃ ἀδική, οὗ τὸν διδάξαντα δεῖ μισεῖν τε καὶ ἐξβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεως. ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ ἔπει δικαίως

C χρεία παρέδωκεν, ὁ δὲ ἐναντίως χρῆται. τὸν οὖν οὐχ ὑθὸς χρόμενον μισεῖν δικαίων καὶ ἐκβάλλειν καὶ ἀποκτιστήνυναι, ἀλλ' οὗ τὸν διδάξαντα.

Cαπ. ΧΙ. ΣΩ. Οἴμαι, ὡς Γοργία, καὶ σὲ ἐμπειρὸν εἶναι πολλῶν λόγων καὶ καθεσαφικῶς ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τοιόντε, ὅτι οὐ λοιπῶς δύνανται περὶ δὲν ἂν ἐπιχειρήσωσι διαλέγεσθαι διορισμένοι πρὸς ἄλληλους καὶ μαθόντες καὶ διδάσκοντες

Δ' ἔαν τοὺς οὕτω διαλύσεσθαι τὰς συνοπτικὰς, ἀλλ' ἐὰν περὶ τοῦ ἀμφιβολήσωσι καὶ μὴ φῇ ὁ ἔτερος τὸν ἔτερον ὑθὸς λέγειν ἢ μὴ σαφῆς, χαλεπαίνοντοι τε καὶ κατὰ φθόνον οἴονται τὸν ἐαυτῶν λέγειν, φιλονεικουντας, ἀλλ' οὗ ἄρτι οὐ ζητοῦντας τὸ προσείμενον ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. καὶ ἔνιοι γε τελευτώντες αἰσχρατὰ ἀπαλλάττονται, λοιποιηθέντες τε καὶ εἰπόντες καὶ ἀκούσαντες περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν τοιαύτα, οἳ καὶ τοὺς παρόντας ἄκηθεσθαί ὑπὲρ σφῶν αὐτῶν, ὁτι τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων ἥξιωσαν
Άκροιται γενέσθαι. Τοῦ δὴ ἔνεκα λέγω ταῦτα; Εἴτε νῦν ἐμοὶ δοξεῖς σὺ οὐ πάνω ἀξόλοθρα λέγειν οὐδὲ σύμφωνα οἷς τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγες περὶ τῆς ἤτορικῆς. φοβοῦμαι οὖν διελέγχειν σε, μή με ὑπολάβῃς οὐ πρὸς τὸ πράγμα φιλονεικοῦντα λέγειν τοῦ καταφανὲς γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς σέ. ἐγὼ οὖν, εἰ μὲν καὶ σὺ εἰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀντικρατήσῃς 458 καὶ ἐγώ, ἦδεος ἂν σε διερατῶν· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἐφην ἂν. ἐγὼ δὲ τίσων εἰμί; τῶν ἦδεως μὲν ἂν ἐλεγχθέντων, εἰ τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγοι, ἦδεος δ' ἂν ἐλεγχθάντων, εἰ τίς τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγοι, οὐκ ἀνήστερον μέντι ἂν ἐλεγχθέντων ἡ ἐλεγχθάντων· μεῖζον γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἄγαθὸν ἥγουμαι, ὅσπερ μείζον ἄγαθὸν ἦστιν αὐτὸν ἀπαλλαγῆναι κακῶν τοῦ μεγίστου ἢ ἄλλων ἀπαλλάξας. οὐδὲν γὰρ οἷοι τοιοῦτον κακὸν εἰναι ἀνθρώπος, ὅσον δάξα γευδῆς Β περὶ ὧν τυγχάνει νῦν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ὁ. εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ σὺ φησὶ τοιοῦτος εἰναι, διαλεγόμεθα· εἰ δὲ καὶ δοξεῖ χρῆναι εὖν, εὖμεν ἦδη χαίρειν καὶ διαλύμενεν τὸν λόγον. ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλὰ φημὶ μὲν ἔγογγε, ὁ Σάκχρατες, καὶ αὐτὸς τοιοῦτος εἶναι, οἷον οὐ θρηγεῖ· οἰσὶ μὲντοι χρὴν ἐννοεῖν καὶ τὸ τῶν παρόντων. πάλαι γὰρ τοι, πρὸν καὶ ὑμᾶς ἔλθειν, ἔγω τοῖς παρασκεύασε ἐπεδεικώθης· καὶ νῦν ὑσις πάρθη ἀποτενοῦμεν, ἤν διαλεγόμεθα. σκοπεῖν οὖν χρῆ καὶ τὸ τοῦτο, μή τινας αὐτῶν κατέχομεν βουλομένους τι καὶ ἄλλο πράττειν.

ΣΑΡ. ΧΙ. ΧΑ. Τοῦ μὲν θορύβου, ὁ Γοργία τε καὶ Σάκχρατες, αὐτοὶ ἀκούσετε τούτων τῶν
GORGIAS.

ἀνδρῶν, Βουλομένων ἀκούειν, ἐὰν τι λέγητε. ἐμοὶ δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μη γένοιτο τοσαύτη ἀσχολία, ἃτε τοιούτων λόγων καὶ οὕτω λεγομένων ὑφεμένου προφυγναίτερον τι γενέσθαι ἀλλο πράττειν. ΚΑΔ. Νη τούς θεούς, ὦ Χαίρεσον. καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς πολλοῖς ἡδή λόγοις παραγενόμενοι οὐκ οἶδ' εἰ πάσποτε ἥσθην οὖτως, ἀδ' ἄρ' νυν, ὡς τ' ἐμοίγε, κἂν τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην ἐθέλητε διαλέγεσθαι, χαριεῖσθε. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τὸ γ' ἐμὸν οὐδέν κωλύει, εἰπερ ἐθέλει Ποργίας. ΓΩΡ. Ἀισχρόν δὴ τὸ λοιπὸν, ὦ Σώκρατες, γίγνεται ἐμὲ γε μὴ ἐθέλειν, καὶ ἐταύτα αὐτὸν ἐπαγγελμένον ἑρωτᾶν δ' τι τις βούλεται. ἀλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ τοιτοίς, διαλέγου τε καὶ ἑρωτά, ὦ τι βούλει. ΣΩ. Ἕξερεν δὴ, ὦ Ποργία, ὦ Θανιμάξω ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ σοῦ ἱσως γάρ τοι σοῦ ὅρθως λέγοντος ἐγὼ οὐκ ὅρθως ὑπολαμβάνω. ἡπτορίχων φῆς ποιεῖν οὕτος τ' εἰναι, ἐὰν τις βούληται παρὰ σοῦ μανθάνειν; ΓΩΡ. Ναι. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν περὶ πάντων ὡς τ' ἐν ὅχλῳ πιθανὸν εἶναι, οὐ διδάσκοντα, ἀλλὰ πείθοντα; ΓΩΡ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Ἕξερεν τοι νῦν δὴ ὅτι καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανότερος ἔσται ὁ ἥττοφ. ΓΩΡ. Καὶ γὰρ ἐλεγον, ἐν γε ὅχλῳ. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ ἐν ὅχλῳ τούτῳ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς μη εἰδόται; οὐ γὰρ δῆτον ἐν γε τοῖς εἰδότοι τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανότερος ἔσται. ΓΩΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰπερ τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανότερος ἔσται, τοῦ εἰδότος πιθανό-βτερος γίγνεται; ΓΩΡ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Οὐκ

459 ἐν ὅχλῳ πιθανὸν εἶναι, οὐ διδάσκοντα, ἀλλὰ πείθοντα; ΓΩΡ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Ἕξερεν τοι νῦν δὴ ὅτι καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανότερος ἔσται ὁ ἥττοφ. ΓΩΡ. Καὶ γὰρ ἐλεγον, ἐν γε ὅχλῳ. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ ἐν ὅχλῳ τούτῳ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς μη εἰδόται; οὐ γὰρ δῆτον ἐν γε τοῖς εἰδότοι τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανότερος ἔσται. ΓΩΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰπερ τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανότερος ἔσται, τοῦ εἰδότος πιθανό-βτερος γίγνεται; ΓΩΡ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Οὐκ
ιατρὸς γε ὃν· ἡ γάρ; ΓΟΡ. Ναι. ΣΩ. 'Ὁ δὲ μὴ ιατρὸς γε δήποτε ἀνεπιστήμων ὃν ὁ ἱατρὸς ἐπιστήμων. ΓΟΡ. Δῆλον ὦτι. ΣΩ. 'Ὁ οὐκ εἰδὼς ἢ ἂν τοῦ εἰδότος ἐν οὐκ εἰδόσι πιθανότερος ἔσται, ὅταν ὁ ρήτωρ τοῦ ἱατροῦ πιθανότερος ἦ. τούτῳ συμβαίνει, ἡ ἄλλο τί; ΓΟΡ. Τούτῳ ἐνταῦθα γε συμβαίνει. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀπάσας τέχνας ὁσαντίος ἔχει ὁ ρήτωρ καὶ ἡ ρήτορική· αὐτὰ μὲν τὰ πράγματα οὐδὲν δεὶ αὐτήν εἰδέναι ὅπως ἔχει, μηχανήν δὲ οὐκ εἰδώς μᾶλλον εἰδέναι τῶν εἰδότων.

ΚΑΡ. ΧΙΒ. ΓΟΡ. Οὐκοῦν πολλή ῥητορική, ὁ Σάκρατες, γίγνεται, μὴ μαθόντα τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας, ἄλλα μὲν τάς τετράρχης τῶν δημιουργῶν; ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν ἔλαττοῦται ἢ μὴ ἔλαττοῦται ὁ ρήτωρ τῶν ἄλλων διὰ τὸ οὐ- τοῦ ἔχειν, αὐτίκα ἐπισκεψόμεθα, εὖν τι ημῶν πρὸς λόγον ἢ· νῦν δὲ τόδε πρότερον σκέψω- μεθα, ἣν τυγχάνει περὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ καθιστάσαι καὶ τὸ ἀδικοῦν καὶ τὸ αἰσχρόν καὶ τὸ καλόν καὶ ἁγαθόν καὶ κακόν οὕτως ἐχαν ὁ ρήτορικὸς ὃς περὶ τὸ ψυγείον καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὃν αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι, αὐτὰ μὲν οὐκ εἰδός, τί ἁγαθόν ἢ τί κακόν ἐστιν, ἢ τί καλόν ἢ τί αἰσχρόν, ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἁδικον, πειθῶ δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν μειχανημένος, οὕτω δο- κεῖν εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδός ἐν οὐκ εἰδόσι μᾶλλον τοῦ Ἐ. εἰδότος; ἢ ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι, καὶ δεὶ προσεπιστήμω- νον ταύτα ἄφικέσθαι παρὰ σὲ τῶν μέλλοντα μαθήσεσθαι τὴν ρήτορικὴν; εἰ δὲ μή, σὺ ὁ τῆς
"Γοργία; καὶ πρὸς Διός, ἄσπερ ἄρτι ἔπες, ἀποκαλύψας τῆς ὑποτικῆς ἐπεὶ τίς ποθ' ἢ δύναμις ἤστιν. ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ὡς Σώκρατες, εἶτ' τύχῃ μὴ εἰδώς, καὶ ταύτα παρ' ἐμοὶ μαθήσεται. Σ. Ἡχε δὴ καλῶς γὰρ λέγεις. ἐάνπερ ὑποτικὸν σὺ τίνα ποιήσῃς, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸν εἰδέναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἀδίκα ἢτοι πρότερον γε ἢ ὑστερον μαθῶντα παρὰ σοῦ. ΓΟΡ.

ὡς Πάνω γε. Σ. Τί οὖν; ὃ τὰ τεκτονικὰ μεμαθηκός τεκτονικός, ἢ οὕ; ΓΟΡ. Ναί. Σ. ὁ ὕικοῦν καὶ ὁ τὰ μουσικὰ μουσικός; ΓΟΡ. Ναί. Σ. Καὶ ὁ τὰ ιατρικὰ ιατρικός; καὶ τάλλα οὔτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὁ μεμαθηκὸς ἐκαστα τοιοῦτος ἢστιν, οὗ ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐκαστον ἀπεργάζεται; ΓΟΡ. Πάνω γε. Σ. Ἔνικοῦν κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον καὶ ὁ τὰ δίκαια μεμαθηκῶς δίκαιος; ΓΟΡ. Πάνως δήποτε. Σ. Ὡς ὁ δὲ δίκαιος δίκαια ποιήσει. ΓΟΡ. Ναί. Σ. ὁ ὕικοῦν ἀνάγκη [τὸν ὑποτικὸν δίκαιον εἶναι], τὸν[δὲ] δίκαιον δίκαια βουλεύεσθαι πράττειν; ΓΟΡ. Φαίνεται γε. Σ. Οὐδέποτε ἄρα βουλήσεται δὲ γε δίκαιος ἄδικειν. ΓΟΡ. Ἀνάγκη. Σ. Τὸν δὲ ὑποτικὸν ἀνάγκη ἐκ
τού λόγου δίκαιον εἶναι. ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Ουδέποτε ἢρα βουλήσεται ὁ ὕθτορικὸς ἄδικείν. ΓΟΡ. Οἱ φαίνεται γε.

Ἀρ. ΧV. ΣΩ. Μέμνησαι οὖν λέγων ὀλίγῳ πρῶτον, ὅτι οὖ δὲ τοῖς παιδοτρίβαις ἐγκαλείν οὐδ’ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων, ἐὰν τὸ πῦκτης τῇ πυκτικῇ [μὴ καλῶς] χρηταὶ τε καὶ ἄδικη; ὅσαύτως δὲ οὕτω καὶ ἐὰν ὁ ὕττωρ τῇ ὑθτορικῇ ἁδίκως χρηταί, μη τῷ διδάξαντι ἐγκαλείν μηδὲ ἐξελαύνειν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἄδικουντι καὶ οὐχ ὁθδώς χρησίμουν τῇ ὑθτορικῇ; ἐξήθη ταῦτα, ἦ οὖ; ΓΟΡ. Ἐξήθη. ΣΩ. Νῦν δὲ γε ὁ αὐτὸς οὔτος φαίνεται, ὁ ὑθτορικὸς, οὐχ ἂν ποτὲ ἢ ἁδικήσας. ἦ οὖ; ΓΟΡ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοις γε, ὁ Γόργια, λόγους ἔλεγετο, ὅτι ἢ ὑθτορική περὶ λόγους εἰή οὐ τοὺς τοῦ ἄρτιον καὶ περιττοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοὺς τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἁδίκουν.

giatan; ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ τοῖνυν σον τότε ταῦτα λέγοντος ὑπελάβον, ὡς οὐδέποτ’ ἄν εἰὴ ἢ ὑθτορικὴ ἁδικον πράγμα, ὅ γ’, ἂν περὶ δικαίοσύνης τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖται. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλίγον ὑστερον ἔλεγες, ὅτι ὁ ὕττωρ τῇ ὑθτορικῇ κἂν ἁδίκως χρῆτο, οὔτω θανατάσας καὶ ἡγησάμενος ὁ οὐ συνάδειν τὰ λεγόμενα ἔκεινος εἰπὼν τοὺς λόγους, ὅτι, εἰ μὲν κέρδος ἦροο εἶναι τὸ ἐλέγχεσθαι, ὅστερ εἰγ’ ἄξιον εἰη διαλέγεσθαι, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἐὰν χαίρειν. ὑστερον δὲ ἦμῶν ἐπισκοπούμενων, ὁρᾶς ἢ καὶ αὐτός, ὅτι αὐ ὀμολογεῖται τὸν ὑθτορικὸν ἁδύνατον εἶναι ἁδίκως χρῆσθαι τῇ ὑθτορικῇ καὶ ἐθέλειν ἁδικείν. ταῦτα οὖν ὅπῃ ποτὲ
Β ἔχει, μᾶ τὸν κύνα, ὁ Γοργία, οὐχ ὀλίγης συνομοσίας ἐστίν, ὅστε ἵκανὸς διασκέψασθαι.

Cap. XVI. Π.Ω.Α. Τί δαί, ὑ Σῶκρατες; οὕτω καὶ σὺ περὶ τῆς ἰτητορικῆς δοξάσεως, ὡσπερ νῦν λέγεις; ἢ οἴει, ὅτι Γοργίας ἠχώνθη σοι μὴ προσομολογήσαι τὸν ἰτητορικὸν ἀνδρα μὴ σύχι καὶ τὰ δίκαια εἰδέναι καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ ἀγαθά, καὶ ἐὰν μὴ ἐλθῇ ταῦτα εἰδὼς παρ' αὐτὸν,

C αὐτὸς διδάξειν — ἐπειτα ἐν ταύτης ἵσος τῆς ὁμολογίας ἐναντίον τι συνεβή ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, τοῦθ' ὁ δὴ ἅγαπάς, αὐτὸς ἅγαγων ἐπὶ τοιαῦτα ἐρωτήματα. ἐπει τίνα οἴει ἀπαρνησθεῖσαι μὴ σύχι καὶ αὐτὸν ἐπίστασθαι τὰ δίκαια καὶ ἄλλους διδάξειν; ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄγειν πολλῆ ἀγαθοκία ἐστὶ τοὺς λόγους. Σ.Ω.γ. Χάλλιστε Πώλε, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἐξεπιτηδεῖς κτώμεθα ἑταίρους καὶ νείας, ἵνα, ἐπειδὰν αὐτοὶ πρεσβύτεροι γιγνόμενοι σφαλλόμεθα, παρόντες ὑμεῖς οἱ νεότεροι ἐπάνων οὔπωστε ἰδίον τὸν βίον καὶ ἐν ἐργοῖς καὶ ἐν λόγοις. καὶ νῦν εἰ τί ἐγὼ καὶ Γοργίας ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σφαλλόμεθα, σὺ παρὸν ἐπανόρθουν. δικαίος δ' εἰ. καὶ ἐνω ἐθέλω τῶν ὁμολογημένων εἰ τί σοι δοκεῖ μὴ καλῶς ὁμολογήσαι, ἀναθεόσθαι τι ἄν σὺ βουλή, ἐὰν μοι ἐν μόνον φυλάττῃς. Π.Ω.Α. Τί τούτο λέγεις; Σ.Ω. Τὴν μακρολογίαν, ὁ Πώλε, ἢν καθεύξης, ἢ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπεχείρησας κρῆσθαι. Π.Ω.Α. Τί δαί; οὐκ ἐξε-Ε σταὶ μοι λέγειν ὅπως ἀν βουλόμαι; Σ.Ω. Δεῦ να μὲν τ' ἀν πάθος, ὡ βέλτιστε, ει' Ἀθήναξ ἀφικόμενος, οὐ τῆς Ἕλλαδος πλείστη ἐστίν ἐξου-
σία τοῦ λέγειν, ἐπειτα σὺ ἐνταῦθα τούτου μόνος ἀτυχήσαις. ἂν ἄλλα ἀντίθες τοι. "Σοῦ μακρὰ λέγοντος καὶ μὴ ἐθέλοντος τὸ ἑρωτόμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι, οὐ δεινα ἂν αὐτ ἐγὼ πάθοιμι, εἰ μὴ ἐξεσταί μοι ἀπίεναι καὶ μὴ ἀκούειν σου;" ἂλλ’ εἰ ἄρα τι κηδεί τοῦ λόγου τοῦ εἰρημένου καὶ ἑπανορθοσάσθαι αὐτὸν βούλει, ὃσπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, ἀναθέμενος δι’ τι σοι δοκεῖ, ἐν τῷ μέρει ἑρωτῶν τε καὶ ἑρωτόμενος, ὃσπερ ἔγω τε καὶ Γοργίας, ἐλεγχὲ τε καὶ ἐλέγχον. φης γὰρ δῆπον καὶ σὺ ἐπισταθάσαι ἄτερ Γοργίας. η̄ οὗ; Π.Ω.Α. Ἐγωγεῖ. Σ.Ω. Οὔχιν καὶ σὺ κελεύεις σαντὸν ἑρωτῶν ἐκάστοτε ὁ τι ἀν τις βούληται, ὡς ἐπιστάμενος ἀποκρίνεσθαι; Π.Ω.Α. Πάνω μὲν οὖν Β. Σ.Ω. Καὶ νῦν δὴ τούτων ὁπότερον βούλει ποιεῖ ἐρώτα, ἣ ἀποκρίνον.

Καπ. ΧVII. Π.Ω.Α. Ἀλλὰ ποιήσω ταῦτα καὶ μοι ἀπόκριναι, δ’ Σάκρατε. ἐπειδὴ Γοργίας ἀπορείν σοι δοκεῖ περὶ τῆς ἡμερικῆς, σὺ αὐτὴν τίνα φής εἶναι; Σ.Ω. Ἀρα ἑρωτᾶς ἥντινα τέχνην φημὶ εἶναι; Π.Ω.Α. Ἐγωγεῖ. Σ.Ω. Οὐδεμία ἐμοίγε δοκεῖ, ὃ Πάλε, ὡς γε πρὸς σὲ τὰ λῆθη εἰρήσθαι. Π.Ω.Α. Ἀλλὰ τί σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ἡμερική εἶναι; Π.Ω. Πράγμα, ὃ φης σὺ ποιήσαι τέχνην ἐν τῷ συγγράμματι, ὃ ἐγὼ ἐναγχός ἄνέγνων. Π.Ω.Α. Τί τούτο λέγεις; Σ.Ω. Ἐμε πειράν ἐγωγέ τινα. Π.Ω.Α. Ἐμπειρία ἄρα σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ἡμερική εἶναι; Σ.Ω. Ἐμοίγε, εἰ μὴ τι σὺ ἂλλο λέγεις. Π.Ω.Α. Τίνος ἔμπειρία; Σ.Ω. Χάριτος τίνος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας.
Π.Ω.Α. Οὐκοῦν καλὸν σοι δοκεῖ ἢ ὀητορικὴ εἶναι, χαρίζεσθαι οἶνον τ᾿ εἶναι ἀνθρώποις; Σ.Ω. Τί δὲ, ὁ Πόλε; ἢδη πέπυσαι παρ’ ἐμοῦ ὃ τι δοκεῖς αὐτὴν εἶναι, ὅσε τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔσωτὰς, εἰ οὖν καλὴ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι; Π.Ω.Α. Οὐ γὰρ πέπυσας, δι’ ἐμπειρίαν τινὰ αὐτὴν φῆς εἶναι; Σ.Ω. Βούλεις οὖν, ἐπειδὴ τιμᾶς τὸ χαρίζεσθαι, ομικρὸν τί μοι χαρίσασθαι; Π.Ω.Α. ἔγραψεν. Σ.Ω. Ἐρωτούν μὲ, ὁμοποιία ἢτις μοι δοκεῖ τέχνη εἶναι. Π.Ω.Α. Ἐρωτῶ δὴ, τίς τέχνη ὁμοποιία; Σ.Ω. Οὐδὲνία, ὁ Πόλε. Π.Ω.Α. Ἀλλὰ τί; φαθι. Σ.Ω. Φημὶ δὴ, ἐμπειρία τις. ΕΠ.Ω.Α. Τίνος; φαθι. Σ.Ω. Φημὶ δὴ, χάριτος καὶ ἰδιωτ/pub/επεργασίας, ὁ Πόλε. Π.Ω.Α. Ταῦτάν δὲ ἔστω ὁμοποιία καὶ ὀητορική; Σ.Ω. Οὐδαμῶς γε, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς ἐπιτηδεύσεως μόριον. Π.Ω.Α. Τίνος λέγεις τάς ταῦτας; Σ.Ω. Μὴ ἀγοριστέρου ἡ τὸ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν· ὅκυρο γὰρ Γοργίου ἔνεκα λέγειν, μή ὁμηται με διακομίδειν τὸ ἐαυτοῦ ἐπιτήδευμα. ἴνιδο δὲ εἰ μὲν τοῦτο ἔστω ἡ ὀητορικὴ ἡν Γοργίας ἐπιτηδεύει ὁμοία· καὶ γὰρ ἄρτι ἐκ τοῦ λόγου οὐδὲν ἢμῖν καταφανὲς ἐγένετο τί ποτε οὕτος ἢγεταί; ὁ δὲ ἐγὼ καλὸ τὴν ὀητορικὴν, πράγματος τινὸς ἔστι μόριον οὐδενὸς τῶν καλῶν. Γ.Ο.Ρ. Τίνος, ὁ Σόφιατες; εἰπέ, μηδὲν ἔμε αἰσχυνθεῖς. 

Σ.Χ. Τ. Λοιποῦ τοίνυν μοι, ὁ Γοργία, εἶναι τι ἐπιτήδευμα τεχνικὸν μὲν οὐ, ψυχῆς δὲ στοχαστικῆς καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ φύσει δεινῆς Β' προσομιλείν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· καλὸ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἴναν

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τὸ κεφάλαιον κολαχεῖαν. ταύτης μοι δοκεῖ τῆς ἐπιτιθεδέουσι πολλά μὲν καὶ ἄλλα μορία εἶναι, ἐν δὲ καὶ ἡ ὤντοποικὴ ὁ δοκεῖ μὲν εἶναι τέχνη, ὡς δὲ ὁ ἐμὸς λόγος, οὐκ ἔστι τέχνη, ἄλλ' ἐμπειρία καὶ τριθή. ταύτης μόριον καὶ τὴν ὑποτοικὴν ἐγὼ καλὸν καὶ τὴν γε κομμωτικὴν καὶ τὴν σοφιστικὴν, τέταρτα ταύτα μόρια ἐπὶ τέταρτοι πράγματα εἰσιν· εἰ οὖν βούλεται Πῶλος πυθανήσθαι, πυθανεῖσθω· οὐ γὰρ πω πέπτυσται ὑποτὸν φημὶ ἐγὼ τῆς κολαχείας μόριον εἶναι τὴν ὑποτοικὴν ἄλλ' αὐτὸν λέλησθα οὕτω ἀποκεριμένος, ὁ δὲ ἐπανεροτά, εἰ οὐ καλὸν ἦγομία εἰναι. ἐγὼ δὲ αὐτῷ οὖν ἀποκρινοῦμαι πρότερον εἰτε καλὸν εἰτε αἰσχρὸν ἦγομία εἰναι τὴν ὑποτοικὴν, πρὶν ἂν πρῶτον ἀποκρίνωμαι ὁ τι ἔστιν. οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον, ὁ Πῶλε· ἄλλ' εἴπερ βούλει πυθανήσθαι, ἑρῶτα ὑποτὸν μόριον τῆς κολαχείας φημὶ εἶναι τὴν ὑποτοικὴν. Π.Ω.Λ. Ἐρωτῶ δή, καὶ ἀπόκρυναι, ὁ ὑποτὸν μόριον. Σ.Ω. Ἄρ' οὖν ἂν μάθοις ἀποκριναμένον; ἔστι γὰρ ἡ ὑποτοικὴ κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον πολιτικῆς μορίον εἰδολον. Π.Ω.Λ. Τί οὖν; καλὸν ἡ αἰσχρὸν λέγεις αὐτὴν εἶναι; Σ.Ω. Αἰσχρὸν ἔγαγε· τα γὰρ κακὰ αἰσχρὰ καλὸ· ἐπειδὴ δὲι σοι ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὡς ἦδη εἰδότι ὁ ἐγὼ λέγω. Γ.ΟΡ. Μα' τὸν Δία, ὅ Σάχρατες, ἄλλ' ἐγὼ οὐδὲ αὐτὸς συνήσιμοι ὁ τι λέγεις. Σ.Ω. Εἰκό-Ετος γε, ὁ Γοργία· οὐδὲν γὰρ πω σαφῆς λέγω, Πῶλος δὲ ὦδε νέος ἔστι καὶ ἔστ' ἐπὶ πός λέγεις πολιτικῆς μορίου εἰδολον εἶναι τὴν ὑποτοικήν. Σ.Ω.
'Αλλ' ἔγο τειράσομαι φράσσαι ὅ γέ μοι φαίνεται εἶναι ἡ φητορική· εἰ δὲ μὴ τυχάνει ὁν τοῦτο, Πώλος οδὲ ἐλέγξει. σῶμα πον καλεῖς τι καὶ ψυχήν; Ἐπιτική. Πῶς γὰρ οὕ; Σ.Ο. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τούτων οὐκει τινὲς εἰναι ἐκατέρων εὐεξίαιν; Ἐγώ. Σ.Ο. Τί δέ; δοκοῦσαν μὲν εὐεξίαιν, οὐσαν δ’ οὗ; οἷον τοιόνδε λέγω· πολλοὶ δοκοῦσιν εὖ ἔχειν τὰ σώματα, οὐς οὐκ ἂν ἁρδίως αἰσθοῖτο τις, ὅτι οὐκ εὖ ἔχουσιν, ἄλλος ἡ ἰατρός τε καὶ τῶν γυμναστικῶν τις. Ἐπιτική. 'Ἀλήθη λέγεις. Σ.Ο. Τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγῳ καὶ ἐν σώματι εἶναι καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ, ὅ τι ποιεῖ δοκεῖν μὲν Β εὖ ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, ἔχει δὲ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον. Ἐπιτική. 'Εστι ταῦτα.

Καπ. XIX. Σ.Ο. Φέρε δὴ σοι, εὰν δύνομαι, σαφέστερον ἐπιδείξω ὁ λέγω. Ἀνοίην ὄντων τοῖν πραγμάτων δύο λέγω τέχναις: τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ ψυχῇ πολιτικήν καλῶ, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ σώματι μίαν μὲν οὖς ὁνομάζει οὐκ ἔχω σοι, μιᾶς δὲ οὖς τῆς τοῦ σώματος θεραπείας δύο μόρια λέγω, τὴν μὲν γυμναστικὴν, τὴν δὲ ἰατρικὴν. τῆς δὲ πολιτικῆς ἀντίστροφον μὲν τῇ γυμναστικῇ τῇ νομοθετικῆς, ἀντίστροφον δὲ τῇ ἰατρικῇ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ. ἐπικοινωνοῦσι μὲν δὴ ἄλληλαις, ἀτε περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ οὖσαι, ἐκάτερα τούτων, ἡ τε ἰατρικὴ τῇ γυμναστικῇ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῇ νομοθετικῇ· ὅμως δὲ διαφέρουσι τι ἄλληλαις. τεττάρων δὴ τούτων οὖσαν, καὶ ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον θεραπευούσον, τῶν μὲν τὸ σῶμα, τῶν δὲ τὴν ψυχήν, ἡ κολαχευτικὴ αἰσθομένη, οὐ γνοὺσα λέγω ἄλλα
στοχασαμένη, τέτραχα ἐαυτὴν διανείμασα, ὑποδύσα ὑπὸ ἔκαστον τῶν μορφῶν, προσποιεῖται εἰ διανείμασα ὑπὸ δύσα ὑπὸ τοῦτο, ὁπερ ὑπέδυν, καὶ τοῦ μὲν βελτίστου ὀυδὲν φροντίζει, τῷ δὲ ἁπειρὸν θηρεύεται τὴν ἀνοίαν καὶ ἐξαπατᾶ, ὥστε δοκεῖ πλεῖστον ἀξίω εἶναι. ὑπὸ μὲν ὄν τὴν ἱατρικὴν ἡ ὁψοποιική ὑποδέδυσε, καὶ προσποιεῖται τὰ βέλτιστα σιτία τῷ σώματι εἰδέναι, ὥστε, εἰ δέοι ἐν παῖσι διαγωνίζονταί ὁψοποιών τε καὶ ἱατρῶν ἡ ἐν ἀνδράσιν ὄντως ἀνοίχτους ὁπερ ἔστει πάθεις, πότερον ἐπαίει περὶ τῶν χρηστῶν σιτίων καὶ πονηρῶν, ὁ ἱατρὸς ἡ ὁ ὁψοποιὸς, λιμῷ ἂν ἀποθανεῖν τὸν ἱατρόν. Εἰ κολαχεῖαι μὲν ὄντος αὐτῷ καλῶ, καὶ αἰσχρὸν φημι εἶναι το τοιοῦτον, ὡς Πόλεως,— τοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς σὲ 465 λέγω,— ὅτι τοῦ Ἡδεος στοχαζεῖται ἄνευ τοῦ βελτίστου. τέχνην δὲ αὐτὴν οὐ φημί εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἐμπειρίαν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει λόγῳ οὐδένα ἡ προσφέρει ὅποι' ἀτίτα τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν, ὅστε τὴν αἰτίαν ἔκαστον μὴ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν. ἔγὼ δὲ τέχνην οὐ καλὸν ὃ ἂν ἡ ἀλογὸν πράγμα. τούτων δὲ πέρι εἰς ἀμφισβήτεις, ἔθελον ὑποχεῖν λόγῳ.
γάρ ἂν ἰσός ἀκολουθήσαις—ὅτι ὁ κομματικὸς
πρὸς γυμναστικὴν, τοῦτο ὑποτοικὴ πρὸς ἰατρικὴν. μᾶλλον δὲ ὁδε, ὅτι ὁ κομματικὸς πρὸς γυ-
μαστικὴν, τοῦτο σοφιστικὴ πρὸς νομοθετικὴν, καὶ ὁ δὲ ὑποτοικὴ πρὸς ἰατρικὴν, τοῦτο ῥητο-
ρικὴ πρὸς δικαίουσίννην. ὑπερ μέντοι λέγω, διέ-
στηκε μὲν οὔτω φύσει· οἶτε δὲ ἔγγυς οὖνων φύ-
σονται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ περὶ ταῦτα σοφισταὶ καὶ
ῥήτορες, καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὁ τι χρήσονται οὕτε
αὐτοὶ ἐξαντοί οὔτε οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνθρώποι τούτοις.

Δ καὶ γάρ ἂν, εἰ μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι ἐπεστάτη, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸ αὐτῷ, καὶ μὴ ὑπὸ ταύτης κατεθεωρεῖ-
to καὶ διεκρίνετο ἡ το ὑποτοική καὶ ἡ ἰατρική, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα ἱκρίνε σταθμίσμενον ταῖς
χάρισι ταῖς πρὸς αὐτό, τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου ἂν
πολὺ ἦν, ὁ φίλε Πωλέι—οὐ γὰρ τούτοις ἐμπεπερ-
φος·—όμοι ἂν πάντα χρήματα ἐφύρετο ἐν τῷ
αὐτῷ, ἄχριτον οὖν τῶν τοῖς ἰατρικῶν καὶ ύγιε-
νῶν καὶ ὑποτοικῶν. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐγώ φημι τὴν
ῥητορικήν εἶναι, ἀκήρους· ἀντίστοροφον ὑποτο-
Εἰς ὑπ ψυχῆ, ὁς ἐκείνο ἐν σώματι. ἰσός μὲν
οὖν ἄτοπον πεποίηκα, ὅτι σε οὐν ἐὼν μακροὺς
λόγους λέγειν αὐτὸς συχνὸν λόγον ἀποτέτακα.
ἀξιον μὲν οὖν ἐμοὶ συγγνώμην ἔχειν ἐστὶ· λέ-
γοντος γάρ μου βραχεά οὐχ ἐμάνθανε, οὔδὲ
χρῆσαι τῇ ἀποκρίσει ἦν σοι ἀπεκφινάμην οὐδὲν
466 οἶδος τῇ ἰθά, ἀλλ᾽ ἐδέου διηγήσεως. ἐὰν μὲν
οὖν καὶ ἐγώ, σοῦ ἀποκρινομένον, μὴ ἔχω ὃ τι
χρήσομαι, ἀπότεινε καὶ σύ λόγον, ἐὰν ὁ ὧ ἔχω,
PLATONIS

ἐξα μὲ χρῆσθαι· δίκαιον γάρ. καὶ νῦν ταύτη 
τῇ ἀποκρίσει εἰ τι ἔχεις χρῆσθαι, χρώ.

ΣΑΡ. XXI. ΠΩΛ. Τί οὖν φῆς; κολακεία 
δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἡ ἤτορική; ΣΩ. Κολακείας 
μὲν οὖν ἔγογγε εἰπὼν μόριον. ἀλλ' οὖ 
μνημονεύεις τηλικούτος ὄν, ὥς Πόλε; τί τάξα 
δράσεις [πρεσβύτητος γενόμενος]; ΠΩΛ. Ἄρ' οὖν 
δοκοῦ 
σι σοι ὡς κόλακες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι φαῦλοι νομίζε- 
θαί οἱ ἄγαθοι ὑήτορες; ΣΩ. Ἐράτημα τοῦτ' 
ἐρωτᾶς, ἢ λόγου τινὸς ἄρχην λέγεις; ΠΩΛ. 
Ἐρωτῶ ἔγογγε. ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ νομίζεσθαί ἔμοιγ 
δοκοῦσι. ΠΩΛ. Πῶς οὖν νομίζεσθαί; οὐ 
μέγι 
στον δύνανται ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν; ΣΩ. Οὔκ, εἰ 
τὸ δύνασθαι γε λέγεις ἄγαθὸν τι εἶναι τῷ δυνα- 
μένῳ. ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ λέγω γε. ΣΩ. 
Ἐλάχιστον τούνοις μοι δοκοῦσί τῶν ἐν τῇ 
πόλει 
δύνασθαι οἱ ψήτορες. ΠΩΛ. Τί δὲ; οὖν, ἂς-
περ οἱ τύραννοι, ἀποκτιννύσας τε ὄν ἄν 
βουλον-
ται, καὶ ἀφαιροῦνται χρήματα καὶ ἐξβάλλονται 
ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὃν ἄν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς; ΣΩ. 
Νὴ 
τὸν κύνα, ἀμφιγνοῦ μέντοι, ὥς Πόλε, ἔφ' ἐκά-
στον ὃν λέγεις, πότερον αὐτὸς ταύτα λέγεις καὶ 
γνώρη 
ςαυτοῦ ἀποφαίνει, ἡ ἔμε ἔρωτᾶς. ΠΩΛ. 
Ἀλλ' ἔγογγε σὲ ἔρωτῶ. ΣΩ. Εἶδεν, ὥς 
φίλο 
ἐπείτα δὸ τῷ ἄμα με ἔρωτᾶς; ΠΩΛ. Πῶς δῦο; 
ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρτι οὕτω πως ἔλεγες, ὥς ἀποκτιν-
νύσασιν οἱ ψήτορες οὐς ἄν βουλονται, ὡς 
περ οἱ 
τύραννοι, καὶ χρήματα ἀφαιροῦνται καὶ ἔξε-
λαύνοντιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὃν ἄν δοκῇ 
αὐτοῖς; ΠΩΛ. Ἐγογγε.
CAP. XXII. ΣΩ. Λέγω τοίνυν σοι, ὅτι δύο ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ ἐρωτήματα, καὶ ἀποκρινοῦμαι γέ σοι πρὸς ἀμφότερα. φημὶ γὰρ, ὅ Πόλε, ἐγὼ καὶ τοὺς ἱητοράς καὶ τοὺς τυφάννους δύνασθαι Ἐ μὲν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι σιμικρότατον, ὡσπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ποιεῖν ἂν βουλόνται, ὡς ἔποσ εἰπεῖν· ποιεῖν μὲντοι ὃ τι ἂν αὐτοῖς δόξῃ βέλτιστον εἶναι. ΠΩΛ. Ὁυκοῦν τούτῳ ἐστὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι; ΣΩ. Οὐχ, ὅ γε φησὶ Πόλος. ΠΩΛ. Ἐγὼ οὖ φημὶ; φημὶ μὲν οὖν ἔγορε. ΣΩ. Μὰ τὸν—οὔ οὐ γε, ἐπεὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι ἔφης ἄγαθὸν εἶναι τὸ δυναμένῳ. ΠΩΛ. Φημὶ γὰρ οὖν. ΣΩ. Ἀγαθὸν οὖν οὖει εἰναι, ἐὰν τις ποιῆ ταῦτα, ἃ ἄν δοξῇ αὐτῷ βέλτιστα εἰναι, νοῦν μὴ ἔχων; καὶ τούτῳ καλεῖς μέγα δύνασθαι; ΠΩΛ. Οὐχ ἔγορε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀποδείξεις τοὺς ἱητοράς νοῦν ἔχοντας καὶ τέχνην ἄστην ἱητορικήν, ἀλλὰ μὴ κολακείαν, ἐμὲ ἐξελέγξας; εἰ δὲ με ἐδάσεις ἄνελεγκτον, οἱ ἱητορεῖς οἱ ποιοῦντες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄ δοξεῖ αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ τύραννοι οὐδὲν ἄγαθὸν τοῦτο πεποίησονται, εἰ δὴ δύναμιν ἐστίν, ὡς οὐ φῆς, ἄγαθὸν, τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν ἀνευ νοῦ ὧ δοξεῖ καὶ οὐ ὀμολογεῖς κακῶν εἶναι. ἡ οὖ; ΠΩΛ. Ἐγορε. ΣΩ. Πῶς ἂν οὖν οἱ ἱητορεῖς μέγα δύναντο ἡ οἱ τύραννοι ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἐὰν μὴ Σωκράτης ἐξελέγκτη ὑπὸ Πώ- Β λου, ὅτι ποιοῦσιν ἄ βουλονται; ΠΩΛ. Οὐτος ἀνήγ — ΣΩ. Οὐ φημὶ ποιεῖν αὐτούς ἄ βου- λονται ἀλλὰ μὲ ἔλεγχε. ΠΩΛ. Οὐχ ἢρτι ὀμολογεῖς ποιεῖν ἄ δοξεῖ αὐτοῖς βέλτιστα εἶναι,
τούτου πρόσθεν; Σ. Καὶ γὰρ νῦν ὁμολογῶ. Π.Ω.Α. Ὁυχοῦν ποιούσιν ἐ̄ βουλοῦνται. Σ.Ω. Ὡυ φημί. Π.Ω.Α. Ποιούντες δὲ ἄ δοξεῖ αὐτοῖς; Σ.Ω. Φημί. Π.Ω.Α. Σχέτλια λέγεις καὶ ὑπερφυὴ, ὡ Σόκρατες. Σ.Ω. Μὴ κατηγορεῖς, ὡ λάβε Πώλε, ἵνα προσείτα γε κατὰ σὲ· ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν ε ἔχεις ἐκεῖ ἐρωτῶν, ἐπίδειξον, ὧτι ψεύδομαι, εἰ δὲ μὴ, αὐτὸς ἀποκρίνου. Π.Ω.Α. Ἀλλ’ ἔθελω ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἵνα καὶ εἰδῶ ὃ τι λέγεις.

Καπ. ΧΧΙΙ. Σ.Ω. Πότερον οὖν οἱ δοκούσιν οἱ ἀνθρωποὶ τούτο βουλεσθοῦσι, δ ὃ ἂν πράττωσιν ἐκάστοτε, ἡ ἔκειν, ὡ ἔνεκα πράττουσι τοῦθ’, δ ἐπάρτουσι; οἶνον οἱ τὰ φάρμακα πίνοντες παρὰ τῶν ἱατρῶν πότερον οἱ δοκοῦσι τούτο βουλεσθαι, ὡπερ ποιοῦσι, πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον δ καὶ ἄλγειν, ἡ ἔκειν, τὸ ψυχαίνειν, ὡ ἔνεκα πίνουσι; Π.Ω.Α. Ἀηλπ, ὃτι τὸ ψυχαίνειν, ὡ ἔνεκα πίνουσι. Σ.Ω. Οὐχοῦν καὶ οἱ πλέοντες τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον χρηματισμὸν χρηματιζόμενοι οὐ τοῦτο ἐστιν δ βουλοῦνται, δ ποιοῦσιν ἐκάστοτε· τίς γὰρ βούλεται πλεῖν τε καὶ κυνδυνεύειν καὶ πράγματ’ ἔχειν; ἀλλ’ ἔκειν, οἶμαι, οὐ ἔνεκα πλέουσι, πλοῦτεῖν· πλοῦτον γὰρ ἔνεκα πλέουσι. Π.Ω.Α. Πάνω γε. Σ.Ω. "Ἀλλο τι οὖν οὕτω καὶ περὶ πάντων; ἦν τίς τι πράτη ἐνεκά του, οὐ τοῦτο βούλεται, δ πράττειν, ἀλλ’ ἔκειν, οὐ ἔνεκα πράττειν. Π.Ω.Α. Ναι. Σ.Ω. "Ἀρ’ οὖν ἐ ἐστι τι τῶν οὖν τόν, οὐ οὕτω ἢτοι ἄγαθον γ’ ἐστιν ἡ κακὸν ἡ μεταξ’ τούτων, οὔτε ἄγαθον οὔτε κακὸν; Π.Ω.Α. Πολλῇ ἄνάγκῃ, ὡ Σοκρατεῖ.
ΣΩ. Οὖχοῦν λέγεις εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μὲν σοφίαν τε καὶ ψυχεὶν καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ τάλλα τὰ τοῦ-αὐτα, κακὰ δὲ τάναντία τοῦτον; ΠΩΛ. Ἕγω-γε. ΣΩ. Τὰ δὲ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακὰ ἄρα 463τοιάδε λέγεις, ἂ εὕροσε μὲν μετέχει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, εὕροσε δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ, εὕροσε δὲ οὐδετέρον, οὗν καθῆσαι καὶ βαδίζειν καὶ τρέχειν καὶ πλεῖν, καὶ οὗν αὖ λίθον καὶ κύλα καὶ τάλλα τὰ τοῦ- αὐτα; οὐ τάυτα λέγεις; ἡ ἄλλ' ἄττα καλεῖς τὰ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακὰ; ΠΩΛ. Οὐχ, ἄλλα ταύτα. ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν τὰ μεταξύ ταύτα ἐνεκέν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πράττουσιν, ὅταν πράττοσιν, ἡ τάγαθα τῶν μεταξύ; ΠΩΛ. Τὰ μεταξὺ δὴ- β' ποι τῶν ἀγαθῶν. ΣΩ. Τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄρα διώ- κοντες καὶ βαδίζομεν, ὅταν βαδίζομεν, οὐδὲνοι βέλτιον εἰναι, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἔτσιμεν, ὅταν ἔστωμεν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐνεκά, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἡ οὖ; ΠΩΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὖχοῦν καὶ ἀποκτίννυμεν, εἰ τιν' ἀποκτίννυμεν, καὶ ἐκβάλλομεν καὶ ἄφαι- ρομεθα χρήματα, οὐδὲνοι ἁμείνον εἰναι ἡμῖν ταύτα ποιεῖν ἡ μῆ; ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Ἔνεκ' ἄρα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀπαντά ταύτα ποιοῦσιν οἱ ποιοῦντες. ΠΩΛ. Φημί.

CAP. XXIV. ΣΩ. Οὖχοῦν ἁμολογήσαμεν, ἃ εἰ ἐνεκά τοῦ ποιοῦμεν, μὴ ἔκεινα βούλεσθαι, ἄλλ' ἔκεινο, οὗ ἐνεκα ταύτα ποιοῦμεν; ΠΩΛ. Μά- λιστα. ΣΩ. Οὐχ ἄρα σφάτειν βουλόμεθα οὔδ' ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων οὐδὲ χρήματα ἄφαι- ρεῖσθαι ἀπλῶς οὕτως, ἄλλ' ἐδώ μὲν ἄφελμα ἡ ταύτα, βουλόμεθα πράττειν αὐτά, βλαβερὰ δὲ
οντα ου βουλόμεθα. τα γαρ ἀγαθα βουλόμεθα, ὡς φης συ, τα δε μήτε ἀγαθα μήτε κακα ου βου-
λόμεθα, ουδε τα κακα. η γαρ; ἀληθη σοι δοκω
λεγειν, δ Πολε, η ου; Τι ουξ αποκρινει; δ Π.Π.Α.
Αληθη. ΣΩ. Ουχον ειτερ ταυτα ομο-
λογουμεν, ει τις αποκτεινει τινα η ἐκβαλλει εικ
πολεως η αφαιρειται χρηματα, ειτε τυφανος αν
ειτε ητορ, οιμενος Αμεινον ειναι αυτω, τυγ-
χανει δε ον κακιον, ουτος οητου ποιει α δοκει
αυτω. η γαρ; ΠΠΑ. Ναι. ΣΩ. 'Αρσ ουν
και δ βουλεται, ειτερ τυγχανει ταυτα κακα
οντα; Τι ουξ αποκρινει; ΠΠΛ. 'Αλλ ου
μοι δοκει ποιειν δ βουλεται. ΣΩ. 'Εστιν ουν
οπως ο τοιουτος μεγα δυναται εν τη πολει ταυ-
τη, ειτερ εστι το μεγα δυνασθαι αγαθων τι κατα
την σην ομολογιαν; ΠΠΑ. Ουξ έστιν. ΣΩ.
'Αληθη άρα έγω έλεγον, λεγον, διι εστιν αν-
θρωπον ποιουντα εν πολει α δοκει αυτω μη]
μεγα δυνασθαι μηδε ποιειν α βουλεται. ΠΠΑ.
'Ως δη συ, δ Σωκρατεσ, ους αν δεξαμε εξειναι σοι
ποιειν ο τι δοκει σοι εν τη πολει μαλλον η μη,
ουδε ζηλοις, οταν έθης τινα η αποκτειναντα δε
ειδοξεν αυτω η αφελομενον χρηματα η δησαντα.
ΣΩ. Δικαιοις, λεγεις, η αδικως; ΠΠΑ. 'Οπο-
tερ αν ποιη, ουχ άμφοτερος ζηλωτων έστιν; 469
ΣΩ. Ειφημει, δ Πολε. ΠΠΛ. Τι δη; ΣΩ.
'Οτι ου χρη ουτε τους αξιλατους ζηλουν ουτε
τους αθλιους, αλλ' ελεειν. ΠΠΛ. Τι δαι;
ουτω σοι δοκει εχειν περι δεν έγω λεγα των αν-
θρωπων; ΣΩ. Πος γαρ ου; ΠΠΛ. 'Οστις
οὖν ἀποκτίννυσιν ὅν ἂν δόξῃ αὐτῷ, δικαίως ἀποκτινών, ἅθλιος δοκεῖ σοι εῖναι καὶ ἔλεεινός; ΣΩ. Οὐχ ἔμοιγε, οὐδὲ μέντοι ζηλωτός. ΠΩΛ. Ἡ Οὐχ ἄρτι ἄθλιον ἔφησά β ΣΩ. Τὸν ἄδικον γε, ὃ ἔταυρε, ἀποτείναντα, καὶ ἔλεεινόν γε πρὸς τὸν δὲ δικαίως ἄζηλωτον. ΠΩΛ. Ἡ ποὺ ἢ ἐποθνήσκουν ἄδικως ἔλεεινός τε καὶ ἄθλιος ἔστιν. ΣΩ. Ἡ Ἑττον ἢ ὁ ἀποκτίννυς, ὁ Πόλε, καὶ ἦττον ἢ ὁ δικαίως ἀποθνήσκων. ΠΩΛ. Πῶς δήμα, ὃ Σώκρατες; ΣΩ. Οὔτως, ὃς μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν τυγχάνει ὃν τὸ ἄδικεῖν. ΠΩΛ. Ἡ γὰρ τοῦτο μέγιστον; οὐ τὸ ἄδικεῖσθαι μείζον; ΣΩ. Ἡ κιστά γε. ΠΩΛ. Σὺ ἀρα βουλοί μὲν ἂν ἄδικεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἄδικεῖν; ΣΩ. Βουλούμεν μὲν ἂν ἔσογε οὐδέτερα· εἰ δ' ἀναγάκτον εἰπ' ἄδικεῖν ἢ ἄδικεῖσθαι, ἐλοίμην ἂν μᾶλλον ἄδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἄδικεῖν. ΠΩΛ. Σὺ ἀρα τυφαννέειν οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο; ΣΩ. Οὔκ, εἰ τὸ τυφαννεῖν γε λέγεις ὑπὲρ ἔγω. ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλ' ἔσογε τοῦτο λέγω, ὑπὲρ ἄρτι, ἔσογε ἐν τῇ πόλει, ὃ ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ποιεῖν τοῦτο, καὶ ἀποκτίννυντε καὶ ἐκβάλλοντε καὶ πάντα πράττοντε κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ δόξαν.

Cap. XXV. ΣΩ. Ἡ μακάριε, ἐμοῦ δὴ λέοντος τῷ λόγῳ ἐπιλαβοῦν. εἰ γὰρ ἔγω ἐν ἄγορῇ πληθοῦση λαβῶν ὑπὸ μάλης ἐγχειρίδιον λέγομι πρὸς σὲ, ὅτι Ἡ Πόλε, ἐμοὶ δύναμίς τις καὶ τυφαννείς θαναμαία ἄρτι προσέγγονεν· εἰὼν γὰρ ἄρα ἐμοὶ δόξῃ τινὰ τουτονὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἢν σὺ ὁρᾷς αὐτίκα μάλα δεῖν τεθνᾶναι, τεθνήξει
οὗτος, ὃν ἂν δόξην καὶ τινὰ δόξην μοι τῆς κεφαλῆς αυτῶν κατεαγέναι δεῖν, κατεαγώς ἢσται αὐτίκα μᾶλα, κἂν Θοιμάτιον διευξήσθαι, διεσχμένον ἢσται. οὕτω μέγα ἔγοδ δύναμιν ἐν τῇ δε τῇ Επόλει. ἐκ οὖν ἀπιστούντι σοι δεῖξαι τῷ ἐρχείσιν, ἵσως ἂν εἴποις ἰδὼν, ὡς ἦν Σάκρατες, οὕτω μὲν πάντες ἂν μέγα δύναντο, ἐπεὶ κἂν ἐμπροσθείη οἰκίᾳ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἦντιν ἂν σοι δοξῇ, καὶ τὰ γε Ἄθηναιῶν νεώφυλαι τετρήσει καὶ τὸ πλοῖα πάντα καὶ τὰ δημόσια καὶ τὰ ἱδία. ἀλλ' ὀνεὶ ἄρα τούτ' ἢστι τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι, τὸ ποιεῖν ἢ δοξεῖ αὐτῷ. ἡ δοξεῖ σοι; ΠΩΛ. Οὗ ἄτο δῆτα οὕτω γε. ΣΩ. Ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν, διότι μέμψει τὴν τοιαύτην δύναμιν; ΠΩΛ. Ἐγώρησε. ΣΩ. Τί δή; λέγε. ΠΩΛ. Οτι αὔγκατον τὸν οὕτω πράττοντα ἐξισούοσθαι ἢστι. ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ ἐξισούοσθαι οὐ κακὸν; ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. ὄνοχον, ὥς Θανάσισε, τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι πάλιν αὐτῷ φαίνεται, ἔδω μὲν πράττοντι ὃ δοξεῖ ἐπηται τὸ ὀφελίμως πράττειν, ἀγαθόν τε εἰναί, καὶ τοῦτο, ὡς ξοικεῖ, ἢστι τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι. εἰ δὲ μὴν κακὸν καὶ συμφόρον δύνασθαι. Σκεψάμεθα δὲ καὶ τόδε. ἀλλ' τι ὁμολογοῦμεν ἐνίστε μὲν ἄµενον εἰναί ταῦτα ποιεῖν, ὥ νῦν δή ἐλέγομεν, ἀποκτινώναι τε καὶ ἐξελάνειν ἀνθρόποις καὶ ἀφαιρεῖσθαι χρήματα, ἐνίστε δὲ οὕ'; ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Τούτω μὲν δή, ὡς ξοικε, καὶ παρὰ σοῦ καὶ παρ' ἐμοῦ ὁμολογεῖται. ΠΩΛ. Ναὶ. ΣΩ. Πότε οὖν σοὶ φης ἄµενον εἰναί ταῦτα ποιεῖν; εἰπὲ τίνα ὦρον ὀρίζει. ΠΩΛ. Σὺ
μὲν οὖν, ὁ Σῶκρατες, ἀπόκριναι ταύτῳ τούτῳ.  

C ΣΞ. Ἐγὼ μὲν τούτων φημί, ὁ Πώλε, εἰ σοι παρ' ἐμοῦ ἤδιον ἔστιν ἀκούειν, ὅταν μὲν δικαίως τις ταύτα ποιή, ἀμείωνον εἶναι, ὅταν δὲ ἀδίκως, κάκιον.

CAP. XXVI. ΠΩΑ. Χαλεπὸν γέ σε ἐλέγξαι, ὁ Σῶκρατες· ἀλλ' οὐχὶ κἂν παῖς σε ἐλέγξειεν, ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθὴ λέγεις; ΣΞ. Πολλὴν ἀρα ἔγὼ τῷ παιδὶ χάριν ἔξω, ἵσθη δὲ καὶ σοί, ἔάν με ἐλέγξης καὶ ἀπαλλάξῃς φλυαρίας. ἀλλὰ μὴ κάμπτῃς φίλον ἄνδρα εὐεργετῶν, ἀλλ' ἐλέγχε. ΠΩΑ.

D Ἀλλὰ μήν, ὁ Σῶκρατες, οὐδέν γέ σε δεῖ παλαιοὶ πράγμασιν ἐλέγχειν· τά γάρ ἐχθὲς καὶ πρόην γεγονότα ταύτα ἰκανά σε ἐξελέγξαι ἐστὶ καὶ ἀποδείξῃ, ὅσ πολλοὶ ἀδικοῦντες ἀνθρώποι εὐθαίμονες εἰσί. ΣΞ. Τὰ ποία ταύτα; ΠΩΑ. Ἀρχέλαον δήμου τούτων τὸν Περδίκχου ὄρας ἄρχοντα Μακεδονίας; ΣΞ. Εἰ δὲ μή, ἀλλ' ἀκούω γε. ΠΩΑ. Εὐθαίμονον οὖν οὐ δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ ἀθλιος; ΣΞ. Οὐκ οἶδα, ὁ Πώλε· οὐ γάρ ποι συγγέγονα τῷ ἄνδρι. ΠΩΑ. Τί δαί; Εὐσυγγενέμονος ἄν γνωῖς, ἀλλως δὲ αὐτὸθεν οὐ γιγνώσκεις ὅτι εὐθαίμονει; ΣΞ. Μὰ δὲ οὐ δῆτα. ΠΩΑ. Δῆλον δή, ὁ Σῶκρατες, ὅτι οὐδέ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα γιγνώσκεις φήσεις εὐθαίμονα ὅντα. ΣΞ. Καὶ ἀληθὴ γε ἔρω· οὐ γάρ οἶδα παῖδειας ὅπως ἔχει καὶ δικαιοσύνης. ΠΩΑ. Τί δέ; ἐν τούτῳ ἡ πάσα εὐθαίμονία ἐστίν; ΣΞ. Ὡς γε ἔγω λέγω, ὁ Πώλε· τὸν μὲν γάρ καλὸν κάγαθον ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα εὐθαίμονα εἶναι.
φημι τὸν δὲ ἄδικον καὶ ποιητῶν ἄθλιον. Π.Ω.Δ. ἁπὶ Ἄθλιος ἄρα οὐτὸς ἐστιν ὁ Ἀρχέλαιος κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον; Σ.Ω. Εἴπερ γε, ὦ φίλε, ἄδικος. Π.Ω.Δ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν ἢ πῶς οὖν ἄδικος; ὃ γε προσῆκε μὲν τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐδέν, ἢν νῦν ἔχει, ὃντι ἐκ γυναικὸς, ἢ ἢν δούλῃ ᾽Αλκέτου, τοῦ Περδίκκου ἀδελφοῦ, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸ δίκαιον δούλος ἢν ᾽Αλκέτου, καὶ εἰ ἐθούλετο τὸ δίκαια ποιεῖν, ἐθούλευεν ἢν ᾽Αλκέτη καὶ ἢν εὐδαιμόνικα κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον. νῦν δὲ θαυμασίως ὦς ἄθλιος γέγονεν, Β ἔπει τὰ μέγιστα ἥδικηκεν· ὃς γε πρῶτον μὲν τούτων αὐτὸν τὸν δεσπότην καὶ θείον μετατεμψάμενος ὡς ἀποδόσων τὴν ἀρχήν, ἢν Περδίκκας αὐτὸν ἀφείλετο, ἐξείπασα καὶ καταμεθύσασα αὐτὸν τε καὶ τὸν νῦν αὐτοῦ ᾽Αλέξανδρον, ἀνεψιον αὐτοῦ, σχεδὸν ἡλικιώτην, ἐμβαλὼν εἰς ἁμαξαν, νύκτωρ ἐξαγαγὼν ἀπέσφαξε τε καὶ ἠράνισεν ἀμφότεροι, καὶ ταῦτα ἁδικήσας ἔλαβεν ἐξαυτὸν ἄθλιότατος γενόμενος καὶ οὐ μετεμέλησεν αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' ὁλίγον ὤστερον τὸν ἀδελφὸν τὸν γνήσιον, σ τὸν Περδίκκου νῦν, παῖδα ὡς ἐπτατῇ, οὐ ἢ ἀρχὴ ἐγίγνετο κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον, οὐκ ἐθούληθη εὐδαιμόνιος γενέσθαι δικαίως ἐκθέσας καὶ ἀποδοὺς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐκείνην, ἀλλ' εἰς φρέαρ ἐμβαλὼν ἀποπνίξας πρὸς τὴν μητέρα αὐτοῦ Κλεοπάτραν χήνα ἔφη διώκοντα ἐμπετείν καὶ ἀποθανεῖν. τοιγάρτοι νῦν, ἄτε μέγιστα ἡδικηκός τῶν ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ, ἀθλιότατος ἐστὶ πάντων Μακεδώνων, ἀλλ' οὐκ εὐδαιμονεστάτος, καὶ ἵσως ἐστὶν ὡστε ᾽Αθηναίων ἀπὸ σοῦ ἀρξάμενος δέξαιτ' ὃν ἄλλος
Δόστισσον Μακεδόνων γενέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ Ἀφέλαιας.

ΚΑΠ. ΧΧΧΒ. ΣΩ. Καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς τῶν λόγων, ὁ Πόλες, ἔγογγε σε ἐπήνεσα, ὅτι μοι δοκεῖς εὖ πρὸς τὴν ὑποτικὴν πεπαίδευσθαι, τού δὲ διαλέγεσθαι ἤμεληκέναι· καὶ νῦν ἄλλο τι οὕτως ἔστων ὁ λόγος, οὐ με καὶ ἂν παῖς ἔξελέγξειε, καὶ ἐγὼ ὑπὸ σοῦ νῦν, ὡς σὺ οἶχε, ἔξελήγγυμαι τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ, φάσκων τὸν ἀδικοῦντα οὐκ εὐδαιμονα εἶναι; πόθεν, ἢ ἔγηδέ; καὶ μὴν οὐδέν γέ σοι τούτων ὀμολογῶ ὑπὸ σοῦ φής. Π.Ω.Δ. Οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλεις, ἐπεὶ δοκεῖ γέ σοι ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω. ΣΩ. ἢ μακάρις, ὑποτικὸς γάρ με ἐπιχειρεῖς ἔλεγχεν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἤγουμενοι ἔλεγχεν. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ οἱ ἔτεροι τοὺς ἐτέρους δοκοῦσιν ἔλεγχεν, ἐπειδὰν τῶν λόγων ὃν ἂν λέγωσι πάρατρως πολλοῖς παρέχονται καὶ εὐδοκίμουσι, ὁ δὲ τάναντα λέγων ἔνα τινα παρέχεται, ἡ μηδένα. οὕτως δὲ ὁ ἔλεγχος οὔτεν ἄξιος ἐστὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀταλῆθειαν· ἐνώτε ὡς ἂν καὶ καταγεννυματηροθηκής τις ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ δοκοῦντων εἶναι τι. καὶ νῦν περὶ ὅν σὺ λέγεις ὅλγον σοι πάντες ὑμνήσασθαι ταῦτα Ἀθηναίοι καὶ ξένοι· εἰ ἐν βούλῃ κατ' ἐμοῦ πάρατρος παρασχέσθαι ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγω, μαστιγῇσον σοι, ἐὰν μὲν βούλῃ, Νικίας ὁ Νικηφάτων καὶ οἱ ἄδελφοι μετ' αὐτοῦ, ὃν οἱ τρίποδες οἱ ἐφεξῆς ἐστῶτες εἰσίν ἐν τῷ Διονυσίῳ, ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, Ἀριστοκράτης ὁ Β. Σχέλλιον, οὐ αὖ ἔστων ἐν Πυθίον τούτῳ τῷ καλῶν ἀνάθημα, ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, ἡ Περικλέους ἄλη
οἰκία, ἡ ἄλλη συγγένεια, ἦντινα ἄν βούλη τῶν ἐνθένδε ἐκλέξασθαι. ἀλλ᾽ ἐγὼ σοι εἰς ὁν ὁν ὁμολογῶ· οὐ γὰρ με σὺ ἀναγκάζεις, ἀλλὰ γενε- δομάτυρας κατ᾽ ἐμοῦ πολλοὺς παρασχόμενος ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐκβάλλειν με ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς. ἐγὼ δὲ ἂν μὴ σὲ αὐτὸν ἔνα ὄντα μάρτυρα παράσχομαι ὁμολογοῦντα περὶ ὧν λέγω, οὔτε ὁμιλεῖν ἀξίων λόγων μοι πεπεράνθησεν περὶ ὧν ἂν ἦμιν ὁ λόγος ἦ· οἰμάι δὲ ὁυδὲ σοι, ἐὰν μὴ ἐγὼ σοι μάρτυρός εἰς ὁν μόνος, τοὺς δ᾽ ἄλλους πάντας τοῦτοις χωρίειν εὖς. ἐστὶ μὲν οὖν οὐ- τός τις τρόπος ἐλέγχον, ὡς σὺ τε οἴει καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ· ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλος, ὅν ἐγὼ αὐ σοι ὁμιλεῖ. παραβαλόντες οὖν παρ᾽ ἄλληλους σχεψόμεθα εἰ τι διοίσουσιν ἄλληλων. καὶ γὰρ τυχάνει περὶ ὧν ἁμφισβητοῦμεν οὐ πάνυ σοικρὰ ὅντα, ἄλλα σχεδὸν τι ταὐτά, περὶ ὧν εἰδέναι τε κάλλι- στον, μή εἰδέναι τε αἰάχιστον· τὸ γὰρ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἡ γιγνάσκειν ἡ ἀγνοεῖν ὅστις τε εὐ- δαίμον ἐστὶ καὶ ὅστις μή· αὐτίκα πρῶτον, περὶ ὃ νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστί, σὺ ἡγεῖ σοῦ τε εἰναὶ μακά- ριον ἄνθρα ἐδικοῦντα τε καὶ ἐδικοῦν ὅντα, εἰποῦ Ἀρχέλαον ἐδικοῦν μὲν ἡγεῖ εἰναί, εὐδαίμονα δὲ. ἄλλο τι ὡς οὔτω σου νομίζοντος διανοῶμεθα; Π.Ω.Λ. Πάνυ γε.

ΚΑΠ. ΧΧVIII. Σ.Ω. Ἐγὼ δὲ φημι ἀδύνατον. ἐν μὲν τούτῳ ἁμφισβητοῦμεν. εἰπὲ· ἐδικοῦν δὲ ὅ ἐνδαιμὸν ἐσται ἄρ᾽, ὃν τυχάνη δίκης τε καὶ τιμωρίας; Π.Ω.Λ. Ἡκεῖτα γε, ἐπεὶ οὔτω γ᾽ ἂν ἀθλιώτατος εἰη. Σ.Ω. Ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν ἄρα μὴ τυγ-
χάνη δίκης ο αδικων, κατά τὸν οὖν λόγον εύδαιμον ἐσται. Π.Ω.Α. Φημί. Σ.Ω. Κατα δὲ γε τὴν ἑμὴν δόξαν, ὁ Πόλε, ὁ αδικῶν τε καὶ ἐ ἀδίκος πάντας μὲν ἄθλιος, ἀθλιώτερος μέντοι, εάν μὴ διδῶ δίκην μηδε τυγχάνῃ τιμωρίας ἀδικῶν, ἦττον δὲ ἄθλιος, εάν διδῶ δίκην καὶ τυγχάνῃ δίκης ὑπὸ Θεῶν δὲ καὶ ἀνθρώπων. Π.Ω.Α. Ἀτοπά γε, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐπιχειρεῖς λέγειν. Σ.Ω. Πειράσομαι δὲ γε καὶ σὲ ποιήσαι, ὁ ἔταιρε, ταυτὰ ἐμοὶ λέγειν· φίλον γάρ σε ἤρωμαι. νῦν μὲν οὖν ὁ διαφερόμεθα ταὐτ᾽ ἔστε· σκόπει δὲ καὶ σύ. εἰτὸν ἐγὼ ποὺ ἐν τοῖς ἐμπρόσθεν τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον εἰναι. Π.Ω.Α. Πάνω γε. Σ.Ω. Σὺ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι. Π.Ω.Α. Ναι. Σ.Ω. Καὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας ἄθλιους ἔφην εἶναι ἐγὼ, καὶ ἐξηλέγχθην ὑπὸ σοῦ. Π.Ω.Α. b Ναι ὡς Λία. Σ.Ω. ὃς σὺ γε οὐχι, ὁ Πόλε. Π.Ω.Α. Ἀληθῆ γε οὐκέμενος ἄνωτερος. Σ.Ω. Σὺ δὲ γε εὐθαλάμωνας αὖ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας, ἐὰν μὴ διδῶ δίκην. Π.Ω.Α. Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Σ.Ω. Ἐγὼ δὲ αὐτοὺς ἀθλιωτάτους φημί, τοὺς δὲ διδόντας δίκην ἤττον. βοῦλει καὶ τοῦτο ἐλέγχειν; Π.Ω.Α. Ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι τοὺτ᾽ ἐκείνου χαλεπότερόν ἐστιν, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐξηλέγχαι. Σ.Ω. Οὐ δήτα, ὁ Πόλε, ἀλλ᾽ ἀδύνατον· το γὰρ ἀληθές οὐδέποτε ἐλέγχεται. Π.Ω.Α. Πῶς λέγεις; εὰν ἀδικῶν ἀνθρώπος ληφθη τυφλῶς ἐπιθυμεῖν, καὶ ληφθεὶς στρεφλάται καὶ ἐκτέλεσαι καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐκχάναι, καὶ ἄλλας πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας καὶ παντοδιαπόστιμα ἀντίς τε λοβηθεῖς καὶ τοὺς
αὐτοῦ ἐπιδῶν παῖδας τε καὶ γυναῖκα τὸ ἔσχατον ἀνασταυρωθῇ ἥ καταπιτωθῇ, ὦτος εὐδαιμονεῖστερος ἔσται ἢ ἐὰν διαφυγὼν τύραννος καταστῇ καὶ ἄρχον ἐν τῇ πόλει διαθῷ ποιῶν ὃ τι ἄν βούληται, ξηλαστὸς ὃν καὶ εὐδαιμονιζόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων; ταύτα λέει ἄδικα ἐξελέγχειν;

CAP. XXIX. ΣΩ. Μορμολύττει αὖ, ὁ γενναῖς Πόλε, καὶ οὐκ ἐλέγχεις· ἀρτι δὲ ἐμαρτύρω. ὁμοις δὲ ὑπόμνησιν με σμικρῶν· ἦν ἄδικως ἐπι-βουλεύων τυραννίδι, εἶπες; ΠΩΛ. Ἐγὼ ἔγραψα. ΣΩ. Εὐδαιμονεῖστερος μὲν τῶνν ὁδόποτε ἔσται ὁδέτερος αὐτῶν, οὔτε ὁ κατεφρασμένος τὴν τυ-ραννίδα ἄδικος οὔτε ὁ δίκην δίδονέ· δυοῖν γὰρ ἄθλιοι εὐδαιμονεῖστερος μὲν οὖν ἂν εἰῆ· ἀθλιώ-τερος μέντοι ὁ διαφυγὼν καὶ τυραννεύσας. Τί ἐ-τοῦτο, ὁ Πόλε; γελάσ; ἄλλο αὖ τοῦτο εἴδος ἐλέγχου ἐστὶν, ἐπειδὰν τὸ ἐπική, καταγέλαν, ἐλέγχειν δὲ μή; ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ οἴει ἐξεληλέγχθαι, ὁ Σάκρατε, ὅταν τοιαῦτα λέγης ἀ οὐδεῖς ἂν φήσεις ἂνθρώπων; ἐπεὶ ἔροι τινα τοντινί. ΣΩ. Ὁ Πόλε, οὖν εἰμὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, καὶ πέ-ρυσι βουλεύειν λαχῶν, ἐπειδὴ η φυλή ἐπροτάνευε καὶ ἔδει με ἐπιηρήσειεν, γέλατα παρέχω καὶ οὖν ἡπιστάμην ἐπιηρήσειεν. μὴ οὖν μηδὲ νῦν ἃ με κέλευς ἐπιηρήσειεν τοὺς παρόντας, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ μὴ ἔχεις τούτων βελτίω ἐλέγχον, ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἔγνω ἔλεγον, ἐμοὶ ἐν τῷ μέρει παράδος, καὶ πείθάσαι τοῦ ἐλέγχου οἶον ἔγω οἴμαι δεῖν εἶναι. ἔγω γὰρ ὃν ἂν λέγω ἔνα μὲν παρασχέσθαι μάρτυρα ἐπί-
στάμαι, αὐτὸν πρὸς ὄν ἀν μοι ὁ λόγος ἦ, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἐό χαίρειν, καὶ ἔνα ἐπιμηπρίζειν ἐπὶ-β στάμαι, τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς οὐδὲ διαλέγομαι. ὃρα ὦν, εἰ ἔθελῆσεις ἐν τῷ μέρει διδόναι ἐλεγχον ἀποκρινόμενον τὰ ἔρωτόμενα. ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οὐ-μαι καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον ἰχθυόθαυ καὶ τὸ μὴ διδόναι δίκην τοῦ διδόναι. Π.Π.Α. Ἐγὼ δὲ γε οὔτ’ ἐμὲ οὔτ’ ἄλλον ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα. ἔπει σὺ δὲξαι ἄν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἥ ἀδικεῖν; Σ.Ο. Καὶ σὺ γ’ ἂν καὶ σὲ ἄλλους πάντες. Π.Π.Α. Πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ἀλλ’ οὔτ’ ἐγώ οὔτε σὺ οὔτ’ ἄλλος οὐδεὶς.

Σ.Ο. Οὐκοῦν ἀποκρίνει; Π.Π.Α. Πάνω μὲν οὐν· καὶ γὰρ ἐπιθυμῶ εἰδέναι ὅ τι ποτ’ ἔρεις. Σ.Ο. Λέγε δὴ μοι, ἵν’ εἰδῆς, ὁσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐς ἀρχῆς σε ἡρώτων· πότερον δοκεῖ σοι, ὅ Πολε, κάκιον εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἥ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι; Π.Π.Α. Τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἐμοίγε. Σ.Ο. Τί δὲ δὴ αἰσχίον; πότερον τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἥ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι; Ἀποκρίνουν. Π.Π.Α. Τὸ ἀδικεῖν.

Cap. XXX. Σ.Ο. Οὐκοῦν καὶ κάκιον, εἶσερ αἰσχίον. Π.Π.Α. Ἡκιστά γε. Σ.Ο. Μανθάνω· D οὐ ταύτων ἤγει οὐ, ὡς ἔσχας, καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγα-θὸν καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν. Π.Π.Α. Οὐ δέητα. Σ.Ο. Τί δὲ τόδε; τὰ καλὰ πάντα, οἶν καὶ σόματα καὶ χρώματα καὶ σχήματα καὶ φωνάς καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα, εἰς οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπων καλεῖς ἑκάστοτε καλά; οἶν πρὸτον τὰ σώματα τὰ κα-λὰ οὐχὶ ἦτοι κατὰ τὴν χρείαν λέγεις καλὰ εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ ἂν ἑκάστων χρήσαις ἥ, πρὸς τούτῳ, ἥ
κατὰ ἡδονήν τινα, ἕαν ἐν τῷ Θεωρεῖσθαι χαίρειν ποιή τους θεωροῦντας; ἔχεις τι ἐκτὸς τούτων λέγειν περὶ σώματος κάλλους; Π.Ο.Α. Οὐκ ἔχω. Σ.Ω. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τάλλα πάντα οὐτω καὶ σχήματα καὶ χρώματα ἢ διὰ ἡδονήν τινα, ἢ διὰ ὦφελείαν, ἢ δι’ ἀμφότερα καλὰ προσαγωγεῖσι; Π.Ο.Α. Ἔγγει. Σ.Ω. Οὐ καὶ τὰς φωνὰς καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν μουσικὴν πάντα ὦσαίτως; Π.Ο.Α. Ναι. Σ.Ω. Καὶ μὴν τὰ γε κατὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα οὐ δήπον ἐκτὸς τούτων ἐστὶ τὰ καλά, τοῦ ἢ ὦφελιμα εἶναι, ἢ ἢδεα, ἢ ἀμφότερα. Π.Ο.Α. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοξεῖ. Σ.Ω. 475 Ὁνικοῦν καὶ τὸ τῶν μαθημάτων κάλλος ὦσαίτως; Π.Ο.Α. Πάνυ γε καὶ καλῷς γε νῦν ὀριζεῖ, ὃ Ἐπαφατε, ἡδονή τε καὶ ἅγαθος ὀριζόμενος τὸ καλὸν. Σ.Ω. Οὐκοῦν τὸ αἰσχρὸν τῷ ἐναντίῳ, λύπῃ τε καὶ κακῷ; Π.Ο.Α. Ἀνάγκη. Σ.Ω. Ὅταν ἀρα δυνὸν καλοῖν θάτερον κάλλιον ἢ, ἢ τῷ ἐτέρῳ τούτων ἢ ἀμφότεροι ὑπερβάλλον κάλλιον ἐστίν, ἢτοι ἡδονῆ ἢ ὦφελεία ἢ ἀμφότεροι. Π.Ο.Α. Πάνυ γε. Σ.Ω. Καὶ ὅταν δὲ δὴ δυνὸν αἰσχρόν τὸ ἐτέρον αἰσχρὸν ἢ, ἢτοι λύπη ἡ κα-Β καὶ ὑπερβάλλου αἰσχροῦ ἐστιν. ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη; Π.Ο.Α. Ναι. Σ.Ω. Φέρε δὴ, πῶς ἐλέγετο νῦν δὴ περὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι; οὐκ ἔλεγες τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν αἰ- σχον; Π.Ο.Α. Ἐλεγον. Σ.Ω. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ αἰσχρὸν τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἢτοι λυπηρό- τερον ἐστὶ καὶ λύπη ὑπερβάλλου αἰσχον ἀν εἰη, ἢ κακῶ, ἢ ἀμφότεροι; οὐ καὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη; Π.Ο.Α. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;
GORGIAS.

C Cap. XXXI. ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν δὴ σκεψόμεθα· ἄφα λύπη ὑπερβάλλει τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ ἀλγοῦσι μᾶλλον οἱ ἀδικοῦντες ἢ οἱ ἀδικοῦμενοι; ΠΩΑ. Οὐδαμῶς, ὁ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο γε. ΣΩ. Οὐχ ἂν ἀρα λύπη γε ὑπερέχει. ΠΩΑ. Οὐ δήτα. ΣΩ. Οὐχοῦν εἰ μὴ λύπη, ἀμφοτέρους μὲν οὐχ ἂν ἦτι ὑπερβάλλοι. ΠΩΑ. Οὐ φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Οὐχοῦν τῷ ἔτερῳ λείπεται. ΠΩΑ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τῷ κακῷ. ΠΩΑ. Ἔοικεν. ΣΩ. Οὐχοῦν κακῷ ὑπερβάλλον τὸ ἀδικεῖν κάκιον ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι. ΠΩΑ. Δῆλον δὴ ὅτι. ΣΩ. Ἀλλο τι οὖν ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ὑπὸ σοῦ ἀμολογείτο ἢμῖν ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν χρόνῳ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι; ΠΩΑ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Νῦν δὲ γε κάκιον ἐράνη. ΠΩΑ. Ἐοικε. ΣΩ. Δέξαιο ἂν οὖν οὐ μᾶλλον τὸ κάκιον καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἢττον; Μὴ ὅχει ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὁ Πῶλε— οὐδέν γάρ βλαβήσει,— ἀλλὰ γενναίως τῷ λόγῳ, ἔστερ ἰατρῷ, παρέχων ἀποκρίνον, καὶ ἡ φάθι ἡ μη ἄ ἐρωτῶ. ΠΩΑ. Ἀλλ, οὖν ἂν δεξαίμην, ὁ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Ἀλλος δὲ τις ἀνθρώπων; ΠΩΑ. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ κατά γε τοῦτον τοῦ λόγου. ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆ ἂρα ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι οὐτ' ἂν ἐγὼ οὔτ' ἂν οὐ οὔτ' ἂλλος οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων δέξαιτ, ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον γαρ τυγχάνει ὅν. ΠΩΑ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Ὅρας οὖν, ὁ Πῶλε, ὁ ἔλεγχος παρὰ τὸν ἔλεγχον παρα- θαλλόμενος ὅτι οὐδέν ἐοικεν, ἀλλὰ σοὶ μὲν οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ὁμολογοῦσι πλὴν ἐμοῦ,
εξαρχεῖς εἰς ὁν μόνος καὶ ὁμολογῶν καὶ μαρτυρεῖ-476 ὑον, καὶ ἔγω σε μόνον ἐπιμηψίζων τούς ἀλλους ἐν χαίρειν. Καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἵμιν οὔτως ἔχετο· μετὰ τοῦτο δὲ περὶ οὗ τὸ δεύτερον ἡμεροδημήσῃ· μεν, σκεφώμεθα, τὸ ἀδικοῦντα διδόναι δίκην ἢρα μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἔστιν, ὡς σὺ ἦσον, ἤ μεῖζον τὸ μὴ διδόναι, ὡς αὐτ ἔγω ἦμιν. σκοπώμεθα δὲ τῇ· τὸ διδόναι δίκην καὶ τὸ κολαξεσθαι δικαιῶς ἀδικοῦντα ἢρα τὸ αὐτὸ καλεῖς; ΠΩΛ. Ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. 'Εχεις οὖν λέγειν, ὡς οὐχὶ τὰ γε δίκαια β πάντα καλά ἔστι, καθ' ὅσον δίκαια; καὶ δια- σκεφάλμενος εἶπε. ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλὰ μοι δοξεῖ, ἦ Σώκρατες.

ΚΑΡ. ΧΧΧII. ΣΩ. Σκόπει ὅτι καὶ τόδε· ἢρα εἰ τίς τι ποιεῖ, ἀνάγκη τι εἶναι καὶ πάσχον ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ ποιοῦντος; ΠΩΛ. Ἐμοιγε δοξεῖ. ΣΩ. Ἀρα τοῦτο πάσχον ὃ τὸ ποιοῦν ποιεῖ, καὶ τοιοῦτον οἶον ποιεῖ τὸ ποιοῦν; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοι- ὄνδε· εἰ τις τύπτει, ἀνάγκη τι τύπτεσθαι; ΠΩΛ. Ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. Καὶ εἰ σφόδρα τύπτει ἡ ταχὺ τὸ τύπτον, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τυπτόμενον τύπτε- σθαι; ΠΩΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τοιοῦτον ἢρα πά- θος τὸ τυπτομένῳ ἔστιν οἶον ἂν τὸ τύπτον ποιή· ΠΩΛ. Πάντως γε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ κἀκεῖ τις, ἀνάγκη τι κάεσθαι; ΠΩΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; ΣΩ. Καὶ εἰ σφόδρα γε κἀκεῖ ἡ ἀλγεινῶς, οὕτω κάεσθαι τὸ καφεμένον ὃς ἂν τὸ καῦν κάη; ΠΩΛ. Πάντως γε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ τέμνει τις, ὃ αὐτὸς λόγος; τέμνεται γάρ τι. ΠΩΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Καὶ εἰ μέγα γε ἡ βαθὺ τὸ τρίμικα ἡ ἀλγεινῶν,
GORGIAS.

Д тοιούτων τμήμα τέμνεται το τεμνόμενον οἷον το τεμνόν τέμνει; ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Συλλήβδην δὴ ὤρα, εἰ ὁμολογεῖς ὁ ἄρτη ἔλεγον περὶ πάντων ὁἷον ἂν ποιῆ το ποιοῦν, τοιούτων το πάσχον πάσχειν. ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλ' ὁμολογῶ. ΣΩ. Τούτων δὴ ὁμολογουμένων, τὸ δίκην διδόναι πότερον πάσχειν τί ἐστὶν ἡ ποιεῖν; ΠΩΛ. Ἀνάγκη, ὁ Σωκράτες, πάσχειν. ΣΩ. Οὐκούν ὑπὸ τινὸς ποιοῦντος; ΠΩΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὗ; ὑπὸ γε τοῦ ἔξολοντος. ΣΩ. Ὁ δὲ ὀρθῶς κολάζων δικαίως κολάζει; ΠΩΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Δίκαια ποιῶν, ἡ οὖ; ΠΩΛ. Δίκαια. ΣΩ. Οὐκούν ὁ κολαζόμενος δίκην διδοῦς δίκαια πάσχει; ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Τὰ δὲ δίκαια πον καλὰ ὁμολόγηται; ΠΩΛ. Πάνω γε. ΣΩ. Τούτων ἄρα ὁ μὲν ποιεῖ καλά, ὁ δὲ πάσχει, ὁ κολαζόμενος. ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

CAP. XXXIII. ΣΩ. Οὐκούν εἶπερ καλά, ἄπταγαθα; ἡ γὰρ ἡδεὰ ἡ ὀφέλιμα. ΠΩΛ. Ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. Ἀγαθὰ ἄρα πάσχει ὁ δίκην διδοῦς; ΠΩΛ. Ἐοικεν. ΣΩ. Ὁφελεῖται ἄρα; ΠΩΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Ἀρα ἢπερ ἐγὼ ὑπολαμβάνω τὴν ὀφέλειαν; βελτίων τὴν ψυχήν γίγνεται, εἶπερ δικαίως κολάζεται; ΠΩΛ. Εἰκός γε. ΣΩ. Κακίας ἄρα ψυχῆς ἀπαλλάττεται ὁ δίκην διδοῦς; ΠΩΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν τοῦ μεγίστου B ἀπαλλάττεται κακοῦ; Ὁδὲ ἢ ἐκ ὁκίπτει. ἐν χρημάτων κατασκευή ἀνθρώπου κακίαν ἄλλην τινὰ ἐνορᾶς ἡ πενίαν; ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ, ἄλλα πενίαν. ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἐν σώματος κατασκευή; κακίαν ἄν
φήσαις ἀσθένειαν εἶναι καὶ νόσον καὶ αἰσχος καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα; ΠΩΔ. Ἕγογε. ΣΩ. Ὄνυχον καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ πονηρίαν ἤρει τίνα εἶναι; ΠΩΔ. Πῶς γὰρ οὗ; ΣΩ. Ταύτην οὖν οὐκ ἀδικίαις καὶ ἀμαθίαις καὶ δειλίαις καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα; ΠΩΔ. Πάων μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Ὄνυχον χρημάτων καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς, τριών ὄντων, τριτάς C εἰρήκας πονηρίας, πενίαν, νόσον, ἀδικίαις; ΠΩΔ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν τούτων τῶν πονηρών αἰσχύσης; οὐχ ἢ ἀδικία καὶ συλλήβδην ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρία; ΠΩΔ. Πολύ γε. ΣΩ. Εἰ δὴ αἰσχύσης, καὶ κακίστη; ΠΩΔ. Πῶς, ὥστε, ὡς Σώκρατες, λέγεις; ΣΩ. Ὅδε· ἂν τὸ αἰσχυστὸν, ἢτοι λύπην μεγίστην παρέχον ἢ βλάβην ἢ ἀμφότερα, αἰσχυστὸν ἔστων ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογημένων ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν. ΠΩΔ. Μάλιστα. ΣΩ. Ἀισχυστὸν δὲ ἀδικία καὶ σύμπασα ψυχῆς πονηρία νῦν δὴ ὁμολόγηται ἡμῖν; ΠΩΔ. Ὡμολόγηται γάρ. ΣΩ. Ὅνυχον ἢ ἀναιρότατον ἐστιν καὶ ἀνίκη ὑπερβάλλον αἰσχυστὸν τούτων ἔστιν, ἢ βλάβη, ἢ ἀμφότερα; ΠΩΔ. Ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν ἀλγεινότερον ἔστι τοῦ πένεσθαι καὶ κάμνειν τὸ ἀδικον εἶναι καὶ ἀκόλαστον καὶ δειλὸν καὶ ἀμαθῆ; ΠΩΔ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὥς Σώκρατες, ἀπὸ τούτων γε. ΣΩ. Ὡπερφυεὶ τιν ἁρα ὡς μεγάλη βλάβη καὶ κακῆ εὐνομοῖς ὑπερβάλλονσα τάλλα ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρία αἰσχιστὸν ἐστί πάντων, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀλγηδόνι γε, ὥς ὁ σος λόγος. ΠΩΔ. Φαύνεται. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν πον τὸ γε μεγίστῃ βλάβῃ ὑπερβάλλον μέγιστον ἢν
κακόν εἰς τῶν ὄντων. Π.Ω.Λ. Ναί. Σ.Ω. Ἡ ἄδικία ἄρα καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ψυχής πονηρία μέγιστον τῶν ὄντων κακόν ἐστὶ; Π.Ω.Λ. Φαίνεται.

Αρ. Χρησιμοποιήσας μὲν ἄρα πενίας ἀπαλλάττει, ἵπποι, ἰατρικὴ δὲ νόσου, δίκη δὲ ἀκολασίας καὶ ἄδικίας. Π.Ω.Λ. Φαίνεται. Σ.Ω. Τίς οὖν τούτων καλλιστὸν ἔστιν; Π.Ω.Λ. Τίνων ἔγειρε; Σ.Ω. Χρησιμοποιήσας, ἰατρικὴς, δίκης. Π.Ω.Λ. Πολὺ διαφέρει, ἢ Σάκχρατες, ἢ δίκη. Σ.Ω. Οὐκοῦν αὖ ἦτοι ἡδονὴν πλείστην ποιεῖ, ἢ ὠφέλειαν, ἢ ἀμφότερα, εἰπὲρ καλλιστὸν ἐστί; Π.Ω.Λ. Ναί. Σ.Ω. Ἡ ἄρει τὸ ἰατρεύ- εσθαι ἢδυ ἐστὶ, καὶ χαίρονσιν οἱ ἰατρεύομενοι; Π.Ω.Λ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοξεῖ. Σ.Ω. Ἄλλοι ὠφέλιμον γενέθλιον ἡ γὰρ; Π.Ω.Λ. Ναί. Σ.Ω. Μεγάλου γὰρ κακοῦ ἀπαλλάττεται, ὡστε λυσιτελεῖ ὑπομείναι τὴν ἀληθείαν καὶ ὑγεία εἰναι. Π.Ω.Λ.
Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; ΣΩ. Ἄρ', οὖν οὖτος ἂν περὶ σῶμα εὐδαιμονέστατος ἁνθρώπου εἰ, ἱατρευόμενος, ἥ μηδὲ κἀμινον ἀρχὴν; ΠΩΛ. Ἀδηλω, ὦτι μηδὲ κἀμινον. ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ τούτ' ἢν εὐδαιμονία, ὥς ξεικ, κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγῇ, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν μηδὲ κτῆσις. ΠΩΛ. Ἔστι ταῦτα. ΣΩ. Τί δὲ; ἀθλιότερος πότερος δυοῖν ἔχοντον κακόν εἰτ' ἐν δοματὶ εἰτ' ἐν γυνῇ; ὅ ἱατρευόμενος καὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενος τοῦ κακοῦ, ἥ ὁ μὴ ἱατρευόμενος, ἔχον δὲ; ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται μοι ὁ μὴ ἱατρευόμενος. ΣΩ. Ὅυκοῦν τὸ δίκην διδόναι μεγίστον κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγὴ ἦν, πονηρίας; ΠΩΛ. Ἡν γὰρ. ΣΩ. Σοφρονίζει γὰρ ποικὶ καὶ δικαιοτέρος ποιεῖ καὶ ἱατρικῆς γίγνεται πονηρίας ἢ δίκη. ΠΩΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Εὐδαιμονεστάτους μὲν ἀρὰ ὁ μὴ ἔχων Εκακίαν ἐν γυνῇ, ἐπειδῆ τούτῳ μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐφάνη. ΠΩΛ. Ἀδηλω δη. ΣΩ. Δεύτερος δήποτ' ὁ ἀπαλλαττόμενος. ΠΩΛ. Ἐσικεν. ΣΩ. Οὖτος δ' ἢν ὁ νουθετούμενός τε καὶ ἐπιπλήττομενος καὶ δίκην διδοὺς. ΠΩΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Κάκιστα ἄφα ὥτ' ἐς ἓν ἀδικίαν καὶ μὴ ἀπαλλαττόμενος. ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὖτος τυγχάνει ἂν, ὡς ἂν τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικών καὶ χρόμενος μεγίστη ἀδικία διαπράξῃ τά ὧστε 479 μήτε νουθετεῖσθαι μήτε κολάξθαι μήτε δίκην διδόναι, ὡστερ σὺ φήμ, Ἄρχελαον παρεσκευάσθαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τυφάννους καὶ ῥήτορας καὶ δυνάστας; ΠΩΛ. Ἐσικε.
GORGIAS.

Ε' ὁ τεις μεγίστοις νοσήμασι συνισχόμενος δια-
πράζατο μή διδόναι δίκην τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα
ἀμαρτημάτων τοῖς ἵστροῖς μηδὲ ἵστρεύεσθαι, φο-
βούμενος, ὡσπερανεὶ παইς, τὸ κάοσθαι καὶ τὸ
tέμνεσθαι, ὅτι ἀλγεινόν. ἦ οὐ δοξεῖ καὶ σοὶ
οὐτως; ΠΩΛ. Ἕμοιγε. ΣΩ. Ἀγνοῶν γε, ὡς
ζοίκεν, οἶνον ἐστιν ἡ ὕγεια καὶ ἀρετὴ σῶματος.
κυνδυνεύουσι γὰρ ἐκ τῶν νῦν ἡμῖν ὁμολογημένων
tοιοῦτον τι ποιεῖν καὶ οἱ τὴν δίκην φεύγοντες,
ὅ Πόλε, τὸ ἀλγεινόν αὐτῶν καθορᾶν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ
ἀφέλιμον τυφλὸς ἐχειν καὶ ἁγνοεῖν ὡς ἀθλιώ-
tερόν ἐστι μὴ ὕγιοις σῶματος μὴ ὕγιει ψυχῇ
ς συνοικεῖν, ἀλλὰ σαθρῷ καὶ ἀδίκῳ καὶ ἀνοσίᾳ.
οἶν καὶ πᾶν ποιοῦσιν, διότι δίκην μὴ διδόναι
μηδ' ἀπαλλάττεσθαι τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ, καὶ
χρήματα παρασχεναζόμενοι καὶ φίλους καὶ ὑποῦς
ἀν ὄσιν ὡς πιθανώτατοι λέγειν. εἰ δὲ ἡμεῖς ἀλη-
θῇ ὁμολογήκαμεν, ὥς Πόλε, ἄρ' αἰσθάνει τὰ
συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τοῦ λόγου; ἦ βούλει συλλογι-
σόμεθα αὐτά; ΠΩΛ. Εἰ μὴ σοὶ γε ἄλλως
δοξεῖ. ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν συμβαίνει μέγιστον κα-
κόν ἡ ἀδικία καὶ τὸ ἀδίκειν; ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται
D γε. ΣΩ. Καὶ μην ἀπαλλαγῇ γε ἐφάνη τοῦ-
tου τοῦ κακοῦ τὸ δίκην διδόναι; ΠΩΛ. Κυν-
δυνεύει. ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ γε μὴ διδόναι ἐμμονή τοῦ
κακοῦ; ΠΩΛ. Ναι. ΣΩ. Λεύτερον ἄρα ἐστὶ
tῶν κακῶν μεγέθει τὸ ἀδίκειν· τὸ δὲ ἀδικοῦντα
μή διδόναι δίκην πάντων μέγιστον τε καὶ πρῶτον
κακῶν πέφυκεν. ΠΩΛ. Ἕπαικεν. ΣΩ. Ἄρ'
οὖν οὐ περὶ τοῦτον, ὧ φίλε, ἡμερεσθητήσαμεν, σὺ
μὲν τὸν Ἀρχέλαον εὐθαμονίζων τὸν τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικοῦντα δίκην οὐδεμίαν διδόντα, ἐγὼ δὲ του-Ε
ναντίον οἰόμενος, εἰτ’ Ἀρχέλαος εἰτ’ ἄλλος ἀν-θρώπων ἀστισοῦν μὴ δίδωσι δίκην ἄδικον, τούτῳ προσήκειν ἄθλιῳ εἶναι διαφέρόντος τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ αἰ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα τοῦ ἀδικομέ-νου ἀθλιώτερον εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὴ διδόντα δίκην τοῦ διδόντος; οὐ ταύτ’ ἦν τὰ ὑπ’ ἔμοι λεγόμε-να; Π.Ν. Ναί. Σ.Ν. Οὐκούν ἀποδέδεικται, ὅτι ἀληθῇ ἔλεγετο; Π.Ν.Α. Φαινεῖται.

ΚΑΡ. ΞΧΧΧΒ. Σ.Ν. Εἴεν. εἰ οὐν δὴ ταὐτ-480 τα ἄληθῆ, ὁ Πόλε, τίς ἡ μεγάλη χρεία ἐστὶ τῆς ἡγεροικῆς; δεὶ μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν νῦν ἀμολογη-μένων αὐτῶν ἔστων μάλιστα προλάτειν, ὅποις μὴ ἀδικήσῃ, ὅς ἔκανον κακὸν ἔξοντα. οὐ γὰρ; Π.Ν.Α. Πάνω γε. Σ.Ν. 'Εἴαν δὲ γε ἀδικήσῃ ἡ αὐτῶς, ἡ ἄλλος τις ἄν ἡθηται, αὐτῶν ἔστων ἔναι ἑκεῖος ὅπου ὡς ταχίστα δῆσει δίκην, παρὰ τὸν δικαστὴν ᾧσπερ παρὰ τὸν ἰατρόν, σπευδο-ντα ὅπος μὴ ἐγχρονισθεὶν τὸ νόσημα τῆς ἅδικίας Β ὑπούλου τὴν ψυχήν ποιήσῃ καὶ ἀνίατον. ἡ πῶς λέγομεν, ὁ Πόλε, εἴπερ τὰ πρότερον μένει ἡμῖν ἐμολογημάτα; οὐκ ἀνάγηκα ταῦτα ἐξείνοις ὀὕτω μὲν συμφωνεῖν, ἄλλος δὲ μὴ; Π.Ν.Α. Τί γὰρ δὴ φάμεν, ὁ Σάκχατες; Σ.Ν. 'Επὶ μὲν ἄρα τὸ ἀπολογεῖσθαι υπὲρ τῆς ἅδικίας τῆς αὐτοῦ, ἡ γονέων, ἡ ἔταφρος, ἡ παιδών, ἡ πατρίδος ἄδι-κούσις ὁ χρήσμως οὐδὲν ἡ ἐργοτρική ἡμῖν, ὁ Πόλε, εἰ μὴ εἰ τις ὑπολάβοι ἐπὶ τοῦναντίον, C κατηγορεῖν δεῖν μάλιστα μὲν ἔστω, ἐπείτα δὲ
καὶ τῶν οἰκείων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὃς ἂν ἀεὶ τῶν φίλων τυγχάνη αδικῶν, καὶ μὴ ἀποκρύπτεσθαι,
ἀλλ’ εἰς τὸ φανερὸν ἄγειν τὸ ἁδίκημα, ἵνα δὖ
δίκην καὶ ὑγιὴς γένηται, ἀναγκάζειν τε καὶ αὐ-
τὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους μὴ ἀποδειλήν, ἀλλὰ παρέ-
χειν μῦσαντα καὶ ἀνδρείως, ὅσπερ τέμνειν καὶ
καίειν ιατρῷ, τὸ ἄγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν διόκοντα, μὴ

D ὑπολογιζόμενον τὸ ἀλγεινόν · ἔαν μὲν γε πληγῶν
ἀξία ἡδίκησις ἢ, τύπτειν παρέχοντα, ἔαν δὲ δε-
σιμοῦ, δεῖν, ἔαν δὲ ἤπειρα, ἀποτίνοντα, ἔαν δὲ φυ-
γῆς, φεύγοντα, ἔαν δὲ θανάτου, ἀποθνῄσκοντα,
αὐτὸν πρῶτον ὑπατον κατηγοροῦν καὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν
ἀλλῶν οἰκείων καὶ ἐπὶ τούτο χράμενον τῇ ἕθος-
κῇ, ὅπος ἂν καταδηλῶν τῶν ἁδίκημάτων γιγνομέ-
νων ἀπαλλάττων τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ, ἁδίκιας.

Ε φάμεν οὖτος, ἢ μὴ φάμεν, ὁ Πωλεῖς; Π. Ω. Δ. Ἀ-
τοπα μὲν, ὁ Σάκχρατες, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, τοῖς μέντοι
ἐμπρόσθεν ἰσας σοι ὑμολογεῖται. Σ. Ω. Οὐκοῦν
ἡ κάκεινα λυτέον, ἡ τάδε ἀνάγκη συμβαίνειν ;
Π. Ω. Ναί, τούτῳ γε οὔτως ἔχει. Σ. Ω. Τού-
ναντίον δὲ γε αὐτοῦ μεταβαλόντα εἰ ἄρα δεῖ τινα
κακῶς ποιεῖν, εἰτ’ ἐχθρὸν εἰτε ὄντινοιν, ἐὰν μό-
νον μὴ αὐτὸς ἁδικήται ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐχθροῦ,—τούτῳ
μὲν γὰρ εὐλαβεῖτεν,—ἐὰν δὲ ἄλλον ἁδικῆ ὁ
ἐχθρός, παντὶ τρόπῳ παρασκευαστέον καὶ πράττω-
ντα καὶ λέγοντα, ὅπως μὴ δὸ δίκην μηδὲ ἔλθῃ
παρὰ τὸν δικαστήν · ἐὰν δὲ ἔλθῃ, μηχανητέον
ὅπως ἂν διαφύγῃ καὶ μὴ δῦ δίκην ὁ ἐχθρός, ἀλλ’
ἔαν τε χρυσίον ἤποτακὸς ἢ πολύ, μὴ ἀποδιδῷ
tούτῳ, ἀλλ’ ἔχων ἀναλίσκηται καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν

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καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ ἀδίκως καὶ ἠθέως, ἐὰν τε αὐθανάτων ἁξία ἡδικής ἢ, ὅπως μὴ ἀποθανεῖται, μάλιστα μὲν μηδέποτε, ἀλλ' ἀθάνατος ἢσται ποθὲν ὦν, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ὅπως ὡς πλείστον χρόνον βιώσεται τοιοῦτος ὦν. ἐπὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔμοι γε δοκεῖ, ὑπὲρ ἢ ἡθορικὴ χρήσιμος εἶναι, ἐπεὶ τῷ γε μὴ μέλλοντι ἀδικεῖν οὐ μεγάλῃ τίς μοι δοκεῖ ἡ χρεία αὐτῆς εἶναι, εἰ δὴ καὶ ἐστὶ τις χρείας· ὡς ἐν γε τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς ὑδαμῆ ἐραμφήν οὖσα.

Cap. XXXVII. ΚΑΛ. Εἰπὲ μοι, ὁ ἐκφορῶν, σπουδάζει ταῦτα Σωκράτης, ἥ παίζει; ΧΑΙ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, ὑπερφυὸς σπουδάζειν· οὐδὲν μέντοι οἶον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν. ΚΑΛ. Νῦ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀλλ' ἔπιθυμῶ. Εἰπὲ μοι, ὁ Σώκρατες, πάτερόν σε φῶς ψυχῆς σπουδάζοντα, ἥ παίζοντα; εἰ μὲν γὰρ σπουδάζεις τε καὶ τυχόνει ταῦτα ἀληθῶς ὄντα, ἡ λέγεις, ἄλλο τι ἡ ἡμῶν ὁ βίος ἀνατετραμμένος ἢν εἰρη τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία πράττομεν, ὡς ἑοικεῖν, ἢ ἃ δεῖ; ΣΩΜ. Ἡ Καλλίκλεις, εἰ μὴ τι ἢν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πάθος, τοῖς μὲν ἄλλο τι, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλο τι, τὸ αὐτὸ, ἄλλα τις ἡμῶν ἐδού τι ἐπαθέν πάθος ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι, οὐχ ἢν ἢν ἢδον ἐνδείκνυσθαι τῷ ἐτέρῳ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ πάθημα. λέγω δ' ἐννοήσας, ὅτι ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ νῦν τυχόνειν ταὐτόν τι πεπονθότες, ἔρωτε δύο ὄντε δυεῖν ἐκάτερος, ἐγώ μὲν Ἀλκηδιάδου τε τοῦ Κλεινίου καὶ φιλοσοφίας, σὺ δὲ τοῦ τε Ἀθηναίων δήμου καὶ τοῦ Πυριλάμπους. αἰσθάνομαι οὖν σοι ἐκαστοτε, καὶ περὶ ὄντως δεινοῦ, ὅτι ὁπόσι ἄν φη σου
τὰ παιδικὰ καὶ ὅπως ἂν φη ἔχειν, οὐ δυναμένου
Ε ἀντιλέγειν, ἄλλ’ ἄνω καὶ κάτω μεταβαλλόμενον.

ἔν τε τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, ἐὰν τι σοῦ λέγοντος ὁ δῆμος
ὁ Ἀθηναίον μὴ φη οὕτως ἔχειν, μεταβαλλόμενος
λέγεις ἃ ἐκεῖνος βουλευ-μασί τε καὶ λόγοις οὔχ οἶδο τ’ εἰ ἐναντιοῦσθαι,
ὡς, εἰ τίς σοῦ λέγοντος ἐκάστοτε ἃ διὰ τούτου
λέγεις Θαυμάζοι ὃς ἄτοπα ἔστιν, ἵςος εἴποις ἂν

α’ ὁ ἄντων, εἰ βουλοί τάληθῃ λέγειν, ὦτι, εἰ μὴ τις
παύσει τὰ σὰ παιδικὰ τούτων τῶν λόγων, οὐδὲ
σὺ παύσει ποτὲ ταύτα λέγων. νόμιζε τοῦν καὶ
παρ’ ἔμοι χρὴναι ἑτερα τοιαῦτα ἀκούειν, καὶ
μὴ Θαυμάζει, ὥσ πῶ ταύτα λέγω, ἀλλὰ τὴν φιλο-
λοσοφίαν, τὰ ἕμα παιδικά, παύσον ταύτα λέγο-

σαν. λέγει γάρ, ὃ φίλε ἐταῖη, ἀεὶ ὃ νῦν ἔμοι
ἀκούεις, καὶ μοί ἔστι τῶν ἑτέρων παιδικῶν πολὺ
ἡττον ἐμπληκτός· ὃ μὲν γὰρ Κλεινιεῖος οὕτως
ἀλλοτε ἄλλων ἔστι λόγων, ἢ δὲ φιλοσοφία ἀεὶ

Β τῶν αὐτῶν. λέγει δὲ ὃ σὺ νῦν Θαυμάζεις· πα-
ρήσθα δὲ καὶ αὗτός λεγομένος. ἦ ὁν ἔκεινη
ἐξέλεγξον, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, ὡς οὐ τὸ ἀδικεῖν
ἐστί καὶ ἀδικοῦντα δίκην μὴ διδόναι ἀπάντων
ἔσχατον πακοῦν· ἢ εἰ τοῦτο ἐάσεις ἀνέλεγκτον,
μὰ τὸν κύνα, τὸν Διονυσίων θεόν, οὗ σοι ὁμο-
λογήσει Καλλίκλῆς, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλὰ διαφω-
νήσει ἐν ἀπαντὶ τῷ βίῳ. καίτοι ἔγωγε οἴμαι, ὃ
βέλτιστε, καὶ τὴν λύραν μοι κρείττον εἶναι ἀναρ-
μοστεῖν τε καὶ διαφωνεῖν, καὶ χορὸν ὃ χορηγοῦν,
καὶ πλείστους ἀνθρώπους μὴ ὁμολογεῖν μοι ἀλλὰ ἐναντία λέγειν, μάλλον ἦ ἐνα ὁντα ἐμε ἐμαντὸ ἀσύμφωνον εἶναι καὶ ἐναντία λέγειν.

Cap. XXXVIII. ΚΑΔ. ἩΩ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖς νεανιεύεσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὅς ἀληθῶς δημηγορός ἦν· καὶ νῦν ταῦτα δημηγορεῖς ταὐτὸν παθόντος Πόλου πάθος, ὅπερ Γοργίων κατηγόρει πρὸς σὲ παθεῖν. ἢπῃ γὰρ ποι Γοργίαν ἐρωτάμενον ὑπὸ σοῦ, ἦν ἀφίκηται παρ᾽ αὐτὸν μὴ ἐπιστάμενος τὰ δίκαια ὁ τὴν ἡττορικὴν βουλὸς μενὸς μαθεῖν, εἰ διδάξει αὐτὸν ὁ Γοργίας, αἰσχυνθήναι αὐτὸν καὶ φάναι διδάξειν διὰ τὸ ἔθος τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅτι ἀγανακτοῖεν ἂν, εἰ τις μὴ φαίη· διὰ δὴ ταῦτην τὴν ὁμολογίαν ἀναγκασθηναι ἐναντία αὐτὸν αὐτὸ εἰπεῖν, σὲ δὲ αὐτὸ τούτῳ ἀγαπᾶν. καὶ σοι κατεγέλα, ὥσ γε μοι δοκεῖν, ὅρθος τότε. νῦν δὲ πάλιν αὐτὸς ταὐτὸν τούτῳ ἔπαθε, καὶ ἔγαγε κατ᾽ αὐτὸ τούτῳ οὐκ ἄγαμαι Πόλου, ὅτι σοι συνεχώρησε τὸ ἀδικεῖν αἰσχιον ἐἰναι τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι· ἐκ ταύτης γὰρ αὐ τῆς ὁμολογίας αὐτὸς ὑπὸ σοῦ συμποδισθεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐπεστορίσθη, αἰσχυνθεὶς ἄν εἴπῃ εἰπεῖν. σὺ γὰρ τῷ ὄντι, ὁ Σώκρατες, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄρεις φορτικὰ καὶ δημηγορικὰ, φάσκων τὴν ἀλήθειαν διάκειν, ἄρ γυσει μὲν οὐκ ἔστι καλά, νόμῳ δὲ. ὡς τὰ πολλὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, ἦ τε γύσει καὶ ὁ νόμος. ἵνα οὖν τις αἰσχύνηται καὶ μὴ τὸλμῃ λέγειν ἄπερ νοεῖ, ἀναγκάζεται1483 ἐναντία λέγειν. ὁ δὴ καὶ σὺ τούτῳ τὸ σοφὸν κατανενοηκὸς κακουργεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ἦν μὲν
τις κατὰ νόμον λέγη, κατὰ φύσιν ὑπερατῶν, ἐὰν δὲ τὰ τῆς φύσεως, τὰ τοῦ νόμου. ἢςερ αὐτίκα ἐν τούτοις, τῷ ἀδικείν τε καὶ τῷ ἀδικεῖσθαι, Πῶς λοι τὸ κατὰ νόμον αἰσχρῷν λέγοντος, κύ τὸν νόμον ἔδιωκαθες κατὰ φύσιν. φύσει μὲν γὰρ πάν αἰσχρὸν ἐστὶν ὑπὲρ καὶ κάκιον, *οἶον* τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, νόμῳ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄνδρος τούτῳ γ’ ἔστι τὸ πάθημα, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἄλλ’ ἄνδραπόδου τινός, δ’ ἡρείττον ἔστε τεθνάναι ἢ τη, δόσεις ἀδικοῦμενος καὶ προπηλακιζόμενος μὴ οἴστε ἐστὶν αὐτός αὐτῷ βοηθεῖν μηδὲ ἄλλῳ σοὶ ἢν κηδηταί. ἄλλ’, οἶμαι, οἱ τιθέμενοι τοὺς νόμους οἱ ἀπεθενεῖς ἄνθρωποι εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ πολλοί. πρὸς αὐτοὺς οὖν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸς συμφέρον τοὺς τε νόμους τίθενται καὶ τοὺς ἑπαίνους ἑπαινοῦσι καὶ τοὺς γάρ γοὺς ψέγουσιν· — ἐκφοβοῦντὲς τοὺς ἐφ’ ὅμοιον τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ δυνατοῦς οὐν τοῦ πλέον ἔχειν, ἵνα μὴ αὐτῶν πλέον ἔχοσι, λέγουσιν, ὅς αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἀδικῶν τὸ πλεονεκτεῖν, καὶ τοῦτο ἔστι τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὸ πλέον τῶν ἄλλων ζητεῖν ἔχειν· ἀγαπῶσι γὰρ, οἶμαι, αὐτοὶ ἢν τὸ ἴσον ἔχοσι φαυλότεροι ὄντες. ΤΑΡ. ΤΤΤΧΧΧΧ. διὰ ταῦτα δὴ νόμῳ μὲν τούτῳ ἀδικοῦ καὶ αἰσχρόν λέγεται, τὸ πλέον ζητεῖν ἔχειν τῶν πολλῶν, καὶ ἀδικεῖν αὐτῷ καλοῦσιν· ἢ δὲ γε, οἶμαι, φύσις αὐτῆς ἀποφαίνει αὐτῷ, ὅτι δίκαιον ἔστι τὸν ᾿Αμιείναν τοῦ κείρονος πλέον ἔχειν καὶ τὸν δυνατότερον τοῦ ἀδυνατώτερον. δηλοῖ δὲ ταῦτα πολλαχοῦν δὴ οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἄλλοις καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐν ὅλαις ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς γέ-
νεσιν, ὃτι οὕτω τὸ δίκαιον κέχριται, τὸν κρείττω
τοῦ ήττονος ἄρχειν καὶ πλέον ἔχειν. ἐπεὶ ποῦρ
δικαίω χρώμενοι Ξένις ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐστρά
tευσέν, ἢ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ Ἐκθήσας; ἢ ἀλλα
μνήμη ἃν τις ἔχοι τοιαύτα λέγειν. ἀλλ' οἶμαι,
οὕτω κατὰ φύσιν [τὴν τοῦ δικαίου] ταύτα πράτ
tουσι, καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία κατὰ νόμον γε τὸν τῆς
φύσεως, οὐ μέντοι ἵσως κατὰ τούτον, ὅν ἡμεῖς
τιθέμεθα πλάττοντες τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ ἐξω-
μενεστάτους ἦμων αὐτῶν· ἐκ νέων λαμβάνοντες,
ἄσπερ λέοντας κατεπάθοντες τε καὶ γοητεύοντες ἃ
cαταδουλούμεθα, λέγοντες, ὅσ τὸ ἵσων χρῆ ἔχειν
καὶ τούτῳ ἐστι τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. ἐάν
δὲ γε, οἶμαι, φύσιν ἰκανὴν γένηται ἔχαν ἰνὴρ,
pάντα ταύτα ἀποκεισάμενοι καὶ διαφήξας καὶ
diaφυγὼν, καταπατήσας τὰ ἡμέτερα γράμματα
cαὶ μακαρεύματα καὶ ἐπιρᾶς καὶ νόμους τόις
παρὰ φύσιν ἄπαντας, ἐπαναστῶ ἀνεφάνη δεσπό-
tης ἡμέτερος ὁ δοῦλος, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐξέλαμψε τὸ
τῆς φύσεως δίκαιον. δοκεῖ δὲ μοι καὶ Πίνδαρος
ἀπερ ἐγὼ λέγω ἐνδείκνυσθαι ἐν τῷ ἄσματι, ἐν ὧ
λέγει, ὅτι Νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς θυα
tῶν τε καὶ ἄθανάτων· οὕτοι δὲ δὴ, φησίν,
ἄγει δικαίων τὸ βιαίοτατον ὑπερτάτα
χερί· τεκμαύρομαι ἐφοισίν Ἡρακλέως,
ἐπεὶ ἀπορίας— λέγει οὕτω πως· τὸ γὰρ
ἄσμα οὐκ ἐπισταμαι. λέγει δ', ὅτι οὕτε πριá-
μενος οὕτε δόντος τοῦ Γηρώνου ἦλάσατο τᾶς
βοῦς, ὃς τούτον ὄντος τοῦ δικαίου φύσει,
cαὶ βοῦς καὶ τάλλα κτήματα εἶναι πάντα τοῦ βελ-
τίονός τε καὶ ἔρηπτονος τα τῶν χειρόνων τε καὶ ἔττόνων. Καπ. XL. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἄληθές οὖτος ἔξει, γνώσει δὲ, ἂν ἐπὶ τὰ μείζω ἔλθης ἔσας ἦδη φιλοσοφίαν. φιλοσοφία γάρ τοι ἔστιν, ὡς Ἀκρατεῖς, γαρίεν, ἂν τις αὐτοῦ μετρίος ἀψηταὶ ἐν τῇ ἁλίξιᾳ· ἔδω δὲ περαιτέρῳ τοῦ δέοντος ἐνδιατρίψη, διαφθορά τῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἔδω γάρ καὶ πάνω εὐφρής ἢ καὶ πόρφω τῆς ἁλίξιας φιλο-

D σοφῆ, ἀνάγκη πάντων ἀπειρον γεγονέναι ἔστιν, ὡς χρη ἐμπειρον εἰναι τὸν μέλλοντα καλὸν καγαθὸν καὶ εὐδοκίμον ἐσεθῇ ἁνδρα. καὶ γάρ 
tῶν νόμων ἀπειροι γίγνονται τῶν κατὰ τὴν πό-
lιν, καὶ τῶν λόγων, οἷς δὲι χρώμενον ἐμίλειν ἐν 
tοῖς χυμολαίοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἴδια καὶ 

δημοσία, καὶ τῶν ἴδονον τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν 

ἀνθρωπείων, καὶ συλλήβδην τῶν ἱδρῶν παντάπασιν 

ἀπειροι γίγνονται. ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἐλθοσιν εἰς τινα 

Ε ἰδίαν ἡ πολιτικὴν πράξιν, καταγέλαστοι γίγνον- 
tαι, ὅπερ γε, οἴμαι, οἱ πολιτικοὶ, ἐπειδὰν αὖ 
eis τῶς ύμετέρας διατριβᾶς ἐλθόσι καὶ τοὺς λό-
gους, καταγέλαστοι εἰςι. συμβαίνει γάρ τὸ 
tοῦ Εὐφιτίδου· λαμπρὸς τ᾽ ἔστιν ἔκαστος ἐν 
tουτῷ, 

κατὶ τούτῳ ἐπείγεται, 

νέμων τὸ πλεῖστον ἡμέρας τοῦτο μέρος, 

ἐν αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τυγχάνῃ βέλτιστος ἄν. 

485 ὅποιν δ᾿ ἢν φαῦλος ἢ, ἐντεῦθεν φεύγει καὶ λοι-
dορεῖ τοῦτο, τὸ δ᾿ ἔτερον ἐπαινεῖ, εὐνοια τῇ ἔαν-
tοῦ, ἡγοῦμενος οὕτως αὐτὸς ἐαυτὸν ἐπαινεῖν. 

ἀλλ᾽, οἴμαι, τὸ ὀρθότατον ἔστιν ἀμφοτέρων μετα-
σχείν. φιλοσοφίας μὲν, ὣσον παιδείας χάριν, καλὸν μετέχειν, καὶ οὐκ ἀλήθρουν μετακάθω ὄντι φιλοσοφεῖν· ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἢδη πρεσβύτερος ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἔτι φιλοσοφή, καταγέλαστον, ὁ Σάκρατες, τὸ χρῆμα γίνεται, καὶ ἐγγει ὄμοιότατον πάςχα πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας ὥσπερ πρὸς τοὺς Β ἱερλιξομένους καὶ παίζοντας. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ παιδίον ἢδω, ὃ ἐτι προσήκει διαλέγεσθαι οὕτω, ἱερλιξομένων καὶ παιζον, χάριος τε καὶ χαρίεν μοι φαίνεται καὶ ἐλευθέριον καὶ πρέπον τῇ τοῦ παιδίου ἡλικίᾳ· ὅταν δὲ σαφῶς διαλεγομένου παιδαρίου ἀκούσα, πισχὸν τί μοι δοξεῖ χρῆμα εἶναι καὶ ἀνιχθον μον τὰ ὅτα καὶ μοι δοξεῖ δουλοφρονεῖν τι εἰναι· ὅταν δὲ ἄνδρος ἄκοιψη τις ἱερλιξομένου ἣ παίζοντα ὅρα, καταγέλαστον φαίνεται καὶ ἄνανδρον καὶ πληγῶν ἄξιον. ταὐτὸν οὖν ἔγογς τοῦτο πάςχα καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας. παρὰ νέῳ μὲν γὰρ μετακάθω ὁρῶν φιλοσοφίαν ἀγαμαί, καὶ πρέπειν μοι δοξεῖ, καὶ ἡγοῦμαι ἐλευθερὸν τινα εἶναι τοῦτον τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τόν δὲ μὴ φιλοσοφοῦντα ἀνελευθερον καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐδέποτε ἀξιώσοντα ἐαυτὸν οὔτε καλὸν οὔτε γενναῖον πράγματος· ὅταν δὲ δὴ πρεσβύτερον ἢδω ἢτι φιλοσοφοῦντα καὶ μὴ ἀπαλλαττόμενον, πληγῶν μοι δοξεί ἢδη δεῖσθαι, ὁ Σάκρατες, οὖτος δὲ ἀνήρ. ὁ γὰρ τοῦ ἢδη ἔλεγεν, ὑπάρχει τούτω τῷ ἄνθρωπῳ, κἂν πάνω ἐφιπησῇ ἢ, ἀνάνδρῳ γενέσθαι φεύγοντι τὰ μέσα τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὰς ἄγορας, ἐν αἷς ἔφη ὁ ποιητής τούς ἄνδρας ἀριστείς γίγνεσθαι, καταδεδυκότι δὲ τὸν λοιπὸν
βίον βιῶναι μετὰ μειρακίων ἐν γωνίᾳ τριῶν ἦν τεττάρων ψυχοῦσοντα, ἐλεύθερον δὲ καὶ μέγα καὶ ἐκανὸν μηδέποτε φθεγξασθαί. Σιφ. ΥΛ. ἔγω δέ, ὁ Σάκρατης, πρὸς σὲ ἐπιεικῶς ἐκχωρικῶς. καὶνδυνεύον οὐν πεπονθέναι νῦν ὅπερ ὁ Ζήθος πρὸς τὸν Ἀμφίονα ὁ Εὐριπίδου, οὔπερ ἐμνήσθην. καὶ γὰρ ἔμοι τοιαῦτ᾽ ἀτα ἐπέρχεται πρὸς σὲ λέγειν, οὔτερ ἐκείνος πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφόν, ὦτι ἀμελεῖς, ὁ Σάκρατης, ὦν δὲ ἐνε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ φύσιν ψυχῆς ὡδὲ γενναίαν μειρα-486κιώθεί τινι διαπρέπεις μορφώματι, καὶ οὔτε ἂν δίκης βουλαῖσι προθεῖτ' ἂν ὁρθῶς λόγον, οὔτε ἐκχός ἂν καὶ πιθανὸν λάθοις, οὔθ' ὑπὲρ ἄλλου νεανικόν βούλευμα βουλεύσαι. καίτοι, ὁ φίλε Σάκρατες — καὶ μοι μηδὲν ἀξιεσθῆς· εὔνοια γὰρ ἔρω τῇ σῇ — οὐκ αἰσχρὸν δοξεῖ σοι εἴναι οὔτως ἔχειν, ὡς ἔγὼ σὲ οἴμαι ἐξεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς πόρφω αἰεί φιλοσοφίας ἑλαύνοντας; νῦν γὰρ εἰ τις σοῦ λα-θόμενος ἢ ἄλλου ὄτονον τῶν τοιοῦτων εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον ἀπαγάγοι, φάσκων ἀδικεῖν μηδὲν ἢ ἀδικοῦντα, οἶδοθ' ὅτι οὐκ ἄν ἔχοις ὃ τι χρήσασι σαυτῷ, ἀλλ' ἵλιγγίες ἂν καὶ χασμῷ οὐκ ἔχων ὃ τι εἶποι, καὶ εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ἀναβάς, κατη-γόρου τυχῶν πάντα φαινὸν καὶ μοχθηροῦ, ἀπο-θάνοις ἂν, εἰ βούλοιτο θανάτον σοι τιμᾶσθαι. καίτοι πῶς σοφὸν τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὁ Σάκρατης, εἰ τις εὐφρᾶ λαθοῦσα τέχνη φῶτα ἐθηκε χει-ρόνα, μήτε αὐτὸν αὐτῷ δυνάμενον βοηθεῖν μηδ' ἐκσῶσαι ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων χινδύνων μήτε ἑαυτῶν

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μήτε ἄλλον μηδένα, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ἑχόρων περισυλλαθέρων πάσαν τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀτεχνώς δὲ ἀτιμον ζῆν ἐν τῇ πόλει τῶν δὲ τοιούτων, εἰ τι καὶ ἀγροοικοτερον εἰρηθεῖται, ἔξεστιν ἐπὶ κόδης τύπτοντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην. ἀλλ' ὃ γαθέ, ἔμοι πείθου, παυσάς δ' ἐλέγχων, πραγμάτων δ' εὔμοιοι διέσκει, καὶ ἄσκει ὁπόθεν δόξεις φρονεῖν, ἄλλοις τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτ' ἀφεῖ, εἰτε ληφθήματα χρή φάναι εἰναι εἰτε φιλαρίας, ἐξ δὲν κενοῦσιν ἐγκατοικήσεις δόμοις. ζηλῶν οὐκ ἐλέγχονται ἄνδρας τὰ μικρὰ ταῦτα, ἀλλ' δ' οῖς ἐστι καὶ βίος καὶ δόξα καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ ἀγαθά.

ΚΑΡ. XLII. ΣΩ. Εἰ χρυσὴν ἔχον ἐτύγχανον τὴν ψυχήν, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, οὐκ ἂν οἶει με ἄσμενον εὑρεῖν τούτων τινὰ τῶν λίθων, ἢ βασανίζοι τὸν χρυσὸν, τῆν ἀρίστην, πρὸς ἤρθηνα ἐμελλὸν προσγαγόν αὐτήν, εἰ μοι ὄμολογήσειν ἐκείνη καλῶς τεθεραπεύσθαι τὴν ψυχήν, εὖ εἰσεσθαι, ὅτι ἰκανὸς ἔχω καὶ οὐδὲν μοι δεῖ ἄλλης Ἐ ἐμφάνον; ΚΑΛ. Πρὸς τί δ' τοῦτ' ἔρατάς, ὁ Σάκρατες; ΣΩ. Ἑγὼ σοι ἐρῶ νῦν. οἴμαι ἐγὼ σοι ἐντετυχήσως τοιούτῳ ἐφημαί ἐντετυχῆσαι. ΚΑΛ. Τί δή; ΣΩ. Εὖ οἶδ', ὅτι, ἂν μοι ὃς ὄμολογήσης περί ὃν ἢ ἐμή ψυχή δοξάζει, ταῦτ' ἢδη ἐστίν αὐτὰ τάληθη. ἐννοοὶ γὰρ, ὅτι ἴση σύμφωνα μελλοντα βασανίζειν ἰκανὸς ψυχῆς πέρι ὑπόθεσις τε ἐξείτης καὶ μὴ τρία ἀφα δεῖ ἔχειν, εὐ πάντα ἔχεις, ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ εὖνοιαν καὶ παράξειον. ἐγὼ γὰρ πολλὸς ἐντυγχάνω, οἴ
GORGIAS.

εμὲ οὖχ οἷοί τε εἰσὶ βασανίζειν διὰ τὸ μῆ σοφοῖ
εἶναι ὁσπερ σύ· ἐστεροὶ δὲ σοφοὶ μὲν εἰσὶν, οὖχ
ἐθέλουσι δὲ μοι λέγειν τὴν ἀλήθειαν διὰ τὸ μῆ
χαίδεσθαί μοι ὁσπερ σύ· τὼ δὲ ξένῳ τάδε, Γορ-
βίας τε καὶ Πῶλος, σοφῶ μὲν καὶ φίλω ἐστῶν
ἐμῶ, ἐνδεικτέρῳ δὲ παράδεισιας καὶ αἰσχυντηρο-
τέρῳ μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος· πῶς γὰρ οὖ; ὃς γε εἰς
τοσοῦτον αἰσχύνης ἐλημύθησιν, ὡστε διὰ τὸ αἰ-
σχυνεσθαί τολμᾶ ἔκατεροι αὐτῶν αὐτὸς αὐτὸς
ἐναντία λέγειν ἐναντίον πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ
ταῦτα περὶ τῶν μεγίστων. οὐ δὲ ταῦτα πάντα
ξεις, ὃ οἱ ἄλλοι οὖν ἔχουσι· πεπαίδευεσθαί τε γὰρ
ζικανῶς, ὡς πολλοὶ ἦν φήσαιεν 'Αθηναίων, καὶ
C ἐμοί γ' εἶ εὖνοις. τίνι τεκμηρίῳ χρώμαι; ἐγὼ
σοι ἔρῳ. οἶδα ὑμᾶς ἐγὼ, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, τέτταρας
δόντας, κοινωνίας γεγονότας σοφίας, σὲ τε καὶ
Τίσανδρον, τὸν Ἀφριδναίον, καὶ Ἀνδρέωνα, τὸν
Ἀνδροτίωνος, καὶ Ναυσικύδην, τὸν Χολαργέα.
καὶ ποτε ὑμῶν ἐγὼ ἐπήκουσα βουλευομένων μέ-
χρι ὅποι τὴν σοφίαν ἁσκητέον εἴη, καὶ ὁδὰ, ὅτι
ἔνικα ἐν ὑμίν τοιάδε τις δόξα, μὴ προθυμεῖσθαι
D εἰς τὴν ἀθρόιδειαν φιλοσοφεῖν, ἀλλὰ εὐλαβεῖσθαι
παρεκελεύεσθε ἀλλήλοισιν, ὅπως μὴ πέρα τοῦ δέ-
οντος σοφάτεροι γενόμενοι λήσετε διαφθάρετες.
ἐπειδὴ οὖν σοι ἀκούω ταῦτα ἐμοὶ συμβουλεύ-
οντος, ἀπεὶ τοῖς σεαυτὸς ἔταιροτάτοις, ξικανῶν
μοὶ τεκμηρίων ἐστῖν, ὅτι ὃς ἄληθὸς μοι εὖνος εἰ.
καὶ μὴν, ὅτι γε οὗς παράδειγμαίερθαι καὶ μὴ αἰ-
σχύνεσθαι, αὐτῶς τε φῆς καὶ ὁ λόγος, ὃν ὄλιγον
πρώτερον ἔλεγες, ὁμολογεῖ σοι. ἔχει δὴ οὔτωσι
δὴ λοι πέρι νυν· ἐὰν τι σὺ ἐν τοῖς ἐνόμοις ὀμολογήσῃς μοι, βεβασανισμένον τοῦτ' ἡδη ἔσται ἰκανός ὑπὲ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ, καὶ οὐχέτι αὐτὸ δεησαι ἐπὶ ἀλλήν βάσανον ἀναφέρειν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε αὐτῷ συνεχώρησας σὺ οὔτε σοφίας ἐνδεία συφτ'ai ἀισχύνης περιουσία· οὐδ' αὖ ἀπατῶν ἐμε συγκαρῆσας ἂν· φίλος γὰρ μοι εἶ, ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς φῆς. τῷ ὄντι οὖν ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ ὡς ὀμολογία τέλος ἡδη ἔξει τῆς ἀληθείας. πάντων δὲ καλλίστη ἐστὶν ἡ σχέσις, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, περὶ τούτων ἂν σὺ δὴ μοι ἐπετύμησας, ποῦν τίνα χρῆ εἴναι τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ τῇ ἐπιτηδεύειν καὶ μέχρι τοῦ, καὶ πρεαδότερου καὶ νεάτερον ὄντα. ἐγὼ γὰρ εἰ τι μὴ ὀρθὸς πράττει κατὰ τὸν βίον τὸν ἐμαντοῦ, εὐ ἵσθι τοῦτο ὅτι οὖν ἔχων ἐξαιρετάνω, ἀλλ' ἀμαθία τῇ ἐμῇ. σὺ οὖν, ἀστερ ἢρξῃ νοοθετεῖν με, μη ἀποστῆς, ἀλλ' ἰκανός μοι ἐνδειξά τι ἐστι τοῦτο, ὁ ἐπιτηδευτέον μοι, καὶ τίνα τρόπον κτησαίμην ἂν αὐτὸ. καὶ ἐὰν με λάβῃς νῦν μὲν σοι ὀμολογήσαντα, ἐν δὲ τῷ ύστέρῳ χρόνῳ μὴ ταῦτα πράττοντα, ἀπορ ὀμολόγησα, πᾶν με ἦγον μὲλανκόλεια εἶναι καὶ μηκέτι ποτὲ με νοοθετῆσῃς ὑστερον, βώς μηδενὸς ἄξιον ὄντα. ἐξ ἀρχῆς δὲ μοι ἐπανάλαβε, πῶς φης τὸ δίκαιον ἔχειν καὶ σὺ καὶ Πήν- δαρος τὸ κατὰ φύσιν; ἁγενὶ βίᾳ τὸν κρείττῳ τὸ τῶν ἡττώνων καὶ ἀρχειν τὸν βελτίω τῶν χειρόνων καὶ πλέον ἔχειν τὸν ἀμείνω τοῦ φαυλοτέρου; μή τι ἀλλο λέγεις τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, ἠ ὀρθῶς μέμημαι;

Cap. XLIII. ΚΑΔ. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ἔλεγον
καὶ τότε, καὶ νῦν λέγω. Σ.Ω. Πότερον δὲ τὸν
C αὐτὸν βελτίων καλεῖς οὖ καὶ κρείττον; οὐδὲ γὰρ
τοι τότε οἶδος τʼ η ὡδεῖν σον τί ποτε λέγεις.
πότερον τοὺς ἵχυροτέρους κρείττους καλεῖς καὶ
δεῖ ἄχροσθαι τοῦ ἵχυροτέρου τοὺς ἀσθενεστέ-
ρους, οἶνον μοι δοκεῖς καὶ τότε ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὡς αἴ
μεγάλαι πόλεις ἐπὶ τὰς σμικρὰς κατὰ τὸ φῦσιν
ἄχραν ἐργονται, ὦτι κρείττους εἰσὶ καὶ ἰχυρό-
tεραί, ὦ το κρείττον καὶ ἰχυρότερον καὶ βέλτιον
ταυτὸν ὄν, ἦ ἐστι βελτίων μὲν εἶναι, ἤττο δὲ καὶ
ἀσθενεστέρων, καὶ κρείττω μὲν εἶναι, μοχθορέι-
D ρον δὲ· ἦ ὁ αὐτὸς ὄρος ἐστὶ τοῦ βελτίωνος καὶ
τοῦ κρείττους; τοῦτο μοι αὐτὸ σαφῶς διόρισον,
tαυτὸν, ἦ ἔτερον ἐστὶ τὸ κρείττον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον
καὶ τὸ ἰχυρότερον; ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ σοι σα-
φῶς λέγω, ὅτι ταυτὸν ἐστιν. Σ.Ω. Οὐκοῦν οἱ
πολλοὶ τοῦ ἐνὸς κρείττους εἰσὶ κατὰ φύσιν; οἱ
δὲ καὶ τοὺς νόμιμους τίθενται ἐπὶ τὸ ἐνὶ, ὡσπερ καὶ
σὺ ἄρτι ἔλεγες. ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; Σ.Ω.
Τὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἄρα νόμιμα τὰ τῶν κρείττων
Ε ἐστὶ. ΚΑΛ. Πάντα γε. Σ.Ω. Οὐκοῦν τὰ τῶν
βελτίωνον; οἱ γὰρ κρείττους βελτίους πολὺ
kατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον. ΚΑΛ. Ναι. Σ.Ω. Οὐ-
κοῦν τὰ τότων νόμιμα κατὰ φύσιν καλά, κρείττω-
νον γε ὄντων; ΚΑΛ. Φημι. Σ.Ω. Ἀρʼ οὖν
οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν οὕτως, ὡς ἄρτι αὐ ὦν ἔλεγες,
ὁ δίκαιον εἶναι τὸ ἴσον ἐχειν καὶ αἰσχρόν τὸ ἄδικειν
τοῦ ἄδικείσθαι; ἐστὶ ταύτα, ἦ οὐ; καὶ ὅπως μη
ἀλάσει ἐνταύθα σὺ αἰσχυνόμενος. νομίζουσιν, ἦ
οὐ, οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ ἴσον ἐχειν ἀλλʼ οὐ τὸ πλέον
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δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ αἰσχύναν τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι; Ἔτη φθόνει μοι ἀποκρίνασθαι τούτῳ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἣν, ἐὰν μοι ὀμηλογήσῃς, βεβαιώσω μαί ἡ ἡ παρὰ σοῦ, ἀτε ἰκανοῦ ἀνδρὸς διαγνῶναι ὀμηλογηκότος. ΚΑΛ. Ἠλλ', οὗ γε πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν οὕτως. ΣΩ. Οὐ γόμφω ἄρα μόνον ἐστὶν ἀισχύναν τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐδὲ δίκαιον τὸ ἰσον ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ φύσει· ὅστε κινδυνεύεις εἰς ἀληθὴ λέγειν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐδὲ ὀρθῶς ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖν λέγον ὅτι ἐναντίον ἐστὶν ὁ νόμος καὶ ἡ φύσις, ἢ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ γνω纲 κακουργῶ εἰς τοῖς λόγοις, ἐὰν μὲν τις κατὰ φύσιν λέγῃ, ἐπὶ τὸν νόμον ἄγων, ἐὰν δὲ τις κατὰ τὸν νόμον, ἐπὶ τὴν φύσιν.

ΚΑΠ. ΧΛΕΙΝ. ΚΑΛ. Οὕτοσί ἀνήρ ὦ παύσεται φλυαρῶν. Εἶπέ μοι, ὦ Σάκχατες, οὐκ αἰσχύνεις, τηλικοῦτος ἄν, ὄνοματα θηρεύων, καὶ ἐὰν τις ὁμιαία ἀμάρτη, ἐρμαιοῦ τοῦτο ποιούμενος; Οὐ οἱ πάλαι σοι λέγω, ὅτι ταύτων φημι εἶναι τὸ βέλτιος; Οὐ πάλαι σοι λέγω, ὅτι ταύτων φημί εἶναι τὸ βέλτιος καὶ τὸ κρέιττον; ἢ οὔτε με λέγειν, ἐὰν συφρετοῦσιν συλλέγῃ δούλων καὶ παντοδαπῶν ἀνθρώπων μηδενὸς ἄξιον πλὴν ἵστως τῷ σώματι ἀγαπήσασθαι, καὶ οὐτοὶ φάσον, αὐτὰ ταύτα εἶναι νόμιμα; ΣΩ. Εἶδος, ὦ σοφότατε Καλλίκλεις· οὕτω λέγεις; ΚΑΛ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν οὕν. δὲ ΣΩ. Ἠλλ', ἔγω μὲν, ὦ δαιμόνιε, καὶ αὕτως πάλαι τοπάζω τοιοῦτον τί σε λέγειν τὸ κρέιττον, καὶ ἀνέρωτῳ γλυχόμενος σαφῶς εἰδέναι ὃ τι λέγεις. οὐ γὰρ δήμου σου γε τους ὄντος βέλτιους ἤρετο τοῦ
ἐνός, οὐδὲ τοὺς σοὺς δούλους βελτίους σοῦ, ὅτι ἴσχυρότεροί εἰσιν ἦ σὺ. ἄλλα πάλιν ἐξ ἄρχης εἰπέ, τί ποτε λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους, ἐπειδὴ οὐ τοὺς ἴσχυρότερους; καὶ, ὃ θαυμάσει, προάτερον μὲ Ε προδίδασκε, ἵνα μὴ ἀποφοιτήσω παρὰ σοῦ. 
Κ.Α.Α. Εἰρωνεύει, ὁ Σόρκατες. Σ.Ω. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Ζήθον, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, ὁ σὺ χράμενος πολλὰ νῦν δὴ εἰρωνεύον πρὸς με. ἄλλοι ἦν εἰπέ, τίνας λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους εἶναι; Κ.Α.Α. Τοὺς ἁμεῖνον πᾶς ξέγογε. Σ.Ω. Ὁρᾶς ἄρα, ὅτι σὺ αὐτὸς ὑμάτα λέγεις, δηλοῖς δὲ οὐδέν. σὺν ἐρεῖς τοὺς βελτίους καὶ κρείττους πότερον τοὺς φρονιμώτερους λέγεις, ἥ ἄλλους τινάς; Κ.Α.Α. Ἀλλὰ ναὶ μὰ Δία τούτους λέγω, καὶ σφόδρα γε. Σ.Ω. 
Πολλάκις ἄρα εἰς φρονὸν μνημόνης ἢ φρονούν- γος τῶν κρείττων ἐστὶ κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ τού- τον ἄρχειν δεῖ, τοὺς δὲ ἄρχεσθαι, καὶ πλέον ἔχειν τὸν ἄρχοντα τῶν ἄρχομένων. τοῦτο γὰρ μοι δοξεῖς βουλεύσθαι λέγειν—καὶ οὐ θηματα Θη- χαὶ—, εἰ δὲ εἰς τῶν μνημών κρείττων. 
Κ.Α.Α. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ἐστὶν ὃ λέγω. τοῦτο γὰρ οίμαι ἐγὼ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι φύσει, τὸ βελτίων ὄντα καὶ φρονιμώτερον καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ πλέον ἔχειν τῶν 
φαυλοτέρον. 

Β. ΚΑΡ. XLV. Σ.Ω. Ἐχε δὴ αὐτοῦ. τί ποτε ἀν νῦν λέγεις; ἔαν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ οἶμαι, ἀσπερ νῦν, πολλοὶ ἁθρόοι ἀνθρωποί, καὶ ἦμιν ἦ ἐν κοινῷ πολλὰ σιτία καὶ ποτά, οἴμεν δὲ παντοδαποί, οἱ μὲν ἴσχυροί, οἱ δὲ ἀσθενεῖς, εἰς δὲ ἡμῶν ἢ φρονι- 
μώτερος περί ταῦτα ἱκτρὸς ὄν, ἤ δὲ, οἶον εἰκὸς,
τῶν μὲν ἱσχυρότερος, τῶν δὲ ἀσθενέστερος, ἄλλο τι ἢ οὕτως φρονιμώτερος ἦμων ὅν βελτίων καὶ κρείττων ἦσται εἰς ταύτα; ΚΑΛ. Πάννυ γε. ΣΩ.

Ἡ οὖν τούτων τῶν σιτίων πλέον ἦμῶν ἐκένος γαλακτίων καὶ καταξιοθείας εἰς τὸ ξαντὸ σῶμα οὐ πλεονεκτητεόν, εἰ μὴ μέλλει ζημιοῦσθαι, ἀλλά τῶν μὲν πλέον, τῶν δὲ ἔλαττον ἐκένος· εἰν δὲ τῷ πάντων ἀσθενέστατω ὅν, πάντων ἐλάχιστον τῷ βελτίστῳ, ὁ Καλλίκλεις; οὐχ οὕτως, ὁ γραθε; ΚΑΛ. Περὶ σιτία λέγεις καὶ ποτὰ καὶ ἱατροὺς καὶ φλυαρίας· ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ ταύτα λέγω. ΣΩ. Πότερον δ' οὖν τῶν φρονιμώτερον βελτίω λέγεις; Φάθι ἢ μή. ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν βελτίω πλέον δείν ἔχειν; ΚΑΛ. Οὐ σιτίων γε οὐδὲ ποτῶν. ΣΩ. Μανθάνω, ἀλλ' ἢς ἰματίων, καὶ δεὶ τὸν υφαντικάτατον μέγιστον ἰμάτιον ἔχειν καὶ πλείστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἀμφεχώμενον περιέχειν. ΚΑΛ. Ποίων ἰματίων; ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εἰς ὑποδήματα δῆλον ότι δεὶ πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν φρονιμώτερον εἰς ταύτα καὶ βέλτιστον. τὸν σκυτότεθμον ἢς μέγιστα δεὶ ὑποδήματα καὶ πλείστα ὑποδειμένον περιπατεῖν. ΚΑΛ. Ποῖα ὑποδήματα φλυαρεῖς ἔχων; ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεις, ἢς τὰ τοιάδε· οἴνον γεφυρικὸν ἄνδρα περὶ γῆν φρονιμόν τε καὶ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν, τούτον δὴ ἢς δεὶ πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν σπερμάτων καὶ ὡς πλεύστορ σπέρματι χρησθαι εἰς τὴν αὐτοῦ γῆν. ΚΑΛ. Ὡς ἀεὶ ταύτα λέγεις, ὡ
Σόκρατες. Σ.Ω. Οὗ μόνον γε, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, αλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν. ΚΑΔ. Νή τοὺς θεοὺς, ἀτεχνῶς γε αἰεὶ σκυτέας τε καὶ κναφέας καὶ μαγεῖρους λέγων καὶ ἰατροὺς οὐδὲν παύει, ὡς περὶ τούτων ἡμῖν ὄντα τὸν λόγον. Σ.Ω. Οὐχόν γὰρ ἐρεῖς περὶ τίνων ὁ κρείττων τε καὶ φρονιμώτερος πλέον ἔχων δικαιός πλεονεκτεῖ; ἢ οὖτε ἐμοῦ ὑποβάλλοντος ἀνέξει οὔτ’ αὐτὸς ἐρεῖς; ΚΑΔ. Ἀλλ’ ἐγὼν καὶ πάλαι λέγω. πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς κρείττους οἱ εἰσιν, οὐ σκυτοτό-μους λέγω ουδὲ μαγεῖρους, ἀλλ’ οἱ ἂν εἰς τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα φρόνιμοι ὄσιν, ὄντινα ἂν τρόπον εὗ ὡςκότοι, καὶ μη μόνον φρόνιμοι, ἀλ- λα καὶ ἀνδρείου, ἵκανοι οἴντες ᾧ ἂν νοησώσων ἐπιτελεῖν, καὶ μη ἀποκάμνοις διὰ μαλακίαν ψυχῆς.

ΚΕΡ. ΧΛΒ. Σ.Ω. Ὄρας, ὁ βέλτιστος Καλ-λίκλεις, ὃς οὐ ταῦτα σὺ τ’ ἐμοὶ κατηγορεῖς καὶ ἐγὼ σοῦ; οὐ μὲν γὰρ ἐμὲ φῆς αἰεὶ ταῦτα λέγειν, καὶ μέμφει μοῦ ἐγὼ σὲ σοῦ τοῦναντίον, ὅτι οὐ- C δέποτε ταῦτα λέγεις περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τοτέ μὲν τοὺς βελτίους τε καὶ κρείττους τοὺς ἰσχυ-ροτέρους ὁρίζον, αὖθις δὲ τοὺς φρονιμωτέρους, νῦν δ’ αὖ ἐτερόν τι ἥκεις ἔχων· ἀνδρείτεροί τινες ὑπὸ σοῦ λέγονται οἱ κρείττους καὶ οἱ βελτίους. ἀλλ’ ὃ ὑγαθε, εἰπὼν ἀπαλλάγῃ τινας ποτὲ λέ-γεις τοὺς βελτίους τε καὶ κρείττους καὶ εἰς ὄ τι. ΚΑΔ. Ἀλλ’ εἰρηκά γε ἐγὼν τοὺς φρόνιμους D εἰς τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα καὶ ἀνδρείους. τοῦτος γὰρ προσήκει τῶν πόλεων ἄρχειν, καὶ
τὸ δίκαιον τούτ’ ἐστὶ, πλέον ἔχειν τούτους τῶν ἄλλων, τοὺς ἄρχοντας τῶν ἄρχομένων. ΣΩ. Τί δὲ; αὐτῶν, ὃ ἔταφε; [ἡ τί ἄρχοντας ἢ ἄρχομένους;] ΚΑΛ. Πῶς λέγεις; ΣΩ. Ἐνα ἔκαστον λέγω αὐτὸν ἐαυτοῦ ἄρχοντα. ἦ τούτῳ μὲν οὐδὲν δεῖ, αὐτὸν ἐαυτοῦ ἄρχειν, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων; ΚΑΛ. Πῶς ἐαυτοῦ ἄρχοντα λέγεις; ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ποικίλον, ἀλλ’ ὁσπέρ οἱ πολλοὶ, σώφρονα ὅντα καὶ ἐγκρατῆ αὐτὸν ἐαυτοῦ, τῶν ἰδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἄρχοντα τῶν ἐν ἐαυτῷ. Ε ὂς ἄλλο χρόνος εἰ! τοὺς ἡλιθίους λέγεις τοὺς σώφρονας. ΣΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; οὐδεὶς ὡστε οὐκ ἂν γνοή, ὃτι οὐτω λέγω. ΚΑΛ. Πάνω γε σφόδρα, ὃ Σώκρατες ἐπεὶ πᾶς ἄνεγεν τοῖς ἄνθρωποις δουλεύον ὑπάρχον; ὅλα τὸ τούτ’ ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον, ὅ ἐγώ σοι νῦν παραγηγαζόμενος λέγω, ὃτι δεῖ τὸν ὄρθως βιωσόμενον τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας τὰς ἐαυτοῦ ἐπι τὸς μεγίστας εἶναι καὶ μηδελάξειν, ταῦτας δὲ ὡς μεγίστας οὖσαι ἵκανον εἶναι ὑπηρέτειν δι’ 492 ἀνθρείαν καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ ἀποκτιπλάναι ὃν ἂν ἂεὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία γίνηται. ἄλλα τούτ’, οἷμαι, τοῖς πολλοῖς οὐ δυνατῶν ὃθεν πρέπουσι τοὺς τοιούτους δι’ αἰσχύνην ἀποχρωτόμενοι τὴν αὐτῶν ἀδυναμίαν, καὶ αἰσχρὸν δὴ φασιν εἶναι τὴν ἀξιολογίαν ὃπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐρώθειν ἔλεγον, δουλούμενοι τοὺς βελτίους τὴν φύσιν ἀνθρώπους, καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐκπορίζονται ταῖς ἰδοναῖς πλήρωσιν ἐπαινοῦσι τὴν σοφοσύνην Β καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἀνανδρίαν.
Δια τοῦ ἕρωτα ἢ τοῦ τοῦτον, ὃς τὸν ἀνθρώπον ἀφήνειν ἢ τοὺς τοῦτον τοὺς ἄγνωστους πορεύεται, γὰρ ὁ λόγος τὴς παρὰ καθήκοντος ἀνθρώπων ἀφήνειν ἢ τοὺς τοῦτον τοὺς ἄγνωστους πορεύεται,
μηδενὸς δεόμενοι ευδαιμονεῖ εἶναι. ΚΑΛ. Οἶ
λίθοι γὰρ ἂν οὕτω γέ καὶ οἱ νεκροὶ εὐδαιμονε-
στατοὶ εἶν. ΥΣ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ καὶ ὡς γε σὺ
λέγεις δεινὸς ὁ βίος. οὐ γὰρ τοι ἦπαινομῦν’ ἂν,
eἰ Ἐὔρυπίδης ἀληθῆ ἐν τοῖτεδε λέγει, λέγων
τὸς δ’ οἴδεν, εἰ τὸ ζῆν μὲν ἔστι καθανεῖν,
tὸ καθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν;
καὶ ἡμεῖς τῷ ὄντι ἓσως τέθναμεν· ὑπὲρ ἥδη τοῦ 493
ἔγογε καὶ ἡκουσα τῶν σοφῶν, ὡς νῦν ἡμεῖς τέθνα-
μεν, καὶ τὸ μὲν σῶμα ἔστιν ἡμῖν σῷμα, τῆς δὲ
ψυχῆς τούτο, ἐν δὲ ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσὶ, τυχάνει ὁν
οἶν ἀναπείθομαι καὶ μεταπίπτειν ἂνο κάτω,
καὶ τούτῳ ἄρα τις μυθολογῶν κομψὸς ἄνήρ, ἢς ὁς
Σικελὸς τις Ἡ Ἐπαρικός, παράγων τῷ ὑνομιατὶ διὰ
τὸ πιθανόν τε καὶ πιστικὸν ἄνομασε πίθου, τοὺς
δὲ ἄνοητοι ἀμυντός· τῶν δ’ ἄμυντων τοῦτο Β
τῆς ψυχῆς, οὗ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσὶ, τὸ ἀχάλαστον
αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐ στεγανον, ὡς τετρημένος εἰς πίθος,
διὰ τὴν ἄπληστίαν ἀπεικάσας. τοῦν ἄντι τοῦ νῷ
οὕτος σοι, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, ἐνδείκνυται, ὡς τῶν ἐν
"Αἰδοῦ— τὸ ἀείδες δὴ λέγων— οὕτοι ἀθλιώτα-
τοι ἂν εἴεν οἱ ἀμυντοί, καὶ φοροῦν εἰς τὸν τετρη-
μένον πίθον ὑδορ ἐτέρῳ τοιούτῳ τετρημένῳ χο-
σκίνῳ· τὸ δὲ κόσμινον ἄρα λέγει, ὡς ἔφη ὁ πρὸς
ἐμε λέγων, τὴν ψυχὴν εἰναι· τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν χο-
σκίνῳ ἀπεύκασε τὴν τῶν ἄνοητοι ὡς τετρημένην,
ἀτε οὐ δυναμένην στέγειν δι’ ἀπιστία σε καὶ
λήθης. ταῦτ’ ἐπιτειχὸς μὲν ἐστίν ὑπὸ τι ἀτοπα,
ὅλοι μὴν ὁ ἐγὼ βούλοιμαι σοι ἐνδειξάμενος, ἐάν
πως οἴδος τὸ ὁ, πείσαι μεταπέθοθαί, ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀπλή-
GORGIAS.

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στως καὶ ἀκολάστως ἔχοντος βίου τὸν κοσμίως καὶ τοὺς Αἰεὶ παροῦσιν ἔκανος καὶ ἔκρηκτοῦντος ἔχοντα βίον ἔλεσθαι. ἀλλὰ πότερον πείθω τί σε καὶ μετατίθεσαι εὐθαμονεστέρους εἶναι τοὺς κοσμίους τῶν ἁκολάστων, ἢ οὐδέν, ἀλλ᾽ ἂν καὶ πολλὰ τοιαύτα μυθολογῶ, οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον μετα-
θήσει: ΚΑΛ. Τούτ᾽ ἀληθέστερον εἴρηκας, ὁ Ἔραχρατες.

ΚΑΡ. XLVIII. ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, ἂλλην σοι εἰ-
κόνα λέγω ἐν τοῦ αὐτοῦ γυμνασίου τῇ νῦν. ἱκό-
πει γάρ, εἰ τοιόνυν λέγεις περὶ τοῦ βίου ἐκατέρου-
το τε σώφρονος καὶ τοῦ ἁκολάστου, οἶον εἰ δυ-
εῖν ἀνδροῖν ἐκατέρῳ πίθοι πολλοὶ εἰνὲν, καὶ τῷ
Ε μὲν ἐτέρῳ υγιεῖς καὶ πλήρεις, ὁ μὲν οἰνοῦ, ὁ δὲ
μελίτος, ὁ δὲ γάλακτος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πολλῶν,
νάματα δὲ σπάνια καὶ χαλεπὰ ἐκάστοι τοῦτων εἰς
καὶ μετὰ πολλῶν πόνων καὶ χαλεπῶν ἐκπο-
ριζῶμενα· ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐτέρος πληρωσάμενος μὴν
ἐποχετεύοι μήτε τι φροντίζοι, ἀλλ᾽ ἕνεκα τούτων
ἐσημιάν ἔχει· τῷ δ᾽ ἐτέρῳ τα μὲν νάματα, ὅσπερ καὶ
ἐχείνο, δυνατὰ μὲν πορίζεσθαι, χαλεπὰ δὲ,
τὰ δ᾽ ἀγχειά τετρημένα καὶ σαθρά, καὶ ἀναγχά-
494 ξοίτο ἄει καὶ νύχτα καὶ ἠμέραν πιμπλάναι αὐτά,
ἡ τὰς ἐσχάτας λυποῖτο λύπας· ἄρα τοιοῦτον ἐκατέρω ὄντος τοῦ βίου, λέγεις τὸν τοῦ ἁκολά-
στου εὐθαμονεστέρου εἶναι ἡ τοῦ τοῦ κοσμίου; πείθω τί σε ταῦτα λέγων συγχωρήσαι τὸν κόσμι-
ον βίον τοῦ ἁκολάστου ἀμείωτο εἶναι, ἢ οὐ πείθω; ΚΑΛ. Οὐ πείθεις, ὁ Ἔραχρατες. τῷ μὲν γάρ
πληρωσαμένῳ ἐκείνῳ οὐκέτ᾽ ἔστιν ἱδονή οὐδεμία,
άλλα τούτ’ ἔστιν, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, τὸ ὀσπερ λίθον ἔτι ἐπείδ’ ἐπείδ’ ἐλεφάντα χαίροντα ἔτι ὁ μήτε λυποῦμενον. ἀλλ’ ἐν τούτῳ ἔστι τὸ ἢδέως ἐτιν, ἐν τῷ ὑπείκον ἐπιφάνειν. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη γ’, ἄν πολὺ ἐπιφάνει, πολὺ καὶ τὸ ἀπιόν εἶναι καὶ μεγάλ’ ἢτα τὸ τρήματα εἶναι ταῖς ἐκροαίς; ΚΑΛ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Χαράδρομος τίνα νῦν οὐ βίον λέγεις, ἄλλ’ οὐ νεκροῦ οὔτε λίθον. καὶ μοι λέγε, τὸ τοιόν τε λέγεις, οἶνον πείνην καὶ πείναιντα ἐσθίειν; ΚΑΛ. Ἕγαγε. ΣΩ. Καὶ δησίην γε καὶ διπόντα πίνειν; ΚΑΛ. Ἀνέρ, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας ἀπάσας ἔχοντα καὶ δυνάμενον πληροῦντα χαίροντα εὐθαμόνως ἐτιν.

ΚΑΡ. ΧΛΙΧ. ΣΩ. Ἐγείρε, ὃ βέλτιστε, διάτελε γὰρ ὀσπερ ἡδέω, καὶ ὅπως μὴ ἀπαισχυνεῖ. δεῖ δὲ, ὃς ἔοικε, μηδ’ ἐμε ἀπαισχυνθήναι. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν εἰπὲ, εἰ καὶ παραῖτα καὶ παρηκτα, ἀρθόνως ἔχοντα τοῦ κυνήθαι, κυνάθεσθαι διατελοῦντα τὸν βίον εὐθαμόνως ἔστι ἐτιν. ΚΑΛ. Δ ΣΩ. ἀτοπος εἰ, ὃ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἀτεχνός δημηγόρος. ΣΩ. Τοιγάρτοι, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, Πώλων μὲν καὶ Γοργῆα καὶ ἐξέπληξα καὶ αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐποίησα, σὺ δὲ οὐ μὴ ἐκπλαγῇς οὐδὲ μὴ αἰσχυνθῆς· ἁνδρείων γάρ εἰ. ἀλλ’ ἀποκρίνειν μόνον. ΚΑΛ. Φημί τοῖν ταῦν καὶ τὸν κυνάμενον ἢδέως ἄν βιῶναι. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἶπερ ἢδέως, καὶ εὐθαμόνως; ΚΑΛ. Πάνω γε. ΣΩ. Πότερον εἰ τὴν κεφα- ἐλη μόνον κυνίσθη, ἢ ἔτι τι σε ἔρωτα; ὅρα, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, τι ἀποκρίνει, ἐὰν τίς σε τα ἐχόμενα
τούτοις ἐφεξῆς ἀπαντᾷ ἐρωτᾷ. καὶ, *τὸ* τούτων τοιούτων ὄντων κεφάλαιον, ο τῶν κιναῖδων βίος οὗτος οὐ δεινός καὶ αἰσχρός καὶ ἀθλιος; ἡ τούτων τολμήσεις λέγειν ευθαίμονας εἶναι, ἓν αρθόνως ἔχωσιν ἢν δέονται; ΚΑΔ. Οὐκ αἰ- σχύνει εἰς τοιαύτα ἤγον, ὃ Σάκρατες, τοὺς λό- γους; ΣΩ. Ἡ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἄγα ἐνταῦθα, ὃ γενναίε, ἥ̄ ἐκεῖνος, δι ἂν φη ἀνέδην οὐτοῖς τοὺς χαίροντας, ὅπως ἂν χαίροσιν, εὐθαίμονας εἶναι, καὶ μὴ διορίζεται τῶν ἢδονῶν ὅσοικε ἀγαθαὶ καὶ κακαί; ἀλλ’ ἔτι καὶ νῦν λέγε, πότερον φῆσι εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ ὡδυ καὶ ἀγαθόν, ἡ εἶναι τι τῶν ἢδεων, ὃ οὐχ ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν; ΚΑΔ. Ἡν δὴ μοι μὴ ἀνο- μολογούμενος ἢ δ’ ὅλογος, ἕαν ἔτερον φῆσι εἶναι, τὸ αὐτὸ φημὶ εἶναι. ΣΩ. Διαφθείρεις, ὃ Καλ- λίκλεις, τοὺς πρὸ τοὺς λόγους, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι μετ’ ἔμοι ἰκανός τὸ ὄντα ἔξτασεις, εἶπερ παρὰ τὰ B δοξοῦντα σαντὸ ἐρεῖς. ΚΑΔ. Καὶ γὰρ σύ, ὃ Σάκρατες. ΣΩ. Οὐ τοίνυν ὁρθῶς ποιῶ οὕτ’ ἐγὼ, εἴπερ ποιῶ τοῦτο, οὕτε σὺ. ἀλλ’, ὃ μακά- ρει, ἄθρει μὴ ὧ τοῦτο ἢ τὸ ἀγαθόν, τὸ πάντως χαίρειν. ταῦτα τε γὰρ τὰ νῦν ἢ δὴ αἰνιχθέντα πολλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ φαίνεται ὑσταίνοντα, εἰ τού- το οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἀλλά πολλά. ΚΑΔ. Ἡς σὺ γε οἴει, ὃ Σάκρατες. ΣΩ. Σὐ δὲ τῷ ὄντι, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, ταῦτα ἰγνορίζει; ΚΑΔ. Ἡ Ἐγώε. c ΣΑΡ. Λ. ΣΩ. Ἑπιχειροῦμεν ἄρα τῷ λόγῳ, ὃς σοῦ σπουδάζοντος; ΚΑΔ. Πάνυ γε σφόδρα. ΣΩ. Ἡ θή μοι, ἐπειδὴ οὕτω δοκεῖ, διελοῦ τάδε. ἐπιστήμην που καλεῖς τι; ΚΑΔ. Ἡ Ἐγώε.
ΣΩ. Οὐ καὶ ἄνδρείαν νῦν δὴ ἔλεγές τινα εἶναι μετὰ ἐπιστήμης; ΚΑΛ. "Ελεγόν γὰρ. ΣΩ. "Αλλο τι οὔν ὃς ἔτερον τὴν ἄνδρείαν τῆς ἐπιστήμης δύο ταῦτα ἔλεγες; ΚΑΛ. Σφόδρα γε. ΣΩ. Τί δὲ; ἣδονήν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ταύτων, ἢ δ' ἔτερον; ΚΑΛ. "Ετερον δήποτε, ὥσοφότατε σὺ. ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ ἄνδρείαν ἔτεραν ἥδονης; ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γάρ οὔ; ΣΩ. Φέβε δὴ ὅπως μεμονωμέθα ταῦτα, ὅτι Καλλικλῆς ἤφη ὁ Ἀχαρνεύς ἄδυ μὲν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ταύτων εἰναι, ἐπιστήμην δὲ καὶ ἄνδρείαν καὶ ἀλλήλους καὶ τὸ ἄγαθον ἔτερον. ΚΑΛ. Σωφράτης δὲ γε ἢμιν ὁ Ἀλαπεκήθεν οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ ταῦτα; ἢ ὁμολογεῖ; ΣΩ. Οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ· οἴμαι δὲ γε ὡς καὶ Καλλικλῆς, όταν αὐτὸς αὐτὸν θεάσηται ὁρθῶς. εἰπὲ γάρ μοι, τοὺς εὐ πράττοντας τοὺς κακῶς πράττοντος οὐ τοῦναντίον ἤγει πάθος πεπονθέναι; ΚΑΛ. "Εγώγε. ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν, εἰπὲν ἔναντία ἡστὶ ταῦτα ἀλλήλους, ἀνάγκη περὶ αὐτῶν ἔχειν ἄσπερ περὶ ψυχείας ἔχει καὶ νόσου; οὐ γάρ ἄμα δὴπον ψυχαῖνει τε καὶ νοσεῖ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, οὔδὲ ἄμα ἀπαλλάττεται ψυχείας τε καὶ νόσου. ΚΑΛ. Πῶς λέγεις; ΣΩ. Οἶνον περὶ οὗτον βούλει τοῦ σώματος ἀπολαθὸν σκόπει. νοσεῖ ποι ἄνθρωπος ὁφθαλμοὺς, ὁ ὄνομα ὁφθαλμοῖα; ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γάρ οὔ; ΣΩ. Οὐ δήποτε καὶ ψυχαῖνει γε ἄμα τοὺς αὐτούς; ΚΑΛ. Οὖθ' ὀπωστιοῦν. ΣΩ. Τί δὲ; ὅταν τῆς ὁφθαλμίας ἀπαλλάττηται, ἀμα τότε καὶ τῆς ψυχείας ἀπαλλάττεται τῶν ὁφθαλμῶν καὶ τελευτῶν ἄμα ἀμφότερον ἀπῆλλακται; ΚΑΛ. "Ἡκιστά γε.
Β ΣΩ. Θαυμάσιον γάρ, οἶμαι, καὶ ἄλογον γίγνεται. ἡ γάρ; ΚΑΔ. Σφόδρα γε. ΣΩ. Ἄλλη ἐν μέρει, οἶμαι, ἐκάτερον καὶ λαμβάνει καὶ ἀπολλύει; ΚΑΔ. Φημί. ΣΩ. Οὐχοῦν καὶ ἵσχυν καὶ ἀσθένειαν ὁσαύτως; ΚΑΔ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Καὶ τάχος καὶ βραδυτῆτα; ΚΑΔ. Πάντες γε. ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ τάγαθα καὶ τήν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τάναντία τοῦτον, κακά τε καὶ ἀθλιότητα, ἐν μέρει λαμβάνει, καὶ ἐν μέρει ἀπαλλάττεται ἐκατέρω; ΚΑΔ. Πάντως δήπον. ΣΩ. Ἐνώ εὖ χρωμεν ἁρα ἄττα, ὅν ἁμα τε ἀπαλλάττετος ἀνθρώπος καὶ ἁμα ἔχει, δῆλον διτ ταυτά γε οὐκ ἂν εἴη τό τε ἄγαθον καὶ τό κακόν. ὁμολογοῦμεν ταύτα; Καὶ εὖ μάλα σκεψάμενος ἄποθεύμων. ΚΑΔ. Ἄλλῃ ὑπερφυσάς ὃς ὁμολογῶ. 

ΣΑΡ. ΛΙ. ΣΩ. Ἡθί δή ἐπὶ τά ἐμπροσθεν ὁμολογημένα. τό πεινην ἔλεγες πότερον ἥδυ, ἡ ἀνιαρὸν εἶναι; αὐτὸ λέγω τό πεινην. ΚΑΔ. Λ. Ανιαρὸν ἔγογε τό μέντοι πεινῶντα ἐσθίειν ἥδυ. ΣΩ. Μανθάνω ἄλλῃ οὖν τό γε πεινην αὐτό ἀνιαρόν. ἡ οὐχὶ; ΚΑΔ. Φημί. ΣΩ. Οὐχοῦν καὶ τὸ διψῆν; ΚΑΔ. Σφόδρα γε. ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν ἔτι πλεῖο ἐρωτῶ, ἡ ὁμολογεῖς ἀπασαν ἐνδειαν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν ἀνιαρὸν εἶναι; ΚΑΔ. Ὁμολογῶ, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἑρωτά. ΣΩ. Εἴειν. διψῶντα δὲ δὴ πίνειν ἄλλο τι ἡ ἥδυ φῆς εἶναι; ΚΑΔ. Ἐγώγε. ΣΩ. Οὐχοῦν τούτον ὁδέγει εἰς τό μέν διψῶντα λυποῦμεν δῆπον ἔστι; ΚΑΔ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τό δὲ πίνειν πλήρωσις τε τῆς ἐνδείας καὶ ἱδονῆ; ΚΑΔ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐχοῦν 7ο
κατὰ τὸ πίνειν χαίρειν λέγεις; ΚΑΛ. Μάλιστα. ΣΩ. Διψώντα γε; ΚΑΛ. Φημί. ΣΩ. λυπούμενον; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Αἰσθάνει οὖν τὸ συμβαίνον, ὅτι λυπούμενον χαίρειν λέγεις ἀμα, ὅταν διψῶντα πίνειν λέγης; ἢ οὐχ ἂμα τοῦτο γίνεται κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον καὶ χρόνον εἰτε ψυχής εἰτε σώματος βούλει; οὐδὲν γάρ, οἴμαι, διαφέρει. ἔστι ταῦτα, ἢ οὐ; ΚΑΛ. Ἐστιν. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν εὐ γε πράττοντα κακῶς πράττειν ἂμα ἀδύνατον ἔριθς εἰναι. ΚΑΛ. Φημὶ γάρ. ΣΩ. Ἀνισυμένον δὲ γε χαίρειν δυ-407 νατὸν ὁμολόγηκας. ΚΑΛ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Οὔκ ἄρα τὸ χαίρειν ἐστὶν εὐ πράττειν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀνισόθαι κακῶς, ὥστε ἔτερον γίνεται τὸ ἤδυ τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ. ΚΑΛ. Οὔκ οἴδ᾽ ἄτιτα σοφίζει, ὁ Σάκρατες. ΣΩ. Ὁδιὰ, ἀλλὰ ἄκακίζει, ὁ Καλλίκλεις. καὶ προθίζει γε ἐτι εἰς τοῦμπροσθεν, ὅτι ἔχον ληρεῖς, ἵνα εἰδῆς ὡς σοφὸς ἕν με νουθε- βεῖς. οὔχ ἂμα διψῶν τε ἑκαστος ἡμῶν τέπανται καὶ ἂμα ἡδόμενος διὰ τοῦ πίνειν; ΚΑΛ. Οὔκ οἴδα δι τὰ λέγεις. ΓΟΡ. Ἑρμαμώς, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλ᾽ ἀποχρίνον καὶ ἡμῶν ἑνεκα, ἵνα πε- ρανθῶσιν οἱ λόγοι. ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ τουτός ἐστι Σωκράτης, ὁ Γοργία· σμικρὰ καὶ ὀλίγον ἄξια ἄνεροτά καὶ ἐξελέγχει. ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλὰ τι σοι διαφέρει; πάντως οὐ σῇ ἀυτῇ ἢ τιμῇ, ὁ Καλλίκλεις· ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὸσχες Ἱωκράτει ἐξελέγχει ὅπως ἀν βούληται. ΚΑΛ. Ἐρῶτα δὴ σὺ τὸ σμικρὰ τε καὶ στενὰ ταῦτα, ἐπείπερ Γοργία δο- κεῖ ὀὕτως.
Cap. LII. ΣΩ. Ευδαίμων ει, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, ὃτι τὰ μεγάλα μεμύησαι πρὶν τὰ σμιχρά· ἐγὼ δὴ ὦν ἡμὺν θεμιτὸν εἶναι. ὅθεν ὦν ἀπέλυτης, ἀποκρίνου, εἰ ὦν ἁμα παύεται δισφῶν ἐκαστος ἡμῶν καὶ ἵδομενος. ΚΑΛ. Φημί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ πεινῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμοῦν καὶ ἵδονῶν ἁμα παύεται; ΚΑΛ. Ἐστι ταυτα. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν λυπῶν καὶ τῶν ἰδονῶν δ ἁμα παύεται; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τῶν ἁγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν ὦν ἁμα παύεται, ὡς σὺ ὀμολογεῖς· νῦν δὲ ὦν ὀμολογεῖς; ΚΑΛ. Ἐγὼ. τί οὖν δή; ΣΩ. Ὅτι οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ γίνεται, ὁ φίλε, τάγαθά τοῖς ἤδεον οὐδὲ τὰ κακά τοῖς ἄνισαροῖς. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἁμα παύεται, τῶν δὲ οὐ, ὡς ἐτέρων οὐντων. τῶς οὖν ταυτὰ ἄν εἰ ἄγαθοι καὶ τὰ ἄνιαρα τοῖς κακοῖς; Ἐὰν δὲ βούλη, καὶ τῇ ἑπίσκεψαι· οἴμαι γάρ ἐσοι οὐδὲ ταυτή ὀμολογεῖσθαι. ἂθρετ ἐς τοὺς ἁγαθοὺς οὐχὶ ἁγαθοὶ παροισία ἁγαθοὶ καλεῖς, ὥσπερ τοὺς οἷς ἂν κάλλος παρῇ; ΚΑΛ. Ἐγὼ. ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἁγαθοὺς ἄνδρας καλεῖς τοὺς ἄρφονας καὶ δειλοὺς; οὐ γὰρ ἄρτι γε, ἄλλα τοὺς ἄνδρείους καὶ φρονίμους ἔλεγες. ἦ οὐ τοὺς ἁγαθοὺς καλεῖς; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Τί δέ; παῖδα ἁνόητον χαίροντα ἦδη εἴδος; ΚΑΛ. Ἐγὼ. ΣΩ. Ἀνδρα δὲ οὖντο εἴδος ἁνόητον χαίροντα; ΚΑΛ. Οἴμαι ἐγώ. ἀλλά τί τούτο; ΣΩ. Οὐδεν· ἀλλ’ ἀποκρίνου. ΚΑΛ. Εἴδον. ΣΩ. Τί δέ; νοῦν ἐχοντα λυπομένον καὶ χαίροντα; ΚΑΛ. Φημί. ΣΩ.
Πότεροι δὲ μᾶλλον χαίρουσι καὶ λυποῦνται, οἱ φρόνιμοι, ἢ οἱ ἄφρονες; ΚΑΔ. Οἶμαι ἐγὼ γαρ αὐτοὶ φυλακήν τι διαφέρειν. ΣΩ. 'Αλλ' ἄρκει καὶ τοῦτο. ἐν πολέμῳ δὲ ἡδη εἰδές ἀνδραὶ δειλὸν; ΚΑΔ. Πᾶς γὰρ οὐ; ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἀπιόντων τῶν πολεμίων πότεροι σοι ἐδόξον μᾶλλον χαίρειν, οἱ δειλοὶ, ἢ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι; ΚΑΔ. Ἀμφότεροι ἐμοί γε μᾶλλον εἰ δὲ μή, παραπλησίως γε. Β ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν διαφέρει. χαίρουσι δ' οὖν καὶ οἱ δειλοὶ; ΚΑΔ. Σφόδρα γε. ΣΩ. Καὶ οἱ ἄφρονες, ὡς έσοκε. ΚΑΔ. Ναι. ΣΩ. Προσιόντων δὲ οἱ δειλοὶ μόνον λυποῦνται, ἢ καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι; ΚΑΔ. Ἀμφότεροι. ΣΩ. Ἄρα ὡμοῖος; ΚΑΔ. Μᾶλλον ἰσώς οἱ δειλοὶ. ΣΩ. 'Απιόντων δ' οὖ μᾶλλον χαίρουσιν; ΚΑΔ. ἰσώς. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν λυποῦνται μὲν καὶ χαίρουσι καὶ οἱ ἄφρονες καὶ οἱ φρόνιμοι καὶ οἱ δειλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι παραπλησίως, ὡς οὖ φῆς, μᾶλλον δὲ οἱ δειλοὶ τῶν ἀνδρείων; ΚΑΔ. Φημ. ΣΩ. 'Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐ γε φρόνιμοι καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι ἀγαθοί, οἱ δὲ δειλοὶ καὶ ἄφρονες κακοὶ; ΚΑΔ. Ναι. ΣΩ. Παραπλησίως ἄρα χαίρουσι καὶ λυποῦνται οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ κακοὶ; ΚΑΔ. Φημ. ΣΩ. Ἄρ όν παραπλησίως εἰσὸν ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τε καὶ οἱ κακοὶ; ἢ καὶ ἑτεῖ μᾶλλον ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοὶ εἰσὶν οἱ κακοὶ;

ΣΑΡ. ΛΙΠ. ΚΑΔ. 'Ἀλλὰ μα Ἰδ' οὖν οἶδ' ὁ τι λέγεις. ΣΩ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ὃτι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἀγαθῶν φῆς παραπλησίως εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ, κακοὺς δὲ κακῶν; τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸ εἶναι τὰς ἡδονὰς, κακὰ δὲ
τάς ἀνίας; ΚΑΛ. Ἡ Ἕγογε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῖς χαίρονσι πάρεστι τἀγαθὰ, αἱ ἡδοναῖ, εἶπερ χαίρονσι; ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀγαθῶν παρόντων ἀγαθοὶ εἰσιν οἱ χαίροντες; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τί δὲ; τοῖς ἁνιμωμέ-νοις οὐ πάρεστι τὰ κακά, αἱ λύπαι; ΚΑΛ. Πάρεστι. ΣΩ. Κακῶν δὲ γε παρούσια φής σὺ εἶναι κακοὺς τοὺς κακοὺς. ἥ ὁυκέτι φής; ΚΑΛ. Ἡ Ἕγογε. ΣΩ. Ἀγαθοὶ άρα οἱ ἀν χαί-ροντες, κακοὶ δὲ οἱ ἀν ἁνιμωμένοι; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Οἱ μὲν γε μᾶλλον μᾶλλον, οἱ δ᾽ ἠττον ἠττον, οἵ δὲ παραπλησίως παραπλησίως; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν φής παραπλησίως χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι τοὺς φρονίμους καὶ τοὺς ἄφρονας καὶ τοὺς δειλοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἀνδρείους, ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι τοὺς δειλούς; ΚΑΛ. Ἡ Ἕγογε. ΣΩ. Συλ-λόγισαι δὴ κοινῇ μετ᾽ ἐμοῦ, τί ἡμῖν συμβαίνει ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογημένων; καὶ δὲς γὰρ τοι καὶ τρίς 499 φασί καλὸν εἶναι τὰ καλὰ λέγειν τε καὶ ἐπισχο-πεῖσθαι. Ἡ Ἀγαθὸν μὲν εἶναι τὸν φρόνιμον καὶ ἀνδρείον φαμεν. ἢ γὰρ; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Κακοὶ δὲ τῶν ἄφρονα καὶ δειλοὶ; ΚΑΛ. Πά-νυ γε. ΣΩ. Ἡ Ἀγαθὸν δὲ αὐ τῶν χαίροντα; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Κακοὶ δὲ τὸν ἁνιμωμένον; ΚΑΛ. Ἡ Ἀνάγκῃ. ΣΩ. Ἡ Ἀνιμωμένα δὲ καὶ χαίρω τῶν ἄγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν ὁμοίως, ἵσως δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον τὸν κακὸν; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁμοίως γίγνεται κακὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἄγα-θῷ ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον ἄγαθὸς ὁ κακὸς; οὐ ταῦτα συμβαίνει, καὶ τὰ πρῶτα ἔχειν, ἐὰν τις ταῦ-
τά φη ἢδεα τε καὶ ἁγαθὰ εἶναι; οὐ ταῦτα ἀνάγκη, ὁ Καλλίκλεις;

Cap. LIv. KAL. Πάλαι τοί σου ἄχροδμαι, ὁ Σώκρατες, καθομολογῶν, ἐνθυμούμενος, ὅτι, κἂν παύσων τίς σοι ἐνδῶ ὅτιών, τούτων ἄφιεν τὰ μειράχια. ὡς δὴ σὺ οἰεὶ ἐμὲ ἦ καὶ ἄλλον ὄντινοι ἄνθρώπων οὐκ ἤγείσθαι τὰς μὲν βελτίως ἴδονάς, τὰς δ' χείρους. ΣΩ. Ἰον ἴσιν, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, ὡς πανοῦργος εἰ, καὶ μοι ἅπαντες παιδὶ χρῆ, τοτὲ μὲν αὐ φάσκων οὕτως ἔχειν, τοτὲ δὲ ἕτερος, ἐξαπατῶν με. καὶ τοι οὐκ ὕπην γε κατ' ἀρχὰς ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐκόντος εἶναι ἐξαπατηθῆσθαι, ὡς ὄντος φίλου· νῦν δὲ ἐγευσθὴν, καὶ ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀνάγκη μοι κατὰ τὸν παλαιὸν λόγον τὸ παρὸν εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τούτο δέχεσθαι τὸ διδόμενον παρὰ σοῦ. ἔστι δὲ δὴ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ νῦν λέγεις, ὅτι ἴδοναί τινές εἰσιν αἱ μὲν ἁγαθαί, αἱ δὲ κακαί. ἥ γὰρ; KAL. Ναί. ΣΩ. 'Αρ' οὖν ἁγαθαί μὲν αἱ ὀφέλιμοι, κακαί δὲ αἱ βλαβεραί; KAL. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Ὄφελιμοι δὲ γε αἱ ἁγαθὸν τι ποιοῦσαι, κακαί δὲ αἱ κακὸν τι; KAL. Φημί. ΣΩ. 'Αρ' οὖν τάς τοιάσδε λέγεις, οὖν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα άς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν ἐν τῷ ἐσθείν καὶ πίνειν ἴδονά· εἰ ἄρα τούτων αἱ μὲν ὑγιειν ποιοῦσιν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἡ ἕσχιν ἡ ἄλλην τινὰ ἄρετήν τοῦ σώματος, αὕτα μὲν ἁγαθαί, αἱ δὲ τάναντία τούτων κακαί; KAL. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Ὅνυχον καὶ λῦπα τοῖσ ὀσφυϊσ αἱ ἐ μὲν χρησταί εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ πονηραί; KAL. Πῶς γὰρ οὗ; ΣΩ. Ὅνυχον τάς μὲν χρηστάς καὶ
海外市场 καὶ λύπας καὶ αἰφετέον ἐστὶ καὶ πρα-κτέον; ΚΑΔ. Πάνω γε. ΣΩ. Τὰς δὲ πονηρὰς οὖ; ΚΑΔ. Δῆλον δὴ. ΣΩ. "Ενεκα γὰρ ποι ἡν ἁγαθῶν ἀπαντα ἡμῖν ἐδοξε πρακτέον εἰναι, εἰ μημονεύεις, ἐμοὶ τε καὶ Πόλις. ἄρα καὶ σοὶ συνδοξεῖν οὐτω, τέλος εἰναι ἀπασῶν τῶν πράξεων τὸ ἁγαθόν, καὶ ἔκεινον ἐνεκεν δεῖν πάντα τάλλα 500 πράττεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔκεινο τῶν ἄλλων; σύμ- μηφος ἡμῖν εἰ καὶ οὐ ἐκ τρίτων; ΚΑΔ. "Εγώ- γε. ΣΩ. Τῶν ἁγαθῶν ἄρα ἐνεκα δεῖ καὶ τάλλα καὶ τὰ ἡδέα πράττειν, ἀλλ' οὐ τάγαθα τῶν ἡδέων. ΚΑΔ. Πάνω γε. ΣΩ. "Αρ' οὖν παντὸς ἀν- δρός εστιν ἐκλέξασθαι ποιὰ ἁγαθὰ τῶν ἡδέων ἐστὶ καὶ ὅποια παράκα, ἥ τεχνικὸ δεῖ εἰς ἔκαστον; ΚΑΔ. Τεχνικοῦ.

ΣΑΡ. ΛΨ. ΣΩ. "Αναμνησθάμεν δὴ ἐν αὖ ἐγὼ πρὸς Πόλιν καὶ Γοργίαν ἔτυγχανον λέγων. Β ἔλεγον γὰρ, εἰ μημονεύεις, ὅτι εἰπὲν παρασκευαὶ αἱ μὲν μέχρι ἡδονῆς, αὐτὸ τοῦτο μόνον παρα- σκευάζουσαι, ἀγνουσαί δὲ τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ χειρών, αἱ δὲ γιγνώσκονται ὅ τι τε ἁγαθὸν καὶ ὁ τι κακὸν καὶ ἐπίθην τῶν μὲν περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς τὴν μαγειρικὴν ἐμπειρίαν, ἀλλ' οὐ τεχνὴν, τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸ ἁγαθὸν τὴν ἱατρικὴν τεχνὴν. καὶ πρὸς φιλίου, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, μήτε αὐτός οὗν δεῖν πρὸς ἐμὲ παῖζειν μηδ' ὁ τι ἄν τύχῃς πα- C ρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἀποκρίνου, μήτε αὖ τὰ παρ' ἐμοῦ οὕτως ἀποδέχον ὡς παιζοντος. ὀραὶ γὰρ, ὅτι περὶ τοῦτον εἰσὶν ἡμῖν οἱ λόγοι, οὗ τί ἄν μᾶλλον σπουδάσεις τις καὶ σμιχρὸν νοῦν ἔχων
άνθρωπος, η τούτο, οντινα χρὴ τρόπον ἕνη πότε-
ρον ἐπὶ δὲν συ παρακαλεῖς ἐμὲ, τὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώ-
που ταῦτα πράττοντα, λέγοντα τε ἐν τῷ δῆμῳ καὶ δη-
τορικὴν ἀσκοῦντα καὶ πολιτευόμενον τούτον τὸν-
τρόπον, ὃν οὐκεὶς νῦν πολιτεύεσθε, ἡ ἐπὶ τόνδε τῶν-
βιον τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, καὶ τί ποτὲ ἔστιν οὕτως-
ἐκείνου διαφέρουν· ίσως οὖν βέλτιστόν ἔστιν, ὥς-
ἀρτι ἕγα ἐπεχείρησα, διαφείβου, διελομένους δὲ-
καὶ ὁμολογήσαντας ἀλλήλους, εἰ ἔστι τούτω διττῶ-
τὸ βίω, σκέψασθαι τί τε διαφέρετον ἀλλήλουν καὶ-
ὁπότερον βιωτέον αὐτοῖν· ίσως οὖν οὕτω σιῶθα-
tί λέγω. ΚΑΔ. Οὐ δήτα. ΣΩ. 'Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ-
σοι σαφέστερον ἔριϊ. ἐπειδὴ ὁμολογήσα-μεν ἐγὼ-
τε καὶ σὺ εἶναι μὲν τι ἁγαθὸν, εἴναι δὲ τι ἤδυ,-
ἐτέρω δὲ τὸ ἢδυ τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ, ἐκατέρω δὲ αὐτοῖν-
μελέτην τινὰ εἶναι καὶ παρασκευὴν τῆς κτήσεως,
τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἢδεος θήραν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ — ἐ-
ᵃὐτὸ δὲ μοι τοῦτο πρῶτον ἥ σύμφασθι, ἥ μη·-
σύμφης; ΚΑΔ. Οὕτω φημι.

ΚΑΡ. ΛΒΙ. ΣΩ. 'Ιθι δὴ, ἢ καὶ πρὸς τοῦ σε-
ἔγν ἐλεγον διομολογήσαι μοι, εἰ ἃρα σοι ἔδοξα
τότε ἀληθῆ λέγειν. ἐλεγον δὲ ποι, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ὑμω-
πουκῇ οὐ μοι δοκεῖ τέχνη εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἐμπειρίᾳ, ἡ
δ' ἰατρική, λέγουν, ὅτι ἡ μὲν τούτον ὦ Θεραπεύει
καὶ τὴν φύσιν ἔσχεπται καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν δὲν πρά-
tει, καὶ λόγον ἔχει τούτων ἐκάστων δοῦναι, ἡ
ἰατρικῆ· ἡ δ' ἔτερα τῆς ἤδονης, πρὸς ἢν ἡ Θε-
ραπεία αὐτὴ ἔστιν ἄπασα, κυμιδὴ ἀτέχνως ἐπ'
αὐτὴν ἔρχεται, οὔτε τι τὴν φύσιν σκεφαμένη τῆς
ἤδονῆς οὔτε τὴν αἰτίαν, ἀλόγως τε παντάπασιν,
Διαφωμισμένη, μνήμη μόνον σωζομένη τού εισόθως
γίνεσθαι, δή καί πορίζεται τάς ἡδονᾶς. ταῦτ' 
οὖν πρῶτον σκόπει εἰ δοκεῖ σοι ἰκανός λέγεσθαι,
καὶ εἰναὶ τίνες καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς τοιαῦτα ἄλλα 
πραγματεῖα, αἱ μὲν τέχνικαι, προμήθειαν τίνα
ἐχουσαί τοῦ βελτίστου περὶ τὴν ψυχήν, αἱ δὲ 
τούτων μὲν ὀλιγωροῦσαι, ἐσκεμμέναι δ' αὐ, ὃς 
ἐκεῖ, τὴν ἡδονὴν μόνον τῆς ψυχῆς, τίνα ἃν αὐτῇ 
τρόπον γίγνοιτο, ἥτις δὲ ἡ βελτίων ἡ χείρων τῶν 
ἡδονῶν οὕτε σκοποῦμεναι, οὕτε μέλον αὐταῖς


C ἀλλο ἡ χαρίζεσθαι μόνον, εἰτε βέλτιον εἰτε χεῖ-
ρον. ἔμοι μὲν γάρ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, δοκοῦσί τε 
εἰναι, καὶ ἔγονε φημι το τοιοῦτον κολακεῖαν εἶναι 
καὶ περὶ σῶμα καὶ περὶ ψυχῆν καὶ περὶ ἄλλο, 
ὅτου ἃν τις τὴν ἡδονήν ἑραπετή ἀσκέττος ἔχων 
τοῦ ἁμείνονός τε καὶ τοῦ χείρωνος· σὺ δὲ δὴ πό-
τερον συγκατατίθεσαι ἢμῖν περὶ τούτων τῆς αὐ-
τῆς δόξαν ἡ ἀντίφης; ΚΑΛ. Οὐχ ἔγονε, ἀλλὰ 
συγχωρῶ, ἵνα σοι καὶ περανθῇ ὁ λόγος καὶ Γορ-

D γία τάδε χαρίσωμαι. ΣΩ. Πότερον δὲ περὶ μὲν 
μίαν ψυχὴν ἔστι τούτο, περὶ δὲ δύο καὶ πολλὰς 
οὐχ ἔστιν; ΚΑΛ. Οὐχ, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ δύο καὶ 
περὶ πολλὰς. ΣΩ. Οὐχοῦν καὶ ἀθρόως ἀμα 
χαρίζεσθαι ἔστι μηδὲν σκοποῦμενον τὸ βέλτιστον; 
ΚΑΛ. Οἴμαι ἔγονε.

C. ΛΨ. "Εἴδες οὖν εἶπεῖν αἵτινες 
eἰσίν αἱ ἐπιτηδεύσεις αἱ τοῦτο ποιοῦσαι; Μάλλον 
δὲ, εἰ βούλει, ἔμοι ἑρωτῶντος, ἢ μὲν ἃν σοι δοκῇ 
tούτων εἶναι, φάθι, ἡ δ' ἂν μὴ, μὴ φάθι. πρὸ-
τον δὲ σκεψάμεθα τήν αὐλητικήν. οὐ δοξεῖ σοι ἐπὶ τοιαύτη τις εἶναι, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, τήν ἡδονήν ἡμῶν μόνον διόκειν, ἀλλὰ δ᾽ οὐδὲν φροντίζειν; ΚΑΔ. Ἐμοιγε δοξεῖ. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ αἱ τοιαίδε ἀπασαί, οἴον ἡ κιθαριστική ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἀγώσι; ΚΑΔ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τὶ δὲ ἢ τῶν χορῶν διδασκαλίᾳ καὶ ἢ τῶν διθυράμβουν ποίησις; οὐ τοιαύτη τίς σοι καταφαίνεται; ἢ ἵνα τι φροντίζειν Κινησίαν τὸν Μέλητος, ὅποις ἔρει τι τοιοῦτον, ὅθεν ἃν οἱ ἀκούοντες βελτίων γίγνοντο, ἢ ὁ τι μέλ-502 λεί χαριείσθαι τῷ χρόνῳ τῶν θεατῶν; ΚΑΔ. Δῆλον δὴ τούτο γε, ὁ Σώκρατες, Κινησίον γε πέρι. ΣΩ. Τὶ δὲ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ Μέλης; ἢ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον βλέπων ἔδοξεί σοι κιθαρῳδεῖν; ἢ ἐκείνος μὲν οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸ ἡδότον; ἡνίᾳ γὰρ ἄδειον τοὺς θεατὰς. ἀλλὰ δὴ ἰσότει; οὐχὶ ἢ τε κιθαρῳδικὴ δοξεῖ σοι πᾶσα καὶ ἢ τῶν διθυράμβων ποίησις ἡδονής χάριν εὑρήσθαι; ΚΑΔ. Ἐμοιγε. ΣΩ. Τὶ δὲ δὴ ἡ σεμνὴ αὕτη καὶ ἡ θαυμαστὴ θη τῆς τραγῳδίας ποίησις ἐφ᾽ ὃ ἐστίν τὸ ἐπιχείρημα καὶ ἡ σπουδὴ, ὡς σοι δοξεῖ, χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς θεαταῖς μόνον, ἢ καὶ διαμάχεσθαι, ἢ τοὺς τούτος ἢ δὲν μὲν ἢ καὶ κεχαρισμένον, πονηροῖς δὲ, ὅποις τούτῳ μὲν μὴ ἔρει, εἰ δὲ τι τυχάναι ἄρας καὶ ἀφέλιμον, τοῦτο δὲ καὶ λέξει καὶ ἄσσει, ἢ τοὺς ταυρόπους ἢ τὰς τραγῳδιῶν ποίησις; ΚΑΔ. Δῆλον δὴ τούτο γε, ὁ Σώκρατες, ὃτι πρὸς τὴν ἡδονήν μᾶλλον ἀφησία καὶ τὸ χαριζέσθαι τοῖς θεαταῖς. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ
τοιούτου, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, ἔφαμεν νῦν δὴ κολα-
κεῖαν εἶναι; ᾿ΚΑΔ. Πάνυ γε. ᾿ΣΩ. Φέρε
δὴ, εἰ τις περέλοιτο τῆς ποιήσεως πάσης τὸ τε
μέλος καὶ τὸν όνομὸν καὶ τὸ μέτρον, ἄλλο τι ἡ
λόγοι γίνονται τὸ λειπόμενον; ᾿ΚΑΔ. Ἀνάγ-
κη. ᾿ΣΩ. Οὔκοιν πρὸς πολὺν ὄχλον καὶ δήμον
D ὃντιν λέγονται οἱ λόγοι. ᾿ΚΑΔ. Φημί. ᾿ΣΩ.
Δημηγορία ἀφα τίς ἐστιν ἡ ποιητική. ᾿ΚΑΔ.
Φαίνεται. ᾿ΣΩ. Οὔκοιν ὑποτικὴ δημηγορία
ἀν εὑρ. ἢ οὐ ὑποτευεῖν δοκοῦσί σοι οἱ ποιηταῖ
ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις; ᾿ΚΑΔ. Ἡμοιγε. ᾿ΣΩ. Νῦν
ἀφα ἡμεῖς εὐρήκαμεν ὑποτικήν τινα πρὸς δήμον
τοιούτου, οἷον παίδων τε ὑμοῦ καὶ γυναίκων καὶ
ἀνδρῶν, καὶ δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων, ἢν οὐ πάνυ
ἀγάμεθα· κολακικήν γὰρ αὐτὴν φαμεν εἶναι.
῾ΚΑΔ. Πάνυ γε.

CADE. LVIII. ᾿ΣΩ. Εἶπεν. τί δὲ ἡ πρὸς τὸν
Ἄθηναίων δήμου ὑποτικὴ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους
Ε τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεις δήμους τοὺς τῶν ἐλευθέρων
ἀνδρῶν, τί ποτε ἦμιν αὐτῇ ἔστι; πότερον σοι δο-
κοῦσί πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον ἀεὶ λέγειν οἱ ὑπότε,ρες,
tούτου στοχαζόμενοι, ὅπως οἱ πολίται ὅσ βέλτι-
στοι ἔσονται διὰ τοὺς αὐτῶν λόγους, ἢ καὶ οὐτοῖ
πρὸς τὸ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς πολίταις ἁρμημένοι, καὶ
ἔνεκα τοῦ ἓδιου τοῦ αὐτῶν ὁλορροῦντες τοῦ κοι-
νοῦ, ὡσπερ παῖσι προσσωμιλοῦσι τοῖς δήμοις, χαρί-
ζεσθαι αὐτοῖς πειράμενοι μόνον, εἰ δὲ γε βελτίως
ἔσονται ἢ χείρους διὰ ταῦτα, οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν;
503 ᾿ΚΑΔ. Οὔχ ἀπλοῖν ἔτι τοῦτο ἐρωτᾶς· εἰσὶ μὲν
γὰρ οἱ κηδόμενοι τῶν πολιτῶν λέγουσιν ὥς λέγου-

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οὐ, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ οὗν οὐ λέγεις. ὉΩ. Ἐξωρχεῖ. εἰ γὰρ καὶ τούτῳ ἐστι διπλοῦν, τὸ μὲν ἐτερῶν ποι
τούτοις κολαχεῖα ἂν εἰη καὶ αἰσχρὰ δημηγορία,
tὸ δ' ἐτερῶν καλῶν, τὸ παρασκευάζειν, ὅπως ὁς
βέλτισται ἐσονται τῶν πολιτῶν αἱ ψυχαί, καὶ
dιαμάχεσθαι λέγοντα τὰ βέλτιστα, εἰτε ὕδω εἰτε
ἀνδρέστερα ἐσται τοῖς ἀκούονσιν. ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πάποτε ὑ
οὐ ταύτην εἶδες τὴν ὕπτορικήν ἦ εἰ τινα ἕχει
τῶν ὑπτορῶν τοιοῦτον εἴπειν, τι οὐχί καὶ ἐμοὶ
αὐτὸν ἔφρασας τίς ἔστιν; ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δι᾽
οὖν ἔχω ἔγωγε σοι εἴπειν τῶν γε ἄνω ὑπτορῶν οὐ-
δένα. ὉΩ. Τί δὲ; τῶν παλαιῶν ἔχεις τινα εἰ-
πειν, δι᾽ οὐτινα αἰτίαν ἔχουσιν ὁθηναιοί βελτί-
ους γεγονέναι, ἐπειδὴ ἐκείνος ἐξηβατο δημηγορεῖν,
ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ χείρους ὄντες; ἕγὼ μὲν γὰρ
οὖν οἶδα τίς ἔστιν οὗτος. ΚΑΛ. Τί δὲ; Θε-κ
μιστοκλέα οὖν ἀκούεις ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γεγονότα
καὶ Κίμωνα καὶ Μιλτιάδην καὶ Περικλέα του-
τον ἥν νεωτίς τετελευκότα, οὐ καὶ οὐ ἀκῆ-
κος; ὉΩ. Εἰ ἔστη γε, ὅ Καλλίκλεις, ἡν πρό-
tερον οὐ ἔλεγες ἀφετηρ, ἀληθῆς, τὸ τάς ἐπιθυμίας
ἀποπιπλάναται καὶ τάς αὐτοῦ καὶ τάς τῶν ἄλλων·
εἰ δὲ μὴ τούτο, ἀλλ᾽ ὅπερ ἐν τῷ υπότρῳ λόγῳ
ἡμαχάδθης μεν ἡμεῖς ὁμολογεῖν, ὅτι αἱ καὶ καὶ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν πληροῦμενα βελτίων ποιοῦσι τὸν ἄν-
θρωπον, ταύτας μὲν ἀποτελείν, αἱ δὲ χείρων, μὴ
τούτο δὲ τέχνη τις εἴναι· τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα τούτου
τινα γεγονέναι ἔχεις εἴπειν; ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ ἔχω
ἔγωγε πῶς εἴπω.

CAP. LIX. ὉΩ. Ἀλλ᾽ ἐὼν χητῆς καλῶς,
εὐρήσεις. ἦδομεν δὴ οὕτωσιν ἀτρέμα σχοποῦ-μενοι, εἰ τις τούτων τοιοῦτος γέγονε. φέρε γάρ, Ἔ ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἄνὴρ καὶ ἔπι το βέλτιστον λέγων ἢ ἂν λέγῃ ἄλλο τι οὔκ εἰκῇ ἐφεί, ἄλλῃ ἀποβλέπουν πρὸς τί; ἀσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες δημιουργοί βλέ-ποντες πρὸς τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον ἔκαστος οὐκ εἰκῇ ἐκλεγόμενος προσφέρει ὁ προσφέρει πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ αὐτοῦ, ἄλλῃ ὅπως ἂν εἰδός τι αὐτῷ σχῆ τοῦτο, ὁ ἐργάζεται. οἶον εἰ βούλει ἰδεῖν τοὺς ἔοιχρό- φους, τοὺς οἰκοδόμους, τοὺς ναυπηγούς, τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας δημιουργούς, ὄντος βούλει αὐ-τῶν, ὅσ εἰς τάξιν τινά ἔκαστος ἔκαστον τίθησιν ὁ ἂν τιθῇ, καὶ προσαναγκάζει τὸ ἔτερον τῷ ἔτερῳ πρότερον τε εἶναι καὶ ἀρμότειν, ἐως ἂν τὸ ἄπαν συστήσηται τεταγμένον τε καὶ κεκοσμημένον πράγμα, καὶ οἳ τε δὴ ἄλλοι δημιουργοὶ καὶ οὓς νῦν δὴ ἔλεγομεν, οἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμα παιδοτρίβαι τε καὶ ἰατροί, κοσμοῦσι πον τὸ σῶμα καὶ συντάττου-σιν. ὄμολογοῦμεν οὕτω τοὐτ' ἔχειν, ἢ οὖ; ΚΑΛ. Ἐστω τοῦτο οὕτω. Σ.Ω. Τάξεως ἄρα καὶ κόσμου τυχοῦσα οἰκία χρηστή ἂν εἰη, ἀταξίας Β ἰδὲ μορφηρά; ΚΑΛ. Φημί. Σ.Ω. οὐχοῦν καὶ πλοῖον ὄσαῦτος; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. Σ.Ω. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰ σώματα φαμεν τὰ ἡμέτερα; ΚΑΛ. Πάντα γε. Σ.Ω. Τί δ' ἡ ψυχή; ἀταξίας τυχοῦ-σα ἔσται χρηστή, ἡ τάξεως τε καὶ κόσμου τυνῶς; ΚΑΛ. Ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν καὶ τοῦτο συνο-μολογεῖν. Σ.Ω. Τί οὖν ὅνομά ἐστιν ἐν τῷ σώ-ματι τῷ ἐκ τῆς τάξεώς τε καὶ τοῦ κόσμου γεγο-μένῳ; ΚΑΛ. Ἐγίειν καὶ ἰσχύν ἢσος λέγεις.
Πλατωνιτις

"Ἐγογε. τί δὲ αὐ tο ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐγγίγνοι-κ μένο τῇ τάξεως καὶ τοῦ κόσμου; πειρῶ εὑ-ρεῖν καὶ εἰπεῖν ὁπερ ἔκειν ἡ ὄνομα. ΚΑΔ. Τί δὲ σοι αὐτὸς λέγεις, ὁ Σώκρατες; Σ. Ἀλλ' εἴ σοι ἤδην ἔστιν, ἐγὼ ἐρώ. οὐ δὲ, ἂν μέν σοι δοκῶ ἐγὼ καλῶς λέγειν, φάθι· εἴ δὲ μή, ἔλεγχε καὶ μή ἔπιτρεπε. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ταῖς μὲν τοῦ σώματος τάξειν ὄνομα εἶναι ὑγιεῖνον, ήδ' ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ὑγίεια γίγνεται καὶ ἡ ἀλλή ἁρετή τοῦ σώματος. ἔστι ταῦτα ἡ σοι ἔστιν; ΚΑΔ. Α. Ἑστι. Σ. Ταῖς δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τάξεις τε καὶ κοσμήσεις νόμιμον τε καὶ νόμος, οὗτος καὶ νόμι- μοι γίγνονται καὶ κόσμοι· ταῦτα δ' ἔστι δικαιο- σύνη τε καὶ σωφροσύνη. φῆς, ἡ οὐ; ΚΑΔ. Ἑστώ.

ΚΑΡ. Λ. Σ. Οὐκοῦν πρὸς ταῦτα αὐ βλέ-πων ὁ θεός ἐκεῖνος, ὁ τεχνικὸς τε καὶ ἄγα-θος, καὶ τοὺς λόγους προσοῦσι ταῖς ψυχαῖς οὗς ἄν λέγη καὶ τὰς πράξεις ἁπάσας, καὶ δῷ γενέτο τι διδάξας, δόσει, καὶ ἕξα τι ἁφαίρησαι, ἁφαί- ρησεται, πρὸς τοῦτο ἀεὶ τὸν νοῦν ἔχων, ὅπως ἅν αὐτοῦ τοῖς πολίταις δικαιοσύνη μὲν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς γίγνεται, ἀδικία δὲ ἀπαλλάττεται, καὶ σωφροσύνη μὲν ἐγγίγνηται, ἀκολασία δὲ ἀπαλ- λάττεται, καὶ ἡ ἀλλή ἁρετή ἐγγίγνεται, κακία δὲ ἄπιη; συγχωρεῖς, ἡ οὐ; ΚΑΔ. Συγχωρώ. Σ. Ο. Τί γὰρ ὄφελος, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, σοματί γε κάμνοντι καὶ μοχθηρῶς διακεμένῳ σιτίᾳ πολλα- διδόναι καὶ τὰ ἠδύτα ἡ ποτα ἡ ἀλλ' ὦτιον, ὁ μή ὄνησει αὐτὸ ἔσθ' ὅτε πλέον ἡ τουνάντιον, κα-
Γοργίας.

505τά γε τον δίκαιον λόγον, καὶ ἐλαττον; ἐστι ταύτα; ΚΑΛ. Ἐστο. ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ, οἴμαι, λυστελεῖ μετὰ μοχθηρίας σῶμας ζῆν ἀνθρώπῳ ἀνάγχῃ γὰρ ὦτῳ καὶ ζῆν μοχθηρῶς. ἢ οὖν ὦτῳ; ΚΑΛ. Ναι. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἀποπιμπλάναι, οὗν πενῶντα φαγεῖν ὅσον βούλεται ἡ διηρύντα πιεῖν, ὑγιαίνοντα μὲν ἐξοι εἰτροὶ ὃς τὰ πολλὰ, κάμνοντα δὲ, ὡς ἔποι εἰπεῖν οὔθεποτ' ἔσοι ἐμπίπλασθαι ἃν ἐπιθυμεῖ; συγχαρεῖς τούτῳ γε καὶ σὺ; ΚΑΛ. Β' Ἐγώγε. ΣΩ. Περὶ δὲ ψυχῆν, ὥς ἄριστε, οὖν ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος; ἔσε μὲν ἄν πονηρὰ ἦ, ἀνὸντός τε οὖσα καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ ἄδικος καὶ ἄνοιχος, εἰργεῖν αὐτὴν δεὶ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν ἄλλ' ἄττα ποιεῖν ἢ ἁρ' ἄν βελτίων ἔσται; φής, ἢ οὗ; ΚΑΛ. Φημί. ΣΩ. Οὔτω γὰρ ποιν αὐτῇ ἄμεινον τῇ ψυχῇ. ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ εἰργεῖν ἐστίν ἁρ' ἄν ἐπιθυμεῖ κολάσειν; ΚΑΛ. Ναι. ΣΩ. Τὸ κολάζεσθαι ἄρα τῇ ψυχῇ ἄμεινον ἐστίν ἢ ἡ ἀκολοσία, ὡσπερ οὐ νῦν δὴ οὖν. ΚΑΛ. Οὐχ οἶδ' ἄττα λέγεις, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἄλλων τινα ἐφάτα. ΣΩ. Οὗτος ἄνηρ οὖχ ὑπομένει ἀφελοῦμενος καὶ αὐτὸς τοῦτο πάσχου, περὶ οὗ δὴ λόγος ἐστί, κολαζόμενος. ΚΑΛ. Οὔδε γέ μοι μέλει οὐδὲν ἄν σὺ λέγεις, καὶ ταῦτα σοι Γοργίων χάριν ἀπεκφινάμην. ΣΩ. Εἶξεν, τί οὖν δὴ ποιήσομεν; μεταξύ τὸν λόγον καταλύομεν; ΚΑΛ. Αὐτὸς γρώσει. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' δ' οὖν τοὺς μύθους φασι μεταξύ θέμισ εἰναι καταλείπειν, ἀλλ' ἐπιθέντας κεφαλὴν, ἰνα μὴ ἄνευ
κεφαλῆς περίη. ἀπόκριναι οὖν καὶ τὰ λοιπά, ἵνα ἦμιν ὁ λόγος κεφαλῆν λάβῃ.

Cap. LXI. ΚΑΔ. Ἡς βίαιος εἰ, ὁ Σώκρατες. ἦν δὲ ἐμοὶ πείθη, ἐδόσεις χαίρειν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, ἦ καὶ ἄλλο τῷ διαλέξει. ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν ἄλλος ἔθελε; μη γὰρ τοι ἀτέλη γε τὸν λόγον καταλείπωμεν. ΚΑΔ. Αὑτὸς δὲ οὐχ ἂν δύναιο διελθεῖν τὸν λόγον, ἦ λέγων κατὰ σαυτὸν Ἐ ἡ ἀποκρίνομενος σαυτῷ; ΣΩ. Ἡν μοι τὸ τοῦ Ἐπιχάριμου γέννηται, ἥ πρὸ τοῦ δύο ἄνδρες ἔλεγον, εἰς οὖν ἵκανός γέννομαι. ἀτὰρ κυκνυνεῖται ἀναγκαιότατον εἴναι οὕτως. εἰ μέντοι ποιήσωμεν, οἴμαι ἐγωγε χρῆναι πάντας ἡμᾶς φιλονεῖκας ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ εἶδέναι τὸ ἀληθὲς τί ἐστι περὶ ὧν λέγομεν καὶ τί ὑπόδες· κοινὸν γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἀπασι φανερὸν γενέσθαι αὐτῷ. διέμι μὲν οὖν τῷ λόγῳ ἐγὼ ὡς ἡν μοι δοκῇ ἐχεῖν· ἦν δὲ τῷ 506 ὑμῶν μὴ τὰ ὅντα δοξῶ ὁμολογεῖν ἐμαυτῷ, χρῆ ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ ἐλέγχειν. οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦ ἐγωγε εἰδῶς λέγω ἢ λέγα, ἀλλὰ ἡταὶ κοινῆ μεθ᾽ ὑμῶν, ὡστε, ἂν τι φαίνηται λέγων ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν ἐμοὶ, ἐγὼ πρῶτος συγχωρήσομαι. λέγω μέντοι ταῦτα, εἰ δοξεῖ χρῆναι διαπερανθῆναι τὸν λόγον· εἰ δὲ μὴ βουλεσθε, ἐκμεν δὴ χαίρειν καὶ ἀπίστωμεν. ГОР. Ἀλλ᾽ ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖ δοξεῖ, ὁ Σώκρατες, χρῆναι πω ἀπιέναι, ἀλλὰ διεξέλθειν Β σε τὸν λόγον· φαίνεται δὲ μοι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοξεῖν. βουλομαι γὰρ ἐγωγε καὶ αὐτὸς ἄκουοις σοι αὐτὸν διώντος τὰ ἐπίλουτα. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ, ὁ Γοργία, καὶ αὐτὸς ἡδέως μὲν ἂν Καλ-
λικλεῖ τούτῳ ἐτὶ διελεγόμην, ἔως αὐτῷ τὴν τοῦ Ἀμφίονος ἀπέδωξα ὥσιν ἀντὶ τῆς τοῦ Ζήθου· ἐπειδὴ δὲ σὺ, οὖ πολλάκις συνδια-περᾶναι τὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' οὖν ἐμοῖ γε ἀκοοῦν ἐπὶ πλασμάνου, ἐὰν τί σοι δοκῶ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν. καὶ με ἐὰν ἔξελέγξης, οὐκ ἀχθεσθήσομαι σοι, ὅσπερ σοι ἐμοί, ἀλλὰ μέγιστος ἐνεργήτης παρ’ ἐμοί ἀναγεγράψει. ΚΑΛ. Δέγε, δ’ γαθέ, αὐτῶς καὶ πέφαινε.

CAP. LXII. ΣΩ. "Ἀχοῦε δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐμοὶ ἀναλαβόντος τὸν λόγον. Ἀρα τὸ ἱδὺ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν; Οὐ ταύτων, ὡς ἐγὼ καὶ Καλλικλῆς ὀμολογήσαμεν. Πότερον δὲ τὸ ἱδὺ ἔνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πρακτέων, ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔνεκα τοῦ ἱδέος; Τὸ ἱδὺ ἔνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Ἡδὺ δὲ ἔστι τούτῳ, οὗ παραγεγραμένου ἡδόμεθα; ἀγαθῶν δὲ, οὗ παρόντος ἀγαθοὶ ἐσμέν; Πάνυ γε. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθοὶ γέ ἐσμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ τάλλα πάντα δόσα ἀγαθὰ ἐστίν, ἄρετὴς τίνος παραγεγραμένης; "Εμοίγε δοξεῖ ἀναγχαίον εἶναι, ὁ Καλ- λικλῆς. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ἢ γε ἄρετὴ ἐκάστου, καὶ σκεύους καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς αὐτι καὶ ζώου παντὸς, οὐ τοῦ εἰκῆ κάλλιστα παραγίγνεται, ἀλλὰ τάξει καὶ ὀρθότητι καὶ τέχνῃ, ἦτε ἐκάστῳ ἀποδέδοται αὐτῶν. ἀρα ἐστι ταύτα; Ἔγω μὲν Ε γάρ φημι. Τάξει ἄρα τεταμένον καὶ κεκοσμημένον ἐστίν ἡ ἄρετὴ ἐκάστου; Φαίην ἂν ἔγραψε. Κόσμος τοις ἄρα ἐγγεγραμμένοις ἐν ἐκάστῳ δ ἐκάστου οἰκεῖος ἀγαθὸν παρέχει ἐκαστὸν τῶν ὅντων; "Εμοίγε δοξεῖ. Καὶ ψυχῇ ἄρα κόσμον ἐχοῦσα
τὸν ἐαυτὸς ἀμείνον τῆς ἀκοσμήτου; Ἄναγκη. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἢ γε κόσμον ἔχουσα κοσμία; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ κέλλει; Ἡ δὲ γε κοσμία σῶφρον; 507 Πολλὴ ἀναγκή. Ἡ ἄρα σῶφρον γυνὴ ἀγαθή. Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἥχῳ παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλα φάναι, ὡς φίλε Καλλίκλεις; σοῦ δ’ εἰ ἕχεις, δίδασκε. ΚΑΛ. Λέγ’, ὁ γαθε. ΣΩ. Λέγω δή, ὅτι, εἰ ἡ σῶφρον ἀγαθή ἔστιν, ἡ τούτων τῷ σῶφρον πεπονθοῦνα κακὴ ἔστιν. ἢν δὲ αὐτὴ ἡ ἁφρον τε καὶ ἀχόλαστος; Πάνυ γε. Καὶ μὴν ὡ γε σῶφρον τὰ προσήκοντα πράττοι ἂν καὶ περὶ Θεοῦ καὶ περὶ ἀνθρώπους; οὐ γὰρ ἂν σωφρονοί τὰ μὴ προσήκοντα πράττον. Ἄναγκη ταῦτ’ εἶναι οὐτω. Καὶ μὴν περὶ μὲν ἀνθρώπους τὰ προσήκοντα ἐπὶ πράττοι δίκαι’ ἂν πράττοι, περὶ δὲ Θεοῦ ὀσια· τὸν δὲ τὰ δίκαια καὶ ὀσία πράττοντα ἀνάγκη δίκαιον καὶ ὀσῖον εἶναι; Ἐστι ταῦτα. Καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ ἀνδρείων γε ἀνάγκη; οὐ γὰρ δὴ σωφρόνων ἄνδρός ἐστιν οὔτε διάκειν οὔτε φεύγειν ἡ μὴ προσήκη, ἀλλ’ ἡ δεῖ καὶ πράγματα καὶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἡδονᾶς καὶ λύπας φεύγειν καὶ διάκειν, καὶ ὑπομένοντα καρτερεῖν ὅπου δεῖ· ὃστε πολλὴ ἄναγκη, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, τὸν σῷφρονα ὅπερ δυῆλθομεν, δίκαιον ὄντα καὶ ἀνδρείων καὶ ὀσίων ἁγαθῶν ἄνδρα εἶναι τελέσως, τὸν δὲ ἁγαθὸν εἰ τε καὶ καλῶς πράττειν ὁ ἂν πράτης, τὸν δ’ εἰ πράττοντα μακάριον τε καὶ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι, τὸν δὲ πονηρὸν καὶ κακῶς πράττοντα ἄθλιον. οὗτος δ’ ἂν εἰῃ ὁ ἐναντίως ἔχων τῷ σῶφρον, ὁ ἀχόλαστος, οὗ ὦ ἐπίπεδες. ΣΑΡ. LXIII. Ἔγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα
οὔτω τίθεμαι καὶ φημι ταῦτα ἁληθῆ εἶναι. εἰ δὲ
D ἔστιν ἁληθῆ, τὸν Βουλόμενον, ὡς ἔσχεν, εὐδαι-
μονα εἶναι σωφροσύνην μὲν διωκτέον καὶ ἄσκη-
tέον, ἀκολασίαν δὲ φευγκέον ὡς ἔχει ποῦδιν ἐξα-
στος ἡμῶν, καὶ παρασκευαστέον μᾶλιστα μὲν
μηδὲν δείσθαι τοῦ κολάζεσθαι, εάν δὲ δεηθῇ ἢ
αὐτὸς ἢ ἄλλος τις τῶν οἰκείων, ἢ ἰδιώτης ἢ πόλις,
ἐπιθετέον δίκην καὶ κολαστέον, εἰ μέλλει εὐδαι-
μον εἶναι. οὕτος ἡμοίγε δοξεῖ ὁ σχοπὸς εἶναι,
πρὸς ὅν βλέποντα δεῖ ἥμν, καὶ πάντα εἰς τοῦτο
τὰ αὐτοῦ συντείνοντα καὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως
E δικαιοσύνη παρέσται καὶ σωφροσύνη τῷ μακαρίῳ
μέλλοντε ἔσχεθαι, οὕτω πρᾶττειν, οὐκ ἐπιθυμίας
ἐόντα ἀκολάστους εἶναι καὶ ταύτας ἐπιχειροῦντα
πληροῦν, ἀνήνυτον κακόν, ληστοῦ βίον ἔσνατα.
οὕτε γὰρ ἂν ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπῳ προσφιλῆ ἂν εῇ ὁ
tοιοῦτος οὕτε θεῷ· κοινωνεῖν γὰρ ἀδύνατος·
ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ ἔνι κοινωνία, φιλία οὐχ ἂν εἴη. φασὶ
δὲ οἱ σοφοὶ, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, καὶ οὐρανόν καὶ γῆν
gοσκαὶ Θεοῦς καὶ ἀνθρώπους τὴν κοινωνίαν συνέχειν
καὶ φιλίαν καὶ κοσμιότητα καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ
dikeóteta, — καὶ τὸ ὄλον τοῦτο διὰ ταύτα κό-
σμον καλοῦσιν, ὡς ἔταιρε, — οὕτω ἄκοσμαν οὐδὲ
ἀκολασίαν. οὐ δὲ μοι δοξεῖς ὅποις προσέχειν τῶν
νοῦν τούτοις, καὶ ταύτα σοφοὶ ἂν, ἄλλα λέληθε
σε, ὅτι ἡ ἰσότης ἡ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ ἐν Θεοῖς καὶ ἐν
ἀνθρώποις μέγα δύναται. οὐ δὲ πλεονεξίαν οἴει
dεῖν ἀσχεῖν· γεωμετριάς γὰρ ἀμελεῖς. Εἴειν. ἕ
B ἐξελεγκτεὸς δὴ οὕτως ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἔστιν, ὡς οὐ
dikaiosúnhe kai sopherousûnhe xthisei eudaimoves
οἱ εὐδαίμονες, κακίας δὲ οἱ ἀθλιοὶ. ἦ εἰ οὗτος ἀληθῆς ἦστι, σχεπτέον τί τα συμβαίνοντα. τὰ πρόσθεν ἐκεῖνα, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, συμβαίνει πάντα, ἐφ' οἷς οὐ με ἢρον, εἰ σπουδάζων λέγωμι, λέγοντα, ὅτι κατηγορητέον εἰη καὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ νιέσκα τεταίρων, εἀν τι ἀδικη, καὶ τῇ ἤμοτοτῇ ἐπὶ τούτω χρηστέων. καὶ ὁ Πόλος αἰσχύνη ᾧ οὐν συγχωρεῖν, ἀληθῆ ἁρα ἦν, τὸ εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ θ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὁσφερὲ παύχων, τοσούτω κάκιον καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα ὁρθὸς ἤμοτοτὸν ἔσσεσαι δίκαιον ἁρὰ δεὶ εἰναι καὶ εἰπτιήμονα τῶν δίκαιων, ὁ αὐ Γοργίαν ἐφὴ Πόλος δι' αἰσχύνην ὁμολόγησα. 

Cap. LXIV. Τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων, σχεψώμεθα τὶ ποτ' ἐστίν ἃ σὺ ἐμοὶ ὀνειδίζεις, ἃρα καλὸς λέγεται, ἢ οὐ, ὁς ἁρὰ ἐγὼ οὐχ οὖς τ' εἰμὶ βοηθήσαι οὔτε ἐμαυτῷ οὔτε τῶν φίλων οὐδενὶ οὔτ' ἐκεῖς τῶν οἰκείων, οὔτ' ἐκαίεις ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κυνόνων, εἰμὶ δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ ὀσφερὲ οἱ ἄτιμοι ὁ τοῦ ἔθελοντος, ἃν τε τύπτειν βουλήσει, τὸ νεανικὸν δὲ τούτῳ τοῦ σοῦ λόγου, ἔπι κόρης, ἢ ἀν τε χρηματὰ ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, ἢ ἐν τε ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἢ ἐν το, τὸ ἔσχατον, ἀποκτεῖναι καὶ οὕτω διακεῖσθαι πάντων δὴ αἰσχιστὸν ἔστιν, ὥς οὐ σος λόγους. ἢ δὲ δὴ ἐμὸς, ὅστις πολλάκις μὲν ἢδη εὑρεῖ, οὐδὲν δὲ καλύπτει καὶ ἐτί λέγεσθαι. οὐ φημι, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, τὸ τύπτεσθαι ἐπί κόρης ἄδικως Ε ἀδίκως ἐναι, οὔτε γε το τύπτεσθαι οὔτε το σῶμα τὸ ἐμὸν οὔτε το βαλάντιον, ἀλλὰ το τύπτειν καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ τα ἐμὰ ἄδικας καὶ τέμνειν καὶ αἰσχικά καὶ κάκιον, καὶ κλέπτειν γε ἄμα καὶ ἀνδρα-
καὶ τοιχωρυχεῖν καὶ συλλήβδην ὅτι οὐν ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ τὰ ἐμὰ τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ αἰ-
σχίον καὶ κάκιον εἶναι ἡ ἐμοὶ τῷ ἀδικοῦμένῳ. Ῥᾳ ἦν ἄνω ἔχει ἐν τοῖς ἐμπρόσθεν λόγοις
οὖν φανέντα, ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω, κατέχεται καὶ δι-
δεται, καὶ εἰ ἄγροικότερόν τι εἰπεῖν ἔστι, οἰδηροὶς
καὶ ἀδαμαντίνοις λόγοις, ὡς γοῦν ἂν δοξεῖν
οὕτωσιν, οὐδὲν εἰ μὴ λύσεις ἢ σοῦ τις νεανικό-
τερος, οὐχ οἶδα τε, ἄλλως λέγοντα ἢ ὡς ἐγὼ νῦν
λέγω, καλῶς λέγειν· ἔπει ἔμοιγε ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος
ἐστὶν άϊς, ὅτι ἐγὼ ταύτα ὑμᾶς ὑπαίτις ἔχει, ὅτι
μέντοι ὃν ἐγὼ ἐντεῦχηκα, ἀσπερ νῦν, οὐδεὶς οἶδας
περὶ τ' ἐστὶν ἄλλως λέγον μὴ οὐ καταγέλαστος εἴναι.
ἐγὼ μὲν οὐν αὕ τίθημι ταύτα οὕτως ἔχειν. εἰ δὲ
οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστίν ἡ ἀδι-
κία τῷ ἀδικοῦντι, καὶ ἔτι τούτοι μείζον μεγίστον
οἄντος, εἰ οἶδα τε, τὸ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην,
tίνα ἂν βοήθειαν μὴ δυνάμενος ἄνθρωπος βοη-
θεῖν ἑαυτῷ καταγέλαστος ἂν τῇ ἁληθείᾳ εἰνή; ἄρ' οὖ ταύτην, ἢτις ἀποτρέψει τὴν μεγίστην
ημῶν βλάβην; ἄλλα πολλῇ ἀνάγκῃ ταύτην εἴναι
tὴν αἰσχύσειν βοήθειαν, μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν
μήτε ἑαυτῷ μήτε τοῖς αὐτοῖς φίλοις τε καὶ οἰκεί-
οΐς, δευτέραν δὲ τὴν τοῦ δευτέρου κακοῦ καὶ τρί-
tην τὴν τοῦ τρίτου, καὶ τὰλλα οὕτως· ὃς ἐκά-
στοι κακοῦ μέγεθος πέρικεν, οὕτω καὶ κάλλος
τοῦ δυνατοῦ εἶναι ἐφ' ἐκαστά βοηθεῖν καὶ αἰσχύ-
νη τοῦ μή. ἄρα ἄλλως, ἢ οὕτως ἔχει, ὡς Καλλι-
κλείς, ΚΑΛ. Οὖν ἄλλως.

CAP. LXV. ΣΩ. Δυνοῖν οὖν ὄντων, τοῦ ἀδι-
9
κείν τε καὶ ἀδικεῖον, μετ' οὗ μὲν φαμεν κακὸν τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ἐλαττὸν δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖον. τί οὖν ἂν παρασκευασόμενοι ἀνθρώπος βοηθήσειεν αὐτῷ, ὅστε ἅμορφοτέρας τὰς ἀφελείας ταύτας ἔχειν, τὴν D τε ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖον; πότερα δύναμιν, ἡ βούλησιν; ὡδὲ δὲ λέγω. πότερον ἦν μὴ βούλησιν ἀδικεῖον, οὐκ ἀδικήσεται, ἡ ἦν δύναμιν παρασκευάσηται τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖον, οὐκ ἀδικήσεται; Ἀδηλον δὴ τούτο γε, ὦτι ἦν δύναμιν. ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν; πότερον ἦν μὴ βούλησιν ἀδικεῖν, ἵκανον τούτ' ἐστίν — οὐ γὰρ ἀδικήσει —, ἡ καὶ Ε ἐπὶ τούτῳ δεῖ δύναμιν τινα καὶ τέχνην παρασκευάσασθαι, ὥστ' ἦν μὴ μάθη αὐτῇ καὶ ἄσκησιν, ἀδικήσει; Τί οὐκ αὐτὸ γέ μοι τούτῳ ἀπεκρίνα, ὅ Καλλίκλεις; πότερον οὐκ ὁκούμεν ὅρθος ἄναγκασθήναι ὁμολογεῖν ἐν τοῖς ἐμπρόσθεν λόγοις ἐγώ τε καὶ Πάλος, ἡ οὖ, ἡνίκα ὁμολογήσαμεν μηδένα βουλόμενον ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλ' ἄκουσας τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας πάντας ἀδικεῖν; ἈΔ. Ἑστο οὐκ οὕτω, ὅ Σώκρατες, ὀυτος, ἵνα διαπεράνῃς τὸν λόγον. ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἁρα, ὅς ἔσοικ, παρασκευαστέον ἔστι δύναμιν τινα καὶ τέχνην, ὅπως μὴ ἀδικήσωμεν. ἈΔ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν ποτέ ἐστι τέχνη τῆς παρασκευῆς τοῦ μηδὲν ἀδικεῖον ἡ ὡς ὄλγιστα; σκέψασαι, εἰ σοι δοκεῖ ἢπερ ἐμοί. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ ἢδε· ἡ αὐτὸν ἄρχειν δεῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἡ καὶ τυραννεῖν, ἡ τῆς ὕπαρχούσης πολιτείας ἔταφον εἶναι. ἈΔ. Ὅρας, ὅ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἐγὼ ἔτοιμός εἰμι
Β ἐπανείν, ἃν τι καλῶς λέγης; τούτῳ μοι δοκεῖς πάντων καλῶς εἰργηκέναι.

Cap. LXVI. Σ.Ω. Σκότει ὅτι καὶ τόδε ἐώς σοι δοκῶ εὖ λέγειν. φίλος μοι δοκεῖ ἐκαστος ἐκά- στῳ εἶναι ὡς οἶδα το μᾶλλον, ἀνπερ οἱ παλαιοὶ τε καὶ σοφοὶ λέγουσιν, ὃ ὁμοῖος τῷ ὁμοίῳ. οὐ καὶ σοι; Κ.Α.Α. 'Εμοιγε. Σ.Ο. Οὐχοῦν ὅπων τύφαννος ἔστιν ἄρχων ἄργιος καὶ ἀπαίδευτος, εἰ τις τούτου ἐν τῇ πόλει πολὺ βελτίων εἴη, φο- βοῖτο δὴμον ἃν αὐτὸν ὁ τύφαννος καὶ τούτῳ ἐξ ἁπαντος τοῦ νοῦ οὐχ ἃν ποτε δύνατο φίλος γενέσθαι; Κ.Α.Α. Ἐστι ταῦτα. Σ.Ο. Οὐδὲ γε εἰ τις πολὺ φανερότερος εἴη, οὐδ᾿ ἃν οὕτως· καταφρονοὶ γὰρ ἃν αὐτοῦ ὁ τύφαννος καὶ οὐχ ἃν ποτε ὡς πρὸς φίλον σπουδάσειε. Κ.Α.Α. Καὶ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ. Σ.Ο. Δείπτεται δὴ ἐκεῖνος μόνος ἄξιος λόγου φίλος τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὃς ἃν, ὁμοίητης ἃν, ταῦτα μὲγα καὶ ἐπαναλήθη ἄρχοντες καὶ ὑποκείσθαι τῷ ἄρχοντι. οὕτως μέγα ἐν ταῦτῃ τῇ πόλει δυνηθεται· τούτων οὐδεὶς χαίρων ἀδικήσει. οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; Κ.Α.Α. Νάι. Σ.Ο. Εἰ ἁρὰ τις ἐννοήσει ἐν ταῦτῃ τῇ πόλει τῶν νέων, Τίνα ἃν τρόπον ἐγὼ μέγα δυναίμην καὶ μηδείς με ἀδικοίη, αὐτή, ὡς ἔοικεν, αὐτῶν ὡς ὑπερ ἐστιν, εὐθὺς ἐκ νέου έρίζειν αὐτῶν τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν καὶ ἀρχεῖσθαι τῷ δεσπότῃ, καὶ παρα- σκευάζειν, ὅπως οἱ μάλιστα ὁμοίοις ἔσται ἐκεῖνοι. Ἐ σοχ οὕτως; Κ.Α.Α. Νάι. Σ.Ο. Οὐχοῦν τούτῳ τῷ μὲν μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ μέγα δύνασθαι, ὡς ὁ ὑμετέρος λόγος, ἐν τῇ πόλει διαπεπράζεται.
ΚΑΔ. Πάνω γε. ΣΩ. ἦ' Ἀρ' οὖν καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν; ή πολλοῦ δεῖ, εἶπερ ὁμοίος ἔσται τῷ ἄρχοντι, ὅντι ἀδίκος, καὶ παρὰ τούτῳ μέγα δυνη- σεται; ἀλλ' οἶμαι ἔγογγε, πᾶν τούναντίον ὀυ- τωσί ή παρασκευὴ ἔσται αὐτῷ ἐπὶ τὸ ὅφε τε εἶναι ὡς πλείστα ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην. ἦ γὰρ. ΚΑΔ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Οὐκ- οὖν τὸ μέγιστον αὐτῷ κακὸν ὑπάρχει, μοχθηρῷ ὅντι τὴν ψυχήν καὶ λελωθμένον ὅτα τὴν μίμησιν τοῦ δεσπότου καὶ δύναμιν. ΚΑΔ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ὅτι στρέφεις ἐκάστοτε τοὺς λόγους ἄνω καὶ κά- τω, ὡ Σόκρατε. ἦ οὐκ οἶθα, ὅτι οὔτος ὁ μιμού- μενος τὸν μὴ μιμοῦμενον ἐκεῖνον ἀποκτενεῖ, ἐάν βουλήται, καὶ ἀφαιρήσεται τὰ ὅντα; ΣΩ. Οἶδα. ὃ ἑγὼ Καλλίκλεις, εἰ μὴ κωφὸς γ' εἰμί, καὶ σοῦ ἀκούσω καὶ Πόλου ἀρτι πολλάκις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄλγου πάντων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει. ἀλλὰ καὶ σὺ ἔμου ἄκουε, ὅτι ἀποκτενεῖ μέν, ἂν βουλήται, ἀλλὰ πονηρός ὃν καλὸν κἀγαθὸν ὅντα. ΚΑΔ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀγανακτήτων; ΣΩ. Οὐ νοῦν γε ἔχοντι, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει. ή οὔτε δεῖν τοῦτο παρασκευαζόμενον ἀνθρώπων, ὡς πλείστον χρόνον ἔχει, καὶ μελετῶν τὸ στέχους ταύτας, αὐ ἄρα οὐκ έκ τῶν κινδύνων σάρξουσιν, ὅσπερ καὶ ἂν σὺ κε- λεύεις ἐμὲ μελετῶν τὴν ἡττορικήν, τὴν ἐν τοῖς δι- καιωτήτοις διασώζουσαι; ΚΑΔ. Ναὶ μὰ Δ' ὀρθῶς γέ σοι συμβουλεύων.

ΣΑΡ. LXVII. ΣΩ. Τῇ δὲ, ὃ βέλτιστο; ἦ καὶ ή τοῦ νεῖν ἐπιστήμη σεμνή τίς σοι δοκεῖ εἰ- ναι; ΚΑΔ. Μὰ Δί' οὖχ ἔμοιγε. ΣΩ. Καὶ
μὴν σάζει γε καὶ αὕτη ἐκ Θανάτου τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ὅταν εἰς τοιούτους ἐμπέσωσιν, οὐ δεῖ ταύτης τῆς ἐπιστήμης. εἰ δὲ αὕτη σοι δοξεῖ σμιχρα ἐναι, ὡς σοι μείζονα ταύτης ἔρω, τὴν κυθερνηκήν, ἢ οὔ μόνον τὰς ψυχὰς σάζει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰ χρήματα ἐκ τῶν ἐσχάτων κυνδύνων, ὡστερ ἡ φητορική, καὶ αὕτη μὲν προσεσταλμένη ἔστι καὶ κοσμία, καὶ οὐ σεμνύνεται ἐσχηματισμένη ὡς ὑπερήφανον τι διαπραττομένη, ἀλλὰ ταύτα διαπραξάμενη τῇ δικαικῇ, εάν μὲν ἔξι Aἰγίνης δεύρο σώη, οἶμαι, δ' οὐθελοῦν ἐπράξαι ἐξατο, εὰν δὲ ἔξι Aἰγύπτου ἡ ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου, εάν πάμπολυ ταύτης τῆς μεγάλης εὐεργεσίας, σώσασ' ἀ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ παῖδας καὶ χρηματα καὶ γυναῖκας, ἀποδιδάσκοι εἰς τὸν λιμένα δύο δραχμὰς ἐπράξατο, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἔχων τὴν τεχνὴν καὶ ταύτα διαπραξάμενος ἐκδᾶς παρὰ τὴν θάλατταν καὶ τὴν ναῦν περιπατεῖ ἐν μετρίῳ σχήματι. λογίζεσθαι γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐπίσταται, ὅτι ἀδηλίων ἔστιν οὐστινας τε ὀφέληκε τῶν συμπλεύστων σῶν ἐσάς καταποντικὸς καὶ οὐστινας ἐξέκλησεν, εἰδὼς, ὅτι οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς βελτίωσ ἐξέβιβασεν ἡ οἴοι ἐνεβήσαν, οὐτε τὰ σώματα οὔτε τὰς ψυχὰς. λογίζεται οὖν, ὅτι οὕς, εἰ μὲν τὰς μεγάλους καὶ ἀνίκας νοσήμασι κατὰ τὸ σῶμα συνεχόμενος μὴ ἀπεπνήγη, οὕτος μὲν ἀθλιὸς ἢ στίν, ὅτι οὕξ ἀπέθανε, καὶ οὐδὲν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὀφέληται. εἰ δὲ τις ἄρα ἐν τῷ τοῦ σώματος τιμωτέρῳ, τῇ ψυχῇ, πολλὰ νοσήματα ἔχει καὶ ἀνίκατα, τούτῳ δὲ βιωτέον ἔστι καὶ τούτον ὑψήσειν, ἂν τε ἔξ
θαλάτης ἂν τε ἐκ δικαστηρίων ἂν τε ἀλλοθεν ὄποθενον σώσῃ, ἀλλ’ οἴδεν, ὅτι οὐκ ἄμεινόν ἐστι β' ζην τῷ μοχθηρῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. κακῶς γὰρ ἀνάγχη ἐστὶ ζῆν. ΨΑΡ. LXVIII. Διὰ ταῦτα οὐ νόμος ἐστὶ σεμνόνεσθαι τὸν κυβερνήτην, καίπερ σάξωντα ἓμας. οὕδε γε, ὅ Θαυμάσιε, τὸν μηχανοποίον, ὅς οὔτε στρατηγοῦ, μὴ ὅτι κυβερνήτου, οὔτε ἄλλον ὀυδενὸς ἐλάττω ἐνίοτε δύναται σάξειν· τόλεις γὰρ ἐστιν οτὲ άλας σάξει. μὴ σοι δοκεῖ κατὰ τὸν δικανικὸν εἶναι; καίτοι εἰ βούλοιτο λέγειν, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, ἀπερ ύμεῖς, σεμνόνων τὸ πράγμα, καταχώσειεν ἂν ἓμας τοῖς λόγοις, λέγων καὶ πα-κρακάλων ἐπὶ τὸ δείν γίγνεσθαι μηχανοποίοις, ὅς οὐδεν τάλλα ἐστιν· ἰκανὸς γὰρ αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος. ἀλλὰ ὁ οὐδέν ἴττον αὐτοῦ καταφρονεῖς καὶ τῆς τεχνῆς τῆς ἐκείνου, καὶ ὃς ἐν ὄνειδει ἀποκαλέσαι ἄν μηχανοποίον, καὶ τῷ νεῖει αὐτοῦ οὔτ’ ἀν δοῦναι θυγατέρα ἐθέλοις, οὔτ’ ἂν αὐτὸς τῷ σαυτοῦ λαθεῖν τὴν ἐκείνου. καίτοι ἐξ ὅν τὰ σαυτοῦ ἐπαινεῖς, τίνι δικαίῳ λόγῳ τοῦ μηχανοποίου καταφρο-νεῖς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄν νῦν ἥ ἐλεγον; οἶδ’ ὅτι Δφαῖς ἂν βελτίων εἶναι καὶ ἐκ βελτίων. τὸ δὲ βέλτιον εἰ μὴ ἐστὶν ὁ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἀλλ’ αὐτῷ τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν ἄρετή, τὸ σάξειν αὐτὸν καὶ τὰ ἐαυτοῦ ὄντα ὀποῖος τις ἐτυχε, καταγέλαστός σοι ὁ ψόγος γίγνε-ται καὶ μηχανοποίος καὶ ιατρὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν, δια τοῦ σάξειν ἑνεκα πεποίηται. ἀλλ’, ὃ μακάρε, ὃρα μὴ ἄλλο τι τὸ γενναῖον καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἡ τοῦ σάξειν τε καὶ σάξεσθαι. μὴ γὰρ τούτο μέν, τὸ ζῆν ὄποσονδὴ χρόνον, τὸν γε ὡς Ε
αληθῶς ἄνδρα ἔστει καὶ οὐ φιλοψυχητέον, ἀλλὰ ἐπιτρέπαμα περί τούτων τῷ Θεῷ καὶ πιστεύσαντα ταῖς γυναιξίν, ὅτι τὴν εἰμαρμένην οὐδ’ ἂν εἰς ἐκφύγοι, τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ σχετεῖν, τίν’ ἂν τρόπον τούτον ὅν μέλλει χρόνον βιώναι ὡς ἀριστά βιών, ἄρα ἐξομοιοῦν αὐτὸν τῇ πολιτείᾳ.

513ταύτη, ἐν ἦ ἂν οἰκή, καὶ νῦν δὲ ἄρα δεῖ σε ὡς ὁμιοίατον γίγνεσθαι τῷ δήμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων, εἰ μέλλεις τούτῳ προσφελῆς εἶναι καὶ μέγα δυνάσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει; τοῦθ’ ὥρα εἰ σοι λυσιτελεῖ καὶ ἐμοί, ὅπως μή, ὃ δαιμόνιε, πεισόμεθα ὅπερ φασί τἀς τὴν σελήνην καθαρούσας, τὰς θεταλίδας· σὺν τοῖς φιλτάτοις ἡ αἴρεσις ἦμιν ἔσται ταύτης τῆς δυνάμεος τῆς ἐν τῇ πόλει. εἰ δὲ σοι οἰκεί δυντινοῦ ἀνθρώπων παραδώσειν τέχνην τινὰ τοιαύτην, ἦτι σε ποιήσει μέγα δυνάσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει τῷ δήμῳ ὅντα τῇ πολιτείᾳ εἰτ’ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον εἰτ’ ἐπὶ τὸ χείρον, ὡς ἔμοι δοκεῖ, οὐκ ὁρθῶς βουλεύει, ὁ Καλλίκλεις· οὐ γὰρ μιμητὴν δεῖ εἶναι, ἀλλ’ αὐτοφυής ὁμιοῦν τούτοις, εἰ μέλλεις τι γνήσιον ἀπεργάζεσθαι εἰς φιλίαν τῷ Ἀθηναίων δήμῳ καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία τῷ Πυριλάμπους γε πρὸς ὅτις οὖν σε τούτοις ὁμιοίατον ἀπεργάζεται, οὕτος σε ποιήσει, ὡς ἐπιθυμεῖς πολιτικὸς εἶναι, ποιεῖν εἰς τοιούτων καὶ ὑποτικὸν· τῷ ἄντων γὰρ ἦθει λεγόμενον τῶν λόγων ἔκαστοι ἀλήθεια, τῷ δὲ ἀλλωτρίῳ ἀχθονται. εἰ μή τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις, ὃ φίλη κεφαλή. Λέγομεν τι πρὸς ταῦτα, ὁ Καλλίκλεις; Cap. LXIX. ΚΑΛ. Οὐχ οἶδ’ ὄντινα μοι τρόπον δοκεῖς εὐ λέγειν, ὃ Σώκρατες. πέπονθα δὲ
τὸ τῶν πολλῶν πάθως· οὐ πάνω σοι πείθομαι. Σ.Δ. ὁ δὴ μον γὰρ ἔρως, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, ἔνων ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τῇ σῇ ἀντιστατεῖ μοι· ἀλλ' ἐὰν πολλακίς ἔσως καὶ βέλτιον ταῦτα ταῦτα διασκοπόμεθα, πεισθήσει. ἀναμνήσθητι δ' οὖν, ὅτι δ' ἔφαμεν εἶναι τὰς παρασκευὰς ἐπὶ τὸ ἐκαστὸν θεραπεύειν καὶ σῶμα καὶ ψυχήν, μίαν μὲν πρὸς ἴδιον ὁμολείν, τὴν ἐτέραν δὲ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, μή καταχαριζόμενον, ἀλλ' διαμαχόμενον. οὐ ταῦτα ἦν ἀ τότε ὀριζόμεθα; Κ.Δ. Πάνω γε. Σ.Δ. Οὐχ οὖν ἦ μὲν ἐτέρα, ἡ πρὸς ἴδιον, ἀγεννής καὶ οὐδὲν ἀλλο ἡ κολακεῖα τυγχάνει οὕσα. ἡ γάρ ἦ Ε. Κ.Δ. Ἑστω, εἰ βούλει, σοι οὕτως. Σ.Δ. Ἡ δὲ γε ἐτέρα, ὅπως ὁ βέλτιστον ἐσται τοῦτο, εἰτε σῶμα τυγχάνει ὅν εἰτε ψυχή, ὁ θεραπεύομεν; Κ.Δ. Πάνω γε. Σ.Δ. Ἀρ' οὖν οὕτως ἡμῶν ἐπιχειρησθέον ἐστι τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς πολίταις θεραπεύειν ὡς βελτίστους αὐτοὺς τοὺς πολίτας ποιοῦντας; ἂνευ γὰρ δὴ τοῦτον, ὡς ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν εὐρίσκομεν, οὐδὲν ὑφελος ἀλλήν εὐφρενείαν 514 οὐδεμίαν προσφέρειν, εάν μὴ καλὴ κάγαθη ἡ διάνοια ἡ τῶν μελλόντων ἡ χρήσιμα πολλά λαμβάνειν ἡ ἀρχὴν τινων ἡ ἀλλήν δύναμιν ἤντινον. θώμεν οὕτως ἔχειν; Κ.Δ. Πάνω γε, εἰ σοι ἴδιον. Σ.Δ. Εἰ οὖν παρεκαλοῦμεν ἀλλήλους, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, δημοσίᾳ πράξαντες τῶν πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων, ἐπὶ τὰ οἰκοδομικά, ἡ τεχνών ἡ νεφρίων ἡ ἔργων ἐπὶ τὰ μέγιστα οἰκοδομήματα, πότερον ἔδει ἂν ἡμᾶς σκέψασθαι ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ Β ἐξετάσαι, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἐπιστάμεθα τὴν τέχνην, ἡ
οὐχ ἐπιστάμεθα, τὴν οἰκοδομικὴν, καὶ παρὰ τοῦ ἐμάθομεν; ἐδει ἂν, ἢ οὐ; ΚΑΔ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν δεῦτερον αὖ τόδε, εἰ τι πάποτε οἰκοδόμημα ψευδομήκαμεν ἵδια ἢ τῶν φίλων τινὶ ἢ ἡμέτερον αὐτῶν, καὶ τούτο τὸ οἰκοδόμημα καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν ἔστι. καὶ εἰ μὲν εὐφύσκομεν σκο-C πούμενοι διδασκάλους τε ἡμῶν ἀγαθοὺς καὶ ἐλλογίμους γεγονότας καὶ οἰκοδομήματα πολλὰ μὲν καὶ καλὰ μετὰ τῶν διδασκάλων ψευδομήκαμεν ἡμῖν, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἰδίᾳ ύφι ἡμῶν, ἐπειδὴ τῶν διδασκάλων ἀπηλλάθημεν, οὕτω μὲν διακειμένων, νοῦν ἐχόντων ἢν ἂν ἴηναι ἐπὶ τὰ δημόσια ἔργα· εἰ δὲ μὴτε διδασκάλον εἰχομεν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπι-δεῖξαι οἰκοδομήματα τε ἡ μηδέν ἢ πολλὰ καὶ μη-δενὸς ἁξία, οὕτω δὲ ἀνόητον ἢν δήποτε ἐπιχειρεῖν τοῖς δημοσίοις ἐργοῖς καὶ παρακαλεῖν ἄλληλους ἐπ' αὐτά. φῶμεν ταῦτα ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι, ἢ οὐ; D ΚΑΔ. Πάνυ γε.

CcCAP. LXX. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὔτω πάντα, τὰ τε ἄλλα, κἂν εἰ ἐπιχειρήσαντες δημοσίευειν παρέκα-λούμεν ἄλληλους ὡς ἰκανοὶ ἰατροὶ ὄντες, ἐπισκε-ψάμεθα δήποτε ἢν ἐγὼ τε σε καὶ συ ἐμὲ, Φέρε πρὸς θεῶν, αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ Σωκράτης πῶς ἔχει τὸ σῶ-μα πρὸς ὑγίειαν; ἢ ἢδη τὸς ἄλλος διὰ Σωκράτην ἀπηλλάθη νόσου, ἢ δοῦλος ἢ ἔλευθερος; Κἂν ἐγὼ, οὐμαι, περὶ σοῦ ἔτερα τοιαῦτα ἐσκόπουν. καὶ εἰ μὴν εὐφύσκομεν δι' ἡμάς μηδένα βελτίω γε-γονότα τὸ σῶμα, μήτε τῶν ἐξων μήτε τῶν ἄστιν, μήτε ἄνδρα μήτε γυναῖκα, πρὸς Διός, ὡς Καλλι-κλείς, οὐ καταρέλαστον ἄν ἢν τῇ ἄληθείᾳ εἰς το-
σοῦτον ἀνοίας ἐλθεῖν ἀνθρώπους, ὅστε, πρὶν ἰδιωτεύοντας πολλὰ μὲν ὡσεὶς ἐτύχομεν ποιήσαι, πολλὰ δὲ κατορθώσαι καὶ γυμνάσασθαι ἰκανῶς τὴν τέχνην, τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο, ἐν τῷ πίθῳ τὴν κεραμείαν ἐπιχειρεῖν μανθάνειν, καὶ αὐτοῦς τε ἡμισυνείς ἐπιχειρεῖν καὶ ἄλλους τοιούτους παρακαλεῖν; οὐχ ἀνόητον σοι δοξεί ἂν εἶναι οὕτω πράττειν; ἩΜΙΟΓ. ΣΘ. Νῦν δὲ, ὥς ἀνθρώπων, ἐπειδὴ ὁ μὲν αὐτὸς ἄρτι ἄρχει πράττειν τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα, ἐμὲ δὲ παρακαλεῖς καὶ ὑπειδίζεις, ὅτι οὐ πράττω, οὐκ ἐπισκεψόμεθα ἀλλήλους, Φέρε, Καλλικλῆς ἦδη τινὰ βελτίω πεποίηκε τῶν πολιτῶν; ἔστιν δὲτις πρῶτερον πονηρὸς ὁ θανάτος καὶ ἀκόλουστος καὶ ἄφρων διὰ Καλλικλέα καλὸς τὸ κάραθος γέγονεν, ἡ ἐξέως ἡ ἀστός, ἡ δουλος ἡ ἔλευθερος; Λέγε μοι, ἐὰν τίς σε ταῦτα ἐξετάζῃ, ὃ Καλλικλῆς, τί ἐρεῖς; τίνα φήσεις βελτίω πεποίηκέναι ἀνθρώπων τῇ συνονοιᾳ τῇ σῇ;—Ὁκεῖς ἀποκρίνασθαι, εἰ περ ἔστι τοιόνδε τι ἔρχον σοι ἐτί ἰδιωτεύοντος, πρὶν ἡμισυνείς ἐπιχειρεῖν; ἩΜΙΟΓ. Φιλόνεικος εἰ, ὁ Σώκρατες.

ΣΑΡ. ΛΧΧΙ. ΣΘ. Ἀλλ᾽ οὗ φιλονεικία γε ἔρατο, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἀληθῶς βουλόμενος εἰδέναι ἀντικεῖ τοῦτο πρῶτον οἶει δεῖν πολιτεύεσθαι ἐν ἡμῖν, εἰ ἄλλον τὸν ἄρα ἐπιμελήσει ἡμῖν ἐλθὼν ἐτί τὰ τῆς Σ πόλεως πράγματα ἦδη ὡσεὶς ὅτι βελτιστοὶ οἱ ποιήσαι ὧμεν. ἡ οὖ πολλάκις ἦδη ὁμολογήσαμεν τούτῳ δεῖν πράττειν τῶν πολιτικῶν ἄνδρα; ὁμολογήσαμεν, ἡ οὖ; ἀποκρίνουν. Ὁμολογήσαμεν· ἐγὼ
ΓΟΡΓΙΑΣ.

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ὑπέρ σοῦ ἀποκρινόμαι. Εἰ τοίνυν τοῦτο δεῖ τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἀνδρα παρασκευάζειν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ πόλις, νῦν μοί ἀναμνησθεῖς εἰπὲ περὶ ἑκείνων τῶν ἀνδρῶν ὃν ὀλίγα πρότερον ἔλεγες, εἰ ἦτι σοι δοξοῦν ἀγαθοὶ πολίται γεγονέναι, Περικλῆς καὶ Κήμων καὶ Μιλτιάδης καὶ Θεσπιστοκλῆς. ΚΑΔ. "Εμοιγε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἶπερ ἀγαθοί, δῆλον ὦτι ἐκαστὸς αὐτῶν βελτίως ἐποίει τοὺς πολίτας ἀντὶ χειρόνων. ἐποίει, ἢ οὖ; ΚΑΔ. Ναὶ. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὦτε Περικλῆς ἠρχετο λέγειν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ, χεῖρος ἦσαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἢ ὦτε τὰ τελευταία ἔλεγεν; ΚΑΔ. "Ισως. ΣΩ. Οὕς ὅσος δῆ, ὡς βέλτιστε, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν ὀμιλογημένων, Ε εἶπερ ἀγαθὸς γ' ἢν ἑκείνος πολίτης. ΚΑΔ. Τί οὖν δῆ; ΣΩ. Οὐδέν. ἀλλὰ τόδε μοι εἰπὲ ἐπὶ τούτῳ, εἰ λέγονται Ἀθηναῖοι διὰ Περικλέα βελτίως γεγονέναι, ἢ πᾶν τοὐναντίον διαφθαρήναι ὑπ' ἑκεῖνου. ταυτὶ γὰρ ἔγαγε ἄκουσα, Περικλέα πεποιηκέναι Ἀθηναίους ἄρχουσα καὶ δειλούς καὶ λάλους καὶ φιλαργύρους, εἰς μισθοφορίαν πρῶτον καταστήσαντα. ΚΑΔ. Τῶν τὰ διὰ κατεγότων ἄκουεις ταὐτὰ, ὡ Σῶκρατε. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τάδε οὐκέτι ἄκουσα, ἀλλ' οἶδα σαφῶς καὶ ἔγω καὶ σὺ, ὦτι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ηὐδοκίμηι Περικλῆς καὶ οὐδεμίαν αἰσχρῶν δίκην κατεψηφίσαντο αὐτοῦ Ἀθηναίοι, ἢνίκα χεῖρος ἦσαν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ καλοὶ δικαίως ἐγόνον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, ἐπὶ τελευτή τοῦ βίου τοῦ Περικλέους, κλοπὴν αὐτοῦ κατεψηφίσαντο, ὀλίγον δὲ καὶ θανάτου ἐτίμησαν, δῆλον ὦτι ὡς πονηροῦ ὄντος.
Cap. LXXII. ΚΑΛ. Τί οὖν; τούτον ἕνεκα κακὸς ἦν Περικλῆς; ΣΩ. Ὅνων γοῦν ἂν ἐπι-
μελητῆς καὶ ἱππῶν καὶ βοῶν τοιοῦτος ὃν κακὸς ἂν ἐδόκει εἶναι, εἰ παραλαβῶν μὴ λακτίζοντας
μνεῖ νυνίτωντας μηδὲ δάχνοντας ἀπεδείξε ταῦτα ἀπαντᾷ ποιοῦντας δι’ ἀγριότητα. ἦ οὐ δοξεῖ σοι
κακὸς εἶναι ἐπιμελητῆς ὁσίους ὀσιοῦν ὃσιον ζῶου, ὡς ἂν παραλαβῶν ἡμερώτερα ἀποδείξῃ ἀγριώτερα ἦ
παρέλαβε; Δοξεί, ἦ οὖ; ΚΑΛ. Πάνω γε, ἵνα
σοι χαρίσωμαι. ΣΩ. Καὶ τόδε τοῖνυν μοι χάρι-
σαι ἀποχρινάμενος, πότερον καὶ ὁ ἀνθρώπος ἐν
τοῖς ζῴοις ἑστίν, ἦ οὖ; ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; ΣΩ.
Οὐκούν ἀνθρώπος Περικλῆς ἑπεμελέτο; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οὐχ ἔδει αὐτούς, ὡς
ἀρτι ὁμολογοῦμεν, δικαιοτέρους γεγονέναι ἀκτὶ
ἀδικαστέραν ὑπ’ ἑκείνου, εἴπερ ἑκείνον ἑπεμελεῖτο ὑπ’
αὐτῶν ἁγαθὸς ὃν τὰ πολιτικά; ΚΑΛ. Πάνω
γε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὐ γε δίκαιοι ἡμεροὶ, ὡς ἔφη
"Ομηρος. οὐ δὲ τί φῆς; οὐχ οὔτως; ΚΑΛ.
Ναί. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγριώτερος γε αὐτούς ἀπέφηνεν ἦ
οὗν παρέλαβε, καὶ ταῦτ’ εἰς αὐτῶν, ὃν ἦχιστ’ ἂν ἐβούλετο. ΚΑΛ. Βούλει σοι ὁμο-
λογήσω; ΣΩ. Εἰ δοκᾷ γέ σοι ἀληθῆ λέγειν. ΚΑΛ.
"Εστώ δὴ ταῦτα. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ
ἀγριώτερος, ἀδικαστέρους τε καὶ χείρους; ΚΑΛ.
"Εστώ. ΣΩ. Οὐχ ἂρ’ ἁγαθὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ Πε-
ρικλῆς ἦν ἐκ τοῦτον τοῦ λόγου. ΚΑΛ. Οὐ σύ
γε φῆς. ΣΩ. Μᾶ Λί’ ουδὲ γε σύ εὖ ἂν ὁμολο-
γεῖσ. Πάλιν δὲ λέγει μοι περὶ Κύμωνος· οὐχ
ἐξωστράκισαν αὐτὸν οὕτω, οὕς ἔθεράπευεν, ἕνα
αὐτοῦ δέκα ἔτών μὴ ἀκούσειαν τῆς φωνῆς; καὶ Ὠρυστοκλέα ταῦτα ταῦτα ἐποίησαν καὶ φυγῆ προσεζημίσαν; Μιλτιάδὴν δὲ τὸν ἐν Μαραθῶν Ἐ ἐν τῷ βάραθρον ἐμβαλεῖν ἐτησίμαστο, καὶ εἰ μὴ διὰ τὸν πρύτανι, ἐνέπεσεν ἄν; Καίτοι οὖτοι, εἰ ἤσαν ἄνδρες ἁγαθοὶ, ἡς σὺ ψῆς, οὐχ ἄν ποτε ταῦτα ἐπασχόν. οὐκουν οὐ γε ἁγαθοὶ ἡνίοχοι καὶ ἁρχαὶ μὲν οὐχ ἐκπίπτουσιν ἐκ τῶν ἦγουν, ἐπειδὰν δὲ Θεραπεύσας τοὺς ἵππους καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀμείνους γένωνται ἡνίοχοι, τότ' ἐκπίπτουσιν. οὖχ ἔστι ταῦτ' οὐτ' ἐν ἡνίοχεια οὐτ' ἐν ἄλλῳ ἔργῳ οὐδενί. ἡ δοκεῖ σοι; ΚΑΛ. Οὐχ ἔρωιγε. ΣΩ. Ἀληθεῖς ἄρα, ἡς ἔοικεν, οἱ ἐμπροσθεν λόγοι ἀν. 517 ἤσαν, ὅτι οὐδένα ἢμεῖς ὑσιν ἄνδρα ἁγαθὸν γε- γονότα τα πολιτικὰ ἐν τῇ ἁπλῇ τῇ πόλει. οὐ δὲ ὄμο- λογες τῶν γε νῦν οὐδένα, τῶν μέντοι ἐμπροσθεν, καὶ προεῖλου τούτους τοὺς ἄνδρας. οὐτοὶ δὲ ἀνεφάνησαν ἔξ ἵπποι τοῖς νῦν ὄντες, ὅστε, εἰ οὖτοι ἂν ἤπερας ἦσαν, οὔτε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἢτορικῇ ἔχοντο — οὔ γὰρ ἀν ἔξεπεσον — οὔτε τῇ κολαχίᾳ.

ΚΑΠ. ΛΥΧΣ. ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι πολλοῦ ἐ κε εἰ, ὃ Σώσσατε, μὴ ποτὲ τις τῶν νῦν ἔργα τοιαῦτα ἔργασθαι, οὐ τούτων ὃς βούλει εὑρίσ- σαί. ΣΩ. Ὁ δαιμόνιος, οὐδ' ἑλεῖ ψέγετο τούτους, ὃς γε διακόνους εἶναι πόλεως, ἀλλὰ μοι δοξοῦσι τῶν γε νῦν διακονικάτεροι γεγονέναι καὶ μᾶλλον οὗτος τοῖς ἐκπροέτειν τῇ πόλει δὲν ἐπεθύμησε. ἀλλὰ γὰρ μεταβιβάζειν τᾶς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέ- πειν, πείθοντες καὶ βιαζόμενοι ἐπὶ τούτο, ὅθεν ἐμελλὼν ἀμείνους ἔσεσθαι οἱ πολίται, ὃς ἔπος
ἐπιτεύν οὐδὲν τούτων διέφερον ἐκείνοι· ὅπερ μόνον ὁ ἔργον ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν πολέτου. ναῦς δὲ καὶ τείχῃ καὶ νεώρια καὶ ἄλλα πολλά τοιαύτα καὶ ἐγὼ σοι ὁμολογῶ δεινοτέρους εἶναι ἐκείνους τούτων ἐκπορφύζειν. Ἡράγμα τοῦ γελοιοῦ ποιοῦμεν ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. ἐν παντὶ γὰρ τῷ χρόνῳ, ὃν διαλεγόμεθα, οὐδὲν πανόμεθα εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἄλλα ἐπιφερόμενον καὶ ἄγνοοι πολλοὶ ὁ τι λέγομεν. ἐγὼ γοῦν σε πολλάκις οἶμαι ὁμολογηκέναι καὶ ἐγνωκέναι, ὅς ἡμι διὰ τῆς αὕτη τις ἡ πραγματεία ἐστι καὶ περί τὸ σῶμα καὶ περί τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ ἡ μὲν ἔτερα διαχονικῆ ἐστιν, ἡ δευτέρα ἐναι ἐκπορφύξειν, ἐὰν μὲν πεινὴ τὰ σῶματα ἤμων, σιτία, ἐὰν δὲ δυσῆ, ποτὰ, ἐὰν δὲ δύχω, ἔματι, στρώματα, ὑποδήματα, ἀλλὰ ἰσχυτέρα σῶματα εἰς ἐπιθυμίαι. καὶ ἐξεπεξεργάσεις σοι διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν εἰκόνων λέγω, ἢν δόλον καταμάθης. τούτων γὰρ ποριστικών εἶναι ἦ κάτηλην οὐταὶ ἡ ἐμποροῦ ἡ δημοσφαιρία του αὐτῶν τούτων, ἀποτομοῦ ἡ ὁμο-Ε ποιοῦ ἡ ὑφάρχει ἡ σχετοτόμον ἡ σχετοδειγμάτων, οὐδὲν θαυμαστῶν ἐστιν, οὔτα τοιοῦτον δόξας καὶ αὐτῶ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Θεραπευτῇ εἶναι σῶματος, παντὶ τῷ μὴ εἴδοτι, ὡς ἐστι τις παρὰ ταύτας ἀπάσας τεχνὴ γνωμαστική τε καὶ ἰατρική, ἡ δὴ τῷ ὄντι ἐστὶ σῶματος Θεραπεία, ἦπερ καὶ προσηκεῖ τούτων ἄρχειν πᾶσῶν τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ χρησκεῖ τοῖς τούτων ἔργοις διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι δὴ τὸ χρηστὸν καὶ πονηρὸν τῶν στεῖων ἡ ποτῶν ἐστὶν ἐς ἀρετὴν σῶματος, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας πάσας ταύτας ἀγνοεῖν· διὸ δὴ καὶ ταύτας μὲν δουλοπρεπεῖς τε
καί διακονικάς καί ἀνελευθέρους εἶναι περὶ σῶματος πραγματείαν, τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας· τήν δὲ γυμναστικήν καί ἱατρικήν κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον δεσπόζονας εἶναι τούτων. ταύτα οὖν ταύτα ὁτι ἔστι καί περὶ ψυχῆς, τοτε μὲν μοι δοκεῖς μανθάνειν ὅτι λέγω, καὶ ὁμολογεῖς ὡς εἰδὼς, ὃ τι ἔγω λέγω· ἥκεις δὲ ὀλίγον ὑστερον λέγων, ὦτι [Ἄνθρωποι]

Β καλοὶ κάγαθοι γεγόνασι πολίται ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ ἑπειδὰν ἔγω ἐφοτώ οἴτινες, δοκεῖς μοι ὁμοιοτάτους προτείνεοθαί ἄνθρωπους περὶ τὰ πολιτικά, ὅσπερ ἂν εἰ περὶ τὰ γυμναστικὰ ἐμοὶ ἐφοτῶντος οἴτινες ἁγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν ἦ εἰσὶ σωμάτων θεραπευταί, ἐλεγές μοι πάντα σπουδάζων, Θεαρίων ὁ ἄρτοκόπος καὶ Μίθαικος ὁ τὴν ὁμοποιίαν ὑγιεινῶν ὑπερεργασῆς τὴν Σικελικὴν καὶ Σάραμβως ὁ κάπηλος, ὦτι οὗτοι θεαμαστοὶ γεγόνασι σωμάτων θεραπευταί, ὥ μὲν

C ἄρτους θεαμαστοὺς παρασκευάζων, ὦ δὲ ὄψων, ὦ δὲ οἶνων. ΚΑΡ. LXXIV. Ἡσος ἂν οὖν ἡγανάχτεις, εἴςοι ἐλεγον ἔγω, ὦτι, Ἀνθρωπε, ἐπικείμενον περὶ γυμναστικῆς· διακόνους μοι λέγεις καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν παρασκευαστάς ἀνθρώπους, οὐχ ἐπαίδευσας καλὸν κάγαθον οὐδὲν περὶ αὐτῶν, οἴ, ἂν οὕτω τῦχωσιν, ἐμπλήσαντες καὶ παχύναντες τά σώματα τῶν ἄνθρωπων ἐπισκοπόμενοι ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν, προσαπολούσιν αὐτῶν καὶ τὰς ἄρχαιας σάρκας. οἴ δὲ ἂν δὲ ἀπειρίαν οὐ τοὺς ἔστιοντας αἰτιάσονται τῶν νόσων αἰτίους εἶναι καὶ τῆς ἀποβολῆς τῶν ἀρχαιῶν σαρκῶν, ἀλλ᾽ οἴ ἂν αὐτοῖς τῦχοι τότε παρόντες καὶ συμβουλεύοντές τι, ὅταν δὴ αὐτοῖς ἥκη ἡ τότε πλησιμονή νόσον φέρουσα
οὐχινῶν ὑστερον χρόνῳ, ἀτε ἀνευ τοῦ ύγεινον γεγονότα, τούτους αἰτιάσονται καὶ γεζουσι καὶ κα-
χόν τι ποιήσουσιν, ἃν οἶοι τ’ ἁσι, τοὺς δὲ προτέ-
ρους ἐκεῖνους καὶ αἰτίους τῶν κακῶν ἐγκαμι-
σουσι. καὶ οὐ νῦν, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, ὁ μοιοῦτατον 
tουτε ἐργάζει ἐγκαμιάζεις ἀνθρώπους, οἳ τοῦ-
tους εἰστιάκασιν εὐχοῦντες ἃν ἐπεθύμουν, καὶ 
φασι μεγάλην τὴν πόλιν πεποιηκέναι αὐτούς ·
ὅτι δὲ οἶς καὶ ὑπουλὸς ἔστι δὲ ἐκεῖνοι τοὺς 
pαλαιοὺς, οὐκ αἰσθάνονται. ἀνευ γὰρ σαφροσύ̄-
νης καὶ δικαιοσύνης λιμένων καὶ νεορίων καὶ 
τεγχον καὶ φόρων καὶ τοιούτων φιλαριῶν ἐμπε-
πήκασι τὴν πόλιν. ὅταν οὖν ἐλθῃ ἡ καταβολὴ 
αὕτη τῆς ἀθενείας, τοὺς τότε παρόντας αἰτιά-
σονται συμβούλους, Θεμιστοκλέα δὲ καὶ Κύμωνα 
καὶ Περίκλεα ἐγκαμιάζουσι, τοὺς αἰτίους τῶν 
κακῶν· σοῦ δὲ ἰσως ἐπιλήμφεσί, ἔναν μῆ εὐλαβῇ, 
kαὶ τοῦ ἐμοῦ ἑταῖρου Ἀλκιβιάδου, ὅταν καὶ τὰ 
ἀρχαῖα προσαπολλώσι πρὸς οἷς ἐκτῆσαντο, οὐχ 
αἰτίων ὅτεν τῶν κακῶν, ἀλλ’ ἰσως συναίτιων. 
καίτοι ἔγαγε ἀνόητον πράγμα καὶ νῦν ἵνα γιγνό-
μενον καὶ ἄκουσα τῶν παλαιῶν ἄνδραν πέρι. 
αἰσθάνομαι γὰρ, ὅταν ἡ πόλις τινα τῶν πολιτικῶν 
ἄνδρῶν μεταχειρίζηται ὡς ἀδικοῦντα, ἀνανα-
kτοῦντων καὶ σχετλιαζόντων, ὡς δεινὰ πάσχουσι 
πολλὰ καὶ ἁγαθὰ τὴν πόλιν πεποιηκότες ἢ ἀδικοῦς ὑπ’ αὐτῆς ἀπόλλυνται, ὡς ὁ τούτων λόγος. 
τὸ δὲ ὅλον ἑρυθρὸς ἔστι. προστάτης γὰρ πόλεως C 
οὐδ’ ἄν εἰς ποτὲ ἀδίκως ἀπόλοιτο ὑπ’ αὐτῆς τῆς 
pόλεως, ἢς προστατεῖ. κινδυνεύει γὰρ ταύτων
εἶναι, δοσι τε πολιτικοὶ προσποιοῦνται εἶναι καὶ δοσι σοφισταί. καὶ γὰρ οἱ σοφισταί, τάλλα σοφοί ὄντες, τούτῳ ἄτοπον ἐργάζονται πράγμα. φάσκοντες γὰρ ἀφετῆς διδάσκαλοι εἶναι πολλάκις καθηγούσι τῶν μαθητῶν, ὡς ἀδικοῦσι σφᾶς αὐτούς, τοὺς τε μισθόν ἀποστεροῦντες καὶ ἄλλην χάριν οὐχ ἀποδιδόντες, εὗ παθόντες ὑπ’ αὐτῶν.

Δ γὰρ τούτῳ τοῦ λόγου τί ἂν ἀλογώτερον εἰσὶν πράγμα, ἀνθρώπους ἀγαθοὺς καὶ δικαιοὺς γενομένους, ἐξαιρεθέντας μὲν ἀδικίαιν ὑπὸ τοῦ διδασκάλου, σχόντας δὲ δικαιοσύνην, ἀδικεῖν τούτῳ ὥς οὐχ ἔχουσιν; οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τούτῳ ἄτοπον εἶναι, ὅ ἔταφε; Ἡς ἄληθῶς δημιουργεῖν μὲ ἡνάρξασας, ὅ Καλλίκλεις, οὐχ ἔθελον ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

Cap. LXXV. ΚΑΔ. Σὺ δ’ οὐχ ἂν οἶδ’ τ’ Εἰρήνει λέγειν, εἰ μὴ τίς σοι ἀποκρίνοιτο; ΣΩ. Ἐοικά γε νῦν γοῦν συγχων τείνω τῶν λόγων, ἐπειδὴ μοι οὖχ ἔθελες ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλ’, ὅ γαθέ, εἰπε πρὸς φιλίου, οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἄλογον εἶναι ἀγαθὸν φάσκοντα πεποιηκέναι τινὰ μέμφεσθαι τούτῳ, ὅτι ύπ’ ἔαντον ἀγαθὸς γεγονός τε καὶ ὅν ἔπειτα πονηρὸς ἔστιν; ΚΑΔ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ. ΣΩ. Οὐχοῦν ἀκοῦεις τοιαῦτα λεγόντων 520 τῶν φασκόντων παρεδείγειν ἀνθρώπους ἐἰς ἄρετῆν; ΚΑΔ. Ἑγαγε. ἀλλὰ τί ἂν λέγοις ἀνθρώπων πέρι οὐδενὸς ἄξιων; ΣΩ. Τί δ’ ἂν περὶ ἔκεινον λέγοις, οἳ φάσκοντες προεστάναι τῆς πόλεως καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ὡς ὡς βελτίστη ἔσται, πάλιν αὐτῆς κατηγοροῦσιν, διὰν τῦχοιν, ὡς πονηροτάτης; οἱ οἰ οἱ διαφέρειν τούτους ἔκεινον; ταύτον, ὃ μα-
κάρι', ἦστι σοφιστής καὶ ὄμητορ, ἡ ἐγγύς τι καὶ παραπλήσιον, ὅσπερ ἦγα ἔλεγον πρὸς Πώλων. οὐ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν τὸ μὲν πάγκαλον τι οἴετε εἶναι, ἐν τὴν ὕπτωσιν, τοῦ δὲ καταφορεῖς. τῇ δὲ ᾀληθείᾳ κάλλιον ἦστι σοφιστικὴ ὕπτωσις ὀφεῖρ πομοθετικὴ δικαστικὴ καὶ γυμναστικὴ ἰατρικὴ. μόνοις δ' ἔγγηκε καὶ ὀφθη τοῖς δημηγοροῖς τε καὶ σοφισταῖς οὐκ ἐγγισθεὶν μέμφεσθαι τοῦτο τῷ πράγματι, οὗ αὐτοῖς παζεύσουσιν, ὡς πονηρὸν ἔστιν εἰς σφᾶς, ἡ τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ ἀμα καὶ ἑαυτῶν κατηργοῖαν, ὃ τι ὀφελήκασιν οὐς φασιν ὄφελεῖν. οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; ΚΑΔ. Πάνυ γε. Σ.Ω. Π. Καὶ προέσθαι γε δήποτε τὴν ἐνεργεσίαν ἄνευ μοθοῦ, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, μόνοις τούτοις ἐνεχάρει, εἶτερ ἀληθὴ ἔλεγον. ἀλλὰ μὲν γὰρ ενεργεσίαι τις ἐνεργετηθείσαι, οἴον ταχὺς γενόμενος διὰ παιδοτρίβην, ὅσος ἂν ἀποστερήσει τὴν χάριν, εἰ προοίτο αὐτῷ ὁ παιδοτρίβης καὶ μὴ συνθέμενος αὐτῷ μισθὸν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀμα μεταδίδοι τοῦ τάχους ὁ λαμβάνει τὸ ἄγνοιον· οὐ γὰρ τῇ βραδυτήτῃ, οἴμαι, ἀδικοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἀλλ' ἄδικα. ἢ γὰρ; ΚΑΔ. Ναι. Σ.Ω. Οὐκόοι εἰ τις αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἄραιει, τὴν ἀδικίαν, οὐδὲν δεινὸν αὐτῶν μήποτε ἀδικηθή, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἄσφαλές ταῦτη τὴν ἐνεργεσίαν προέσθαι, εἴπερ τῷ ὅτι δύνατο τις ἡγαθοῦς ποιεῖν. οὐχ οὕτως; ΚΑΔ. Φημί. ΣΑΡ. LXXVI. Σ.Ω. Λία ταύτ' ἄρα, ὡς εἰσέχει, τὰς μὲν ἄλλας συμβουλές συμβουλεύειν ἐν μεθανοῦ ἄγνοιον, οἶον οἰκοδομίας πέρι ἡ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν, οὐδὲν αἰσχρόν. ΚΑΔ. "Εοικέ
γε. ἜΩ. Περὶ δὲ γε ταύτης τῆς πράξεως, ὅτιν' ἂν τις τροπὸν ὡς βέλτιστος εἰη καὶ ἄριστα τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικεῖ ἦ πόλιν, αἰσχρὸν νενόμισται μὴ φάναι συμβουλεύειν, ἐὰν μὴ τις αὐτῷ ἄργυριον διδό. ἦ γὰρ; ἩΝ. Ἐὰν γὰρ, ὅτι τοῦτο αὐτῶν ἦστιν, ὅτι μόνη αὐτῇ τῶν εὐεργεσιῶν τὸν εὗ παθόντα ἐπιθυμεῖν ποιεῖ ἀντ', εὗ ποιεῖν, ὡστε καλὸν δοκεῖ τὸ σημεῖον εἶναι, εἴ εὗ ποιήσας ταύτην τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἀντ' εὗ πείσε-521ται· εἴ δὲ μή, οὐ. ἔστι ταύτα οὕτως ἔχοντα· ἘΩ. Ἐπὶ ποτέραν ὅν μὲ παρακαλεῖς τὴν θεραπεῖαν τῆς πόλεως; διόρισόν μοι· τὴν τοῦ διαμάχοσθαι Ἀθηναίοις, ὅπως ὃς βέλτιστον ἔσονται, ὡς ἵπτότων, ἦ ὃς διακονήσοντα καὶ πρὸς χάριν ὄμιλησοντα· Τὰληθῆ μοι εἴπε, ὃ Καλλίκλεις· δίκαιος γάρ εἰ, ὥσπερ ἥρω παρόμοιαζοσθαι πρὸς ἐμέ, διατελεῖν ὃ νοεῖς λέ-Βγαν. καὶ νῦν εὗ καὶ γενναίος εἴπε. ἘΩ. Δέ-γα τοίνυν, ὅτι ὃς διακονήσοντα. ΣΩ. Κολα-κεύσοντα ἁρὰ με, ὃ γενναίοτάτης, παρακαλεῖς. ἘΩ. Εἴ σοι Μυσῶν γε ἥδιον καλεῖν, ὃ Σώ-κρατες· ὡς εἴ μή ταύτα γε ποιήσεις — ΣΩ. Μη εἴπης ὃ πολλάκις εὑρίσκας, ὅτι ἀποκτενεί με ὃ βουλόμενος, ἱνα μή αὐ καὶ ἔγω εἴπο, ὅτι πονηρὸς γε ὅν ἀγαθὸν ὄντα· μηδ' ὅτι ἀφαιρήσεται, ἐὰν C τι εἶχα, ἱνα μή `αυ τῇ ἔγω εἴπο, ὅτι Ἀλλ. ἄφελο-μένου οὐχ ἐξει ὃ τι χρήσεται αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ' ὅσπερ μὲ ἀδίκως ἀφείλετο, οὕτω καὶ λαθῶν ἀδίκως χρή-σεται· εἴ δὲ ἀδίκως, αἰσχρὸς· εἴ δὲ αἰσχρῶς, κακῶς.
ΚΑΠ. ΛXXVII. ΚΑΛ. Ἄυσ μοι δοκεῖς, ο Ὁσ-χρατες, πιστεύειν μηδ’ ἂν ἐν τούτων παθεῖν, ὡς οἰχάν εκποδῶν καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἰσαχθείς εἰς δικαστή-ριον ύπὸ πάνω ἰσως μοχθηροῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ φαύλου! ΣΩ. Ἀνύπτωσ ἄρα εἰμὶ, ο Ἀκαλλί-κλεις, ὡς ἀληθῶς, εἰ μὴ οὐσομαι ἐν τῇ δὲ τῇ πόλει ὀντων ἂν, ὁ τι τύχοι, τούτο παθεῖν. τὸδε μὲν-τοι εὖ οἶδ’, ὡς, εἶναι εἰσὶν εἰς δικαστήριον περὶ τούτων τινὸς κυνοῦντον ἄν ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνος, πονηρὸς τίς μὲ ἕσται ὁ εἰσάγων· οὔδεις γὰρ ἂν χρηστὸς μὴ ἀδικοῦντε, ἀνθρώπων εἰσαγάγοι. καὶ οὐδὲν γε ἄποτον, εἰ ἀποθάνοιμ. Βοῦλει χρὸνος εἰπὼ, διότι ταῦτα προσδοκῶ; ΚΑΛ. Πάνω γε. ΣΩ.-Οἴ-μαι μετ’ ὀλύγων Ἀθραίων, ἢν μὴ εἰπὼ μόνος, ἐπιχειρεῖν τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικῆ τέχνη καὶ πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ μόνος τῶν νῦν. ἢτε οὖν ὁδὸς χάριν λέγων τοὺς λόγους οὗς λέγω ἐκά-στοτε, ἄλλα πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἡδι-Ε στον, καὶ οὐχ ἐθέλων ποιεῖν ὃ συν παραίνεις, τα- κομιδα ταῦτα, οὐχ ἔχω ὁ τι λέγω ἐν τῷ δικαστή-ριος. ὁ αὐτὸς δὲ μοι ἤκει λόγος, ὀντερ πρὸς Πά- λων ἔλεγον· χρυσόμαι γὰρ ὁς ἐν παιδίοις ἱατρὸς ἄν χρύσιτο καθηγοροῦντος ἰμηποιοῦ. σχότις γὰρ, τί ἂν ἀπολογοῖτο ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνθρώπος ἐν τούτοις ληρθεῖς, εἰ αὐτοῦ καθηγοροῦ τις λέγων, ὅτι ἩΡαῖδες, πολλά ὑμᾶς καὶ κακὰ ὅδε εἰργα- σται ἀνήγ καὶ αὐτοὺς, καὶ τοὺς νεώτατους ὑμῶν διαφεῖσι, τέμνων τε καὶ κάσων καὶ ἱσχυννων522 καὶ πνίγων ἀποφεῖν ποιεῖ, πιθρότατα πάματα δι- δοὺς καὶ πεινήν καὶ διψήν ἀναγκάζων, οὐχ ὀσπερ
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ἐγὼ πολλά καὶ ἤδεα καὶ παντοδαπά εὐάχουν ὑμᾶς. τί ἄν οἶει ἐν τούτῳ τῷ κακῷ ἀποληπρείνετα τὸν ἰατρὸν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν; ἢ εἰ εἶποι τὴν ἄλληθειαν, ὅτι Ταῦτα πάντα ἐγὼ ἔποιον, ὡς παῖδες, ὑμεῖν, ὅποιον οἶει ἂν ἀναβοηθαί τοὺς τοιούτους δικαστάς; οὐ μέγα; ΚΑΛ. Ἡ ἱσως οἴεσθαι γε χρή. ΣΩ. Ὁμοῦ οἶει ἐν πάσῃ ἀποφία ἂν αὐτὸν ἔχεσθαι δ τι χρή εἰπεῖν; ΚΑΛ. Πάννυ γε.

ΚΑΠ. ΛΞΧΒ. ΣΩ. Τοιοῦτον μέντοι καὶ ἐγὼ οἶδ᾽ ὅτι πάθος πάθοιμι ἂν εἰσελθὼν εἰς δικαστήριον. οὔτε γὰρ ἱδονάς ἃς ἐκπετόρικα ἔγω αὐτοῖς λέγειν, ἃς οὔτε εὐφροσύνης καὶ ὠφελείας νομίζουσιν, ἐγὼ δὲ οὔτε τοὺς πορίζοντας ξηλῶ οὔτε οἷς πορίζεται. ἐὰν τε τίς με ἡ νεατέρους φη διαιρέειν ἀπορεῖν ποιοῦντα, τὸ τούς πρεσβυτέρους κακηγορεῖν λέγοντα πικρὸς λόγον ἡ ἱδίᾳ ἡ δημοσία, οὔτε τῷ ἄλλῃ ἔξω εἰπεῖν, ὅτι Δικαιώς Κ α πάντα ταύτα ἐγὼ λέγο, καὶ πράττω τὸ ὑμέτερον ἡ τούτο, ὃ ἄνδρες δικασταί, οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδέν. ἀπε ίσως, ὅ τι ἄν τύχω, τούτῳ πείσομαι. ΚΑΛ. Ἀθεί οὐν σοι, ὅ Σάκρατες, καλᾶς ἔχειν ἀνθρώπος ἐν πόλει οὕτως διακείμενος καὶ ἀδύνατος ὁν ἐαυτῷ βοήθειν; ΣΩ. Εἰ ἔκεινό γε ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχῃ, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, ὃ οὐ πολλάκις ἀμολογησάς· εἰ βεβοηθηκὼς εἰ ἄυτῷ, μὴς περί ἀνθρώπων μὴς περὶ θεοῦς ἄδικον μηδὲν μὴς εἰρηκάς μὴς εἰργασμένος. αὕτη γὰρ τις βοήθεια ἐαυτῷ πολλάκις ἡμῖν ἀμολογήται χρατίστη εἰναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐμὲ τις ἔξελέγχοι ταύτην τὴν βοήθειαν ἀδύνατον ὄντα ἐμαυτῷ καὶ ἄλλῳ βοήθειν, αἰσχύ-
νοῦμαν ἄν καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ ἐν ὀλίγοις ἐξελεγχό-
μενος καὶ μόνος ὑπὸ μόνου, καὶ εἰ διὰ ταύτην τὴν
ἀδυναμίαν ἀποθνῄσκοιμι, ἀγανακτοῦν ἄν· εἰ δὲ
κολακιζῆς ὑποτεχνῆς ἐνδεία τελευτῶν ἔγονε, εὖ
οἶδα, ὅτι ἤδικος ἦδος ἄν με φέροντα τὸν θάνα-
τον. αὕτῳ µὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀποθνῄσκειν οὐδεὶς φοβεῖ-
tαι, ὡστις µὴ πανταπασιν ἀλόγιστος τε καὶ ἄνα

· φρός ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἄδικεῖν φοβεῖται. πολλῶν γὰρ
ἀδικημάτων γέμοντα τὴν ψυχήν εἰς "Αἰδον ἀφι-
kέσθαι πάντων ἔχοντα κακῶν ἔστιν. εἰ δὲ βου-
λει, σοι ἡγώ, ὡς τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ἐθέλω λόγον
λέξαι. ΚΑΔ. Ἀλλ’ ἐπείπερ γε καὶ τάλλα ἐπε-
ρανας, καὶ τοῦτο πέρανον.

Cap. LXXIX. Σ.Ω. "Ἀκούες δή φρασί, µάλα 523
καλοῦ λόγου, ὅν σὺ µὲν ἤρισει µύθον, ὡς ἡγώ οἰ-
μαι, ἠγά το λόγον· ὡς ἄληθῆ γὰρ ὅντα σοι λέξω
ἀ µέλλω λέγειν. "Ὡσπερ γὰρ "Οµηρος λέγει,
dieneίµαντο τὴν ἄρχην ὁ Ζεὺς καὶ ὁ Ποσειδῶν
καὶ ὁ Πλοῦτων, ἐπειδὴ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς παρέλα-
θον. ἣν οὖν νόµος ὅδε περὶ ἄνθρωπον ἐπὶ Κρό-
νου, καὶ ἄει καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἔστιν ἐν θεοῖς, τῶν ἀν-
θρώπων τὸν µὲν δικαίως τὸν βίον διελθόντα καὶ
ὁσίως, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ, ἐς µακάρων νῆσους ἀπε-
Β ὅντα οἰκεῖν ἐν πάση εὐδαιμονίᾳ ἔκτος κακῶν, τὸν
δὲ ἄδικως καὶ ἀθέος εἰς τὸ τῆς τίσεως τε καὶ δίκης
demotήριον, δὴ τάρταρον καλοῦσιν, ἵναι. τού-
των δὲ δικασταὶ ἐπὶ Κρόνου καὶ ἔτι νεωσεὶ τοῦ
Διὸς τὴν ἄρχην ἔχοντος ἵπτες ἥραν ἱόντων, ἐκεῖ-
νη τὴ ἡµέρα δικαίωσιν, ἣ μέλλοιεν τελευτῶν.
κακῶς οὖν αἰ δίκαι ἐκφύνοντο. ὁ τε οὖν Πλοῦτων
καὶ οἱ ἐπιμεληταὶ οἱ ἐκ μακάρων νήσων ἵνα τέτει
C ἔλεγον πρὸς τὸν Δία, ὅτι φοιτῶν ὁρὸν ἀνδρωποῦ
ἐκατέρωσε ἀνάξιοι. εἶπεν οὖν ὁ Ζεὺς, ὁ Ἀλλ.
ἐγὼ, ἔφη, παῦσο τοῦτο γενόμενον. νῦν μὲν γὰρ
κακῶς αἱ δίκαις δικᾶσωνται. ἀμεθόμενοι γὰρ,
ἔφη, οἱ κρινόμενοι κρίνονται· κριόντες γὰρ κρίνον-
tαι. πολλοὶ οὖν, ἢ δὲ ὤς, ψυχᾶς πονηρὰς ἐχοντες
ημηρεσμένοι εἰσὶ σώματα τε καλὰ καὶ γένη καὶ
πλοῦτοι, καὶ, ἐπειδὰν ἡ κρίσις ἢ, ἐφικνοῦσιν αὐ-
toῖς πολλοὶ μάρτυρες, μαρτυρήσοντες, ὡς δικαιῶς
D βεβιάσκαιν. οἱ οὖν δικασταὶ ὅπο τε τούτων ἐκ-
πλήττονται, καὶ ἁμα καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀμπεσμένοι δι-
kάζονσι, πρὸ τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς αὐτῶν ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ
ὕτα καὶ ὅλον τὸ σῶμα προκεκαλυμμένοι. ταύτα
ἡ αὐτοῖς πάντα ἐπιπρόσθεν γίγνεται, καὶ τα αὐ-
tῶν ἀμφεσμάτα καὶ τὰ τῶν κρινόμενον. πρῶτον
μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, πανστέον ἐστὶ προειδότας αὐτοὺς
tῶν ἑάνατον· νῦν μὲν γὰρ προίσασι. τούτο μὲν
οὖν καὶ ἡ εἰρήται τῷ Προμηθεί ὡς ἄν παῦσῃ
Ε αὐτῶν. ἐπειτὰ γυμνοὺς κριτέον ἀπάντων τοῦ
τῶν· τεθνεῖται γὰρ δεῖ κρίνεσθαι. καὶ τὸν κρι-
tήν δεὶ γυμνὸν εἰναι, τεθνεῖται, αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ
αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς θεωροῦντα ἐξαίρθησι ἀποθανόν-
tος ἐκάστοτε, ἔρημον πάντων τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ
καταλιπόντα ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς πάντα ἐκεῖνον τῶν
κόσμων, ἵνα δικαία ἡ κρίσις ἢ. ἔγω μὲν οὖν ταὐ-
tα ἐγνωκὼς πρότερον ἢ ὦμεῖς ἐποιησάμην δικαι-
στάς νεῖς ἐναντοῦ, δύο μὲν ἐξ τῆς Ἀσίας, Μίνω
524ε καὶ ὁ Ραδάμανθον, ἕνα δὲ ἐξ τῆς Εὐρώπης,
Δικαύν. οὐτοὶ οὖν ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσωσι, δικαί-
οὐσιν ἐν τῷ λειμώνι, ἐν τῇ τρόιδος ἢ τῇ φέρετον τῷ ὀδῷ, ἢ μὲν εἰς μακάρων νῆσους, ἢ δ’ εἰς τάφ-
ταρον. καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας Ῥαδάμανθος
κρινεῖ, τοὺς δὲ ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης Ἀιακὸς. Μίνω
δὲ προσθεῖται δόσο, ἔπιστικοι, ἐὰν ἀπορήτων τι
tὸ ἔτερο, ἦν ὁς δικαιοτάτη ἡ κρίσις ἦ περὶ τῆς
πορείας τοὺς ἀνθρώποις.

Cαρ. ΛΧΧΧ. Ταύτ’ ἐστιν, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, ὁ
ἐγὼ ἀκηχοῦσ πιστεύω ἀληθῇ εἶναι· καὶ ἐν τοῦ-
των τῶν λόγων τοιόνδε τι λογίζομαι συμβαίνειν.
Ὀ θάνατος τυγχάνει ὄν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοξεῖ, οὐδὲν
ἀλλο ἢ δυνοῖ πραγμάτων διάλυσις, τῆς ψυχῆς
καὶ τοῦ σώματος, ἄτ’ ἀλλήλου. ἐπειδὰν δὲ δια-
λυθῆτον ἄρα ἀπ’ ἀλλήλου, οὐ πολὺ ἤτοι ἐκά-
tερον αὐτοῖν ἔχει τὴν ἔξιν τὴν αὐτοῦ ἡμερ καὶ
ὅτε ἢ ὁ ἀνθρώπος, τὸ τε σώμα τὴν φύσιν τὴν
αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰ θεραπεύματα καὶ τὰ παθήματα,
ἐνδήλα πάντα. ὁδ’ εἰ τίνος μέγα ἦν τὸ σῶμα
φύσει ἢ τροφῇ ἢ ἀμφότερα ἱδόντος, τοῦτον καὶ
ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ ὁ νεκρὸς μέγας· καὶ εἰ παχύς,
pαχύς καὶ ἀποθανόντος, καὶ τὰλλα οὕτως. καὶ
εἰ αὐτ’ ἐπετίθεινεν κομαῖν, κομήτης τοῦτον καὶ ὁ νε-
κρὸς. μαστίγιας αὐτ’ εἰ τις ἦν καὶ ἵνα εἰχέ τῶν
πληγῶν ὀμιλᾶς ἐν τῷ σώματι ἢ ὑπὸ μαστίγων ἢ
ἀλλων τραυμάτων ἱδόν, καὶ τεθνεότος τὸ σῶμα
ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ταύτα ἔχον. κατεγήνατε τε εἰ τοῦ ἦν
μέλη ἢ διεστραμμένα ἱδόντος, καὶ τεθνεότος ταύτα
ταύτα ἐνδήλα. ἐνὶ δὲ λόγῳ, οἷος εἶναι παρε-
σκεύαστο τὸ σῶμα ἱδόν, ἐνδήλα ταύτα καὶ τελευ-
τήσωστος ἢ πάντα ἢ τὰ πολλὰ ἐπὶ τινα χρόνον.
ταύτον δὴ μοι δοξεῖ τούτ’ ἄρα καὶ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς εἶναι, ὁ Καλλίκλεις ἐνδῆλα πάντα ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἐπειδὰν γυμνωθῇ τοῦ σώματος, τὰ τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ τὰ παθήματα ἡ διὰ τήν ἐπιτηδευσόν εξάστον πράγματος ἔσχεν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὁ Εὐάνθρωπος. Ὅπως δὲν ἀφίκουσι ηὐρήκατον παρὰ τῶν δικαστῶν, οἱ μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας παρὰ τὸν Ῥαδάμανθυν, ὁ Ῥαδάμανθος ἔκεινον ἐπιστήσας δεικαὶ ἐξάστον τῇ ψυχῇ, οὐχ εἰδὼς ὅτου ἐστὶν, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως ἐπιλαμβάνετο ἡ ἀλλοὶ ἄνθρωποι βασιλέως ἡ δυνάστευ κατείδευν οὐδὲν ὑπερέχει ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἀλλὰ διαμεμαστεῖν γορμεύειν καὶ οὐλῶν μεστίν ὑπὸ ἐπιορκιῶν καὶ ἀδικίας, ἡ ἐκάστοτε ὁ πρᾶξις αὐτοῦ ἐξωμόρραι ὅπως τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ πάντα σχολιά ὑπὸ Ἱσιδορίου καὶ ἀλαζονείας καὶ οὐδὲν εὑρή διὰ τὸ ἀνεν ἀληθεῖας τεθράφηκαί καὶ ὑπὸ ἐξουσίας καὶ τροφῆς καὶ ὑβριδίων καὶ ἀκρατίας τῶν πράξεων ἀνθρωπείας τε καὶ αἰσχρότητος ρέομεσαν τῇ ψυχῇ εἰδοῖν. ἢδον δὲ αἰὼν ταύτην ἀπεπέμψας εὑρή ἑν χρυσοφάς, οἱ μὲλλει ἐλθοῦσα ἀνατιθηναί τὰ προσήκοντα πάθη. ΣΑΡ. ΛΧΧΧΙ. Προσήκει, δὲ παντὶ τῶν ἑν τιμωρία ὁντι, ὡντ᾽ ἄλλου ὅρθως τιμωρομένος, ἡ βελτίων γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὃνισθαι καὶ παραδείγματι τοῦτο ἀλλος γίγνεσθαι, ἡν ἄλλοι ὅρθως παραδείγματα ἐν τὰ πάσχα ροδοῦμενοι βελτίους γίγνεσθαι. εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ μὲν ἀφελοῦμενοὶ τε καὶ δίκης διδόσας ὑπὸ τῆς τελώ τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων οὕτωι, οἳ ἂν ἰάσιμα ἀμαρτήματα ἀμαρτώσωι ἡμῶς δὲ δι᾽ ἁγηθοῦν καὶ ἀδικεῖναι αὐτοῖς ἡ ὀφελεία καὶ
ένθάδε καὶ ἐν Ὁλίδου· οὖ γὰρ οἶδον τε ἄλλος ἀδικίας ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. οἴ δὲ ἂν τά ἔχοντα ἀδικήσωσι καὶ διὰ τά τοιαῦτα ἀδικήματα ἀνίατοι γένονται, ἐκ τούτων τά παραδείγματα γίγνεται, καὶ οὕτωι αὐτοὶ μὲν οὐκέτι οὖν ἑλλαβοῦν οὐδέν, ἀτε ἀνίατοι ὄντες, ἄλλοι δὲ ὄνυνανται οἱ τούτους ὄραντες διὰ τά ἀμαρτίας τά μέγιστα καὶ ὄνυναντακαὶ καὶ φοβερότατα πάθη πάσχοντας τόν ἄει χρόνον, ἀτεχνῶς παραδείγματα ἀνηρτημένους ἔχει ἐν Ὁλίδου ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ, τόσο ἄει τῶν ἄδικων ἀφικνομένοις θεάματα καὶ νουθετήματα. ὃν ἦγο δ θημι ἕνα καὶ Ὁρίξελαον ἔσεσθαι, εἰ ἄληθῇ λέγει Πόλους, καὶ ἄλλον οὕτως ἂν τοιοῦτος τῶρηνος ἢ. οἴμαι δὲ καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς εἶναι τούτων τῶν παραδειγμάτων ἐκ τυράννων καὶ βασιλέων καὶ δυναστῶν καὶ τά τῶν πόλεων πραξάντων γεγονότας· οὕτωι γὰρ διὰ τήν ἐξουσίαν μέγιστα καὶ ἀνοσιώτατα ἀμαρτήματα ἀμαρτάνονται. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τούτοις καὶ Ὄμηρος· βασιλεῖς γάρ καὶ δυνασταὶ ἐκεῖνος πεποίηκε τοὺς ἐν Ὁλίδου τόν ἄει Ε χρόνον τιμωρομένους, Τάνταλον καὶ Σίσυφον καὶ Τιτυνόν. Θερσίτην δὲ, καὶ εἰ τις ἄλλος πονηρὸς ἢν ἰδιώτης, οὔδεις πεποίηκε μεγάλαις τιμωρίαις συνεχόμενον ὡς ἀνίατον· οὐ γὰρ, οἴμαι, ἔξεσιν αὐτῶ· διὸ καὶ εὐδαιμονεστέρος ἢν ἢ οἷς ἔξεσιν. ἄλλα γὰρ, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, ἐκ τῶν δυναμένων εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ σφόδρα πονηροὶ γιγνόμενοι ἀνθρώποι· 526 οὐδὲν μὴν κολύει καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἀγαθοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐγγίγνεσθαι, καὶ σφόδρα γε ἄξιον ἀγαθοὶ τῶν γιγνομένων· χαλεπὸν γὰρ, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, καὶ
πολλοῦ ἐπαίνου ἡξιον ἐν μεγάλη ἐξουσίᾳ τοῦ ἀδικείν γενόμενον δικαίος διαθέαναι. ὠλίγοι δὲ γίγνονται οἱ τοιοῦτοι· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἄλλοι θει γεγόνασιν, οἴμαι δὲ καὶ ἔσονται καλοὶ κάγαθοι.

Β ταύτην τὴν ἄρετήν την τοῦ δικαίου διαχειρίζειν ἃ ἂν τις ἑπιτρέπῃ· εἰς δὲ καὶ πάνω ἐλλόγιμος γέγονε καὶ εἰς τούς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας, Ἀριστείθης ὁ Δυσιμάχου. οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ, ὁ ἄριστος, κακοὶ γίγνονται τῶν δυναστῶν. ΚΑΡ. LXXXII. Ὁπερ οὖν ἔλεγον, ἐπειδὰν ὁ Ὁραίμανθος ἐκεῖνος τοι- ούτον τινα λάθη, ἄλλο μὲν περὶ αὐτοῦ οὖν οἶδεν οὔδεν, οὔθ’ οὕτως οὐθ’ ὄντως, ὃτι δὲ πονηρός τις· καὶ τότῳ κατιδών ἀπέτεμημεν εἰς τάφταρον,

希腊文

ΕΠΙΣΗΜΗΝΑΜΕΝΟΣ, ἐὰν τι ἰδίαμος ἔχαν τε ἀνίατος δοξὴν ἐναί.· ὃ δὲ ἐκεῖσθε ἀριστομΕνος τα προσε- κοῦντα πάσχει. ἔνιοτε δ’ ἄλλην εἰσαίδῳ ὁσίως βε- θιώτικαν καὶ μετ’ ἀληθείας, ἀνδρὸς ἰδιότου ἦ ἄλλον τινὸς, μάλιστα μὲν, ἔγωρε φήμη, ὁ ΚΑΛΛΙ- ΚΛΕΙΣ, φιλοσόφον τα αὐτοῦ πράξαντος καὶ οὐ πο- λυτραγμονήσαντος ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ἡγασθε τε καὶ ἐς μαχάρων νήσους ἀπέτεμας. ταύτα ταύτα καὶ ὁ ΔΙΑΧΑΣ. ἔκατερος δὲ τῶν ἄδεδων ἔχων δικάζει.

D ὁ δὲ ΜΙΝΩΣ ΕΠΙΣΚΟΠΟΤΩΝ θαύτης μόνος, ἔχων χρυ- σοῦν σχῆματον, ὡς φησιν ὉΔΥΣΕΥΣ ὁ ὈΜΗΡΟΥ ἰδεῖν αὐτῶν

χρύσουν σχῆματον ἔχοντα, θεμιστεύοντα νέ- κυσιν.

Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὁ ΚΑΛΛΙΚΛΕΙΣ, ὑπὸ τούτων τῶν λόγων πέπεισμα, καὶ σκοπᾶ, ὅπως ἀποφανοῦμαι τῷ κριτῆ ὥς ἔγινετάτην τήν ψυχήν. χαίρειν οὖν
ἐάσας τὰς τιμὰς τὰς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, τὴν ἀλήθειαν σκοπῶν πειράσομαι τῷ ὑπὲρ ὡς ἄν δύναμαι βέλτιστος ὁντι καὶ ἥν καὶ, ἐπειδὰν ἀποθνη—Ε σχο, ἀποθνῆσειν. παρακαλῶ δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας ἀνθρώπους, καθ’ ὅσον δύναμαι, καὶ δὴ καὶ σὲ ἀντιπαρακαλῶ ἐπὶ τοῦτον τὸν βίον καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα τούτον, ὅν ἐγὼ φημί ἀντὶ πάντων τῶν ἐνθάδε ἄγανον εἶναι, καὶ ὄνειδίζω σοι, ὅτι σὺ ὁδὸς τ’ ἔσει σαντῷ βοηθῆσαι, ὅταν ἡ δίκη σοι ἢ καὶ ἡ κρίσις ἢν νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ἀλλὰ ἐλθὼν παρὰ τὸν δικαστὴν τὸν τῆς Ἀλήθειας νῦν, ἐπειδὰν 527 σον ἐπιλαβόμενος ἄγη, χαριζομαι καὶ ἰληγχάσεις ὕσσεν ἤποτον ἢ ἐγὼ ἐνθάδε ὑπὲρ ἐκεῖ, καὶ σὲ ᾿Ησιος τυπτήσει τις καὶ ἐπὶ κόρης ὀτίμασι, καὶ πάντως προπηλαξεῖ.

Τάχα δ’ οὖν ταῦτα μυθός σοι δοξεὶ λέγεσθαι, ὅσπερ γραός, καὶ καταφρονεῖς αὐτῶν. καὶ σὺ ὄντιν γ’ ἂν ἢν χαμακτὸν καταφρονεῖν τοῦτον, εἰ τη ἦπτοντες εἰχομεν αὐτῶν βελτίω καὶ ἀληθέστερα εὑρεῖν· νῦν δὲ ὅρος, ὅτι τρεῖς ὄντες ὑμεῖς, οὐπερ σοφότατοί ἐστε τῶν νῦν ᾿Ελλήνων, σῷ τε καὶ Β Πῶλος καὶ Γοργίας, οὕν ἔχετε ἀποδείξει, ὅσ δεὶ ἄλλον τινὰ βίον ἢν ἢ τοῦτον, ὅσπερ καὶ ἐκεῖς φαίνεται συμφέρων, ἀλλ’ ἐν τοσοῦτοις λόγοις τῶν ἄλλων ἔλεγχομενοι μόνος ὄντος ἢρεμεῖ ὁ λόγος, ὡς εὐλαβητέον ἔστι τὸ ἀδικεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, καὶ παντὸς μᾶλλον ἀνδρὶ μελετητέον οὐ τὸ δοξεῖν εἶναι ἁγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ· ἔκαν δὲ τις κατὰ τι κακὸς γίγνεται, καλοστέος ἔστι, καὶ τοῦτο δεύτερον ἁγαθόν μετὰ C
Τὸ εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸ γίγνεσθαι καὶ κολαζόμενον διδόναι δίκην· καὶ πᾶσαν κολακείαν καὶ τὴν περὶ ἕαυτὸν καὶ τὴν περὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, καὶ περὶ ὀλίγους καὶ περὶ πολλοὺς, φευγέτεον· καὶ τῇ ὕπ- 
τορικῇ οὕτω χρηστέον, ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἄει, καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ πάσῃ πράξει.

**Cap. LXXXIII.** Ἐμοὶ οὖν πειθόμενοι ἀκο-
λούθησον ἑνταύθα, οἱ ἀφρικόμενοι εὐθαμονήσεις 
καὶ ζῶν καὶ τελευτήσας, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει. 
καὶ ἔσασιν τινὰ σου καταφρονήσαι ὡς ἀνοητοῦ 
καὶ προστήλακίσαι, ἐὰν βούληται, καὶ ναὶ μᾶ Δία 
σύ γε Θαρηὸν πατάξαι τὴν ἀτιμὸν ταῦτην πλη-
ρήν· οὐδὲν γὰρ δεινὸν πείσει, ἐὰν τῷ ὅρι ᾗς κα-
λὸς κἀγαθός, ἀσκῶν ἁρετήν. κάπειτα οὕτω κοινῆ 
ἀσκήσαντες, τότε ἢδη, ἐὰν δοκῇ χρῆται, ἐπιθυμο-
μεθα τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, ἦ ὁποῖον ἂν τῷ ἢμῖν δοκῇ, 
tότε βουλευσόμεθα, βελτίως ὄντες βουλευέσθαι 
ἡ νῦν. αἰσχρῶν γὰρ ἔχοντάς γε ὡς νῦν φανώ-
μεθα ἔχειν, ἕπειτα νεανιεύσεθαι ὡς τῷ ὅρῳ, οἷς 
Ε ὀυδέποτε ταύτα δοκεῖ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ ταῦτα 
περὶ τῶν μεγίστων· εἰς τοσοῦτον ἥχομεν ἀπαίδευ-
σίας! ὅπερ οὖν ἤγεμόν τῷ λόγῳ χρησάμεθα 
tῇ νῦν παραφανέντε, ὃς ἢμῖν σημαίνει, ὅτι οὐτὸς 
ὁ τρόπος ἄριστος τοῦ βίου, καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην 
καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἁρετήν ἁσκούντας καὶ ζῆν καὶ 
tεθνᾶναι. τούτῳ οὖν ἐπάμεθα, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους 
παρακαλῶμεν, μὴ ἐκεῖνο, ὃ σὺ πιστεύον ἔμε πα-
ρακαλεῖς· ἔστι γὰρ οὐδενὸς ἄξιος, ὃ Καλλίκλεις.
NOTES.

N. B. The references follow the marginal pages and letters of the text, which are those of the Paris edition of 1573, edited by H. Stephanus. Ml. stands for Matthias's Grammar, second edition; K., for Kühner’s Middle Grammar, translated by Edwards and Taylor; Cr., for Crosby’s, second edition; and Soph., for that of Sophocles, quoted according to the original sections: — In the new edition (1847) the earlier and present sections are collated at the beginning.

447 A. οὖν μεταλαγχάνειν, so to take part in; i. e. in the present instance, to take no part in at all. Callicles says, — “It were well to have such a share in a battle, as you have had in listening to Gorgias”; i. e. it were well to arrive too late for an unpleasant employment, but not for a feast such as we have had. For the selection of war in this proverbial phrase, comp. Phædr. 242, B, οὖ πόλεμων ἀγγέλλεις, what you tell me is not at all disagreeable; and so Laws, 702, D. — τὸ λεγόμενον, as the saying is. Soph. § 167, N. 2. Cr. § 334. 8. The accusative may be explained by considering it as the object of the general notion of action contained in the verbs, — are we doing τὸ λεγόμενον, i. e. are we too late. — ἐπεδείξατο. This verb in the middle, with an accus. (e. g. σοφίαν or a neuter adjective) or without, especially denotes that ostentatious display of their art, which the sophists and rhetoricians at this time were wont to make. — τούτων refers to ἡμοῖον καὶ υπεροῦκέν. As the verbs denote but one act, τούτων might be used equally well, and the plural is not unfrequently used in referring to a single verb. Comp. 492, C.
B. ἐγὼ γὰρ καὶ ἵσομαι. καὶ also, refers to a suppressed clause. No matter: 'for if I did the harm, I will also find the remedy. According to Olympiod and a Schol., the words are drawn from the Telephus of Euripides, being spoken by Achilles, who wounded that hero. — ἐὰν μὲν δόξῃ. The indic. implies belief that such is the view of Socrates; while in ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ the subjunctive expresses the wish as a mere possible contingency.— ἐσάνθης, again, at another time, hereafter. So εἰσάνθης ἀναβαλοῦ, Sympos. 174, E; εἰσάνθης ἀποθέσαι, Euthydem. 275, A. — ἔδωκαί; usually, where ἔδωκα is found, ἔδωκα is in some MSS. as a various reading. The longer form, it is now admitted, is properly retained after τι and πῶς, where wonder or indignation is expressed.— ὑποτιν... ὑμῖν. Stallb., Ast, and others explain the construction by regarding ἡκεῖν as used imperatively (Soph. § 219, N. 6; Cr. § 625; K. § 306, R. 11), ἄκοινοι τοῦριν being understood. I incline to regard ἐπεδείξεσαι ὑμῖν as the proper apodosis, which, owing to the intervention of the clause beginning with γὰρ, deserts its own construction for that of the interposed clause. The sense is, Well, then, whenever you wish to come to my house, Gorgias will exhibit to you, for he lodges with me. So, apparently, Heindorf. Comp. Soph. Ὑ. R. 227—229, where the clause πείθεται γὰρ οἴδειν turns the apodosis following it, which would be naturally γῆς ἀπίτω ἄβλαβῆς, into γῆς δὲ ἀπείτον ἄβλαβῆς. — εἴ λέγεις, i.e. you are very civil in inviting us to your house, and quite right in wishing to spare Gorgias further fatigue. But, etc.

C. διαλέξῃναι, here, to discourse by way of question and answer, tacitly contrasted with an ἐπιδείξεσαι, in which Gorgias would be the sole speaker. Hence, to hold a discussion, or search for truth in that way, as Socrates did. Socrates, in Xen. Mem. 4. 5. 12, defines it κοινὴ βούλευσιν διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη τὰ πράγματα. In the end, the
notion of question and answer faded away from the derivatives of this word; and that of logical reasoning, or that of the science of unchangeable, absolute truth, remained. — δύναμις, essence, nature. — τοῦ ἄνδρος pronominis fere partes agit, ut exprimi possit pronomine possessivo. 

Ast. The art of the man — his art, with perhaps something of contempt in τοῦ ἄνδρος. — τὸ αὐτόν ἐρωτᾷν, to ask him in person, or himself. And so 481, B. αὐτὸν is taken with the object of ἐρωτῶν not expressed.

D. ἔρως, second aor., not ἔρων. No present is used by the Attics. Soph. § 118, sub voce; K. § 166; Cr. § 298. — δὲ ἐπαγγέλει ἀποκρίνεσθαι. Cic. de Fin. 2, init.: “Quorum [sophistarum] e numero primus est ausus Leon- tinus Gorgias in conventu poscere quæstionem, id est, jubere dicere, qua de re quis vellet audire.” This is spoken of at length by Philostr. Vit. Sophist., Proem.

448 A. ἦν τοῦ ... ἀποκρίνει, no doubt, then, you answer with ease, O Gorgias. Ast translates ὑμῖν ὁμοιώς, libenter, but his power to answer, and not his willingness, is in question. — ἄν δὲ γε βούλῃ, ἐμοὶ, sc. λάμβανε πείραν. For λ. πείραν spoken of a person, comp. εἰ βούλει λαβείν μου πείραν, Protag. 341, E, cited by Ast. — τί δὲ ... ἵκανῶς; but what difference does that make, if I answer well enough for you? To the common formula, τί τούτο; is sometimes added διαφέρει, which Stallb. here supplies. But τί can well be a nominative. τί τούτο; what is that? i. e. what of that?

B. Ἠρόδικος, a brother of Gorgias, of whom we know nothing besides his name and calling. He is not to be confounded, as the Scholiast well observes, with another man often mentioned by Plato, Herodicus of Selymbria in Thrace, and originally of Megara; who first taught gymnastics, but on the failure of his health gave himself up to the attempt to recover it; and was among the earliest to
cure diseases by exercise. — τινα ἄν ... ὄνομα ἱκετέων. The predicate-accusative with καλεῖν, ὄνομαῖν, may be τίνα, referring to any one by name or by some appellation taken from his art, business, etc.; or τι, which is neuter on account of ὄνομα. Here in τινα ἄν ... ὃν ὄπειροθετῶν both forms occur together. — τῇ ὁ ἀδέλφος αὐτοῦ. Polygnatus of Thasos, the most celebrated of this family of painters. He painted upon the wall of the Stoa Poecile at Athens gratuitously, and at Delphi. Of his pictures from epic subjects in a hall near the Delphian temple, Pausanias gives a minute account (10. 25. seq.), which has enabled two artists of the present day to reproduce his designs in the spirit of ancient art.

C. τῶν ὥστε ἐπείδη. In this sentence, both the main clause and that which furnishes the reason are interrogative, a usage which would be awkward in English, but is lively and favorable to brevity. A little below, 451, A, we have the interrogative included between the article and participle (ἡ περὶ τι ... ἐξομολογοῦνται), as it often is found within a relative sentence. Comp. Cr. § 539. 2. — ὃ Χαίρειμῖν. The words which follow are plainly not in the style of conversation. The juxtaposition of words from the same root (ἐμπειρίων ἐμπειρίως, ἀλλοι ἄλλων ἄλλος, ἀφίστων ἀφίστου), αἰώνα for βίον, and the antithetical form of the clauses all show, that either the style of Polus is imitated by Plato, or that words from a treatise of his are here put into his mouth. They are quoted as his by Syrianus on Hermogenes. (4. 44. Walz.) See 462, B.

D. σοι βουλομένῳ ἐστιν. Soph. § 196, N. 2; Cr. § 408; K. 234. 10. c. — δῆλος γὰρ ... διαλέγεσθαι, for it is plain to me, even from what he has said, that Polus has studied the art of rhetoric, so called, rather than how to discourse (logically) by way of question and answer. δῆλος, etc., for δῆλον ἐστι, ὃι Πῶλος, by attraction, as it is sometimes called. The
tendency to give prominence to the main word — here the subject — of the second clause caused it to be pushed forward into the leading clause. This made that clause personal instead of impersonal, and bound the two clauses together more closely.

E. ἥρωτα. So all the MSS., but the editors give ἡρωτα,* on account of ποια τις εἶη. But this is unnecessary, for the present may be rhetorically for the imperfect, or may include it. Nobody asks you = nobody asked you or now asks you. Comp. Xen. Anab. 1. 1. 3, διαβάλλει ... ὡς ἐπιβολεύοι, for διεβαλλέ. In this sentence, ποῖος and τίς, which belong to direct inquiry, are found in company with ὅσις, by which indirect questions are introduced. Comp. ποῖα and ὅποια together, 500, A. Comp. also οἶαν for ὅποιαν, 450, C, ὅσα for ὅποσα, 451, B, and other passages.— ὡσπο τὰ ἐμπροσθεν. For the asyndeton, comp. 450, B, note. For τὰ ἐμπροσθεν, comp. Soph. § 141, N. 1; Cr. § 478, a. The second clause begins at καὶ νῦν οὕτως.

449 A. ὑποτείνεσθαι, est quæstionem ita proponere ut alteri subjicias quid respondendem sit, et in universo proponere quæestionem. Ast. — ὡς τίνος ... τίχνης. Another form of compound interrogation, when one clause has the participial structure (ἐπιστήμων, sc. ὄντα). — ἀγαθὸν γε, not bene moratum, as Routh translates it, but plainly egregium certe. — ὡς ἕφη Ὅμηρος. Il. 6. 211, and elsewhere.

B. οὖκούν. See Preface. — ἀλλοθι. See Introd. pp. xiii., xiv. — ἀλλ' ὅπερ, etc., but be not false to the promise you make. Socrates takes for granted that he consents. Hence ὅπερ, which Ast would change into εὗτος, is justly defended by Stallb.— εἰσί ... ποιεσθαί, = ἀναγκαῖον ἔστιν ἐνίας (Heind.), or ἐν ἐνίας ποιεσθαί. See 448, D. In some of the answers it is necessary to discourse at length.

* Stallb. has ἥρωτα in his second edition.
C, D. \(\text{δός διὰ βραχυτάτων} = \text{δός βραχύτατα}, \text{or \ δός \ οἷον \ το} \ \text{διὰ βραχυτάτων}, \text{just below.} \) — With this boast of Gorgias, comp. the ironical passages in Protag. 329, B, 334, D. The latter runs thus: — “O Protagoras, I happen to be an oblivious sort of person, and if I have a long speech made to me, I forget what is the topic of discourse; therefore, as, in case I were somewhat deaf, you would think that you ought to talk in a louder tone with me than with others, to carry on a conversation with me; so, seeing I am so forgetful, abridge your answers, and make them shorter, to enable me to follow you.” — πάντως . . . \\(\text{ἐπιθετικός, quite sufficiently, or very well.}\\)

E. \(\text{ποιοῦσα δούλους . . . ἐγκαίνιον; what kind of words? are they those which make known by what sort of regimen the sick can get well?} \) Understand \(\text{περὶ} \ \text{with ποιοῦσα δούλους;} \) as in 450, A, line 4. This is a condensed expression for \(\text{ποιοῦσα} \ \text{περὶ \ οὗς \ ἐστιν;} \) The subject of \(\text{ἐγκαίνιον} \) is attracted forwards to \(\text{δηλοῦσι} \) as its object. \(\text{οἷς} \ \text{is} \ \text{quomodo, not ut, and to be taken with διακρίσωμεν.} \) The two words have the same sense as \(\text{τίνι} \ \text{διαίτη.}\\) Comp. 453, C. — \(\text{οὖχοιν \ περὶ ὁπερ, etc. = οὖχοιν \ ποιεῖ δυνατοῦ καὶ φορεῖν περὶ δούλων \ περὶ ὁπερ λέγειν δυνατοῖς ποιεῖ.}\\)

B. \(\text{οὖτος ἐκαίνιον · ἐκάινη. One of a number of the in·450 stances of asyndeton which occur in this dialogue. Some are owing to earnestness of feeling (449, A, ὁσπερ . . . ἀπεκρίνω); some heighten the effect of contrast by bringing clauses closely together (503, E, τοῖς ἡγαλάφοις . . . τοῖς ἄλλοις), or making a word more emphatic (510, C); but in the greater number the second clause is added without a particle to explain the first, and, like a noun in apposition, would rather be separated than connected by a particle. Comp. K. § 325. — \(\text{οἷς ἐποιεῖ εἰπεῖν. This common phrase nearly always, in this work, moderates the force of some universal word, as πᾶς, οὖνείς. According to Lobeck (para-}
lipom. Gram. Graec. 59), ἐπος εἰπεῖν occurs very often, εἰπεῖν ἐπος rarely. It denotes, 1. ut ita dicam, as here; 2. speaking inaccurately, the opposite of ἀκοφίλει λόγῳ. — τῆς δὲ ὤτο-ρικής. The sense is, But there is no such manual operation pertaining to rhetoric, but all its activity and efficiency are exercised by means of words. The Scholiast says, that χειροφορία and κύροσις are provincial words brought by Gorgias from his native town, Leontini. This is probably a mere random assertion, and unlikely in itself. But the use of these words, instead of χειροφορία and κύρος, may be intended to show forth the artificial and elaborate style of Gorgias. Thucydides uses κύροσις (Lib. 6. 103).

C. ἄρα ὁ νῦν... καλεῖν; Indeed, I perceive what sort of art you wish to call it. So Ast. “Formula ἄρα ὁ νῦν eodem modo ut ὁ νῦν ὁ νῦν initio per interrogationem cum negatione junctam affirmat.” Hermann on Soph. Antig. 628 (632). Or we need only say that ἄρα, as it often does, requires an affirmative answer. Stallb. retains the interrogative force of ἄρα, and supposes the question to require a negative answer, Do I understand, etc., i.e. I do not understand. But μονοθάνω can denote a perception that is not yet clear. Prof. Crosby remarks on this passage as follows: — “Is there not a species of anacoluthon at the beginning of this chapter? ‘Do I then understand what you would call it? However, I shall soon know.’ He seems to me to be first intending to ask Gorgias directly, whether the idea he obtains from his answer is the true one; but then another mode of satisfying himself occurs, and he changes the discourse abruptly.” — For τῶν μὲν... ἦναι δὲ, comp. Soph. § 142, N. 3.

E. ὁ νῦν... ἐνεῖς, although in the expression which you make use of you so said. ὁ νῦν refers to the succeeding subordinate clause. ὁ νῦν ὁ νῦν is properly elliptical for ὁ νῦν λέγω, or ὁ νῦν ἐγὼ ὁ νῦν, and sometimes, followed by ἀλλα, means not
only, or not only not. Comp. Mt. § 624. 4.—ᴅυναταιν, to be captious in the discourse or discussion.

B. εἰπομέναν... ὑπατία. Complete the sentence by τις 451 τῶν κύριος ἵπποι, I would say that it is one of those arts that exert their power with regard to (whose efficiency consists in inquiring concerning) the odd and even, how many there can be of each, i.e. that it is an art, which asks how many there are, and whose elements are odd and even numbers. γνώσις is due to a copyist, who thought the structure deficient. ——ὅσπερ οἱ ἐν τῷ δῆμῳ συγγραφομένοι, as those say who draw up written motions in the meetings of the people, i.e. who offer amendments in the assembly. The clearest light has been thrown upon this phrase recently by Boeckh, in his Inscriptiones Graecae, Vol. I. No. 84. The allusion is to the formula τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ τῷ βουλῷ, sc. ἐδοξεῖν, which was used by those, who, in the assembly, made amendments to the decrees or probouleumata brought down from the council. They employed the phrase to avoid the trouble of reading over those parts of the decree which they left unaltered. συγγραφαμα is so used of a clause in a decree by Ἀσχίνης c. Ctes. § 127 Bekker. The Scholiast, with less success, explains these words of cases where two or more bills proposed by the same person followed one another in succession. It was the custom to prefix the names of the citizen, of his father, his demus, and tribe, to his resolution. In such cases the herald, says he, to save time, would say τὰ μὲν ἄλλα κατὰ ταυτιά, the same as before. But this explanation is unfortunate for several obvious reasons. Still more so is Coray's, who understands οἱ συγγραφομένοι of public contractors.

C. διαφέρειν δὲ τοσοῦτον, etc., but it differs (ἡ λογιστική) thus much: that the art of calculating considers how the odd and the even are related to themselves (i.e. odd to odd and even to even) and to each other in respect to number.
For πῶς ἦσεν πλήθους, see Soph. § 188, N.; Cr. § 363, β; K. § 274. 3. This definition of λογιστική is found again in Charmides, 166, A. Arithmetic seems in Plato’s definition to be employed with number in general, and λογιστική to be the vulgar art of reckoning, in which numbers are considered in their relations. A later distinction in the science of number was into Arithmetic, which inquired περὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ καθ’ έαυτό, and Music περὶ τοῦ πρὸς ἀλλα, i. e. concerning the relations of numbers. Sometimes, as here, the former term included the whole science of number, but was used ἰδιαίτερον περὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ καθ’ αὑτό, more especially of numbers in themselves considered.

D. The second τι is added by Stallbaum from a conjecture of Heindorf, and seems necessary to the text. The stars denote insertion. — ἄμφισθησίμων καί τοῦτο λέγεις. See Eurip. Alcest. 106, and p. 452, E, τι ... τοῦτο λέγεις; also Cr. § 528.

E. τοῦτο τὸ σκολιόν. This scolium, or table-song, is ascribed by the Scholiast to Simonides or to Epicharmus. It is often quoted, as by Athenæus at the end of his work. Comp. a fine passage, Laws 1. 631. The whole song is,—

"ύγιαινειν μέν ἄριστον ἀνδρὶ Θνατῷ,
δεύτερον δὲ καλὸν φιλὸν γενέσθαι,
τὸ τρίτον δὲ πλούτειν ἀδόλως,
καὶ τὸ τέταρτον ἥβαν μετὰ τῶν φίλων."

Plato does not allude to the last line, because no trade or employment is concerned with it.

452 A. ἵπτρός τε ... χρηματιστής. They are named in the order suggested by the scolium. Heindorf wished to read ὁ ἵπτρός τε, but Buttmann observes (the remark does not appear in the second ed. of Heind.), that the article so used would denote that one person had all the attributes mentioned: ὁ τε ἵπτρός καί χρηματιστής, on the contrary, would
sufficiently discriminate the persons; or, in ambiguous cases, Ὅ τε ἵκτος καὶ ὁ χρηματιστής. — ἄποι ... ὅνι ... ἀπαιτή. For oratio recta after ὅτι, comp. Cr. § 609, a.

B. Ἰαυμάζωμι γ' ἀν ... ἐν 'οσ' ἕχε. The reason, according to Stallb., why there is here an indic. in the protasis with an opt. in the apodosis is, that what the paedotribe says, "interlocutoris mentem potius quam suam ipsius opinionem respiciat." As, however, ἕχε εὐδιώκει is, in his own opinion, only a possibility, he says Ἰαυμάζωμι ἀν. But perhaps Ἰαυμάζωμι ἀν may be considered the optative of politeness, which expresses, under the form of a possibility, something real and absolute. Comp. Kühner's largest Gr. § 817. 6. — τίσης depends on ὄγεθον, good pertaining to his art.

C. πᾶς κατὰφροσὺν ἀπάντων is added in satire, to show the higher pretensions of the meanest of the three employments. Gorgias and the sophists held philosophy in like contempt, compared with the arts of show. One of the comic poets, Anaxandrides (Athenæus, 694, F), proposes to comply with these high claims so far as to change the place of the second and third lines of the scolium. He says, "when the author of it named making money as the third best thing," —

"τῶθ', ὅρϊς, ἐμαίνετο,
μετὰ τὴν ὑγίειαν γὰρ τὸ πλούσιον διαφέρειν.
καλὸς δὲ πεινῶν ἐστὶν αἰσχρὸν ἡροῦν."

καὶ μὴν ... ὅδε, and yet you see Gorgias here maintains on the contrary.

D. καὶ σὲ ... αὐτῶ. There is here a change not unknown to our language from the relative to the demonstrative construction. — αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, i.e. the cause why the men themselves who are possessed of the art are free. αὐτοῖς is used on account of the contrast with others whom they govern. There is here a certain rhetorical col-
oring, which may be intended as an imitation of the style of Gorgias.

E. ὁ πειθεῖν ἵγως οἷον τι εἶναι, I certainly pronounce it, or mean by it the being able to persuade, etc. — ἐν ἄλλῳ συνάγωγο, facile intelligas τοὺς συνεργάζεται. Stallb. — ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει, i. e. when in or invested with this power. — ἄλλῳ σοί is added as if ἄλλῳ had not gone before. Comp. 521, D, ou ἡδόνα ἐν εὐφορίᾳ . . . ἄλλῳ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἑσπερίαν.

453 A. ὁ κεφάλαιον εἰς τοῦτο τελευτᾷ, i. e. its sum and substance, its essential ends in this or tends to this as its result, τοῦτο referring to πειθεῖς. τελευτάω, meaning to end, takes the preposition εἰς and adverbs of motion to a place after it, as including the previous motion, together with the end itself; = to come to an end. So ὁχεῖν, to begin, is joined with ἐπί, ἐκ, and adverbs of motion from a place, = to start. — ἡ εἰς ... δύνασθαι. Here τι seems to be taken with δύνασθαι, and ἐπὶ πλέον is to a greater extent, plus. Comp. ταῦτα ἐπὶ πλέον εἰπεῖν, Laws 697, C; ἐπὶ πλέον τι δύναται, Politicus 305, B. So also ἐν' ἐλαττῶν, ἐπὶ πολὺ, ἐπὶ σμικρῶν (Soph. Electr. 414), are used.

B. ἐγώ γὰρ . . . τούτων ένα, be assured that I, as I flatter myself, — if any other person engages in conversation with another, because he wishes to know the very nature of that about which the discourse is held, that I also, I say, — am a person of that description. It is often the case, as here, that an infinitive and its subject are introduced after ὁ. This happens, for the most part, when a clause intervening between ὁ and the infinitive renders the change from the grammatical construction to its equivalent one less obvious. But here there is an anacoluthon also. Owing to the change just mentioned, ἐγὼ is left by itself, and ἐμε takes its place. — ἐγὼ . . . οὐχ οἴδα. Here notice the emphatic position of ἐγώ, the attraction of τῇ ... πειθεῖς to the main
sentence, in which ὁδα is, and the interposition of εὐ γοῦ ὀτι between the adverb and the verb.

C. οὐ σοῦ ἔνεκα... λέγεις, not on your account (to draw any thing further from you), but on account of the discussion, that it may go on in the way in which it can make the subject discussed most clear to us. Some authorities have ποἰς, which arose from not perceiving that ὅς here is quod modo, and not ut. See 449, E. — ὥσπερ ἦν. ἦν belongs to ἔρωμν, and is repeated on account of its distance from the verb, occasioned by the conditional clause. Comp. 447, D. — Ζεὺς τις. As this great painter painted for Archelaus, king of Macedon, who died in the same year with Socrates, there is here no anachronism, and Pliny's date for his entrance on his art (Olymp. 95. 4, after the death of Socrates), must be incorrect. — καὶ ποῦ. These words have given no little trouble to the interpreters, because the place where a painter's works are, which is their natural meaning, has nothing to do with the definition of his art. Ast's explanation of ποῦ as meaning where, in what thing, in regard to what (i. e. what animals and what properties of them, etc.), and Cousin's, where, on what, as canvas or stone, are hardly deserving of mention. Others suppose the text corrupt. Heind. conjectures πόσον, for how much, and Coray, τὸν, whose son. But how the compensation or the father of Zeuxis had any thing more to do with the definition of his art than the place where he painted, they do not inform us. Stallb., after Routh, would read πῶς, which makes good sense, though it departs too much from the letters of the actual text. I conjecture (that I likewise may contribute my mite) that the sentence originally ended at γράφων; which, indeed, may be argued from the fact, that Plato afterwards only alludes to τὰ γῶνα. To this τὰ ποῖα τῶν γῶν, and ἄλλα πολλὰ γῶν point; and no other definition of the art of Zeuxis is hinted at. Next to γράφων
came ἦ οὖ, ΠΟΤ, which was corrupted into ΠΟΓ, and then καὶ was added to bring ποῦ into grammatical connection with the sentence. For the confusion of Π and Π in the MSS., Bast's Epist. Palæograph. in Schäfer's Gregory Corinth., p. 716, may be consulted. A similar corruption of ἦ οὖ into ποῦ, in Repub. 437, D, is removed in modern editions.

D. καλῶς ἄν σοι ἀπεικόπτω; would your answer have been a good one? This verb, like several other deponents, is used both actively and passively,—a usage almost confined to the perfect, pluperfect, and aorist. Comp. Soph. § 208, N. 2; K. § 252; Cr. § 564. — ov δήτα denies the latter part of the alternative, ov πιλέτα.

454 A. τὸν λευτρα, him who makes this assertion, that rhetorical is the art of persuasion.

B, C. ταύτῃς... τῆς τινοῦς, λέγω, sc. τὴν ὑπορικὴν τε-χνὴν εἰναι. — ἀλλ' ἡν μὴ Θαυμάζεις, etc. The form of this sentence changes a little as it proceeds. ὀπεῖ ἔφο λέγω is written as if μὴ Θαυμάζει had gone before. The proper apodosis of ἡν... Θαυμάζει is τοῦ ἐπαν... ἐρωτοῦ, but the connection is broken up by ἔφο in ὀπεῖ ἔφο λέγω. The sense of ὀπεῖ... λέγω is, for as I say (i. e. as I was just saying, 453, C), I put the inquiry that the discourse may be finished in due order,—not on your account, but that we may not be in the habit of too soon catching up each other's words on mere suspicion (of what they mean, and without giving one another time for explanation). With προαναγκαίνω... τὰ λεγόμενα, comp. Herodot. 9. 91, δὲ ὑπαρπάσας τὸν ἐπιλοιπὸν λόγον.

E. βούλει... Θομέρ like visne videamus, volo hoc continent. Soph. § 219. 3, last ed.; Cr. § 611. 3; K. § 259. 1. 6.

455 A. πιστευτικῶς, productive of belief. — διδάσκαλωτικῶς, able to impart instruction or knowledge, i. e. knowledge founded upon absolute, unchangeable principles. — ἀλλά πιστικοῖς
George Stephey's altered form: 

\[ \textit{able to cause belief and nothing more} \]

This word has been altered into \( \textit{πιστικός} \) by Stephens, Heindorf, Coray, and Buttman; and some MSS. favor the change. Bekker, Stallb., and Ast, with reason, retain \( \textit{πιστικός} \). For, as is shown by Ast at great length, \( \textit{πιστικός} \) denotes \( \textit{having relation to, having to do with, i.e.} \) \( \textit{able to produce} \), and is the more general word, and not necessarily opposed to \( \textit{διδασκαλικός} \); while \( \textit{πιστικός} \) means \( \textit{able to produce} \), which has just been contrasted with \( \textit{ἐπιστήμη} \) (454, D). Again, as to the form of the word, — which, according to Buttman, cannot analogically be derived from \( \textit{πίστις} \), — Ast observes that adjectives in \( \textit{-τικός} \) are freely derived, not only from verbs, but also from nouns (\( \textit{ἀγωνίς} \), \( \textit{ἀρχικός} \)), adjectives (\( \textit{φιλός} \), \( \textit{φιλικός} \)), and imaginary forms (\( \textit{νοῦθετικός} \) from \( \textit{νοῦθέτης} \)). What objection, then, is there to regarding \( \textit{πιστικός} \), or \( \textit{πίστις} \) (comp. \( \textit{φύσις} \), \( \textit{φυσικός} \), \( \textit{φθαίς} \), \( \textit{φθισικός} \)), as the source of \( \textit{πιστικός} \)? However derived, such words may take a genitive. But here there is no necessity of supplying a genitive with \( \textit{πιστικός} \).

B. \( \textit{ίδωμεν τι ποτε και λέγουμεν}. \) The force of \( \textit{kai} \) in such a case, before a verb, seems to me to correspond with that of \textit{even}. \textit{Let us see what we are even saying}, where an emphasis is thrown on the verb; — \textit{what we can mean}. A few MSS. have \( \textit{λέγουμεν} \), which gives the inapposite sense of \textit{let us see what we shall say}. — \textit{τοι ἵκτῳν αἰτέως}. "The ancient states maintained public physicians at a salary; and Hippocrates is said to have been so employed at Athens. Such physicians had assistants, especially slaves, who practised among the poorer sort of people. The famous Democedes of Croton, about Olymp. 60, although as yet little money was in circulation, received the large salary of thirty-six \textit{Attic talent of silver} (§ 1,017). When he was called to Athens, he received one hundred minæ
(§ 1,692), until Polycrates, tyrant of Samos, engaged his services for two talents (§ 2,034).” Boeckh’s Civil Econ. of Athens, I. § 21. — αὐλο τι ἣ (literally, is there any thing else than, is it not true) is a very common formula in Plato, meaning no more than nonne. Very often αὐλο τι, without ἣ, is found in the same sense at the beginning of a sentence; and Bekker always prefers it to αὐλο τι ἣ. According to Hermann on Viger, note 110, when the latter is used, the interrogation extends to the end of the sentence; but when αὐλο τι, it stops with those words. — αἰσιαῖα is in the middle. — After ἣ νεοιῶν, supply συμβουλεύουσιν ὁ ἡτοιμός. And, just below, a similar clause, which is to be supplied in thought before ἀλλ’ οἱ στρατηγοὶ, is afterwards in part expressed. — A passage precisely like this occurs in Protag. 319, B.

C. τὸ σῶν σπείδειν, tuis rebus studere. See 458, B, note. — τινὰς σχεδὸν καὶ συχνοὺς. τινὲς includes many and few, as the more generic word (Wyttenbach on Phaedo, p. 116), and therefore πολλὸς, ἀλλ' ἦς, and similar words, often follow to define it. Here καὶ, on account of the position of σχεδὸν, seems to me not to be and, but even. The sense is, some, almost even many, i.e. some, indeed even quite a number.

D. αὐτὸς ... καλὸς ἐψιγήσω, for you yourself have admirably led the way, i.e. in speaking about the docks, etc., just now you suggested a good answer.

E. τὰ δ’ ἐκ τῆς Πειρικλέους. τὰ δὲ is used as if τὰ μὲν had preceded : and partly through that of Pericles. — ἐκ τῶν δῆμοισάνων, through the advice of the artificers. Heind. and Buttmann wish to read τῆς δημοιουχῶν. But there is no need of this, because a man effects what his advice effects; and such brevity is common in Greek. Thus, in Alcibiad. I. 135, E, cited by Ast, we have πέλαγος οὗ ὃ ἐρὴς ἔρως οὕδεν διοίκης, my love then will not differ
from a stork, i. e. from a stork’s love; and in Repub. 375, A, we have οἱ τί διαφέρειν φύσιν γενναίου σφιλακὸς εἰς φυ- λακὴν (in respect to keeping guard) νεανίσκου εὐγενοῦς; Comp. Soph. § 186, N. 1. — τοῦ διὰ μέσου τεῖχος. According to Colonel Leake (Topography of Athens, 354–357), this expression denotes both the long walls, which, as he supposes, reached from Athens to Piræus and Port Phalerum; so named as being between the city and the seaports, and also called τεῖχος in the singular, as forming a sort of fortification. Plutarch (Vita Pericl. § 13), alluding to this passage, interprets the words — perhaps carelessly — by τὸ μακρὸν τεῖχος, and thus sanctions Leake’s view. But Harpocration, s. v. διὰ μέσου τεῖχος, explains the phrase of the southern of the two long walls, so styled as being between the northern and the Phaleric wall; and this southern wall it is, says he, which Plato mentions in Gorgias. This is so confirmed by Thucyd. 2. 13, — who speaks of a Phaleric wall reaching to the city, and also of the long walls reaching, both of them, from the city to Piræus, the outer or northern one of which was guarded, — that it is not easy to see how the opinion of Leake can stand. See the commentators on Thucyd. I. c., especially Dr. Arnold. Now this inner or southern leg of the long walls, τὸ μακρὸν τεῖχος τὸ νότιον (Æschin. de Fals. Leg. § 174, Bekker), was built after the thirty years’ peace with Sparta, i. e. after B. C. 445, when Pericles began to be at the head of affairs, and when Socrates was over twenty years old.

A. οἱ νικῶντες τὰς γνώμας, Soph. § 164, N. 2; K. § 278, 456 2; Cr. § 433. — πάλαι ἐφοτό. πάλαι is very often found with the present of an action begun in the past and still continued. — Join τὸ μέγεθος with δαιμονία, as the accus. of specification. — εἰ πάντα γε εἰς τείχος. The apodosis must be something like δαιμονία ἀν καταφάνειτο, which is pointed at by γε.
NOTES.

B. μετὰ τοῦ ἀδιάφορον. See 448, B. — ἥ τεμεῖν ἤ καῦσαι, etc., to put himself into the physician's hands, to be cut or cauterized. A heated iron was applied to the wound for the purpose of stanching blood by the ἰατρός; who, as Routh observes, exercised both the medical and the surgical arts. παραμετέρειν, sc. ταυτόν; comp. 475, D. For ἢ τεμεῖν, καῦσαι, see Soph. § 219. 2; Cr. § 621. β. An infinitive so used, if it have the direct object of the leading verb for its subject, is in the passive, but otherwise in the active.

C. οὐδαμοῦ ... φανήναι, would be of no account. Comp. Soph. Antig. 183, τούτων οὐδαμοῦ λέγω; Xen. Memorab. 1. 2. 52, μηδαμοῦ εἶναι, to be nowhere, in no estimation. — εἰ βούλειτο is elegantly added, says Stallb., to denote the arrogance and pretension of Gorgias, — if he chose to give himself the trouble.

D. ἐμαθεῖ, sc. τις. Soph. § 157, N. 8; K. § 238, R. 3; Cr. § 546. This omission of the indefinite subject τις is common in this dialogue, as is also the transition from a singular verb to a plural, or the contrary, where the subject is an indefinite one. — ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι dicuntur qui veris armis certare discunt. Nam vulgo juventus non veris armis se exercerat sed rudibus, aut pilis præpilatis, quæ dicuntur Græcis ἑσφαιρομείνα ἀχόντια [i. e. with a ball covering the point]. Quæ sunt verba Casauboni ad Theophrast. Charact. p. 79, ed. Fischer. Stallb.

E. ἔκείνοι μὲν γὰρ, etc., for they intrusted (them to their scholars) for the purpose of using them aright against their foes, and those who wrong them, in defending themselves, not in beginning an assault. τούτως refers to the means of defence used in the arts just named. The subject of ἐξιτ-οδοι is to be gathered from the context, viz. such persons as learn to box, and beat their friends. The forms of ὑπάρ-χειν, and those of ἀμύνομαι, are often contrasted, in the senses of acting on the offensive and defensive. — μετα- 13*
στρίψωντες, turning round, i.e. on the contrary. Comp. μεταβαλόν, 480, E.

A. εμβολχή, in short, is taken with περὶ ὄτου ἢν βούληται, 457 to show that that phrase comprises all that can be said, or is used in its widest sense. Its force is like that of omnino.

B. καὶ τῇ ὑποτικῇ ... ὑπερ καὶ. For καὶ, in each member of the sentence, comp. the note on Electr. 1301, where it is said that καὶ often stands after words of comparison to show connection, without any force that can be given in English. See also 458, A, at the beginning.—καὶ τα. Post participia, καὶ εἰτα, καὶ ἐπείτα inferuntur, ubi εἰτα et ἐπείτα expectes. Stallb. A frequent idiom.

C. δύναται, sc. οἱ λέγοντες, implied in τῶν λόγων; or, more exactly, the subject is indefinite, and plural, because the action of conversing requires more than one.—οὕτω repeats and recalls the participles. Join διαλύεσθαι to δύναται.

D. μὴ σαφῶς; i.e. μὴ φη (deny) τῶν ἔτερον σαφῶς λέγειν. —καὶ κατὰ φθόνον, etc., and they think that they are (i.e. each thinks that the other is) speaking out of envy, or with ill feelings towards each other, having a contentious spirit, and not seeking after that which was proposed in the discussion. For ἔκατον = ἀλλήλων, Soph. § 145, N. 2; K. § 302. 7; Cr. § 507. 7.—τελευτώντες, Cr. § 457. a; K. § 312, R. 3.—οἷα καὶ, etc., so that even the by-standers feel vexed for themselves, because they consented to be listeners to such people. The infinitive follows οἷα here, as it so often does ὅτε.

E. διελέγεσθαι, to go on, or through with a refutation of. διὰ has the same force in διερωτήν below. In the next words, the sense is, Lest you should suppose that I speak with my zeal for debate not directed towards the subject, that it may become plain, but against you. For τοῦ γενίσθαι, comp. Soph. § 187. 1; K. § 308. 2. (b); Cr. § 372.
With genitives in this relation of the motive, ἐνεκα is often found.

457 a. τὸν ἵδεως ... ἐν ἡλεγχθέντον = τούτων οἷς ἰδεως ἐν ἡλεγχθέντων. K. § 260. 2. (5) ; Cr. § 615. 2. Comp. Euthyphro 3, D, where Socrates says, that he converses, not only without taking pay for it, ἀλλὰ καὶ προστιθέεις ἐν ήδεως, sc. μισθόν, but even with a willingness to give pays, if any one is disposed to hear him. Here προστιθέεις without ἐν would mean, that he actually paid his listeners. — Just below, for ἰ'i τι μὴ ἀληθές λέγω, we should expect ἰ'i τι ... λέγοντεν, or, with the transition to the first person, λέγομεν, parallel to the succeeding λέγοι. The reason for using λέγω seems to be that given by Stallb., which Ast opposes: that Socrates, in speaking of himself, denotes the probability of his being in an error by ἐν with an indicative; but only the possibility of error on the part of another by ἰ'i and an optative. — αὐτῶν ἀπαλλαγὴν. Comp. for αὐτῶν emphatic (the word with which it agrees being omitted), 447, C, οὐδὲν οἷον αὐτῶν ἐρωτάν.  

B. ὅσον δόξα ψευδῆς. Græci in hujusmodi comparisonibus modo casus præcedenti nomini accommodant, modo nominativum ponunt, intellecto verbo superiore. Stallb. Comp. Republic 334, B, τοῦτο μὲντοι ὡς οἰκεῖ ἐτι, ὑφελεῖν μὲν τοὺς φίλους ἡ δικαιοσύνη, where τήν δικαιοσύνην would have been more common. See Cr. § 655. 4. — τὸ τῶν παρόντων, the interests or feelings of the present company. And so τὸ τούτων, just below; τὸ οὖν σπεύδουσι' ἁμα, καὶ τοῦ- μον αὐτῆς, Soph. Electr. 251. Such formulæ are sometimes little more than circumlocutions for the pronoun. Comp. τὸ γ' ἐμὸν, 458, D. — The Schol. thinks that Gorgias is here finding an excuse to break off. But probably nothing more than polite attention to the wishes of the auditors is intended. Gorgias is uniformly polite to Socrates, and willing to continue the discourse. Comp. 497, B, 506, A.
C. πάσος ἀποτελομεν, we shall extend too far, be too prolix. The verb is here used without an object, or, if anything is understood, it is ἢμας αὐτούς, rather than τὸν λόγον. — έμοι δ᾽ οὖν, etc., and as for that (οὖν), may I myself also never have so much business, that leaving a conversation such as this, and so carried on (i. e. on a subject of such importance, and so interesting), it may be of more importance for me to do any thing else.

D. τὸ έμον is the subject of κωλύει. — τὸ λοιπόν, after this, i. e. since all the others wish that the debate should continue. — καλ ταῦτα, etc., and that too (i. e. and especially) when I myself announced, that whatever questions any one wishes to put he may do so.

A. ἀλεγές τοι τῶν δῆ, you were saying certainly just now. 459 I have written τοι τῶν δῆ for τοίνυν δῆ, at Bekker’s suggestion, on account of the sense. — τὸ εν ὥστι νοῦτο, this expression εν ὥστι. This is the subject of ἡττων, and the remaining words the predicate. — εν τοῖς μὴ εἰσῶσιν. Compare the negative μὴ here, and in ὦ μὴ ἱστρός, with ὦ in ὦ οὐς εἰσῶσ, εν τοῖς οὐς εἰσῶσιν, just below. In the first two cases, the negation is general and indefinite: “before such as do not know, whoever they are,” “he who is no physician, supposing such a person to exist.” In the other two cases, the negation being made concerning something definite and particular (the orator and the crowd), οὐ is properly used.

B. ἐνταῦθα, i. e. in the case of the art of medicine.

C. ὑποτίμη, saving of trouble, convenience.— ἔιν τι ἢμιν πρὸς λόγου πῇ, if it come at all within the scope of our discourse. πρὸς, (literally,) on the side of, in favor of, to the advantage of.

D. οὗτος ἔξωρ. This clause is afterwards defined by αὐτὰ μὲν οὖς εἰσῶσ.

A. ὄπισθ ἢρι ἔπες. See 455, D. — οὖμαι is paren-
NOTES.

460, A.

Theical: hence μαθήσεται follows, and not μαθήσομαι. — εἰκε δή, as Ast says, is a formula of exhorting, like ὅγε δή; as Heindorf, a "formula subsistendi et inhibendi," = ἐκεί σεαυτόν; as Stallb., after Hermann, one of admonishing another to remember something, and perceive its results, = ἐκεί τοῦτο. Its use, here, at least, consists in drawing attention, in causing one to stop and consider something, especially some objection derived from what had been said.

B. τῦλλα οὐτο, sc. ἐκεί. — κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, after the same form of speech, after the same analogy. The next words, being explicative of this clause, are without a connecting particle.

C. The words here inclosed in brackets are so injurious to the sense, that there can be little doubt, I think, of their being interpolations. The reasoning is this: He who has learned justice is just. The just does justly. Therefore he will or prefers to do justly. Therefore he never will prefer to do unjustly. The orator, if taught justice by Gorgias, is just, and therefore will never will or prefer to do unjustly. For this passage, consult the Introduction. — ἐκ τοῦ λόγου, from what has been said; as follows from the argument. These words show that Socrates begins here to apply what has been conceded to the case of the rhetorician, which is proof that the words in brackets are indefensible.

D. ἔρμαλλειν, sc. αὐτοῖς, and so with ἔκλαυνειν, just below. When the same noun follows two verbs, or a participle and a verb, in different cases, the Greeks content themselves usually with expressing it once. Comp. Mt. § 428. 2. — ὁδοντῶς οὐτο, in the selfsame way. These adverbs answer, as Coray observes, to ὁ αὐτοῦς οὗτος.

E. φανεται...οὐκ ὅν ποτε ἀδικήσας, appears incapable of ever doing injustice, = φανεται ὦτι οὐκ ὅν ποτε ἀδικήσει. F. A. Wolf, on Demosth. c. Leptin. (p. 468, ed. Reiske),
lays down the rule, that ἐπαινομαι with an infin. = videor, but with a particip. palam sum. —— ὁ γ’ . . . ποιεῖται, since it is always discoursing. For the use of the relative, comp. note on 488, D. Here ὅ, which refers to ἥ ὑποτοιχή, is put in the gender of the predicate πολύμα, by attraction. Comp. 463, E.

A. εἰπον . . . ὅτι . . . ἐξιον εἰη. Here ἄν is not used, because the sense is, I said that it was worth while. With ἄν the sense would be, I said that it would be worth while. The first is a direct assertion, in oratio obliqua; the second a hypothetical one, in the same form. And so just above, 460, E, εἰξετο ὅτι ὑποτοιχή . . . εἰη, that rhetoric was, but ὕπιλασον ὅς οὐδέποτ’ ἄν εἰη, that it never could be.

B. μᾶ τὸν κόμα. A very common oath in the mouth of Socrates, concerning which much has been written. In 482, B, we have μὰ τὸν κόμα, τὸν Αἴγυπτιων θεόν, i. e. “laetrator Anubis,” which is either a comic addition to the original formula, μᾶ τὸν κόμα, or else shows the oath to be of Egyptian origin. Mr. Mitchell (Aristoph. Wasps, Appendix, Note D) is of the latter opinion. We refer those who wish to pursue this point further to the Commentt. and the Scholl. on that play, v. 83, Solanus on Lucian’s Vit. Auct. (Vol. III. p. 520, ed. Lehm.), and Coray on this place. The ancients thought that such oaths were introduced by Rhadamanthus, to avoid swearing by a divinity on a common occasion. Zeno, the Stoic, in imitation of Socrates, swore by the caper-bush. —— οἷκ ὀλίγης οὐνομαίας; haud exigui est sermonis. —— καὶ . . . δοξάζεις. According to Ast, καὶ affects δοξάζεις, being a little out of its place. Do you even or really think? —— ἦ οἴμι . . . ἵσωτήματα. A passage of considerable difficulty, which seems to be best explained by regarding the sentence, with Schleierm., as a broken one; which is indicated in this edition by a dash after διδαξεῖν. Polus is so eager, that he cannot end his
sentence grammatically, but must make a rhetorical exhibition of his feelings. The sense is, Or do you think, because Gorgias was ashamed not to admit, both that the orator must understand the just, beautiful, and good; and that he himself would give instruction in these subjects, if one should come to him to study oratory ignorant of them; — then, perhaps, from this admission, an inconsistency arose in the discussion, to wit (διὰ) the very thing which you take satisfaction in, though you yourself led the way to such questions (i.e. though you alone, by your artful questions, are to blame for the inconsistency). For the first sentence, Schleierm. supplies a close from τοῦτον διὰ . . . αὐτὸς, as if Polus had at first meant to say, “or do you think, because Gorgias,” etc. . . . “to find your pleasure therein.” But perhaps some other close of more emphasis may be gathered from the context, such as, (“do you think, because Gorgias, through shame, made certain admissions,) that therefore his inconsistency is to be charged to rhetoric.” The other attempts to explain this sentence which I have seen are, — 1. Ast’s, who gives to oíte the sense of τοῦτον αὐτὸς, and supplies ὡς. Or do you think so because, etc. 2. Stallb., in his first ed., translates thus: an putas Gorgiam præ pudore negasse, etc. But this perverts the sense. Comp. 482, C, D, where the passage is alluded to and in part explained. He also ends the sentence beginning with ὣν oíte at ἐπείτη, — a strange and flat close to the period. 3. In his second edition, where he blames Ast for his “mira commenta,” deserting his former view, he continues the sense in an unbroken period, and treats oíte as though it did not affect the structure. The sense then becomes, because Gorgias was ashamed to deny, etc. . . . did therefore, do you suppose, from this admission an inconsistency arise, etc.? But an inconsistency did arise, for the very reason contained in the words ὣν Γοργίας, etc. This is evident from
The words of Polus then become unmeaning. —

482, D. The words of Polus then become unmeaning. —

μὴ προσαυλογήσαι ... μὴ όντι. μὴ όν sometimes, as here, follows a simply negative expression, — quin before a subjunctive. But more usually it follows a verb of negative import, when όν precedes such a verb. Thus ἐπαφοροῦμαι μὴ ἐπιστασθαί, I deny that I know, but όν ἐπαφοροῦμαι όν ἐπιστασθαί, I do not deny that I know. An analogous formula to this latter is found just below, 461, C, — τίνα όντι ἐπαφοροῦσαθαί μὴ όντι. καὶ αὐτὸν ἐπιστασθαί, — where the interrog. implies a negative.

D. ἐπαφοροθοίτε. Most of the MSS. have the opt. here in lieu of the subj. after a present in the principal clause. The reasons given for the opt. in the present case by Stallb. and Ast are scarcely sufficient. — δικαίως δ' τι, and it is right for you so to do. For δικαίως, see Mt. § 297; K. § 307, R. 6; Cr. § 551. It is for δικαίων τοι στ, etc., owing to the cause explained in the note on 448, D. — ὀμοθείσαθαί, to retract, properly, to put a piece over again, to change a move in playing draughts. Comp. Xen. Memorab. 2. 4. 4. Cicero, in a frag. of his Hortensius, says, — “Itaque tibi concedo, quod in duodecim scriptis solemus, ut calculum reducas, si te alicujus dicti pænitet,” borrowing his figure perhaps from Plato. The subject of ὀμοθείσαθαί Ast takes to be σε understood. “Quod fieri non posse manifestum est,” says Stallb. But such cases are possible, and we believe Ast to be right. Here, σοι δοκί, just before, and ὀ τι ἐν σοι βούλη, just after, almost forbid us to supply με. A stronger case occurs Theæt. 151, C:

“For many feel so towards me, as positively to be ready to bite me, when I strip them of some folly of theirs,” — καὶ όντι ὁτινατ ενοίκαι τοιούτο ποιη, i. e. that I do this. (Such is the MS. reading.) — φυλάττε, if you will only observe one thing. The middle, if you will guard against, might stand here.
E. οὐ... λέγειν, where of all Greece there is the greatest liberty of speech, Ἑλλάδος being a genitive partitive. — ἀντίθεσ, put over against it, sc. this, viz. σοῦ μακὰ λέγοντος, etc. For this latter passage, compare Aristoph. Acharn. 303, σοῦ δ’ ἐγὼ λόγους λέγοντος οὖν ἀκούσομαι μακρούς. —

462 B. νῦν δ’, nunc igitur.— ἐν τῷ ὑπάρχοντι. Aristotel (Metaphys. init.) refers to this treatise, or to the words of Polus of like import on 448, C, and approves of his opinion making experience the foundation of art.

C. οὐκόνων καλὸν... ἄνθρωποις; does not rhetoric, then, namely, to have the faculty of giving pleasure to men, seem to you to be a good thing? The last clause of the sentence explains, and is in apposition with, ἡ ἀρμοδίωρ. οὖν τ’ ἔγινε = νῦν οὖν τ’ ἔγινε.

D. βούλει οὖν, etc., are you willing, then, since you prize giving pleasure, to give me a little pleasure? For the play on χαρίζωμαι (which itself playfully alludes to χαίρετος τίνος καὶ ἡδονής, just above), comp. 516, B. In this sentence, the present infinitive denotes the habit of Polus; χαρίζωμαι, that which Socrates wishes him to do in this instance.

E. τίνος λέγεις τούτης; Comp. 449, E, note on ποιον τούτον. — μὴ ἀγοροκόιτον, I fear that it may seem too rude. For διδοGTK omitted, comp. Soph. § 214, N. 4; Cr. § 602. 2. The comparative, which here denotes a lower degree of the quality than the positive, is usual in such apologies.

463 A. δοκεῖ τοινν μοι... ἄνθρωποις, it seems to me, then, to be a sort of study, that has not indeed the properties of an art, but which belongs to a mind dexterous in attaining its ends, and manly, and possessed of a natural talent to communicate with men.

B. δς δὲ ὁ ἑμὸς λόγος, etc., yet, as I maintain, is not an art but experience, or a routine and practice, i. e. has
nothing to do with absolute truth and reason, but proceeds from accidental discovery that a certain end is gained by certain means.—κομματικὴ διέρρη κοσμητικὴν quâ honestus ornatus quaeritur. Stalb.

C. τίταρα . . . πράγματα, four divisions these (of flattery or the art of show) relating to four matters or subjects. These four subjects, according to Coray and Stallb., are words, food, the ornamenting of the body, and philosophical disquisitions.—ἀποκριμένος. Comp. 453, D, note.—πρὶν ἢν . . . ἀποκρίνωμα. With πρὶν "subjunctivum non usurpant tragici, nisi in priore membro adsit negandi aut prohibendi significatio." Elmsley on Medea, 215. In which case ἢν accompanies πρὶν, with some exceptions almost confined to poetry, and the subjunctive aorist has the sense of the exact future of Latin; e. g. here prior quam respondero. For the reason why the subjunctive follows πρὶν, see Mt. § 522, C.; K. § 337. 9. b.

D. ἀποκριμένων, sc. μον. Comp. 461, D, note.—πολιτικῆς μορφῶν εἴδωλων, a shadow or semblance of a division of the political art, "civilitatis particular simulacrum," as translated by Quintil. 2. 15. 25, where this passage is examined.

E. Πῶλος δὲ ὡδέ. There is here, probably, an allusion to the meaning of the name colt, as Schleierm. remarks. For another pun on the name of Polus, comp. Aristot. Rhet. 2. 23: ὁς Κόνων θρασύβουλον "θρασύβουλον" εξάλει, καὶ Ἡρόδικος (of Selymbria, comp. 448, B, note) θρασύμαχον, "αἰτὶ θρασύμαχος ἐ," καὶ Πῶλον, "αἰτὶ σὺ πῶλος ἐ," καὶ Δράκοντα τὸν νομοθέτην, ὥστε σὺν ἀνθρώπων οἱ νόμοι ἀλλὰ δράκοντος.—In τυγχάνει ὅν τούτο, the predicate τούτῳ determines the gender of ὅν by attraction, instead of ἐντοιχικῇ, to which it refers. Comp. 460, E.

A. οἴνον τοιοῦτο λέγω, for instance I mean as follows, literally, "of which sort I mention such a thing as this, viz."
This, with or without the article before τοιοῦτος, is a common formula in Plato, when examples are adduced. — τὰ σῶματα is the accus. of specification.

B. ἔχει δὲ οὐδὲν μὴλλον, i. e. εὖ. The subject of ἔχει is supplied by the preceding accusatives, σῶμα and ψυχήν. But, or, while yet they (soul and body) are none the more in a good condition. Another construction also is possible: ὅτι ποιεῖ (τινα) δοκεῖν μὲν εὖ ἔχειν (κατὰ) τὸ σῶμα ... ἔχει δὲ, while he is none the more in a good condition. — τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ σῶματι, etc., but the art for the body I am not able to name to you off-hand by one name. σῶμα and ψυχή freely take and lose the article (comp. 465, D). They lose it, perhaps, as approaching the nature of abstract nouns. In 463, E, they could not have it. μὴν is the predicate-accusative. οὕτω, thus, in these present circumstances, is often equivalent to illico. Comp. 509, A. — τῆς δὲ πολιτικῆς, etc. Here λέγω is to be supplied in thought, and τῆς πολιτικῆς depends on τὴν νομοθετικῆν, its part. The sense is, And of the political art I mention (one branch) the legislative as the counterpart to the gymnastic art, and (the other) justice as the counterpart to medicine. The political art, or the general art of securing the public good, has two divisions, first, that which consists in securing the moral welfare by law, which prescribes what is right, and according to which the public health will be preserved; and, secondly, that which restores this health when once impaired, or justice, the judge’s art. (See Introduction.) Analogous to these arts for the soul are, for the body, gymnastics, or the art of preserving, and medicine, or that of restoring health. Plato elsewhere insists on the analogy between the healing art and justice, e. g. in Repub. 444, C, — a fine passage, where, however, justice is taken in the higher sense of that controlling virtue, which brings all the parts of the soul, like those of a well-regulated state, into their due place and order.
C. πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, with a view to the greatest good. — ὅν γνῶσαι λέγω ἀλλὰ στοχασμένη. As αἰσθομένη is a general word denoting mental perceptions, whencesoever derived, it is explained by this clause, not guided by knowledge, I would have you understand, but by guess. Comp. 463, A. — ἐποδῦσα ὑπὸ ἔκαστον, having slipped under, or by stealth put on the garb of each of the four divisions.

D. ἑρῴεται τῆν ἄνοιαν, hunts for, seeks to captivate ignorance, or the unwary. — τῷ ... ἡδίστω, by that which is at the time the most agreeable.

A. τὸῦτο γὰρ πρὸς σὲ λέγω alludes to 463, D, where Po-465 lus puts the question concerning the quality of rhetoric. Comp. 448, C—E. — ὅτι ὦν ἔχει λόγον ὑπὲρ αἱ προσφέρει, because it cannot explain what sort of things those are in their nature, which it makes use of. Here we see what Plato thought that a τέχνη must be. The MSS. give, almost unanimously, ὃ προσφέρει ἡ προσφέρει, and the editors, without MS. authority, ὃν προσφέρει. I have restored a part of the MS. reading, and have since observed that Stallb., in his second edition, has made the same change. — ἐποσχεῖν λόγον, to submit the reason, or rationale, to explain and defend a position.

B. ὑπόκειται, puts itself under, puts on the form or mask of, = ὑποδύει above. — ὡσεὶ ποιεῖν ... ἀμελεῖν, so as to make men attach to themselves adventitious beauty, and neglect their own, obtained through the gymnastic art.

C. ὁπερ μίντι τοῦ λέγοι. In the ensuing words, down to ὁφοποιοῖ, the thoughts seem to be only half expressed, as if Socrates, anxious to avoid a long speech, were hastening to an end. Some editors suppose that the text has sustained an injury, but, as I think, without reason. Such, says Socrates, are these arts in their nature; but in practice the Sophists' art and rhetoric are confounded together;
and the like would be true of cookery and medicine, if the body judged of them without a presiding mind. The thoughts are not essential to the argument, and are only thrown out en passant. ὅπερ . . . λέγω refers to what has just preceded; but as I say, or was just saying. — διέστηκε. The subject of this verb, according to Buttmann in Heindorf's edition, is all the arts before mentioned, and ὅντων has the same subject, which is ταῦτα understood, referring to these arts. Stallb. restricts διέστηκε, with reason, I think, in his first edition, to σοφιστικὴ καὶ ἡττορική. ὅντων may be used instead of ὅντες, referring to σοφισταὶ καὶ ἡττορεῖς, next following. A participle is sometimes found in the genitive absolute, when its subject is the same as that of the verb; the cause of which seems to be a desire of the writer to express the thought contained in the participle more distinctly. The grammatical construction is caused by Plato's passing in thought from the arts to those who pursue them. — ἦσ τὰ ἐγγύς ὅντων, but, inasmuch as they are conterminous arts, sophists and orators are (mixed together in the same place and about the same things, i.e. are) confounded together, and indiscriminately give themselves to the same pursuit, and they know not what to make of themselves, nor their fellow-men of them (i.e. neither they nor others have any exact idea of their so-called arts). For the thought, comp. 520, A: ταύτων, ὡς μακάριε, ἐστὶ σοφιστής καὶ ἡττωρ, ἦ ἐγγύς τι καὶ παραπλήσιον, ὡσπερ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον πρὸς Πίθολον.

D. τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου ἄν πολὺ ἦν, what the well-known (τού) Anaxagoras said (his tenet) would hold extensively (in regard to these arts). For the uses of the article, see Soph. § 176, and § 139, N. 1; Cr. §§ 477. a, 479. Anaxagoras taught that all things were in a chaos at first; then came mind, and arranged them. In other words, he ascribed to an intelligent author, not creation, nor motion and
quality, but only arrangement; which was, however, a step beyond the earlier Ionic philosophers, who accounted for all phenomena by the physical properties of matter. — οὕ γὰρ τούτων ἐμπειρός. The Schol. of the Clarke MS. supposes these words to allude to the rhetorical figure called παράλογος, which takes place when similar words, as φίλε Πωλέ here, are brought together. Another Schol. explains them of the acquaintance of Polus with the philosophy of Anaxagoras, — to which sect, says he, Polus belonged, — a piece of information probably picked out of the text. Perhaps nothing more than ironical praise of Polus for great knowledge is intended. Comp. 462, A.

E. ὡς ἔκεινο ἐν σώματι, sc. ἀντιστροφόν ἐστι τῆς ὅπτομικῆς. The clause might be removed without injury to the sense. ἀντιστροφόν here governs a genitive, but a dative, 464, B. Some other compounds of ἀντί vary in the same way as to their regimen. ἔκεινο, referring to ὅπτομικᾶς, accommodates its gender to that of ἀντιστροφόν.

A. Init. If, therefore, I too, when you answer, shall not know what to make (of it), do you likewise prolong your discourse; but if I shall, let me make use of it. The dative, which should follow χρήσωμαι, is contained in ἀποκρινομένου.

B. οὐδὲ νομίζω, not even to be thought of, i.e. to be held in no estimation at all. This verb, which just above has a predicate, φαῖλοι, is here used absolutely. Our verbs to regard, to consider, and others, are capable of the same twofold use.

C. The colon, which most editors put after κύνα, ought, as it seems to me, to be erased. Comp. μὴ τὸν Δια... ἀλλ’, 463, D, νη τοὺς θεοὺς ἀλλ’, 481, C, where the formula of swearing unites in one clause with what follows. Socrates does not answer Polus by the phrase νη τὸν κύνα, but only begins his answer in the next chapter.
E. οὐδὲν γὰρ ποιεῖν, etc. Comp. Repub. 9. 577, E. "Is not the state that is enslaved and under a tyrant far from doing what it wishes? Very far. And the soul, accordingly, that is governed by a tyrant, will be very far from doing what it may wish (if we speak of the whole soul); and, drawn along forcibly by urgent lust, will be full of agitation and regret." For ὧς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, qualifying οὐδὲν, see 450, B. — ἔγω ὦ ἀρημί; ἐγόνε νεγό; — μὰ τὸν. The Schol. on Aristoph. Frogs, 1421, thinks that the name of the divinity is omitted out of reverence. But the omission seems intended rather for comic effect, as though the right divinity did not readily occur to the mind. — καὶ τίγνην τὸν ὑποτρικήν. Supply οἴσων. Comp. 495, C.

467 A. ἐμὲ ξελιγχύς. The aorist participle, which Heindorf declares to be used for the present, has its own force. Po- lus could come to his conclusion, when he had refuted, or by refuting. The argument may be considered as the prelimi- nary to the conclusion, or as the means of reaching it. In the first case, the aorist is needed; the present, if used, would have the second sense. — οὐδὲν ἄγαθὸν τοῦτο κε- κτήσωνται. By τοῦτο, he means τὸ ποιεῖν ὑ ὁτεί ἄφτοις. — ξελιγχύς . . . ὦ. The verb is here used in sensu praegnan- ti, unless Socrates be refuted, and it be shown that, thus answering nearly to our verb convince.

B. οὖτος ἄνη. An instance of aposiopesis or reticentia, a figure often caused by excited feelings, which cannot find the language to express themselves. "In hac formula recte omittitur articulus, quoniam dicitur δεικτικῶς de eo qui pra- sens est." Stallb. οὖτος contains a shade of contempt sometimes like iste. Comp. 489, B, 505, C. — καὶ γὰρ non est etenim, sed καὶ pertinet ad νῦν. Stallb.; i. e. καὶ is also. — ἵνα προσεῖται ὡς κατὰ σέ, that I may address you in your own style. This refers to λῶτε Πόλε, and the arti- ficial juxtaposition of words of equal length, or of similar form or sound. Comp. 448, C, 465, D.
C. πίνοντες παρά, i.e. πίνοντες τῷ φάρμακα, λαβόντες αὐτὰ παρὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν, a constructio praegnans.

D. οἱ πλέοντες, i.e. who make voyages for commercial purposes. —— ἄλλ' ἐκεῖνο ... πλουτεῖ, when a demonstrative pronoun thus prepares the way for the infinitive, the latter often loses its article. Comp. τοῦτο ... ἔσειναι, 469, C. But, just above, we have not only τοῦτο, πίνειν, but also ἐκεῖνο, τὸ ὄντιονειν. —— ἄλλο τι ... οὕτω. Supply ἔχει. Is it not so, then, in all cases?

E. πολλῇ ὄναγκῃ. The preceding question of Socrates is equivalent to a negative proposition, which is here to be supplied; so that there is nothing which is not either good or bad, etc.

A. προάπτουσι, on fit, like λέγουσι, on dit. The same indefinite subject appears just before in the first person plural, βαδίζομεν, etc.

C. ἀνθέος οὕτως, thus in themselves considered, without respect to something further.

E. ἐν τῇ πόλει ταῦτῃ. Not in this city, Athens, as Hein- dorf understood it, but in this just-mentioned city, i.e. in the supposed city. If Athens had been intended, Socrates, living there, would have said, as Stallb. after Boeckh on Pindar (Not. Crit. in Olymp. 6. 102) observes, ἐν τῇ δὲ τῇ πόλει. Comp. this formula so used, 469, D, fin.; Leges 932, A. ὅδε seems to be the strongest, and, so to speak, most objective of the demonstratives, and to point especially at that which has a close outward relation (as that of place) to the speaker. —— εἰς ... δύνασθαι. εἰςιν = fieri potest. —— ὃς δή, as forsooth, just as though. Stallb. translates these words by quasi vero, Ast by nam revera.

A. περὶ δὲν ... τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Comp. Soph. § 151. 3; 469 K. § 332. 8; Cr. § 522.

B. καὶ ἔλεεινόν γε πρὸς· præpositioni πρὸς absolute posi-
tae (præterea) adjungi solet particula γε. Ast. = yes, and pitiable besides. — πώς, cur. — οὖν ώς, ὡς, for this reason that. And so, in English, we say how is this? nearly in the sense of why is this? the reason of which is, that the manner in which a thing is done often involves the cause why it is done.

C. ἔξειναι. Supply τινι, to which αὐτός refers, in the next line.

D. τῷ λόγῳ is added to explain the sense in which ἐπικαβδοῦ is used, attack in your discourse, refute by argument. δὴ seems to belong to the imperative, with the usual hortatory sense. — ἐν ἄγορά πληθοῦσα, in the agora, when it is crowded, which it was between early morning and mid-day. This phrase denotes place, — not time, as Stallb. says, to which ἐν is opposed. περὶ ἄγορᾶν πληθοῦσαν is a common phrase for time. ἄγορά, even when definitely used, is often without an article, like πόλις, παίδη, and many other nouns. And this is particularly frequent after prepositions. Comp. 447, A. — τεθνήξετι, he shall be dead, the meaning of τεθνηκα put into a future. This appears to be the received form in old Attic, and τεθνήξεται came into use afterwards. See Elmsl. on Aristoph. Acharn. 590. — τινι ... τῆς κεφαλῆς αὐτῶν κατεγίναι, that any of them shall have his head broken, like συντριβήναι τῆς κεφαλῆς, Aristoph. Peace, 71. But the accusative may also follow this verb, as in 515, E. Yet the accusative of κεφαλῆ was disallowed by the Atticists, although used by Lysias and others of the best writers.

E. τοῦτος, desidero articulum. Stallb. αὐτί, which may have been absorbed by καῦ (ΚΑΙ for ΚΑΙΛΑΙ), is added by Coray. But the article is unnecessary, being implied or contained in τι, as Ast observes. One article often suffices, even for two substantives of different genders, or for two words separated by disjunctive particles. Comp. Hermann on Eurip. Hec. 593 of his second edition.
A. τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι, etc. The construction is anacoluthous; καὶ τὸ τοῦτο . . . ἐστὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι being, for the sake of greater emphasis, in the place of καὶ ἔστω μέγα δύνασθαι. The sense is, To have great power appears to you to be a good, if success follows a man while he acts as seems best to him; and this (i. e. the use of great power when accompanied with success), as it seems, is to have great power; but otherwise to have great power is a bad thing, and is to have little power. Socrates shows the absurdities into which Polus, on his own ground, falls.

B. εἰπὲ τίνα ὅρον ὅριζεν. τίς is here used like ὅστις in indirect inquiry. See 447, C, 448, E, etc.

C. χαλεπῶν γε ὥστε ἐλέγξει. These words are obviously spoken in irony.

D. ἄλλα ἄξονω γε. Routh and other editors since suppose that by this form of words Socrates conveys ridicule of ὅρις, just above, which is used quite rhetorically. This may be so, but ἄξονω is often thus used for ἄξονα. Comp. 515, E; Cr. § 579, ζ; K. § 255. 1. R. — ὅτι οἷα. The noble passage down to ἄλλα μὲν δὴ is freely translated by Cicero, Tuscul. Quaest. 5. 12. — αὐτόθεν, ex ipsa re. Stallb., from the nature of the case itself.

E. παιδεύας ὅποις ἔκει. See 451, C. — τὸν . . . ἀνδρα καὶ γυναικα. See 469, E, note.

A. Archelaus began his reign by the foul means mentioned in the text, in 413 B. C., and died by assassination in 399. He seems to have been an able prince, and he made, according to Thucyd. (2. 100) more internal improvements in Macedonia than all his predecessors. His desire of the society of men of letters is well known; besides Euripides, the poet Agathon and others resorted to his court. (Aelian. Var. Hist. 2. 21.) Socrates, also, is said to have been invited, and to have replied, ὃβον ἐστὶ μὴ δύνασθαι ἄρμανασθαι ὁμοίος εὖ παθόντα ὅστε καὶ κακῶς. (Aristot. Rhet. 2. 23.)
He said, also, that Archelaus had spent 400 minæ in getting his palace painted by Zeuxis, but had spent nothing on himself. (Ælian. u. s. 14, 17.) Athenæus, in a bitter passage, filled with aspersions of Plato (Lib. II. sub fin.), says that the philosopher was, according to the testimony of his nephew, Speusippus, on very good terms with the man whom he here speaks so ill of. But as Plato was scarcely thirty when Archelaus died, and until that time a man of little distinction, the story is probably distorted and exaggerated. — ἐδούλευεν άν᾽. Some few MSS. give ἐδούλευσεν. Heindorf condemns Routh for adopting ἐδούλευεν, saying that the latter, with άν', is serviret; the former, servisset. But this is not so. The imperfect indicative with άν', "plerumque refertur ad præsens. Sæpe vero etiam ad præteritum, ejusmodi quidem, quod diuturnitatem aliquam vel repetitionem facti continet," Hermann de partic. άν', II. 10.

B. ἡμαμαίως ὑς ἄθλιος. See 477, D, note. — μεταπεμψάμενος, etc. "Insignis est hic locus eo, quod plurima participia cumulantur, copula non intercedente." Stallb. In this, the style of rhetoric seems to be imitated. The circumstances are compressed into one sentence, and vibrated, so to speak, one after another with rapidity, for the sake of the greater effect.

C. ἐμβαλὼν τις φθέαρ, according to Ast and Stallb., denotes the manner in which the action of ἀπονεῖσας took place, having drowned him by throwing him into the well. Perhaps it may suit the rhetorical style here better, if they are taken side by side, as if καὶ were in the text, having thrown him into the well (and so) drowned him. For ἀπονείσας, comp. 512, A. — ἀφίζαμενος ἀπὸ σοῦ, τυχε ἰμπρίμισ, seu interque eos tu primus. Heindorf, who has added a number of examples of the phrase.

D. τοῦ ... ἡμεληκία. This clause is brought, by a
negligent freedom of style, under the influence of ὀτί, although Socrates of course did not praise Polus for ignorance of the art of conversation. ὦς has the force of quamquam; although you seem to have neglected the art of discussing. — πόθεν. Comp. my note on Eurip. Alcest. 95.

A. δοκούντων εἶναι τι. Cr., § 450, regards τι as indeclinable, corum qui videntur esse aliquid; not as predic. accus., corum qui se putant esse aliquid. Aliquis and aliquid are both used by classical Roman writers in the same emphatic way. Cic. Tusc. Quæst. 5. 36. 104: an quidquam stultius, quam quos singulos contemnas, eos esse aliquid putare universos. And so τις, τινες, as in the noted line of Pindar, τί δέ τις; τι δ' οὐ τις; σκιζὸς ὄναρ ἀνθρωπὸς, Pyth. S. 95; and in Demosth. c. Mid. § 213, πλούσιου πολλὸι ... τὸ δοκεῖν τινὲς εἶναι δὲ εὐπορίαν προσευληφότες, which favors Crosby's view. — διήνυ. Soph. § 220 (223. 2); Cr. § 623. — Νικίας. This well-known wealthy general perished in the Sicilian disaster, some seven years before the time when this dialogue is feigned to have been held. He is, however, without anachronism, selected as a witness, in the same way that the testimony of Homer might be appealed to. The men here named were not selected on account of their unjust actions, — for they were, perhaps, all of them, among the best Athenian public men, — but probably on account of their wealth, illustrious connections, and ancestry. Socrates means to say, that the spirit of all the great and opulent families in the city led them to prefer prosperous injustice before depressed goodness. — οἱ τριπόδες. A favorite kind of votive offering. The tripods here spoken of were set up on the top of small temples in the inclosure of the temple of Bacchus, in commemoration of victories in which the dedicators were the choragi of their tribes. — Ἀριστοκράτης, son of Scellias. This man, one of the more moderate aristocrats, after helping, in 411
B. C., to overturn the Athenian constitution, soon again united with Theramenes to put down the more violent revolutionists. His dislike of democracy is punned upon in Aristoph. Birds, 125. We find probably the same person acting as general with Alcibiades, 407 B. C., and one of the commanders in the great sea-fight of Arginusæ, 406 B. C. With five colleagues, he perished, the victim of the popular frenzy which succeeded that event. It would not, then, seem very apposite to cite him the next year as a witness of the tenets of Polus, which his own experience so sadly belied. Either Plato forgot the date of this transaction, or with concealed irony selects the case of this man as really disproving what it is intended to prove. And he may have adduced the others with the same feeling.

B. ἐν Πυθιῷ, sc. ἱερῷ, in the temple of Apollo Pythius at Athens. So I have no hesitation in reading, with Coray, after one MS., for the common Πυθα, Delphi. For τοῦτο points at a votive offering well known and familiar to Athenians, and this temple (i.e. its sacred precinct) was the place where those who conquered in the cyclic choruses at the Thargelia deposited their tripods. Comp. Boeckh's Inscript., no. 213, and Thucyd. 6. 54. — τῶν ἐνθεόν is for τῶν ἔρωτας, by attraction or accommodation to ἐκλέξασθαι, which contains the notion of taking from. — ἐξβάλλειν ... ἄληθοις. In these words there is an elegant allusion to actions of ejectment. There is, also, according to Stallb., a play upon οὖσια, which means not only substance, estate, but reality, truth. ἐξβάλλειν, also, may allude to the tyrants before mentioned; as though Socrates had said, — "You mean to act the part of one of these tyrants, whom you admire so much, and expel me from my only substance, the truth, by getting a multitude of opinions in your favor."
C. ὁν ἐγὼ αὖ οἶμαι. Supply τρόπον ἔλεγχοι εἰναι, and comp. 473, C, 508, B.

D. σὺ ἤγεῖ οἴον τε εἰναι. οἴον is neuter, and εἰναι is to be taken with μακάριον ἄνδρα; another εἰναι being understood, unless we say that the one in the text by brachylogy performs a double part. Comp. Repub. 486, A: οἴον τε οἶει τούτῳ μέγα τι δοκεῖν εἰναι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον. — ὡλο τι... διανοομέθα; shall we not suppose that you think so? For the genitive absolute with ὁς, after a verb of knowing, comp. Soph. § 192, N. 2; Mt. § 569. 5; K. § 312, R. 12; Cr. § 640. — ἢρα interrogative is sometimes found out of its usual place at the beginning of the sentence, like other words of the same class. It is, however, before the most important clause. Comp. 476, A.

A. ὑπὸ θεῶν. ὑπὸ is used because τυχάνη δίκης con-473 tains a passive idea = κολαζηται.

B. ἀληθή... ἵσως. Hoc ἵσως cum irissione dictum de re certa ut Lat. fortasse. Stallb. — ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτ... κα- λεπώτερον alludes to 470, C, καλεπόν γε σε ἔλεγξαι, and is ironical.

C. εκτιμηται, exsecetur. Ast. — τοὺς αὐτοῦ ἐπιδῶν παιδας. Supply λοβηθέντας. ἐπιδέειν (to look upon, to live to see), "ponitur semper in rebus gravioribus, et ἐπὶ συμ- φοράς ut ait Thomas Magister, p. 335." Wytenbach on Plut. de sera num. vindict., p. 17, referred to by Heindorf and others. Not semper, but sepe. We have, for instance, Eurip. Med. 1025, πρὶν σφῖν ὑνεσθαι καπιδεῖν εὐδαιμονας; Plut. Pelopid. § 34, Διανόειν ἐπιδόντα νίοις στεφανομε- νοὺς 'Ολυμπίαιν, and so several times in Plutarch's lives. — καταπιτωθη, pīce oblitus cremetur. — οὗτος εὐδαιμο- νίστερος ἦσατι. The compar. here has far less authority in its favor than the superl.; and quite a number of MSS. have εὐδαιμων. Stallb. inclines to the superl., but no sure example has been adduced of this degree used for the compara-
tive and followed by ἵπποις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἱλιοῖς, and by strangers besides, or and by the rest of men, viz. strangers. This seemingly pleonastic use of ἄλλος is quite common. Comp. 480, D; Phædo, 110, E, γῆ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἱλιοῖς; Leg. 7. 789, D, κύλλος καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ὑώμην; Xen. Cyrop. 7. 3, βούς καὶ ἱπποις . . . καὶ ἄλλα πρόβατα πολλά.

D. μοσμολύττει αὖ, etc., you are this time bringing up bugbears, and not attempting a refutation; and just now you were bringing up witnesses. Socrates is making game of the rhetorical substitutes for philosophical proof used by Polus. For ἄφετε δὲ ἐμαθῆτεν, comp. 470, D, 472, A, to which places there is a reference. — δυοῖν γὰρ ἄδιλλων. Supply οὐδέτερος.

E. ἄλλο αὖ τοῦτο εἴδος ἐλέγχον. This may allude to a rhetorical precept of Gorgias mentioned by Aristot. Rhet. 3. 18, that the "impression produced by the serious discourse of the adverse party must be destroyed by mirth; and that of his mirth by seriousness." — καὶ πέρυσι βουλεύειν λεχών . . . οὐκ ἕπιστευμεν ἐπιψηφίζειν. Socrates, in his ironical way, attributes to ignorance a proceeding which sprang from a conscientious regard to law, and crowned him with the highest honor. It is narrated by Xenophon, in his Hellenics, 1. 7, and mentioned by him (Memorab. 1. 1. 18, and 4. 4. 2) and Plato (Apol. Socr. 32, A), and in the dialogue Axiochus, § 12. Socrates happened to be the Epistates or president of the Prytanes, and as such the presiding officer in the assembly, on the day when the generals who had conquered at Arginusæ (comp. 472, A, note) were brought before the people on a charge of having neglected to pick up the bodies of the citizens that were floating in the water. It was proposed, contrary to the laws, to try them all at once by a summary process. Some of the Prytanes, who declared that they would not put the vote contrary to the laws, were frightened from their pur-
pose by the rage of the people, "and all promised that they would put the vote, except Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus, who only said that he would do every thing according to the laws." (Xen. Hellen. u. s.) Whether Socrates was overruled by his colleagues it does not appear. One is tempted to conjecture that they took the affair out of his hands, and pretended that his delay in allowing the assembly to vote proceeded from ignorance; and that to this he playfully alludes. His conduct, however, was viewed by all in its true light. There is some reason to believe, however, that for that day he stayed proceedings upon the proposition. "But on the next day, Theramenes and Callixenus, with their party, by suborning fraudulently chosen proedri, procured the condemnation of the generals without a trial." (Axiochus, u. s.) This passage from a work ascribed to a disciple of Socrates, but commonly regarded as spurious, is important, not only for this item of information, but also for the statement, which may have some historical basis, that the foul plot against the generals was consummated by means of the proedri non-contribules, as they are called, who were drawn according to a pretended lot, on the day of the assembly, by the Epistates for the day, who was the successor of Socrates.

A. ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἐλέγω is to be taken with ἐμοί ... 474 παράδος, as I was saying just now, hand over the proof to me in my turn. He refers to 472, C.

B. τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς οὐδὲ διολέγομαι. These words with some bitterness silently contrast the philosopher with the orator, who aims to persuade the many. —— διδόναι ἐλέγχον, to give an opportunity of refutation, to let (another) take up the argument. —— πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. In this formula, καὶ is often added before δεῖ in the sense of even.

D. τί δὲ τὸδε; intellige λέγεις. Stallb. —— εἰς οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπων, etc. Do you call beautiful things in general
NOTES.

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1. Do you consider beauty a fundamental quality, or resolve it into something else? — πρὸς ὁ ὁν. These words down to τοῦτο are expository of the preceding clause.

E. καὶ μὴν τὰ γε ... ἀμφότερα. In this sentence, Ast wishes to write καλὰ without the article, thus making it a predicate. τὰ καλὰ is added by way of explanation. τὰ κατὰ ... νόμους = ὁ νόμου. The sense is, And, moreover, laws and studies — those that are beautiful, that is — are not removed from (are not without) these properties, viz. the useful or pleasant, or both.

475 A. τὸ τῶν μαθημάτων κάλλος ὁπαντός. Supply ἐξετ. — καλῶς ... ὅφιξε. This conveys a bitter satire of Polus, who by pleasure and the good meant the same thing. — οὐκοῦν τὸ αἰσχρὸν τῷ ἑναντίῳ, i. e. οὐκοῦν καλῶς ὅριζομαι, τῷ ἑναντίῳ ὅριζομενος τὸ αἰσχρόν.

B. οὐ καὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη; frequens apud Plat. dictio pro quâ quis expectet οὐ καὶ τοῦτο ἀναγκαίον; infra, p. 499, B, οὐ τοῦτα ἀνάγκη. Štalb.

C. οὐκοῦν τῷ ἐτέρῳ λείπειαι, sc. ἑπερβαλλεῖν αὐτό.

D. ἂντι τοῦ ἤτοιν, sc. κακοῦ καὶ αἰσχροῦ.

E. For παρίσων, see 456, B. — ὁ ἐλέγχος ... οὐδὲν ἐκ-

476 A. σκέψωμεν, σκοπῶμεν. The present imperative, and the subjunctive used for it, seem sometimes to have a closer reference to the present time than the aorist; and therefore to be more urgent. Comp. let us be going, and let us go, in English. It has been remarked (first, I believe, by Elmsley), that in the present and imperfect the Attics say σκοπῶ, ἔσχοπον, or σκοπούμαι, ἔσχοπούμην, but not σκέπτομαι, ἔσχεπτόμην. There is only one instance of σκέπτομαι in Plato to very many of σκοπῶ. On the con-
trary, they never use ἂνοπῶ in the future, aorist, or perfect.

B. διασκεψάμενος, after careful consideration. — ἂνο τοῦτο πᾶχων, sc. ἐστι, or better, ἀνάγκη τοῦτο πᾶχων εἶναι (i. e. πᾶχων), τοῦτο being the object. The participle is used to continue the form of the preceding discourse.

C. The Attic form καὐ is justly preferred by all modern editors to καὶω, having, as it does, the support of several MSS.

D. τοῦτον δὴ ὁμολογούμενον. The participle is properly in the present, as the clause may be resolved into ἐπειδὴ ταῦτ' ὁμολογοῦμεν.

A. ἂνο ἤπειρο ἐγὼ ὑπολαμβάνω τὴν ὁφειλειαν; Supply 477 ὁφειλέται, to be taken with its cognate noun, and for the place of ὁφειλειαν in the sentence, comp. Soph. § 151, Rem. 7; K. § 332. 8; Cr. § 522.


C. αὔτὸ τὸ αἴσχιστον, etc. In every case, that which is most ugly is most ugly, from what has been admitted before, either as occasioning pain in the greatest degree, or harm, or both. The student will have observed that καὐ, αἰ- σχός, preserve the same sense throughout the discussion, and there seems to be no fit word except ἄγαθος by which to translate the latter of the two. And yet ugly will not bear to be used in as wide an extent as αἰσχός. ἄγαθος, καὐ, denote the relation of any thing to our well-being, especially to future and ultimate well-being as opposed to pleasure in the present time.

D. ωὐκοῦν ἃ ἀιμαφότατον, etc. Therefore it is either most unpleasant, and the ugliest of them because it exceeds
(them) in unpleasantness, or (it is so because it exceeds them) in hurtfulness, or in both. τούτων refers to the two πνευματικά of soul and body. — ὑπερθύμη τιν... ὡς μεγάλη βλάβη, by some extraordinarily great harm. This may be explained as a confusio duarum locutionum, ὑπερθύμη τοιν ὡς μεγάλη βλάβη, it is astonishing by how great a harm, and ὑπερθύμη τιν βλάβη, by some astonishing harm. The common formula ὑπερθύμη τός, ὑπερθύμη τός, with an adjective, can be explained in the same way, or by an attraction by which the adjectives ὑπερθύμη, ὑπερθύμη (τοιν) are changed in their form by the relative adverb.

E. ἀπαλλάττει. This means no more than “has a tendency to free.” Some are beyond the reach of cure by punishment (525, C). Nor does Socrates teach here that the ultimate object of punishment is to free the bad man from his badness, as that of medicine is to cure the sick. The comparison is not to be pressed in all respects.

478 A. τί μὴ σώς ὑποθετήσ, if on this view of the subject you are not prepared to answer.

C. ἀπαλλάττεται. The subject is to be found in οἱ ἱερεύνωμενοι, such as are under cure, which, being indefinite, readily gives place to a singular. — ἱερεύνωμενος is added to explain οὕτως. — ὁρχήν, omnino, used chiefly with negatives. Comp. Soph. Antig. 92. — τὴν ὁρχήν μηδὲ κτῆσις, the not even possessing it at all.


E. οὕτως δ’ ἦν, but this was, i. e. this is, as we proved, he who, etc.

479 A. διαπράξῃ τί ὦσε. This verb and ἐπικράσωω are often followed by ὦσε before an infinitive. Comp. Soph. Antig. 303. Eurip. Alcest. 298. — ὀπειραγ ἄν τι τις. In phrases like this, an apodosis to which ἄν belongs is to be supplied:
here διαπράξατο is to be repeated. A little below ὁσπερα-
νεὶ παῖς = ὅσπερ φιλοῦτο ἐν ὑπὸ παῖς εἶν.

B. τὸ ἀλγεινὸν αὐτοῦ καθορᾶ ἐν added to explain τοιοῦ-
tόν τι. αὐτοῦ refers to δικὴν διδόναι, implied in δικήν, just
above.—μὴ ὑγιοὺς σῶματος stands, with a brevity which
is not uncommon in comparisons, for τοῦ συνοικεῖν μὴ ὑγιὴ
σῶματι, in order to prevent the repetition of συνοικεῖν.
Comp. 455, E, note; Soph. Antig. 75; and Soph. § 186,
N. 1; K. § 323, R. 6; Cr. § 461, R. 2.

C. παρασκευαζόμενοι. This verb can be followed by an
accusative, and by a clause beginning with ὅπως. The two
constructions are here united. — ὅπως ἐν ὧσιν, the means
whereby they may be. — συμβαίνει μέγιστον κακόν. This
verb may be united with the participle or infinitive of εἰμι,
or with a simple predicate, as here. Comp. Soph. Electr.
261, note in my ed.

E. τὸν ἀδικοῦτα... διδότα, the one who, though he com-
mits the greatest wrongs, suffers no punishment for them.
— φαίνεται, sc. ἀποδείχθαι.

A. αὐτόν εαυτόν... φυλάττειν, etc. For one needs to keep
480 guard especially over himself; lest he act unjustly, on the
ground that (if he so act) he will be possessed of a serious
evil. The subject of φυλάττειν is τινά, with which αὐτόν is
to be joined; and the same omission of the indefinite sub-
ject occurs a few lines below. — ὅπως μὴ ἀδικήσῃ. One
MS. has ἀδικήσῃ, and one other ποιήσῃ, just below. The old
doctrine of Dawes, that ὅπως μὴ cannot be followed by a
first aorist subjunctive, but requires either a second aorist
subjunctive or future indicative, is now exploded by all re-
spectable scholars.

B. ἡ πῶς λέγομεν. λέγωμεν, which Bekker prefers, would
be equally good here. Comp. τι φῶμεν, just below. The
difference is, that πῶς λέγομεν = what is our opinion?
pῶς λέγωμεν, what shall we say? what ought to be our opin-
ion? what have we good reason to believe?
C. "Sometimes a second \( \nu \) follows \( \varepsilon \), as in Latin nisi si." Mt. § 617. d; K. § 340, R. 5; Cr. § 667. 2. Stallb., on Sympos. 205, E, says: "Alterum \( \varepsilon \) rem magis etiam reddit incertam, ut quod exceptioni conditionem adjiciat." — \( \varepsilon \)i \( \tau \omega \nu \varepsilon \tau \iota \iota \varphi \). According to Stallb., \( \chi \omega \sigma \iota \mu \omicron \omicron \varepsilon \iota \nu \alpha \iota \iota \) is here to be supplied, and the clause \( \kappa \alpha \tau \gamma \omicron \phi \epsilon \iota \nu \) \( \delta \epsilon \iota \nu \), being explanatory of \( \tau \omega \nu \varepsilon \tau \iota \iota \varphi \), follows without a copula. But this view of the construction overlooks \( \delta \epsilon \iota \nu \). It may be explained by supplying \( \sigma \upsilon \chi \omega \sigma \iota \mu \omicron \omicron \sigma \theta \iota \sigma \theta \iota \sigma \) \( \iota \mu \iota \nu \) again in thought with \( \varepsilon \iota \nu \) \( \tau \tau \iota \varsigma \), etc., or in other words, Plato, studious of brevity, proceeds as if he had forgotten all of the sentence preceding \( \sigma \upsilon \chi \omega \sigma \iota \mu \omicron \omicron \sigma \theta \iota \sigma \theta \iota \sigma \). For making a defence, etc., ... rhetoric is of no use at all to us (nor is it of any use), unless one should suppose, on the contrary, that he ought to be an accuser first of all of himself, etc. — \( \delta \varsigma \ \alpha \nu \ \dot{\delta} \iota \). Here \( \ddot{\alpha} \iota \iota \ = \) at any time. — \( \dot{\alpha} \lambda \lambda \ \tau \alpha \sigma \iota \chi \epsilon \mu \uomicron \nu \pi \omicron \omega \nu \alpha \), etc., but to give himself up, with his eyes closed and manfully, as to a physician, etc. \( \mu \omicron \nu \omega \nu \alpha \) expresses endurance of calamity with determination, the impressions concerning pain derived from the sense of sight, and their effects in weakening resolution, being thus prevented by the will of him who shuts his eyes. Comp. Soph. Antig. 421.

E. \( \sigma \omicron \iota \) \( \omicron \mu \omicron \omega \lambda \omega \gamma \epsilon \iota \iota \omicron \mbox{.} \) Heindorf and Coray would exclude \( \sigma \omicron \iota \) from the text. If it be the pleonastic dative, as it is called, the sense is for you, i.e. I am willing to own to you that they agree with what was said before. — \( \tau \omega \nu \varepsilon \tau \iota \iota \varphi \), etc. If, on the other hand, says Socrates, one would do evil to another, he must save him by the use of rhetoric from punishment. Thus the rhetoricians, who place the value of their art in doing good to a friend, and harming an enemy, do just the contrary; they harm their friends by saving them from justice, and do good to their enemies by the opposite. All this proceeds upon the principles with regard to justice and injustice which Polus has been com-
pelled to admit. The parenthesis \( \epsilon \nu \mu \omicron \omicron \omicron \pi \omicron \omicron \nu \epsilon \lambda \alpha \beta \eta \iota \omicron \omicron \), as understood by Buttmann, amounts to this: that this method of doing evil to an enemy is only applicable in case the enemy wrongs a third person; for when the enemy wrongs the orator himself, to do evil to him thus, namely, to save him from justice, would be but exposing the orator to fresh injuries from him. By rhetoric, then, he cannot gain the point he desires, namely, to do evil to his adversary without injuring himself. — \( \mu \epsilon \alpha \beta \alpha \lambda \omicron \omicron \tau \alpha, \ \mu \nu \tau \tau \alpha \tau \iota \epsilon \omicron \omicron \), \( v \iota \omicron \iota \omicron \iota \omicron \), \( v \iota \iota \iota \). Comp. \( \mu \epsilon \alpha \sigma \tau \rho \epsilon \iota \omicron \omicron \), 456, E. It agrees with the subject of \( \pi \omicron \epsilon \iota \omicron \nu \). The abundance of words to denote opposition is worthy of notice: \( \tau \omicron \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \iota \omicron \omicron, \ \alpha \nu \), and this participle. — \( \epsilon \nu \ \delta \epsilon \ \dot{\alpha} \lambda \nu \), etc. \( \delta \epsilon \) often resumes the subject after a parenthesis. The sense of the first part of this sentence is as follows: — But on the other hand, again, if, reversing the case, one has need to do harm to any person, whether enemy or any one whomsoever, — provided only one be not himself wronged by his enemy; for that must be guarded against, — if, I say, an enemy wrong another, he (that other) must procure in every way, by deed and word, that he (the enemy) suffer not punishment nor come before the judge.

A. \( \dot{\alpha} \nu \alpha \lambda \omicron \omicron \eta \tau \alpha \). This, according to Coray, is an iso-481 lated instance of the middle of \( \dot{\alpha} \nu \alpha \lambda \omicron \omicron \) used as the active, and to be altered into \( \dot{\alpha} \nu \alpha \lambda \omicron \omicron \). This word and \( \dot{\alpha} \nu \delta \delta \) are in a different tense from the aorists preceding, as containing the signification of continuance, which, however, rather belongs to \( \mu \nu \dot{\alpha} \nu \delta \delta \) taken together than to the verb in itself.

C. \( \nu \nu \tau \omicron \omicron \ \theta \epsilon \omicron \omicron \nu \dot{\alpha} \lambda \lambda \). Comp. 466, C, note. — \( \pi \omicron \tau \omicron \omicron \omicron \sigma \epsilon \phi \omicron \omicron \nu \ \sigma \pi \omicron \delta \alpha \dot{\alpha} \omicron \omicron \). For verbs meaning to speak construed with a participle, see Mt. § 555, Obs. 2. — \( \epsilon \nu \ \mu \nu \ \eta \nu \), etc. If men had not the same state of mind, some of them some one, and others some other (i. e. if classes or portions of mankind did not agree in one or another state
of mind), but each of us had a peculiar state of mind different from what the rest of mankind had, it would not be easy to manifest your own state of mind to another.

D. ἵδιος ἦ. This construction with ἦ, which belongs to ἄλλος, εὐαντίος, and similar words, is adopted here by ἵδιος, on account of the notion of difference implied in it. — πε- πονθότες. Soph. § 137, N. 6; Cr. § 337. α; K. § 241, R. 8. Then follows ἐφῶντε, because δίο renders the duality of the persons more striking. — Ἀλκιβιάδου. At the time when Plato would have us suppose this dialogue to be spoken, Alcibiades, then a man of forty and upwards, had retired for the last time from Athens, and long before that the intimacy between him and Socrates had ceased. That intimacy was of the purest kind on the part of Socrates. He saw in the young Alcibiades high natural endowments, and hoped to win him over to the love of wisdom and virtue. But political ambition and his passions were more attractive. — τοῦ Πυριλάμπους, the son of Pyrilampes, whose name was Demus. Pyrilampes was a wealthy Athenian, and a friend of Pericles. He reared peacocks (see Plutarch. Pericl. § 13; Athenæus, p. 397, C), as did his son Demus; and this being then a new bird in Greece, attracted visitors from so far off as Sparta and Thessaly. On the first day of the month, and at no other time, this living picture-gallery was open to all. Demus was as much admired for his beauty as one of his peacocks. Hence the parody in Aristoph. Wasps, 97 (acted seventeen years before the date of this dialogue): καὶ νῆ Ἀλ’ ἦν ἤδη γε ποὺ γεραμμεῖν | τὸν Ἱπριλάμπους ἐν Θύρῃ Δήμον καλὸν, | ἵνα παρέγγαψε πλησίον, " Κημὸς καλὸς," i. e. where he finds written Δήμος καλὸς, "Demus is beautiful," he writes close by it, " Κημὸς" — the top-piece of the judge's ballot-box — "is beautiful." Pyrilampes also was considered as handsome and as large a man as any in Asia, whither he went on embassies to the great king and
others. (Charmides, 158, A, if another person of the name be not meant.) We find Demus commanding a galley at Cyprus, before the battle of Cnidus, which happened in 394 B.C. (Lysias de Bonis Aristoph. § 25, Bekker.) The object of Socrates here is to teach Callicles, in a playful way, that he feels constrained to follow his object of attachment, philosophy, wherever it leads him; just as Callicles obeys the whims of the people. I know not why Alcibiades is brought in, unless it be for the reason which Ast has given: that, though aside from his main object, it serves to put Socrates in contrast with the politicians and orators. "I love beauty of mind," he says, "in Alcibiades, truth and justice in philosophy; but you love external beauty in Demus, and an ignorant, unjust Athenian people."

—οτι ... ου δυναμένου. There is here a confusion of two expressions, οτι ... δύναμις, and δυναμένου, without οτι, construed with ου. οτι thus becomes idle.

A. των ἔτερων παιδικῶν. The latter word could have an honest sense.—ἐμπληκτος, fickle. It has this sense in Lysis, 214, C (where it is joined to ἀστάθμητος), Soph. Ajax, 1358, and elsewhere.

B. ἔκεινη ἔκλεγξε... ὁς, refute her (philosophy) and show that. See 467, A.

C. ὁ Σύνορατες. The sense is, O Socrates, you seem to take airs upon yourself in your discourses, being in very truth nothing but an haranguer; and in the present instance you make this harangue because the same thing has befallen Polus, which, he said, befell Gorgias in respect to you. The first clause relates to the general habit of Socrates, which, as Callicles, judging him falsely, says, was that of bringing a man into perplexity by sophistical arguments, and then of crowing over him, as from a loftier moral ground. The second clause asserts this to be true in the instance of Polus. δημηγόρους (comp. δημηγορίκα, 482, E)
means one who, like a popular speaker, gains his ends by sophistry and pretence of honesty. — οἵον παθόντιος furnishes the ground or else the occasion why Socrates indulged in this spirit.

D. ὁτι ἀγανακτοῖν ἄν, εἰ τις μὴ φαίη, because they would be displeased if any one were to refuse. Without ἄν, the sense would be, they were displeased. With ἄν, the verb, if put into oratio recta, would be in the optative; without ἄν, in the indicative. Comp. 461, A.

E. σὺ πᾶρ τῷ ἄντι, ὁ Σωκράτης, etc. For, O Socrates, while you profess to be in pursuit of the truth, you in reality turn (the conversation) to such vulgar and popular things as these, which are not beautiful by nature, but by law. For φορτικά, comp. Mitchell on Aristoph. Wasp, 66. It may be translated, also, disagreeable, disgusting. Schol. φορτικόν ἐστι τὰ βάρος ἐμποιεῖται, and so Ast, Stallb. It is joined with δικανικά, in the style of pleadings, in Plat. Apol. Socr. 32, A. δημηγορικά, Schol. τὰ πρὸς τὴν τῶν πολλῶν βλέποντα δόζαν, i. e. in the style of a δημηγόρος. — ὅς τὰ πολλὰ δὲ. δὲ is rarely found after the third word of the clause. Here, however, ὅς τ. π. are in a manner one word. See Poppo's note on ἐν τοῖς πρὸτοι δέ, Thucyd. I. 6.

483 A. τοῦτο τῷ σοφῶν is in apposition with its relative, being added to explain it. — κακοφηγεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, you deal unfairly in your discussions. — ὑπεροφότων, asking slyly. He says, that if a person speaks of any thing as according to law, Socrates changes the ground cunningly, and asks about it according to nature, and the contrary. — Πόλου τὸ κατὰ νόμον αὖχων, etc., literally, when Polus spoke of that which was more ugly according to law, you followed up the law according to nature, i. e. in your argument you followed out law, as if it were nature. Ast, with some reason, wishes to erase τὸ κατὰ νόμον and κατὰ φύσιν, which last words are wanting in some books. The sense would then
be, When Polus spoke of that which was more ugly, you urged the law, i. e. you spoke of that which was by law more ugly. For the phrase, διώκειν, κατά νόμον, comp. Republic. 5. 454, B, κατά τό ὄνομα διώκειν, to pursue an inquiry according to the letter, and not the idea. For εἰδοκαθές (which Elmsley on Medea, 186, regards as an aorist, but which here seems to be an imperfect, and its infinitive, Euthyphron 15, D, a present), I beg leave to refer to my note on Antigone, 1096, second edition. — τό ἀδικεῖον. οἶνον, though in no MS., is added before τό by several editors, and assists the sense; though without it ἀδικεῖον (a part), may be regarded as added in apposition, to explain πᾶν (the general idea). Being pronounced by the scribes like the ending ὅν of κλῆσων, οἶνον might easily be absorbed by that word.

B. οἱ τιθέμενοι τοὺς νόμους. See 488, D.

C. ἐκφαβοντες. After this word, τε stands in a few MSS. It seems to have been added to do away with the asyndeton; which, however, is allowable here, as what follows is an illustration of the foregoing. — ὄγαπωσι γάρ, etc. For they are contented if they are put on an equality when they are inferior. — ζ. . . φύσις. Stallb. observes, that οἶμαι is sometimes interposed between a noun and its article or preposition.

D. δῆλοι. Not φύσις δῆλοι, but ταῦτα δῆλοι, these things show that they are so. But Stallb. and Ast give the verb an intransitive sense here. These things are evident that they are so, i. e. it is evident.

E. κατὰ φύσιν τῆν τοῦ δικαίου. The three last words, though in all the MSS., are looked on by several editors as interpolated. Ast retains them, translating φύσιν δικαίου not the nature of justice, but natural justice. He remarks, that a noun governing a genitive may sometimes be resolved into an adjective qualifying that genitive; and cites,
in his support, Aristoph. Plut. 268, ἡ χρυσόν ἀγγείλας ἐπῶν, i.e. golden words; Phædrus, 275, Α, σοφίας... ἀλήθειαν ποιήσεις, true wisdom. —— δεν ἡμεῖς οιδήμεθα πλάττοντες, etc. The primary idea, as Heindorf observes, is expressed by the participle. The sense is, Not however, perhaps, according to that law which we enact, (thereby) moulding those among us who have the best gifts and most strength; — taking them in their youth, by our incantations and juggleries, we tame them as we would lions, etc. The asyndeton at ἐν νεόν is like a number already noticed: the clause is epexegetical of the foregoing. See 450, B. ἵως is used sarcastically, the thing being regarded as certain by Callicles.

484 A. ἄνηγ, according to Stallb. and Ast, is here used un-emphatically as a man, a person. If contempt were expressed, ἄνθρωπος would have been chosen, as in 518, C. —— ἄποσισαμένος contains a figure drawn from a horse throwing his rider. —— γαμματα, written ordinances. —— ἐπαναστα, etc. He rises upon us and turns out our master, — this slave that was, i.e. this one whose spirit we had curbed by laws against nature. The aorists ἀνέφωη, ἕξι-λαμψ, denote an action wholly indefinite in regard to time, and thus answer to οὖν γίνῃ in the protasis, instead of presents or futures. The aorist, in such cases, represents a general truth as a matter of experience; the present, as something oft occurring in the existing state of things; the future, as something sure to happen, as the effect of existing causes.

B. νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς. This fragment of an uncertain poem of Pindar’s is often referred to, especially by Plato. It is treated of at large by Boeckh, Pind. Vol. III. 640. Boeckh makes it probable that the words κατὰ φύσιν, or something equivalent, belong to the passage; φησίν, having the same sound, and almost the same letters, as φύσιν,
may have caused that word to be omitted. οὕτως δὲ δὴ γὰρ are interposed by Callicles. Something like this followed in Pindar: ἑπέι ᾿Ηρώουνα βῶς Κυκλωπίων ἐπὶ προσόφων Ἐὐφυεὸς ἀναήτας (1) τε καὶ ἀντίκατας ἂλασεν. Coray supposes that Callicles perverted the sense of Pindar, but the same turn is given to the words in Leges, 10. 890, A, and Aristides (2. 69, Diindorf) knows no other. The sense of ὅγει δικαίων τὸ βιωτάτων, according to Boeckh, is afferre vim maximam, justam eam efficiens; i.e. law (the law of nature) makes use of might, and calls it right. ὅγει and δικαίων have the same object. Socrates interprets ὅγει, below (488, B), in the sense of carrying off, plundering, which is suited to the action of Hercules. Hence Ast derives his translation, lex abigit s. rapit, ex suo jure agens, violentissime; where τὸ β. is treated as an adverbial phrase. But Aristides, by using the opposite phrase, ὅγει τὰ δικαία προσβεσθον, shows that τὸ βιωτάτων is at least the object of δικαίων.

— τοῦτον refers forward to καὶ βοῦς ... εἶναι.

C. The changes of number here are worthy of notice: τις ... ἀργηταί, ... τῶν ἄνθρωπων, ... εὖφυής ἂ, ... γίγνονται. — ήλικιάς de aetate juvenili intelligendum. Itaque πόδων τῆς ήλικίας est ultra juvenitatem. Stallb. πόδων can take a genitive in two relations. 1. That of the thing from which one is far off; as, Phaedrus, 238, D, οὐκέτι πόδων διήνοιμον φιλοσοφίαν, my words are not far from the style of dithyrambs. 2. That in respect of which one is far advanced; as Symposium, 217, D, διελθόμεν πόδων τῶν νυκτῶν, I conversed to a late hour of the night; infra 486, A, πόδων ἀεὶ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἔκαστον, always pushing forwards in philosophy; and in the text the sense can be, to too late a period of his youth.

D. καλὸς κάγιαθὸς ἄνήρ, in the mouth of Callicles, means quite another thing from what the same words would intend if used by Socrates. In earlier times the optimates were
so called, i.e. the name was given to men of a certain birth. By the standard of Callicles, it would belong to a man of the highest rank in public estimation. The moral character of the individual gave him a right to this title, in the estimation of Socrates. Comp. Welcker, Pref. to Theogonis, p. 25. — ἐν τοῖς ἀλμολογοῖς, in stipulations, or business transactions in general. The word denotes both private and public contracts, and treaties of commerce. — ἰθαν, characters.

E. το τοῦ E. See 465, D. The following lines are from the Antiope, and, as the Schol. says, from a speech of Zethus to Amphion. Valckenaer, in his Diatribe on the frag. of Eurip. (the seventh and eighth chapters of which are devoted to this play), gives these words to Amphion. — ἓν αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ, etc., where, i.e. in whatsoever, he happens to do his best, whereinsoever he most excels. One MS. only has ἀνακάνει, a reading which the editors before Stallb. generally preferred. But it is now admitted on all hands, that in the poets relative words occasionally are joined to the subjunctive without ἄν. Cousin translates this line, "afin de se surpasser lui-même." It is strange that he did not see that in the very next line Plato interprets the ancient and poetical ἓν, where (which the Attic prose-writers did not entirely give up), by ὃν τού ἄν. — For αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ, see Soph. § 144, N. 4, and § 232; and for βέλτιστος αὐτοῦ, § 177, N. 5; Cr. § 464. The comparative with the reflexive pronoun in the genitive denotes the having gone beyond a previous or usual state; the superlative with the same, the possession of the quality in the highest degree to which the person spoken of attains.

485 A. εἰνολη ἡ ἄντος, out of regard to himself, through self-love. The genitive is objective, as is the possessive pronoun, 486, A, εἰνολη τῆ σῆ. — ὃσον παιδείας χάριν, just for the sake of education. — ὅμοιώτατον πάσχω, I feel very
much the same thing. To ὅμοιος, in the second clause, ὅσα
πέρ succeeds, instead of ὅπερ or ὅν. Comp. Xen. Symposium, 4. 37, ὅμοιά μοι δοκοῦσι πᾶσχεν ὅσερ εἰ τις πολλὰ ἔσθισιν μηδέποτε ἐμπίπλατο, and 518, B.

D. ἔρη ὁ ποιητῆς, in Iliad, 9. 441.


A. In the Antiope of Euripides, a dialogue between the 486 brothers Zethus and Amphionides was contained, in which the former, who was a shepherd, exhorts the other to give up the art of music, to which he had devoted himself. The dialogue, as the remains show, involved a brilliant comparison between the life of the practical man and of one devoted to the arts. See Appendix, No. 3.—μηθαμύδει . . . μορφώματι, you strive to ornament a soul so nobly endowed by a puerile form, or outside. μορφώματι denotes external decoration; here, the musical and poetical pursuits of Amphion.—οὐν ὅν δίκης, etc., nor in the counsels of justice couldst thou put forth thy words, nor take hold of any thing probable and persuasive; i. e. Zethus denies to his brother the power to defend himself in suits at law, and to use the arts of persuasion.—ἀπαγόροι. The word points at the ἀπαγώγη of Attic law, a summary process by which the accused could be dragged before the proper magistrate, and locked in prison, without previous citation. One of the crimes to which this process was applicable was ἀσέβεια, the offence for which Socrates, though by another process, was actually tried. There is an allusion below, no doubt, to what actually happened; to the seeming helplessness and unskilfulness of Socrates at his trial; to his
accusers, who were men of little influence or repute; and especially to the leading one, Meletus, a bad poet and a bad man; as well as to the penalty of death, which they attached to their indictment. — *ādikeīn*, says Stallb., accipiendum pro *γινεται*. Heindorf on Protag. p. 310, D, makes the same remark, and brings a number of examples in proof of it. One is from Lysias, p. 678, Reiske: *οἱ δ' ἕδικηκότες ἐκποιήμενοι τοὺς κατηγόρους οὐδὲν ἔδοξαν ἀδίκειν*. According to Ast, the present includes the past, = to have done and to be still doing wrong. This is often true, but it will not explain such a case as this from Lysias, p. 136, Reiske, cited by Heindorf: *ἀξίω δὲ, ὃ βουλή, εἰ μὲν ἀδικῶ, μηδεμίας συγγένωνς τυγχάνειν*, where one crime some time before committed is spoken of. The true explanation is, perhaps, that ἀδικῶ properly means, *I am a wrongdoer*, as well as *I am doing wrong*. But he is a wrongdoer who has done wrong.

B. *κατηγόρου ... μοιχηροῦ*, a very common and paltry sort of accuser; referring to the accuser's standing in general. — *Θανάτου ... τιμᾶσθαι*, to lay his damages against you at death, which happily is an expression we do not use, because our law, unlike that of Athens, never places human life in the power of a vile or revengeful accuser, and of a throng of unrestricted judges. *τιμᾶσθαι*, to make his own estimate, set his price, is the usual word for the plaintiff's claim of satisfaction, whether pecuniary or penal. The court were said *τιμᾶν*. The defendant was said *ὁμι-τιμᾶσθαι*, to estimate in his turn what ought to be the verdict, or *ὑποτιμᾶσθαι*, to give his reduced estimate, in case he had been voted guilty by the judges. And all this was allowed only in certain suits called *ἀγώνες τιμητολ*, or those in which the laws had not settled the penalty, but left it to the judges. One of these was *ἀνάβεσια*, for which Socrates was tried. On being found guilty, his *ὑποτιμημα* was called
for; and instead of naming some small mulct which might have saved his life, he named support in the Prytaneum. This led the judges, who usually chose between the accuser's estimate and that of the accused, to sentence him to death. — περιουλασθαι, ξην. These infinitives, as Stallb. remarks, depend on ἐθηκε, which is followed at first by a participle, δυνάμενον, added as a paraphrase of the poet's χείρονα, and then by an infinitive. — ἀνεύως. See 491, A.

C. εἰ τι καὶ ἄγοικότερον. See 509, A, note. — ἐπὶ κόψῃς τῷ τέμπεις, to strike a person upon the side of the head or temples, is spoken only of blows with the flat hand, and was the highest insult at Athens. See 527, D. — πραγμάτων... εἰμοντιαν. This expression is from Eurip., and alludes to Amphion's pursuit. His brother says, No longer practise music, but musicalness of conduct, i.e. that which is in harmony with your nature and powers.

D. ἀγαθά. A. Gellius (10. 22) has quoted the passage from φιλοσοφία γάρ, 484, C, to this place, but misapprehends its import. — τὴν ἀγολην is in opposition to τινα τῶν λίθων. Just above we should expect αἷς βασανίζοντοι for ἦν, referring to τούτων τῶν λίθων; but ἦν comes from Plato's having τινα λίθον in his mind. — προσαγαγόν, admovens, is used with allusion to gold, which was brought to the touchstone to be rubbed upon it, that a judgment might be formed by the color. The order here is, προς ἦν προσαγαγόν αὐτήν, ἐμπληνον εἰν εἰσαύσδαι εἰ. Comp. Herodot. 7. 10: "pure gold we do not distinguish by itself, but when we rub it (viz. on the touchstone) by the side of other gold, then we distinguish the better."

E. ἂν = ἂ ἂν. — ἄνια τάληθην, true in themselves, or the very truth.

A. ἴππες πείρι... μή, as to the soul's living rightly and 487 the opposite.
NOTES.

B. μαλλον τον δεοντος. μαλλον is often thus used with a comparative instead of a positive; and in the same way περα, just below, 487, D.

C. Andron is mentioned in Protag. 315, C. He was probably the father of Androtion, an orator and disciple of Isocrates, against whom an oration of Demosthenes was written. — ἐπηκουσα. So Bekker, Ast, and others, with most MSS. Stallb. prefers ἐπηκουσα, I overheard. (This he retracts in his second edition.)

D. ειλαβησαν τι ... διαφααι.εντες. Strikingly like Ecclesiastes vii. 16: "Neither make thyself overwise. Why shouldst thou destroy thyself?"

E. δελον οτι are often interposed in the middle of a sentence, without having an effect on the construction. And so οιοθ' οτι. — τελος της ἀληθειας, de veritate perfecta et consummata accipio. Heindorf. — των ἄνδρα, i.e. mankind. The article is used because ἂνης has its widest generic sense, and thus forms a definite whole.

488 A. ευ ἴωθι τουτο οτι. τουτο traxerim ad ἐξαμαφτάνω. Nam Demostheni familiaris formula ευ ἴωθι τουθ' οτι, Platoni, quod sciam, non item. Heindorf.

B. ἄγειν. See 484, B, note. If ἄγειν is there correctly explained by Boeckh, we must suppose that Socrates plays upon the word, without essentially injuring the sense of the passage from Pindar.

C. ἀκοοισθαι, obedire, like ἀκονειν. — τοτε, i.e. antea, quum de his rebus disputares. Sic τοτε passim ponitur. Stallb. — τι ποτε λέγειν. The present embraces the whole time of the present discussion. Hence it is here for ἐλεγες.

D. οι δη χαι, etc. Since, indeed, they even make laws for the one, i.e. to control the one. The relative, as often elsewhere, renders a reason; i.e. = the demonstrative with γαρ. τιθημαι νόμον is used of a people, or one empowered by them, making laws, the maker being one of the party
to be governed; ἵθημι τόμον, of a sovereign or a divine lawgiver.

A. ὅπως μὴ ἀλώσει. See Soph. § 214, N. 3; Cr. § 602, 4893; K. § 330, R. 4. — αἰδοχνώμενος. Socrates refers with admirable irony to 482, C, D. — ἢνα ... βεβαιώσωμαι, etc., that I may get confirmation (for it) from you, seeing that a man who is competent to decide has admitted it.

B. κυνδυνεύεις οὖν ἄληθῆ λέγειν, it seems that you were not speaking the truth; for λέγειν is the infinitive of the imperfect. — ἄ ... κακουργοῦ. He quotes what Callicles said, 483, A. — ὕψωμαι ἑρευνῶν, verba auctupans. Comp. 490, A. The same metaphor is seen in our word captious. — ὕψωμαι ἄμαρτεῖν, to use a wrong expression.

C. ἦ οὗτος μὲ λέγειν, etc. Or do you think my opinion to be, that if a rabble should be collected of slaves and of all sorts of men, of no account except by reason of their bodily strength, and these persons should say any thing, that these very things which they say ought to have the force of law. Join τῷ ἵθημισωσαθαί together. This verb can mean pollere, contendere, fidere. For the first meaning, which is less common but seems to belong to it here, comp. Dio Cass. 44, p. 406, Reimar: χαλεπον ἵθημισωσων τι τῷ σώματι φρονιμωτοσ ἐκβήναι, difficile est corpore esse valido, et animo prudenti. φώσων must be taken absolutely, without an object, in the sense of decreeing, determining, but with contemptuous disparagement; unless we read, with Heindorf, ἄτα for αὐτά. And αὐτὰ ταῦτα refers to the edicts implied in φώσων.

D. τοῦς δυὸ ... τοῦ ἐνός. As the numerals are opposed to one another, they have a certain definiteness. Hence the article. So τὰ δυὸ μέρη, sc. out of three, two thirds. Comp. Cr. § 483. — τί ποτε λέγεις τοὺς βελτίωνς is as legitimate an expression as τίνας ποτε, which Routh wished to put into its place.
E. προδίδασκε. Schol. περιττεύει ἡ πρόθεσις Ἀττικῶς. I believe that in προδίδασκεν, προμανθάνειν (Aristoph. Clouds, 476, 966), πρὸ means forwards, and that it is prefixed without adding much to the meaning of the verbs, because the idea of advance is involved in learning and teaching. This word alludes to a school, as is shown by ἀποφοιτῆσον.

οὐ μᾶ τὸν Ζηθόν. Comp. 485, E. Most MSS. want οὐ, which, however, is necessary here, for although μᾶ is almost confined to oaths expressly or impliedly negative, it is in itself merely affirmative, being connected, perhaps, in origin with μὴν, μὲν. — ὁ οὖ χρόματος, etc., whose words you used of me just now with much raillery. — ὀνόματα λέγεις, you utter mere words.

490 B. πολλοὶ ἀθρόοι, multi simul. Sæepenúmero sic jun-guntur. Stallb.

C. ἦ οὖν τούτων τῶν στίων, etc. Must he then have more of these provisions than we, because he is better; or ought he, in virtue of his authority, to distribute them all, etc.— εἰ μὴ μέλλει ξημιονοῦσαι, unless he intends to pay the penalty (by making himself ill). — πάντων ἐλάχιστον τῷ βελτίστῳ. Supply έκτέον.

D. ποιῶν ἵματιων; sc. δεῖ αὐτῶν πλέον ἔχειν. ποῖος is often used in questions conveying wonder, indignation, or contempt. Aristoph. Clouds, 366, Ὁ Ζεύς . . . οὐ ἔχεις ἔστιν; | ποίος Ζεύς; οὐ μὴ ληφθέως; οὐδέ ἔστι Ζεύς. Just below we have ποία ὑποδήματα . . . ἔχων; what shoes are you talking nonsense about? ἔχον here takes an accusative, unless we write ποία ὑποδήματα; φιλαρέτης ἔχων. Of this last phrase explanations, not quite satisfactory, are given by Hermann on Viger, note 228; Mt. § 567; Cr. § 632; K. § 668, R. 1 (largest Gr.). Comp. 497, A.

E. ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν. Comp. Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 6, δὲ γε ταύτων δεινότερον, ἔφη, ὃ Ἰππία, οὐ μόνον ἀεὶ τὰ αὐτὰ λέγω, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν· οὐ δ' ἱκώς, διότι τὸ πολυμαθῆς εἶναι, περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν οὐδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ λέγεις.
A. *ἀιτίας, absolutely, positively.* You never stop talking always about cobblers and fullers and cooks, and positively nothing else. In the sense without art, the penult has the acute accent. — *ἀι... λέγων... οὐδὲν παύει.* *ἀι* is joined thus redundantly with *οὐδέν παύομαι* again, 517, C, and in *Leges*, 2. 662, E. Socrates was often thus reproached or derided for drawing his illustrations from homely sources. He was led to it by love of simplicity, contempt for pretension, the desire to find a general truth by means of familiar instances, and frequent conversations with artisans. See a fine passage in *Sympos.* 221, E. — *περὶ τίνων... πλέον ἔχων.* Heind. remarks that *περὶ τι, not περὶ τινος*, is the usual formula with *πλέον ἔχειν.* — *τοὺς κρατητους οὗ εἶσον, etc., by the better, namely, by who they are I do not mean, etc.* οὗ εἶσον dictum est cum abundantia quadam qualem Callicles in hac oratione sectatur passim. Poterat enim omitti. Stallb.

B. For *κατηγορεῖν* with the genitive of the person, see *Soph.* § 183. 2 (§ 194, N. 3).

D. *τί δὲ;... ἀφχομένους;* The reading and pointing here are quite uncertain. The passage in brackets is omitted by Bekker, after one MS. It has the look of an explanation of *τί δὲ.* Nor does Socrates afterwards do anything with ἀφχομένους, while ἀφχοντας is easily supplied with αὐτῶν. The sense without this passage is, *But what? Does justice consist in this, that those who rule themselves should have more than others.* Stallbaum's reading in his second ed. is αὐτῶν... *τί [ἡ τί] ἀφχοντας *ἡ ἀφχομένους;* where *τί* is quatenus, quae in parte. But how can ἀφχομένους be the subject of πλέον ἔχειν? or how could he say quatenus sibimet ipsis imperantes unless he had already spoken of governing one's self. — *ἡ τούτο μὲν οὐδὲν δὲ. δὲ* sometimes takes an accusative of the thing, when that is a pronoun.
E. ὁς ἡδὺς εἶ answers nearly to the French comme vous êtes plaisant! how ridiculous or foolish you are! γλυκύς is used in the same way. — τοὺς ἡλικίους λέγεις τοὺς σωφρόνας, you mean those fools the temperate. The one accusative is in apposition with the other; unless, with Stallb., we make τοὺς ἡλικίους the predicate-accusative; in which case the sense is, by the temperate you mean the silly. The sophists struck a disastrous blow against morality by giving it this title. Comp. Republic. 348, D. “What!” says Socrates to the sophist Thrasymachus; “do you call justice (κακίαν) badness?” “No,” said he, “but (πάνυ γενναίων εὐθείαν) very noble folly.” — πάνυ γε σφόδρα, sc. τοῦτο λέγεις.

492 B. ὁς ... ὑπηρέτευ ... νιέσαι εἴναι ἣ ἀὑτοὺς ... ἴκανοὶς. εἴναι belongs to both clauses. For the transition from the dat. dependent upon the verb to the accus. construed with the infinitive, comp. 510, E, fin., and Soph. Electa, 962. — τί ... κάκιον εἰη, for τί ἃν ... κάκιον εἰη. Comp. τίς ... κατάσχει, Soph. Antig. 605; Mt. § 515, Obs. ἃν may have dropped out here, as τί itself is wanting in ten MSS., both being absorbed, so to speak, by the last two syllables of δυναστείαν. — ὁς ἐξον, etc. A contracted expression for ὁ, ἐξον ἀὑτοῖς ... ἀὑτοὶ ἐπαγάγοιντο, which is much the same as εἰ, ἐξον ἀὑτοῖς, etc., if, when they had it in their power, ... they were themselves to introduce. Comp. Republic. 465, fin.: “Do you remember that some one reproved us, because we, in his opinion, made (ποιοῦμεν) our guards not happy, ὁς ἐξον πάντα ἔχειν τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν οὕτων ἔχοιν, who, when they could possess every thing belonging to the citizens, were to have nothing.”

C. τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν ἄρετῆ, etc. τοῦτο refers, not to the three nouns just preceding, but rather to ἐὰν ἐπικούριαν ἔχει, — to the condition of things when τρυφῇ, etc., are able to supply
their wants. — τὰ δὲ ἄλλα. The predicate is φλυαινεῖ καὶ οὐδενῶς ἄξιον.

D. ἄμοδον γε ποθεν, undecunque, from obsol. ἄμος, Attic ἄμος, τε, whence μηδαμοῦ. This is Bekker's emendation of ἄλλοθεν ποθεν, which is evidently a false reading. — ἐτοιμάζειν is for ἐτοιμάστειν, which the construction of the first clause would require. With this infin. supply δεῖν involved in κολαστέον.

E. ὡς γε σὺ λίγεις ... δ βίος, such a life as you mention. — The lines here quoted are probably from the Polydus of Eurip., and very similar to another fragment from his Phrixus. The second trimeter is completed by κάτω νομίζεται. The passage is parodied by Aristoph. in the Frogs, 1477.

A. The singular passage next following is introduced 493 by the way, and perhaps half in sport. At the beginning of an argument concerning the good and the pleasant, Socrates takes breath a moment, and changes reasoning for playful illustration. He first mentions an opinion concerning the true life, which was expressed by the Orphic and Pythagorean theologists; — that the body is the tomb of the soul, release from which will admit it into real existence. To this dogma Plato alludes in Cratylus, 400, C. He says (ironically throughout), upon the derivation of σώμα, that it may come from σῆμα, because some call the body the σῆμα of the soul, as being that in which in this present it is buried; or because the soul σημαίνει by means of the body its thoughts and wishes. But he thinks that the name is due to the followers of Orpheus especially, who taught that the soul was inclosed and kept (σώζειν) in it to atone for its crimes in an earlier state. This derivation, he says, would require no change of letter. The Pythagorean Philolaus (Boeckh's Philolaus 181, Clem. Alex. Strom. 3. 3, p. 518, Potter) says, that "the old thelogers and diviners testify,
that the soul is joined to the body to suffer a certain penalty, and is buried in it ἐν σώµατι." To this, and to the comparison of the body to a prison, there is frequent allusion. Socrates now passes on to an allegorical explanation of the fable of the Danaides, which illustrates the unsatisfactory nature of devotion to animal desire. It was the doctrine of some Mysteries (the Orphic or Bacchic especially) that the initiated fared better in the world below than the uninitiated, and use was made of this fable to show the difference in their condition. The fable was afterwards spiritualized, as we see in the text, and applied to the soul and its parts.

It may be doubted who is the author of this punning allegory. Boeckh contends that it was Philolaus, who was a native of Croton or Tarentum. But there is no evidence that this allegory, and the dogma first spoken of, are to be attributed to the same person. The Schol. refers it to Empedocles, and Olympiod. (apud Stallb.) does the same. But their assertions may be mere guesses. Ast regards it as Plato's own invention, playfully ascribed to an Italian or Sicilian, for the purpose of laughing at the countrymen of Polus and Gorgias.—τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν, etc. And that that part of the soul in which the desires lodge is capable of being persuaded, and of changing from one side to the other. There may be a side-thrust at rhetoric, the object of which is πειθόν, when it is said that the part of the soul which contains the desires is moved this way and that by persuasion.—μυθολογῶν, expressing in the form of a fable.

The ensuing words, as Buttmann, in Heindorf's ed., observes, seem to be taken from a song of Timocreon of Rhodes, a lyric poet contemporary with the Persian war; of which song a few words in Ionic a minore dimeters preserved by Hephæstion (p. 71, Gaisford) are as follows: Σίκελὸς κομψός ἀνήρ ποτὲ τῶν ματέρ' ἔφα.—κομψός. On this word, Ruhnken (Timæus s. v.) says: κομψόν dicitur
quicquid scitum et venustum est. Plerisque autem locis, apud Platonem vox habet aliquid ironiae Socratice, ut non tam de vera et naturali, quam de nimia et adscititiae venustate capienda videtur. Gorg. 521, E. Pro splendidis uigis sumendum est Gorg. 486, C. Neque tamen desunt loci ubi simpliciter et sine ironia ad laudem referatur: which he considers to be the case here. It answers to nice, fine, refined, and witty. I cannot help thinking that it here contains something of irony.—

B. τῶν δ' ἀμυητῶν, etc., and that that part of the soul of the uninitiated, where the desires reside,—its incontinent and irretentive part,—he said that this was a cask with holes in it; making the comparison on account of its ἀπληστία. ἀμυητῶν, besides its similarity to ἀνοητῶς, seems to have a double sense, uninitiated (ἡ, μυήν) and not closing, unable to contain, as if from ἡ, μύειν. The construction is completed by supplying εφη, suggested by ἀνομασε. αὐτοῦ seems to refer to ψυχῆς, although no reason appears why the neuter should here be chosen. Heindorf wished to read δι' τὸ ἀκόλωστον, in which case αὐτοῦ would refer to τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς. — τοναντίον and οοὶ are to be joined, the opposite of what you have expressed.—τὸ ἀνιδῆς δὴ λέγων, meaning of course the invisible, i. e. the intellectual, as opposed to the material. Comp. Phædo 80, D, ἡ δὲ ψυχῇ ἄμω, τὸ ἀνιδῆς, τὸ εἰς τοιούτου ἔειρον τόπον ὀφθαλμοῖνον. —οὖτοι ... κοινόν, that these uninitiated persons are, as it would seem (εἰς κατ'), the most wretched, and carry water into the cask with holes in a sieve likewise perforated. The early mysteries seem to have consisted of purifications, the effect of which was to remove guilt. Hence the initiated escaped the punishment in the future world which was to fall on others. This was denoted by making use of certain fables of the poets, which exhibited the popular view of the punishment of great offenders, and applying them to the uninitiated.
C. _ἀτε ὦν δυνατέν, _etc., _on account, _namely, _of its inabili-
vit to retain, _through _unbelief and _forgetfulness. _ἀποκα-
av alludes to πιθον. — _ἐπεικοῦς. _Non explicuerim cum
Heindorfio _satis, _admodum, _sed habet _vim _affirmandi _atque
concendii, _ut _Latinorum _utique, _sane _quidem. _Stallb.
_Ut _candido _loquar. _Routh. — _ὑπό τι, _aliquatenus, _quo-
dammodo. _Stallb. — _δεῖνοι _μὴν, _etc. _Yet _they _make _that
clear, _by _the _exhibition _of _which _I _wish _to _persuade _you —
if _in _any _wise _I _can — _to _change _your _mind. — _μεταθι-
σθαι, _sc. _γνώμην _or _ψῆφον. _The _next _words _explain _μετα-
thiσθαι, _and _therefore _have _no _need _of _καλ. _which _is _in
some _editions. _Just _below, _μεταθισθαι _is _used _in _what _is
called _the _constructio _prægnans _like _ἐξελεγχω, _p. 452, _B.
The _sense _is, _And _do _you _change _your _opinion, _and _say
that, _etc.

D. _ἐν _τού _αυτοῦ _γυμναίον _τῷ _ὕπν, _from _the _same _school
with _that _just _now, _from _some _allegorizing _sophist. _For
ὁ _αυτός _followed _by _the _dative, _in _brief _phrases, _see _Soph.
§ 195, _N. 3. — _After _οἴον _supply _λίγοις _ἀν.

E. _νάμαι _... _ἐκάστου _τούτων, _liquors _belonging _to, _or
put into, _each _of _these _tubs.

494 _B. _χαραδριοῦ. _A _bird, _so _called _from _the _ravines _and
beds _of _torrents _where _it _lives, _of _a _yellowish _color, _and
very _voracious. _ἄμε _τῷ _ἐσθιέν _ἐκχοίνει, _says _the _Schol.
The _Schol. _on _this _place _and _many _others _mention _that
these _birds _were _reputed _to _cure _the _jaundice _by _being
looked _at; _whence _those _who _brought _them _into _town _for
sale _kept _them _covered, _lest _they _should _effect _a _cure _for
nothing. _More _about _the _bird _will _be _found _in _Schneider
on _Aristot. _Hist. _Animal., _Vol. _IV. _80, _seq. _He _thinks _it
to _be _the _charadrius _οξίδενεμος _or _c. _hiaticula _of _Linnaeus.
— _τὸ _τούτων _ἐλέγεις, _οἴον, _do _you _allow _that _there _is _such _a
thing _as.

C. _λίγω, _καὶ, _etc. _λίγω, _to _be _repeated _after _καὶ _in _the

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sense of *speaking of*, takes a personal object with which the participles agree. The sense is, *Yes, and I speak of (allow that there is such a thing as) a man having all the other desires, and able to live happily by taking pleasure in feeding them.*——οἵς μη', i.e. ὅποις ὁπο ὁμή, as usual. ἀποικονεῖ is used with allusion to what Callicles has said of the modesty of Gorgias and Polus, as in 489, A.——κρύμενον διατιλοῦτα τὸν βλέννος explains the preceding clause. Hence the asyndeton.——δημηγώρος, coarse, vulgar.

D. ἀνδρείας γάρ εἰ. This alludes ironically to his definition of the βελτιστος as being the ἀνδρείαι (491, C).

E. τὸ ... κεφάλαιον, id quod rerum hujus generis (i.e. turpissimarum) caput est. Ast. κεφάλαιον is in apposition with δ βίος.——ἀνεδήν, freely or openly.

A. ἀνομολογούμενος, inconsistent, disagreeing; from ὁμο-495 λογούμενος, used as an adjective, and δ' priv.——διαφημίζεις ... λόγος, you make what we have said before good for nothing.

B. καὶ γὰρ οὐ. Well, what of that? For you do too, i.e. παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦτα σαυτοὶ λέγεις.

C. διελοῦ τάδε, etc. Explain the following. You mean something probably by ἐπιστήμη (certain knowledge), do you not?——ἀλλο τι οὖν, etc. Did you not accordingly, on the ground that knowledge was a different thing from manliness, speak of these as two? The allusion in this and the prior question is to 491, Α. Β. With τὴν ἀνδρείαν, σοφία is to be supplied. The accus. absol. is often found without the participle of ἡμι expressed. Bekker, without MS. authority, adds οὖν after ἔτερον, which is a very probable conjecture, as οὖ may easily have been swallowed up by ἔτερον. The participle οὖ would be attracted in gender to the predicate.

D. ο Ἀχιερεύς. Socrates playfully but severely imitates the solemn style of covenants, in which the δεμος of the
parlies was mentioned. Some of the _demi_, as that to which Socrates belonged, had no corresponding adjective forms. The want was in most cases supplied by an adverb in _σέν_ taken with the article.

496 A. _περὶ_ ὅ τον ... _ἀπολαβὼν_, look at this with regard to any part of the body you please, taking it by itself, or separately. — _ὅ_, which _disease_, refers to _νοσεῖν_ implied in _νοσῆ_.

C. _ὑπερφυός_ ὦς. Comp. 447, D.

D. _οἶκον_ τοῦτον οὐ_ λέγεις_, etc. _In that of which you are speaking, the one part, viz. διψῶν_, being thirsty, is then feeling pain, is it not? He was speaking of διψῶν πίνειν.

E. κατὰ τὸ πίνειν χαίρειν λέγεις; _do you speak of taking pleasure so far forth as the act of drinking is concerned?_ i.e. does the pleasure go with the drinking? — _λυπούμενον_; at the same time that the person feels pain? — _εἰτε_ _ψυχής_ εἰτε_ _σῶματος_. Stallb. would read _ψυχῆς_ _πέρι_. But there can be no objection to taking _τόπον_ with the genitives; and _χρῶν_ is excused by being in its company.

497 A. _γίγνεται_. See 525, E, note. — _ἀκκίζει_. Olymp. apud Stallb. _προσπαιχωρίαν καὶ τὸ μὴ_ _εἰδέναι_. Moeris defines _ἀκκίζομαι_ as the Attic expression for _προσπολίζω_. From examples of the use of the word, its meaning evidently is, _to pretend that you do not_, particularly to decline _taking a thing_ (as food at table) _when you want it_. Comp. Coray on Heliodor. 2. 64. _Σφυτομαι_ has sometimes much the same sense, e.g. in Plut. Anton. § 12, where it is used of the feigned reluctance of _Cæsar_ to wear the crown. — _οὐτὶ_ _ἐχὼ_ _λησθεῖς_. Comp. 490, E, note. Stallb. (first ed.) and Ast suppose this to be a gloss. Stallb. (second ed.), after Winckelmann on Euthydem. 295, C (quite a parallel passage, _οὐχ ἀποκρίνεται, ἔφη, πρὸς_ ὁ _ἀν υπολαμβάνησ, οὗτ ἐχὼν_ _φυλαρεῖς καὶ_ _ἀρχαιότερος εἰ_ τοῦ _δέοντος_), gives _καὶ_ _προίδει_ _γε_ ...
vovthetwv to Callicles, and oνχ ύμα...πίνειν to Socrates. On this passage we may remark, — 1. That ὡτι ἔχων ληφεῖς, a choice Attic expression, has not the look of a gloss, and it is not easy to say what it is a gloss upon. 2. The phrase is not in dramatic keeping with the politeness of the Platonic Socrates. But then, 3. As Callicles wishes to break off the discourse, προῖθι εἰς τοῦμπροσθήνυν is not what he would say. 4. vovthetwv can only point at the advice given by Callcles to Socrates, on pp. 484—486, and not to any thing said by Socrates. Comp. 488, Α, ᾠπερ ᾦξω vovthetein με, referring to Callcles. 5. There is no mark of a change of person at νυχ ὕμη, and little at καὶ προῖθι. These last considerations induce me to reject Winckelmann's view, and to regard it even more probable that ὡτι ἔχων ληφεῖς are words spoken by Socrates. But I can arrive at no sure affirmative conclusion respecting the passage.

B. οὐ σῇ σαίνῃ τῇ μιμῇ, this damage or cost is not yours, i. e. this does you no harm.

C. ὡτι τὰ μεγάλα μεμυῆσαι. There is an elegant allusion to the mysteries of Ceres; which were divided into the small, held in the city, and the great, held chiefly at Eleusis. The latter could not be witnessed until a year or more after initiation into the other. The sentiment is something like that in Artegall's words to the Giant: —

"For how canst thou those greater secrets know,
That dost not know the least thing of them all?
Ill can he rule the great, that cannot reach the small."

—ὁθέν ἀπέλιπες ἀποκρίνου, answer beginning where you left off. The usual construction of ἀποκρίνω with an adverb of motion is here adopted by ἀποκρίνομαι. — πεινῶν is a participle; παύετω here adopts two constructions.

D. ὁμολογεῖσθαι seems to mean to agree with itself; oυi being the ethical dative, and τὸν λόγον or ταῦτα understood the subject. But ὁμολ. oυi may also denote to be consistent with your previous admissions. Comp. 487, D.
NOTES.

497. E. τοὺς οἷς ἐὰν κάλλος παρῇ. Supply καλοῦς καλεῖς. The article is here used as a demonstrative, — a usage not uncommon before a relative sentence introduced by ὁς, ὥστε, or ὃς.

498 A. ἀμφότεροι ἐμοιγε μᾶλλον, i. e. χαίρειν δοξοῦσι. This is said in contempt, as if Socrates were not deserving of a sensible answer.

C. ἢ καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον, etc. If cowards, who, according to Callicles, are the bad, feel more pleasure and pain than brave men when enemies retire and advance, and if pleasure and pain are the same as good and evil, then the bad are both bad and good in a higher degree than the good, which is absurd. After μᾶλλον ἄγαθοι, the MSS. have οἷ ἄγαθοι, which Routh and succeeding editors have justly left out, as wholly perverting the sense.

E. δις γὰρ τοι, etc. A proverb, imputed by the Schol. to Empedocles, a part of one of whose hexameters (v. 164 in Sturz's Emped.) is καὶ δις γὰρ διὲ καλὸν ἐστιν ἐνιοτίν. τοι, you know, is often used in making familiar remarks or citing well-known passages. A little below, in 499, B, πάλαι τοι, it has, according to Stallb., "vim confirmandi cum quadam admiratione vel indignatione," = really, or don't you know.

499 B. ὡς δὴ, see 468, E. — ἵνα sometimes expresses grief, sometimes joy, or, as here, wonder. It is oxytoned by all the editors of Plato. Others would write ἵνα, either always, or when it does not denote grief.

C. αὖ, again, refers to 491, C. He is again inconsistent with himself. — ἐκόντος ἐμαυ, if you could help it, if you had your way about it. See Soph. § 221, N. 3; Cr. § 623, N.; K. § 306, R. S. According to Hermann (Append. to Viger, de pleonasmo), it is not simply sponte, but quantum quis sponte quid faciat, and is used "de eo potissimum quod quis facere detrectat." Dr. Arnold (on Thu-
cyd. 2. 89), after Hermann, says that ἐκὼν ἐναι "is used generally in negative sentences where the speaker wishes to qualify his denial or refusal, by saying that he will not do it if he can help it, but that very possibly he may not be able to help it." He adds, that in Prometheus, 266 (ἐκὼν ἐκὼν ἡμαρτον), ἐκὼν ἐναι would make nonsense. — τὸ παρὸν ἐν ποιεῖν, to do well what is in one's power, to make the best of what you have. This proverb again occurs in Lēgēs, 12. 959, C. — ὡδοναὶ τίνες ... αἱ μὲν ... αἱ δὲ. The constant use of ὁ μὲν, ὁ δὲ, in antitheses, seems to be the reason why (by a kind of apposition, perhaps,) they follow τίνες here. Instead of τίνες μὲν ... ἀλλαὶ δὲ, some, ... others, we have, as if the contrast needed to be made stronger, some, these I say ... those. Comp. Eurip. Hec. 1185, πολλαὶ γὰρ ἡμῶν, αἱ μὲν ἐν ἐπὶ θοροί | αἱ δ’, etc. In Ἀσχίνης, c. Ctes. (§ 11, Bekk.), αἱ μὲν follows τίνες, and the second αἱ μὲν is suppressed, as is often the case with ὁ μὲν, ὁ δὲ alone. The formula often occurs as in Plat. Repub. 8. 560, A.

D. ἐὶ ἀρὰ τοῦτων. Græci frequenter relativam orationis structuram permutant cum conditionali. Stallb. The relative structure would be αἱ μὲν ἀρὰ τοῦτων, etc.

E. τέλος, etc. Comp. Cic. de Fin. 2. 2. 5: Hunc ipsum sive finem sive extremum sive ultimum definiebas, id esse, quo omnia, quae recte fierent, referrentur, neque id ipsum usquam referretur.


B. See 464, B, seq. — παρασκευαί, the Schol. observes, is a middle term, standing for τίναι and ἐμπεύωι both, like ἑπιστεύοις. — μέχρι άδονῆς, terminating in pleasure. This is explained by the next words, where
NOTE.

500, b.]  

αιτο τουτο refers to ἵδονη, i.e. το ἵδυ. καὶ ἐπὶ Θημ, etc., and among those pursuits which relate to the pleasures, I set down cookery as a knack, and not an art; but of those which have to do with good (I set down) medicine as an art. πρὸς φιλίου, supply Διος. μητε αὐτός οἰον, etc. In this sentence, the two main clauses begin with μητε; and the clause beginning with μηδε is the second part of the first clause. Comp. K. largest Gr. § 743, R. 4. — μηδ' ο τι ἄν τίχες, etc., and do not, contrary to your opinion, answer whatever comes into your head, nor take what I say as though I were in sport.

C. οὐ τι ἄν μάλλον ... η τουτο. The last words are added to recall οὐ to mind, and τουτο takes the construction of τι rather than of περὶ τουτον οὐ. It often happens that η and quam are so inserted after a genitive depending on a comparative. ἐπὶ θυ, i. e. τουτον ἐφ' θυ. τα του ἄν—διφος δ' ταῦτα πράττοντα, whether I ought to spend my life in doing those deeds of the real man, forsooth, that you spoke of. The reference is to 485, A—D. δ' is ironical. ἐπὶ τὸν δ' τὸν βίον. We should expect τὸνδε τὸν βίον, sc. ἔτη; but Plato forms this clause as though he had written πότερον ἐμὲ παρακαλεῖς ἐπὶ τοῦτον, etc.

D. εἰ ἐστι ... τῶ βίω. A rare instance of a dual agreeing with a singular verb. As is usual in similar examples in Attic writers, where plurals not neuter are joined with a singular verb, the verb is ἐστί, and it precedes the noun.

E. Socrates breaks off in the middle of the sentence, to know whether Callicles is so far of the same opinion.

501  A. δ' ἰατρικὴ, i.e. δοκεῖ μοι τίχην ἔλαι. Just below, ἰατρικὴ is added to explain ἐ μεν. Comp. δ μεν ... δ κολαζόμενος, 476, E. — η δ' ἐτέρα τῆς ἰδονης ... ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἐκεῖται. There is a striking change of construction here. The sentence begins with ἰδονης, as if Plato had in his mind the form of the preceding sentence, and were going
to say, τῆς ἡδονῆς οὖτε τὴν φύσιν ἔσκεπται οὖτε τὴν αἰτίαν. But this thought, which afterwards appears in the participial form, is postponed, and the intervening clause, πρὸς Ἡν ἡ θεραπεία... ἔπασα, determined him to say, ἐπι ᾗν ἔσκεπται, accommodated to πρὸς Ἡν, and to leave ἡδονῆς in the lurch, so to speak. It may be asked, why, when he read it over, he did not dismiss ἡδονῆς from its irregular position. The answer is, that the Greeks were governed in their style by nature,—a higher rule than grammar, and did not object to such irregularities of structure as arise from the nature of the mind, and are heard in good conversation.—ἀτεχνως, and not ἀτεχνως. Comp. 491, A.—ἀλόγως τε παντιάπως, in a manner altogether irrational, making, I may say (i.e. almost), no estimates (or discriminations), a mere practice and experience.

B. ὑδὴ καὶ ποριζέται. ὑδὴ refers to τῷ μνήμῃ σῶξεσθαι τοῦ εἰσόθος γίγνεσθαι.—καὶ εἰναὶ τινες, i.e. καὶ εἰ δοξοῦι σοι εἰναὶ τινες. It might have been said equally well, εἰναὶ τινας, etc.—ὡστε ἐκεῖ, i.e. as in the case of the body.—οὔτε μιλον αὐτιῖς, etc., nor having any concern about aught else but gratification merely, no matter whether it be for the better or the worse. Here the structure changes to the impersonal participle, and the subject of the prior clause becomes αὐτίς.

C. ἐμοὶ... δοξοῦι εἰναὶ, it seems to me that there are such, or they seem to me to exist. The words refer to εἰναὶ τινες πρωγματείαι, etc. It is strange that Stalb. and Ast, overlooking this plain sense, understand κολακεία as the predicate.—συγκατατέθεια. The word means, properly, to drop one's vote in the same vessel with another person, as a judge in the court. ἡμίν is ironical, as he had compelled Gorgias and Polus to agree with him.

D. οὔν, ἀλλὰ καί. οὔν denies the previous sentence taken as a whole.—χαρὰς σωθαί ἔστι, i.e. ἔστι.
The infinitive explains the demonstrative, and depends on ἄξει repeated. — ἕν ὀν-δὲν ἐξαιτία. This verb, in the sense of caring about, usually takes a genitive, or a genitive with περὶ, but sometimes a neuter accusative. Soph. § 182, N. I. — ἐν τοῖς ἄγαδι. Plato condemned all music on the flute, as tending to render the young unmanly and fond of pleasure. He was, however, for retaining the lyre and harp in education, but disapproved of some of the occasions where they were used, such as the public contests of cho- ruses, dramatic or dithyrambic, thinking that pleasure and not good was their object, and that they tended to agitate and not to calm the soul. Comp. Republic. 3. 393—403.
— ἐν τοῖς χοροῖς διδασκαλία, the exhibition of choruses, so called because the instruction of the chorus was the principal preparative. The chorus in dithyrambic poetry is especially intended. — Κινήσεως of Thebes, so called, it is said, because ἐν τοῖς χοροῖς ἐχρήτο πολλῇ κινήσει. He was much laughed at for his poetry by the comedians (Aristoph. Birds, 1377, and Schol.), and attacked by the orators on account of his character (Lysias in Athenæus, 551, 552).

502 A. τί δὲ ... Μέλης; i. e. ἔδοξει σοι, as above τί ὀνδιδασκαλία καὶ ποίησις; i. e. καταφαίνεται σοι. A little below, τί δὲ δὴ ἢ σεμνῇ, etc., the construction is different, namely, τί δὲ δὴ ἢ ἐστι τούτο ἐφ᾽ ὃ ἔσπούδαξε ἢ σεμνῇ, etc. What is said here is a mere passing fling at Meles on account of the badness of his odes.

B. ἢ ... θαυμαστῇ ἢ τῆς τραγῳδίας ποίησις. The ordinary collocation, as Stallb. remarks, would be ἢ θαυμαστῇ ποίησις, ἢ τῆς τραγῳδίας. He cites Herodot. 7. 196, ὁ ναυτικὸς δὲ τῶν βαρβάρων στρατός; Republic. 565, D, τὸ ἐν Ἀρχαδία τὸ τοῦ Λιδοῖ τοῦ Ανκαλου ἱερὸν, and other examples. — δια-μάχεσθαι ... ὅπως μὴ ἔφε. Is its aim ... to insist upon it.
... that it will not say, etc. — εἰ δὲ τι τυγχάνει ἀνδρίς. For ὁν omitted, comp. Soph. Electr. 313. — ποτέρως ... παρευκανάσθαι, utro modo tibi videtur comparata esse. For Plato's view of tragedy, comp. Repub. 8. 568, C, 2. 378, seq., and a noble passage, Leges, 7. 817. Another admirable passage treats of the corruption of tragedy by popular influence. Leges, 2. 659.

C. εἰ τίς περιελθοτο. Aristides, in opposing this passage, and the Schol., have περιελθοτ, which Coray and Stallb. prefer. Ast, in defending the text, says that εἰ περιελθο δenotes if one were to strip off, εἰ περιελθοτο, if one were to strip off for himself, i.e. in his own mind to conceive of it as stripped off. — μέλος, musical accompaniment; ὑνθύμον, definite succession of arses and theses; μέτιον, definite succession of long and short syllables. — ἄλλο τι ἡ λόγοι γι-γνοται. The verb is attracted in number to the predicate λόγοι.

D. οὐκοῦν ... ἄν εἰ, It (tragedy) would be then a rhetorical species of popular speaking. — δῆμον τοιοῦτον, οἶον παιδῶν, i.e. to a people (or audience) composed of boys, etc. The grammatical construction, which would be οἶος ἐστι (δῆμος) παιδῶν, is forsaken through a singular kind of attraction, by which οἶος, ὁς, ἡλίκος, with the noun or adjective they accompany, adopt the case of the antecedent. It has been inferred from this, and a few other passages of Plato, that women attended the theatre at Athens, at least in tragic exhibitions. Comp. Leges, 2. 658, D, 7. 817, C, and Becker's Charicles, excursus to Scene 10.

A. οὐχ ἄπλοῦν, etc. = τοῦτο ὁ ἐφωτιζει οὐκείτε ἐστιν ἄπλοῦν, 503 i.e. does not admit of a simple answer. — διαμάχεσθαι λέγοντα, to persist in saying, or steadily to say.

B. τι οὐχι ... οὐν ἐφοσας. Mt. § 503, c, says, "After τι οὐ an aorist often follows, where we should have looked for a present." A degree of urgency is contained
in this mode of speaking. It may be explained by the practice of expressing a wish by means of an interrogative sentence. "Why did you not tell me?" = "I wish you had already told me," and by implication, "Tell me at once." — ἀδίκων ἴξουσίων, have it ascribed to them, is here used in a good sense.

C. οὐ χάκομεν. Præsens hujus verbi de durante fama, — perpetuo ponitur. Stallb.; i. e. it is used of something which is said and may be heard until now. Comp. the editor’s note on Prometh. 683 (ed. sec.). — νεωστι, i. e. about twenty-three years before. — οὐ καὶ ἄνεξκοας. See 455, E. For Plato’s opinion of Pericles, see the Introduction. — εἴ ὅσι γε ... ἢν οὐ ἔλεγες ὁρετήν, ἀληθῆς. Comp. for ὁρετήν, Soph. § 151, Rem. 6. The apodosis of this sentence, which might be "they are good men," is omitted. "When a proposition with εἰ μὴν, or ἢν μὴν, has another with εἰ δὲ opposed to it, the apodosis is often suppressed in one of the two," Mt. § 617. In the ensuing clause, the predicate, ἔστων ἀληθῆς, is left out, and ὅτι before the infinitive is redundant. Examples are given by Heindorf, on Phædo, 63, C. Comp. 453, B, above. ὅτι was used as though δὲ ἀποτελεῖν was to follow; but when Plato came to that part of the sentence, he accommodated ἀποτελεῖν to εἰ δὲ μὴ τούτο: "if this, viz. ἀποτελεῖν, is not virtue, but this, viz. ἀποτελεῖν, etc., is so."

D. τοῦτο δὲ τέχνη τις εἶναι. The nominative here is used by anacoluthon, as if, instead of ἦναγκάζοντημεν ὁμολογεῖν, Plato had written ὁμολογήσθη. — οὐτωσον ἀτρέμα, quite calmly, or pretty calmly. οὕτως, like sic in Latin, throws into the adverb before which it stands a certain modification of its meaning, which cannot be easily expressed. Comp. Eurip. Alcest. 680, for an analogous use of οὕτως with verbs.

E. ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, etc. άλλοι is used here as in 473,
C. The verb προσφέρει leaves the number required by δημιουργοί, through the influence of ἐκαστός, added in apposition to that noun. Comp. Mt. § 302, Obs. — ὁδὸν εἰ βούλει ἰδεῖν. In this sentence the apodosis is omitted. One can supply in thought ἡ ἁρδίως τούτο ὤψει. But the true account of the sentence is, that the apodosis should have begun at ὡς εἰς τάξιν ("if you wish to look at painters, etc., — you will see that, etc."); but by a change of style the clause ὡς εἰς τάξιν is made to depend on ἰδεῖν, and the apodosis loses its proper form under the impression that an imperative, ἰδε εἰ βούλει, instead of εἰ βούλει ἰδεῖν, had commenced the sentence.

B. καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰ σώματὰ φαίνειν, ἑ. τάξις τυχόντα χρή-504 στὰ εἴναι.

C. εἰπεῖν ὁσιορ ἐκείνο τὸ ὄνομα, to mention the name for it, as you did for that. In the MSS., ἐκείνο stands, which, if genuine, is put briefly for ἐκείνον τὸ ὄνομα.

E. ἦ ἀλλ' ὁμοῦν, etc., or any thing else which sometimes will not be of more use to it (the body) than the contrary (i. e. abstinence from such gratifications will be) according to a right view of the case; — nay, even of less. So this clause must be rendered as it stands. But I am persuaded, notwithstanding what Stallb. says, that η ought to be inserted before κατά, as Heindorf proposes, or γε turned into δε. For since γε shows that the clause κατά ... λόγον relates to the foregoing, καὶ ἐπάττων stands quite by itself; and the asyndeton (καὶ being etiam) is intolerable.

B. οὐχοῦν ... κολατζεῖν; ἢφ' ὄν ἐπειθεῖει belongs to εἰφ-505 γεῖν. — ὁσιορ ... ὤν relates to ἀκολούθια. See Chap. 46, 48.

C. οὔτος ἄνη. See 467, B. — κολατζέομενος is obviously in apposition with πάσχων; but we might have also had κολατζεσθαί in apposition with τούτω. According to Aristotle on Rhet. 1. 10. 17, cited by Stallb., κολατζεῖν (to chastise,
correct, lit. to cut off, prune) differs from ἐπιτείσθαι (to take satisfaction from, punish) in this; that the former takes place for the sake of the sufferer, the latter for that of the doer. — μεταξὺ τὸν λόγον καταλύομεν; are we ending the discourse in the middle? Some inferior MSS. have καταλύομεν, are we going to end, and some καταλύομεν, which (or rather καταλύομεν, as the action is momentary) would be shall we end. The present denotes that they are doing that which is equivalent to stopping, that they are beginning to stop. — αὐτὸς γνώσει, you yourself must judge, i.e. I wish to stop, but leave it to you.

D. θέμις. This word, being here an accusative, must be indeclinable. Of this use few will doubt, after reading what Elmsley and Hermann (Soph. Οἰ. Col. 1191), and Buttmann (largest Gram. 1. § 58, and 2. p. 405) have written. The other examples occur in ὘. Col. u. s., Xen. Οἰ. Ν. 11, 11, and Α. Suppl. 331. In Α. Choeph. 632, it is a neuter nominative. No phrases are found besides θέμις ἐστί, θέμις εἰσα. This is a strange but not a solitary anomaly. Comp. χρεὼν, δεῖνa sometimes indeclinable, κρατα in Sophocles nominative and accusative. — περίη, sc. ὑμῖν. The style changes from the plural to the singular. Comp. for the expression, Leges, 6. 752, Α, οὕκουν ... ἀν μῦθον ἀχίφαλον καταλίποιμι, πλανώμενος γὰρ ἂν ἀπάντη τοιοῦτος ὅν ἀμορφος φαίνοιτο.


506 Α. οὖδὲ γὰρ ... είδος λέγω. Socrates often places him-
self in the attitude of a searcher after truth, unable of himself to find it, and hoping that others know where it is.

B. ἐνὶ... ζήθου, till I had given him back the speech of Amphion for that of Zethus, i. e. until I had defended philosophy from his attack. See 485, E. ἐνὶ with an imperfect or aorist indicative accompanies another clause containing the same tenses with ἄν, when a res non facta is spoken of.

C. ἀχθεσθήσομαι. This form is condemned by Mœris as un-Attic, but is found several times in Attic writers, where, however, it may have come from the scribes. ἀχθεσθήσομαι is the approved form. — — ἐνεγήτης... ἀναγεγράφη. An allusion to the honorary votes recorded on marbles, in favor of foreigners who had rendered Athens a service. — — λίγε αὐτός. αὐτός is by yourself, without another speaker, and so in οὐ αὐτοῦ διώντος above.

D. οὐ τῇ εἴκη. An elegant and certain emendation of Stallb. (ed. sec.) for οὐχ αὐτῶς εἴκη. — — καλλιστα παραγιγνεται. One would expect καλλιστή. Coray wishes to strike out the word; Heindorf, to read μάλιστα. The sense is, attends upon it, or is present most beautifully, i. e. is present in its greatest beauty, or highest perfection.

A. ηῦ δὲ αὐτή, i. e. now this we found to be. ηῦ points 507 to the time when such a soul was (subjectively to them, i. e. appeared to be) ἄφρων, etc. Comp. 478, E, note.

B. α δεῖ... φείγειν καὶ διώκειν. With the definition of the σῴζων ἄνηρ here given, Routh compares Aristotle's in the Eth. Nicom. 3, sub fin.: ἐπιθυμεὶ δ' σῴζων ἄν δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὡς. Plato may seem to have unfairly used this am-
biguity in his argument. So Heindorf and Stallb. view the passage. Routh, on the contrary, says, "Vult philosophus consequens esse necessario ex antecedentibus eum qui recte agit felicem esse. Vix enim potest credi ut Plato duplci sensu verborum εὐ πράττειν ad argumentum probandum aputi vellet." Finally, Ast, after Schleierm., correctly, as I think, observes, that Plato "in his conclusionem non ducit ex ambiguo,—sed usum loquendi cogitandus est in rem suam convertere, eumque quodammodo corrigere voluisse, ex ea enim quam posuit ratione,— nisi bonum quod est, nihil est prosperum ac beatum." With this Stallb., in his second edition, agrees.

D. βουλόμενον εὐδαίμονα εἶναι... διωκτίον. The subject of the action of a verbal may be in the accusative or in the dative. — ὃς ἔχει ποδῶν = ὃς ἔχει τάχος, Thucyd. 2. 92, = ὃς τίχιστα. Comp. Soph. § 188, N.; Cr. § 363, B. — παρασκευαστίον is the verbal of the middle voice here, = δεῖ παρασκευάσασθαι. Mt. § 447. 2. — ἰδιώτης (when opposed to the state), an individual. — In the next sentence, εἰς τοῦτο refers to ὁπως... ἔσεσθαι, and οὕτω πράττειν to συντείνοντα and what follows it.

E. ἀγνιτωτὸν κακόν, an endless or cureless evil, is in apposition with the participial clause preceding it, and in the accusative. Soph. § 167, N. 4; Cr. § 334. 8; K. § 266, R. 2. — φαοὶ δ’ οἱ σοφοὶ, etc. The allusion is more particularly to Empedocles, who made φιλία and νεῖκος fundamental causes in his world of phenomena; the former, or the attracting principle, the cause of union among things unlike, of organization and of motion when one is made out of many, and the latter or the dissolving principle the cause of separation. He is the Agrigentine who taught in verse, that "quae in rerum natura constarent, quaque moverentur, ea contrahere amicitiam, dissipare discordiam." Cic. de Amicit. 7. His causes for the phenomena of the world were
physical; and Socrates here gives playfully a moral turn to his doctrine.

A. τὸ ὄλον τούτο ... κόσμον καλοῦσιν. The universe owed the name κόσμος, order, system, to Pythagoras. Comp. Xen. Mem. 1. 1. 11, ὁ καλοῦμενος ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν κόσμος, which shows that even then the appellation had not become very current. — ἡ ἴδιότης ἡ γεωμετρικῇ. Geometrical equality is that of ratios, arithmetical, of numbers. It exists figuratively in morals and politics, when the receipts of one are to his claims as those of another to his, i. e. when justice prevails and assigns to each according to his due, and not according to his power of receiving. But πλεονεξία or selfishness disturbs and destroys this kind of equality. In the state, this equality takes power from the bad, i. e. from the unjust and ignorant, and gives it to the wise and virtuous, because it is right that only they should govern who can govern well. There is a noble passage on the two equalities in the Leges, 6. 757, B, cited by Routh.

B. ἐξιλεγκτέος ... ὅς. See 467, A, note. — κακίας δὲ οἱ ἄθλοι. The predicate ἄθλοι is omitted. See K. § 852. 2, largest Gr. This is the more natural, because the preceding words, εὐδαίμονες οἱ εὐδαίμονες, clearly indicate the construction. Stallb. has added ἄθλοι, without authority or sufficient reason. — τὶ τὰ συμβαίνοντα. This use of τὶ in the predicate with a plural subject is not uncommon. Comp. Ἀσchin. c. Ctes., ἀπόδειξιν πολὴν τὶ ποτ' ἤν ἢ ἐπερατέας, καὶ τὶ ποτ' ἤν ἢ ἐλεγες. (§ 165, Bekker.) The same formula is repeated just below, τὶ ποτ' ἐστὶν ὁ ... ἄνειδεῖς.

D. εἰμὲ δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ, etc. And that I am in the power of any one who has the will, as those punished by civil infamy are in any one’s hand who wishes it (lit. belong to any one). There were three kinds of civil infamy at Athens, and they are particularly described by Andocides (p. 35, Reiske). The lowest consisted in a deprivation of
certain particular rights, as that of bringing an action as a public accuser. The next involved the taking away of all civil rights; and to this the highest added confiscation. As in the two latter kinds, the person affected with ἀμιλα could not appear in court as a prosecutor or a witness, or complain of his wrongs if not by a public accuser. The clause is in apposition with τοὺπτειν ἐπὶ κόψῃς. Comp. 507, E. The same is true of τὸ ἔχασαν, as it respects ἀποκτεῖναι. Socrates refers to 486, A—C.

E. τίμεσθαι, when taken with σῶμα, is in frusta dissecari.

509 A. καὶ εἰ ἄγγοικότερον... ἐστὶ. These words are used to excuse the confidence and want of deference to others which Socrates here displays. Comp. 462, E, 486, C. In the latter passage, we have εἰ καὶ ἀ., and here καὶ εἰ ἀ. According to Herm. (on Viger, note 307), referred to by Stallb., καὶ εἰ, etiam si, is used concerning that which we only assume as true; εἰ καὶ, quamquam, concerning that which we declare to be true. Socrates, then, does not here admit that his expression is impolite; but in 486, C, Callicles acknowledges by εἰ καὶ his trespass against the rules of good-breeding. —οὐτωσίν ut Latinorum sic est primo aspectu. Ast.

B. τίνα ἄν βοήθειαν, etc. By his inability to afford what kind of aid to himself would a man be in truth ridiculous? This alludes to 486, B, μὴν αὐτὸν αὑτῷ δυνάμενον βοήθειν. —ταύτην εἶναι τὴν αἰσχίσιν βοήθειαν, μὴ δύνασθαι βοήθειν is for αἰσχίοντον εἶναι ταύτην τὴν βοήθειαν μὴ δύνασθαι βοήθειν, that it is most disgraceful not to be able to render this assistance, etc. (viz. this assistance which will avert the greatest evil). With this very strange instance of attraction, if it be such, we may compare the expression in
our own language which Routh adduces, this is the most shameful thing to be without, for it is most shameful to be without this thing.

C. τὴν τοῦ δευτέρου κακῶν, sc. βοήθειάν, and that the aid given to prevent the evil next in magnitude is second (second in shame if inadequate, and in honor if adequate; for this latter is implied). βοήθεια κακῶν is like ἄλκη κακῶν in Euripides. — καὶ τὰ λαξ ὁμοίως, sc. ἔχειν, not ἔχει, which Stallb. supplies.

D. ἄδικήσεται. See Soph. § 207, N. 6; Cr. § 554, a; K. § 251, R. 1. — τέ δὲ δὴ τοῦ ἄδικείν; well, but what about doing wrong? This genitive without a preposition may be compared with that which accompanies verbs of speaking. Comp. Soph. Electr. 317.

E. τί οἷα ... ἀπεκρίνα. See 503, B, note. The imperfect ἀπεκρίναν is in most MSS.; but in this formula that tense is not used. — μηδένα βουλόμενον ἄδικείν. See 468, C, and the Introduction, p. xxiv.

A. ὁποῖος μὴ ἄδικησωμεν. See 480, A, note.

B. φίλος μου δοκεῖ, etc. Here ὁπερ refers forward to ὁ ὤμοιος, and ὦς οἷαν τε μᾶλλα is taken with φίλος. οἱ παλαιοὶ τε καὶ σοφοὶ alludes especially to Hom. Odys. 17. 218, ὥς αἰτὶ τὸν ὤμοιον ἦσεν Θεός ὡς τὸν ὤμοιον. The thought is found also in Sympos. 195, B, ὁ γὰρ παλαιός λόγος εὖ ἔχει, ὥς ὤμοιος ὤμοιώ ἄι κελέζει, and in Lysis, 214, where it is said that the bad, being unlike themselves, that is, variable and unstable, cannot be friends. Comp. also Leges, 716, C, τῷ ὤμοιῳ τῷ ὤμοιον ὄντι μετόφω φίλον ἐν εἴη, τὰ δ᾽ ἀμετρα οὐτὶ ἄλληλοις οὔτε τοῖς ἐμετέρως.

C. δύνατο φίλος γενέσθαι. Repentina subjecti mutatio, says Stallb., i. e. τοῦτο refers to ὁ τύραννος, and the subject of δύνατο is ὁ τοῦ τύραννον βελτίων. This appears most probable, as Plato might easily return in his mind to the earlier subject of the clause, εἰ τίς ... εἴη; and as οὐδ᾽ ἂν
οὖτος shows that the same subject was still in his mind. It is not, however, necessary, because either this person or the tyrant might be called a friend to the other. — ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει. See 468, E, note.

D. χιλιῶν, impune, the opposite of κλαίων, passim apud dramaticos. And so gaudens is used in Latin. — αὐτή, ... ὕδως ἐότων. αὐτή, the subject of ἐστι, refers to ἐδίξειν, but is attracted, as often happens, in gender, to the predicate ὕδως.

E. ἐσται ἐπὶ τὸ ὦτῳ τε ἐῖναι, will be in favor of, or will tend to his being able. Here the construction of the dative with the infinitive is followed by that of the accusative. See 492, B.

511 B. οὐχοῦν ... ἡγανακτητῶν; Well, then, is not this just the thing to rouse indignation?

D. προσωπαλμίνη, simple, properly spoken of garments, drawn close to the body, in contrast to a garment which spreads out with numerous folds and plaits. — ἄλλα ταύτα διαποζωμίνη, etc. But when it has effected the same things with the forensic art, it charges, I presume, but two obols if it has brought a man safe from Ἁigion hither; and if from Egypt or the Pontus, — at the highest rate (ἐὼν πάμπολυ), when it has conveyed in safety what I just now spoke of, the man himself, and his children, and property, and women; having landed them in the port, it demands but two drachms. Ast and Coray wish to change the order in this sentence. I see not why; for it is not more broken than often happens in earnest conversation. ἐποᾶσατο is the aorist of indefinite time. See 484, A. With ἐὼν πάμπολυ, supply πράττειν.

512 A. λογίζεται οὖν ὅτι οὖν, etc. Here οὖν belongs to βιωτείον ἐστι καὶ ὄνησειν, which is the primary clause. But the sentence assumes an antithetical structure, the clauses εἰ μέν τις, ... εἰ δὲ τις, and οὖτος μὲν, τούτῳ δὲ being paired off
against one another. On this form of sentences, Mt. § 622. 4, remarks, that "clauses are put in contrast with one another by means of μία and δι, of which only the second clause suits the connection, while the first in other languages would be treated as a parenthesis." Preserving the Greek order and form nearly, we may translate, "He reflects that it cannot be (οὐ), if a man afflicted with great and incurable diseases, whom he has saved from drowning, is miserable because he lost not his life, that he on the other hand ought to live, who has many incurable maladies in that which is more precious than the body, the soul, and that he (the person so reflecting) will do him good if he deliver him from the dangers of the sea, or the tribunal, or any other place. Nay, he knows," etc. The use of the optative ὑπάρχειν is to me at least perplexing. Stallb. renders it, with its attendant words, neque a se ullo modo juvari posse, and then in defence of it refers to Mt. § 529, on the oratio obliqua. But if I am not deceived, such a form as λογιζεται (being a present not equivalent to a historical tense, and not reducible to the form of oratio obliqua, as cases like λέγεται ὃς τινὰ τίς δέξιτο are) ὅτι οὐχ ὑπάρχειν would not be Greek, and if it were, must mean, not can benefit, but probably benefits. Heindorf conjectured ὑπάρχειν ἂν, can (not) do him good, which in some degree removes the difficulty. I beg leave to offer an opposite conjecture, ὑπάρχει, on the supposition that the final syllable ἂν may owe its birth to ἂν wrongly repeated.

B. οὐ νόμος ἐστι, it is not the custom. — μή ὅτι κυβερνήτου, i.e. μὴ εἶπης ὅτι, not to say, or to pass by the pilot, who is not mentioned in order to select a stronger case, that of the general. Comp. οὐχ ὅτι, 450, E, note. — ἐλάττων σωζεῖν = ἐλάττωνα σωτηρίων πορίζειν, or ἀπεργάζεσθαι. — μή σοι δοκῇ κατὰ τὸν δικαστὴν εἶναι; does he seem to you to be on a level with (and not rather above) the forensic man?
Comp. Repub. 466, B, μὴ πὴ κατὰ τὸν τῶν σκυτοκόμων φαίνει ται βιον; does it seem to you to rank with the shoemaker's kind of life?

C. λέγων καὶ παρακαλῶν ἐπὶ τὸ δεῦν. Briefly for λέγων δεῦν, καὶ παρακαλῶν ἐπὶ τὸ δεῦν. — ὁς οὐδὲν ταλλά ἐστιν, on the ground that every thing else is of no value (in comparison with engineering). — ἀποκαλέσας. This compound of καλέω, as Stallb. remarks, is often used when a name is given in anger or contempt, — to call by a nickname, to call contemptuously, or with a scornful air. Examples may be found in Ἀσchin. c. Ctes., and in Reiske's Index to Demosth. — ἔς ὁν τὰ σαντοῦ ἐπανεῖς = ἐκ τῶν ἐπαίνων οὐς τὴν σαντοῦ τίχην ἐπανεῖς.

D. μὴ γὰρ τοῦτο ... ἑατίον ἑτί. μὴ denoting suspicion that something is true, or mild expression of opinion, may be joined with an indicative; and the like may be said of ὀρα μὴ also. Comp. Soph. Electr. 581, 554 (where τίθη, and not τιθη, is supported by the MSS.); Alcibiad. 2. 139, D, ἀλλ' ὀρα μὴ οὖχ οὖν ταῦτα ἔχει. μὴ may here be translated by perhaps, or I suspect. The sense is, I suspect that a man deserving the name ought to throw away the idea of living as long as ever he can, and not love his life too well; and yielding the disposal of all such things to the Deity, as well as believing what the women say, that no one, whosoever he be, can escape his destiny, that he ought to consider thereupon how he can best live during the life which he is probably about to live, etc. A fine parallel passage occurs in Leges, 2, 661, C. ἐπιτρέπειν, in the sense of committing or referring to, and of giving up to, takes a dative of a person, often with a genitive with πει. Ἀσchin. c. Ctes. § 83, εἰ ἐπιτρέπειν ἐθέλει πόλει τινὶ ἵνα καὶ ὀμολα τοῖς τῶν ἐγκλημάτων, εἰ he wished to refer the grounds of complaint to some impartial and disinterested state. Alcibiad. 1. 117, D, τῷ κυβερνήτῃ ἐπιτρέψας ἄν ἣνιχαν ἔχοις; would you let the pilot have his
own way, and be quiet? For oὐδ᾽ εἰς, more emphatic than ὁδεῖς, comp. Eurip. Alcest. 671 (note in my ed.).

A. καὶ νῦν δὲ ἄφα δεῖ depends on ὁπεπιέον ἄφά. — τὰς τὴν σελήνην καθαρουσάς. The Thessalian sorceresses, who drew down the moon by their incantations, drew down mischief also upon themselves. They lost, it was thought, their eyes or their children, to which last τοῖς φιλιτάτοις alludes. Even an astrologer, in predicting an eclipse of the moon, which was akin, in the minds of the vulgar, to magical arts, was supposed to incur calamity. Hence ἐνὶ σαυ- τῶ σελήνην καθαρεῖς, or καθέλκεις, is used proverbially of those who draw down calamities upon themselves by their conduct. The next words, ὅν τοῖς φιλιτάτοις, must mean with the loss of what we hold most dear, i. e., as Socrates estimates things, of virtue and truth. ὅν here properly denotes the means, and it is only by inference from the connection that the phrase can imply the loss of. The preposition, as Stallb. observes, seems to be chosen with allusion to Iliad, 4. 161, σῶν τε μεγάλον ἀπέτισαν | σῶν σφήνων κεφαλῆ- σι γυναιξὶ τε καὶ τικέεσσι.

B. ἐν τῇ πόλει τῷ δε, i. e. in Athens. See 469, D, and 468, E, note. — ἀνώμοιον . . . χείρον, so long as you are unlike the political institutions either on the better side or on the worse, i. e. so long as you are not assimilated exactly to the democracy of Athens, but are either like the true philosopher, in favor of better institutions, under which knowledge and virtue, and not the popular will, shall govern, and resemble such institutions in your character; or, on the other hand, have the selfish spirit in the extreme, like the tyrant who first corrupts, and then destroys, popular liberty. Thus, I suppose, the politics of Plato, as set forth in the Republic and Laws, require us to understand these words. — τῷ γρήγορον ἀπεσωμάτω, etc., to effect any genuine or real result in regard to obtaining the friendship
of the Athenian people, i. e. to be on terms of true friendship with Athens. ὃς depends on φιλίαν. For τὸ ἰν-φιλάμπους, see 481, D. — ὃς εἰπεῖ μείζον πολιτικός ἦναι. Ast, after one MS., omits πολιτικός, but Stallb. justly says of it, iteratur non sine vi et gravitate. There is, as it seems to me, even something of scorn in the emphatical repetition of the word. ὃς is since, seeing that; not as, i. e. according to (your wishes).

D. πρὸς ἑδονήν ὦμιλεῖν, i. e. τὸ τινὰ πρὸς ἑδ. σώματι καὶ ψυχῇ ὦμιλεῖν. With the indefinite subject of the infinitive agree the two subsequent participles.

E. η δὲ γε ἔτερα, ὅπως. Supply ὦμιλεῖ, as ὄμιλοῦσα is understood just above with η πρὸς ἑδονήν. — ἐπιχειρητέον . . . Θεραπεύειν. The infinitive is added epexegetically, and the datives depend on the verbal. Comp. Soph. Electr. 543, 1277. For the construction of ποιώντας, see 492, B, note. It is without a copula as explaining οὔτως, and ὃς is taken with βεβλίστουσι only.

514 A. εὐφιλάκομεν. The Atticists and MSS. vary in regard to the augment of verbs beginning with εὐ. The earlier practice seems to have been, to leave the diphthong unchanged. Mt. § 167. 6. Below, 514, E, two of the best MSS. give ηὐφιλάκομεν, and ηὐδόκομεν, 515, E. — εἰν μὴ . . . ηὐτίνοιν explains and defines ἔνεν τούτον. Comp. a similar apposition of a clause beginning with εἷν μὴ in Soph. Antig. 87. — δημοσίως πράξαντες τῶν πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων, after we had engaged in a public capacity in any transactions of the state. The genitive is taken partitively. The words πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων denote any employment in the state’s service, as that of an ἱγοιλαβοῖς, or contractor, like Phidias, and of an ἄρχητέκτων, like Ictinus, the builder of the Parthenon.

B. εἰ ἐπιστέμεθα, and a little below, εἰ φιλοδομήκαμεν. After would it be incumbent on us to examine, we should add
in English, whether we knew, εἰ ἐνιαύθεσα, relative to ἔδει ἦν, and not εἰ ἐπιστάμεθα, which is absolute: and so whether we had built (in the pluperfect), not whether we have builded. But the Greeks, in many kinds of dependent clauses, preferred the absolute to the relative form, as here. The cause of this lay in that liveliness of mind which made the past present and the possible real, and often led them to the use of oratio recta for oratio obliqua.

C. ἵδια ... ἡμῶν. According to Ast, ἡμῶν depends on ἵδια, which would alone express the idea, were not ἡμῶν wanted for the contrast with μετὰ τῶν διδασκάλων. Those who would reject such an expression as ἵδια ἡμῶν, which is destitute of the support of parallel examples, must read with Stallb., after one MS., ἵδια ὑπὶ ἡμῶν. — οὕτω μὲν δι-ακεμένων, etc. It would be the part of prudent men, if so situated, to engage in public works. Here ἦν has ἦν, but just below is without it. I think, with Ast, that although ἦν is often used without ἦν, (see Mt. § 508, Obs. 2,) yet here the influence of ἦν can extend to the second ἦν.

D. A very similar passage may be found in Laches, 186, B, C. In the first sentence, ἦν belongs to ἐπισευάμεθα, which verb is taken with πάντα ... ἄλλα, as well as with εἰ παρεκκαλοῦμεν. The aorist, with ἦν following the imperfect, here denotes transitory action referable to present time (if we were urging ... we would examine: see Hermann de partic. ἦν, I. 10), or possibly (since we have ἐπικόπνουν just below), there may be an inaccuracy of style, like that of using our potential pluperfect for the imperfect, — would have for would. Comp. 447, D, for the opposite use of the imperfect (εἰ ἐτύχανεν ἦν ... ἀπεκφίλησα), in speaking of something continuing in past time. Some would read ἐπι-σκεπτόμεθα here, but it is scarcely Attic. See 476, A, note.

E. ἄνθρωπου ... ἐτύχομεν. The style passes freely from
the first person plural, as a representative of a general truth, to the third, and then back again. There is no reason why we should suspect ἀνθρώπους, or read ἡμεῖς. ὦστε goes with ἐπιχειρεῖν. — ὦπος ἐπιχειρεῖν, in an ordinary way, as we could, utcumque. — τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο. See 447, A. δὴ is just or even. — ἐν τῷ πιθῶ, etc., to try to learn the potter’s art by beginning with the jar,— the largest vessel, and therefore the hardest to make. This proverb occurs again in Laches, 187, B, in company with its opposite, ἐν τῷ Καρὶ ἵμιν ὅ κίνδυνος, i. e. to risk what you value least, attempt what you can best afford to fail in; which refers to the Carian mercenaries in war, whose blood was less precious than their employer’s.

515 B. οὖν ἰδιωτεύοντος. Soph. § 174; Cr. § 454; K. § 266. 2.

D. For what is here said of “the four,” see the Introduction. — ἀγαθοὶ πολιτεῖα here is much the same as ἀγαθοὶ τὰ πολιτικά, which is used as an equivalent, 516, C, 517, A.

E. ἀκούω. See 503, C. — εἰς μισθοφορίαν ... καταστήσασθαι, by being the first to bring them into the practice of taking pay for performing their political duties. Pericles introduced the practice of paying the judges. The pay was one obolus per diem at first, and then three. After the death of Pericles, the people also drew pay for attending in the assembly. All this is explained at large in that admirable book, Boeckh’s Civil Economy of Athens, Book II. §§ 14, 15. — τῶν τὰ δίω καταγότων. See 469, D. This phrase is explained fully by Protag. 342, B, “The Lacedaemonians,” Socrates there says, “conceal their philosophy, and thus deceive those in other states who affect Spartan manners, and who, in imitation of them, have their ears bruised by blows received in boxing, (ὅτα κατάγγειλαι μισθοφοροὶ αὐτοῖς,) and bind the cæstus round their
hands and study gymnastics, and wear short tunics, just as though the Lacedæmonians surpassed the rest of Greece by such means." The phrase, then, denotes the partisans of Sparta, those who admire Spartan institutions, and are ill-affected towards Athens.

A. γεγόνεσαν. Comp. Soph. § 79 (91. 6, N. 4); Cr. 516 § 194. 1; K. § 120, R. 2. — κλοπὴν αὐτοῦ κατεφησάντο. Thucyd. merely says (2. 65) χρηματίν εξημίσαν. Plutarch mentions an accusation and a fine (Vit. Pericl. § 35), as does Diodorus also (12. 45); but the charge was no doubt false: he was χρηματίν διαφανῶς ἀδιωφότατος by the testimony of the most impartial of historians. See Appendix, No. II. — ἑαυτῷ ἐτίμησαν. See 486, B, note: δῆλον ἢτι, 487, E, note. — ὁνὼν ἐπιμελητῆς. Comp. Xen. Memorab. 1. 2. 32, for a similar passage. — ἀπειθεῖξε ... ποιῶντας, if he had caused them to do. This verb and ἀποφαίνω are often used in the sense of causing something to appear, of effecting, rendering, and, like φαίνω, δεῖξωμι, take their complement in the form of a participle.

B. καὶ τὸδε ... χάρισαι. There is a similar play upon χαρίζομαι in Repub. 1. 351, C, σοὶ γάρ, ἐφε, χαρίζομαι. Ἐν γε οὗ ποιῶν* ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ τὸδε μοι χάρισαι καὶ λέγε.

C. ὡς ἐφι Ὄμηρος. Nusquam disertis verbis hoc dic tum in eo quem hodie habemus Homero, nisi quis huc trahere velit quod Routhius fecit Odys. 6. 120, 9. 175, ἡ ἣ' ὡς' ὑδρότατοι τε καὶ ἁγίοι, νόθε δίκαιοι. Heindorf. Plato puts the ἄγαθοι and ἡμεροι together, in Repub. 5. 470, E, and makes τὸ ἡμερον a part of the philosophic nature in Repub. 3. 410, E. — ὄν ἡμιστ' ἄν ἐβολεύετο, i. e. εἰς ὃν.

D. What is here said of Cimon and Themistocles is well known. What is said of Miltiades rests on the authority of Plato, and of the Scholiast on Aristides 3. 677, Dindorf, whom Valck. on Herodot. 6. 136 first cited from a MS. The Scholiast says ὅτε ἔκφεντο ἐπὶ τῷ Πάφῳ (i. e.
on account of his fruitless attack upon the island of Paros soon after the battle of Marathon), ἃθέλησαν αὐτῶν κατακατ-

μισαί, δὲ πρύτανις εἰσελθὼν ἐξητῆσατο αὐτῶν. Plato per-

haps exaggerates a little in saying ἐπηφίσαντο. The Pry-

tanis, being president of the assembly of the people which

tried the case, was probably one of those friends of Miltia-

des of whose advocacy Herodot. speaks, and by his inter-

cessions led the judges to lower the penalty from death to a

heavy fine. But for that, death, by being thrown into the

pit, would have been his portion. See Grote's Greece, Vol.

IV. p. 491. — τὸν ἐν Μαραθονίῳ, him who was at Marathon,

the general there. ἐν is used because the action was "in

Marathonio agro." See Soph. Electr. 1. Thucyd. 2. 85, τῆς

ἐν Σιριάδισκωμόχις, at, near Stratus. — τὸ βασανὸν is defined

by Timæus (Lex. Platon. s.v.), "a place like a well, where

the condemned were thrown," and in Bekker's Anecdot. 1.

219, is said to be "an excavation in Keiriadae, a demus of

the Oeneid tribe, where they threw down the capitaly con-

demned, as the Lacedaemonians did into Kæadas." He-

rodot. 7. 133, says that the heralds of Darius were thrown

by the Athenians into this place. Comp. Aristoph. Clouds,

1450, and the Schol. on Aristoph. Plut. 431.

E. εἴ μὴ διά, but for. This not unfrequent formula has

always the same sense as if some part of κωλύω were under-

stood. The origin of the phrase is not clear. Ast ac-

counts for it as a confusion or union of two forms of speak-

ing; e. g., in this case, εἴ μὴ ὁ Πρύτανις εἶ, if the Prytanis

had not existed, ... ἐνεπεσεν ἄν, and διὰ τὸν Ἰ. ... ὦν ἐνε-

πεσεν. — ὀυκοῦν οἱ γε ἁγαθοὶ ἵνιοχοι, etc. This sentence

is formed like that explained in the note on 512, A. The

sense is, It is not true that good drivers are not at first

thrown from their chariots, but when they have improved their

horses by care, and have become better drivers themselves, that

they are then thrown out. ἔσπος is often used of the vehi-

icle, as well as of the yoke or pair of animals drawing it.
A. τῶν μέντοι ἔμπροσθέν. Here, by a kind of zeugma, ἔλε-517
γες, readily suggested by ὀμολογεῖς, is to be supplied, togeth-
er with τινάς, which is contained in οὐδένα. Comp. Soph.
Antig. 29. — οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔξεπεσον. The metaphor is bor-
rowed from charioteers, and is the more natural, as persons
who lost their rank or authority were said ἔξεπεσον. Comp.
Soph. Antig. 679. — οὔτε τῇ κολακίκῃ. If they had used
the true art of rhetoric, that is, had been good politicians,
they would have made the people better, and not have had to
rue its ingratitude: if the flattering art of rhetoric, they
would have escaped from dangers, because that art, accord-
ing to the Sophists, οὐχεῖ ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων μάλιστα
μὲν ἐμντόν. Aristides triumphs in a supposed inconsistency
of Plato, who had before called "the four" κόλαχαι, and
now says that they did not use τῇ κολακίκῃ ὡτορίκῃ. But
he does not see into the meaning. The words contain a
sneeer at the rhetoricians. They were κόλαχες, inasmuch as
they studied to gratify, not to benefit; and carrying such a
motive into their public addresses, they imbued all their
words with it. But if the false art of rhetoric can rescue
from dangers, and makes that its first aim, they fell short of
it. In other words, the art cannot gain its own dearest
ends. They had the principles of the false rhetoric, but
could not gain that for which the art was esteemed.

B. πολλοῦ γε δεῖ . . . μη . . . ἐγκάσεται. πολλοῦ δεῖ is
usually followed by an infinitive, and Stallb. says that he
knows of no example like this. The reason for the con-
struction seems to be, that πολλοῦ δεῖ, being in sense a neg-
ative, adopts the construction appropriate to οὐ. οὐ μη ἐγκά-
sεται would be a familiar formula. — ὃς βούλει, a singular
expression for (τις) ὃν βούλει, to be referred to the rule of
attraction of the relative. Comp. Cr. § 526. γ. The verb
must be regarded as coalescing with ὃς to form one notion,
like quivis in Latin. — ὃς γε διακόνους ἑναι πόλεως, as to
their being servants of the state, or considering them merely as \(\text{δεις γε}\) being servants of the state. Stallb. thinks that the phrase arises, by a *confusio duarum locutionum*, out of \(\text{δεις\ldots διακόνους,}\) and \(\text{διακόνους εἶναι.}\) But the infinitive with \(\text{δεις}\) can be used in this relation to the main verb, as well as in others. — καὶ \(\muη\) ἑπιτρέπειν, and in regard to not letting them have their own way. The infinitives limit \(\text{διέφερον.}\)

**τούτων**, politicians of the present day.

C. οὗδέν πανόμεθα \ldots \text{εἰ.} Comp. 491, A. — \(\text{ἀγγο-}\)

ούντες ἀλλήλων ὁ τι λέγομεν. \(\text{ἀγγοῖοω}\) takes a genitive, like \(\text{μανθάω}\) and other verbs of learning or understanding. Soph. § 182; Cr. § 375. \(\beta;\) K. § 273. 5, f.

D. \(\text{ἡ δυνατὸν εἶναι}\) is for \(\text{ἡ δ. ἐστι,}\) by a change of style from direct to suspended discourse. Supply \(\text{ὅμολογήκαμεν.}\)

— \(\text{ὅγιοῦ}\) is for \(\text{ὅγιοῖ},\) subjunctive of \(\text{ὁγίω};\) and so \(\text{ὅγιῶν}\) for \(\text{ὅγιον}\) infinitive, in Aristoph. Clouds, 442. This is quite analogous to the contraction of \(\text{πεινῶ},\) and a few others in \(\text{αω},\) by \(\eta\) instead of \(\alpha,\) but is usual with no other verb except \(\text{Ὁφόω}.\) Buttmann (largest Gr. 1. 506, and note in Heindorf) thinks that both contractions are relics of a general method prevailing in old Ionic. — \(\text{τούτων γὰρ πο-}\)


κοινῆς εἴναι, etc. This sentence changes its structure, and proceeds as if \(\text{ὅτα,}\) and not \(\text{εἶναι,}\) had stood here. The anacoluthon is caused by the explanatory clause \(\text{ἡ κάπηλον ὅτα\ldots σκυτοδεσφόν,}\) and by the difficulty of carrying out the original construction.

518 A. \(\text{διὸ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα\ldots εἶναι.}\) The construction changes from \(\text{ὅτα}\) and a finite verb, \(\text{εἰδότι ὅτι ἔστι τίς,}\) etc., to an infinitive with its subject accus. — \(\text{ταῦτα οὖν ταῦτα,}\) etc. Now at one time you seem to be aware that I say that the selfsame thing holds good of the soul also, and you agree to it, as if understanding what I mean. \(\text{τοτὲ μὲν}\) answers to \(\text{ὁλίγον δὲ ἑπιτεφόν,}\) and \(\text{δὲ}\) is, in a sense, out of its place.

B. \(\text{προτεινόσθαι, to hold forward as a sample of what}\)
one has got, hence to take, or select as a specimen. —

ὅμοιοτάτοις ... ὅσπερ. See 485, A. — Ὠθηρίων must have been the fashionable baker at Athens. He is thus spoken of in a fragment of the Gerytades of Aristophanes (Atheneus, 3. 112, E): ἂν Ὠθηρίων ἄρτοπώλιον ἑτημόν, ἵν' ἐστὶ χρισάνων ἔδωδος,—which is a parody of the beginning of the Hecuba. And a longer fragment from the Omphale of Antiphanes, preserved in the same place, asks, (by way of parody on Soph. Electr. 257, perhaps,) how a man of noble birth could ever go out of the house where he saw the white loaves of bread ... οὕς δημότας | Ὠθηρίων ἐδειξεν. — ἄρτοπώλος. In a number of MSS., ἄρτοπώλος appears. Still another word for the same thing is ἄρτοπός, which has most commendation from the Atticists, and which has probably been without reason thrust out of its place by the other words in a number of instances. See Lobeck on Phrynichus, 222. — Μιθακός, etc. Mithaecus, who wrote the treatise called "La Cuisine Sicilienne." The Sicilians were in the gastronomic art to the Greeks what the French are now to the world, and Mithaecus was a Syracusan cook. Repub. 3. 404, D, Συρακοσιαίος τρόπεζαν καὶ Σικελικὴν ποικιλον ὄψαν, ὅς ἐσθικὴ, οὗν αἴνεις. Athenæus, 12. 518, C, διαβόητοι εἶσιν ἐπὶ τροφῇ καὶ αἱ Σικελῶν τρόπεζαι. Comp. also Cicero de Fin. 2. 28. According to Maximus Tyrius (23. 1), cited by Routh, Mithaecus went to Sparta, but they, thinking that too many cooks would spoil their broth, drove him away. — To Sarambus (or Sarabus, as Meineke, Com. Græc. frag. 4. 525, would write the name) many later writers allude, but they seem to have derived their knowledge of him from this passage. See the commentators on Suidas, sub voce.

C. παροσκευαστὰς ἄνθρώπον. ἄνθρωπος is often added in contempt, having something of the force of our fellow. ἄρης is used on the contrary with an honorable sense. This
is shown at large in Valckenaer's Opusc. 2. 243, ed. Lips. — ὁί, ἀν οὖλω τύχων, etc. Who, it may be, after they have filled and fattened the bodies of the men, and while they are praised by them, will cause the loss (not only of this increase of flesh, but) of their old flesh besides.

D. ὅταν δὴ αὐτοῖς ἢχη, when now their former repletion shall have brought on disease a good while afterwards. ἢκω φεῖσθαι is often nearly the same as φεῖσθαι, and can only be figuratively explained here of the repletion acting as a cause bringing in its train disease as the effect.

E. Nothing is truer than these remarks. The seeds of present national evil are sown in the past, and yet we blame the men of the present for what we suffer, and praise the men of the past, who are the true source of our calamities. It is thus that some, who look with alarm on the turn our affairs are taking, worship Jefferson as a political saint. — καὶ φασὶ ... αὐτοῖς is for καὶ οὖς φασί, by a change of style from the relative to the demonstrative.

519 A. καταβολή. περιοδική λῆψις πυρετοῦ, interprete Timæo Lex. p. 154 ubi v. Ruhnken. Heindorf. — Ἀλκιβίάδου. As he had some time before left Athens for the last time, Plato is here forgetful of dates. See 481, D, note, and Appendix, No. I.

B. ἀγανακτούντων, sc. αὐτῶν, these politicians.

C. Comp. 460, C, and Xen. Memorab. 1. 2. 7. — κιν-δυνεῦε ταυτόν εἶναι, (τοῦτοις,) ὑποτει, the same thing seems to hold good of those who, etc. But Mt. § 632, has a different explanation of the form of the sentence.

D. καὶ τοῦτον τοῦ λόγου. For καὶ, Heindorf, without authority, writes καίτων. But καὶ, in the beginning of imperative and interrogative sentences, marks liveliness of transition (Mt. § 620), like our and in animated questions, particularly in those where objections are refuted. — δὴ-μηνοφεῖν με ἡγάκασας. See 482, C, 494, D.
E. συγνοὺς τείνω τῶν λόγων. The construction seems to be τινὰς τῶν λόγων συγνοὺς τείνω, i. e. ὥστε συγνοὺς εἶναι, some things which I have to say I dwell largely upon. But if λόγων depends on συγνούς, as it well can (comp. Soph. § 177. 1), the sense must be, I think, a good many of my discourses I extend in length. — πρὸς φιλίου. See 500, B.

A. ἵταν τὺχωσιν. Comp. 514, E, 518, C. — What is said here refers to Protagoras, Prodicus, and other professed teachers of virtue, as Heindorf remarks; and it is amusing to see the contempt felt by the friend of Gorgias, a mere teacher of words (λέγειν οἴτειν δεῖν ποιεῖν δεινοὺ, Meno, 95, C), for the Sophists, whose pretensions were as much higher as wisdom is higher than eloquence.

B. τί... ἀμα καὶ ἔστω κατηγορεῖν. Here supply δεῖν or ἀνάγκην εἶναι, which is readily suggested by ἔγχωρεῖν. Comp. 517, A.

C. προίσθαι, to bestow freely, and in the first instance, without knowing what return the party receiving the favor will make. Comp. Thucyd. 2. 43, κάλλιστοι ἔσεσαν αὕτη προϊσθήνοι, bestowing upon their country a most precious contribution. So προϊστήνους εὐφρεδίαν, Xen. Anab. 7. 7. 47, where Schneider adverts to this sense. — ἄνευ μισθοῦ. Protagoras, who first openly called himself a Sophist and took pay (Protag. 349, A), says (328, B) that he had a price, which his student might give if he pleased; but if not, that the student went to a temple, and paid so much as he (the student) pronounced on oath the instructions to be worth. For the opinions of Socrates on this point, see, among the rest, Xen. Memorab. 1. 6. 13. — ἐγχώρειν. The absolute form without ἄν is here used for the hypothetical with it. See Mt. § 508, Obs. 2; K. § 260, R. 3. — τὴν χορίν, the favor due, the compensation, as a mark of a grateful mind. — καὶ μὴ συνθέμενος... τὸ ἀφύσιον, and should not take the money in consequence of a bargain made
with him (i.e. should not take it as the payment which was stipulated) at the very time when he was imparting to him the power of swiftness. οὐ μάλιστα is joined with ἀμα to increase its precision.

E. ἐὰν μὴ τις αὐτῷ δίδω. αὐτῷ refers to the indefinite subject of φάναι. — ἄντι εὖ ποιησίν. There can be little doubt that Stallb. is right in separating these words, in opposition to Buttmann (2. 361, largest Gr.), who writes in one word ἀνευσυνείν. εὖ and δεῖς are united only to derivative forms, except in the instance of the strange word δινηθῆσκον, used by Euripides. — εἰ εὖ ποιήσας. Heindorf writes δ εὖ ποιήσας, "sed fallitur, loco qui repudiat articulum non recte explicato." Hermann on Eurip. Hecuba, 485, 2d ed. The indefinite subject is understood, and εὖ ποιήσας denotes after conferring a favor.

521 A. ὁς διακονήσοντα καὶ ὁμιλήσοντα. Instead of writing τὸν τὸν διακόνησιν καὶ ὁμιλῆσιν, Plato deserts the construction of the nearest words, through the influence of ὁς ἵνα ὑπάρχων, and accommodates the participles to παρακάλεις. See Mt. § 555, Obs. 2. Just below, Heindorf, Coray, and Stallb. think that ὁς has fallen out before κολακεύσοντα.

B. εἰ γὰρ Μυσὸν γε ἤδιον καλεῖν. The sense of this vexed passage seems to be that which Stallb. and Olympiod., whom he cites from the MSS., give to it, if you like better to call (such a man) a Mysian, call him so; i.e. "You may give the political man the most contemptible name that you can find. Do as you like about that, since if you will not act so as to gratify the Athenians (εἰ µὴ ... ποιήσας) you will ——." The apodosis to εἰ ... καλεῖν is omitted, being readily suggested by the sense of the passage. It is οὔτως καλεῖ, or οὐδὲν κολαφεῖ, or something equivalent. The apodosis which εἰ µὴ ... ποιήσας would have had, if Socrates had not cut the sentence short, is to be found in his words. With καλεῖν must be understood τοῦ-
τον, this political man, whom in fact, though not in so many words, Socrates calls a κάλλως. But the connection with the foregoing must be owned to be rather loose. The My- sians stood low among the people of Asia Minor. Μυσίων ἐσχάτος (Theaet. 209, B) is a proverb for the vilest of the vile. Cicero, in his Or. pro Flacco, § 27, says, "Quid porro in Graeco sermone, tam tritum atque celebratum est, quam, si quis despicatui ducitur, ut Mysorum ultimus esse dicatur?"

C. οὐχ ἐστι ὁ τι χρήσεται αὐτοῖς. αὐτοῖς is his property, before spoken of in ἐὰν τι ἔχω. In 465, C, the indicative, but in many places the subjunctive, follows ἔχω in this formula. The distinction seems to be, that with the future the action is viewed as simply future; with the subjunctive, as connected with and dependent on some contemplated cause and ground of action. Thus, in οὐχ ἐστι ὁ τι χρήσεται, the subject is in doubt about his future action; in οὐχ ἐστὶ ὁ χρησμοῖς, about his rational future action. — ὡς μοι δοκεῖς. ὡς is exclamatory. — ὡς οἰκών . . . καὶ οὐχ ἂν εἰσαχθεῖς, as though you were living aloof, and could not be brought (on trial) into court. For εἰσαχθεῖς ἂν comp. 458, A, note.

D. ὃ τι τύχοι. Miferis Heindorfium ὃ τι ἂν τύχοι corrigentem. Nam optativus post relativa in obliqua oratione haudquaquam infrequens est. Addito ἂν hoc loco scribendum erat τύχῃ. Stallb. — The dissatisfaction with the political institutions of Athens, which is here clearly im- plied, was felt by Socrates to some degree, but far more by Plato, whose ideal turn of mind was not fitted to find satisfaction in the present under any system, particularly under one where demagogues reigned, and philosophers had to drink poison. — πονηροῖς. An allusion, no doubt, to the actual accusers. — οὐδὲν γε αἰσιον, sc. ἐν.

E. τὰ καμπύτα ταύτα. An allusion to what Callicles says, 486, C. — ὃς εἰσγαστάι ὄνηρ. ὃς, like οὐτοῖς, 489, B,
used of a person who is present and pointed at, has no article. — καὶ αὐτοῖς, καὶ τοὺς νεωτάτους. αὐτοῖς is taken with ὑμᾶς εἰργασται, and serves to contrast the whole ὑμᾶς with the part νεωτάτους. καὶ = and especially. — νεωτάτους διαφθείρει. An allusion to the actual charge against Socrates. Comp. 522, B.

522 A. For εὐωχεῖν governing two accusatives, see Mt. § 421, Obs. 1; Cr. § 430. This construction (which γεῖνω also sometimes takes) seems to be owing to this; that the verb means substantially to make to eat, and needs an object for each of these notions. — The sentiment conveyed by this comparison of the cook and the physician is expressed in another way by Crates of Thebes, a Cynic philosopher who flourished at Athens in Alexander’s time (Diog. Laert. 6. 86): τί θεί μαγείον μνᾶς δέχ’, ἰατρῷ δραχμήν. | κόλαξι τάλαντα πέντε, συμβούλῳ καπνόν. | τόρνη τάλαντον, φιλοσόφῳ τριάδαλον.

B. οὔτε γὰρ ἡδονάς. Το οὔτε, εἶν τε answers. An affirmative and a negative proposition are often thus bound together by οὔτε and τε; but οὔτε must come first. αὐτοῖς the judges implied in δικαστηρίων. — οὔτε οίς πορίζεται, i. e. οὔτε τούτοις, οίς τεῦτοι (referring to ἡδοναί) πορίζεται. — ἀποφεύς ποιοῦσια. This was a frequent charge against Socrates. The doubt he threw upon their former opinions, and the unsettled state of mind which he produced, may have been unwelcome to a few, and regarded as dangerous by a few more; but probably nothing made him more unpopular than his provoking way of bringing men who argued with him to a stand, so that they did not know what to say. Meno says (79, D, cited by Heindorf), “O Socrates, I used to hear it said of you, before I became acquainted with you, that you do nothing else except αὐτός τε ἀποφείς, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖς ἀποφείς.”

C. πρατίζω τῷ ὑμείτισθον δῇ τούτῳ, and herein I am doing
just (δι') what is for your interest. Ast takes πάντα ταύτα with ποιότω, as well as with λίγω, and ἕµέτερον... τουτο as added in apposition. — οὕτως διακειµένος (not οὕτω). Videtur οὕτως, etiam sequente consona litera, usurpatum esse ubi vi et pondere suo pollet plurimum. Stallb. — έν οὕτω ὑπάρχει. Heindorf wishes to erase ἔν, or write ἔν, with some reason, as ὑπάρχει takes with it a simple dative.

D. βοήθεια ἰαυτῷ. This noun with the dative denotes help afforded to; with the genitive, against (comp. βοήθεια ἐκαθοῦ, 509, C, βαρβύρων, Plat. Epist. 7. 332, E), or to any one. — There is an allusion here to 436, B.

E. αὐτό το ἀποδηνήσεων. Comp. for the sentiment Plato's Apol. 28, B, et seq. — φοβείται, sc. πάς τις, by brachylogy supplied from οὕδεις, just above. See my note on Soph. Antig. 29. — ὄς τούτο οὕτως ἔρει depends on λόγον λέξαι, as if it were λόγος δεῖξαι ὄς ... ἔρει.

A. φασι, i.e. as story-tellers say, when they begin a story. — λόγον opposed to μῦθον is a historical narrative, a true story, as opposed to a fictitious narrative. — ὁµηριοις λέγει. Iliad. 15. 187. — καὶ αἰὲ καὶ νῦν ἔτι, et semper et nunc etiam. Ast. ἐνων includes a past tense.

B. ρεωστὶ, in modern times, used relatively to the days of Saturn. — οἱ ἐν ... νῆσον. The preposition is accommodated to ἱοντες (see Soph. Electr. 137), because the officers set over the blessed islands came from thence. Comp. Cr. § 659; K. § 300. 4; and 472, B, note.

C. ἵσκαίφως, in each direction, to the blessed islands, and to the prison of punishment.

D. προκεκαλυμμένοι = ἱοντες προκεκαλυμμένον. See Æsch. Prometh. 362; Soph. Electr. 54. The sense is, having eyes and ears, and the whole body, spread as a veil before the soul. — αὐτοὺς ... ἐπιπροσθίων γίγνειται, are in their way. — τούτ' αὐτῶν, this property of theirs, this in them.
E. ἐξαίρετος ἀποθανόντος = εὐθὺς ἀποθανόντος, the moment he is dead. Soph. § 222, N. 4. — By a construction ad sensum, ἐγραμματεύτω τοι σαύρων are in the masculine, because τίνι ψυχὴν ἐκάστου is the same as each person. — δύο ἐν τῆς Ἀσίας. Routh explains this by their being born of Europa, a Phænician, and adds, that Minos was regarded by some as a stranger in Crete. “Sed Cretam insulam Asiae assignasse videntur veteres sicut Libya modo Europæ modo Asiae contribuerunt; ut duas orbis terrarum partes posuerint, Asiam et Europam.” Ast. But no proof has been found elsewhere, that Crete was assigned to Asia.

524 A. ἐν τῷ λειμανθ., etc. Virgil, Aeneid, 6. 540: —

"Hic locus est, partes ubi se via findit in ambas:
Dextera, qua Ditis magni sub mania tendit,
Hac iter Elysium nobis: at læva malorum
Exercet pœnas, et ad impia Tartara nittit."

B. οὐ πολὺ ἵπτον ... ἡπέρα καὶ ὅτε ἐξῆ. A free and rather irregular construction, instead of οὐ πολὺ ἵπτον ... ὥστε ἐξῆ. ἡπέρα is brought in through the influence of τίνι ἐξιν τῆς αὐτοῦ, and alters the ensuing words to suit itself.

D. οἴος εἶναι παθησενάστο, etc., such as he had prepared himself to be while living in regard to his body, i. e. such as were his ways of using his body. Just below, ἐδηλα ταύτα refer to the qualities of body implied in οἴος εἶναι παθησενάστο, as if οἴος εἶχεν ἐν τῷ σώματι had been written.

E. κατεὶδεν ... ψυχῆς. The aorist marks indefinite time (484, Α, note): ψυχῆς depends on οἴδιν; nothing belonging to, or in, the soul. Comp. Republic. 376, Α, ὃ καὶ ἄξιον θαύμασαι τοῦ θηλίου. — ἀλλὰ διαμεμεισμομένην, etc. Tacit. Annal. 6. 6, "Neque frustra praestantissimus sapientiam firmare solitus est, si recludatur tyrannorum mentes, posse adspici laniatus et ictus; quando, ut corpora verberibus, ita sævitia, libidine, malis consultis animus dilaceretur."
B. **οἱ ωφιλούμενοι ... καὶ διδόντες**, i.e. those who, while **525** they suffer, are made better . . . are such as, etc.

C. **τοῖς ἀεί.** See 464, D; Prometh. 937.

D. **τοὺς πολλοὺς ... παραδειγμάτων.** By a **constructio ad sensum**, παραδειγμάτων used of the persons who serve as examples, is joined to πολλοὺς, as if it were masculine.— **“Ομηρος.** Odys. 11. 575, seq.

E. **οὐ γὰρ ἔξην αὐτῷ, sc. αὐνέχεισαι. — ἐκ τῶν ... ἀνθρωποι, the men who prove to be even very wicked are of the class of the powerful.** Here, 497, A, 526, B, and elsewhere, γίγνεσθαι means to become subjectively, i.e. to become in the view of the mind, to be found out to be.

C. **ἐπισημηνάμενος, ἐὰν τε, etc., putting his mark upon** **526** him to show whether he thinks him curable or not. Comp. Repub. 10. 614, which I will give in English. "When, therefore, his soul went out of his body, he began a journey, with a number of others, and they came to a wonderful place, where there were two openings in the ground close by one another, and others opposite to them above in the sky. Between these judges sat, who, whenever they finished judging, bade the just take the road on the right and upwards through the sky, having first attached certificates (**σημεία**) to those who had been judged, in front; and ordered the unjust to take the road to the left and leading downward, with marks behind indicating all their conduct.” — **οὐ πολυπραγμονήσαντος, who has not been “a busybody in other men's matters,” who has not gone out of his own sphere of duties, to perform a part belonging to another.** In Repub. 4. 433, A, it is made a definition of justice, that a man **τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττει καὶ οὐ πολυπραγμονεῖ.** Here the words especially point at taking an active part in politics, which, for a man who is not yet qualified for political life, is undertaking another's duty to the neglect of his own.
C, D. ἐκύρεσθαι... νέκυσαι. This passage is considered to be spurious by Heindorf and Ast, for reasons which, as far as I can see, are altogether insufficient. The passage from Homer is in Odys. 11. 568.

E. ἀντιπαρακαλῶ. ἀντὶ denotes in my turn, in reply to the exhortations which you gave me to engage in politics. Just below, ἀντὶ... ἀγώνων denotes worth all the trials here, i. e. to be set against, or equal in importance to all the trials before human tribunals, where rhetoric, as its advocates alleged, would save a man from condemnation. ἐν-θῷε, ἐνεῖ, and ἐκεῖος are often used of this life, and of death or a future state; the context of course suggesting the explanation. Comp. Soph. Antig. 76; Electr. 356; Eurip. Alcest. 363.

527 A. τὸν τῆς Ἀἰγίνης νιόρ. Αἰacus (son of Jupiter and Ἀεινη), as being the judge for all from Europe. Olympiod. apud Stallb. says, "He adds Ἀεινη because Callicles was from Ἀεινη." But as that Platonic Scholiast can have known nothing about Callicles, I suspect that the last word, Ἀἰγίνης, is an error in transcribing for Ἑὐφόρης, occasioned by the similar word preceding it. — χαιρήσει, etc. This noble passage alludes to 486, B. — τυπτῆσαι. The Attic form of the future of τυπτεῖν, according to Thomas Magister and Μαρίς sub voce. Comp. Aristoph. Clouds, 1379, 1443. The later writers used all the forms from τυπτεῖν, unless it be the present and imperfect.

B. ἐκεῖο... συμφέρων, advantageous there. See 526, E. The adverb of motion is used, because the journey from this world is thought of. It is the same as when we go thither. Comp. the opposite in Ἀςχιν, c. Ctes. § 97, Bekker: "He said that he wished to report to you τὴν ἐκ Πελοποννήσου πρεσβείαν ἦν ἐπιφάνειας, his embassy into Peloponnesus, strictly the embassy into P. from which he had returned. — ἔμει, remains quiet, unshaken, i. e. unre-
futed. — οὗ τὸ δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν, ἄλλα τὸ εἶναι. Comp. the noble words in Repub. 2. 361, Α, ἔσχάτη ἄδικα δοκεῖν δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ ὄντα. Ἀeschylus was the source of the expression, Sept. c. Theb. 574, οὗ γὰρ δοκεῖν ᾑριαίος ἄλλ' εἶναι διλε, upon which words all the theatre turned and looked at Aristides, according to Plutarch in his life.

C. οὗτος χρηστεών. οὗτος is immediately explained by ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἄτι. — ἐνιαὐθα, to that kind of life. ἐνιαυθα came perhaps to be used with a verb of motion, because with the motion its end, rest in the place, is often thought of. — ὁς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει, as the discourse shows. Stallb. gives ὁς ὁ σως λόγος, with the best of the MSS., to which Ast very justly objects. The same false reading appears 511, B, 460, C, and Socrates could not call the argument, so far as it proved this point, the argument of Callicles, to whom he here speaks.

D. πατάξαι. The interpreters are divided between πατάξαι, with which ἔσκον τινα and σε, from σου, just above, are to be supplied, and πατάξαι πινε τε ὑπέρ. Buttmann even denies that the middle can have this sense, and, I incline to think, with reason. It may denote strike yourself, or get yourself struck (i.e. do something which shall cause the action of striking to come back upon yourself), but not allow yourself to be struck, i.e., in this place, “bear such an infliction without thinking it the greatest evil in the world.” Stallb., in defence of the middle so used, cites from Aristoph. Clouds, 494, φίλ' ἀδω τι δοξής, ἦν τίς σε τύπτη; where Strepsiades replies, τύπτομαι: this word Stallb. takes in the sense of ἐὼ ἔραντον τύπτεσθαι. I apprehend that τύπτομαι is in the passive. “What do you do,” says Socrates, “if a person beats you?” “I am beaten,” is the reply; i.e. I do nothing but suffer, I get beaten. We need not be troubled by οὗ γε ἔπαι τυφύων; for οὗ is occasionally repeated with γε in the second clause, with a certain increase of
force in the exhortation. Comp. Herodot. 7. 10, "I shall hear of you as being torn to pieces by dogs and birds, ἦ κον ἐν γῇ τῇ Ἀθηναίων ἦ σὲ γὺ ἑν τῇ Λακεδαιμονίων;" Soph. Æd. Tyr. 1101, τίς σὲ ... ἐκτε ... Πανὸς ... προσπελασθεῖοι, ἦ σὲ γὺ ... Ἀοξίοι; The same is true of ὁ γὺ, and tu in Latin. Nor do I see how ἰαπόδων opposes this construction any more than ἰαπόδωντος would. The sense, then, is, Yes, indeed, and do you calmly let him give you this dishonorable blow. — Stallb., I find, has given up his defence of πατάξαι, imperative middle, in his second edition.

E. οἶς οὖδέποτε ταύτα δοξέ. Comp. 491, B. He includes himself in the censure, to give it a milder form.
Where and when does Plato represent this Dialogue to have taken place?

1. Where? In the house of Callicles, say all with whose opinion I am acquainted, except Schleiermacher. He decides in favor of some public place, such as the Lyceum, where other conversations of Socrates were held. His reasons, given in a note on his translation of Gorgias (Vol. III. 473, of his Plato), are principally these. 1. Socrates (447, B) seems to be going into the place where Gorgias is. He meets Callicles without, who says, “Whenever you wish to come to my house, Gorgias will exhibit to you, for he lodges with me.” (See the note on that place.) The words, whenever you wish to come, must relate to some future time. What does Callicles do, then, if they are at his house, (Schl. leaves to be implied,) but shut the door in his visitors’ faces. To tell a stranger just entering your house to call at any time, without asking him in, is to turn him away. 2. Schl. finds it strange, and not consistent with Athenian politeness, that Callicles should have deserted his guests, and be going away from his own house. To these reasons of Schleiermacher’s may be added two others. 3. If Socrates and his friend were at the door of Callicles’s house to hear Gorgias display his rhetorical powers, and if Chærephon knew Gorgias well, why should they need the information that Gorgias lodged there? 4. Perhaps it may be
regarded as a slight argument, that Socrates says (506, A), ἐξειν χαίαν και ἀπειεριν: to which Gorgias replies, "It does not seem to me that we ought yet ἀπειεριν." For ἀπειεριν must have the same subject as the preceding ἀπειεριν. Here, then, Socrates expects that the other parties to the conversation will go away from the place when the discourse is broken off; and Gorgias repeats what Socrates had said, including himself among those who would leave the place. But this could not be, if they were where Gorgias was staying.

No one within my knowledge has examined what Schleiermacher says on this point, or given reasons for choosing the house of Callicles as the scene of the Dialogue, except Cousin. His reasons, I must think, have little weight. 1. There would have been some allusion, direct or indirect, to the place, if a public one. The same might be said, with equal reason, I think, on the other side. 2. It was mainly in private houses, as Plato affirms in Hippias Major, that Gorgias spoke. Plato's expression is ἰδίῳ ἐπιθέσας ποιημένος, and ἰδίς, contrasted with ἐν τῷ δήμῳ just preceding, means nothing more than in other places besides the assembly. 3. Of Callicles leaving his guests, and going out to talk with Socrates, he says, "Nothing is more natural than to go to meet persons who are visiting you, and whom you are to receive, at the entrance of your house." If I mistake not, the porter would have admitted the strangers, and the master of the house have been in a distant part of the building. 4. To Schleiermacher's main remark, he replies, that, as Gorgias was fatigued, Callicles could not ask him to repeat his exhibition, and therefore begged the visitors to call at another time. But need they be turned away? Might they not be invited in, without the necessity of a new exhibition on the part of Gorgias?

2. When? The passage 473, E, which is treated of at
large in the note, has been usually supposed to determine the time. But several scholars, as Boeckh (which I learn from C. F. Hermann’s work, I. 634) and Foss, have ascribed an earlier date to the Dialogue, and one so early even as the first visit of Gorgias to Athens. The arguments, so far as I know them, with a single exception, are of little importance. They are,—1. Pericles is spoken of as νεώστι τελευτηκός, 503, C. But νεώστι may be widely used. Comp. 523, B. “Nuper, id est paucis ante sæculis.” Cic. de Nat. Deor. 2. 50. It was twenty-four years before 405 B.C. And Pericles in this passage is contrasted tacitly with Themistocles, Cimon, and Miltiades, whose deaths were considerably earlier. 2. Archelaus is said to have committed the crimes by which he gained the throne “yesterday and the day before.” But this is very plainly a rhetorical contrast with the παλιωτέρας πρόγμασιν, just before spoken of. See 470, D. 3. Demus, son of Pyrilampes, was a youth when the Wasps was written, seventeen years before 405 B.C. See 481, D. Suppose him thirty-two in 405, Plato, I imagine, if he had been aware, at the time of writing, of his exact age, would not have scrupled to say what he does. 4. The passage, 473, E, where Socrates speaks of his ignorance of the way to put the question when he was a presiding officer, is inconsistent with Apology 32, B, which refers to the famous occasion in 406 B.C. Socrates, therefore, must allude to something else. I can scarcely conceive how any one, used to the style of the Platonic Socrates, can take what he says 473, E, as sober earnest. 5. In 481, D, and 519, A, Alcibiades is spoken of as beloved by Socrates after their intimacy must long have ceased, and as likely to be punished by the Athenians, after his last departure from Athens, and a little before his death. This appears to me the most serious objection to the year 405. But I apprehend that this is by
no means the only instance in which Plato assigns the relations of one time to another, changing the more immaterial circumstances, as the tragic poets did those of the fables, to suit his design.

No. II.

On what is said of Pericles, 516, A, and on the Character given to him in this Dialogue.

An eminent historian (Thirlwall, Hist. of Greece, Vol. III., chap. 18, and Appendix, 2) has examined the passage above quoted, and thinks that Plato's charge of peculation at this time arose out of a confusion of dates and circumstances. This may be so, but there are two things which ought to be said on behalf of Plato, before we fully condemn him for injustice towards his great countryman. The first is, that he expresses no opinion as to the justice of the charge. If it is admitted to be unjust, his argument is so much the stronger, for it turns upon the ingratitude of a people towards its public servants. Indeed, taken in connection with the charges against Themistocles, Cimon, and Miltiades, it wears the appearance of an unfounded accusation. The other is, that the fact may have been as Plato represents it: the people, in a sudden outburst of displeasure, may have at this time fined him, upon a charge of peculation so frivolous that Thucydides does not think it worthy of mention. The circumstances were these. Pericles was deposed from his office of general (Plut. Pericl. § 35, Diodor. 12. 45),—it may be at one of the epicheirotomic, or in consequence of a special process, an eisangelia. A suit was brought against him,—probably a ἐργατηρία, though Plutarch calls it a δίκη. Cleon, Simmias, or Laeratidas,
was his accuser, and he was fined in a sum variously estimated at fifteen, fifty (Plut.), and eighty (Diodor.) talents. The nature of the suit is not stated, but it certainly may have been χαπαδί δημοσίων πραγμάτων, based upon some trifling circumstance, occurring at a time when moneys would be under his control, as commander of the forces. The general Timotheus, with no more reason, perhaps, was accused of treason, and then, at the rendering of his accounts (ευθυναί), charged with bribery, and fined one hundred talents. To this it may be added, that Aristides, in his vindication of Pericles, nowhere, so far as I have observed, taxes Plato with inaccuracy, but follows his statement, as if he thought it true. And this he does in a work where he accuses Plato of anachronisms and misquotations. (Aristid. 2. 319, 327, de Quat. mort. ed. Dindorf. In the latter place the Sophist says:—"If one should ask Plato whether, supposing he had been one of Pericles's judges when he was tried for peculation, he would have been one to condemn him, and would have given more weight to the words of Cleon than to those of Pericles, or," etc.)

Plato, then, in this very serious and not at all ironical passage (see Thirlwall, III. 91), may have given no credit to the charge against Pericles, and, notwithstanding the silence of historians as to the nature of the suit, may be right in calling it one for peculation.

Upon another point, — Plato's consistency in the character which he gives to Pericles, — I will say but a word. There are three passages which concern us here; Gorg. 515, C—517; Meno, 99, B—100, B, compared with 94, B; and Phaedrus, 269, A—270, B. In Meno, ἐνδοξία, or correct opinion, is ascribed to Pericles, without wisdom, and in Phædrus he has the credit of possessing consummate eloquence, derived from the discipline of Anaxagoras. In
GORGIAS.

Gorgias, he is denied to be a true orator, but in Phædrus is declared to be πάντων τελεότατος εἰς τὴν ὕποτοικίν. The seeming inconsistency can be explained by taking into consideration, that Plato judges of the orator in Gorgias by a moral standard, and in Phædrus looks at him as capable of producing a work of art; and perhaps by this consideration also, that while he would grant to Pericles all that knowledge of the mind which the physical instructions of Anaxagoras could furnish, he might still refuse to him the attributes of a truly philosophical artist.

No. III.

See 486, A, note.

The verses yet extant of this dialogue between the brothers have been collected and emended by Valckenaer, Matthiæ, and others. We here add the passage adjacent to the lines cited or alluded to by Plato, according to Hartung's arrangement in his Euripides Restitutus (Hamburg, 1843). Zethus invites his brother Amphion to go a hunting, and, on his refusal, reproaches him with effeminacy of mind, as giving himself up to the musical art and to indolence, while he neglects useful pursuits. To this scene Horace alludes (Epist. 1. 18. 39):

"Nec tua laudabis studia, aut aliena reprêndes,
Nec, cum venari volet ille, poemata panges.
Gratia sic fratrum gemonorum, Amphionis atque
Zethi, dissiluit, donec suspecta severo
Conticuit lyra; fraternal cessisse putatur
Moribus Amphion.

Zethus first speaks:

"Αμφιλοχιζών, ἀμίθείς ὅν ἐπιμέλειοθείοις σε δεῖ
ψυχὴ; δὲ... ὃδε γενναίων φύσιν
APPENDIX. 241

gυναικομήψις διαπρέπεις μορφώματι ·
οὔτ' ἐν δίχης βουλαίᾳν ὅρθως ἐν λόγῳ
προσέλει ποιημάς, οὔτ' ἐν ἀσπίδος κύτει
. . . . ὑπολήψεις, οὔτ' ἄλλων ὑπὲρ
κεννίκον βουλεύμα βουλεύσαι. . . .
κακῶν κατάρχεις τῇ Μωυσάν εἰσίγων
ἀσύμφορον τῷ ἀτόπον . . . .
ἀργὸν φίλοινυ χρημάτων ἀτημηλῇ.
. . .
πολλοὶ δὲ θυτῶν τούτου πάσχοντων κακῶν.
γνώμην φρονοῦντες οὐ Θέλουν ὑπηρετεῖν
ψυχῆ, τὰ πολλὰ πρὸς φίλων νικῶμενοι.
. . . .
ἀνὴρ γὰρ ὅστε εὐ βίον κεκτημένος
τὰ μὲν κατ' οἴκους ἀμελεῖ παρεῖς εὖ,
μοιπότασι δ' ἡθεῖς τοῦτ' ἀδεὶ θερεῖται,
ἀργὸς μὲν οἴκοις καὶ πόλει γενήσεται,
φίλοις δ' οὐδεῖς · ἡ φῶς γὰρ οἰχεῖ
οὐταν γλυκεῖας ἡδονῆς ἡσαυνων τὸς ἡ
καὶ πῶς σοφὸν τοῦτ' ἐστίν, εἰ τε εὐφινή
λαβοῦσα τέχνη φωτ' ἔθηκε χεῖρον
μῆτ' αὐτὸν αὐτῷ δυνάμενον προσάρχεσαι ;
. . . .
. . . . μισοῦ . . .
σοφὸν λόγοις, ἐς δ' ὅμηρν σοφόν.
. . . . ἀλλ' ἐμῷ πιθοῦ,
παῦσαι δ' ἀσιδῶν, πολεμῶν δ' εὐμυσίων
ἄσκει, τοιαῦτ' ἡεῖδ' ἀφ' ὅπως δέξεις φρονεῖν,
σκάτων, ἄρων χῦν, ποιμνίοις ἐπιστατῶν,
ἄλλοις τὰ κομψά ταύτ' ἀφεῖς σοφίσματα
ἐξ ὁν κενοῖσιν ἐγκατοικίσεις δόμοις.

ἈΜΦΙΩΝ.

ἐκ παντὸς ὅτι τις πρόγματος δισοδῶν λόγων
Τὸ θεῖον ὀν, εἰ λέγεις εἶ ἁρωφός.

... ὅς δ’ εὐγλεσσίς

νικᾷ, σοφὸς μὲν, ἀλλὰ τοι τὰ πράγματα

κρείσσω νομίζω τῶν λόγων ἄει ποτὲ.

λαμπρὸς δ’ ἐκατός καὶ ποὺ τοῦτ’ ἐπείγεται,

νέμων τὸ πλεῖστον ἡμέρας τούτῳ μέρος

ἐν’ αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τυχαίη κράτιστος ὡς.

κ. τ. λ.

THE END.
ERRATA.

Page 131, line 20, for ἄν read ἄν
132, " 34, " éστι " éστιν
139, " 20, " ἐπ' " ἐπ'
163, " 7, " whom " whom
164, " 12, " τίνες " τίνες
164, " 13, " σκίᾶς " σκίᾶς
171, " 16, add a period at the end of the line.
189, " 14, for ἰκανοὺς read ἰκανοὺς
193, " 18, " αὐτὸς " αὐτὸς
194, " 23, " εἰμί " εἰμί
199, " 19, " δή " δή
201, " 4, " περὶ " περὶ
201, " 32, " στρατὸς " στρατὸς
201, " 33, " ιερὸν " ιερὸν
219, " 27, " ἡ " ἡν
226, " 17, " χρήσωμαι " χρήσηται